OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV
JAN 19 1926
2657-9-276
3600
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Present Situation in China.

(See Reports #5690, 5679, 5666 & 5662.)

2657-9-27 RECEIVED 8/2 W.D. JAN 19 1926

1. At the time of the rendition of Report #5690 the military status was as outlined in par. 1 of that report with the circumstances noted in par. 3 constituting a threat to the continued suspension of hostilities. The rumors reported in pars. 5 and 6 were just being circulated and were followed later in the day by others indicating an extraordinary change in the whole situation. The circumstances of this change, so nearly as they can be determined, are as follows.

2. In the face of the continued advance on Shantung and Chihli provinces by the troops of Sun Chuan-fang and Yueh Wei-chun, in defiance of the mandate quoted in par. 1 of Report #5690, Chang Tso-lin became alarmed that the compromise which had resulted in the suspension of hostilities was a strategem on the part of his enemies by which they had hoped to rapidly mass against him from the south, while he was withdrawing his troops from that direction and that of Nankow. He suddenly countermanded all orders for withdrawal and announced a determination to fight. Apparently this brought to immediate head a plot of some duration which expressed itself in an announcement by Li Ching-lin of neutrality, and a revolt by Kuo Sung-ling, one of Chang Tso-lin's most trusted commanders who was in command of the Fengtien 10th Division.

3. On November 24th Kuo Sung-ling declared Chang Tso-lin responsible for the existing troubles and called upon him to resign. He included Yang Yu-ting, Chief of Staff of the Fengtien Army, in his denunciation. He followed this by massing his troops along the Peking-Mukden Railway near Lanchow and the dispatch of three brigades toward Mukden.

4. A period of great uncertainty among the general public followed this sudden action, and consternation in the Fengtien forces. Yang Yu-ting fled from Mukden to Dairen and took refuge. It is said that his departure from Mukden was that Chang Tso-lin might be convinced that the use of Yang's name as the object of the attack was not genuine. Events have proven the correctness of this statement.

5. As the situation cleared it became apparent that the troops disaffected to the point of hostility against their former associates of the Fengtien army were confined to those immediately under Kuo Sung-ling, and those to the point of neutrality to Li Ching-lin's 1st Division in and about Tientsin. Of Chang Tsung-chang and his troops little less was expected than that they would join the elements opposed to Chang Tso-lin, it having been rumored that Chang's ambition to control Shantung would result in his remaining in that province at whatever cost to his allegiance to Chang Tso-lin. It has developed that Chang Tsung-chang, who had been holding his own against the advance of Sun Chuan-fang, has remained loyal to Chang Tso-lin during the present crisis and plans are now being made to evacuate his army through Tsingtao or Chefoo by sea to the north. In the meantime he is holding on to his position in Tsinan, and has inflicted some loss on Honan troops attacking him from the south. The advance of the troops of Kuo Sung-ling on Mukden was checked near Shanhaikwan by troops loyal to Chang Tso-lin and some fighting occurred, the rails being cut both at Changli and Wan Chia Tun.

From M/A, China Report #5698 December 2, 1925.

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6. Yang Yu-ting has returned to Mukden and the extent of the treachery having been appraised there is a distinct improvement in Fengtien morale. Fengtien money is being spent liberally to bring about the desertion from Kuo Sung-ling of his forces. There is prospect of fighting between Kuo Sung-ling and loyal Fengtien troops in the neighborhood of Shanhaikwan.

7. The probable course of action of Li Ching-lin remains problematical. On the one hand he is finding his position in Tientsin increasingly difficult from the continued advance of Honanese soldiers via Paotingfu, and on the other, he is evidently in some doubt as to the success of the plot designed to throw back Fengtien troops north of the Wall and in which, as has been stated, his role was to be that of a neutral.

8. I am of the opinion that in his attack on Chang Tso-lin, Kuo Sung-ling was acting in accordance with pre-arranged plans between Feng Yu-hsiang and Yueh Wei-chun. Kuo has named the forces under his command the Northeastern Kuominchun (this is the Chinese name of the National Army commanded by Feng Yu-hsiang, Yueh Wei-chun and Sun Yueh). However, except for a statement that he intends to continue his support of Tuan Chi-jui as Executive of the Government and a re-occupation of the area about Peking, Feng has done nothing. It is reported that in the event of fighting between Kuo and Chang near Shanhaikwan, Feng will support Kuo by an attack through Jehol against Chang Tso-lin's rear. In this connection the American Consul, Kalgan, reports on November 25, 1925, that additional troops of Feng Yu-hsiang are being dispatched to the Dolonor region; and that a new road to Dolonor some 36-ft. wide is being rushed to completion. Other reports are to the effect that the Fengtien troops that had been mobilized near Jehol (see par. 2, Report #5679) are being sent to Shanhaikwan to assist in the defense of that place against Kuo's advance, and that Feng Yu-hsiang's troops are moving into the area vacated about Jehol. As noted above, Yueh Wei-chun is continuing the advance of his Honanese troops of the Second National Army on Shantung via the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and on Chihli via the Peking-Hankow Railway.

9. Though apparently at a standstill, the campaign of Wu Pei-fu and the Chihli party leaders must be taken into account as factors in the situation. It would seem that for the present they have been deserted by Sun Chuan-fang and Yueh Wei-chun, but they muster too considerable a force and control too much territory not to be of moment.

10. The conflicting reports and rumors coupled with apprehensions have thrown the present government into a state of paralysis and the population of the cities of northern China into what is little short of abject terror. The occasion for the latter is the steady approach of the Honanese troops known to be under a very loose discipline and practically all of bandit antecedents. It is true, too, that though while in undisputed possession of cities under their control the troops of Li Ching-lin and Chang Tsung-chang preserve order, if it becomes certain to their minds that they will have to vacate, a period of looting by them will precede their departure.

11. The paralysis which has fallen upon the Peking Government is due to well grounded apprehensions of their fate should the government be overthrown by forces now opposed to it. An example of the summary

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punishment meted out to those who fail immediately to adhere to a new cause or are too intimately identified with the old cause, is presented by the case of Chiang Teng-hsuen, adherent of Chang Tso-lin and recently appointed Tupan of Anhui. Captured by Kuo, Chiang refused to join in the revolt against his chief and was shot out of hand.

12. There have been some changes in the Cabinet and rumors are current of others that impend. The Ministers of War and Communication have resigned and mandates have been issued relieving Yang Yu-ting from office as Tupan of Kiangsu. The Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police has resigned. The Minister of Education has submitted his resignation which has not yet been accepted. The officials relieved of office and who have resigned are Fengtien supporters or Anfu Party men, the latter appointed by Tuan Chi-jui.

13. There are indications that the present situation is one due to a widening split between the radical and conservative wings of the Kuomintang and its military instrument, the Kuominchun. The indecisive results of all the recent movements spring from this division of councils. It seems that Feng from having been the leader of the radical, Soviet supported, element, has now withdrawn to a more conservative position, and that radicalism has turned for its leaders to Yueh Wei-chun and Kuo Sung-ling.

14. Karakhan is expected shortly in Peking and his return and conferences which will follow may clarify a situation that as yet is difficult to penetrate. It is my opinion that events are in train for the removal of Tuan Chi-jui and his whole entourage and the erection of a new government with a cabinet inclusive of Huang Fu and C. T. Wang, probably in its platform similar to that which immediately followed the coup of October 23, 1924. One other explanation of the delay in the consummation of this plan may very reasonably lie in the fact that such an alteration of government might have a serious effect upon the progress of the Tariff Conference now moving steadily toward practically all that China desires. It would be far simpler to defer a change in the government until the conclusion of the Conference.

15. November 28th and 29th were marked by extensive demonstrations and rioting in Peking during the course of which the residences of various ministers were visited; some were wrecked, some individuals were maltreated and the plant of the Chen Pao, vernacular newspaper opposed to the radicals, nearly completely destroyed. During all these demonstrations Feng Yu-hsiang's soldiers were in attendance but did nothing to prevent the riots.

16. On the 29th Lu Chung-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang's Defense Commissioner of Peking, issued a statement that no further rioting would be permitted. From all available information it is my belief that these riots were engineered as a result of conferences held in the Russian Embassy between radical and conservative members of the Kuomintang and were for the purpose of so disturbing Peking as to induce the flight of Tuan Chi-jui. The radical element was defeated in an endeavor to arm a considerable portion of the demonstrators. The demonstrators ostensibly were students but actually included many coolies who were paid from Soviet funds 50¢ a day for their activities. I think it was never the

intention to permit the demonstrators to do more than evince to both the Conference and Tuan the extent of Chinese opposition to continued restriction upon tariff autonomy or the perpetuation of unequal treaties. The demonstrators carried placards denouncing the treaties and the Tariff Conference and fiery speeches were made of the same tenor. However, the authorities recognize that anything more than a demonstration might do more harm to their cause than good.

17. It is interesting in this connection to note that at this time the Chinese government is reviving the Shanghai incident. In a note to the Diplomatic Body certain specific demands for the settlement of this incident are made. These demands were couched in language little short of insolent and were of a nature impossible to grant except as an act of abject surrender.

18. The defection of Kuo Sung-ling is the result of a division of sentiment between its leaders which has existed for some time in the Fengtien army. Originally a bandit, Chang Tso-lin's army at first was composed of his former associates. Subsequently as he made efforts to modernize and improve it, officers were added who had received foreign military training. The result was an improvement in discipline which the old bandit officers found irksome. Their discontent was added to by the fact that these new officers found increasing favor with Chang Tso-lin and his son, Chang Hsueh-liang.

Prominent among these officers of foreign training is Yang Yu-ting, Chief of Staff of the army, and the disloyal Kuo. Both are Japanese trained. Though there has been substantial unanimity of opinion between the leaders of the factions that have grown out of this division, Kuo and Yang have not been friendly.

The "Young General", Chang Hsueh-liang, generally has been regarded as the chief supporter, if not leader, of the foreign trained faction. It has long been reported that his relations with Yang are not cordial.

When Kuo denounced Chang Tso-lin and Yang he is said to have called on the "Young General" to take command of the Fengtien army, and he evidently counted on general support from the elements under foreign trained officers. His call to the "Young General" was unheeded.

Kuo Sung-ling owes his prominent position in the Fengtien army to the unfailing friendship which has been shown him both by Chang and his son. Young Chang had at one time been Kuo's pupil, thereby establishing a relationship of great importance in Chinese ethics. During the past year Kuo had speculated, losing $280,000 which were paid for him by Chang Tso-lin. His treachery is said to have been induced by his jealousy of Yang Yu-ting, who in addition to his high rank had recently been appointed Tuchun of Kiangsu, but I am inclined to think that it was actually brought about by offers and suggestions from Feng Yu-hsiang.

19. It would appear that by his plots and inactivity at critical moments Feng has again defeated his foes without striking a blow. He is today the undisputed master of what government exists in Peking. So far as the 2nd, 3rd and Northeastern National Armies are loyal to him, he is master of China from the Yangtze to the Wall. Forces allied with him are pushing toward Mukden and his own forces are moving eastward toward Jehol.

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20. With a vast amount of shooting and expenditure Wu Pei-fu was eliminated, but none of the shooting nor expenditure was by Feng. After still further shooting and expenditure, Chang has been pushed north of the Wall, and still Feng has shot and spent nothing. Yet both results were brought about by his plots, and today he bulks more hugely, physically and in the imagination, than those who futilely have gone before. How much of the future of all in China, Chinese and foreigners, hangs upon the decision of this inscrutable man may not be overestimated. He is the man of the hour in China.

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G-2 Report

6180

2657-9-276

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Present Military Situation

See Reports #5679, 5666, and 5662)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. DEC 29 1925

1. At the date of rendering Report #5679 there was every indication that the warfare initiated in the south by Sun Chuan-fang would spread to and include all northern China. On the 13th of November, Chang Hsueh-liang arrived in Tientsin with orders for an immediate attack along the lines indicated in paragraph 6, Report #5679. All hope of a compromise had been abandoned by even the most optimistic among Chinese and foreigners. On the 14th rumors became current of a conference that was effecting a compromise. On the 15th a mandate was issued by Tuan Chi-jui calling upon Sun Chuan-fang to withdraw his troops, entrusting the Peking-Hankow line to Feng Yu-hsiang and Yueh Wei-chun, the Tientsin-Pukow line to Chang Tso-lin and Li Chin-ling, and directing that troops recently moved toward Peking be withdrawn. It is obvious that Tuan Chi-jui, whose whole tenure of power is dependent upon Feng and Chang, issued this mandate only with their concurrence and by their direction.

2. On November 18th, at 5 p.m., telegraphic report #488 was made to the Secretary of State by the Legation. Paragraph 4 of this report contained a request that it be repeated to the War Department. There is nothing to add to the explanation of suspended hostilities given in this telegram. I am of the opinion that the compromise agreement arrived at is based on so many and such uncertain factors as to be of uncertain duration. It is possible that the actual terms of the agreement will never be known; certainly at the moment they are a complete secret.

3. One of the most dangerous features of the present situation is Honan. Reports indicate that that province is taxed to a point where the farmers are deserting the land; that Yueh Wei-chun is more completely under the dominance of the Soviets than Feng Yu-hsiang; that he is numerically stronger than Feng and in closer affiliation with the radical wing of the Kwomingtang. I do not believe that he will be restrained from his desire to emulate Sun Chuan-fang and extend his control to the rich and adjacent province of Shantung by any agreements entered into between representatives of Chang and Feng or other parties in Peking.

4. The possibility exists that the compromise was brought about by Japanese influence. All crises in China are leading to the ultimate one of armed conflict on the Asiatic Mainland between Japan and Russia. I do not believe Japan is ready for this clash but alarmed by the progress of Russian preparation for it. The extent of her influence with Feng is problematical but that she has some is certain.

5. Reports received while this is being written are to the effect that Feng Yu-hsiang has declared martial law in Kalgan, and that heavy concentrations of Fengtien troops are being made north of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Mukden railway. Also, that Li Chin-ling has declared his intended independence of Chang Tso-lin in the event of warfare between him and Feng. Though the compromise may be perpetuated, or a stronger and more enduring arrived at, I am still of the opinion that there will be war in northern China within a comparatively short time.

6. As this report is being completed information is received that, protesting against the continued advance of Honan troops into Shantung, Chang Tso-lin had abruptly determined on war; that Li Chin-ling, Tuchun of Chihli and one of Chang's principal lieutenants, has announced his

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independence of Chang Tso-lin and moved troops north to Shanhaikwan in the neighborhood of which fighting has occurred between his troops and those loyal to Chang; rail service between Tientsin and Mukden is suspended; only one train has arrived in Peking from Tientsin in the last 24 hours. There is a rumor to the effect that the compromise which caused a temporary suspension of hostilities was a piece of stratagem on the part of the anti-Fengtien forces, who used the time thereby gained to hasten their movement northward to coordinate their attack with the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang. Li Chin-ling's treachery has long been expected.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War. 2657-J-276 (65)
(See Reports #5666 and #5662)

2657-J-276 (66)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. DEC 14 1925

1. The period since the rendition of the last report on this subject (#5666, November 2, 1925) has been one of mobilization, maneuvering and negotiation. On November 5th and 12th telegrams were sent by the Legation to the State Department outlining the situation. Both telegrams contained a request that the contents be shown to the War Department.

2. Mobilization. Fairly reliable reports indicate that Fengtien mobilization has been as follows: In the Jehol area 2 infantry divisions and 7 cavalry brigades with a total of approximately 50,000 men. From Shanhaikwan to Tientsin, along the line of the Peking-Mukden railway, approximately 70,000 men. Between Chinchow and Shanhaikwan north of the Wall a reserve of unknown strength, estimated at some 40,000 to 50,000 men. An air base has been established at Peitsang just north of Tientsin, 8 temporary hangars having been erected. Heilungkiang troops have been moved into the Jehol area. Kirin troops mobilized in Mukden were moved into the area about Shanhaikwan after the Heilungkiang troops had cleared Mukden.

3. The mobilization of forces under Feng Yu-hsiang has been difficult to determine. Reports indicate much military activity in Kalgan, with a shifting of some 30,000 troops on the Peking-Suiyuan line to the neighborhood of Nankow, and of the 30,000 Feng Yu-hsiang troops in and about Peking, some 15,000 strong, to Nankow and its vicinity.

4. The forces of Sun Chuan-fang, numbering some 40,000 to 45,000, have continued their movement northward along the Tientsin-Pukow railway to the Shantung-Kiangsu border. Before their advance Fengtien troops under Chang Tsung-chang have steadily retreated with no severe fighting.

5. Although accurate details are unobtainable, it appears that troops of Yueh Wei-chun, commanding the Second National Army in Honan, have been moving westward on the Lunghai railway in support of Sun Chuan-fang. Additional support is said to have been forthcoming to Sun from the provinces of Fukien, Anhwei and Hupeh, although reports of this also lack confirmation.

6. Maneuvering. The Fengtien plan of campaign as indicated in previous reports seems to be as follows: Recognizing the over-extension in the line from Tientsin to Shanghai, they are retreating to a line, roughly, Tehchow northwest to Tamingfu and Paotingfu, thence northeast through Tungchow, Peking exclusive, to the Great Wall. At vital points this line to be entrenched. Such points would be those controlling the Tientsin-Pukow and Peking-Hankow railways. Throughout its length, except for these places, it is to be of observation only. These lines are designed to hold attacks from the south and southwest while maneuvers are carried out designed to force Feng Yu-hsiang into the open as an active adversary and crush him, or through the threat of doing so, force his adherence to the Fengtien side. In carrying out this plan it is apparent that the Fengtien

From M/A, China Report #5679 November 13, 1925

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forces will not hold any area at a considerable distance south of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Pukow railway if such re-enforcements are necessary to that end as to prejudice the chances of success of maneuvers directed against Feng. Tientsin and Peking constitute the keys to the present situation, and Chang will hold them though at the loss of any area to the south.

Maneuvers against Feng Yu-hsiang have been the occupation of Langfang on the Peking-Tientsin railway by a considerable infantry force; at Paotingfu by a similar force which cuts Feng Yu-hsiang's communications with the south along the Peking-Hankow railway; the occupation by cavalry units of the area to the east of the Peking-Tientsin railway and south and east of and distant about 30 miles from Peking. The coordination of advance in this general direction with an attack from Jehol through Kupeikou against the Peking-Suiyuan railway at Nankow constitutes the threat against Feng Yu-hsiang above alluded to and is responsible for such concentration as he is making in the neighborhood of Nankow.

7. Maneuvers of those forces opposed to the Fengtien army apparently have been based upon the belief that Chang Tso-lin would meet the attack along the Tientsin-Pukow railway by Sun Chuan-fang with a determined resistance in the south of Shantung which would open his lines to a flank attack from Feng Yu-hsiang and the west. In this they seem to have failed through Chang's penetration.

8. Negotiations. While pushing forward the attack against the Fengtien position in Shantung and Kiangsu, negotiations were entered into by Feng Yu-hsiang with Chang Tso-lin designed to bring about by threat the withdrawal of Fengtien forces south of the Wall and the accomplishment by this means of all it could be hoped to gain by warfare. Demands on Chang included not only this withdrawal but the relinquishment by him of Jehol. Though subsequently modified, these demands have been too excessive and present indications are that negotiations have failed.

9. Probable Course of Events. It is possible that Feng Yu-hsiang may relinquish all control of Peking and the Metropolitan District without a struggle and that the threatened war may not eventuate or be confined to a separate and comparatively minor affair between Chang Tso-lin and Sun Chuan-fang. It is also possible that Soviet influence may be sufficient to cause Feng Yu-hsiang to fight for the control of Peking. If the latter course is followed, severe fighting may be expected in the neighborhood of Peking.

10. There is no present indication of any anti-foreign feeling nor of danger to foreigners other than that which must always be incident to Chinese civil war.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., DEC 4 1925

1. Due to the strict censoring of telegrams imposed at the beginning of the recent military activities and to the mass of conflicting rumors and propaganda, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the present stage of military affairs. Only paragraph two emerges with clarity.

2. Chekiang troops under Sun Chuan-fang have continued their advance to Nanking with no obstacles other than minor damage to railroads. Fengtien troops have retreated to Hsuchowfu. Additional Fengtien troops have been moved to the Tientsin area but their numbers are uncertain. Martial law has been proclaimed in Mukden and the troops of Heilungkiang and Kirin have been mobilized. Thus far, operations have been confined to the Peking-Mukden railway as mobilization; the Tientsin-Pukow railway as the scene of the retirement to Hsuchowfu; the Shanghai-Mukden railway, over which the troops of Sun Chuan-fang have advanced to Nanking; and the contesting factions to Fengtien and Chekiang.

3. In the Yangtze, Wu Pei-fu has announced from Hankow the assumption of command of troops intended to crush Chang Tso-lin. He has been joined by his former lieutenant, Chih Hsieh-yuan and has announced his staff. In the northwest, Feng Yu-hsiang has remained inactive.

4. From these facts it is being deduced by many observers that the war will be confined to the present determined contestants and may subside with undisputed occupation of Kiangsu by Sun Chuan-fang, and that the action of Wu Pei-fu has been premature and will result in nothing. The government for the present evinces no uneasiness.

5. It is my opinion that this is too optimistic a view. It does not seem reasonable that Sun Chuan-fang should have attempted his northern advance with an army of only some 45,000 men if he were not assured of support, nor that the Fengtien army would have retreated before this advance had it not good reason to believe that support existed. Nor do I believe that Wu Pei-fu, who has been cautious in maintaining a neutral attitude and surrounded by competent advisors, would have thrust himself forward at this time into a position from which he cannot extricate himself except with ignominy had he also not been assured of support in the valley as well as from the Kwomingtang military leaders. I think an explanation of the delay in pushing ahead lies in the fear of one or another of the parties to the combination that they might be defeated prior to their uniting, and that maneuvers to secure this united action and the additional funds necessary for the campaign are now being carried on.

6. Should the Yangtze valley leaders, Sun Chuan-fang and Feng Yu-hsiang, strike at once, the position of the Fengtien army would be difficult though it should be able to hold at Tientsin or its vicinity. But it is also quite possible that Chang might launch a counter attack against Feng Yu-hsiang from Jehol which would eliminate the latter. Or if Chang were assured that Feng is definitely aligned against him it would be a wise move if Chang should initiate hostilities himself in that direction. I therefore am of the opinion that the combination does exist as outlined in Report #5662 and cablegram #90, and that a general war is almost inevitable.

From: M/A, China Report #5666 November 2, 1925.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War - cont'd.

7. Additional reasons for this belief exist in Soviet activities in support of the Mongolian movement for independence and the creation of an independent republic in western and northwestern China. I do not think that Soviet troops would so grossly violate the Russo-Chinese agreement as to the evacuation of Mongolia if they were not assured that not only would Feng not oppose them but that such a combination at present exists against Chang Tso-lin as to preclude any action on his part. As the political condition of Honan is at present comparable in its subservience to Soviet influence to that of the area controlled by Feng Yu-hsiang, and ascommunistic troops in Kwangtung have recently scored successes against their opponents, apparently a situation exists that justifies Soviet hopes as reported in par. 16, Report #5503.

8. Another possible explanation of the suspension of hostilities lies in the fact that circumstances have made Feng Yu-hsiang master of the situation. Apparently he gave sufficient assurance of his support to the Yangtze valley leaders to make them believe that he was definitely aligned with them. The conflict having been precipitated by Sun Chuan-fang and Wu Pei-fu having emerged and assumed the leadership of forces in the valley allied with Sun, Feng Yu-hsiang, realizing the strength of his position or with plotting having brought about this domination of position, now suggests by his attitude a willingness to make terms with Chang Tso-lin. Indications are that if he is given complete and undisputed control of Peking, always heretofore threatened by Fengtien forces, the Three Administrative Areas, which includes Jehol, heretofore under control of the Fengtien forces, and Kansu, Shensi and Shansi, he will be content to remain neutral. This must result in the prompt crushing of Sun Chuan-fang and the subsidence of the Yangtze valley movement.

9. If this is a correct estimate of Feng's present attitude, his course of action will accurately determine the extent of Soviet influence. There is no doubt that the Soviets are making every effort to bring about war between Feng and Chang. Nor is there any doubt that Feng has always clung to the belief that he could use Soviet aid to his own ends and break with the Soviets when those ends were no longer identical with Soviet aims. Thus the issue is one not only between Feng and Chang or the Fengtien party and its opponents, but between Chinese radicals and Soviet influence that seeks to control them. No doubt the course of events in Canton, where the fiery Borodin, contrary to the advice of Ilyin, has precipitated a war, will have a profound effect upon the main situation.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., DEC 4 1925

Military events of the past four days make it clear that civil war again is to break out in China. The stability of the present Provisional Government and the peace that in general has existed in northern China since the termination of the Chihli-Fengtien war of 1924 has been due to a disinclination on the part of the leaders of opposing factions to bring on hostilities until the prospects were more favorable for their success. The present Provisional Government is the creation of Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang and its continuation is the symbol of their suspended hostilities. In May of this year, concerned over the increasing strength of Feng Yu-hsiang, Chang Tso-lin made a move on Peking with the intention of occupying it and later Kalgan. This effort was halted by threats to his rear in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, by the alarm caused through finding the extent of Feng Yu-hsiang's preparations, and his support by the Soviets, and by the Shanghai incident of May 31st. Chang Tso-lin, who had visited Tientsin intent upon proceeding to Peking, retreated behind the Wall and was advised by the Japanese to withdraw all his forces from south of the Wall. He did not withdraw the troops and on the contrary within the next few weeks strengthened his position in Chihli, Shantung and Kiangsu, securing the appointment of his own men as tuchuns of each of these provinces and of Anhui.

Politically Chang Tso-lin has represented the conservative element in China and the Provisional Government reflects his political views rather than those of Feng Yu-hsiang. With his increasing military strength south of the Wall, it is apparent that though he does not physically dominate Peking he has in mind again to attempt its occupation as well as the occupation of Kalgan in accordance with his frustrated plans of May. Such occupation adequately supported would give him a firm and undisputed control of the Central Government. To this strength of position would be added the tremendous sentimental and political value of a successful conclusion to the Special Conference on the Tariff due to meet in Peking on October 26th.

There would also be added such increase in income as would result from the authorized surtaxes. Therefore, a continuation of the peace that has lasted since last fall would see a conservative government firmly established in Peking under the protection of Chang Tso-lin and the Manchurian party. That this government and this course of events might in the end be beneficial or harmful to China is a debatable point. In the interests of China and her foreign relations it should by all means be determined by the peaceful processes of time and evolution.

Feng Yu-hsiang may be taken as the military head of the national and radical movement in northern China. He has repeatedly denounced the Tariff Conference, demanded tariff autonomy and the abrogation of the unilateral treaties and advocated war on Great Britain. Apparently if he could dictate the course of events even at this late date he would prevent the Tariff Conference from meeting, or if it met, from accomplishing anything. From his announced policy both immediately following his coup of October, 1924, and of recent months, it must be

From: M/A, China Report #5662 Date: October 21, 1925

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War - cont'd.

recognized that should he become the dominant figure in the Central Government, foreign powers must look forward to ultimatums rather than conferences.

In the Yangtze valley the remnants of the Chihli party have been intriguing for some time with the view primarily to regaining control of the government. To accomplish this it is necessary for them to drive back of the Wall the Manchurian army and to crush Feng Yu-hsiang. Their strength is not sufficient for the accomplishment of either. They have thus been driven to the contemplation of an alliance with one of these adversaries that the other might be defeated. The prospects of a continued peace in northern China were based largely upon the belief that the Chihli party would find itself unable to combine either with Feng Yu-hsiang or with Chang Tso-lin and that Feng alone was not ready to forcibly resist the advance of Chang Tso-lin.

Great anxiety was felt over October 10th, the anniversary of the establishment of the republic. The Provisional Government had sufficient self-confidence as well as apprehension that an understanding had finally been reached between the Chihli party leaders and the Kwomintang to order the arrest of four of the most prominent among the former. October 10th having passed without incident, hopes grew stronger that peace would not be interrupted.

At this time it was recognized by Kwomintang and Chihli party leaders alike that unless something bold and immediate were attempted the Manchurian party would firmly establish itself in control of the government, the Tariff Conference would proceed along the conservative lines favored by Chang Tso-lin to a successful conclusion and there would be but remote prospect of a change in government. Therefore, however suicidal civil war may seem at this time it is perfectly understandable from a viewpoint of party politics as understood in China where no material advantage to the country is permitted to stand in the way of the advancement either of personal or party ends.

It is too early exactly to say what portions of the Chihli party and the Kwomintang have joined hands in the movement, the initial steps of which were taken about Shanghai and in Kiangsu province. I believe that Sun Chuan-fang has come to a definite understanding with Hsiao Yao-nan in Hupeh, Chao Heng-ti in Hunan, Yueh Wei-chun, commanding the Second National Army in Honan, and Sun Yueh, commanding the Third National Army in Shensi. Also I think it probable that Wu Pei-fu will emerge as commander-in-chief of the consolidated forces of these leaders and that these forces will be known as the army for the protection of the constitution. I think it probable that they will endeavor to seize Nanking and assemble there the members of the parliament dispersed by Chang Tso-lin at the time of the establishment of the present Provisional Government. They probably will then call to their councils either as premier or president Tang Shao-yi, the famous Kwomintang leader in Shanghai. A possibility exists that if they are successful in their ultimate object of seizing Peking they will recall Tsao Kun to the presidency. The government that would result from the

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War - cont'd.

success of the combination of these elements would be composed both of radicals and conservatives. Tang, always a leader among the conservatives, recently has violently denounced the Tariff Conference and it is probable that he may be able to work in harmony with the members of the radical wing of his party. If this is the case there will be no material difference so far as foreign relations are concerned between the Government so established and one under the domination of Feng Yu-hsiang.

Probable Scenes of Fighting.

In his occupation of the Peking-Mukden-Tientsin-Pukow railway from Mukden to Shanghai, Chang Tso-lin's lines have been over extended and he has long determined that in the event of an attack from the south on Shanghai he would vacate at once by rail if time permitted and by sea if time did not permit. How far northward he will move before making a stand is a matter of some doubt but it would appear that he could not afford to undertake conflict with the Lunghai railroad on his right rear. It may be expected, therefore, that he will retreat at least as far as Hsuchowfu. He may continue his retreat to Tientsin and there are excellent strategic reasons for this course. He now controls Tientsin but to obtain possession of Peking he probably will have to fight.

It it quite possible that Feng Yu-hsiang will remain inactive in Kalgan and in physical control of Peking without participating in any fighting until the situation has developed in the south. If it becomes apparent that Chang Tso-lin is able to hold the attack from the south and spare enough troops to attack Peking, I think Feng Yu-hsiang will forcibly contest his advance and fighting of a serious nature may be expected between Peking and Tientsin. Another probable scene of conflict is in the area around Jehol (Chengtehfu) distant from Kupeikou, the nearest pass in the Great Wall, about 90 miles, and from Peking about 165 miles. Jehol is now under the control of the Manchurian Army which is said to have a considerable concentration of troops at or near it.

I am of the opinion that war will be general and widespread; that Chang Tso-lin has the greatest prospect of success; that if he is defeated this war will only be a prelude to a second war between the Chihli party and Feng Yu-hsiang.

The following is a statement of the course of events to date and of the military forces and their affiliations so far as it is now possible to determine them.

China (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War.

KIANGSU:

On October 17th General Sun Chuan-fang of Chekiang arrived in Shanghai and issued a proclamation denouncing Chang Tso-lin. Through railway traffic was stopped between Shanghai and Peking due to the closing of the Shanghai-Nanking railway for military use. The Shanghai-Hangchow Railway has also been closed. The forts of Woosung were seized and garrisoned by the 1st Chekiang Division October 17th.

The Fengtien troops stationed at Shanghai under General Hsin Shih-lien at the threat of Sun Chuan-fang's advance withdrew as follows:

Oct. 17th - to Soochow.
Oct. 18th - to Tanyang.
Oct. 19th - to Chinkiang.

Their efforts to hinder the Chekiang advance are reported to have been confined to the destruction of bridges on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway.

On October 19th it was reported that Northern Kiangsu had been invaded by the Second Kuominchun under Yueh Wei-chun along the line of the Lunghai Railway. The Kuomingchun troops were reported as having reached Tangshan, 50 miles from the vital junction of the Lunghai Railway with the Tsin-Pu line at Hsuchow.

FUKIEN:

Tupan Chou Yin-jen has come out in favor of Sun Chuan-fang.

SZECHUAN:

There are some 200,000 troops in the province, under various leaders. These are so busy fighting for personal supremacy that it is not believed Szechuan will have any influence on the present situation.

HONAN:

Under Yueh Wei-chun, Commanding 2nd National Army, approximately 90,000 strong. It believed to be in support of an alliance with Sun Chuan-fang in his attack on the Manchurian forces.

Concentration of 20,000 troops at Kweiteh on the Lunghai Railway, just east of Kaifengfu, and also at Langyi, north of that city.

500 Red Russian troops drilling at Honanfu.

Troops are moving from western Honan to the east along the Lunghai Railway and north along the Kin-Han Ry. Large concentrations have taken place at Changteh on the Kin-Han and at Taokow, the rail-head of the Sinsiang-Taokow branch of the Kin-Han. Both these places are north of the Yellow River.

China (Military)

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CHIHLI:

In Chihli, General Feng Yu-hsiang, in command of all National Armies and direct command of the 1st National Army, has about 20,000 men in the vicinity of Peking. His largest concentration is at Kalgan, (Chang Chia Kou). He has recently increased his garrison at Nankou Pass, and is in complete control of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway.

In Chahar, he has about 40,000 men and in Suiyuan another 40,000.

Manchurian forces in Chihli are concentrated as follows:

Peking and vicinity	10,000
Tientsin	15,000
Along Peking-Mukden Ry.(inside the Wall)	32,000
Along Tientsin-Pukow (as far as Pukow)	28.000

There are also about 20,000 provincial troops, which may be considered pro-Manchurian.

SHANSI:

See Report No. 5623.

SHENSI:

Shensi has been recently taken over by Sun Yueh with the 3rd National Army of about 30,000 men. It is reported that Sun's men have returned to Loyang from the Shensi border.

It is believed that Sun Yueh is in support of an alliance with Yueh Wei-chun and Sun Chuan-fang.

KANSU:

Feng Yu-hsiang has been appointed concurrent Tupan of Kansu, but has not so far gone there - nor is it believed that he will.

The forces here are unknown.

MONGOLIA:

The Mongolian army, Russian trained, is estimated at about 50,000 men, and it is believed they are in alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang.

SHANTUNG:

The Tupan, Chang Tsung-chang, is one of the chief lieutenants of Chang Tso-lin and has about 65,000 men. He is thought to be of doubtful loyalty. In this province are located some of the Fengtien troops noted above as along the Tientsin-Pukow Ry. There is a brigade of Russians at Tsinanfu. (See Report No. 5387).

In the southwest part of Shantung, where the province forms an angle between Honan and the Yellow River, Chang Tso-lin has concentrated troops at Tsaochowfu and Tungming on the Yellow River.

China (Military)

Subject: The Impending Civil War.

HUPEH:

Hsiao Yao-nan has declared martial law. His political affiliations are doubtful, but he is believed to be in a combination to crush the Manchurian army.

Hupeh is an important province because of Hankow and the Hanyang Arsenal.

ANHWEI:

In an effort to consolidate his position south of the Wall, Chang Tso-lin recently had his adherent Chiang Teng-hsuan appointed Tuchun. It is not thought Anhwei can be held to the Manchurian cause, but will join the combination against it.

At Pochow, in the northwest tip of Anhwei, Chang Tso-lin has at present a concentration point, almost directly south of Kweiteh, (Anhwei Province). The object of this is believed to be a threat to the Kin-Han Railway in central Honan near Yenchengho.

It is reported that Sun Chuan-fang's troops have invaded Anhwei, and have reached Kuangteh, ten miles inside the border. This move is evidently part of the advance on Nanking.

CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 20
4-1 1925 2657-J-276
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6190
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Present Military Situation in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. OCT 15 1925

There have been no troop changes of importance since the rendition of the last report. There have been certain re-alignments however, and certain minor indications which have given rise to apprehension. The air is full of rumors of immediate warfare.

The only warfare which is likely to occur is between Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin. The object of such a warfare on the part of Feng Yu-hsiang is to extend his personal power and that of the radical elements of China. On Chang Tso-lin's part the object of warfare against Feng Yu-hsiang would be to crush the rising power of Feng and the radicals and to check the increasing Soviet influence in China. Another statement of the essential differences between these forces may be taken as conservatism versus radicalism. Yet another statement, and I believe the ultimate occasion, is the approaching conflict between the Soviets and Japan.

At the time of the last report, Chang Tso-lin's position south of the Wall was considered precarious. For some reason as yet unknown to me, Chang and the Fengtien party have within the last ten days shown a decided stiffening in their attitude toward the Provisional Government and in opposition to Feng. A strong Fengtien party man has been made tupan of Anhui. Yang Yu-ting, Fengtien Chief of Staff, has been made tupan of Kiangsu. There is a Chinese saying that as heaven is above so is Kiangsu on the earth. The consolidation of these two provinces under Fengtien control with Shantung indicates an intention to hold firmly south of the Wall.

In Peking, Lu Chung-lu, Feng Yu-hsiang's adherent and Commissioner of Defense of the Metropolitan District, has had his powers considerably curtailed, the Fengtien party has been put in command of the gendarmerie and the troops of the Minister of War pronounced neutral have been doubled in number.

Recent reports from Mukden state that Chang Tso-lin will not open warfare unless the province of Shansi is attacked by troops of Feng Yu-hsiang or his lieutenants, Yueh Wei-chun and Sun Yueh, and that the tuchun of Shansi has been assured of Fengtien support in case of such an attack. Chang Tso-lin's reason for this determination is that the inclusion of Shansi in the provinces under Feng would constitute too serious a menace to his position in Chihli to be tolerated. Minor indications of Chang's increasing influence with the Central Government are to be found in the reversal of attitude by Marshal Tuan toward the student movement as evidenced by his admonition to them and their teachers, heretofore reported, and the mandate issued against the importation of war material, which can only be directed against Feng Yu-hsiang. Further evidence of Chang Tso-lin's increasing independence is to be found in the sudden release of Ostroumoff from jail in Harbin with his three associates. Reports indicate that the cases against these men will be dropped completely within a brief period. Ostroumoff's long imprisonment without justification in a complete indictment and in defiance of all prescribed Chinese criminal procedure, has been the result of Soviet influence with Chang Tso-lin.

From: M/A, China Report No. 5612 Sept. 16, 1925.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Present Military Situation in China (cont'd)

I do not believe the Soviets have been satisfied in this case but rather have been defied.

On the other hand, considering the activities of Feng Yu-hsiang and his adherents, it is reasonable to expect that the number of pronouncements against Shansi may bear fruit in an active attempt to overrun and conquer that province to Feng Yu-hsiang's purposes. In Shensi, on the west, Sun Yueh is in strength; in Honan on the south and east, Yueh Wei-chun threatens invasion, while reliable reports from Kalgan are to the effect that there have been troop movements west from Kalgan to Shansi's northern border. In the northern portion of Shansi Feng's tax collectors have already been at work. Reports of Soviet plans for the consolidation of the northwest include a statement that the subjugation of Shansi is to be pushed with all haste. Thus there is established Shansi as a debatable ground and possible cause of immediate warfare. Much light would be thrown on the matter if accurate information could be secured as to the attitude of Hsiao Yao-nan in Hupeh, and Wu Pei-fu. Hsiao Yao-nan is apparently trading with all parties. He is the master fence-rider of China, as uncertain and unstable as a drop of quicksilver.

There are curious and persistent reports from a variety of sources that Wu Pei-fu has come into sudden possession of a considerable war chest. I cannot learn the source of this money; however, see Report #5582. This may be the explanation. There are as many reports that Wu Pei-fu is about to join hands with Feng as that he has decided to bury the hatchet with Chang Tso-lin. I am inclined to think the latter course the more probable.

In Honan, Yueh Weu-chun is said to have increased his army by impressment to a total of 300,000 men.

Suicidal as a war at this time would be with its effect upon the approaching Conference, there is nothing in the history of China nor of its present militarists to suggest that they will be influenced by any consideration in initiating such a war than the furtherance of their own plans. Among the officials, the bankers, merchants and journalists there is today the utmost apprehension of war within the next two or three weeks.

Conclusion: It is my opinion that war will not come until spring, and I think the groundwork of the various rumors of immediate war occasion for alarm is to be found in propaganda issued by the parties to the present contention, each of whom are anxious to deceive the other as to their immediate desire or willingness for war that time may be gained for further preparation.

If Soviet influence continues unchecked, I think that with the early spring it is quite probable Feng will move in force on Peking and announce the consolidation of north and northwestern China into a separate republic affiliated with similar republics in the south and center of China, and all on terms of close understanding if not alliance with the U.S.S.R.

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4-1 1925 3657-9-276 JUN 8 '39 JUN 31
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT An Impending Crisis.

From M.A. Peking.

No. 5419 Date May 2, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 4

5020

Factors in the impending crisis are the Japanese Government, the Soviet Government, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang.

The Japanese Government is concerned with the maintenance in Manchuria of its supremacy. While apparently as strong as ever in Southern Manchuria, Japan is much concerned over the efforts of the Soviets to gain control in Mongolia; by means of an alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang to extend that control through Kalgan to Peking; over Soviet propaganda generally throughout China with the threat it conveys to the Government of Japan; over the active campaign against the South Manchurian Railway now being waged by the Soviet manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Ivanoff.

The Soviet Government has taken up and made its own the Manchurian policy of the Tsarist Government, and in pursuit of it is bent on regaining if possible all former Russian property and concessions in Manchuria; is now in control in Mongolia; is endeavoring to extend its influence or control over all China. It has opened a vigorous campaign against the Japanese South Manchurian Ry. by means of preferential tariffs designed to divert freight from that railway and the port of Dairen to the Eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Ry., the Ussuri Ry. and Vladivostok. In its efforts to gain influence and control in China it has made advances to Feng Yu-hsiang, conveying to him at once a threat and a promise by arming, equipping, organizing and training a Mongolian Army. Munitions for such an army have been coming into Inner Mongolia for a considerable time, but efforts to detect this importation have been defeated by the fact that there is little travel by outsiders in Mongolia during the winter and by the skill with which the munitions have been distributed. Organization and training have been effected by the introduction into Inner Mongolia of 5,000 instructors, 500 of whom are Russian, the remainder being Mongolians and Buryat. All had been trained at Soviet Military Schools for Red Army Instructors.

The threat conveyed to Feng was that in case he did not aid the Soviet this force would be used against him. The promise was that if he would aid the Soviets, he would be put at the head of this force, be assured of supplies of munitions of war, and supported by the Soviets in a campaign, ostensibly a revolution against the present government of China, actually designed to establish a Soviet Government in China.

Chang Tso-lin, head of the Fengtien Army and ruler of Manchuria, was disappointed at the full measure of success for which he had hoped at the end of the last Chihli-Fengtien war. Having fallen out with Feng Yu-hsiang, he had to retire from Peking, which he had unwisely entered with a few troops at a time when Feng had an army of some 60,000 about the city. Doubtful of

Binding Margin.

the loyalty of some of his lieutenants, his money and ammmunition exhausted, and told by his supporters the Japanese, that they would not help him in a campaign south of the wall, he withdrew to Mukden. Recognising the peril he was in from Feng and the Soviets, he made overtures to the Diplomatic Body for support against both. In Manchuria he is having difficulty in maintaining his position due to the pressure applied to him in the north by the Soviets and the south by the Japanese. I believe him nationalistic, strongly anti-Bolshivik, and ready to use any aid other than theirs in maintaining and increasing his power.

After his coup of October 23rd Feng tarried in Peking and organised a cabinet of radical tendencies, instead of going on to Tientsin and Lan-chowfu with his troops. The result was a clash with Chang. Furthermore, he found himself an object of hatred and suspicion throughout China because of his betrayal of Wu Pei-fu. Cut off from the sea and any sources of supply, he eventually retired to Kalgan, opening commmunications with the Soviet Government.

The situation existing as a result of these conflicting factors is one of armed neutrality between Chang and Feng to which the present government in Peking owes its existance and of continuing intrigue between the Soviets and Japan. I think Tuan is decidedly anti-Bolshevik and pro-Japanese, but does not express his view for fear of Feng.

No. 5420, May 12

On January 21st, 1925, the Russo-Japanese Agreement was entered into. This is said to contain certain secret clauses, which have been made the subject of a separate report (M.A.China, May 1, 1925, No. 5418). On March 14th, 1925, a loan was made to Chang Tso-lin by the Japanese, details of which have also been made the subject of a separate report. From about the first of April all efforts at secrecy in the delivery to Kalgan of munitions of war from Russia seem to have been given up and the supply greatly accelerated.

Chinese and other informants have reported the imminence of an attack from Feng and in the interests of the Soviets.

On the 29th of April Fengtien Army authorities seized telegraphic communications at Shan Hai Kwan and ordered a mobilization of rolling stock at that point.

On the 30th of April Li Ching-lin, in command of the Fengtien 2nd Army, Tuchun of Chihli, served notice on Feng Yu-hsiang that he would have to move his troops out of Chihli Province.

I estimate the situation as follows:

The Japanese were not sincere in their part of the secret clauses of the Russo-Japanese Agreement, above alluded to. It is to me inconceivable that the present Japanese Government could enter into any agreement in the nature of an alliance with the Soviet Government. It fears the Communistic propaganda in Japan. Were Japan to become sovietized, there would be occasion to apprehend a pan-Asiatic movement, but not until then. Japan was willing to enter into the secret clauses for the sake of any temporary benefit which might accrue to her. An additional reason for doubting the sincerity of her purpose in these secret clauses is the existence of the loan agreement, above alluded to.

Both Chang Tso-lin and Japan have become aware of the large amount of munitions being sent to Feng from Russia, and are doubtless aware of Feng's being in sympathy with the Soviets. It is probable that they have suspected both these matters before, but doubted if the amount of munitions sent into Kalgan were considerable or that Feng actually and whole heartedly would join the Soviet plans. Aware now of the gravity of the situation, Japan has consented to aid Chang in a campaign south of the wall and may

even have urged him to strike quickly. This would explain the seizure of the telegraphs and consentration at Shanhaikuan and the action of Li Ching-lin.

On the other hand, recognizing that his efforts to get an arsenal established at Kalgan, or munitions from any other source were futile and that to sit still at Kalgan was only to await the day when Chang would be strong enough to crush him, Feng has definitely cast his lot with the Soviets, and is feverishly preparing to strike against Peking and the present Government. This would explain the cessation of all attempts at secrecy in getting munitions from Russia.

If this estimate is correct, an open clash should only be a matter of a short time.

Fighting would probably occur in or near Peking.

I think the struggle would be much more bitter than the last war, and would essentially be a test of strength between Japan and the Soviet Government. They might be openly drawn into the conflict, but I think that ~~doubtful~~ doubtful.

The forces which each side can muster, exclusive of any foreign mercenaries, are roughly as follows:

Fengtien Army.....150,000
Feng Yu-hsiang.....115,000.

To Fengtien forces might be added those of the crushed Chihli Party. There are many rumors of an understanding having been reached between Chang and Wu. Probably 30,000 more men might thus become available.

I do not think Sun Yueh would remain loyal to Feng Yu-hsiang, nor the troops of Hu Ching-yi.

Combined these would add 100,000 men to Feng's forces but even if loyal, they are at such a distance from Feng that they could readily be cut off from him.

Feng must count heavily not only on support from Soviet sympathisers in northern China, but from Russians as well.

It is my opinion that both he and the Soviets are much deceived as to Chinese and Japanese attitudes and that they will be defeated. It does not seem credible that Japan under any circumstances short of ruin would permit a Sovietization of Peking and North China.

If Chang is successful I think it will not only be a crushing set back for Soviet plans in China and Mongolia but will as well be a defeat for them in Manchuria, the extent of which is indicated by the railway concessions granted Japan for lines to Tsitsihar and to San Sing on the Sungari River. Chang will owe his victory over the Soviets to the Japanese and no one else. They will not fail to press their advantages in Manchuria and will be the dominant foreign factor in Peking and all North China.

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4-1 1925 2657-D-776 MAY 26 01
58
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Re-Organisation of Fengtien (Manchurian) Army.

From M/A Peking.

No. 5405 Date April 22, 1925. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

6170

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 22 1925

Binding Margin.

Army Reorganisation

1. Following the fighting of the fall of 1924 Marshal Chang Tso-lin decided to reorganise his armies along the most modern lines using combination of European and American systems. His purpose was two fold, (a) to make each unit practically independent thereby allowing for greater mobility and facility in administration, and (b) to promote many officers who had shown remarkable ability during the recent campaign by giving them added responsibility.

2. In December 1924 an Army Reorganization Bureau was constituted at ~~G.H.Q.~~ G.H.Q. in Mukden and General Chang Hsueh-liang (the youthful son of Marshal Chang Tso-lin) was placed in direct command. During the past three months this Bureau has worked continuously making the necessary alterations, recommendations for promotions, transportation of personnel and material, etc. and on March 27, 1925, a General Order was issued giving the following outline of the "Armies of the North East":

3. There are 16 Divisions of Infantry, 2 Divisions of Cavalry and 2 Artillery Brigades.

Infantry Div.

1. Each of the 16 Infantry Divisions is organized as follows under the command of a Major General (Three gold stars on a field of gold epaulets)
   (a) Two Brigades each commanded by a Brigadier General totalling 5,400 officers and men each
   (b) Three Regiments in each Brigade, each regiment commanded by a Colonel and totalling 1,800 officers and men per regiment.
   (c) Three Battalions in each Regiment, each Battalion commanded by a Major and totalling 600 officers and men per Battalion
   (d) Four Companies in each Battalion each company commanded by a Captain and totalling 150 officers and men per company
   (e) Three Platoons in each Company. One First Lieutenant and Two Second Lieutenants command the three platoons. There are non-commissioned officers, usually one sergeant and two corporals to every two squads, one squad totalling eight men.

Auxiliary Reg. (Inf) units.

1. Each Regt. (Inf) has attached to it
   (a) One Machine Gun Co. of 6 guns and totalling 40 officers and men.
   (b) One Trench Mortar Company of 6 three inch Sutton Mortars and totalling 100 officers and men,
   (c) One Special Battalion including Pioneers, Engineers, sanitary and hospital units, and replacements, 700 officers and men.

Total Strength Inf. Regt.

1. It will be seen therefore that the total strength of each division of Infantry is 11,640 officers and men and that the total strength of 16 divisions of infantry is 186,240 officers and men.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

1. Each of the two divisions of cavalry is organized as follows under the command of a Major General. The total strength of each division is 3,200 officers and men

(a) Two Brigades each commanded by a Brigadier General totalling 1,600 officers and men
(b) Two Regiments in each Brigade each commanded by a Colonel totalling 800 officers and men each
(c) Four squadrons in each Regiment each commanded by a Major and totalling 200 officers and men each
(d) Three troops in each Company each commanded by a Captain and totalling 70 officers and men each.
(e) Three platoons in each squadron each under the command of a Lieutenant.

Artillery Brigade.

1. Each of the two Artillery Brigades is organized as follows under the command of a Brigadier General. The total strength of each Artillery Brigade is 2,700 officers and men and 108 Field Guns.

(a) Three regiments in each brigade each commanded by a Colonel and totalling 900 officers and men and 36 guns.
(b) Three battalions to each regiment commanded by a Major totalling 300 officers and men and 12 guns each
(c) Three batteries in each battalion each commanded by a Captain totalling 100 officers and men and 4 guns.
(d) Two sections in each battery commanded by one First Lieutenant and two Second Lieutenants, two guns each.

Engineers.

1. There is one regiment of Engineers under the command of a Colonel and divided into 5 battalions each commanded by a Major. There are 600 officers and men in each battalion or a total of 3,000 in all.

Recapitulation

16 Divisions, Infantry,	11,640 ea....	186,240
2 Divisions, Cavalry,	3,200 ea....	6,400
2 Brigades, Artillery,	2,700 ea....	5,400
1 Regiment, Engineers,		3,000
	Total.....	201,040

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MAY 15 '25
M.I.D.
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7A 2657-9-276
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WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Attitude of Japanese during recent war between Manchurian forces (Chang Tso-lin) and the Chihli forces (Wu Pei-fu).

From M. A., Peking.

No. 5995 Date April 7, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

6990

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 13 1925

The following was prepared by a trained and impartial observer who was with Marshal Wu Pei Fu's Headquarters during much of the fighting about Shan-Hai Kwan. He reported events for Shanghai, American, and British newspapers.

China's civil wars have been too often dismissed as merely the expression of the overweening jealousies of provincial warlords, fighting for supreme political control. That is true to a certain extent, but behind these warlords, there are in some cases very powerful foreign factors, which sometimes make all the difference in the issue.

In the last major military clash, between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, foreign interests were almost as active as the participants themselves. The foreign aspect of the fighting communicated itself even to the men in the line. Almost every soldier on the Wu Pei-fu (Chihli) front was of opinion that he was fighting the Japanese and White Russians, as well as the Manchurian or Fengtien army, and accordingly referred to them frequently and hatefully. The writer can speak only of the Chihli side of the campaign, but he has it from eye-witnesses of the operations on the Fengtien side that Chang Tso-lin's soldiers were equally impressed with the supposed co-operation of the United States and Great Britain with the Chihli forces.

However, this memorandum is concerned only with the facts on the Chihli side, and the connexion of the Japanese, acting with or without the concurrence of the Japanese Government, with the campaign, as witnessed from that angle. In view of the fact that Chang Tso-lin's relations with the Japanese Government since his appointment in Manchuria have always been cordial, it might be presumed that the evidence presented herewith could be supplemented with corroborative facts by an eye-witness on the Fengtien side.

The reservation must first be made that the writer believes the Chihli army was inoculated with anti-Japanism right from the outset, in order to fan their martial spirit, and put them on their mettle. But that does not alter the fact that the Japanese repeatedly violated their Government's stated policy of non-intervention and non-interference.

When Wu Pei-fu came to Peking, on Sept. 17, for the first time in his career as the semi-dictator of China he assumed the responsibilities which he won from Chang Tso-lin in 1922. In addition to creating a military and political machine capable of meeting his enemy, he devoted much attention to the foreign status in South Manchuria. In 1922 he was deterred from pursuing Chang into Manchurian territory partly for the reason that he was advised that he might jeopardise China's position vis-a-vis Japan if he continued the struggle. This time he determined to try to remove Japan's hostility to operations in Manchuria before he proceeded to the fighting zone.

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His strategy was intimately connected with Japan's peculiar interests in South Manchuria. To reach Mukden, he relied on a combined attack by railway and by sea, and he had already selected a point near Hulutao at which to force the landing of a division of men, who were to be entrained along the South Manchuria railway. This division subsequently proved to be the 26th, under General Yang Ch'ing Ch'un.

Wu had first to gain Japan's consent to the use of the South Manchuria railway. On Sept. 19, he entertained Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Minister to Peking, and broached the subject. Mr. Yoshizawa was non-committal, and said he would refer the matter to his government. Wu waited in Peking, even after the time had arrived when his place was at the front, Fengtien having penetrated the Great Wall at a very dangerous point, but no instructions were communicated to him, and when he eventually took train for Chinwangtao on October 11, he felt that he could not reply on any goodwill or even inaction on the part of the Japanese authorities were he to try to use the South Manchuria in the transportation of men or material. As events proved, he was not able to put the issue to a test, but, knowing that the South Manchuria railway was used for the transportation both of men and material for Chang Hsueh-liang, he was determined to proceed with his strategy, with or without Japanese permission, and risk a diplomatic incident.

On arrival at Shanhaikwan, on October 12, Wu Pei-fu and his staff paid a visit of inspection to the line. Coming down the hill at Shanhaikwan, he met a Japanese officer, a Lieutenant Abe, armed, with field glasses, and generally equipped like a field officer. This officer belonged to the Japanese garrison at Shanhaikwan, which is allowed to be garrisoned under the terms of the Boxer Protocol. This agreement divided the Peking-Mukden railway into international police zones, the Japanese zone being from Lanchow to Shanhaikwan, which comprised the zone of the Chihli organisation in the war. When the officer was interrogated, it was found that he had neither authority nor reason for his presence on the hill. He was asked to go away, but, the officers with Wu Pei-fu allege, refused to do so. He was then taken into custody, and brought down to the garrison in Shanhaikwan. Here the officer in charge gave his word for his future good behaviour, and the party proceeded down the line to the headquarters train at Chinwangtao, which was thereafter the Chihli headquarters. Here Major Matsumura, Japanese military observer, also interceded on Abe's behalf.

The writer happened to be at tiffin the same day in the same saloon as the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Division, a General Li. General Li had been with the Commander-in-Chief of Shanhaikwan, and he was holding forth in the company of the Japanese military observer and the Japanese correspondents on the morning's incident. Although the writer could not understand what he was saying, his remarks were afterward interpreted for him, and proved to be a diatribe against the Japanese. This was borne out to the writer by the gestures of the General, the impassive attitude of the Japanese present, and the uneasy looks of the other Chinese in the saloon.

The Japanese military observer immediately protested to Marshal Wu Pei-fu, and the latter promised to reprimand General Li, who is well-known as an irresponsible officer, in whom the Marshal placed no reliance. The General was duly reprimanded, and told not to enter the foreign saloon again. But this did not satisfy the military observer. He said that he would wire his government immediately, recommending his immediate recall. The matter was subsequently taken up from the Japanese military headquarters in Tientsin, and eventually smoothed over, after a good deal of unpleasantness had been aroused.

This was the beginning of Marshal Wu's troubles with the Japanese. He called a conference of his staff officers the same night to consider the question of the system of Japanese-controlled wireless communication in the Chihli zone. The Japanese had a plant in Lanchow, one in Chinwangtao, and

a heliograph in Shanhaikwan. It was suspected that they were communicating with Dairen from the Chinwangtao station, and that messages were being transmitted to Mukden, to Shanghai, and to Shwangchiao, near Peking (the Mitsui plant erected for the Chinese Government). At this time there was apparently no direct evidence of Japanese complicity with the Fengtien intelligence service; only a suspicion due to the close relations existing in Manchuria between Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese. Wu Pei-fu had no such intelligence system in the Lanchow-Shanhaikwan zone as the Japanese, and the situation created by the Japanese monopoly, which was felt to be held in the interests of their enemies, caused the liveliest feelings of apprehension among the headquarters staff of Wu Pei-fu. At this stage, the writer's only suspicion that the Chinwangtao station might be used against the interests of the Chihli side was the fact that the Japanese correspondents used to foregather at the wireless station nightly, and return with glowing accounts of Chang-Tso-lin's successes, and much more general news than could otherwise be obtained. Incidentally, they were all frankly anti-Wu Pei-fu in their sentiments, and minimised all reports of Chihli successes, and gloated on any scrap of good news from the Mukden side, which they were the first to transmit to the other correspondents.

As a result of the conference above referred to, it was decided that on such a matter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be requested to communicate with the Japanese Legation. It was felt to be outside the competence of the Commander-in-Chief, seeing that the matter affected the foreign affairs of the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was requested to point out to the Japanese Government that although under the Boxer Protocol, the Japanese had certain rights of patrolling the Peking-Mukden line between Lanchow and Shanhaikwan, yet that privilege should not be taken advantage of in the communication to the outside world of military intelligence that would be useful to the enemy. Although the writer does not know exactly what was represented to the Japanese Government, he knows that Wu Pei-fu made it clear in his instructions that Japan had really no control over the intervening air, as well as the intervening territory, under that instrument, and that, if it were argued that communication by air was necessary in the interests of policing privileges, then the Japanese Government should give an undertaking that only railway matters and other matters strictly germane to the agreed would be transmitted.

It cannot be determined whether any reply was received to the representation of the Waichiaopu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), but evidently no action was taken, for reasons which will be related in their due order. The Japanese attached to the headquarters train remained just as well-informed of even the most minute developments on the Mukden side of the Great Wall. Apparently nothing was done, for Wu Pei-fu at one time considered the advisability of dismantling the wireless stations, and leaving the issue to be fought out diplomatically. He considered that he had every right to take this step, not only because of the lack of mention of wireless stations in the policing privileges, but in view of the wireless agreement signed at the Washington conference. However, he was dissuaded from taking this extreme step.

What impelled him to consider this step was the fact that whenever he proceeded to the Shanhaikwan front he was greeted with an artillery bombardment, which started half an hour after he had arrived. The circumstance was considered very peculiar, inasmuch as on occasion the bombardment ended an artillery silence of half a day. The shells all fell in the vicinity of General Peng Shou-hsin's headquarters, where he stayed. Chinese armies are notoriously deficient in adequate intelligence services, and yet the synchronising of an artillery bombardment with Wu's presence in Shanhaikwan denoted the operation of a more than creditable system of communication inside the enemy lines.

To the writer there was other circumstantial evidence of Japanese wireless activities. At the beginning of hostilities, a British submarine arrived at Chinwangtao, L[illegible], with orders to guard a convoy which was held in readiness to take off foreign residents. It was equipped with wireless, but for several days could not send messages because of the monopoly of the air exercised by the Japanese station. If the British tried to use their set, it was certain to be "buzzed over" by the Japanese. Then the British came to an agreement with the Japanese whereby the former were allowed to use their wireless without interruption for a certain period every day. But the Japanese failed to live up to the agreement, and the same haphazard conditions returned in a few days.

This was also the complaint of the Chinese in regard to the wireless apparatus with which Army Hq were equipped. The Chinese frequently complained to the writer that the Japanese often used to key their instruments to the requisite wave-length and "buzz over" or "rile" the Chinese messages.

In the meantime the Japanese had brought four gunboats up to Chinwangtao harbour, and were talking of augmenting their garrison. The British submarine officers' orders remained that they were to guard the convoy tied to the wharf, but on October 19 the Japanese officer in charge at Chinwangtao told them that he had been instructed to oppose by force any attempt at evacuation by sea on the part of Wu Pei-fu's troops. Seeing that the fleets of the powers operating in China waters work together, it was essential for the British to ask for further instructions. The Admiral was communicated with, and he informed the British Legation of the matter, and the Minister instantly obtained a repudiation from the Japanese Minister. It was evident from this that the army authorities were working independently of the Legation.

In addition to their wireless monopoly, or rather because of it, the Japanese had full control of all independent news (i.e. for newspapers) of the progress of the war from the Chihli side. In China the Japanese have a ramified news organisation, working through various news agencies, and as there were nine Japanese correspondents on Wu Pei-fu's train, the operations were fully recorded, and commented upon. Immediate news dispatches could be transmitted only in one way, namely, by wireless, for Wu Pei-fu's HQ held back all telegrams filed by correspondents until military telegrams had been dispatched, which generally meant a delay of from seven to nine days. The train service was also blocked, and only two trains were able to convey mail during the whole time that Wu Pei-fu was at the front. Thus, when correspondents other than Japanese returned to Peking, it was found that hardly any of their messages had got through, but that the capital, Tientsin, and Shanghai had been drenched with Japanese news messages, which thus constituted the only intelligence which the reading public had to rely on to keep it abreast of developments, or rather so-called developments. The kind of message which the Japanese retailed to the reading public may be illustrated by one that the writer read as soon as he returned to Tientsin with Marshal Wu, on October 25. This was to the effect that on hearing of the coup d'etat in Peking on October 23, Wu had committed suicide by cutting his throat with a razor. This was typical of the biased news that was sent from the front by the Japanese correspondents, all using Japanese wireless in the transmission of their messages. In this way they were able to get away their dispatches at least seven days before their foreign, or even Chinese, colleagues, and in addition escaped military censorship, which was most rigorously applied by Marshal Wu's staff. That it could be applied to all dispatches but Japanese was a constant source of irritation at GHQ.

One of the Japanese news reports to reach Peking was to the effect that on October 19 Marshal Wu sent his last reserves up the line. This was evidently also conveyed to the British Legation, for the British officer in Chinwangtao was surprised of the report, and asked for an explanation. At

this time, troops were being landed from transports in the harbour to the number of many thousands daily. This was obvious to everybody at Chinwangtao. It was also obvious that the 26th division had not been sent into the line, but were being kept in reserve in Chinwangtao, either to carry out the operations at Hulatao, or to take the places of other troops as reinforcements were needed. The statement that Marshal Wu was using his last reserves was utterly untrue, and was obviously circulated maliciously.

According to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's statements immediately after he brought off his coup in Peking, biased and untrue news reports were also circulated by the Japanese to him. He said in his first newspaper interviews that his information was that the soldiers under Marshal Wu were badly clothed, badly equipped, and badly fed. He said they were absolutely without any winter clothing, and that they were demoralised and already beaten. These statements were absolutely not in accordance with the writer's personal knowledge. Whether Feng Yu-hsiang was partly influenced by his information in returning to Peking at the time he did is a moot point.

Either on the day of the coup d'etat in Peking, October 23, or a day or two after, Mr. Yoshizawa, at a meeting of the diplomatic body in Peking, submitted that the time had arrived when the powers should consider the reversal of their non-interventionist policy toward the civil war. He brought up the question on several occasions, and finally the British Minister said that Great Britain could not possibly be a party to intervention, either open or underhanded. He said he thought the other powers represented in the Body would coincide in that stand. Mr. Yoshizawa thereupon dropped his suggestion. This plainly showed a governmental tendency to support the anti-Wu Pei-fu movement which had been set going right from the start of the war by the Japanese army authorities.

Two final illustrations may be given. On October 22, when Peking was apparently in ignorance of the promise of the following day, reports of the impending coup were published by two Japanese newspapers, the Manchuria Daily News and the Japan Times. Again, on the first international train that came through from Tientsin to Peking, after the coup, some of the Japanese passengers had carried pigeons in their possession, which they released with notes and maps prepared after an overt study of the situation in Wu Pei-fu's lines near Yangtsun, where the clash between Feng Yu-hsiang and Wu Pei-fu eventually took place. At this time Wu Pei-fu had just brought a few thousand of his Chinwangtao troops to take up positions on the Peking road, preparatory to giving battle to his seceding lieutenant, Feng Yu-hsiang. These troops were engaged in digging in near Yangtsun.

It might be wondered why the Japanese did not actually oppose the evacuation by sea of the Chihli forces when they were routed near Chinwangtao in the closing days of October. One can only surmise that this plan, the work of the army authorities, did not meet with the support of the Japanese Government. However, two other reasons may also be considered. First, that the debacle of Wu Pei-fu's forces was so surprisingly complete that the purpose of the Japanese plan had already been achieved, namely, the ending of the war in favour of Chang Tso-lin. Secondly, the Japanese Government, after the failure of Mr. Yoshizawa's effort to start an intervention movement in the Diplomatic Body, realised the inadvisability of fathering such an extreme step, and dissuaded the army authorities from taking it.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Japanese attitude during Chihli-Fengtien War, October-November 1924.

From M/A China. 2657-I

No. 5382 Date April 6, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

Received G. 2 W.D. MAY 13 19

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The enclosed copy of report on this subject made to his Government by the British Military Attache is corroborative of reports of the same general nature heretofore rendered.

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Japanese attitude to the Chihli Fengtien war, Oct.Nov. 1924.

Report No. XI

From Military Attache Peking 11th November 1924.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Sir,

I have the honour to forward you the following notes on the attitude of the Japanese in the recent war between Chihli and Fengtien, during the months of October November 1924.

In a secret report received from the Military Attache Tokio, No. XXXVIII 5/4 of 30/9/24, the following statement was made in para 4. "In view of the somewhat complicated and divergent views held in (Japanese) army circles, (on the Wu bei fu Chang tso lin conflict) my informant stated definitely that the military authorities had compromised and intended to abide by the views of Lt General Banzai, the advisor to the Chinese President. This officer is considered par excellence the expert on Chinese affairs in the Japanese army, and it has been agreed that his views are to prevail.

"General Banzai is in favor of non intervention. His argument is that whatever party in China is successful, the fact that it had been helped by the Japanese would in no way assist Japan in her future relations with China. A fortiori should the party Japan decides to help fail, her relations would be even worse with the victorious party."

This argument shows sound common sense except in the one case when it might be previously known which party in China would be victorious, especially if that victorious party was the one favoured by Japanese military opinion as the one most likely to fall in with their wishes in the case of a war with another power, by granting them the things most necessary to Japan in such a case, control of raw materials necessary for munitions and military supplies. It also shows that whatever help might be given to one side in the Chinese conflict, that help must be masked under a show of perfect neutrality.

In the recent war it is most probable that had Feng not transferred his allegiance and disobeyed his leader Wu, the result of the campaign would have been changed. The fighting mightnot perhaps have gone in favour of the Chihli party, but it is certain that Peking would never have been at the mercy of Chang. It is known that money passed from Mukden to General Feng, but it is not yet known by whom the negotiations for the betrayal of Wu were brought to completion.

It is to be imagined that if the purchase of Feng's honour was made directly by Chang, the actual declaration of betrayal would have been kept a profound secret until it was too late for Wu to prevent the occurrence by stratagem or by assassination. But if the purchase had been arranged through a third party, there might properly be a leakage of information.

The betrayal was freely discussed as a certainty before its occurrence and the source of the majority of these rumours was Japanese. The Peking and Tientsin Times states in a leading article of Nov. 12 that the coup d'etat which took place on the 23rd October was talked about at a lunch given to Tsao Kun's secretary at the Japanese Legation on the 22nd, when the hosts told their guest that if the President desired asylum in the Japanese Legation it would be prepared for him.

A significant story was published in the North China Daily News or Herald of October 17th in Shanghai, which is as follows:

A Bogus Telegram.

One of the gentry who tried to negotiate with the recalcitrant snipers at Markham road discovered that a reason for their obstinacy was credence in a telegram which arrived in Shanghai the day before yesterday through a Japanese telegraph agency, that Tsao Kun had left Peking through the treachery of General Feng Yu hsiang and that Tuan chi jui had entered Peking and was about to assume the Presidency.

Careful investigation regarding this telegram disclosed the fact that it was addressed to Lu Yung hsiang and Ho Feng lin and was sent from Japan. Not a single telegram dealing with this subject came from any other source. Nor have the facts since its receipt borne out its contents. It is believed that the Generals who ran away sent it to themselves for the purpose of creating disturbances in Shanghai.

The actual occupation of Peking by Feng's troops in completion of the coup d'etat occurred on the 23rd October, in view of which the following

extract from the Manchurian Daily News, published in Dairen on October 22nd is of interest.

War Notes

Things moving against General Wu at Peking.

Advices from Peking say that Generals Feng Yu Hsiang and Wang Chen ping have already declared independence and have undertaken the patrolling of the walled city of Peking. This step has been taken to steal a march on Major General Hu Ching yi under General Wu Bei fu, who has been delegated to garrison Peking. The Chinese capital is made out to be seething with confusion and Members of the cabinet and general populace are fleeing to Tientsin in succession.

In consequence the railway journey between Peking and Tientsin that ordinarily takes eight hours to be completed in, 20 to 30 hours is now required. (Yesterdays Mukden telephone).

It is curious that no other nationals had sources from where to draw an intelligent forecast of events in the Chinese capital, as the coup d'etat and the occupation of Peking by Feng came as a profound surprise to all except the Japanese.

It would appear that a good market for the above forecast might have been found in the camp of Wu Bei fu, but as no action was taken until the coup d'etat was a fait accompli it is presumed the news was not carried to that quarter by a benevolent neutral.

It may be argued that the Japanese like any other nation were at liberty to make intelligent guesses at the probable trend of events, as Feng's treachery is not the first instance in Chinese military annals of a subordinate selling his forces to the opposing side. If this argument is accepted however the publication in advance of Feng's desertion may be taken with other Japanese inspired news of chimerical Fengtien victories as a deliberate attempt to discourage faith in the then existing government and its generalissimo Wu Bei fu. It is most probable that the disparagement of Wu's forces did deprive him of urgently needed reinforcements after the coup d'etat of the 23rd October, when he still had time to deal with Feng before the debacle at Lanchou on the 28th October.

It is a curious fact that the nation with the most complete installations of wireless in China, with the most nationals, all of whom are potential sources of information, with the most advisors to the various competitors for power in China and with the biggest garrison on Chinese territory, should have been so accurate as to information but so inaccurate as to dates. Every defeat suffered by Wu Bei fu as narrated by the Japanese inspired press did occur but generally several days after their publication. The treachery of Feng took place some weeks after it was rumoured, though it must be admitted that it was no hasty action, but a carefully thought out and well planned stab in the back.

The Japanese Military Head Quarters at Tientsin had not the same excuse for partiality to Chang as had their garrison in Manchuria, yet charges of aiding Chang were levelled at them both before and after the coup d'etat. The Chinese Foreign Office in a despatch of October 17th requested foreigners not to allow themselves to become tools of interested parties in committing acts of espionage and transmitting military information to the detriment of the interests of the national forces.

This despatch stated that reports of foreigners getting into the fighting zone and employing the wireless apparatus of foreign forts for the transmission of information prejudicial to the aims of the National forces were continially being received.

This is a charge directly levelled at the heads of the Japanese, as they have the only permanent wireless installation in the part of Chihli which has suffered from the war, and were in a position to impart to Mukden the news of any reinforcements arriving in Chinwangtao by their wireless at that part. Had Wu Bei fu ever contemplated a flanking movement by sea, secrecy would have been impossible unless the Japanese wireless apparatus had been in his hands.

As evidence of Japanese fears for their wireless in Chinwangtao, the despatch of the British General Staff at Tientsin No.G.S.N.C. 11-1/41 is quoted.

On the morning of the 22nd October, the Japanese Chief of Staff, Colonel Hasebe, (in the absence of General Yoshioka, sick) visited British Headquarters to discuss the defence of foreign lives and property at Chinwangtao in the event of a break through by the Fengtien forces, and a consequent sauve qui peut on the part of the Chihli troops. He was extremely anxious that a Commandants' Conference should not be called, pointing out that the nations concerned were only the British and Japanese, the former on account of the large British in-

terests represented by the Kailan Mining Administration, and the latter on account of their responsibility for the protection of that sector of the Railway line. The Japanese forces at present at Chinwangtao only consist of 43 rifles, the remainder of the personnel (27) being telegraphists or wireless operators. He appealed for a reinforcement of British troops from Shanhaikuan (a platoon have already been promised in case of emergency, and urged the despatch of a British warship large enough to furnish a landing party. The Japanese proposal was to neutralize a zone around Chinwangtao, to prevent the harbor and foreign buildings being shelled, and to warn both combattants that entry into this zone would be resisted by force. The line suggested included the whole of Chinwangtao main line railway station, and the front which would have had to be held amounted to 6,000 metres.

This was manifestly absurd with the forces available, besides being unfair to the Chihli party, who were doubtless relying on Chinwangtao to evacuate the bulk of their troops in case of being cut off from the railway. A counter proposal was accordingly made by the British Commandant that the "Bluff" and breakwater alone should be occupied (the positions being comparatively easy to defend with the force available) and that the Chinese should be allowed the right of access to the sea and the use of the pier. The original Japanese proposal savoured altogether too much of the desire to embarass Wu Pei fu and to turn his possible defeat into an irretrievable disaster.

The British Minister, and the Admiral Commander in Chief were informed telegraphically of these proposals. Arrangements were made with the K.M.A. for the transport by sea of the platoon fron Shanhaikuan, should the necessity arise.

At a conference with the Japanese Chief of Staff in the afternoon, Col. Hasebe objected to the British plan that it left their wireless station unprotected, and that the Japanese view was that either their original proposal for the neutral zone should be put into effect, or that Chinwangtao should be entirely evacuated by the foreign contingents. The Japanese, during the afternoon, telegraphed for reinforcements of one battalion from Port Arthur, and approached the British Commandant for permission to use the British Barracks at Chinwangtao, which is close to the wireless station, for their accommodation. This permission was granted, as in the event of the platoon being sent from Shanhaikuan, accommodation has been offered for the men by the K.M. on the "Bluff".

In the case of the arrival of a British cruiser, which could furnish a landing party, the Japanese waived all claim to precedence in command of the shore troops, a somewhat auspicious admission, inasmuch as it led one to suppose that if Wu Pei fu suffered a disaster, owing to being cut off from the sea, the British would be implicated.

The reason for their sudden solicitude for the safety of Chinwangtao probably lies in the fact that they are in possession of the information that staking all upon a single throw, and having assured himself of the benevolent neutrality of Feng Yu hsiang, Chang Tso lin has denuded his Chao-yang front of practically all his troops, and has massed his 4th Army in the right rear of the Shih-men-chia position, under General Li, to deal his adversary the coup-de-grace. This knowledge the Japanese have kept studiously to themselves, until they considered the success of the operation was assured, and it was only at the last possible moment that they divulged it. The final attack is not expected before the 24th October at earliest.

That the Japanese Military were favourable to and were aiding Chang Tso-lin was believed by all of Wu Pei fu's army, as may be instanced by the hustling of Japanese at Tientsin Central station when Wu arrived after his betrayal. Their fear for their wireless station was entirely due to the knowledge that Wu suspected them of transmitting news to Mukden. It might be thought that these fears of Wu's resentment would have caused the Japanese Military to act with the greatest caution so as to show they were entirely neutral in deed as well as in profession. But this was not so as instanced by another quotation from the above mentioned British Staff officer's despatch G.N.S.C. 11-1/43 of 24-25th October.

On the morning of the 26th October, the Japanese, assured of the arrival of their reinforcements, issued orders to their Detachment Commander to prevent Chihli troops entering the Dock area by force if necessary, and giving them leave to open fire if an attempt were made to do so. These orders were shown to Wu Pei fu, who made no reply. Later in the day 220 Japanese arrived, with two more destroyers

It may here be noted that, on the last despatch of the International train to Shanhaikuan, at the request of the Japanese, for the reinforcement of Chinwangtao, the Japanese reinforcement consisted almost entirely of telegraphists. These men were dropped off at all principal stations on the line, in the American and French sectors, and by the time the train reached Chinwangtao the reinforcements had dwindled down to a couple of men.

Also the following despatch from the same source, being a quotation from the minutes of the Commandants' conference at Tientsin of 24th October is of interest.

The Japanese opened this question by stating that in the event of a defeat of Wu Pei-fu, Chinwangtao would become the scene of fighting, and that the lives and property of foreigners would be in great danger. They alleged that this station was their only means of communicating with Tokio. They were accordingly extremely anxious to stop fighting as this would inevitably endanger their station. They had no right to do so. They proposed that Wu Pei-fu should be told to use Peitaiho if he wished to embark his army, in case of defeat. The Japanese destroyers now at Chinwangtao could easily chase off the Chinese transports.

It may be remarked that the utility of Peitaiho as a place of embarkation is very small, there being no facilities of any description and that in the event of an embarkation being ordered from this point on the coast there would have been no possibility of Wu being able to get away his guns and he would have had an army without artillery with which to continue his campaign.

That the Japanese did not carry their threat into execution and changed their mind about the use of Chinwangtao as a port of embarkation for Wu's army must be recorded, but there is no evidence to show why they altered their plans, or whether their original threat was only made to embarrass Wu.

The above press extracts and opinions will show whether or not the Japanese have observed the policy of non-intervention as intimated to the Military Attache, Tokio. In any case they will obtain credit for intervention on the side of General Chang Tso-lin with especial reference to the bribery of General Feng. Few residents in China will believe in Japanese neutrality and the Chinese themselves are unanimous in the opinion that Japan has dispersed the Chihli party so as to reinstate their Anfu friends. In order to illustrate this the Peking and Tientsin Times in a leader of the 12th November openly accuses the Japanese of participation in Chang's victory. This is hardly to be wondered at if the following extract from the General Staff War Notes of 28th October G.S.N.C. 11-1/46 is taken into consideration.

"Undoubtedly the most dangerous form of publicity which has taken place in the present struggle is that organized by the Japanese, who have through the means of the Press fostered a campaign of defaitism against Wu Pei-fu from the beginning. It is well established that their wireless station at Chinwangtao was in constant communication with Mukden during the whole time that the fighting was going on on the Shanhaikuan front. It was very strongly suspected, particularly by the Chinese, that all identifications of Chihli troops in the sector was thus communicated to the enemy. Further, the Japanese Headquarters in Tientsin has been consistently supplying the Press with information derived from their own military source, whenever such information has been unfavourable to the Chihli party. In China, the Foreign Press has remarkable liberty, and information of immense military value is published in a way which would never be tolerated in a European War.

Just before the coup d'etat, before it was generally realised that the Fengtien Forces had made such progress beyond Shih-men-chia, on the Shan-hai-kuan front, and while not only the general public, but most of the better informed organs know little of the exact situation, the Japanese began giving to the British Intelligence, and to the most influential foreign papers, a tolerably accurate account of what was going on. Immediately after Feng Yu-hsiang entered Peking, and while the situation was still uncertain, the Japanese entirely ceased their communications until the moment, when, having considered the Fengtien plans could not possibly miscarry they felt that publicity might add to the alarm and despondency of the partisans of Wu Pei-fu. On the night of the 28th, Captain Watari sought out the editor of the Peking and

Tientsin Times, took him round to Japanese Headquarters, and having introduced him to Major Kaneko (Japanese Intelligence Officer) gave for publication all the messages coming in from military sources. On the last eastward journey of the International train Japanese telegraphists were dropped all along the line in the American sector, and it was their messages which were deliberately given to the world, in the most influential paper in North China.

The Editor was accommodated in the quarters of the Intelligence Officer until midnight, and was able to publish the account of the disaster to the Chihli troops at Lan-hsien in his morning's issue.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Colonel,
Military Attache,
Peking.

To Sir Ronald Macleay, K.C.M.G.
H.B.M.'s Minister,
Peking.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Chinese Armed Forces.

From M/A. Peking.

No. 5290 Date April 10, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

6180

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 13 19

1. The following general remarks are based upon reports already filed from this office; reports made to this office by observers with Chinese armies during the wars of the past several months; and personal experience. They are applicable to and intended as descriptive of all Chinese armed forces.

2. There is no Chinese Army in the sense of an armed force maintained for the preservation of domestic and national peace and dignity.

3. Such armed forces as exist are maintained by leaders. The prominence of leaders is dependent upon the number and efficiency of their own armed forces, or of those of the leaders who for the time support them. Thus Tuan Chi Jui has no armed forces of his own, but is supported in his present power by those of Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang.

Chang Tso-lin, in turn, owes his supremacy in Manchuria, and Feng-Yu-hsiang his in Chihli, to the armed forces each commands.

4. Armed forces have the loyalty to their leaders of men who in a land where it is always hard to gain a livelihood, are fed, clothed and paid. With the possible exception noted in the next paragraph, it is not a loyalty that can endure reverses or great hardships, or that will be preserved if food, clothing and pay is withheld.

5. Feng Yu-hsiang, with more acumen than other leaders, has sharply distinguished his men from those of other armed forces by making them Christians. There is much scorn of this among both Chinese and foreigners. I do not think this scorn well advised. Whether or not they are Christians according to western conceptions, the vast majority of officers and enlisted men are earnest, sincere, and in many cases fanatical in their observance of rites and ceremonies that they believe Christian. I think it probable that in a severe test this will result in a greater loyalty and devotion to Feng than other leaders can command. He is himself known as the "Christian General" and I attribute his personal belief, and the immediate efforts he makes to "Christianize" all recruits to his forces, to an astute sense of their potential value alike in foreign estimation and domestic warfare.

6. For food, uniform and pay of the Chinese soldier see Reports M.A. China, No. 2749, Feb. 16, 1921; No. 2730, Dec. 8, 1920; and China Year Book, 1923; and Digest No. 6410. In theory the Chinese Government maintains the armed forces. Actually the leaders obtain the money necessary. Various

Binding Margin.

methods are used, the commonest being by taxation. Whenever this, as established, is sufficient, it is collected and diverted from its intended use to the keep of the army. If it is not sufficient, more taxes are levied, and individuals and groups compelled to contribute. The proceeds of the Peking Octroi have for some time been absorbed by Jung Yu-hsiang for his men. Chambers of Commerce are frequently called upon for sums. The cultivation of poppies is made compulsory in certain areas, as this crop always produces a large revenue.

7. The Chinese foot soldier is armed with a rifle and bayonet. See Report M.A. China, No. 2750, Dec. 8, 1920. The Japanese model 7.9 mm. is the commonest type of rifle, and is being manufactured in a few of the Chinese arsenals. The Cavalry soldier is armed with an obsolete 6.5 and 7.9 carbine.

See Report M.A. China, 2064, May 20, 1919; and 2156, Aug. 5, 1919.

A German model 77 mm. field piece is the commonest type of artillery. A few of these guns are now being manufactured at Mukden.

A trench mortar is a new weapon in the Fengtien Army.

A German type automatic rifle and a light German type machine gun are in limited use.

A limited number of special troops have pistols and beheading swords. The latter are not unlike bolos except that they are two handed. They are carried across the shoulders in dederative scabbards and are more indicative of special missions and duties of their bearers than intended for warfare.

The commonest type of pistol is the Mauser.

8. Aeroplanes in increasing numbers have been added to the equipment of Chinese armed forces.

9. There is no chemical warfare service.

10. Infantry is the predominant arm. Organization designed to fix a proportion between arms and services, based upon modern standards, fails because of lack of guns for artillery, mounts, equipment and training for the cavalry, and equipment and training for special troops.

There are no Signal, Engineering or Medical Corps troops worthy of note, though all exist in theory.

11. Every leader has attached to his headquarters a wireless equipment and a personnel for its operation, generally Japanese trained and efficient. The equipment is of limited sending range. These are jealously guarded, for no apparent reason, and no foreigner has been able to make a close inspection of them. Some batteries are equipped with field telephones, and some with buzzers.

12. The enlisted personnel of the armed forces is of the coolie class. With the exceptions noted in the next paragraph, they are natives of the provinces in which they serve. It is believed that in time of peace the larger part of the men have entered the service voluntarily. It offers them at least food, clothing and shelter, and the work is not hard. The Chinese

are gregarious, and the Chinese youth in particular enjoys the society of large numbers of his fellows. The soldiers seem happy and contented in times of peace and to be reasonably proud of their occupation.

13. The personnel of the Fengtien armed forces, both commissioned and enlisted, is drawn from the colonists who have entered Manchuria from south of the Great Wall. These are mainly from the provinces of Shantung and Chihli. As a result, the efficiency of these, while serving in Manchuria, is equal to that of other Chinese troops, but is materially decreased when in campaigns south of the Wall. In such campaigns they are in areas full of family and religious associations, and encounter in combat relatives and friends. As furthermore many of them on outbreak or war, are impressed into the army, the foregoing added to an opportunity to regain their former homes, cause many desertions and a marked decline in fighting power.

The armed forces of the Kwo Ming Tang in Kwangtung are mainly mercenaries from Yunnan with some from Hunan and Kwangsi. The men of Kwangtung do not make good soldiers.

14. The men of Yunnan and Szechuan have the reputation of being the boldest, and best fighters in China.

15. The lower grades of the commissioned officers are in general filled by men promoted from the ranks. It is of infrequent occurrence that they reach a grade above that of captain. Especially capable and ambitious men, however, advance rapidly, particularly if they have learned to read and write. Tsao Kun and Feng Yu-hsiang are examples.

In the upper grades officers are appointed through family or party influence, and with little regard to fitness. Wise leaders endeavor to avoid this practice, particularly in the grades of general officers, but are not always able to do so. Thus Wu Pei-fu kept as Commanding General of the 26th Division the cowardly and incompetent Tsao Ying, brother of Tsao Kun, head of the Chihli Party.

16. There have been many efforts made to establish and maintain schools of instruction for officers. These generally begin with carefully worked out plans and promise well. A faculty is assembled that includes some foreign instructors, students ordered from the armed forces or civil life, and some little headway actually made. The changes in government, however, and the vicissitudes of the frequent wars, interrupt the course, and the school languishes. A Chinese characteristic that operates against the benefit to be derived from foreign instruction is their conceit.

There are some officers who have received military training abroad, principally in Japan and the United States. Those from Japan are generally viewed with more respect than those from the United States. Many of the former have gained high rank.

I do not know of any officer trained in America who has a higher rank than that of Brigadier General. This officer is Chief of Police in Harbin. He was not given any command in the Chihli-Fengtien war. For a short time another American trained officer was executive to the Commanding General of the Railway Police. While on this duty he held the brevet rank of Major General. During the war he was given no command.

For military training schools see Reports M.A. China, No. 2857, Jan. 27, 1921; and 2908, Aug. 28, 1921.

Certain leaders, notably Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang, were and are energetic in the instruction of their officers. In their forces schools were maintained and attendance was compulsory. From personal inspection and from reports, the impression gained was of a maximum of effort with a minimum of result. The instructors being all Chinese.

17. The junior officers are fairly efficient in the duties of their grades. Their initiative is not cultivated. As a class they do not promise material for higher command.

Senior officers, with a few notable exceptions, are incompetent. Their knowledge of the military profession is rudimentary. They lack the quality of leadership.

With certain exceptions, officers give the impression of being lacking in an agressive spirit. I do not believe them cowardly, but they are not courageous. I am of the opinion that they could be made so.

The great outstanding defect in the corps of Chinese officers of any of the armed forces, is that there is no fixed unswerving loyalty to any leader or cause. I am of the opinion that this could be cultivated.

18. The relations between officers of different grades under normal circumstances are easy and pleasant, as are those, within the limits of discipline, between officers and enlisted men. The latter, under beloved leaders such as Wu Pei-fu and Chih Hsieh-yuan, show a blind and devoted loyalty. Under abnormal circumstances the treatment of junior officers by seniors, and of enlisted men by officers, is on occasion marked by a ferocity without justice. Instant and fearful punishment for real or fancied infractions of discipline, is imposed without trial or proof.

19. The training of enlisted men is almost wholly in close order drill, gymnastics and cleanliness about barracks.

The first is along the lines of instruction given at the time of the organisation of the model army by Yuan Shih-kai, and is mainly German, modified in recent years by the influence of Japanese trained officers.

The Chinese have a natural sense of rythym and time, great muscular control, unending patience, and marked submissiveness to authority. As a result close order drill among the better troops, particularly those of Feng-Yu-hsiang, reaches a very high standard of excellence and one that must be seen to be believed.

Smooth and polished as it is, however, there is apparent to the close observer a lack of the snap and fire that marks western troops.

Bayonet exercise is a beautiful example of perfect timing and laborious training, but is not of value in inculcating a desire to close with that weapon, or to make the soldier efficient in its use in a hand to hand fight.

Senior officers are saluted punctiliously, but no attention is paid juniors as they move about among the troops.

The second results in a high standard of gymnastic ability among all the men. It includes much posturing and leaping about known as "boxing" and "fencing" in which individuals meet imaginary opponents. It might be compared to our "shadow boxing", except that it seems to be traditional, and to follow rigid lines of attack, feint and defense, the excellence of a performance being determined by the faithful adherence in all movements to an established sequence. In the "fencing" the huge beheading knife is used, though occasionally spears are also seen.

The third results, in permanent barracks, in a cleanliness that is remarkable, and that would reflect credit upon the best western troops. It does not carry over into field service, however, camps generally being filthy.

There is a minimum of extended order drill, and no battle exercise. The initiative of non-commissioned officers is not cultivated. There is no target practice.

Some theoretical instruction is given in the use of the weapons with which the men are equipped but it does not seem of much value.

The personal equipment of the men is kept clean, but not as a well trained soldier should keep it, rifles in particular being scrubbed with fine sand until they gleam like silver inside and out.

The general impression given by the enlisted men is that of a lot of coolies who thoroughly enjoy concerted movements, who are patient, strong, obedient and good natured. It is distinctly not that of fighting men. I believe that they could be made excellent soldiers.

20. The physical endurance of the Chinese soldiers is well established. On a meagre ration, in a cotton uniform that costs less than one dollar, in cloth shoes that he makes and repairs himself, equipped with his rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition, he can make astounding marches, 30 miles a day for several days being easily performed.

21. Transportation for the armed forces differs somewhat in different parts of China. It is what the country-side provides. There is no standard equipment for armies, nor is any amount kept on hand in times of peace. On the outbreak of hostilities, carts, draft and pack animals are seized from the streets of the towns and the farmers in the country. It isof the rarest occasion that the owners see them again. For transportation and forage see Report M.A. China, Nos. 2815, May 20, 1921; M.A. Peking, Jan. 26, 1922; and M.A. China, No. 5167, July 30, 1923.

22. Armed forces throughout China are organized on similar lines. See Reports M. A. China, 2640, Sept. 9, 1920; and 2659, Sept. 30, 1920; and Digest 6170.

CHINESE ARMED FORCES IN THE CHIHLI-FENGTIEN WAR IN THE FALL OF 1924.

23. The causes of this war have heretofore been reported. It was watched with much interest to determine what advance the Chinese armies had made since the last Chihli-Fengtien clash and the effect of the two new weapons at their disposal, i.e., the aero-plane and the trench-mortar.

Both parties to the conflict had been adding to their air service, though it was thought certain that the Fengtien forces had a superiority. It was believed possible that Chang Tso-lin would bomb Peking, and that he would use his superiority with marked effect.

Only the Fengtien forces had the trench mortars.

At the outbreak of this war it was estimated that the organized armed forces in China numbered something over a million and less than one million two hundred thousand men.

The Fengtien army strength was placed at 150,000 maximum. Its allied force under Lu Yung-hsiang at 58,000. The Chihli army had an immediately available strength of 225,000 and estimated reinforcements of another 200,000.

24. The contending forces will be alluded to as Chihli and Fengtien. By Chihli is meant all those forces under the Chihli Party, then in control of the Central Government. It is not to be understood as being confined to troops from Chihli Province.

By Fengtien is meant all those forces opposed to the Chihli Party which come from Manchuria. Fengtien is the name of one of the Manchurian provinces, and has been given in general to the Manchurian armies.

25. The Fengtien Army.

Chang Tso-lin is the super-Tuchun of Manchuria and Commander-in-Chief of the Fengtien armies. He is of mediocre military ability and timid nature. His Chief of Staff, Yang Yu-ting, is Japanese trained. He is energetic, hardworking, and clever and is generally regarded as the brains of the army.

Principal leaders at the outbreak of the war were:

Chang Hsueh-liang,	Commanding,	1st and 3rd Armies.
Li Ching-lin,	"	2nd Army.
Chang Tso-hsiang	"	4th Army.
Wu Hsing-chuan	"	5th Army.
Hsu Lan-chow	"	6th Army.

26. The strength of the army was estimated at not to exceed 150,000. Its organization was as follows:

1st Army - 4 Mixed Brigades.
2nd Army - 1 Division, 3 Brigades.
3rd Army - 1 " , 3 "
4th Army - 4 Brigades, Kirin troops.
5th Army - 4 Brigades, Heilungkiang troops.
6th Army - 2 Cavalry Brigades.

The 4th, 5th and 6th Armies took no part in the fighting and have remained in Manchuria.

27. Viewed as a strictly military problem, the Fengtien army seemed to be at considerable disadvantage. In numbers and resources it was far inferior to its adversaries. Chang Tso-lin had occasion to doubt the personal loyalty of some of his leaders. There was dissension among elements of his army. He feared an invasion by the Soviets of the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The country was heavily flooded. His arsenal was not yet completed.

The difficulties of his position were well known to his enemies who deliberately attacked in the belief that Chang would be unable to overcome them.

A defensive campaign seemed the wisest course to follow and the initial Fengtien maneuvers were to this end.

28. Initial mobilization was effected at Mukden; Kirin and Heilungkiang troops concentrated on that point by marching and over the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways. The 1st and 3rd Armies were moved over the Peking-Mukden Railway to Chinchow. The 2nd Army directed to march on Chaoyang and Pingchuan. The 4th Army was held in reserve.

An air station was established at Chinchow and all planes at Mukden sent to that point.

29. Movement of troops was effected with the greatest secrecy. A rigid censorship was maintained and details of mobilization impossible to obtain. Trains carrying the 1st and 3rd Armies to Chinchow were dispatched at night from Mukden, and there was no interruption of normal freight and passenger service.

30. Concentration at Chinchow of the 1st and 3rd Armies was accomplished prior to the actual outbreak of war.

31. The ultimate destination of the 1st and 2nd Armies was Shanhaikwan, where the Peking-Mukden Railway passes through the Great Wall. Here was expected the main Chihli attack. The ultimate destination of the 2nd Army was Pingchuan, where the roads join that lead north from Kupeikou and Haifengkou. This force was expected to contain any Chihli forces advancing from either of these points.

32. On the night of Sept. 11-12, the Peking-Mukden Railway was interrupted 12 miles north of Shanhaikwan. By that date the advance elements of the 1st and 3rd Armies had arrived just north of that point, constructed trenches and artillery positions and were prepared to resist anyadvance of the Chihli forces.

33. The 2nd Army carrying out its plans, was in conflict with Chihli forces near Chaoyang on Sept. 15th, captured that place on the 27th and captured Pingchuan on October 7th.

34. Hostilities opened at Shanhaikwan September 18th by an air attack delivered by the Fengtien forces. At this time the best information obtainable placed the Fengtien air concentration at Chinchow as consisting of

1 Spad
3 Italian pursuit planes, old.
2 Fokkers,
10 Breguets.
6 Caudrons.
2 Handley-Page with
2 Loehner sea-planes at Hulatao.

35. Toward the end of September many of the disadvantages of the Fengtien position had been overcome and others had been found to be more apparent than real. On September 20th Chang entered into an agreement with the Soviets, known as the Soviet-Mukden Agreement. In this he made many concessions to the Soviets, but in return all his fears of an invasion of his rear by a Soviet Army were allayed. Chang announced that through the agreement he was able to release enough men from guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway to form two new armies, the 7th and 8th, for service against the Chihli forces.

The agreement and this announcement caused much consternation in Peking. It was not until after the war that it was discovered that the 7th and 8th Armies never were organized.

A sufficient war chest had been raised and its potent influence secured any loyalties that had been wavering.

The floods were found to not greatly impede the movement of Fengtien troops in the area north of and adjacent to the Wall.

[redacted]

The arsenal was speeded up to a point where it was supplying ammunition needed for a prolonged campaign.

36. Other factors contributory to an increased aggressiveness on the part of the Fengtien forces were the sympathetic attitude of the Japanese and the completion of negotiations with certain Chihli leaders for the betrayal of Wu Pei-fu.

Concerning the first various reports have already been rendered.

Concerning the second, there is every reason to believe that a plot had been in existence for some time between Chang Tso-lin, Lu Yung-hsiang, Tuan Chi-jui, Feng Yu-hsiang and Wang Cheng-pin for a concerted attack on the Chihli Party and Wu Pei-fu. Knowledge of this plot and its threat had induced the attack on Lu Yung-hsiang by Chi Hsieh-yuan, which brought on the war. Full reports have been rendered on this matter. (See Report M.A. China, No. 5301, Nov. 7, 1924, and No. 5272, July 1, 1924.)

37. At the outbreak of the war Chang was not certain that he would be able to obtain sufficient money to secure the adherence to the plot of Feng-Yu-hsiang and Wang Cheng-pin. Under Chihli organization and disposition for attack, the former, in command of the Chihli 3rd Army, was sent to Jehol, and Wang Huai-ching, in command of the 2nd Army, was sent to Hsi Feng-kou. Wang-Cheng-pin was sent to Jehol to command both the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and co-ordinate their efforts with the main attack which Wu planned to the eastward. It was to meet this force that the Fengtien 2nd Army was sent to Pinchuan.

38. Now, however, Chang became in sudden possession of an addition to his war chest for the express purpose of buying Feng's betrayal. It may be that the exact truth of the source of this addition will never be known. It is generally believed to have been Japanese. (See Report M.A. China No. 5349, Mar. 5, 1925.

Negotiations were brought to a satisfactory conclusion between Chang and Feng.

As a result the 2nd Fengtien Army was relieved of its duty of watching the Chihli concentration at Jehol, abandoned that front and marched south against the Chihli communications at Lanchow.

The Fengtien armies passed from the defensive to a vigorous offensive about Shanhaikwan. Retaining a holding force directly in front of it, and subjecting it to a bombardment, the larger part of the 1st and 3rd Armies delivered a vicious attack on Chiu Men, a pass in the mountains and gate in the Great Wall nine miles inland from Shanhaikwan. Chiu Men was captured October 8th, and the Fengtien troops pushed on and occupied Shih Men Chai October 15th. This place is approximately 30 miles due north of Chinwangtao, at that time Headquarters of the Chihli Armies. It is at the end of a branch line of railway which extends from Chinwangtao to Linkiang. From it an attack could immediately have been delivered on Chinwangtao which would have caused a retreat of the forces at that point to Lanchow and the capture of Shanhaikwan and the Chihli troops there. However, such an attack and result was not all that the Fengtien command desired to accomplish from its dispositions and plans. Accordingly no effort was made to exploit the advantages gained pending the arrival of the 2nd Fengtien Army within striking distance of Lanchow and the expected defection of Feng Yu-hsiang.

39. On the morning of October 12th, Marshal Wu Pei-fu arrived at Chinwangtao. Unaware of the gravity of the situation, he left immediately on an inspection by sea of landing places on the coast north of Shanhaikwan and in the Fengtien rear. On his return on October 14th he found furious attacks in progress that ended in the capture of Shih Men Chai by the Fengtien forces. All initiative lost, he hastily disembarked troops intended for an attack by sea on the Fengtien rear, and made desperate efforts to reestablish his front.

The Fengtien forces remained on the defensive, and the fighting was sanguinary but without gains for Wu.

On October 23rd, word was received of Feng Yu-hsiang's seizure of Peking and declaration against Wu. Immediately the Fengtien forces launched a furious assault on Chinwangtao, which they captured on the 30th,- Shanhaikwan falling the next day. On October 29th the 2nd Fengtien Army captured Lanchow. The victory was complete and overwhelming. The only troops to escape were 30,000, - 7000 accompaning Wu to Tientsin October 24th by rail, passing Lanchow barely in time to escape the Fengtien 2nd Army. The other 13,000 escaped by sea.

40. The strategy of the Fengtien army was perfect throughout. It only failed of the complete success hoped for, the capture of Wu, because Feng-Yu-hsiang did not immediately after his coup, move on and seize Tientsin. This cannot be charged as an error in Fengtien plans, in which such an action was contemplated.

I believe that this contemplated plan was known to the Japanese and was responsible for the order received by the Japanese commander at Chinwangtao to prevent the escape of Chihli forces by sea from that point. (See M/A Report No. 5385, page 4, Apr. 4, 1925.

Cut off from the sea, by rail at Lanchow and Tientsin, the escape of any Chihli forces would have been impossible.

41. This failure of Feng to proceed at once to Tientsin was the occasion of the first break between him and Chang Tso-lin.

42. The tactics of the Fengtien army were not closely observed. For diplomatic reasons the observer from this office with that army was forbidden to go to the front. No western foreigners were with the army. Such data as follows was obtained from what our observer was able to learn by an inspection of the battle fields subsequent to the fighting, and from officers' accounts that were given him. Also from reports of observers with Chihli forces. Fengtien officers are much more reticent in giving information to Americans than those of other forces.

Morale of the troops:

Excellent when all was going well. No select troops nor any esprit de corps. Hand to hand fighting was avoided. Trenches were from 1200 to 1500 yards from enemy. Artillery bombarded from positions at maximum range from targets.

Discipline:

Very good, but not up to that of the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang.

Officers:

Staff officers fairly well trained and educated. Line officers not particularly well trained, but on the whole better than those of other Chinese forces.

Trench Mortars:

These were used with great effect. They bombed from ranges of approximately 1000 meters, and though I do not think they had much physical effect, they greatly dismayed the Chihli soldiers. Whether from a lack of explosives, or because of graft in the arsenal, the explosions of the projectiles were not severe and the craters formed insignificant.

Chihli artillery was unable to hit trench mortar positions. They could have easily been blown up by American artillery. The trench mortar has earned a place in Chinese warfare for the present, and is given much greater importance than it deserves or would obtain against efficient troops.

Air Service:

In spite of a fairly good equipment and unrivalled opportunities to use it with deadly effect, the value of planes in the war to the Fengtien forces was negible. They flew at tremendous heights that precluded use of machine guns or accurate bombing. Their bombs were light and defective. When used the planes appeared singly. There is no doubt of the profound effect they would have on morale were they used intelligently. On October 13th at Chinwangtao, a lone Fengtien plane flew over the Chihli forces and dropped one bomb which exploded. It is said to have dropped three which did not explode. The excitement was intense. On the threat of a repetition of the attack the following morning, practically every staff and general officer deserted headquarters and took refuge in the foreign settlement, a mile and a half distant. Six Fengtien planes, flying low and using machine guns and bombs, would have thrown the whole force into hopeless confusion and panic.

Sick and Wounded:

Care and evacuation of sick and wounded was casual and entrusted generally to hired coolies.

43. The higher officers of the Fengtien army present a smart and efficient appearance, no doubt partly attributable to the success of the campaign. The men seemed rugged, cheerful and contented. I concur in the following remark by Capt. N. L. Baldwin, S. C., Assistant Military Attache: "The Manchurian Army is not particularly raised in courage or morale by the recent success of Chang Tso-lin. It has no binding tie to Manchuria. It is lacking in the higher forms of discipline and morale, badly armed, poorly trained, and with no usable modern equipment. Man for man, I do not consider it in any way equal to the forces under Feng Yu-hsiang. I do not believe it could survive a campaign south of the Wall which included unusual hardships or a severe reverse. At the present time it is well paid and fed. If this does not continue to be the case I do not think it can continue as an army."

44. One new element in the personnel of Chinese armed forces appeared in the Fengtien forces in the so-called "Foreign Legion".
(See Report M/A China, No. 5387, April 8, 1925.).

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
In replying refer to

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

2657-J-276

November 1, 1924

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Civil War in North China.

1. Political and Economic Situation

General Wu made proposals to Peking October 29. These efforts for a compromise between Generals Feng and Wu have some promise of success. If successful they might avert bloodshed and save Wu, but cannot prevent the collapse of the Chihli party.

The Yangtze Provinces are still reported loyal to General Wu. The attitude of the southern leaders is non-commital.

Peking is orderly.

International trains are operating between Tientsin and Peking.

The Associated Press, in a dispatch of October 31, reports a new Provisional Cabinet formed at Peking. The new Acting Premier slated is General Huang Fu who was Minister of Education in the Cabinet just fallen, and assisted greatly in the coup. Dr. C.T.Wang is scheduled for Foreign Minister and Wang Yung-chiang, present Civil Governor of Fengtien, a strong Chang man, is slated for Minister of Interior.

2. Military Situation

General Wu Pei Fu's position appears hopeless. In the Shanhaikwan Sector, General Chang's second army pierced the Great Wall at Leng Kou and marching overland, captured the important railroad bridge on the Lan River near Lan Chow on October 29. This cut General Wu's rail communications with Shanhaikwan and has caused the collapse of this front. The number of Wu's troops thus cut off is unknown, but must be between 30,000 and 50,000. Wu is endeavoring to extricate these forces through Chinwangtao by sea to Taku. Several thousand of his soldiers have already been thus extricated by boat.

General Wu is now endeavoring to establish an eastern front at Lutai on the railroad about 30 miles east of, and based on Tientsin and the sea.

General Wu's northwest front is at Yangtsun also based on Tientsin and the sea.

There was some fighting at Lofa on October 30.

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The bulk of General Feng's troops are in positions near Lang Fang. All Feng's troops have been withdrawn from Peking.

Some reenforcements for General Wu have arrived from Shantung, and a line of retreat down the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad remains open.

One division of General Wu's troops mutinied at Tang Ku and temporarily blocked the railway.

According to a Tientsin Press dispatch, two American destroyers and a gunboat bring 1,100 marines dispatched from Cavite some days ago, as a reenforcement to the Peking Legation Guard, are expected to arrive off Taku today. A contingent of British marines is also expected from Weihaiwei today.

James H. Reeves,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

for Gen. Dawes Cable. PSR

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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4-1

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Attitude of Japanese During Recent Fighting in Northern China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 23 1926

1. It is probable that the full details of the revolt against Chang Tso-lin of Kuo Sung-ling will never be known. Many and conflicting stories are told of its origin and support. Only such of them as implicate the Japanese are pertinent to this report.

2. According to one of these, the Japanese for some time have been dissatisfied with the attitude of Chang Tso-lin. Certain memorials concerning this attitude had been presented to the Japanese Government by Japanese resident in Manchuria, in which a more positive course had been recommended. As a result it was decided to supplant him in Manchuria by a Chinese who would be more amenable to Japanese desires in that area and who would give effect to those rights claimed by the Japanese. Kuo Sung-ling was the person selected. He attended the army maneuvers in Japan of the fall of 1925 and at that time the plot was perfected that culminated in his dramatic attempt to seize the Three Eastern Provinces.

3. Another story is that for long the Military Party in Japan had been desirous of taking vigorous measures with Chang Tso-lin, whom they accused of using Japanese help when in straits but of denying any obligation once the emergency was safely passed. In this desire they were opposed by the Government and were unable to enlist popular favor as the people in general, already burdened by taxes, were unwilling to support a movement entailing further expenditures in furthering a plan that did not appeal to them as necessary. They therefore decided to give both the Government and the people an object lesson by encouraging a revolt against Chang, which in its prospects of success would threaten Japanese supremacy in Manchuria.

4. Considering the first story: If Kuo Sung-ling had been successful it would seem that the Japanese Government would have been confronted with the necessity of bringing about with him those relations which, however they fell short of the full measure of hoped for success, they had established over many years with Chang Tso-lin. What guarantees or hostages Kuo could give the Japanese as to his conduct of affairs in the event of his success over Chang are not known. I doubt if greater assurance could be given by him than his word. It seems that the Japanese would be no better off with Kuo than they had been with Chang.

5. The second story holds more elements of probability and is in a measure supported by the course taken by the events. Immediately following the announcement of Kuo's treachery Mukden was thrown into panic. I doubt if this would have been so great, even if it would have been created, had the news of Kuo's treachery not been followed by some intimation from the Japanese that Chang need look for no help from them. There is much reason to believe that Chang finally received help from the Japanese, and certainly Kuo's plans were interfered with and his chances diminished by their actions in Manchuria. At any time they had it in their power to entirely reassure Chang. Yet for the first few days of Kuo's campaign, Japan protested neutrality, while Li Ching-lin in Tientsin announced an intention to remain out of the conflict. News reports from Japan were to the effect that the desperate nature of Chang's predicament was recognized and his flight from Mukden thought to be only a matter of hours. Kuo's victory was accepted as assured and arrangements discussed for insuring the safety of Japanese interests until he was firmly in office. These reports may have been skilful camouflage but they had an air of truth.

From M/A, China. Report No. 5741. January 20, 1926.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Attitude of Japanese During Recent Fighting in Northern China - cont'd.

6. Some digression must be made here to the connection of Feng Yu-hsiang and the National Army with Kuo's attempted coup. Whether or not Kuo had passive or active support from the Japanese, there can be no question of the fact that he received encouragement and assurance of support from Feng. It has long been recognized in China that however disturbing an element the Manchurian Army might be, and in spite of defeats that might and had been administered to it south of the Wall, it could never be conquered in its own territory north of the Wall while it was supported by the Japanese. No leader south of the Wall felt safe against attack from Manchuria, nor did an alliance with the Manchurian Army prove safe.

In an attempt to solve this problem Feng some months ago entered into negotiations with the Japanese. There is reason to believe that he assured them that were he to become the dominant figure in Manchuria he would be more amenable to their wishes than Chang, and that on this understanding he asked their support. There is also every reason to believe that the Japanese were not only distrustful of Feng but had viewed with alarm his increasing strength and close affiliation with the Soviets, their only serious foreign rivals in Manchuria.

With Japanese consent Chang Tso-lin had moved south of the Wall in the spring of 1925 in a campaign whose ultimate object was Feng's suppression (see Report #5419). The maneuvering which followed developed Soviet willingness to support Feng not only south of the Wall with munitions and supplies, but in northern Manchuria as well by demonstrations in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway designed to check any extensive Manchurian Army movement to the south of the Wall. Chang's movements came to an indecisive halt. Later, when attacked by Sun Chuan-fang, Chang's army, following a pre-arranged plan, fell back to Shantung and behind a line roughly from Tsinan to Paotingfu prepared to resist the advance of its enemies from the south while massing the best troops for an assault on Feng. Once again Feng's dispositions for defence at Nankow, as developed by Chang's reconnaissance, were found too strong to risk an attack.

7. Matters were thus at an impasse. Though Feng apparently was unable to secure Japanese support in an attack on Chang in Manchuria, Chang was each time foiled in his efforts to crush Feng. It seems clear that Japanese interests all lay on Chang's side. The only hope of a solution favorable to Chang and the Japanese lay in luring Feng into conflict and breaking his power. It seems reasonable to me that the Japanese gave assent to Feng's and Kuo's plans to conquer Chang. I cannot believe they would have undertaken the campaign without some assurance of support or non-interference from the Japanese. Upon such non-interference and the use of the railway through Tientsin for the forwarding to Kuo of reenforcements and supplies depended its whole success.

8. Events moved rapidly after the plans were matured. Kuo declared his warfare on Chang and moved north toward Mukden, while Li announced his neutrality in Tientsin. When Kuo was irrevocably launched on his attack Li denounced Feng and the trap was sprung. Feng might still have saved himself but it is probable that he had made such promises to his subordinates, based upon his hopes of the success of the plot, that he could not withdraw. Committed fully to the attack on Li Ching-lin, his definite

alignment with Kuo in an attack on Manchuria was patent to all. The public in Japan realized that the attack on Chang was not being made by another Manchurian leader who would, if successful, alter in no way relations as existing between their nationals and interests in Manchuria and Chang, except possibly for the better, but by a leader allied with and supported by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd National Armies, whose own army had been named the North Eastern National Army, and that these armies were under the influence of the Soviets and themselves radical in sympathies to the point of communism. The reaction was immediate and violent in favor of such armed intervention as would remove the peril.

It is known that a number of Japanese troops were sent to Manchuria to reinforce the garrison there and to assist in preserving the neutrality of the South Manchurian Railway. The Japanese admit that these numbered 2,500 men. A report from a foreign official source in Mukden put the reinforcements at 20,000, inclusive of four regiments of artillery. This report was made twice by the same official. Newchwang was closed to Kuo, who thereby was denied a route of approach to Mukden by rail that would have accelerated his advance and taken Chang's line of defence in rear.

A foreign observer of the fighting near Yangtsun reported the presence of a Japanese officer and detachment within Feng's lines, who by means of wireless was giving information to Li in Tientsin. This officer was discovered in his activities by Feng's troops and took refuge with the observer quoted. He was equipped with maps of the area. A Japanese sergeant was actually killed by Feng's men at this time but it is not known if he had been a member of the officer's detachment referred to.

Telegraphic communication from Tientsin was broken during the fighting, but on December 21st the American Consul General there reported that it was known that the Japanese, who on a pretext of tide observations have maintained a small group at Taku for some years, were sending messages from that point to Tientsin. He states that though no one seems to have known of its existence the Japanese have a military wire on the Taku side of the river to Tientsin and that he is satisfied of its existence. The amount of support and its nature, given to Li Ching-lin in his denunciation of Feng and defense of Tientsin is problematical. A deadly blow to Kuo was contained in the following proclamation:

"December 20, 1925.

"The Japanese Headquarters in Mukden made the following announcement with regard to the demarcation of the barred area and the guarding of the railway zone:

1. As regards the cordon within 20 Chinese li of the barred area, cavalry patrols will be posted from December 18th with Mukden as the center of the area.
2. The barred area will be marked with the red and white flags and the Japanese flags will not be used for the purpose.
3. The placing of red and white flags have been notified both to Chang's and Kuo's armies.
4. No Japanese aeroplanes will be used in the barred area, but this will not be applied when it is deemed necessary for military operation.
5. In Tieling and Liaoyang the same cordon will be posted as in Mukden.

6. The Japanese Army will give both the armies of Chang and Kuo absolutely equal treatment, and if any of them venture to break into the barred area, the Japanese army will take decisive measures.

7. Regardless of which side wins or loses, they will be absolutely prohibited from making any operation which disturbs the peace and order in the barred area.

8. As regards the present crisis, it is announced that the Japanese army will never undertake any action which brings dishonor on its dignity."

There are many reports that Japanese soldiers in Chinese uniforms were included in the force that defeated Kuo at Hsinminfu. These must be taken with reserve, but it is to be noted that the army Chang was able to assemble was inferior in discipline, training and morale to Kuo's but was able to receive his attack unshaken and then to counter-attack with boldness, finally completely defeating what was known as the pride of the Fengtien Army. Certainly at least a marvelous reversal of form is indicated, if not the presence of a foreign element.

9. It is possible that, recognizing the trap into which their tool Feng had fallen, and striving to extricate him, the attempt on the loyalty of the Tuchuns of Kirin and Heilungkiang was made by the Soviets as reported in par. 19, Report No. 5739. No doubt the complete dashing of their hopes also was responsible for Krutkovsky's telegram to the 3rd International, as reported in par. 11, same report.

10. This report is made of such length, in spite of its duplication of certain material in Report No. 5734, because as time passes it seems to become more apparent that Kuo's abortive campaign has been of far reaching consequences; that among these consequences almost certainly may be considered the marked diminution of the Soviet menace in northern and probably all China, and of Feng Yu-hsiang's power, with the prospect of an agreement now being possible between the conservative leaders in China. More than anyone else the Japanese have profited. There are reports, as yet unconfirmed, that extensive concessions have been granted them by Chang - concessions he has long denied. Chang, supported by them, has gained what he hoped to accomplish in the spring of 1925 and the crisis reported in Report No. 5419 as impending was reached December 23rd when Kuo was defeated at Hsinminfu and brought Feng down with him in his ruin. But it is a very chastened and humbled Chang who now rules in Manchuria. For a few days he confronted disaster, and the Japanese let him thoroughly measure his impotence and dependence before they rescued him.

11. I can see nothing in this as reported or surmised in which the Japanese are blameworthy. They stand in dread of communism and its extension to their Islands; economically they must retain their position in Manchuria. They have had to fan for months an insidious and dangerous advance on their Manchurian interests by the Russians who will continue to try to regain what they lost in 1905. By guile I believe they were able to make this advance come into the open as an armed attack, and then defeat it (see Report No. 5734). In my opinion the defeat of Kuo by Chang was overshadowed by the defeat of the Soviets by the Japanese in what is only one of their constantly recurring clashes.

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Peking Leader: July 16, 1926.

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AUG 25

[redacted]

[redacted] Power Of Any Value Therewith

By Sherle R. Bonsby
N.C.N.A. News

It is becoming customary for the younger generation of Chinese to resent any criticism of their country even when that criticism consists of a mere statement of provable facts. In this hypersensitiveness lies a fundamental weakness of the Chinese, for it makes it possible for otherwise logical and intellectually honest men to denounce and villify what is called Peking in private conversations and yet to take office in that city because they feel it a duty to confound the foreigner and to make obvious facts less obvious.

For instance, the various acting Ministers who now preside over Cabinet offices in Peking know and have at times expressed their opinion of Peking politics; they know that Peking is not a government, represents nothing and can under no circumstances again become the government of China, unless the feudal autonomy of the dominant militarists is recognized. They know that even if Sun Chuan-fang does send an underling to Peking to become an acting Minister, he (Sun) does not recognize Peking's authority-even on so small a question as the policing of a road near Shanghai; that Canton will never recognize Peking as it is now constituted; and that Feng Yu-hsiang has separated a vast area in the northwest from the authority of the central government.

Peking More Bubble

Now there are naturally some men who believe that a fight to a finish should be made in China over the question of centralization of authority. Wu Pei-fu is such a man; he does not see any good in provincial autonomy.

But there is no widespread support in any part of China for the exercise of Mandarinism by Peking, for the reassertion of the centralized conception of political organization.

Whenever a militarist asserts himself over a section of the country and governs it, the people prefer to treat with him rather than to trust to the uncertain intricacies of Peking politics. Thus, to repeat what has so often been shown to be a fact, Canton is independent. Yunnan is independent; Mongolia is independent. Manchuria is independent. Szechuan is independent. Sun Chuan-fang's five provinces are independent. And to add to the independent areas, Chang Chung-chang's territory is always his territory and he functions with or without Peking's consent as he pleases.

Peking Thrown to Wu

Therefore, Wu Pei-fu finds himself in an awkward position. He has been unable to occupy territory, because none of the possessors of the soil would allow him to take anything from them. He was awarded the city of Peking by those who are supposed to be his subordinates. Whenever he has attempted to place a man of his own, like Chi Hsieh-yuan, for instance, into a definite territorial position, some military feudal governor has declined to accept orders. Wu Pei-fu, then, found that his victory over the Kuominchun was meaningless except that it offered him a possibility to obtain a foreign loan if the Tariff Conference could be made hurriedly to reach a conclusion.

The partisans of Wu Pei-fu have been somewhat careless in the conversations wtih regard to their overlord's foreign relationships.

They permitted it to be understood that arrangements had been made for British support for Marshal Wu and that actually loans had been made to him by British firms in China.

The Chinese press has been full of items in this connexion, the names of some of the firms being mentioned.

They have also allowed the impression to circulate that

[redacted]

[redacted] with Marshal Wu's [redacted] other the plans of his [redacted] One was the [redacted] in the reports that [redacted] had been British loans to [redacted] shal Wu. Any checking of [redacted] situation proves the [redacted] of the innuendo, the purpose [redacted] which was to indicate that [redacted] Feng was backed by a foreign [redacted] Power and as Chang has been [redacted] supported by a foreign [redacted] so is Wu supported and [redacted] by a foreign Power. The [redacted] that the British press of [redacted] has always been kind to Marshal Wu in the general discussion of the political situation. That certain British individuals have been on friendly terms with certain important members of his *entourage*, have given the appearance of truth to these suggestions.

It is of the utmost importance to British and all foreign interests in China that the [redacted] be given at this time to these reports.

There is of course not a word of truth in the stories that Marshal Wu Pei-fu have received British and American loans, and the suggestion that these Powers are supporting him, the report in an American newspaper that they even winked at his collection the Hankow salt money is false, without foundation and unfortunate.

It is important to note that whenever anyone has taken the trouble to trace down these reports, it was found that they emanated from Marshal Wu's *entourage*.

Wu Grows Desperate

The second damaging fact was the impossibility of going ahead with the Tariff Conference while there was no government recognized in any articulate manner by the Chinese people, by the provinces and those who rule them, in Peking. The foreign delegates waited through a war and through a period of political trivialities, until they wearied of waiting and weather-

If the report is true that he stated that he would declare tariff autonomy without further negotiations, if the foreign delegates did not continue the conference, then he permitted himself a gesture of sheer impatience.

In the circumstances, there is nothing for the foreign delegates to do but to go home and to wait until China has a representative government and until the men who govern are less petulant and more concerned with the welfare and status of their country.

World Grows Weary

Unfortunately for China, there are those in Peking who believe that all China's woes can be remedied by propaganda at home and abroad against the foreigners. That may have been true during the months of June and July of last year. It is not true to-day.

The pendulum is swinging against China and although it is perhaps too much to believe that China has lost all the sympathy developed during the discussion of the May 30 troubles, it is nevertheless true that the press in foreign countries indicate by their editorial opinions that the world is weary of a derelict.

What Peking does not seem to realize is that no matter what we in China may think of Feng Yu-hsiang, he has been able to arouse for himself considerable friendliness in foreign countries. He is one of those curious political figures that do little good and yet are praised immensely for the little they do. Even Canton is not without its friends abroad, the liberals and labourites in all countries favouring it.

Merely Militarist

Wu Pei-fu, on the other hand, is regarded merely as a militarist. His foreign support came from two general sources:

1. There were those who believed that only a strong man could unify and govern China and that Wu Pei-fu was such a strong man. They believed that China could only be pacified by force and that Wu was the man to do it. They were disappointed in Wu Peifu, his methods, his results and his following.

2. There was an element among foreigners to whom Bolshevism is the worst possible political doctrine and who dreaded the effects of Soviet influence in China. Because Feng Yu-hsiang was friendly with Soviet Russia and because Wu Pei-fu declared himself as anti-Red, this element looked with favour upon the return of Marshal Wu to power.

They also are disappointed, for Marshal Wu's power has not extended itself to any appreciable part of the country and his increasingly anti-foreign attitude is designed to destroy the last vestiges of financial solvency and the authority of the treaties upon which China's international relations are based.

Powers' Hopeless

Finding then a greater disappointment in Marshal Wu, whose talk out of office was different from his actions in office, the Powers are hopeless of any solution of China's internal chaos in the near future and their political conduct during the next year is bound to be based upon this sense of hopelessness. Marshal Wu's threat of tariff autonomy convinces the foreigners that his methods are not unlike those of his Red predecessors.

Now, the foreigners have gone much further than the Chinese ever hoped in making concessions to China, concessions, which from the foreign point of view, were unwarranted by the facts of China's political condition. They were made on the assumption that these concessions formed a constructive method of assisting China to solve her problems. But China, by civil war, delay, careless political thinking and inadequate leadership, threw her opportunities to the wind. Now, comes the day of determining upon a new course of action and Wu Pei-fu is attempting to hurry the foreign Powers into a consent to a programme of his making, which can only result in an invalidation of existing relationships

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AUG 25

LIBELLING AMERICANS.

It really seems high time that some effective measures were adopted to counteract the reckless and mendacious propaganda of certain religious enthusiasts in the United States in regard to conditions in China. Owing to their calling missionaries and other Christian workers who undertake to enlighten the American public regarding conditions in this country are listened to with a respect which is not usually accorded to lay writers or speakers. We had occasion a few months ago to draw attention to the mendacious reports of events in China circulated under the auspices of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ. Only a few days ago we referred to the absurd utterances of Mr. Rugh, the "Y" Secretary from Peking, who, addressing an Albany audience, denied that there was any civil war in China. The latest American mail brought us another characteristic effort from a religious enthusiast, one "Mary Leitch", who describes herself as formerly a Missionary in Ceylon of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and a Member of the Standing Council of the White Cross International Anti-Narcotic Society of Seattle. Her effusion is printed elsewhere in this issue, not because it is worthy of reproduction, but to show our readers the lengths to which a certain type of religious fanatic will go in vilifying his or her countrymen.

Mary Leitch's effusion who knows the facts regarding the arms traffic in China will doubtless feel that the best place for her would be a lunatic asylum. But the trouble is that the average American at home does not know the facts, and is quite likely to swallow Mary's lies. He does not know, for instance, that the American Minister at Peking in 1919 took the initiative in proposing an arms embargo, to which his and a number of other Governments have been parties ever since. He does not know that there is not a single unit of the million and a half Chinese now under arms that is equipped with American weapons lawfully imported since 1919. He does not know that to prevent the open or clandestine importation

— Peking & Tientsin Times, July 15, 1926 —

AUG 25

We have received the following communication:—

Claremont, California, 508 West 6th Street, June 6th, 1926.

Dear Friend,

Thank you for your letter to [illegible]. Will you also write [illegible] have you received leading Chinese editors.

Will you please send me a duplicate copy of the letter which you sent to him.

The United States and the Chinese [illegible] to secure foreign rights.

Yours for a China freed from foreign domination.

MARY LEITCH.

Formerly Missionary in Ceylon of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

P.S.—I would like to hear from you [illegible]

[illegible] 16th, 1926.

[illegible]

I [illegible] your attention to the [illegible] In the United States are taking a prominent part in China through furnishing arms and ammunition of all sorts to the contending parties in China, thus making it possible for them to continue a devastating Civil War.

As representative of the Student Body in China, Mr. M. I. Ting, in a letter just to hand says, "Your OPEN LETTER to the Students of China came some time ago. I read with great gratitude that our friends in America desire to help us to get rid of the opium evil.

"SAVE CHINA FROM THE OPIUM CURSE, is one of our demands. But I wish to call your attention to another curse, and that is *the selling of large quantities of ammunition to China.*

"We are crying out and begging foreign nations not to sell ammunition to our militarists. If the contending generals could not get ammunition our Civil War would soon come to an end.

"Kindly make known to our friends in America that ammunition [illegible] by this time.

The real sufferers [illegible] people suffer by this cruel selfishness of merchants. Local papers are full of the [illegible] of China. Every one of those bullets has a foreign made steel.

Ammunition and cannon are as [illegible] Millions of our [illegible] farmers to produce [illegible] for them gives a heavy tax. With the tax collected these militarists buy ammunition to promote their selfish ends.

"You may have no idea of our suffering. Thousands and thousands [illegible] into military service and die. Thousands and thousands are left homeless and penniless. The most pitiful sight is to see thousands of youthful soldiers who are damaged for life, whose future holds no hope for them.

"Guns and cannons must both be put out of this country before we [illegible] that—or 'If the Chinese people stop their domestic quarrelings'.....as if the Chinese people had anything to do with this incessant warring.

"The fact that the people themselves are not divided by these struggles—that in fact they loathe all militarists with an impartial loathing—is the one element which renders the situation hopeful."

"Everywhere the populace joins in futily cursing the military. They suffer from victory and vanquished alike. *And now there is a growing movement to translate it into action and crystalize it into effectivity.*"

"So far the movement seems small and impotent, it is true, when compared with the vast field over which it has to work. But there were even smaller and more insignificant beginnings for that other amazing movement which fifteen years ago overthrew an Empire, in a tradition-loving land where Empire had for thousands of years existed. And both movements had found, or are finding, their beginnings in the fiery-

[illegible]

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2657-9-27

G-2 Report. 6000

WAR DEPARTMENT

C H I N A (Military)

Subject: Present Military Situation.

RECEIVED G-2 W.D. APR 13 1926

The military situation may be said to have developed into three main phases.

The first phase includes the LANCHOW (Peking-Mukden Ry.)-JEHOL area, where the troops of the 1st National Army under General Men Chih-chung (Lanchow Sector) and General Sung Chih-yuan (Jehol Sector) are opposed to the Fengtien Army. Forces are as follows:

1st National Army (Kuominchun)
- Lanchow front 20,000
- " " (Line of communications)..... 10,000
- Jehol area 20,000
- Peking area (available as reserve, all fronts. 15,000

Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin).
- Lanchow front 25,000
- Chinchow area (general reserve). 70,000

OPERATIONS:

The National Army has assumed a passive defensive on this front, holding the line of the Lan River to Hsifengkou and thence instituting a regional defense of the Jehol Area. Fengtien has assumed the initiative and has (1) cleared the Peking-Mukden Railway of National Army forces to the Lan River; (2) extended northward up the Lan River to Yung Ping Fu and Ch'ien An Hsien. Attempts to cross the Lan are reported as being repulsed. There is no confirmation of a Fengtien advance into the Jehol area nor is there any evidence of a commitment of the Fengtien reserves.

The second phase includes the "Tientsin Area". In this area the 1st National Army and badly shaken elements of the 3rd National Army are opposed to the allied armies of Li Ching-lin (ex-Tupan of Chihli) and Chang Tsung-chang (Tupan of Shantung).

Strength:

1st National Army.
- Tientsin front 20,000
- Tientsin reserves 5,000
- Peking Area 15,000

3rd National Army.
- Tientsin front 10,000
- Tientsin-Taku area 10,000

Shantung Allies (Chihli & Shantung troops).
- Tientsin front 25,000
- Reserves and communication troops to Techow 20,000
- Landing expedition of Taku ..... 5,000 (under Pi Shu-cheng).

OPERATIONS:

(1) Along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

In this area the National Army forces have assumed the offensive-defensive. Li Ching-lin's forces after advancing up the Tsin-Pu Railway and defeating the 3rd National

CHINA (Military).

Subject: Present Military Situation.

Army at Machang, attacked toward Tientsin along the railway. They were met at Tang Kuan Tun (26 miles from Tientsin) by the 1st National Army which counter-attacked and progressively drove the Chihli and Shantung troops to Machang, Tsinghsien and Tsangchou, all on the Tientsin-Pukow line. An action is still in progress at Tsangchou. Fighting seems to have been severe but not decisive.

(2) Landing operations off Tangku.

On March 3rd an expeditionary force consisting of five cruisers and six transports carrying approximately 5000 Shantung troops under General Pi Shu-Cheng, Defence Commissioner of Tsingtao, appeared off the Taku Bar. The National Army troops already manning the improvised defences at this point were reinforced to 3000 men and the cannon sited at Taku were increased to seven in all - all field pieces. A considerable additional National Army concentration was made in the area from Tientsin and from reserves on the Lanchow front line of communications. The Shantung squadron has lain off Tangku since that date, making frequent feints at landings and bombarding the National Army defences whenever tidal conditions permit. In consequence the National Army has mined the channel and laid such conditions on ingress and egress from the Hai Ho as to paralyze commerce and sever the last means of communication between Peking and the sea. During the night of March 7th a raiding party, approximately 300 strong, was landed from the fleet at Peitang (5 miles north of Tangku) with the object of damaging the Peking-Mukden Railway. This party succeeded in blowing up a 200 foot bridge near this point and were then surrounded and forced to surrender on March 8th - 9th.

The third phase, along the Peking-Hankow Railway, is apparently at a standstill.

The Honan troops of Wu Pei-fu have advanced northward as far as the Yellow River. Their delay is partly due to the tearing up of rails on the railway bridge over the Yellow River by retreating troops of Tupan Yueh Wei-chun.

While these troops were advancing north against Tupan Yueh Wei-chun, an expedition under Chin Yun-ao was moving against Kaifeng (Lung-Hai Railway) from Shantung. Chin was formerly sent into Shantung by Yueh Wei-chun, but turned against him. At Kaifeng Chin Yun-ao met the Ichun forces of Mi Chun-piao (formerly of Jehol) and either drove them back or bought them off, so that they have retreated to the north bank of the Yellow River.

At about this same time the city of Chengchow (Peking-Hankow Railway) which had become the headquarters of Yueh Wei-chun, was attacked by the "Red Spears", a pro-Wu organization in Honan. These "Red Spears" may be classed as a sort of local defence corps, which has been formed in many of the Honan towns and which now has grown to be a gathering of wandering soldiers from all parts.

Yueh Wei-chun was forced to flee and his whereabouts are unknown. Chengchow is in the hands of the pro-Wu forces, who augmented by Liu Chen-hua, formerly Tupan of Shensi, and Wu Hsin-tien who also occupied that post at one time.

G-2 Report. 6000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Present Military Situation.

Yen Hsi-shan, Tupan of Shansi, has advanced to Shihchiachuang where the Cheng-T'ai Railway (Chengting to Taiyuanfu) joins the Peking-Hankow line. He states he holds his former neutral policy, and has only moved there to oppose advance by any party into Shansi.

There are undoubtedly troops of the 1st National Army at Paotingfu and east of there toward Tientsin, but their disposition and numbers are unknown.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political-Military)

Subject: The Present Situation.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 30 1926

1. The Central Government. The government that exists in Peking and with which foreign powers maintain relations as the national government of China becomes each day more evidently a mask for the real government, which is that of the First National Army, under the influence, if not actual command of Feng Yu-hsiang. Except for certain forms and observances, both in its domestic control and foreign relations it is devoid of significance. It is defied by the Cantonese control of Kwangtung. The Three Eastern Provinces have declared their independence of it. Not only is it unable to make its writ run in either of these and other areas of China, but it is impotent within the walls of Peking. On the streets of the capital, during the progress of the Tariff Conference, militarists have imposed an illegal tax of 20% on cigarettes and the government can do nothing. A certain ludicrous dignity marked the rescinding of the order against the use of fireworks during the New Year celebrations. The order was issued with firmness and ignored with contempt. The police have not been paid for six months. A Chinese owned English language newspaper drew attention to the latter fact, and suggested the peril inherent in such neglect of the city's guardians. Having been taken to task by the militarists and required to prove its figures, its next issue in an editorial on the front page headed "Au Revoir" substantiated its former statement, and in full confidence of immediate suppression, made its bow before going into eclipse.

Unable to meet the financial crisis of New Year the Minister of Finance resigned and fled to Tientsin. The Premier undertook his work and though he raised some money, it was not sufficient to satisfy the militarists, and he also resigned and sought Tientsin where, though his resignation has not been accepted, he remains on a leave status. The Minister of War has now undertaken both his duties as Premier as well as these of Finance.

Acting under the duress of the National Army, the Chief Executive has issued a mandate for the suppression of Wu Pei-fu, though so far he has resisted the efforts to make him appoint to succeed Hsiao Yao-nan in Hupeh others than these appointed by Wu.

It would not be correct or fair to the Chinese conducting the government to say that they are not conscious of the absurdities, anomalies and incompetences it presents. Wrapped in such dignity as they can muster they go ahead in all seriousness with such duties as they can perform, participate in international conferences, appoint ministers to foreign countries, issue mandates and denounce their foes. In the interests of the First National Army, or under its pressure, they cling tenaciously to the theory of the existence of the government, and keep life in it that it may endure until its master is strong enough to crush its enemies. Behind it, gaining what advantage it may from its control of such government agencies as exist, and contemptuous of what cannot help it, the First National Army is engaged in negotiation, preparation and disposition for the attack that threatens it from three sides.

From M/A, China Report No. 5778 February 26, 1926

Political - 3090
Military - 6190

CHINA (Political-Military)

Subject: The Present Situation.

2. The Approaching Civil War. In the approaching campaign the parties to the conflict are the First National Army and its allies on the one side, and the combination between Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang on the other. Each day the issue between these contending forces becomes more sharply defined as one between radicalism and anti-radicalism. Sufficient has been reported as to the former to fill the mind with foreboding as to the effect on the relations of the so-called capitalistic nations with the Chinese if its armies are victorious. But it would be a great mistake to assume that a victory of the forces fighting under the banner of anti-radicalism would mean that a government friendly to these nations would of necessity result. Wu for the moment at least is leading these forces. On many occasions he has expressed a bitter anti-foreignism, and though at other times he has been moderate in tone, and is generally considered more a proponent of nationalism than an opponent of foreigners, he is an uncertain quantity. In the flush of full power prior to his defeat by Chang in 1924, his Boys' Brigade used to sing with gusto a song whose burden was the pleasure they were some day going to have in putting the foreigners to the sword. His hatred of the Japanese is sincere and outspoken. It is hard to understand how he could have entered an alliance with Chang except that they both recognize a common and deadly peril in Soviet supported Feng that must be eliminated before they can turn to the more natural and congenial occupation of fighting each other. During the past summer Chang made repeated efforts to secure foreign support in his campaign against Feng. Not only was he refused, but he narrowly escaped disaster and was only rescued by the Japanese at the last moment. However much he may resent his failure to get help from the foreign nations in a campaign he was waging (as much so, he said, in their interests as his own, against the Soviets and Feng) he will be unable to ignore his obligations to the Japanese. So far as it can be ascertained, and judging by his utterances, Sun Chuan-fang is genuinely anti-radical.

3. The First National Army and Its Allies. These met a great defeat at Hsinminfu December 23, 1925 (see par. 11, Report No. 5741). 2657 I-276 p 76. The First National Army gained a pyrrhic victory at the same time at Tientsin. From the field of the latter Feng's forces had to make a retreat that was precipitate to regain their strongholds at Nankow and Kalgan. The disaster than befell Kuo and the enforced relinquishment of the fruits of victory at Tientsin so overcame Feng that he resigned his office and revived his plans for a foreign tour. He left Kalgan for a time. His second in command, Chang Chih-chiang, succeeded him, but Feng, though absent and out of office, yet kept such influence in affairs that Chang was not able to exercise control and took refuge in a hospital. Feng is now back in Kalgan and there being an alleged widespread demand to that effect among the National Army leaders, probably will soon resume his position and lead the effort to suppress Wu - an effort that bids fair to be a defense against the attack of that warrior.

The First National Army was badly handled before Tientsin, and lost heavily in personnel, ammunition and morale. Casualties are said to have been as high as 25,000. It is more probable that they were 20,000. Its present strength is something in the neighborhood of

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160,000. As Chinese armies go, and the standard is being constantly raised, it is excellent. Probably the greatest criticism to be brought against it is that too much effort has been expended in making christian characters of its personnel and too little in making them soldiers. They are kindly, pleasant and well behaved, and their community singing would have delighted a welfare worker in our own National Army. I do not mean to deprecate these things but they should not have the emphasis that certain well intentioned persons tried to give them in our service, and succeeded in giving them in Feng's army at the expense of the training that a soldier must have if he is to be of maximum efficiency in battle.

The Second and Third National Armies are bandit organizations. There is dissension between them and also between them and the First. There is no mutual dependence. Neither the chiefs nor the subordinate commanders are to be relied upon as loyal. Unless assured of adequate reward they will not fight, and in any event they will not fight well. Today in China they are anachronisms, though fifteen or even ten years ago in organization, discipline and training they would have compared favorably with other Chinese troops.

The Fourth National Army, also called the National Army of the Northeast, is that remnant of the force of Kuo Sung-ling that escaped destruction. Though of excellent material it is only some 8,000 or 10,000 strong.

There is no doubt of the desire of the armed forces of the Kuomingtang in Kwangtung to cooperate with the National Army. For details of this force see Report No. 5762.— 2009-166

The Soviets probably are the most valuable ally of the First National Army. They may be relied upon to continue to supply it with munitions, advice, instructors and personnel for leadership, and by machinations in Manchuria to restrain Chang Tso-lin from adding too greatly to its enemies south of the Wall.

Elements of the First National Army are in occupation of Peking and intermediate points on the Peking-Mukden Railway to Lanchow, but not of Tientsin. They also occupy Jehol. The Third Army occupied Tientsin and as far south as Machang on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The Second Army is now engaged with Wu's forces in Honan. A current report is that Wu has just captured Kaifeng.

4. <u>The Combination Opposed to the First National Army</u>. For a statement of Wu's activities see Report No. 5779. It is impossible to obtain any figures as to Wu's strength. It may be as high as 100,000 or as low as 50,000. Probably it is not well equipped or organized but it is without doubt in much better condition than its immediate opponents of the Second National Army.

Sun Chuan-fang has a force estimated as between 40,000 and 60,000 stationed about Shanghai and in Chekiang Province. He controls that province and practically all of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhwei and Fukien.

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The Fengtian army under Chang Tso-lin has just passed through a painful experience. It is reported that it is now reorganized and fit for war. The arsenal is working at full capacity, and there is every reason to believe that Chang has other sources of supply for munitions. It is doubtful if he has an effective force in excess of 150,000. Elements of his army are at Shanhaikwan and others are reported approaching Jehol.

In Shantung are the Fengtien forces under the command of Li Ching-lin and Chang Tsung-chang. The forces of the former are reported approaching Tientsin, and the latter to be invading Honan from the east in support of Wu's movement from the south.

5. Probable Course of Campaign. It seems reasonable to suppose that Wu's objective is the control of the Peking-Hankow Railway and a movement via that route against Peking, while Li's troops advance on and retake Tientsin. If these movements are successful, I doubt if Chang does more than give financial support to Wu, possibly sending reinforcements and supplies to Li by sea. It seems probable that Chang will be very loath to advance south of the Wall for some time, unless the campaign takes such an unfavorable turn that he feels compelled to do so in support of his allies. Not only do I think that the Japanese would oppose such a move on his part but also it almost certainly would be the signal for a back-fire by the Soviets in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a sword of Damocles Chang cannot get from over his head, and a situation in which the Japanese for the present do not seem inclined to assist him.

I do not think that Sun's contribution to the campaign will be much greater than Chang's. However great his desire to participate in the fighting, he is under the same threat that caused him to halt his advance north after the early successes he gained in the fall of 1925, and his return to Shanghai and Chekiang. This threat is the danger of a rising against him in Chekiang led by the civil governor who is his enemy but whom he is as yet unable to suppress, and of an invasion of the province by a Kuomingtang column from Kwangtung through Fukien.

For the First National Army the critical points seem to be Tientsin and control of the Peking-Hankow Railway from some point at or near Paotingfu north to Peking. If Tientsin falls to its enemies it loses its only sea port and the position of its elements on the Tientsin-Mukden Railway north of Tientsin at once becomes untenable. The effect on the morale of the army might be disastrous. It naturally hopes that its ally, the Second National Army, may hold the Lunghai Railway and prevent the junction of the forces of its enemies, but it is a forlorn hope. It will try to prevent Wu's approach to striking distance of Tientsin in connection with Li's attack.

If the campaign continues to develop as at present heavy fighting is to be expected in the neighborhood of Tientsin. If Tientsin falls to its enemies it is not at all certain whether or not the National Army will resist a further advance on Peking, or if it will retreat to its strongholds at Nankow and Kalgan. If the former, fighting will occur in and about Peking.

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Leaders on neither side are able to place complete dependence in their subordinates. The whole course of events may be changed by treachery at any moment.

Assuming the highly improble - that treachery will not decide the issue, and viewing the conflict in a wholly military light, I am inclined to think the probabilities of success are with the First National Army.

I surmise that one factor that in the last war was of prime importance may in this war be absent. That is foreign aid or interference. The only foreign country likely to aid or interfere is Japan. But it seems to me that it will suit her plans to have China south of the Wall torn by a war that however it terminates must lead to other wars and a consequent weakening of and further disruption of China, so long as China north of the Wall remains untroubled. She would probably view with equanimity a victory of Feng, even supported as he is by the Soviets, believing that the rising anti-Soviet feeling in China would make brief his tenure of power.

J. H. Barnum

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2657-D-276
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2657-D-276
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6000 WAR DEPARTMENT APR 14

G-2 Report.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Wu Pei-fu and the Military Situation in Central China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., APR 13 1926

With the gradual return to power of Wu Pei-fu, an attempt on his part to secure his former control of Peking may be expected at an early date.

In order to accomplish this it will be necessary to eliminate the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and his allies,- Sun Yueh (Tupan of Chihli) and Yueh Weipchun (Tupan of Honan). It must be noted that while Feng has nominally resigned from his leadership of the Kuominchun, there can be no doubt that he still is the power behind the throne.

Wu, since his defeat in 1924, and his flight to Central China, has been a figure much feared by Feng, and more than ever has become a popular idol among the Chinese people. His strength in troops, however, has been insufficient to make itself a factor in events of major importance. He has, at the present date, succeeded in advancing slowly northward and his Hupeh troops are reported to have captured Hsinyang, Honan, on February 9th.

Hsiao Yaopnan, while seemingly loyal to Wu (he owed his position to him) was not always in accord with him. In fact several years ago Wu made a special trip to Peking to try and have Hsiao removed. Hsiao "died" on February 14th, supposedly of heart disease, but everything points to his having been eliminated due to his non-cooperation with Wu.

Wu has now appointed Chen Chia-mo as Military Governor of Hupeh and another of his men as Civil Governor. This gives him security behind him in advancing north.

There are several main factors which made the advance of Wu a slow one. The main one is that his position in Hupeh has been none too secure. A second reason is the failure of the expedition under Chin Yun-ao from Shantung to materially advance into Honan, and thus relieve the pressure from the Hsinyang front. Chin's troops are reported advancing in the direction of Tsaochow and Kweiteh and and to have arrived at Tainan and Tsning. A similar move to aid Wu was to have been made from the west by Liu Chen-hua with some Shensi troops who were to move on Loyang. This also has not amounted to much as yet.

The forces opposing Wu in Honan are the 2nd Kuominchun troops of Yueh Wei-chun. These are reported to number nearly a hundred thousand men, but are poorly equipped, many not armed and are of the bandit type, having been formerly under Hu Ching-yi.

Some resistance of sorts was made by these Kuominchun forces against the Hupeh troops at Hsinyang, and heavy fighting was reported when the town was attacked. During this fight an American, Dr. Nelson, of the Lutheran Mission was killed by a stray bullet.

M/A China Report No. 5779. Feb. 26, 1926.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Wu Pei-fu and the Military Situation in Central China.

In relation to Wu's campaign, Chang Tsung-chang, the Fengtien leader in Shantung, stated to a reliable foreign observer that he (Chang) first intended to drive the Hunan Kuominchun from Shantung and then to send two columns to cut the Peking-Hankow Railway at Changteh and Shihchiachuang. At the same time, General Wu, who Chang stated has definitely joined hands with Chang Tso-lin, will engage the Honan army in south Honan. When Honan has been cut off from Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, General Li Ching-lin will advance on Tientsin from the south and Chang Tso-lin from the north. The Tupan stated that Sun Chuan-fang in the Yangtze could be relied upon to remain neutral. Whether or not this plan works out, Tupan Yueh Wei-chun of Honan, whose headquarters are at Chengchow, is in a serious position. His bandit army is not only much too large to be properly coordinated, but is even too large to be supported by the province of Honan. Hence parts of it are joining Wu or turning bandits again.

Yueh Wei-chun's position is made still more uncertain by the fact that support from the 1st Kuominchun is doubtful. These forces are being sent toward Tientsin to prevent any further advance inside the Wall by the Fengtien troops.

While the 1st Kuominchun have been moving eastward, there has been a movement of the so-called "4th Kuominchun" from Lanchow through Tientsin to Paotingfu. These are commanded by Wei I-san and were formerly Fengtien troops, hence they are being sent to the rear where there will be less chance of their going over to the Fengtien side again in case of fighting between the Kuominchun and Chang Tso-lin.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G-2 W.D. MAY 6 - 1926

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Aerial Bombing of Peking.

1. On April 2nd, a.m., an aeroplane appeared over Peking and dropped three bombs near Hsichihmen, the gate in the north-eastern corner of the city wall. The railroad station for the line to Kalgan is near this point. It was thought that this station might be the plane's objective. One old woman is said to have been severely wounded. There were no other casualties.

On the 3rd a plane dropped six bombs in and around the North Lake, Tartar city. Three of these failed to explode. Four more bombs were dropped either by this or another plane. These fell in a line from east to west and about a third of a mile south of the southern wall of the Legation Quarter. No troops are in this area, in which, however, are located the Chien Men stations of the Peking-Mukden and Peking-Hankow Railway.

On the 4th three bombs were dropped south of the Legation Quarter; one near the President's Palace north of the Quarter and in the west city; one in the Forbidden City, and one just to the east of the Forbidden City. The latter fell on Pei Chih Tze, one of the principal streets running north and south through the city, and on which a number of foreigners live. One old woman is said to have been wounded in the south city. No other casualties.

On the 5th six bombs were dropped, three in the grounds of the Temple of Agriculture and three in the grounds of the Temple of Heaven. No casualties so far as known.

2. There is general bewilderment as to the purpose of this bombing. As stated above, at first it was thought the objective was the railroad station for the Kalgan line. The bombs of the 3rd which fell in the Tartar city might have been intended for the troops stationed at Coal Hill, which is near North Lake. The subsequent bombing seems aimless and as no one point has been selected for assault, nor coherent plan followed, the whole affair is valueless, so far as an attack on military forces is concerned. It is possible that it is Chang Tso-lin's answer to the statements in the papers that he is entering into compromise with the troops of the National Army. It is also possible that it is a deliberate attempt to make the Diplomatic Body protest.

3. Planes have flown at from 4000 ft. to 6000 ft. elevation and so far it has been impossible to determine their make. They have been biplanes. The bombs are light and a large proportion fail to explode. A fragment of one was of steel, and the inner surface had a yellowish tinge, indicating imperfect detonation, with an odor of picric acid. They are probably about twenty-five pounds in weight.

4. No anti-aircraft guns have been used against these planes by the National Army. Though four planes are said to have been brought from Kalgan for the purpose of fighting these bombing planes, they have not yet been used for this purpose. It is said that the National Army is reluctant to use anti-aircraft artillery or to fight the planes for fear of damage to the city from falling projectiles or machines.

5. It is not known whether these bombing planes come from Tientsin or from some point between that place and Peking.

From M/A, China. Report No. 5831 April 6, 1926

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Aerial Bombing of Peking. 2076

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 6 - 1926

6. Though other planes have been seen over Peking at an earlier hour, the plane or planes that do the bombing always appear at or about ten in the morning, have finished within ten minutes and disappear to the south. In the course of their flight they pass over the Legation Quarter.

7. Though naturally there is considerable nervousness among the civilian population, the bombing has been without any effect whatever upon military personnel and materiel. In general the negligible effect of any kind is rapidly breeding a contempt for air bombing.

8. There is discussion among diplomatic representatives as to the wisdom of protest against this bombing, and the possible grounds upon which such protest could be made. It would seem that one might be framed in which it was pointed out that prior to attacking a city the inhabitants should be notified of the intention; safe conduct to an area out of the danger zone offered to diplomatic representatives; certain areas within the city designated that, so long as not used as refuge by enemy troops, would be exempted from bombardment, rifle-firing or bombing. This to be addressed to both parties to the conflict, with some intimation that should the attackers persist in their pointless bombing it would afford grounds for a refusal to recognize their belligerent rights if it is granted that a state of war exists, or to recognize a government formed by them. Certainly no safe-conduct to another place should be accepted, nor Peking abandoned. But no less certainly do the foreign representatives seem entitled to the notice of an intent to attack the city that steps may be taken to reduce the risk to life and property of the nationals domiciled in the city; and failure to give such notice prior to a bombing that not only is not directed specifically against military forces but is obviously random, endangering foreigners and their property, seems to afford adequate grounds for just and vigorous protest.

Many prominent Chinese have hoped and suggested that such protest be made that the city may be spared further bombing. They also suggest that failure to protest will have the appearance of showing favoritism to the forces of Chang Tso-lin. On the other hand there is a strong possibility that the bombing is intended to force the hand of the Diplomatic Body, and that a protest, if made, will receive the reply from the Fengtien forces that the bombing will cease when the National Army is made to evacuate Peking.

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TRANSLATION.

"ZARYA" No. 56. 2nd March, 1926.

SHALL JAPAN EVER COME TO WAR WITH MOSCOW?

The interview with Mr. A. N. Ivanoff, as published by Mr. Haig, representative of several American newspapers, was disputed by the former at the time when it appeared in the press. Mr. Ivanoff declared that he never mentioned to his interviewer the subject of the future war between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The American correspondent, however, categorically confirmed the authenticity of the interview published by him.

His statements appear in quite a new light after the sensational article published in the last issue of the "Manchurian Monitor", edited by the Administration of the CER.

The entire article is devoted to the probable conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union and enumerates in detail all preparations which are being carried on by Japan.

The author of this article, a certain V. I. Soorin, ex-officer of the General Staff, states that the encounter of the two powers will take place on territories around Harbin and expresses the opinion that "North Manchuria is much nearer to great events than is usually supposed".

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The article will, undoubtedly, attract public attention, especially in view of the fact that it was published under the auspices of the Railway Manager.

Prior to the publishing of this article, A. N. Ivanoff, handed the proofs to the Soviet Consulate. The political importance of this article was duly appreciated and all the details of it discussed with the Soviet Consulate.

THE "PACIFIC" PROBLEM AND NORTHERN MANCHURIA.

By V. I. Surin.

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A number of articles have already appeared on the pages of our journal casting light upon the "Pacific" problem, upon the solving of which public attention has latterly been earnestly focussed.

In the present article we shall attempt to delinate that side of the question that has in preceding essays been left in abeyance. We should like to analyse, in complete detail, to what extent a possible collision between the most powerful of imperialist nations might affect the status of Russian domains in the Far East, whose destiny is, naturally, one of absorbing interest to those actively employed in the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

To the man in the streetsit might appear that he is divided by too great a distance from the effects of a possible collision in the Pacific Ocean. It is no concern of his that somewhere on the vast expanse of this huge waste of waters, somewhere close to Formosa, the Philippines, or Singapore the roar of heavy guns should signal the commencement of a life and death struggle at sea. War as such has always been of desirable moment to Harbin commercial circles: the twon itself having been but once exposed to direct danger, the opening of hostilities has but increased the chances of augmenting trade returns -- the possibility of pulling of somewhat hazardous but exceptionally renumerative business deals.

However, and in point of fact, the solution of the "Pacific" problem by force of arms would, in all probability, very intimately affect the destiny of Northern Manchuria, and Harbin might become exposed, much sooner than others, to the disastrous aftermath of a fresh conflict involving the world at large. In the article by prof. A. I. Andogsky (Means of solving the problems of the Pacific Ocean - "Manchuria Monitor No. 5-7, 1925) it has been very clearly defined that the solution of a conflict with a view to securing supreme domination on the shores of the Pacific would not only be confined to engagements at sea, but that the struggle would unquestionably be transferred to land, in which case, the Russian Far East and Northern Manchuria would inevitably be drawn into the vortex of strife.

We shall therefore try and delineate without touching upon any statistical details, already thoroughly dealt with in preceding articles (without basing our conclusions on their premises), what part shall be played by these provinces in the war under discussion. In confirmation of our hypotheses, we shall define and discuss those measures undertaken in the Far East by one of the powers interested, measures that, without question of doubt tend to prove that North Manchuria is much more closely involved in matters of world wide import than may be evidenced on the surface.

<u>Probable distinctive features allied to a collision in the Pacific Ocean.</u>

In the article written by prof. Andogsky, he defined the possible outcome solving the "Pacific" problem as an armed conflict waged by Japan, on the one side, and the United States, England and possibly France, on the other.

In order to secure the initiative in the struggle, America and England would have, first of all, to attain the absolute domination of the seas by concentrating their battle fleet, superior to that of Japan, near the Southeastern shores of the Asiatic mainland. After which, and in order to attain the most conspicuous and finite of results, America and England, besides the energetic activity displayed by their fleets, would have to develop intensive operations actuated by their territorial forces on land.

In the present article we shall exclude the possibility of land operations being developed in a northerly direction, the transportation of the American army to Petropavloffsk and the Bay of Castri, and its further advance along the banks of the Amoor into Northern Manchuria. The possibility of such method appears to be a matter confined to the more or less distant future, as a flanking movement undertaken by a million strong American army in a desolate, sparsely peopled and inclement territory, six months

distant from its base and without the support of any railway line from the estuary of the Amoor at Nikolaeffsk to connect up with Russia, and debarred an alliance with the latter, is absolutely out of the question and would come within the realms of a harebrained adventure.

The most probable trend of a world wide struggle would, in the near future, be encompassed in the following. During the first months of the war, Japan would secure the initiative by occupying the Philippines and the island of Guam and would try to advance as far as possible to the South, from which direction the principal blow aimed by the enemy was to be expected. Meanwhile, in accordance with the precepts, set by her mentors the Germans, Japan will pay but scant attention to "scraps of paper" and the territory to neutral powers, China and France, would be seized and occupied, in so far as this was deemed necessary, to enhance or further chances of prosecuting the war to advantage.

During the first two months of the war, Japan would, in all probability, seize and occupy a portion of Chinese territory, to wit -- the provinces of Shantung and Fukien, as well as the northern part of Indo-China belonging to France. Having disembarked an army of several hundred thousand men, Japan, during this period, will exert every endeavor to gain possession of Hongkong and even Saigon, with purpose of dismantling and weakening these ports for the longest possible period of time.

At the beginning of the third month, by which time the combined fleets of England and America have assumed ascendency in the waters of the Southern-China Seas, and the concentration of their troops will have been initiated on the mainland, the task to be fulfilled by Japan would be centred in - hindering the enemy fleet in every possible way from entering the Eastern China and Yellow Seas. With purpose of bringing such development into effect, the ultimate issue of which would result in Japan being severed from her base (China), the agressors would necessarily have to gain possession of and occupy a portion of the sea front. As a result - the main struggle would primarily be shifted to Tongkin, and later into those Chinese provinces contiguous to the shores of South China, Eastern China and Yellow seas.

Certainly, the attitude evinced by China to those in combat will be of paramount significance, either lessening or increasing the difficulties of those at war, but neither one or the other of the belligerents would allow Chinese neutrality to hinder their course of action, as only a powerful and well armed China would be in a position to avert or preclude such infringement. As a matter of fact occupation of Chinese territory would be of more requisite to England or America, as only from Chinese territory could Japan be dealt a decisive blow. But in reality China's neutrality will have been encroached upon by Japan, for to wait until this has been encompassed by the enemy would only result in losing that advantage which owing to circumstance had fallen to her lot -- the advantage of gaining time.

By such enforced infringement by Japan of Chinese neutrality might place her politically in most dire situation. During the period of final and decisive struggle, China may happen to become Japan's opponent, and England and America might, as if it were,

act as the defenders of her rights set at naught. To have her as an enemy a country with such a teeming population as China, upon whose territory hostile military operations were being carried out, even thought the military might of such should be of insignificant moment, would be most disastrous to Japan and would meance her with momentous complications.

The fact of having been driven back from the Chinese sea-board on to Manchurian territory would spell disaster to the Japanese -- tantamount to absolute defeat; as, in such case, Japan would be in the position held by Germany during the Great War, but with weaker and less available resources at her command.

Consequently territorial warfare prosecuted along the coast line of China will be distinguished for its exceeding obstinacy and length of duration. America and England will be in condition to carry on the struggle for an indefinite period, until driven out of China or economic bankruptcy forced Japan to capitulate. However tests proven by the World War tend but to show what enormous resources and reserves are at the disposal of our present day States willing to sacrifice everything upon the altar of ultimate success.

Japan, in case of war with America and England is in no position to manage with the resources at her command. First of all she will be met with a shortage not only of petroleum but of iron as well. If this shortage has made itself supremely evident even during a period of peace, to what extent will it be augmented during a time of war? The art of war, as conducted in our days requires a huge expenditure of ammunition, and this tendency points to but further increase.

During the Franco-Prussian War 1870-71, the artillery was endowed with a high and honorable position in comparison to other branches of the service, being accorded the title "The Queen of the field of battle". Nevertheless the part played by this branch of arms at the time was absolutely nil, if compared to the demands to which it is subjected in our day. During the whole period of the Franco-Prussian War the quantity of iron used by the Germans in artillery ammunition (including the besieging of fortresses) did not exceed 800 thousand poods, while in 1915 Mackensie's ordnance, at the battle on the river Nid, expended more than this quantity during an engagement lasting three days, after which the Russians were forced to retreat from Crakow.

French industries, a year after the commencement of hostile operations, having been put on a war footing increased their output 50 times in comparison to that prevalent at the time prior to the declaration of war.

In the war to come the demand for iron and steel will be increasingly augmented owing to expansive operations at sea. The huge area embraced in the zone of action will require colossal expenditure in mines, and dock yards will be put to it to meet the demands for service. This increase in the lavish outpouring of iron will be effected from the moment hostile operations had been initiated. More than $2\frac{1}{2}$ thousand factories and works were mobilized in Germany in 1914, in accordance with a mobilization schedule prepared in advance, and their transfer to the making of war supplies

was inaugurated the very day war was declared. Sealed secret orders, secured in safes at each works or factory, to be opened only when mobilization had been publicly declared, contained the most detailed instructions as to what use the lathes belonging to the works should be applied, where from the latter should receive supplies of raw material, and what quantity and kind of specified army requisites it was expected the said works would be in a position to fulfil. Without question Japan will make use of lessons taught by Germany and there is no doubt that her plan of mobilization has already been worked out in perfect detail.

But, besides steel and iron, Japan will require other articles, including foodstuffs, with which to supply her nationals. A huge staff of workers will be absorbed into the army and for the defence of the realm, consequently the output of foodstuffs will be proportionately decreased. All these deficiencies can only be obtained from China.

Thus China will form a base of production for Japan, and in consequence the latter will have to secure the closest of relations with the former.

These relations will not only be requisite to secure a source of supply of raw material needed by Japan, but also to ensure that the Japanese army, transported to meet the enemy in Southern Chinese territory, might receive adequate equipment and supplies of munitions from the metropolis. The number of different items embodied in the above is enormous. Experience gained in the Great War tends to show that an army, comprising a million men, in a position to supply itself with its own fodder, requires the service of 350-500 railway cars per diem.

Primarily Japan will take advantage of the different sea routes as being more convenient and easy of access. All supplies necessary for the Japanese troops will be dispatched to Tsintao, Shanghai, Canton and other points on the coast, and from thence freighted to the army base by rail.

But when domination in maritime power has been relinquished by Japan and has fallen into the hands of her allied opponents, sea transport will become more and more hazardous, and dangerous, and Japan will have to devise other methods and means of supply.

Such may include a trunk line having its terminal at ports situated on the shores of the Japanese Sea, that would be immune from enemy attack and passed through provinces in China of interest to Japan. For purposes of security such a trunk line should not be confined to one track but should be numerically increased. These delicate lines of communication, for thousands of versts passing over the territory of Korea. Manchuria and China, hostile to Japan, should be adequately safeguarded from possible disruption. Besides an adequate military guard against any hostile action initiated by the indigneous population, it would be requisite to devise a means of guarding the same in a wider sense -- from assault launched by an outside aggressor. This would entail devising preventative measures aimed at Russia, in case the latter should take up a position inimical to Japan's interests.

In order to guarantee herself from aggression initiated by Russia, Japan must cast her eyes far to the Northwest. She must

needs widen her sphere of influence not only in Korea and Southern Manchuria, but must try and find a foothold in Northern Manchuria, and in the Maritime district (Primoria), thereby, if possible, spreading her political ascendency over the whole area of the Russian Far East, Mongolia and Transbaikalia. In such case she might consider herself absolute mistress within the area commanded by her rear and lines of communication.

It was not in vain, that during the period of intervention in Siberia, Japan pointedly laid stress on the interest taken by her in Far Eastern territory, bounded by Lake Baikal. Not in vain were the separatist aspirations avowed to by various Far Eastern attamans strongly supported by Japan, including the renouned project of forming Transbaikalia into an autonomous Buriat-Mongol principality. Should this project have been brought into effect, under the full economic and financial control of Japan, the latter might have remained easy in her shoes.

The plans of Japan, bound up with aspirations to an absolute domination of the Pacific Ocean Zone, with the intent of the economic seizure of China, Manchuria, Mongolia and the Russian Far East as far as Lake Baikal, are no figment. These plans are being energetically propagated by Japan within the limits of Russian Far Eastern territory and in Manchuria, and if during later years Japan has staid her appetite, this is wholely due to the exigencies of unfavorable circumstance, in view of the increase of power displayed by the Union of the Federated Republics of Russia at home, in view of the latter having reached an agreement with China, in view of the economic reverses encountered by Japan due to the earthquake in 1923 and consequent widening of the breach with labor -- Japan has been forced to refrain from open fulfilment of her maximum intentions on the mainland sponsored by the military party, and to defer to a more discreet and prudent policy.

ACTIVITY DISPLAYED BY JAPAN IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST.

The disastrous termination of the Russo-Japanese war dealt a terrific blow to Russian prestige in the Far East. After 1905 Japan had no further cause to fear Russia's battle fleet, and outlets from the Sea of Japan were firmly secured to her charge.

Nevertheless, the sea-board of the Russian Maritime Provinces with the fortress of Vladivostock was an ever abiding menace to Japan. With their base at this fortress, Russian submarines might venture upon excursions into the open sea without fear of danger.

The Russian revolution, civil war, and subsequent intervention allayed this menace and, at present, the Japanese could seize Vladivostock, in case of need, at short notice.

The Russian Far East is of the greatest significance to Japan. In the first place -- from an economic point of view and secondly -- from a military standpoint. If the port, owing to its scant population affords no tempting market for the products of Japanese industry, nevertheless the abounding riches of the district - fishing, forest and mineral, could not but allure the eyes of the Japanese. During a period of peace -- the region might be devoted to commercial and industrial development; during the time of war - to a military base, although certainly of less significance and value

and value than China, owing to the want experienced therein of a superabundance of food stuffs as well as the paucity of industrial institutions and lack of labor to develop its natural resources.

From a military point of view the significance to Japan of Russia's Far Eastern Provinces is absolutely priceless, as being in such close proximity to the living arteries feeding the country, their utility would be ov exceptional advantage and necessity in case of dire collision with the enemy in the South.

The above affords the reason of Japan's aspiration, so strongly promulgated in 1918-23, to occupy the Russian Far East and to settle for good within these boundaries.

From the moment of the initiation of intervention in 1918, Japan undertook measures towards the exploiting of those natural resources that were of the greatest interest to her in the Russian Far East; petroleum and coal on the Saghalien islands; fisheries in the Okhotsk sea and along the coast line of Kamchatka, and the hewing of timber in the Maritime provinces. They likewise paid close attention to the deposits of iron and other metals to be found in the Sihota - Aline Mountains. All the measures undertaken were calculated to cover no small period of time and meanwhile adequate steps were undertaken to prevent Russian pioneers from competing with Japanese aspirants.

Reports submitted by the Primorsk Chamber of Commerce for perusal at the Washington Conference, with purpose of invoking aid and protection against the policy of aggression practiced by the Japanese, clearly depict the insistance with which Japan, taking advantage of the civil war in Russia, promulgated her policy of wresting Russia's Far Eastern boundaries from Russia proper.

During the period of intervention Japan aimed at spreading her influence over as vast an area in the Russian Far East as was then possible, the line of demarcation being bounded by Lake Baikal, Refusing admiral Kolchak any assistance beyond this boundary, they aimed at supporting, in every way possible, the separatist aspirations advocated by individual "attamans" on Far Eastern Territory.

Supporting the projected formation of an automomous Buriat-Mongol principality in the trans-Baikal district, Japan rightly assumed that she would become absolute mistress of the whole of Eastern Siberia, as far as Lake Baikal, of Manchuria and of Mongolia.

At the same time, during the parleys held with admiral Kolchak Japan agreed to render him assistance against Soviet Russia dependent upon economic prerogatives to be granted her in the Far East. The gaining of a firm foothold in the district was to be inspired by the same methods as had been practiced in China -- the infusion of Japanese capital into commercial undertakings of a mixed Sino-Japanese character. In 1919 the Japanese Ministry of War formulated a plan for the construction of a series of works and factories on Russian Far Eastern territory, to wit: iron factories, cartridge, rifle and ordnance factories, saw mills, et alt. These undertakings were to have been financed by Russo-Japanese capital, their administration likewise being of a mixed order. From this it is clear that herein the idea was being developed into life for transforming the Russian Far East into a Japanese base, in the case of an imbrolio taking place on the Pacific Ocean --~~an~~ a base, far less open to dislocation by a blow dealt from the outside than in the case of China.

The origination of the Japanese maximum programme, involving the construction of railway lines on the mainland, applies to this period of developing a secure foothold in the Russian Far-East, at a time when circumstance and attendant conditions were most favorable to Japan's aspirations.

As a result of a careful and detailed examination of the territory, and of reconnaissance work conducted by the Japanese themselves during the period of intervention, assisted thereto by chartographic material seized by them from the topographical department at Habaroffsk -- the Japanese were enabled to plot a chart of proposed railway construction with descriptive details of the projected lines attached. The chart and descriptive material did not receive broad publicity, as they were charged to the care of but a small group of trustworthy and confidential men.

It was intended to construct Japanese railways upon Russian territory on a concession basis, i.e., under conditions similar to the railway that had been built in Manchuria.

It was proposed that railway cohstruction by the Japanese should embrace the Primorsk, Amoor and Saghalien provinces. In all twelve railway lines were projected for construction, eleven of which were to form a group of terminals centred at the bay of Saint Olga and the town of Nikolsk Usurisk.

The following lines (scheme No. 1) were designed with terminals situated at the port of Saint Olga,

1) From the port of St. Olga along the valley of the river Avvakumovka, across the Sihota-Aline divide into the valley of the river Ulahe and along the same to the estuary of the river Not, with branches deviating therefrom to the station Ussuri and the town of Spassk.

2) From the above line, from the head waters of the river Ulahe via the hamlet Anuchino to the town of Nikolsk Usuriisk;

3) From the port of St. Olga along the seaboard to the hamlet of Vladimiro-Sleksandrovskaia and further on to Vladivostok;

4) From the hamlet of Vladimiro-Aleksandrovskaia to the North along the valley of the river Suchan and further to the hamlet "Anuchino", to connedt with line No. 2.

The second group comprised the following lines:

1) Nikolsk-Usuriisk - Kamen Ribolov, on the western shore of Lake Hanka.
2) Nikolsk-Usuriisk - the town of Dun-nin (Santcha-gow) on the territory of Northern Manchuria.
3) Kamien Ribolov to Grodekovo.
4) Grodekovo to Dun-nin (San-tcha-gow).
5) Razdolnoe to Novokievsk,
6) Novokievsk - Hunchun,
7) Novokievsk- Kionhin.

Examination of this proposed system of railway lines forces one to come to the conclusion that should the Japanese scheme have been brought into effect, supplemented by the construction of the projected lines in Northern Manchuria the whole of the southern Usuriisk district would have been to such extent intersected by a system of Japanese railways that Russia's influence in the district would have practically been brought to naught.

From a military standpoint Vladivostok would have lost the advantages of a rear base being hemmed in, on the one side by the system of Japanese railway terminating at the port of St. Olga, and, on the other, by the ports of Kionsion or Seisin.

Vladivostok would likewise lose its economic significance owing to the close proximity of the Japanese ports of St. Olga and Seisin with feelers extending to and connecting up with the Ussuri railway at the stations Ussuri, Grodekovo, and Spassk. At the same time the Japanese would be in good position to freely exploit the huge natural resources, timber and mineral, extending throughout the Southern slopes of the Sihota-Aline divide.

The project of running a line, Svobodni-Alekseysk, along the valley of the river Zea, across the smaller Hingan rise into the valley of the river Kerby and along the river Amgun to the town of Nikolaevsk on the Amoor, with purpose of controlling the Southern Ussuri region, was kept separate from the above. It was further proposed to carry this line on to a terminal point at the bay of de Castri, with branches deviating to the Tartar Straits and with a tunnel beneath the same, thereby connecting up the Ussuri system of railways with that of the Japanese lines on the island of Saghalien.

This road was intended to bisect a region of extraordinary wealth as regards its natural and economic resources. It was rich in minerals of all kinds: gold, iron, coal, lead etc. Its wealth of timber included cedar, larch aspen and spruce that were valuable for purposes of export. The construction of this line placed all the mineral wealth of Saghalien and the Amoor at the disposal and discretion of the Japanese.

The military significance attached to this road was enormous. If the proposed system of railways in the South Ussuri district had for the purpose of the wresting from Russia of a huge area of territory, the construction of a railway by the Japanese between Saghalien-Nikolevsk-Svobodni, supplemented b y the construction of the Sipingai-Tchen-sai-tun-Taonanfu-Tsitsikar-Sachalian line in Manchuria gave them the possibility of securely grasping, alienating and transforming Saghalien, the Maritime and Amoor provinces and Northern Manchuria, to the East of the Hingan mountains, into their own base.

But the calculations of Japan in regard to the weakness of Russia and the long duration of internecine strife and of internal distrubance proved to be erroneous. She was forced for the time being to refrain from her grandiose plans of wresting a broad expanse of territory in the Russian Far East and in Northern Manchuria to be used as a military rear base, and to satisfy her aspirations by securing certain economic advantages to be derived from the exploitation of petroleum, coal, timber and fishery concessions. The infusion of Japanese capital, with a view to the operation of the above, will tend to facilitate her obtaining a firm foothold in the Russian Far East.

Construction of Railways by Japan in Korea and in Manchuria.

Following the line of least resistance Japan paid serious and undivided attention to Korea and Manchuria, once she found herself thwarted owing to untoward circumstance, in prosecuting her aggressive policy in the Russian Far East.

During the period of the greatest weakness exhibited by Russia, Japan devised her maximum-programme covering railway construction not only on Russian territory in the Far East, but in Korea and Manchuria, as well.

The Korean group of railroads, projected to be constructed according to this programme, found outlet from Northern Manchuria to the Korean ports of Kionsin, Seisin, Hamhion and Gensan.

Greatest attention was paid to the system of railroads to be constructed within the region of the port of Kionsin, besides which this system was closely allied to the roads projected for construction in Northern Manchuria and in the South Ussuri district.

Besides the railway line Kionsin-Hoiren that had already been built, the following lines were projected:

1) Kionsion- Hamhion - Gensan.
2) Kionsin - to the port of Seisin under construction.
3) Seisin-Kionhin.
4) Kionhin - Keiuen.
5) Keiuen - Hoiren
6) Keiuen - Hunchun, on Chinese territory.
7) Hoiren - Sensin.
8) Hoiren - Musan - Hutshan, with a branch to Pukchion.

The construction of these lines was closely allied to the widening and extension of the Port of Kionsion, to fulfil the conditions required by a large and well equipped commercial port, to provide anchorage and wharfage for large draught ocean going steamers and storage room for cereals exported from Northern Manchuria.

However, owing to the difficulties met with, due to natural conditions, in equipping this port in adequate manner to tranship with ease hundreds of millions of freight per annum, it was decided, simultaneously with the above, to construct a large military and commercial port at Seisin, situated close by.

In view of the fact that these measures were projected to be undertaken on, practically speaking, Japanese territory they were quickly brought into effect. Construction of the port of Seisin was initiated in 1922, and already in 1923 the outer moles, breakwaters and military quay had been completed, and work was set in hand on constructing and equipping the inner military harbor.

In like manner was the work of constructing the projected railways in Korea initiated and put in hand. Construction of the trunk line Kioision- Gensan, running parallel to the coast, was commenced from two sides, that have been almost linked up. The line Hoiren - Musan - Pukchion is being carried on apace. The Kionsion - Seisin and Hoiren- Hunchun (on the borders of Manchuria) have now reached completion.

This system of railways in Korea was designated to be linked up with the railway system of the Maritime provinces and of Manchuria via the Hunchun-Dinnin (Sanshagow) branch and the lines running from Hoiren to Lantsi and from Hutshan to Lintsan.

According to this maximum programme the Japanese projected constructing the following lines in Manchuria:

1) Keiuer- Hunchun
2) Huchun-Dunning (Sanchagow)
3) Hoien - Omo- Kirin.
4) Hoiren - Lantsi - Ninguta.
5) Omo - Ninguta.
6) Kirin - Huadian - Hailun - Tielin.
7) Hailin - Lintsian
8) Dunhua - Litun
9) Tielin- Suitun
10) Changsatun - Baintala.

11) Changsatun - Kailun - Taonan - Tsitsikar.
12) Tsitsikar - Mergen - Sachalian.
13) Tsitsikar - Lindian - Anda - Harbin.
14) Nehe - Manaigun - Erkeshan - Huishu - Harbin.

The projected system of Japanese Railways was intended to encircle Manchuria and divert the export of all freight from Vladivostok to the South and Southeast, to Dairen and the Korean ports of Gensan, Kionsion and Seisin. In which case industry and commerce centered on Manchuria would naturally come under the control of Japanese capital.

Having devised the above plan Japan set about securing a series of concessions from the Chinese Government, covering the principal lines of communication projected. The above mentioned system upon being brought into partial effect was made subject to several changes of plan - it was supplemented by newly projected lines, dependent upon results obtained from a preliminary survey or due to change of circumstance, some of the routes having been thrown up entirely or their construction for the time having been postponed.

At the present moment fulfilment of the above plan of railway construction may be represented as follows: The Sipingai - Tchensiatun - Laomin line with a branch from Tchensiatun to Baintala has been completed and, is open to operation. The laomin-Tsitsikar line, despite protests raised b y the Chinese Eastern Railway, is in process of construction and will, most likely, be completed in 1926. The Mukden - Hailun - Kirin line is well under way and preliminary work has been started on the Hoiren - Dunhua - Omo - Kirin road.

Besides which, the following lines have been projected as supplementary to the above: Taonanfu - Jehe (scheme No. 2) with a branch outlet to the sea on the Liaotung Gulf, and Taonanfu-Hailar with a branch line to the siding Horgo on the C. E. R. Endeavors initiated by the Japanese in gaining concessions to cover these roads have been the source of discussion in both the American and local Harbin press.

During the present year news has reached us of changes having been made to some extent remodelling the plan of railway construction to be undertaken in Northern Korea. The ports of Kionsion and Seisin have, apparently, been acknowledged to be incompatible with the purpose designed - of developing them into large seaports similar to that existant at Dairen.

Consequently the Bay of "Rostsin" (Apparently Korniloff Bay according to the Russian charts) situated in Northern Korea, in close proximity to the Russian frontier, has been decided upon for the purpose. It possesses every mutual facility qualifying it to be transformed into a first class port. At present a campaign is being waged for the appropriation of necessary funds to cover the expenses entailed, and to run a railway line between this point to connect up with a line running direct from "Rostsin" to Tsan-Sion or from Rostsin to Kion-hin - On-sion - lan-tsi.

Should this plan be consummated the traverse from Northern Manchuria to the sea of Japan will be shorter than that via Vladvistok.

Measures undertaken by Japan in Mongolia.

The enormous significance to Japan of a ready and effectual connection with China by land has already been annotated above. Should the balance of power in the Eastern Chinese and Yellow seas be transferred to the enemy, the necessity of communication by land would become of greater significance and insistance to Japan- of trunk lines that would guarantee her both and uninterrupted and secure means of communication with China.

Such lines, linking up Japan with her economic and, in part, with her metallurgical base - as well as with Southern China, the point of concentration of a million strong army - may be represented by two railways partly in process of construction and projected to be constructed (see scheme No. 2):

1) Fusan - Seoul - Antung - Mukden - Tientsin - Shanghai.

2) Port Seisin - Heiren - Dunhua - Omo - Kirin - Changchun- Sipingai - Tchantsiatun - Baintala - Jehe - Peking - Hankow - Nanking.

These trunk lines with terminal points at the ports of Seisin and Fusan, situated on the shores of the Japanese Sea (the latter being absolutely impregnable to assault by the enemy), lead into Chinese territory that is absolutely indispensable to Japan. These lines during the strenuous and intense period of hostilities, would be used for the transportation of enormous quantities of freight with destination the ports of Fusan and Seisin - supplies of foodstuffs and raw material for the needs of the population and factories of Japan, and would carry in the opposite direction, the huge supplies of munitions of war required by the Japanese forces operating in the South Eastern Provinces of China.

The first of these trunk lines, running parallel to the sea shore, and in consequence more or less open to attack by the enemy, is already in existence. The second has only partially been completed, the following divisions being ready and in operation:
Seisin - Heiren - Tsianscion; Kirin - Changchun - Sipingai- Tchantsiatun - Baintala; Peking - Hankow. The Tsianscion - Dunhua - Omo - Kirin section is now being prepared for construction, and, in the near future, work on the division Baintala - Jehe will be undertaken, the concession for which has already been secured.

Thus at present a division of a length of 150 versts - Jehe-Peking - is the only constituent part missing preventing the complete linking up of this important artery. No difficulty should be experienced by Japan, owing to the high state attained by present day technical science, in constructing a railway line in this district even during the period of active hostilities, within that comparatively speaking long duration of time when she would virtually be mistress of the Eastern China and Yellow Seas.

The above depicts the fundamentals covering railway construction in Korea and Manchuria instigated and elaborated by the Japanese General Staff - a method of defence called forth by strategical considerations should a conflict arise in the Pacific Ocean. The construction of the said trunk lines have been conceived to counteract plans of aggression that might be adopted by America and England, altho certainly in case of necessity, they might likewise be employed in case of onslaught by Russia.

A purely superficial examination of the chart (scheme No. 2) brings out in evidence the weakness displayed in this work of railway construction. Their weakness is due to that they are vulneralbe and open to attack from trans-Baikalia. Should Russia, during the coming war in the Pacific Ocean, be hostile to Japan and should the latter launch her attack from trans-Baikalia - the probable centre for the concentration of Russia's armed forces - with her eyes fixed on Taonan - Mukden as the goal to be attained, such offensive would menace the very existence of Japan. Should the Eastern China and Yellow Seas be subjected to the combined onslaught of the Anglo-American fleets, a successful attack and advance from Trans-Baikalia to Moukden would dissever Japan from her base in China and force her to capitulate.

It is only therefore to be understood that the nation that is making the most careful and well-planned preparations, according to precepts laid down by her German mentors, to meet the exigencies a campaign in the Pacific, with purpose of securing complete ascendency in these waters, should well consider a plan of action to be adopted in case an unfavorable co-ordination of forces in Northern Manchuria threaten the possibility of attack from the Northwest.

Consequently there remains but one method of action to be brought into effect, should a conflict the Pacific prove imminent, the advance of the Japanese Army and occupation by it of a zone of territory lying between the point of concentration of the Russian forces and the railway trunk lines indispensable to the existence of Japan.

The watershed of the big Hingan represents the only natural effective boundary that could be occupied by the Japanese forces, its most important section being the region contiguous to the Chinese Eastern Railway lying to the south of the line.

From a military standpoint it would only be natural that Japan, should make the required plans for the occupation by her army of suitable positions on the Hingan divide, even though these veiled no aggressive intent directed against Russia, but merely paved the way to safeguard against possible conditions deemed most unfavorable to Japan in the coming conflict in Pacific waters.

Amongst other measures adopted in preparing the premised military zone for action, the adapting and provision of railway transit is one of special and most crucial importance. The rear of our present day armies numbering millions of men - and in case of complications arising with Russia, Japan would have to be in readiness to put this number in the field - must be furnished with an extensive and well-equipped system of railways. This system of railways would convey reserves, ammunition, transport, supplies, etc. to the front.

It must be kept well in mind that the disposition of Japanese troops on the Hingan range, with its utter lack of local supplies, would tend to place this army in worse state as regards provisioning than that experienced by the Russians during the war of 1904 - 1906 in the wealthy districts of agriculture of South Manchuria. Everything would depend upon the question of the fit transportation of supplies and provisions. Experience gained in the Great War taught us that the supply and provisioning (excluding fodder) of a million men at the front required the daily service of 350 - 500 railway freight cars. This supply is only compatible when supported by an adequate and efficient railway system.

In case of complications with Russia during the waging of a possible "Pacific" conflict, Japan's probable method of action might be represented in the following:

First, taking advantage of the numerical weakness of Russia's armed forces in Siberia, the impossibility of Russia being able to rush a sufficient force to the front at short notice, along the single trank of the Siberian main line of railway, and the short distance separating Japan itself from the possible scene of action, Japan would endeavor, during the military period of the struggle, to occupy a sufficiently wide area on the territory of the Far East.

Judging by Japan's present preparations undertaken at home, she would be able to occupy Saghalien, Nikolaevsk on the Amoor, the Bay of Castri, the Maritime provinces bounded by the Iman, and Northern Manchuria with the Chinese Eastern Railway as far as the Hingan mountains, without enfeebling herself by too great diffusion of her armed forces. Of course the occupation of the Hingan could, to certain extent, be hindered by the advance of Russia's vanguard from trans-Baikal provinces. The deploying of the Japanese forces on the Northern Manchurian front might then be approximately featured in the following; (No. 2)- the main forces would be centred on the slopes of the Big Hingan divide, on both sides of the Chinese Eastern Railway, on a front 250-300 versts.

In order to secure its left flank and defend the trunk line from a possible deep enveloping movement from the left through the steppes of Mongolia, a strong projecting force should be positioned in Mongolia, approximately on territory to the West of Kaila. To secure itself from possible attack from the Amoor basin in the direction of Blagovestshensk along the existing road over the minor Hingan range, Sahalian - Nehe - a somewhat weaker screen should be placed in the vicinity of Mergen.

Besides which some danger, but in lesser degree, is afforded by the valleys of the river Sungari and of the Mudantsian, that would allow Russia's forces to operate against the trunk lines held by Japan and the Chinese Eastern Railway, by following the river valleys, to be backed by a flotilla of river steamers on the Amoor. The region parallel to the Ussuri railway from Habaroffsk to the Iman is exposed to the same danger. In these directions companies of men should likewise be deployed.

As depicted in order that the Japanese army, its advance guards and screens, should consider themselves in perfect security it would be necessary that they be supplied with sufficient and effective railway service.

If we glance at any text book on strategy and tactics and examine the system of the rear of an army in present day warfare, we shall find that several trunk lines run from the base, situated in the deep rear, to the front, along which every category of supplies and equipment is transported. These supplies in measure of need are distributed to the army requiring them, being primarily concentrated in storehouses in the rear proximate to the front in action. It is desirable, with this purpose in view, that the trunk lines leading to the front be connected up with lines running parallel to the same, and that narrow guage field lines, supplying the different branches of the army, should have their origin at different points of the feeders running parallel to the front. Railway side lines should also lead to the flanking forces and those in defence of the rear.

If we glance at the scheme of the anticipated deployment of the Japanese army and at a chart of the system of railway construction - when fulfilled according to Japanese plan, the significance and purpose of such construction will at once become apparent (scheme No.2).

On the Ussuri and Chinese Eastern railways, and in the Seisin - Hoiren - Dunhua - Gmo- Kirin - Changchun - Sipingai - Taonanfu and further on to Hilar - Japan would become possessed of two huge trunk lines extending from her bases, Vladivostock and Siesin on the shores of Japanese Sea that led to the Hingan front. Along these lines, primarily the Southern and later on along the Northern, Japanese troops will be carried to occupy the Big Hingan. Later on they will be used for the transportation of equipment, supplies munitions and artillery for Japanese troops occupying Northern Manchuria.

The line Jehey Baintala - Tchantsaitun - Taonanfu- Tsitsikar- Nehe- Mergen, running parallel to the front, will see service removing troops from one position to another and transporting supplies along the length of the front. Narrow guage field feeders will eminate from this line terminating at different points on the Hingan divide.

The flanking screens will be enabled to receive supplies and reserves: on the right, along the Tsitsikar - Nehe- Mergen line, and on the left, along the Sipingai - Tchansiatun - Baintala- Kailar line and its extension, a narrow guage field feeder.

The troops defending the lines of communication to the North whose positions may supposedly be placed as within the region of the Iman and of Siansin, will be supplied by the Vladivostock- Nikolsk - Ussuriisk - Iman division of the Ussuri Railway and the projected Japanese line, Dunhua - Ningoita - Hailun - Siansin line (on the Iantsi- Ningoita - Hailin - Siansin section).

It may be seen from this short analysis of railway construction activity displayed by the Japanese in Manchuria, how great a significance is attached to such construction from a military point of view (in this article we do not take heed of the economic importance attached to these railways as a menace to traffic on the Chinese Eastern railway; from this point the question has been exhaustively dealt with in the article written by E. E. Iashnoff - see Manchurian Monitor No. 3-4, 1925).

It is requisite to note that in bringing their plan of railway construction into effect, the Japanese primarily built those roads that were of significant strategic importance.

Perchance the railways as mentioned above, need not necessarily provide absolute proof of plans of aggression entertained by Japan against Russia. This constructive activity may have been called into being by the maturing of a possible conflict with the United States of America and with England, in which case the effective and sharppoint of the weapon is turned against the aforesaid powers.

However, Russia cannot remain indifferent to the construction of lines of railway that openly menace the security of her Far Eastern Domains, and she must needs undertake measures to prevent this particular phaze of activity from overlapping the confines of certain definite boundaries.

Railway construction as carried out and projected by the Japanese throws an intense light upon her plans and proposed method of action in Northern Manchuria, should a conflict arise in the Pacific Ocean. However the intentions of Japan as delineated are confirmed by her activity in another sphere.

If the region of the Big Hingan, as preindicated by her plans, is destined to play a most important part for military purposes, then Japan should have paid special and avid attention to adapting the same to a particular end and becoming acquainted with the specific features comprised in the territory.

During the period prior to the Great War Germany may be taken as an example of having, a good while prior even to the declaration of hostilities, prepared the future region of the seene of battle, Poland, situated outside her natural boundaries. Poland was then literally overrun by Germans, who acted in every and other capacity, from ordinary workmen to heads of industrial establishments. These with the assistance of military specialists, quickly added to old maps and charts the results attained by fresh investigations, which maps, during the war, proved to be much more reliable and up to date than those possessed by the Russians.

The principal points of vantage were carefully studied; men of the German reserve under the guise of labourers, farm hands or artisans made a study of local conditions that, when war was finally declared, were the means of providing a source of knowledge that proved to be of inestimable value. The Germans tried to buy estates at different locations, that were technically knownsas "Keys to the positions", or that might be used as thepoint of issue for operations undertaken against any salient. Here they prepared points of observation, laid in supplies of explosives for the blowing up, at the commencement of hostilities, of important enemy structures, built concrete platforms as a foundation for their heavy artillery, and, in matter of fact, engendered a whole series of other preparatory military measures.

The activity displayed by the Japanese on the slopes of the Big Hingan, from actual observation, may be taken as being absolute identical with the foregoing. It was only natural that, first of all, they should pay close attention to timber concessions covering a vast tract within the district, and having exclusive significance from a military point of view.

And the first task fulfilled by the Japanese was the purchase of a forest concession acquired by the brothers Shevchenko, that covered an area of over 5,000 square versts and was situated on the topmost ridge of the Big Hingan, and on its Western slopes, on both sides of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

This region is one of the greatest importance should a collision ensue between the enemy forces within the area covered by the Big Hingan. Entrenchments will be run through the concession leading to the centre of the Japanese position. Herein lie a whole series of the most important and shortest routes leading to the trans-baikal borders and valley of the Sungarie River.

Taking advantage of financial difficulties experienced by Shevchenko Brothers in 1920-21, who, conjoint with the diminution of Russian influence in the Far East feared to be althgether deprived of th their rights to the concession, the Japanese in 1922, offered the firm protection afforded by the Japanese flag by becoming shareholders in the concern.

The agreement reached was met by a protest lodged by the authorities of the Heilunkiang province and finally the matter was settled by the formation of the so-called "Tchamian" Company, a Russo-Sino-Japanese undertaking in which besides the brothers Shefchenko, the South Manchurian Railway and the Tsitsikar Provincial Bank were apportioned shares. The Chinese share in the business was represented by the title to the concession, the Bros. Shefchenko the value of the

machinery, installation and equipment, and the Japanese were obligated to supply and pay in a certain capital fund.

But, although the "Tchamian" Concession has three owners and although up to the present, it has not been legally registered, in point of fact the managers of the concern are Japanese. The whole management of the concession is centred in their hands, all work is under their control and guidance, and theother two participants in the concern have altogether been alienated from taking any active part in the work of operation. Matters have come to such a pass, that the Japanese have even forbidden the employees of their co-partner Shefchenko from putting foot within the precints of the concession, despite the fact that to him belong large stocks of timber felled prior to the agreement, as above, having been reached.

The chief executives in the administration of the concession, both at Harbin and on the spot, are officers of the reserve attached to the Japanese army, and the remainder of the Japanese staff, are without question all discharged soldiers.

Thus, the Tchamian concession could supply the Japanese, in case of any complications arising, with a sufficient military force excellently well acquainted with the location; that, when needed, will have been found to have been supplied with everything necessary for bringing any proposition assigned it into execution.

Activity conducted on the spot isveiled from casual or irrelevant scrutiny; but the economic results derived from the concession are of negative moment; as its exploitation yields an annual deficit running into hundreds of thousands yen a year.

At present work on the spot has been absolutely stopped. The statues incorporating the Tchamian Company have never been ratified by the Mukden authorities, but it is to be understood that the Japanese will not easily relinquish the position held by them; an undertaking yielding no profit from an economic point of view, is too great significance to them from a strategic standpoint.

The Japanese have placed on sound and dependable footing matters relative to the examination and survey of the region lying within the area of the Big Hingan and Eastern Mongolia. In 1923 a map of Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, 48 versts to the inch, was published by the Japanese. A careful examination of this map conclusively proves that the system of roads leading from the Barga Territory into Mongolia circumscribing the principal elevations of the Big Hingan Mountains and having outlet on the South Manchurian and Peking-Mukden railways have been carefully and very closely studied by the Japanese. Local designations based upon old Russian topographical maps have been made only to a certain extent; to great extent they have been supplemented by new sources of information, the work upon routes undertaken by Japanese parties of reconnaissance.

Within the area covered by the central masses of the Big Hingan the Japanese have not only confined their labors to planning a map of the "Tchamian" concession, but they have included regions of strategical importance contiguous to the same - the concession belonging to Vorontsoff Brothers along the valley of the river Hailarhe and of its confluent the Kuldura, and also a second concession belonging to the above, called "ladorskia", situated on the upper reaches of the river Imingol. The Japanese plotted these maps in 1924 when they anticipated securing Vorontsoff's concession by right of purchase. A Russian map, 10 versts to the inch, published by the General Staff was taken as the foundation of the work.

This was photographed and supplemented by novel data derived from the survey run by Japanese specialists that included the most insignificant of mountain tracks.

Consequently the whole region assigned to the intended deployment of the Japanese army has been surveyed by the Japanese quite lately.

A branch line, 45 versts in length, situated to the North of the station Irekte, running parallel to the Japanese front could, in case of need, be conditioned of service to them.

The permanent way of a branch line belonging to the Shefchenko Brothers running parallel to the Hingan divide some forty versts in length and situated to the South of the Horgo siding is still in existence. This line runs to the boundaries of the "Choll" concession belonging to the Chinese Eastern Ry. In the future these branch lines might prove of great service to the Japanese and would greatly alleviate the question of adequate supplies to a Japanese army on the Big Hingan.

It is impossible to determine what is actually being accomplished on the "Tchamian" concession as a means adapting it to this particular purpose and as has already been testified - no outsiders are allowed on the concession itself. But the work of exploration for coal and other minerals, carried out by Shefchenko in 1921, afforded full scope for the effecting of every and other kind of earthwork and even the laying of stocks of explosives, without public curiosity being in anyway awakened.

In any case it must needs be acknowledged that even now the Japanese have bought into effect preparatory measures adapting the slopes of the Big Hingan to military purposes.

Sundry purchases of fodder in the districts of Anda and Mangow that took place some two years ago, during the period when the relations between the Union of the Federated States of Russia and Japan were more or less strained, only tends to confirm the surmise that this latter region is designed to become the rear of any Japanese armies presumably operating upon the slopes of this natural boundary line.

The second matter, that should evoke special interest on the part of Japan, should she purpose occupying Northern Manchuria as far as the Hingan mountains, as a means of protection thwarting any attack delivered from the Northwest, is centred in the town of Harbin. This location has all the necessary specific features of a natural base where a multifarious order of army supplies and equipment would be centred. The activity displayed by Japan in her attempts to assume economic ascendency at Harbin is a matter of universal knowledge. The colony of Japanese nationals in this city is estimated at being over 3,000 souls that is densely crowded into the VII-th District, the heart of commercial Harbin. A major number of commercial undertakings and financial institutions are controlled by or are in the hands of the Japanese and they have invested huge sums of money in buildings and real estate. Should Japan, with the initiation of hostilities, decide to shut down Russian industrial and commercial undertakings, a sufficient number of Japanese nationals could be mobilized on the spot to effectively carry on the industries required to supply the needs of an army at the front. It is of interest to note that the building in which the Russo-Japanese Institute is housed, that gives shelter to over 200 young Japanese students, furnishes the salient features of a citadel dominating every quarter of the town.

Consequent to the Big Hingan and the town of Harbin the valley of the river Mudantsian is the next locality of importance that should sttract the special attention of the Japanese.

Besides the projected railway line running from Dunhua to Ninguta- Harbin and further on to Sansin, the Japanese have started work on the Mudantsian waterfalls and, during the last three years, have acquired three timber concessions situated on the left confluents of the river Mudantsian contiguous to the Eastern slopes of the Tchan-guan-tsan-lin divide. The acquisition of these concessions affords Japan the possibility of examining this region, one of great strategic importance, in every detail and of keeping the same under her control, as well as giving employment here to a sufficient contingent of discharged soldiers- under the pretence of an industrial staff.

The significance of this valley to the Japanese lies in that it is the shortest and easiest route leading from the Sungarie river to the Chinese Eastern railway and to Northern Korea, and where, in case of war, the principal Japanese lines of communication would be intended to pass.

Having occupied the Big Hingan salient, the valley of the river Mudantsian and the region of Iman, Japan may well rest assured as to the safety of her position in Manchuria and the security of her trunk lines,- the connecting links between Japan and China.

The above represent measures of the highest strategical importance that are being brought into effect according to prescribed plan. They do not come under the head, nor can they be assigned to development, of Japan's economic interests within the district.

We must needs again lay stress upon the fact that the measures as ~~taken~~ undertaken cannot, with settled conviction, be ascribed as measures indicative of any aggressive intention by Japan against the Union of the Federated States of Russia.

When preparing for war the General Staff always bases its calculations upon political conditions being of the most unfavorable moment, and resting on these premises undertakes measures in accordance with such. More than often it happens that diplomatic parleys succeed in improving the situation, or groupings are formed alleviating the necessary of measures already undertaken preparatory to the opening of hostilities. In such manner, prior to the Great War, Bulgaria inaugurated measures of defence on her borders contiguous to the domains of Turkey, evisaging the latter as a possible enemy. But during the war itself Bulgaria threw in her lot with the triple alliance and the enormous outlay expended on strengthening the Bulgaria-Turkish frontier was money but ill-spent.

Japan may be placed, in part, in somewhat analogical situation in regard to work of preparation effected in Northern Manchuria and in the Russian Far East. A peaceful agreement reached with Russia, in case of the incidence of another and more dangerous collision in the Pacific Ocean and on its shores, gives promise to Japan of but the most manifold of advantages. It would secure Japan's position on the mainland and her means of communication with China would be absolutely reliable and not open to the hazards of circumstance. It would secure to Japan the unhindered delivery of huge quantities of supplies having their origin in North Manchuria, and would afford the possibility of obtaining on Far Eastern territory very large quantities of timber and minerals so very necessary to Japan. An lastly, it would afford Japan the opportunity of securing from Soviet Russia, as well as in transit from Europe, large stocks of material and necessary supplies.

The industry of Japan has been inaugurated and inculcated by German methods, and when put on a multifold warfooting, would require the services of a large staff of specialists, of machinery and material. All the above can be supplied by Germany via Russia, the Great Siberian trunk line being in a position to develop and augment its transit freight to very considerable extent. During the initial period of the Great War, when cut off from means of communication with her allies via the Black and Baltic Seas, Russia received most of the supplies, munitions and equipment required by her from Japan and America via the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Great Siberian trunk line. In 1916 this transit freight exceeded 44 million poods.

In case Russia and Japan should not reach an agreement but were satisfied with an arrangement embodying a coordination of effort, the former might exert pressure on England by menacing India from the borders of Turkeystan. And it must be constituted that never before has England's traditional apprehension, in regard to an offensive launched by Russia against British supremacy in India, had greater foundation of fact than at the present time.

Should serious complications arise in India, England would have no choice but to abandon her interests of but secondary importance in China, and concentrate all her efforts upon the defence of her sovereign power in India, the loss of which would be tantamount to the forfeiture of her world domination.

If combined action initiated by Russia and Japan give promise of but the greatest advantage, it would appear that there should be no reason why Russia should contribute to the annihilation of Japan the the dislodging of her from the southern mainland to her island home. If Japan should be shut up on her islands and be deprived the possibility of expansion to territory washed by Southern temperate seas, she has but one loophole of escape left her - The Russian Far East and Northern Manchuria. And even if Japan be weakened by defeat and reduced to the status of a second-rate power, she has left to her still the slower and safer methods of economic penetration, that finally lead to the result aspaired to by force of arms.

An when on the one side a huge territory is situated, lying between the shores of the Pacific Ocean and Lake Baikal, peopled by a scanty Russian population of 2-2½ million souls, whilst on the other and in close promimity a country with a teeming population of over 56 million is to be found, that is slowly being asphyxiated owing to want of breathing space and with no other outlet of escape in view except that afforded to the Northwest -- why, the climax to the situation is not one of difficulty for solution.

Let us hope that these two great nations will find a way to coordinate their at-times contradictory interests, and that they will be enabled to reach a state of amicable relationship that gives promise of but mutual advantage.

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APR 24
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Foreign Policy of Feng Yu-hsiang and the National Army of the Northwest.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 23 1926

(NOTE: The document translated below was given privately to the American Legation by third parties, who described it as a statement of the foreign policy of Feng Yu-hsiang, sent to Dr. C. T. Wang "for his guidance", about January 18, 1926. Internal evidence would make it appear that it was originally drafted by some one who either wrote it in English, and then translated it, or who was accustomed to think in the English language.... Willys R. Peck, Chinese Secretary, American Legation)

1. The foreign policy of the "Northwest" is a foreign policy for the salvation of China. It in truth concerns the life or death, the existence or dissolution of the whole nation, and not merely the benefit or injuring, the gains or losses, of the northwest corner only. Therefore we cannot but discuss it in detail.

2. As a policy for the salvation of the country, the foreign policy of the Northwest is one of peaceful construction; we do not advocate using our own military strength to unite the country. Nevertheless, under actual existing conditions, we are constantly unable to obtain the assent to our policy of those who hem us in, and there is never a day that we do not suffer the persecution of the envious and inordinately ambitious. For this reason we are obliged to make war for our own preservation and for the salvation of the country; we cannot but make war for eternal peace. However, since the defeat and overthrow of General Kuo Sung-ling we have learned a very great lesson; and what is this lesson: it is the fact that Japan has two conflicting foreign policies.

3. Japan has for a long time been divided into two factions, resulting in the existence of a militarist faction diplomacy and a Foreign Office faction diplomacy. (Comment by M/A: This of course is well known to be the case.) The militarist faction is regardless of everything but a desire for aggressive invasion; its base of operations is in Manchuria. The capitalists who shelter behind the militarist faction use the South Manchuria Railway Company as the backbone of their economic invasion. The diplomacy of the Foreign Office faction is aware and afraid of world conditions and the feelings of the people of China; if it were regardless of everything and thought only of invading South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia in order gradually to nibble up China as the silk worm on the mulberry leaf, it would necessarily arouse the fear of every country and the deep enmity and lasting hatred of the Chinese people and cause a national boycott of Japanese goods. Insofar as this would result in only a present economic attack it would not be of any great concern. But if they should gradually bring about a tradition of deep enmity and lasting hatred, the two peoples of China and Japan would endlessly seek mutual revenge, just as in Europe the warfare and bloodshed of the two peoples of Germany and France has continued for several generations, and is not ended even at the present day. This is the thing which is to be feared most. Can Japan, an island empire with little natural wealth, afford to cultivate such a bitter hatred of generations?

From M/A, China Report No.5799 March 16, 1926

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Foreign Policy of Feng Yu-hsiang and the National Army of the Northwest.

For Japan to act arbitrarily and in disregard of the hatred of the Chinese nation, as well as of the strict supervision of America and Russia, for the sake of a foothold in Manchuria, this, surely, would not be the part of wisdom. For this reason the policy fixed by the Foreign Office faction is comparatively lukewarm. However, in Japan, although this policy is approved by the people as a whole, it is rejected by the militarist faction, and in matter of actual strength it cannot withstand the deeply rooted policy of the militarist faction, and is for this reason constantly defeated. Thus the foreign policies of the two factions are in constant opposition and show no consideration one for the other.

4. General Kuo Sung-ling's recent defeat and downfall may be said to be a severe attack suffered by our work for the salvation of the country, and it may also be said to be a complete exposé of the ugly attitude of Japan's two conflicting foreign policies. Therefore, what should be our attitude today and in future as regards Japan's foreign policy? We should not adopt a policy of uniform hostility to Japan; but still less can we adopt a uniformly subservient attitude toward Japan. Under no circumstances must we go even beyond those who have sold their country, by entering into collusion with the Japanese militarist party. Chang Tso-lin has sold his country; we cannot sell our country. To rely upon the empty ceremonies and exchange of courtesy of diplomacy to bring it about that the Japanese militarist party shall withhold assistance from Chang Tso-lin and thus permit his overthrow - this is clearly impossible. (Comment: This I think to be the expression of a recent and bitter disillusionment, as I feel certain that Japanese non-interference with Kuo's revolt had been counted upon.)

Therefore our foreign policy for the salvation of the country should naturally follow another method; and what method is this: We cannot but create an additional force to aid our diplomacy. This force could vitally affect Japan's position in Manchuria. Then in future we should not need to wag our tails and beg for pity from Japan's militarists, and those Japanese militarists could not but beg for friendship from us. If this could be brought about the downfall of Chang Tso-lin and all other sellers of their country would be inevitable. This, then, is what is called a foreign policy for the salvation of the country, and from this day forth we should study it and investigate it from the ground up and proceed with it, without a moment's delay.

5. In the May thirtieth case, Japan, also, was a leader in stirring up trouble and a leader in wrong doing. Because Huang Fu counselled avoiding the more difficult and taking the easier road we lightly left Japan out of the reckoning, and because the popular mind trusted and depended on our attitude, the people of the nation also changed their attitude toward Japan in view of such unprecedented kindness on our part. (Comment: This refers to the fact that Japan, originally held as culpable for the Shanghai incident as Great Britain, had been able to shift all blame to the latter, and herself escape boycotts and strikes.) Surprisingly, merely because we had had no preliminary communication with them the Japanese not only were not grateful and did not attempt to requite our favor, but they were even in entire ignorance of our action. This heaven-wide kindness was shown to them for nothing, and worse, at the time of the Kuominchun's recent struggle for the salvation of the country, they launched a

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heavy attack upon us. With Kuo Sung-ling dead and Chang Tso-lin preserved the country's salvation in the future is doubly imperilled. Alas! The lesson thus learned can never be forgotten by us, and we will never again make the same mistake. If at the time that Huang Fu came to Kalgan an understanding had been already arrived at with Japan, since the Kuominchun (National Army) had the assistance of Kuo Sung-ling's revolt, in all probability Chang Tso-lin's defeat and ruin would by now have been a question of the past. This must be held to have been a serious mistake in our diplomacy. At the time that the popular anger of the nation was aroused against J apan, because our attitude changed, the anger was dispelled. This time, when we almost beat in the gates of Manchuria the Japanese militarist faction, regardless of what had transpired, pursued its violent course without restraint. As to the despatching of troops to South Manchuria, although the Japanese people opposed it and the Foreign Office faction could not agree to it, actually, they only sat and looked on at this arbitrary action of the militarist faction without being in the least able to restrain it. Today the Foreign Office faction only acts for the militarist faction in covering up its misdeeds, in order to hide the ugliness of its own position.

6. This describes the repellant situation in regard to Japan's two conflicting foreign policies. Moreover, we have been too careless of internal conditions in Japan. Thus not only have we made a free gift of kindness but in so doing we have incurred contempt in return. Today when the popular anger against Japan is entirely dispelled, we have to all intents committed suicide. Now, when we are entirely without recourse, how can we fawn and beg pity from the benevolence and mercy of the Japanese militarist faction? Or shall we rather not rouse our energies anew and foment anti-Japanese wrath in the people, in order to prepare a force for our hands that cannot again be insulted? (Comment: Certainly they have done this of late.)

7. Under heaven there is only one way, to have justice and right in heart and naked blade in hand; only thus can we cause people to fear and respect us and willingly to follow us with confidence. Otherwise, the militarist faction of that country will feel great satisfaction and having an inch will take an ell, whereas the Foreign Office faction will admit that their views were wrong and will turn about and assist in diplomacy and cruelty of the militarists by putting about rumors that we are "red". Then the fundamental Sino-Japanese friendship and the lasting peace of Eastern Asia will be gone beyond recovery, and there will never come the day when we can attain our aim. This can all the more readily be seen and believed from the recent critical editorials of the "Shun T'ien Shih Pao" (vernacular paper controlled by the Japanese), which have persecuted us severely and harshly.

8. From this day on, our relations with Japan must consist from beginning to end in stirring up the popular anger of the entire nation in opposition to Japan, prosecuted with united energy. The militarist faction of that country has released its steel and horsemen in cruelty against Manchuria, and we must cause them to taste the vengeance of the entire country. The higher that the flame of our

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anti-Japanese anger burns, the greater will be the discomfort and pain and bitterness of the entire body of the Japanese people, and the quicker their perception and the more violent their opposition to the militarist faction. Forcibly to restrain the Japanese militarists from bringing calamity to Eastern Asia is not only the duty of the Chinese people but is also the duty of the entire body of the people of Japan. Then the Japanese Foreign Office faction having behind it the support and assistance of the Japanese people, will be able to oppose the militarist faction and forcibly restrain its fierceness. And then, moreover, having the force of the popular anger of the nation in our hands, we shall be able to impose satisfactory terms upon the diplomacy of the Japanese militarist faction. Otherwise we shall have suffered their insults to no end. Why should we ourselves invite their contempt?

9. Next after this is the diplomacy of America; there is no place where the American foreign policy does not conflict with and oppose Japan. This conflict is all the more violent in Eastern Asia regarding Chinese questions. The view of the diplomacy of the Kuomintang draws a clear boundary between the imperialists and anti-imperialists. They include America in their most violent opposition; this is carrying a policy of worm-like stupidity to the extreme. Recently America's attitude toward our side has been, whenever troubles have come up, to remain with hands folded, a mere spectator. Or perhaps, worse than this, America has fallen under the poisonous influence of England and is among those who cherish suspicions of us. America has certainly been adversely affected by the influence of the Kuomintang's policy. Since we have drawn a line of battle between imperialists and anti-imperialists, those countries have drawn a battle line between "reds" and "non-reds" and are attacking us. This last line-up we must split apart by using to our advantage the conflict between the American and Japanese foreign policies. Thus, when we have joined hands with America, we can give her profit and advantage as the occasion offers, and although Japanese militarists may again desire to put about rumors that we are "red" and are anti-foreign, then without the need for any rebuttal from us, America being in the background will testify for us. In this way, without stirring a hand, we shall be successful in our policy of refuting the accusation that we are "red". Again, America is really a country whose policy it is to abstain from interference in China's internal administration. America not only firmly intends to carry out herself this policy of non-interference, but it is her international duty to oversee other countries and not to permit instances of interference by them. For this reason, if we are able to turn America's policy to our own advantage we shall certainly be able to cause her to be of assistance in standing behind and supervising the Japanese militarists. This is again a preparation of force in diplomacy which we should proceed to put into effect without delay.

(Comment: It is certainly true that there has been an apparent effort in the North to exclude America from demonstrations against other foreign powers. Though I think this a genuine document, I am inclined to ascribe its authorship to the Soviets. Karakhan was recently quoted as saying that he would stop anti-American propaganda.)

10. When we shall have ready the above two forces we can in future hold our heads up and have something to say to the Japanese militarists. We do not desire, however, to eradicate Japanese influence and advantages in South Manchuria at one sweep, for if this were to be done, not

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only would Japan receive a tremendous economic injury, but also the Chinese in Manchuria would receive a similar economic injury amounting to suicide. We can under no circumstances follow such a stupid, disregardful policy. Our aspirations are only to overthrow Chang Tso-lin and to overthrow China's militarists in order to open a way for the peaceful and constructive salvation of the country.

11. If we could dispel somewhat the misconceptions of the Japanese militarists and cause them to be somewhat apprehensive, then our aims naturally would be easy of attainment, and at that time there would be no question as to Chang Tso-lin's downfall and defeat, when our work of saving the country would be in part accomplished.

12. This is my humble opinion of the course that should be followed from today on by the foreign policy of the "Northwest".

Comment by M/A: I am inclined to place considerable credence in this statement as genuine and to attach importance to it as interpretative of events since Kuo Sung-ling's defeat, and possibly as a key to future events.

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G-2 Report

2657-9-276

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Battle at Hsinminfu.

(See par. 8, Report #5741, and par. 16, " #5734.)

2657-9-276(76)

2055-622(26)

RECEIVED W.D. MAR 30 1926

1. Further study and reports on this battle indicate its importance as exemplifying the great change taking place in Chinese methods of warfare and Chinese improvement in military art.

2. The force under the command of Kuo Sung-ling comprised the best divisions in the Manchurian army. Stationed at the initiation of its revolt against and attack on Mukden at Lanchow, it encountered such resistance at Shanhaikwan as to keep it out of Manchuria for eight days. Its further advance northward was retarded by the destruction of the railroad at many points. At Chinchow, Kuo Sung-ling had to repel an attack on his left. By this time his troops were beginning to suffer from the severe cold and lack of supplies.

3. At Kowpangtze, Kuo was disappointed in his plans to dispatch a force via Newchwang and the line of the South Manchurian Railway toward Mukden, the Japanese preventing the movement. Kuo was thus confined in his advance on Mukden to a line west of the Peking-Mukden Railway through a sparsely inhabited area where few buildings were available in which his troops might be billeted and which was open and windswept during the bitterest part of the Manchurian winter. Due to the destruction of water-tanks and of large sections of the railway it was difficult to keep the columns supplied. Nevertheless his force marched under these conditions 175 miles and on December 23rd, according to competent foreign observers, was in excellent morale and under good discipline. It attacked unhesitatingly a strongly prepared position, and after an initial repulse, repeated the attack with undiminished vigor. The attack was developed along modern lines. The artillery was particularly efficient both in its fire action and in the disposition and handling of elements not included in the firing line. Of the training and action of a regiment of artillery which at this time was under his observation, Brigadier-General H. J. Reilly, Reserve Corps, U.S. Army, who was present as a journalist, stated that they were equal to those of an average regiment of the United States National Army. The fighting was desperate and prolonged and the casualties heavy. Disaster at this particular battle overtook this force primarily through its lack of cavalry.

4. Though as stated, this force included some of the best divisions of the Fengtien Army, it must not be assumed that there are not other divisions of equal training or that the standard of training which they had reached may not be obtained by other Chinese troops.

5. The forces that Chang Tso-lin opposed to Kuo Sung-ling were disposed as follows: a line was formed on the banks of the frozen Liao river to the east of Hsinminfu. Heilungkiang divisions were on the right, Chang Tso-lin's guard division and other Fengtien troops were astride the railway in the center, and the Kirin divisions on the left. Chang Hsueh-Liang, in general command, took up his headquarters in the center. Hsinminfu was occupied by advance detachments, who were ordered to fall back before Kuo's advance. The front of Kuo's attack was narrower than the extent of Chang's line. As the battle progressed, although the Liao river was crossed by the attackers, Chang's line in the center held its position and his right and left flanks started to envelop Kuo's attack.

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Subject: The Battle at Hsinminfu.

6. (At this stage of the battle the observer above quoted, who was within four miles of the actual fighting, stated that the volume of fire was extremely heavy and excellently controlled, and the accurate service of the artillery particularly noticeable.)

7. (At this, the most critical, stage of the battle, Kuo Sung-ling's rear was attacked by two cavalry divisions and he was completely routed. Chang's forces showed evidence of having been disposed for battle with great skill and to have been possessed of detailed and accurate information concerning the enemy. The cavalry manoeuvre was planned with consummate skill and executed at precisely the right moment. There is thus evidence of excellent staff work heretofore noticeably absent in Chinese battle manoeuvres.)

8. Serious thought must be given to Chinese armed forces which show themselves possessed of such excellent morale, fortitude, discipline, training and staff work. It is futile to deprecate such evidence of higher training and qualities as Chinese forces are beginning to show on the score of their being the result of foreign leadership and advice. On the contrary it is particularly to be noted that whereas in the past the Chinese have accepted such leadership or advice with extreme reluctance, they now seek and are guided by it. It may be accepted as a fact that at present wherever large forces of Chinese troops are engaged foreign advisers will be present and will be listened to; also, that the Chinese are earnestly applying themselves to the mastery of military art to the end that they may be able in the future to apply it to Chinese personnel, materiel and conditions.

9. (The action at Hsinminfu and the fighting about Tientsin which was occurring at the same time, must forever put an end to beliefs that foreign forces would encounter only a rabble when meeting Chinese forces on the field.)

J. B. Brannon

Distribution:

4 MID
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JAN 12 1927
6180
2657-J-276
142
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

4-1

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Maps - accompanying map: Postal Map.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JAN 12 1927

1. A situation has developed in China which is unique in that the important military forces are fairly definitely arrayed in two opposing camps. Although, as will later be shown, there are certain commanders who are occupying positions "on the fence", the larger forces can be grouped as Nationalist (Cantonese), and Anti-Cantonese (Ankuochun). The accompanying sketch map does not permit showing details of the composition of the two forces or certain doubtful areas where the affiliations of subordinate commanders are yet to be disclosed. However, the coloring shows the general line upon which the northern and southern forces are now facing each other. At this time there is practically no fighting except in Fukien, where it appears that the province will soon be wholly included in the Nationalist area.

2. Organization of the Ankuochun. The great success of the Nationalist army in securing the Wu-Han cities and Kiangsi, in the course of which operations Wu Pei-fu was driven back into Honan and Sun Chuan-fang's army was badly defeated, forced the northern leaders to take measures for their continued existence. Dire necessity brought individuals to seek common action who otherwise should have cherished their differences and remained as heretofore, provincial or regional chieftans. It became a question of combining or being effaced. As a result of conferences recently held in Tientsin, the details of which are elsewhere mentioned, there emerged a military alliance of all those northern leaders whose interests lie in opposing the Nationalist army. The alliance, known as the Ankuochun (Army for Tranquilization of the Country) was accomplished by the Fengtien group, and Chang Tso-lin assumed the position of commander-in-chief with the consent of the principal anti-Canton leaders. Wu Pei-fu was not considered in the matter. Chang Tso-lin was installed in Tientsin with colorful and impressive ceremonies on December 2nd. He announced Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang as vice-commanders and published the composition and aims of the Ankuochun. On December 8th, Yen Shi-shan was appointed as the third vice-commander.

3. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN

Chang Tso-lin (Commander-in-Chief)

Fengtien Forces.	Chang Tso-lin	
Peking-Tientsin area	80,000	
Kalgan-Suiyuan area	30,000	
Peking-Mukden Ry to Shanhaikwan	30,000	
Jehol area	20,000	
Peking-Hankow Ry to border of Honan	20,000	
Tientsin	20,000	
Manchuria (Kirin, Fengtien and Heilungchiang)	80,000	
		280,000

(The above are locations prior to movements now in progress.)

From M/A, China Report No. ~~5603~~ 6003 December 11, 1926

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Shantung Forces	Chang Tsung-chang	
Province of Shantung and along Tientsin-Pukow Railway	50,000	
At Pukow, Pengpu, and in Anhwei	30,000	
		80,000
Kiangsu Forces	Sun Chuan-fang	
Kiangsu-Anhwei-Chekiang and northern Fukien	60,000	
Anhwei provincial troops	50,000	
		110,000
These troops are now neutral but indications are that they will join Ankuochun.		
Shansi Forces	Yen Hsi-shan	
Shansi provincial troops	60,000	
In Suiyuan-Charhar area	40,000	
		100,000
These latter are ex-Kuominchun troops, now nominally in the Shansi army. Their allegiance to Ankuochun is most doubtful.		
Honan Forces	Kuo Ying-chieh ? Wu Pei-fu ?	
Vicinity of Chengchow; on Peking-Hankow Ry south to Hupeh border and along Lunghai Ry from western terminal, east to Kweiteh.	100,000	
		100,000
Of these troops, some 20,000 may be considered faithful to Wu Pei-fu, the remainder are neutral, anti-Wu, or pro-Cantonese.		
Liu Chen-hua's Shensi troops now holding Kuominchun near Tung Kwan	20,000	
		20,000
These troops are fighting to regain Shensi and as such may be considered nominally Ankuochun froces.		
Estimated Total (subject to variation).....		690,000

NATIONAL ARMY (CANTONESE)
and
ALLIED KUOMINCHUN

Cantonese Forces		Chiang Kai-shek	
1st Army	(He Ying-chin) Fukien	15,000	
2nd "	(Tan Yen-huan) Kiangsi	12,000	
3rd "	(Chu Pei-te) Kiangsi	12,000	
4th "	(Li Chi-shen) Hupeh	12,000	
5th "	(Li Fu-lin) Canton Garrison	10,000	
6th "	(Chen Tsan) Kiangsi (Probably reserve)	10,000	
8th "	(Tang Sheng-chih) Hankow & Hupeh	15,000	
			86,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kuominchun	Feng Yu-hsiang	
Kweihuacheng - Paotou area and to southwest	40,000	
In Shensi, in Sianfu-Tungkwan area (Liu Yu-fen)	15,000	
		55,000
40,000 ex-Kuominchun troops now in Suiyuan area, nominally under command of Shang Chen (Shensi) would probably go over to Feng Yu-hsiang in case of a general operation.		
Yang Sen's Force		
Along the Yangtze River between Ichang and Kienli	30,000	
		30,000
These troops are ex-Wu Pei-fu men but are believed to have gone over to the Cantonese.		
Estimated Total (subject to wide variance)...		171,000

4. **Present Movements.**

Cantonese. The Cantonese by some fighting and more propaganda are now taking over Foochow, and it appears will soon have all of Fukien, No movement is known to be taking place in Chekiang or in southwest Anhwei. A report of December 8th states that considerable Cantonese troops are arriving in Hankow from down-river, some of which are proceeding up the Han River and smaller bodies of which are going up the Peking-Hankow Railway. This indicates either defensive measures against an Ankuochun advance on Hankow or a possible offensive against the strategic railway junction, Chengchow. The Kuominchun force in the vicinity of Tung Kwan has Liu Chen-hua occupied in defending the passes in that vicinity. There are occasional rumors of activity among Feng's main force in the Suiyuan-Paotou area. So long as this force exists it is a direct threat against Peking. Persistent propaganda is being employed in Chekiang and Shanghai preparing the ground for a later military advance in that direction.

5. Ankuochun. Chang Tso-lin is making very active preparations for securing his position. Although supplies and munitions are being moved on a reasonably large scale and a general troop movement is in progress, it is not believed that his plans are aggressive. Incidentally, there is no great confusion on the railways and the troop movements are being conducted in an orderly manner. It is generally believed that sufficient funds are not available in the north to conduct an offensive, even if this were desired. It is very doubtful if Chang Tso-lin and his conservative Chief of Staff, Yang Yu-ting, would risk an offensive south of the Yangtze. Sun Chuan-fang can remain in Kiangsu and Chekiang without arousing the enmity of the Kwangsu-ites. The movement of any Shantung or Fengtien troops into Kiangsu would cause an immediate and extremely hostile attitude in Kiangsu which the Ankuochun cannot afford to stir up. .

6003
~~5603~~

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

When the first elements of Chang Tsung-chang's troops moved south, a few crossed from Pukow into the suburbs of Nanking but later withdrew back across the Yangtze to Pukow. Since the end of November, Shantung troops have steadily been moving south. They now hold the Tientsin-Pukow railway north from Pukow. Most of them, however, are detraining at Pengpu and moving up the Hwei River into central Anhwei. Their plans are probably to cover the Lunghai Railway, but they could as well be en route to Anking. Fengtien troops are gradually progressing down the Peking-Hankow Railway, some of which are believed to have reached the Yellow River. This movement is doubtless designed to insure the retention of Chengchow, which is now held precariously by Wu Pei-fu. The latter occupies Chengchow, with units to the south along the Hankow Railway as far as the Honan border, and to the east and west along the Lunghai Railway. A few of his subordinates are loyal, but these are club-sandwiched in between neutral and pro-Red units in a most inexplicable fashion. Wu himself is piqued at his subordinate position and is destined for complete elimination it is believed.

It will be noted that Chengchow is a strategic position. Southern adherents threaten it from the south, southwest and west. The Ankuochun may attempt to threaten Hankow but it is more probable that they plan only to stiffen all the uncertain units in the Honan force and to retain Honan. Movements of Fengtien troops from the Peking area south on the Peking-Hankow Railway started on December 8th and are still in progress. Since the first week in December there have been considerable movements of Fengtien infantry and cavalry from Kalgan and through Kalgan to the west. The significance of this westward advance of Fengtien troops is not clear. It is interesting that the movement by rail is thought to be possible only to Chaikowpu, since Tatungfu is held by troops of General Shang Chen, a supposed adherent of Feng Yu-hsiang, who apparently will not permit Fengtien troops to pass that point by rail. It is necessary for Fengtien troops to march overland to Fencheng and thence to Pingtichuan (a point on the railway 35 miles northwest of Fengcheng) where a concentration is in progress.. It may be that the Ankuochun is taking merely defensive measures against an advance of Feng Yu-hsiang from the Suiyuan-Paotou area, or it is possible that it has been determined to eliminate the ex-Kuominchun forces under Shang Chen who occupy an anomalous position in the Suiyuan area, and at certain points along the railway from Suiyuan to Tatungfu. Yen Hsi-shan is shifting his provincial troops to the southern part of Shansi, and is withdrawing to the south some faithful troops now along the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. It appears that he is permitting Fengtien troops to assume the responsibility for the security of north Shansi against Feng Yu-hsiang and the ex-Kuominchun units along the railway as well.

In brief, it is believed that the Ankuochun has immediate plans to eliminate all doubtful units in, and defend the area north and east of the approximate line shown on the accompanying map. Except for the possible advance of the Cantonese into Chekiang and southern Kiangsu, it now appears probable that the situation may stabilize for the winter roughly as shown on the map.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 Legation
1 Japan
1 File

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache



4-1
2657-D-276
2730 163
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Demonstrations at Wuhu.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 16 1927

1. The following account of demonstrations which I witnessed at Wuhu is given to show the typical methods employed by the Nationalists to intimidate foreigners in their first occupation of new territory.

2. Wuhu is about fifty miles up river from Nanking. This area came into the hands of the South without a fight as a result of Chen Tao-yuen's change of allegiance. Nationalist troops first entered Wuhu on March 6th and continued down river, passing through some of Chen's Anhui troops in the town. Nationalist flags were everywhere displayed but the place was quiet when my boat arrived on the morning of the 8th. I went ashore with Mr. Lenox Simpson. We called on the captain of a British destroyer which was tied up near our boat and then called on the Commissioner of Customs at the Customs House some 400 yards from the pontoon. Here we encountered the Harbor Master and strolled down the bund a few hundred yards to look at some 1500 men of Chen Tiao-yuen quartered in a go-down and hulk to which was tied a boat on which Chen was living.

3. From remarks overheard, it was evident that the air was tense. There were few Chinese civilians about since the native city is some distance from the bund. While standing in the Customs grounds a detachment of armed merchants guards arrived on the bund, the first contingent arriving to greet a Cantonese general who, however, did not arrive until late in the afternoon. A crowd began to gather. Nationalist handbills were passed about and individuals pointed at us and gave the usual "Foreign Devil" jeers. Agitators were busy stirring up excitement. We moved off and the Harbor Master proudly showed us a nice little Customs Club and then asked us into his own house just in rear. We met his wife and saw his children aged six and one. While there, a servant called the Harbor Master saying the crowd was ugly in front of the Customs House. We remained only a few minutes and then went out to see a small crowd of men, women and children being dispersed by the Merchants Guards. After hearing the commander of the guards assure the Harbor Master that nothing would happen, the guards were assembled and marched away. At this time Mr. Simpson and I returned to the boat.

4. Just before tiffin, through my glasses I saw some excitement in the vicinity of the Club which was hidden by the Customs House. The crowd was milling about, the soldiers in groups looking on. Then I saw some of the soldiers go to the hulk, return, armed, and form in a circle about the Customs House. During tiffin Mr. Simpson received a note saying that the Club we saw an hour before "is no more" and that we should quietly come over if we desired to see the excitement. We went, found the soldiers had withdrawn and a highly excited crowd, much larger than before, howling, jeering and acting like mad men all about the Club. Men were deliberately punching out window panes with poles, others inside the Club were carrying out and throwing out furniture. Some, like angry children, were dashing chairs to pieces on the ground. Disgusting boy agitators, violently waving their flags, were shrieking for more destruction. Books were being torn apart and flung in the air. Piano

CHINA(Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Demonstrations at Wuhu.

keys had been ripped from a new piano and thrown about and phonograph records were being smashed. The whole Club was gutted, while the mob rushed crazily about. We were then with the foreign staff and Chinese clerks in the Customs House in the same yard, observing this through the windows. Soon the crowd surrounded the Customs House and began throwing stones through the doors and windows, until we all were forced upstairs.

5. About this time four foreigners of the Native Customs staff (under the Maritime Customs) arrived in a sampan at the bund just in front of the Customs House. As they came ashore the crowd surged around them pelting them with stones. These men had been driven from their offices and living quarters up river by a similar mob and had escaped with nothing but their lives. An attempt had been made to swamp their sampan. They made a dash and got inside the Customs House.

6. Some ten of us white men and more Chinese were finally huddled upstairs in a hallway to escape the stones which showered in the windows, expecting the mob to rush the building. It was a helpless feeling to be so trapped. It was also a little bitter to know that one British and one American destroyer were lying in sight carrying out a policy so adverse to the use of force that we might well have been killed before the commanders could have felt justified in interfering. The smallest detachment of men could have cowed the cowardly mob. Finally the same soldiers who had previously driven back the mob and then retired, re-appeared and began to force the mob away from our building. These soldiers had witnessed the whole demonstration from a distance of a few hundred yards and could at any time have protected the Customs property. Nationalist declared policy is to permit mobs a period of unrestrained enjoyment of the new "Freedom".

7. Our boat was due to sail and as early as possible Mr. Simpson and I left the Customs House and hastened back. One felt like a deserter to leave White men in that situation while we sailed away. Later that day the foreigners were evacuated from Wuhu to a boat in the stream, and women and children were sent to Shanghai.

8. Just before our boat sailed a crowd of perhaps 6,000 people, some in organizations, with hundreds of banners and flags, filled the whole bund awaiting Chen Chien, the Cantonese general. The mob demonstration was considerably lessened but I saw some sights through my glasses which I shall never forget. Among other, I saw the wife of the Harbor Master, with her baby in her arms, followed by the amah carrying the other child, being taken out through the back gate of the house where we had seen her in the morning. A jeering crowd surrounded the group, but soldiers pushed them back - and an agitator, as always violently whipping his white flag, was hurling insults. This frightened woman moved out of sight between Chinese soldiers, a reminder that Russian violence had come to China.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin, 1 File.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

AMERICAN LEGATION 3-1
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

1927 2657-J-27 MAY 27

April 1, 1927 164

WAR DEPARTMENT 31

#7008

Subject: The Revolution in China.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 16 1927

1. I have been interested in observing the Nationalist movement in China since 1920, at which time it consisted principally of visions in the mind of Sun Yat-sen and unrest in the minds of students all over China who believed in Dr. Sun. The desire of the Chinese was natural and the movement grew through the agencies of the Kuomintang. Unequal treaties existed and became the target of the Nationalists. Without the use of great publicity and pressure by the Chinese Nationalists, the Western Powers would not give up their peculiar rights. I have always believed in the justice and the necessity, from the Chinese point of view, of strong action to force the Powers to make concessions. However I could never see how the unequal treaties crippled Chinese Nationalists in their efforts to overcome the evils native to China and weakness due entirely to the Chinese character itself. Chinese traits alone have been sufficient to prevent any degree of political cohesion since the Empire and, I believe, will continue for years to prevent a strong China, if the Chinese are left to their own devices. Due to this belief, based on considerable evidence, I have consistently expressed doubt that the Kuomintang could at this time extend its influence over all China and create a government capable of and deserving of complete sovereignty. Because of the weaknesses in the Chinese character, I thought the Nationalist effort, while gradually gaining strength, would have many break-ups and fresh beginnings before China could be strong.

2. It was with this firm conviction that I went on my recent trip to the Yangtze Valley, and I must admit that I hoped to gather facts to prove my views correct. Little vital information became available until I reached Hankow, the Nationalist capital. Here I began to make observations which could be made in no other place. In spite of excellent reports from various sources in Hankow, it became evident to me that the real meaning and extent of the Nationalist movement could only be appreciated there. I found that I could not obtain the proof to justify the views I formerly held and, grudgingly, I had to alter them.

3. It is not that I found my estimate of Chinese character all wrong; there still exist in the personnel of the Kuomintang all the typical Chinese traits such as individualism, jealousy, selfishness, personal ambition and desire for personal gain. All the traits which in the past have caused Chinese movements to disintegrate and fail exist among the Kuomintang leaders today. But something has been superimposed upon the Chinese organization which effectively prevents the Chinese individuals from doing what they naturally tend to do in certain situations. This new factor is a rigid discipline and system of checks imposed by Russians. It is useless to attempt to convince those who refuse to be convinced that Russia has insinuated herself in this situation. However, from irrefutable evidence, I know that this Russian influence is so extensive and so effective that I had to concede it had accomplished what had hitherto seemed impossible. It had instituted such a complete discipline within Kuomintang ranks as to curb if not prevent natural Chinese tendencies to play. In brief, the Nationalist movement, once Chinese, had become a foreign-controlled revolution so effeciently supported and directed that it promises to succeed in spite of Chinese weakness and lack of cohesion. Without this Russian revolutionary direction the Nationalist movement would by now have gone the way of former Chinese attempts at reform. Three unhappy choices seem to face China: A strong but Bolshevized regime; voluntary request for the support of moderate nations in the rehabilitation of the country; a long period of chaos.

4. I informed the Minister of my new conviction in the following telegram which I believe to be fundamentally sound:

"Contrary to previous views, I am convinced that Nationalist movement if unaffected by international complications ultimately will succeed. Ankuochun at present a stronger military force but the morale and political cohesion of the Kuomintang Party is unique in China. Party discipline effectively curbs individualism and personal ambition of military commanders. Present rift between Chiang Kai-shek and Hankow extremists defended by Tang Sheng-chih is serious. It may possibly result in attempt of former to compromise with North, thus delaying nationalist expansion, but it is extremely doubtful if Chiang can lead his subordinates to disregard party authority. A serious defeat by Northerners will delay but not prevent Nationalist success.

"Mere nationalism does not express this movement; it is a fundamental revolution. At present numerous Russians and other foreign radicals with willing Chinese extremists dominate the movement. These are highly efficient revolutionaries who have succeeded in overcoming Chinese inertia and individualism by creating sincere support of peasants and laborers, by perfect

revolutionary technique, by rigid party discipline and first-rate technical supervision in all matters. Russians are working tirelessly and Chinese in key positions appreciate them. Many difficulties will arise from rapid expansion but momentum of movement will prevent its collapse unless combination of Western Powers seriously intervenes.

"Regardless of present Nationalist pronouncements, the final outcome will be a government modelled on Russia and friendly to Russia. Only foreign institutions generally compatible with modified Russian ideals can hope to exist in China when Nationalist control is complete.

"I am convinced that any manifestation of force short of war on our part can result only in aggravating the violence of the revolution. Believing that no Chinese agencies can forestall the development along Russian lines mentioned above, I can see only three steps open to the United States: One, war on China, which would involve also Russia; Two, by means of large scale financial assistance as the opening, replace Russia and direct the course of the revolution along more desirable lines; Three, voluntary cancellation of all unequal rights and gradual evacuation, mitigated so far as possible by avoiding all pin-pricking force."

5. Due to constant demands on my time since my return to Peking, it has been impossible to complete the report upon which the foregoing conclusions were based. This report will be forwarded in the next pouch.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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G-2 Report

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WAR DEPARTMENT

MAY 31 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Opinion of Chang Tso-lin.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 31 1927

1. The accompanying interview with Chang Tso-lin was recorded by Mr. Oudendijk, The Netherlands Minister.

2. There is little sentiment expressed by Chang Tso-lin, but one cannot deny that his cold facts are hard to refute. Compare the rational deductions from known facts contained herein with the high-flown abstractions and distortion of truth in all of Eugene Chen's public utterances, and one has an accurate gauge of the two men, if not of the two political groups which they represent.

3. Were it not for the obstacles placed in the way of the Russians by Chang Tso-lin, there seems little doubt, in the light of present information, that the whole of China would now be hopelessly in the grip of the Russians and their native adherents. It is clear why Chang Tso-lin is the object of vicious attack by the Communists, but puzzling in the extreme why Western opinion so blindly follows the Russian lead.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 Japan
1 File

From M/A, China ReportNo. 7022 April 19, 1927

POLICE CHINA
MAY 1927
2659-9-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION WITH MARSHAL CHANG TSO-LIN

I do not understand the attitude of the Powers, said Marshal Chang Tso-lin in a conversation with the Netherlands Minister on April 7th, 1927.

Although I have shown that I keep peace and order in every part of China which is under my influence and although I have repeatedly given the assurance that I stand for treaty revision only in a regular and legal way I receive no sympathy from anywhere.

One would imagine that if the Powers had been looking out for somebody willing to pay him a high price to stem the tide of disorder, of murder, of rapine and treaty violation, which has spread now over the whole of South China, they could not have struck a better chance than finding me, Chang Tso-lin, engaged in fighting the nefarious influence of the Russian Bolsheviks in my country. Am I not in doing so fighting also the battles of the foreign Powers?

However, instead of meeting with warm support, I find that the whole world is looking quietly on, while I am fighting the battles all alone, and am exhausting all my means both military and financial in what ought to be a common fight for civilization.

In the meantime the Kuomintang does what it likes in the south of China, and every success which it can book at the expense of the foreign Powers, by crushing their trade, by chasing their nationals out of every Treaty Port and out of the whole of the interior, increases its reputation as the patriotic group in China, in the eyes of the common people whereas at the same time I am held up as the traitor.

Do the foreign Powers like to be hooted out of China; do they like to see the Treaties torn up; do they like to see debts and contracts annulled, their commerce destroyed, their shipping driven out of these waters? It almost would seem so when one considers that negotiations are at the same time being carried on with the extreme elements of the Kuomintang.

Do not let anybody suppose that if for instance the English are frightened away, others could step into their place and take over their trade or navigation.

After the English it will be the turn of the others, all together or one by one.

Have not the events of Hankow of these last few days made this clear to the whole world?

And are there still Powers who believe that they could be special friends, and be immune with regard to the far reaching plans of the Kuomintang? What is America thinking of?

When I consider these things it seems to me almost unbelievable that the Powers stand by, doing nothing, and apparently considering it an interesting spectacle when Chang Tso-lin fights single handed for the

benefit of all concerned, straining all his resources.

But my resources are not unlimited, and although I count upon my military strength, yet my financial means must sooner or later give out. And I ask myself why should I exhaust myself entirely when I receive no sympathy from anybody and when I might quietly retire into my Manchurian Provinces. There I could hold my own, and I in my turn might be an interested looker on and watch the foreign Powers struggling in vain whilst giving up their large and vested interests in China. I could quietly watch and see how the Treaties disappear, how foreign rights are disregarded and the foreign debts annulled and the foreigners themselves evacuate the whole of China as they have already evacuated the wouth. It certainly would be easier for me.

If only I could find the slightest sign of sympathy, of financial or even moral support, I would not hesitate to end the Bolshevik Embassy out of the country within a fortnight.

At the present moment the British Government are spending millions upon millions for an expeditionary force in China of some 20,000 men.

Could they conquer China with this army? And are they going to keep it shut up in Shanghai from whence it could not march out? And what good can it do in China if the whole of China falls under the Kuomintang? It would simply be isolated and would be of no good to re-establish the lost trade. And after all is not that the main thing?

Now I notice that panic begins already to reign among the foreign population in Tientsin and Peking. Do the Powers think that matters would improve when I should be forced to retire with my army and leave the situation to the Kuomintang and to the Bolsheviks?

From their attitude towards me one would be inclined to think that such was the case.

And yet look at Manchuria and see how during many years I have given full protection to every foreigner and made it possible for their trade to flourish.

But if they prefer the chaos as exists now in the south I can let them have it, because why should I spend my all and all so that perhaps even Manchuria would not remain open to me?

But suppose that Manchuria should also be overrun by the Kuomintang and their Russian bolshevik friends, does Japan think that her position in Korea would improve?

When I count up all these points I cannot but express my utter bewilderment at the policies pursued by the foreign Powers in China at the present moment. They seem to me lost in a dream.

G-2 Report

4-1 2657-9-276 3850 168

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Central Government's Approach to Foreign Powers.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

1. The following document, just handed to me, presents the argument with which the Peking Government is approaching the Ministers of the United States, Britain and Japan in the present crisis. I hear confidentially that Japan has received the representations warmly and that the British Minister is interested. The source of my information, a foreigner sent by Mr. Koo, tells me that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is sure of American friendship for China, but is aware of the slowness with which our Government can act in such matters. He is hopeful for more immediate action from Japan and Britain, without which action the situation in China becomes daily more menaced by Russian activities. He intimated that if the American officials could appreciate the true situation as outlined in the document and, at least, influence public opinion in America to be favorable to necessary steps to be taken against Russia, such assistance would be appreciated.

2. The document was given to me with the request that I present it to the Minister for his consideration. This I have done.

3. I personally have consistently tried to picture the danger to the Chinese people and ultimately to the United States from the activities of Soviet Russia in China, and accordingly am in sympathy with the sentiments expressed in the document. I believe the facts are as stated, and I am sure that any form of judicious assistance given by the Powers at this time is urgently desired by all Chinese of responsible classes. I further believe that without such assistance China will suffer incalculable harm before Communism, which has taken hold of genuine Nationalism, can be eliminated, if indeed it can ever be eliminated by Chinese agencies alone.

- - - - - - - - - - -

"It has become evident to many of the leaders of China during the last few weeks that South China is rapidly becoming Communistic and that there is danger that the Nationalist Movement in China will be destroyed and that the old traditions and liberties of the Chinese people will be lost. As these leaders remember the famines, lawlessness, breakdown of the homes and religion and the loss of life and property which followed the adoption of Communism in Russia they are making efforts to combat this menace to the Chinese people.

"These men believe that the Nationalist movement of China represents the real desires of the Chinese people and that it can be saved for China but to save it two important steps must be taken by the Chinese people.

"The first and most important step is the organization of a strong Central Government for the country. A government that can not only gain the support of the Nationalist of the North and the South but can particularly gain the support of the large mass of Chinese people who are willing to support the party which they believe can secure for them what they have been taught to believe are their national aspirations.

From M/A, China Report No. 7016 April 14, 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Central Government's Approach to Foreign Powers.

"The military arm of the Central Government is well organized, probably better than the military organization of the Communist, but it is recognized that the administrative arm of the Government is not strong. The Central Government of China today is much like a strong man standing alone without the support of his friends, with one arm tied behind his back and fighting a much weaker man with two working arms and supported in every possible way by a strong ally.

"The Chinese leaders know that the best form of Government for a country is a civilian Government working with but dominating the military arm of the Government. But this is impossible in China at the present time as the country is at war and no civilian can control the military situation so these leaders have decided that the advisable thing to do is to secure the strongest and best prepared military man available to become the responsible head of the new government.

"The only man who meets all the requirements of the situation in China today is Marshal Chang Tso-lin. He can dominate the military authorities, he has proven himself an organizer and an administrator in the management for many years of the Three Eastern Provinces. He has the respect of the Nationalists in China and his views on foreign questions and the aims of the Chinese people have been moderate and practical.

"As the Chinese leaders believe that Marshal Chang is the man most capable of establishing a strong government efforts are being made to induce him to accept this responsibility. Naturally as the Marshal feels that his first obligation is to his people of the Three Eastern Provinces he hesitates to accept this proposition which would add so much to his responsibilities and to the dangers of his present situation. But he can be persuaded to accept this responsibility if he is assured of the support of the Nationalists of the North and the South and he receives the sympathetic support of the three powers most interested in China.

"As the leaders of the North feel that in fighting Communists and Russia in China they are not only fighting for the Chinese people but that they are also fighting for the interests of the foreign powers, they feel that they can in justice ask the three interested powers for the following assistance.

"They ask first that the foreign governments give such recognition of the proposed Government under Marshal Chang Tso-lin when it is formed, as is necessary to make a strong Government.

"As it is realized that no government can be organized in China with sufficient strength to stand or govern China unless it gives to the Chinese people and to the World a program which meets with the present aspirations of the Chinese people and the rights of the foreigners in China they ask that the foreign governments make such revisions and sacrifices of their past agreements with China as are necessary to a program that will meet the present requirements of the Chinese people. If Marshal Chang Tso-lin could show the Chinese people that he can secure for them as much or more from the foreign powers by peaceful means as the Communists can do with their mobs and that it would be more permanent he would take from the Communists their strongest appeal to the masses.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Central Government's Approach to Foreign Powers.

"It is desired also that the foreign powers give careful thought as to a means of helping the proposed Government in a material way. It has been suggested that the foreign powers should abolish the arms embargo which at present is working not only against the interests of the foreign powers but also against the Northern party in China. Also make it possible for the proposed new government to secure supplies on long term credits or to postpone in some way the interest payments of certain foreign loans or obligations as was done among some of the allies during the Great War in Europe.

"Marshal Chang Tso-lin has every confidence that if given this small assistance by the foreign powers that he will not only be able to hold the North of China against the Communist and Russia but that he would in a short time be able to free the South from the control of Russia.

"The Chinese leaders thoroughly understand and appreciate the stand of the foreign powers in the past in not giving assistance to one faction of the Chinese people in fighting another faction but they believe that it must be clear to all who have given any study to the Chinese problems at the present time that in fighting Communism in China it is not fighting against the Chinese people but fighting for the Chinese people against Russia, a country which is as great an enemy of the foreign powers as of the Chinese people.

"As a close student for many years of the conditions in North China, Eastern Russia and Siberia and in view of certain information recently secured from the Communist of China it is evident to Marshal Chang that the Communist of Russia plan not only to control China but they have definite plans for the control of India, Korea and even Japan. He is of the opinion that if Communism does secure control of China that Russia's attempts to also control the other countries of Asia will make it necessary for some of the foreign powers to fight Russia to protect their interests and obligations in India and Korea. But if they wait until Russia controls China they may have to fight Russia with a Communistic China to assist her.

"The offer of the Chinese to the powers at this time gives the powers the choice of giving a small amount of assistance to the Government of China to help China fight Russia or if this assistance is not given by the foreign powers and Communism is not stopped all of the investments and property of foreigners in China will be lost as completely as the pre-war investments in Russia are lost at the present time."

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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JUL 12 1927
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

(Postal Map)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 12 1927

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief.

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin.

5th Army (Tang Yu-lin) - Jehol area		20,000
6th " (Chang Tso-hsiang)		20,000
Some units en route from Kirin to support of Fengtien forces in Southern Chihli. Will take station in Paotingfu-Shihkiachuang area.		
7th Army (Hsing Shih-lien) Peking Garrison. . . .		15,000
9th " (Kao Wei-yueh).		15,000
Kalgan garrison. Some units have gone south to support Fengtien forces in Southern Chihli.		
8th Army (Wan Fu-lin)		18,000
15th " (Chi Chin-chun)		20,000
These constitute 3rd line of defense on Peking-Hankow Railway line, in neighborhood of Chengtingfu.		
10th Army (Wang Shu-chang)		17,000
11th " (Chao En-chen)		12,000
2nd line of defense in and around Changte.		
16th Army (Hu Yü-kun.		19,000
17th " (Jung Chen)		18,000
1st line of defense at Weihui.		
Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces despatched within the Wall)		40,000
Peking-Mukden Railway to Shanhaikuan		10,000
		224,000
Honan Ally - Kou Ying-chieh.		8,000
	Total -	232,000

Changes since last report. Reduction of 26,000 since last report is estimated loss due to casualties and desertions.

The Honan Allies, with the exception of Kou Ying-chieh, are no longer carried under the Fengtien forces, as these troops either have gone over to the South or melted away.

Chihli-Shantung Forces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

Province of Shantung	120,000

In the last report Chang Tsung-chang's forces were estimated at 135,000. During the recent fighting he is believed to have lost in casualties and desertions at least 15,000.

Sun Chuan-fang's forces - Kiangsu-Shantung border	50,000
TOTAL ANKUOCHUN	402,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7063 June 6, 1927

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

No change is noted in the number of Sun Chuan-fang's forces, as his retreat has not been attended by serious fighting.

NATIONAL ARMY (CANTONESE) AND ALLIED KUOMINCHUN.

Chiang Kai-shek.

Army.		Number of Troops
1st - Ho Ying-chin		20,000
14th - Lai Shih-huang	Ho Ying-chin	15,000
17th - Tsao Wan-shun		15,000
31st - Pai Chung-hsi		15,000
40th - Ho Yueh-tsu	Chiang Kai-shek	10,000
7th - Li Tsung-jen		20,000
10th - Wang Tien-pei		15,000
27th - Wang Pu	Li Tsung-jen	5,000
33rd - Po Wen-wei		30,000
2nd - Liu Ti-ping		15,000
4th - Li Chi-chen		18,000
5th - Li Fu-lin		20,000
12th - Yuan Tsu-ming		8,000
13th - Fan Chung-hsiu		20,000
16th - Fan Sih-sheng		20,000
19th - Chen Yi		6,000
26th - Chou Feng-chi		8,000
37th - Chen Tiao-yuan		18,000
		278,000
Shansi Troops - Yen Hsi-shan		100,000
15th - Liu Tso-lung		12,000
Troops of Yang Sen		45,000
" " Hsia Tou-yin		10,000
		67,000
TOTAL		445,000

Hankow Government.

3rd - Chu Pei-te		12,000
6th - Cheng Chien		15,000
8th - Tang Sheng-chih		25,000
11th - Chen Ming-shu		10,000
35th - Ho Chien		13,000
36th - Liu Hsing		12,000
		87,000
Kuominchun - Feng Yu-hsiang		90,000
Honan Allies:		
Yü Hsüeh-chung		15,000
Liu Chen-hua; Chang Chih-kung		10,000
Wei Yi-san, Tien Wei-chin		30,000
Chin Yün-ao		20,000
		75,000
TOTAL HANKOW FORCES		252,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

On June 5th, Yen Hsi-shan declared himself a Kuomintang adherent and his forces a National Revolutionary Army.

Honan Allies reduced 50,000, due to battle losses and desertions, and to Kou Ying-chieh's remaining loyal to Fengtien.

Forces not Participating in Present Conflict.

Szechuan troops (nominally Kuomintang)		305,000
Kweichow	"	30,000
Yunnanese	"	40,000
Shansi	"	70,000
Honan	"	50,000
		495,000

2. The accompanying map shows the areas under control of the following military groups:

(a) Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin)
(b) Chihli-Shantung (Chang Tsung-chang.
(c) Sun Chuan-fang
(d) Chiang Kai-shek (right wing of Kuomintang)
(e) Tang Sheng-chih (left wing of Kuomintang)
(f) Yang Sen, Hsia Tou-yin, Liu Tso-lung.
(g) Yü Hsüeh-chung.

3. Military Operations.

The last situation report (May 27th) showed Pengpu still in Northern hands. Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang's troops in considerable disorder and with low morale were everywhere withdrawing and offering practically no resistance; while Chiang Kai-shek was following up, exerting no pressure.

In Honan, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang were maneuvering a little, but negotiating more, in front of the Honan Allies which everywhere were acting as a buffer between the Fengtien troops and the Nationalists.

About May 26th it was announced that the Fengtien forces were launching a general offensive southward along the Kin-Han Railway from the general area Yencheng-Chowkiakow. No details were available as to the results of this operations, but during the next few days it became apparent that the "offensive" had accomplished nothing. News was later received that Tien Wei-chin was playing false with the Ankuochun. Some of his units went over to the South; some were reported to have been attacked by the Red Spears, dispersed, and retreating, threw Fengtien units into confusion. In the beginning of the offensive it appears that no Fengtien troops were in contact with the Nationalists, and there is little evidence of a determined advance.

On or about May 28th, Tien Wei-chin's forces in the neighborhood of Juning abandoned all pretense of resistance, as a result of which Kuomintang units suddenly appeared near Yushih on the Fengtien flank and rear.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

On May 27th, as a result either of treachery or inefficiency on the part of Chang Chih-kung, another Honan Ally who was covering the Fengtien 8th and 16th Armies against Feng Yu-hsiang, the latter's forces entered Loyang and advanced toward Kunghsien. Thus the Fengtien forces were everywhere threatened, the high command was utterly incapable of taking advantage of a weak and widely dispersed enemy, and retreat began all along the line.

Meanwhile the Chihli-Shantung army was falling back toward Shantung through Anhui and northern Kiangsu. Suchow (railway junction) fell about May 31st. These forces had never maintained any connection with the Fengtien troops and there was neither mutual support nor co-ordinated plan. On the other hand, the two columns of the Southern offensive, while entirely separated, doubtless were able to synchronize their advance because of the vague control still exercised by the Russian staff.

With Suchow (railway junction) doomed, Feng Yu-hsiang on the west flank, and Yen Hsi-shan wavering to the side of the Kuomintang, nothing remained for the Fengtien forces in Honan to do but withdraw across the Yellow River. The withdrawal was accomplished in good order but not without considerable losses. The main body of the troops crossed the Yellow River on the night of the 31st at three different points. The 10th and 17th crossed by means of the Yellow River bridge, the 11th Army north of Kaifeng; while the 8th and 16th ferried over north of Kunghsien, in the vicinity of Szeshui. The Fengtien 6th Cavalry Division is reported to have retreated to Tungming, in southern Chihli.

Since crossing the river, the Fengtien forces have dug in on the north bank, and the indications are that they will make a stand along the Peking-Hankow railroad line. Concentrations have been established at Weihwei, Changte and Chengtingfu.

4. General Remarks.

Four causes are easily discernible for the Fengtien withdrawal from Honan. These are: lack of efficiency of high command and staff, treachery of the Honan Allies, fear of a Chang Tsung-chang debacle and doubt as to the future actions of Yen Hsi-shan.

All military observers agree that Fengtien officers up to and including the grade of colonel are, for Chinese leaders, unusually well trained and are generally courageous and efficient; but of those exercising higher command very little good can be said. In this connection it is also important to note that the Fengtien forces in Honan, which constituted the 3rd and 4th Army Group, were under the joint command of Generals Han Lin-chun and Chang Hsueh-liang (son of Chang Tso-lin). Such a division of authority could never make for efficiency in any organization.

The most conspicuous figure in the treachery of the Honan Allies is that of Tien Wei-chin, who was just recently in Peking, where he called on Marshal Chang Tso-lin, promised him faithful support and in return received considerable amounts of money and munitions.

DDB

John Magruder
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander in Chief.

Fengtien Forces ..... Chang Tso-lin

5th Army	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area	20,000	
6th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang) Kirin; and Peking-Mukden line from Shanhaikuan to Peking; Peking-Hankow line to Paotingfu	20,000	
7th "	(Hsing Shih-lien) Peking Garrison.....	15,000	
8th "	(Wan Fu-lin) part on north bank of Yellow River, part in Paotingfu area..	18,000	
9th "	(Kao Wei-yueh) Chahar area	15,000	
10th "	(Wang Shu-cheng) North bank of Yellow River.....	17,000	
11th "	(Chao En-chen) Kaoyang and Tehchow.....	12,000	
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun) Shihkiachwang area.....	20,000	
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun) Paotingfu area	19,000	
17th "	(Jung Chen) " "	18,000	
Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall)		40,000	
Peking Mukden Railway to Shanhaikuan		10,000	
			224,000
Honan Ally - Kou Ying-chieh			8,000
		Total ----------	232,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces ..... Chang Tsung-chang.

Province of Shantung	110,000
Reduction 10,000 due to battle losses and desertions.	
Sun Chuan-fang's Forces	
Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad and Tientsin Pukow Railroad	40,000
Reduction of 10,000 due to battle losses and desertions, the latter including the whole 9th Division.	
TOTAL ANKUOCHUN	382,000

NATIONAL ARMY (CANTONESE) AND ALLIED KUOMINCHUN

Chiang Kai-shek

7th Army	- Li Tsung-jen	)	20,000
10th "	- Wang Tien-pei	)	15,000
27th "	- Wang Pu	) Li Tsing-jen	5,000
33rd "	- Po Wen-wei	)	30,000
17th "	- Tsao Wan-shun	)	15,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

37th Army	- Chen Tiao-yuan		18,000
14th "	- Lai Shih-huang		15,000
40th "	- H o Yueh-tsu		10,000
31st "	- Pai Chung-hsi	} He Ying-chin	15,000
1st "	- He Ying-chin	}	30,000
2nd "	- Liu Ti-ping		15,000
3rd "	- Chu Pei-te		12,000
4th "	- Li Chi-chen		18,000
5th "	- Li Fu-lin		20,000
12th "	- Yuan Tsu-ming		8,000
16th "	- Fan Shih-sheng		20,000
15th "	- Liu Tso-lung		12,000
19th "	- Chen Yi		6,000
26th "	- Chou Feng-chi		8,000
			252,000
Shansi troops	- Yen Hsi-shan		100,000
Kuominchun	- Feng Yu-hsiang		90,000
		Total	472,000

Changes since last report.

Losses.

13th Army declared with Hankow government.
Yang Sen and Hsia Tou-yun no longer carried.

Gains.

3rd Army forces added.
Feng Yu-hsiang's forces added.

Hankow Government.

6th Army	- Cheng Chien	15,000
8th "	- Tang Sheng-chih	25,000
11th "	- Fan Ching-hsui	20,000
13th "	- Chen Ming-shu	10,000
35th "	- He Chien	13,000
36th "	- Liu Hsing	12,000
		95,000

Changes since last report.

Losses.

3rd Army has declared with Chiang Kai-shek.
Kuominchun allied with Chiang Kai-shek.
Henan allies no longer carried as their attitude is uncertain.

Gains.

13th Army declared with Hankow Government.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Forces not Participating in Present Combat.

Szechuan troops (nominally Kuomintang)	305,000	
Kweichow "	30,000	
Yunnanese "	40,000	
Shensi "	70,000	
Honanese "	125,000	
		570,000

Honan troops increased 75,000 by addition of former Hankow allies.

2. On the right flank of the Ankuochun in Chihli there has been little activity since the time of the last report. Chang Tso-lin's 10th and part of his 8th Armies in the area about Sinsiang are still holding the North bank of the Yellow River, but with the exception of these two units, the main body of Fengtien troops has been withdrawn to Paotingfu and east thereof, with the evident intention of establishing a line of defense between Paotingfu and Machang, on the Tientsin-Pukow line. Part of the 11th Fengtien Army has been sent to Tehchow, replacing a Kirin unit which has been withdrawn to Langfang, with the mission of backing up Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang in the event of their being forced to Tsinanfu.

Chiang Kai-shek, acting upon the results of his Hsuchow conference with Feng Yu-hsiang, on the 24th initiated a drive against Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang, the front extending from Hanchuang (a point on the Tsin-Pu line just at the border of Shantung and Kiangsu) to the east along the Shantung border. On the left of Chiang's forces, and astride the Tientsin-Pukow line, were the 7th Army (Li Tsung-jen) and the 10th (Wang Tien-pei); in the center the 37th Army (Chen Tiao-yuan); and on the right near the seacoast, the 31st Army (Pai Chung-hsi), and the 1st Army (Ho Ying-chin). Chang Tsung-chang was forced back to Chiaho (point on the Tsin-pu where front line crosses railroad), where a defensive position had been established and where for the first time his troops are reported to be putting up a determined resistance. Sun Chuan-fang, offering slight resistance, fell back to the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao railroad line between Tsingchow and Kaomi. Twenty thousand of Sun's troops have since been sent down the Tientsin-Pukow line by way of Tsinan to assist in the defense of Chiaho. It will be seen that Sun's and Chang Tsung-chang's troops are intermingled along the Tsin-pu railway.

On July 4th, Chen Yi-jen, commanding the troops of Chou Yin-jen (former Tupan of Fukien and now an adherent of Sun Chuan-fang) at Kiaochow, suddenly went over to the South. Chen is now moving on Tsingtao, and is engaged at Chengyang with the forces of General Chu Hsiang-pen, commanding the Tsingtao garrison. C hang Tsung-chang is reported to be sending troops to Kaomi to attack Chen Kuo-hua in the rear. At the present time it is impossible to foretell what will be the ultimate result of this disaffection on the part of a portion of Sun Chuan-fang's Army.

Feng Yu-hsiang now has complete control of the province of Honan, except north of the Yellow River, Tang Sheng-chih having withdrawn the 4th and 8th Kuomintang Armies to Hupeh. None of Feng's troops has crossed the

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Yellow River. Feng is reported to be moving against Hankow with 40 battalions, the advance elements of which are said to have reached Wushengkuan. Tien Wei-chin and Chin Yun-ao, Honan military leaders, are reported to have been executed by Feng.

Yang Sen's expedition against Hankow has met with complete defeat, and he has been driven out of Ichang by forces of the 8th Kuomintang Army under Li Pin-hsien. Yang is now unable to return to Wanhsien, his old stronghold, because of opposition on the part of Liu Hsiang and other Szechuan leaders.

Hsia Tou-yin, who since the last report has moved his troops east of Hankow and has been attempting an advance on that point from down river, has also been defeated and his troops driven below Hwangchow.

Wu Pei-fu is still at Nanyang, Honan, with Yu Hsueh-chung. Wu is reported to have raised an army of 100,000 men. Chang Lien-sheng, a former adherent of Chun Yun-ao's, is also at Nanyang with Wu and Yu. Feng Yu-hsiang has declared his intention of attacking this Nanyang group, but as yet no operations of importance have been reported in that vicinity.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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G-2 Report

CHINA(Military).

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN ..... Chang Tso-lin, Commander in Chief.

Fengtien Forces ..... Chang Tso-lin

5th Army	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area	20,000
6th Army	(Chang Tso-hsiang)(Kirin; and Peking-Mukden line from Shanhaikuan to Peking; Peking-Hankow line to Paotingfu	20,000
7th Army	(Hsing Shih-lien) Peking Garrison	15,000
8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin) Paoting area to Tingchow	18,000
9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh) Chahar area	15,000
10th Army	(Wang Shu-cheng) Tingchow area	17,000
11th Army	(Chao En-chen) Paoting area	12,000
15th Army	(Chi Chin-chun) Tingchow area	20,000
16th Army	(Hu Yu-kun) Paoting area	19,000
17th Army	(Jung Chen) " "	18,000
Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall)		40,000
Peking-Mukden Railway to Shanhaikuan		10,000
		224,000
Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh)		8,000
	Total	232,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces ..... Chang Tsung-chang.

Shantung and Northern Kiangsu	110,000

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces.

Shantung and Northern Kiangsu	70,000

Latest reports indicate his forces at 70,000 instead of 40,000 as given in last report

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN ..... 412,000.

NATIONAL ARMY (CANTONESE) AND ALLIED KUOMINCHUN.

Nanking Government ..... Chiang Kai-shek.

1st Army - Ho Yeng-chin	) Operating against	20,000
5th Army - Li Fu-lin	) Hankow Government	20,000
7th Army - Li Tsung-jen	)	20,000
12th Army- Yuan Tsu-ming	)	8,000
14th Army -Lai Shih-huang	)	15,000
16th Army- Fan Shih-sheng	)	20,000
19th Army- Chen Yi	)	6,000
26th Army- Chou Feng-chi	)	8,000
27th Army- Wang Pu	)	5,000
31st Army- Pai Chung-hsi	)	15,000
40th Army- Ho Yueh-tsu	)	10,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

10th Army - Wang Tien-pei	)Operating in	15,000	
17th Army - Tsao Wan-shun	)Northern Kiangsu	15,000	
33rd Army - Po Wen-wei	)and Anhwei against	30,000	
37th Army - Chen Tiao-yuan	)forces of Sun Chuan-	18,000	
44th Army - Yeh Kai-hsin	)fang and Chang Tsung-	10,000	
	)chang.		
			235,000
Shansi troops - Yen Hsi-shan			100,000
Kuominchun - Feng Yu-hsiang			90,000
		Total	425,000

Changes since last report.

Losses:

2nd, 3rd, 4th and 15th Armies have declared with Hankow Government.

Gains:

44th Army, recently organized, added.

Hankow Government:

2nd Army - Lu Ti-ping	)		10,000
8th Army - Li Pin-hsian	)		25,000
19th Army- Chen Ming-shu	)	Tang Sheng-chih	10,000
15th Army- Wang Kuei-yung	)		10,000
35th Army- Ho Chien	)		13,000
36th Army- Liu Hsing	)		12,000
3rd Army - Chu Pei-te	)		12,000
4th Army - Huang Chi-hsing	)		4,000
6th Army - Cheng Chien	)	Ex-Hankow Extremists	3,000
11th Army- Chu Hui	)	Chang Fa-kuei	6,000
20th Army- Ho Lung	)		10,000
Central Independent Division - Hou Lien-ying	)		7,000
		Total	122,000

Changes since last report.

The 2nd, 4th and 15th Armies have been added, but their strength is recently reported as given above, not as carried in last report. The 20th Army, recently organized, has also been added, as has the Central Independent Division.

Forces not participating in present conflict.

Szechuan troops (nominally Kuomintang)	305,000	
Kweichow "	30,000	
Yunnanese "	40,000	
Shensi "	70,000	
Honanese "	125,000	
	Total	570,000.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Chiang Kai-shek's drive against the north progressed no further than the line indicated in the map accompanying the last Situation Report. Chen Yi-yen's attempt to capture Tsingtao for the Nationalists failed, and he was forced to flee, while his troops returned to the army of Sun Chuan-fang. Since about the 9th of July the combined forces of Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang have steadily forced the Kuomintang troops out of Shantung and Northern Kiangsu and have advanced into Anhwei. Hsuchow fell to the Chihli-Shantung Army on July 24th. The capture of Pengpu is not confirmed but large Chihli-Shantung forces are known to hold Suchow. To the eastward of the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad line Sun Chuan-fang is now advancing on Haichow and Tsingkiangpu. His forces are also moving westward over the Lunghai Railroad toward Kuciteh where Feng Yu-hsiang is reported as having concentrated troops to resist this advance.

Chiang's withdrawal from Shantung and Northern Kiangsu was brought about by the necessity of sending many of his best troops, including the 1st, 7th, 14th and 40th Armies, up the Yangtze River to meet the threatened attack of the Hankow Government. The Nanking Government has now concentrated the majority of its forces at Wuhu and Anking, while the main body of the extremist Hankow troops, made up principally of the 4th, 11th, and 20th Armies under General Chang Fa-kuei, have been sent to Nanchang and Kiukiang, from which points it is reported that attacks are to be launched against Anking, in Anhwei, and Hangchow, in Chekiang. As yet no fighting of importance has taken place between the opposing factions.

On the Peking-Hankow line, the Fengtien forces have again withdrawn to the north, their advance elements now being located at Tingchow, with their main concentration in the Pacting area. It is evident that the line Pacting-Machang will be held should Feng Yu-hsiang make a further advance toward Peking. The Fengtien troops stationed along the Tientsin-Pukow line in the vicinity of Tsangchow and Tehchow have been shifted to the Pactingfu area.

Taking advantage of the Fengtien withdrawal, Feng Yu-hsiang on about the 15th of July crossed the Yellow River and has since moved up the Peking-Hankow line as far as Changte, while to the east of the railroad he now occupies Taming. Between the armies of Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin, the forces of Yen Hsi-shan have now occupied the railroad from Chengting to a point about 15 miles north of Changte. They are reported as carefully avoiding contact with either the Fengtien or Kuominchun Armies.

The Wu Pei-fu -- Yu Hsueh-chung combination in Western Honan has been broken up, the troops having been disarmed by Kuominchun forces. Wu has fled into Szechuan with a few retainers, and Yu has escaped to Shanghai.

Heretofore it has been possible to show roughly in the situation map military dispositions, front lines, etc. Due to the rapid transformation of the so-called Nationalist movement, it will now be noted that China is again breaking up into political areas such as were familiar in 1922 and 1923.

John Magruder,
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Major, G.S.,
Military Attache.

M/A China Report No. 7099. Aug. 3, 1927.

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1927 2657-9-276 JUN 30
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

(Map accompanying)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 29 1927

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN - Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief.

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

Peking-Tientsin area	15,000	
Peking-Mukden Ry to Shanhaikwan	10,000	
Kalgan area	10,000	
Jehol area	20,000	
Peking-Hankow Ry to Yellow River	10,000	
Central Honan	80,000	
Three Eastern Provinces	60,000	
		205,000

Changes since last report: (1) The Peking Tientsin area has been decreased by 5,000, representing reinforcements sent south to increase forces in Honan fighting against the Southern Army in Chumatien-Yencheng area, and also west on Lunghai Railway to Loyang; (2) Peking-Hankow Railway to Yellow River increased 5,000 for same reason as stated in (1) above.

(3) Central Honan increased to 80,000 due to reinforcements noted in (1) and (2).

Honan Allies.

Yü Hsieh-chung	15,000	
Liu Chen-hua and Chang Chih-kung	20,000	
Kou Ying-chieh	20,000	
Wei Yi-sen and Tien Wei-chin	40,000	
Chin Yun-ao	30,000	
		125,000

Changes since last report: An increase of 70,000 troops is noted because of forces of Chin Yun-ao, Wei Yi-san and Tien Wei-chin, former Honan military leaders who have gone over to the Fengtien Army.

Chihli-Shantung Forces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

No change has been noted in these forces since last report, for while a large number of recruits have been incorporated they have been fully compensated for by losses sustained in action and by units which have either gone over to the enemy or been disarmed by them.

Province of Shantung	35,000	
Hsuchou area	40,000	
Anhui front	60,000	
		135,000

Sun Chuan-fang's Reorganized Forces along Grand Canal, north of Yangtze	50,000
Total Ankuochun ---	515,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7047 May 27, 1927

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

NATIONAL ARMY (Cantonese) and ALLIED KUOMINCHUN

Under this heading the important point at this time is the vague line of cleavage between the forces loyal to Chiang Kai-shek and those supporting the Hankow Government. A tabulation is given below showing this division as clearly as can be determined from present sources of information. It this connection it should be noted that it is often very difficult to determine on which side an organization should be placed. Not only may the attitude of any army commander vacillate from day to day, but there may be very different lines of cleavage within a particular army, some divisions or brigades having communistic tendencies while others may be distinctly in sympathy with the right wing of the Kuomintang Party.

Chiang Kai-shek

Army		Number of Troops	
1st - He Ying-chin		20,000	
14th - Lai Shih-huang	He Ying-chin	15,000	
17th - Tsao Wan-shun		15,000	
31st - Pai Chung-hsi		15,000	
40th - He Yüeh-tsu	Chiang Kai-shek	10,000	
7th - Li Tsung-jen		20,000	
10th - Wang Tuen-pei		15,000	
27th - Wang Pu	Li Tsung-jen	5,000	
33rd - Po Wen-wei		30,000	
2nd - Liu Ti-ping		15,000	
4th - Li Chi-chen		18,000	
5th - Li Fu-lin		20,000	
12th - Yuan Tsu-ming		8,000	
13th - Fan Cheng-hsin		20,000	
16th - Fan Shih-sheng		20,000	
19th - Chen Yi		6,000	
26th - Chou Feng-chi		8,000	
37th - Chen Tiao-yuan		18,000	
			278,000
15th - Liu Tse-ling		12,000	
Troops of Yang Sen		45,000	
" " Hsai Tou-yin		10,000	
			67,000
	Total --------		345,000

Hankow Government

3rd - Chu Pei-te	12,000	
6th - Cheng Chien	15,000	
8th - Tang Sheng-chih	25,000	
11th - Chen Ming-shu	10,000	
35th - Hu Chien	13,000	
36th - Liu Hsiang	12,000	
		87,000
Kuominchun - Feng Yu-hsiang		90,000
Total --------		177,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Forces not Participating in Present Struggle.

Szechwan troops (nominally Kuomintang)	305,000	
Kweichow troops	30,000	
Yunnanese troops	40,000	
Shensi troops	70,000	
Honan troops	50,000	
Shansi troops	100.000	
		595,000

The above shows a decrease of 45,000 troops as compared with the last report, because of the fact that the forces of Yang Sen have definitely allied themselves against the Hankow Government and are conducting active military operations in Hupeh. It is suspected that Yang Sen still would be sympathetic with Wu Pei-fu if the latter emerges from his present obscurity.

2. On the accompanying map the spheres of activity of the following leaders are outlined with as much accuracy as the extreme complexity of the present military situation will permit. The spheres outlined are as follows:

a) Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin, also including Honan elements recently absorbed.)
b) Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies (Chang Tsung-chang).
c) Sun Chuan-fang's forces.
d) Chiang Kai-shek (right wing of the Kuomintang).
e) Forces of the Hankow Government (left wing of the Kuomintang).
f) Szechwan, Hupeh and Kuomintang leaders (Yang Sen, Hsia Tsu-yin, and Liu Tso-lung) who have recently declared against the extremists of the Hankow Government.
g) The group under the leadership of Yü Hsüeh-chung, who may possible unite with Wu Pei-fu for a drive against Hankow, aided by funds and munitions supplied by Chang Tso-lin.

3. Important Military Operations since last Report.

Since the submission of the last report, the following important developments have taken place in the military situation:

(1) The advance of the Kuomintang Armies up the Peking-Hankow and Peking-Mukden railways.
(2) Feng Yu-hsiang's activity in Western Honan.
(3) The threat against Hankow by forces from Szechwan under Yang Sen, together with Hupeh provincial troops, and the Kuomintang 15th Army under Liu Tso-lung.
(4) The possibility of an alliance between Wu Pei-fu and Yu Hsueh-chung for a drive against Hankow, aided by Fengtien money and munitions.

(1) At the time of the submission of the last report, the Fengtien front in Honan was in the neighborhood of Chumatien. The forces of Chang Tsung-chang were in possession of Pukow, while west of the Tientsin-Pukow line they were attacking near Liuan and Lüchow (Hofeihsien). To

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the east of the Tientsin-Pukow line, Sun Chuan-fang's troops were holding the north bank of the Yangtze river across from Chinkiang and Kiangyin.

About the 15th of May, the forces of Chiang Kai-shek began a general offensive to the North on a front extending from Anking along the river as far east as Kiangyin. This offensive was made in three columns. The eastern column under General Ho Ying-chin was ordered to cross the Yangtze river and drive back the forces of Sun Chuan-fang which had been threatening Chinkiang and Kiangyin. Sun resisted this attack until May 24th when the southerners crossed the Yangtze and forced him northward up the Grand Canal.

In the center the offensive was begun from Nanking under the personal command of Chiang Kai-shek, the vanguard of his forces being made up of the troops of Pai Chung-hsi, commander of the 31st Army and hero of the capture of Shanghai. In launching this attack, a crossing of the river was first made at Taipingfu, to the south of Nanking. Hechow, Hanshanhsien, and Chuantsiao were occupied in turn, thus forcing the evacuation of Pukow by the troops of Chang Tsung-chang. Reports at the present time are conflicting as to how far the Southern drive has carried up the Tientsin-Pukow railway, but Pengpu is believed to be in the hands of Chang Tsung-chang.

On the western and left flank of the Kuomintang drive against the North, Li Tsung-jen (C.G. of the 7th Army) moved into Anhui to attack the forces of Chang Tsung-chang in the neighborhood of Liuan and Hefei (Luchow). At the time of the beginning of the offensive, the former place was reported in the hands of the Chihli-Shantung troops under the command of Chang Ching-yao (C.G. 2nd Chihli-Shantung Army), but the fate of the latter position had not yet been decided, although General Hsu Kun, commanding the 7th Chihli-Shantung Army, had several times been reported as having captured it.

Exact reports are lacking as to the success of the Southern drive in Northern Anhui, but it is believed that the Shantung forces still are in possession of Liuan, while they probably have been forced to retreat from the neighborhood of Hefei.

If the center of the drive actually has carried as far as Pengpu, the position of the Chihli-Shantung units around Liuan and Hefei is extremely precarious, as they will have been entirely cut off from their base on the Tientsin- Pukow line. Furthermore, the fall of Pengpu would place the important concentration point of Hsuchow in great danger, while the loss of the latter point probably would compel the Fengtien forces in Honan to withdraw to Chengchow, if not to Peking or even behind the Wall, as their left flank would then be left open to attack by way of the Lunghai Railway.

In spite of the apparent hostility existing between the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and those supporting the Hankow Government, there is abundant evidence that some sort of an agreement was entered into concerning the launching of a snychronous attack on all fronts against the Ankuochun, for at the same time the troops in Anhui and Kiangsu began their push northward, Tang Sheng-chih, commander of the 8th Kuomintang Army, and principal lieutenant of the Kuomintang left wing faction, initiated a vigorous drive up the Peking-Hankow line against the Fengtien troops, whose point of farthest southward advance was at that time in the neighborhood of Chumatien.

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T he first reports received concerning this drive were to the effect that the Fengtien troops, whose main force in Honan is the 3rd and 4th Army Group under the joint command of Generals Chiang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun, had suffered a severe reverse and had been driven back beyond Yencheng. It now appears, however, that after making a considerable advance, the troops of Tang Sheng-chih have been halted at a point somewhere near Siping, to the south of Yencheng.

(2) Feng Yu-hsiang, the Kuominchun leader, after a long period of inactivity, recently has declared his allegiance to the Hankow Government, and about the 10th of May began operations from the border of Shensi Province toward the western terminus of the Lunghai Railway. At the present time his 9th Army Corps, under Fang Chen-wu, is reported near Kwanyingtang. Ankuochun headquarters in Peking make light of Feng's activities, as they say his troops are short of ammunition and are poorly equipped, but nevertheless the 8th Fengtien Army has been sent to the neighborhood of Kunghsien to guard against a possible further advance of the Kuominchun down the Lunghai.

(3) While the activities of Feng Yu-hsiang may be causing some anxiety to the Fengtien military leaders, the Hankow Government has its own cause for worry in the movement of Yang Sen's forces down the Yangtze River from Szechwan. His troops, which are said to number about 45,000, are now reported as having arrived at Kiayü, south of Hankow. Operating in conjunction with Yang Sen are the forces of Hsia Tou-yin, comprising a division of Hupeh provincial troops, who have also advanced to Kiayu. Yang Sen and Hsia Tou-yin recently have declared their oppositions to the forces of communism.

Liu Tso-lung, commanding the 15th Army, whose troops are reported as concentrated in the nighborhood of Kingshan, also has declared his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and his determination to fight the Hankow Government. The forces of Liu are said to be working in cooperation with those of Yang Sen and Hsia Tou-yin. Some of his units are reported to be in control of Hankow itself.

(4) In southern Honan, Yü Hsüeh-chung, a former lieutenant of Wu Pei-fu's, now in control of a section of the country in southwestern Honan and northwestern Hupeh, recently has declared his intention of advancing on Hankow, and there has been some talk to the effect that Wu Pei-fu might take over the command of his troops for an attack against this seat of communistic government. Such a move is looked upon with favor by the Fengtien heads, and it is believed that if Wu would take such a step, material support in the way of arms and money would be furnished by the Ankuochun. At the present time Wu actually has been reported as having moved his headquarters from Kunghsien, in Northern Honan, to Nanyang, in the southeastern portion of the same province, from which point it is said he intends to lead the forces of Yü Hsueh-chung in an advance down the valley of the Han river.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Yen Hsi-shan's Position as Stated by General Nan Kuei-hsing.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 21 1927

At the request of General Nan Kuei-hsing, I arranged a conversation for him with the Minister on August 10th, at which I was present. General Nan Kuei-hsing is Governor Yen Hsi-shan's representative in Peking who has conducted the recent negotiations looking to a compromise and reconciliation among Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Tso-lin. General Nan outlined Governor Yen's position and aims quite clearly and logically somewhat as follows:

Yen has always felt that Chinese officials should consider the needs of the people and should conform in all their acts to reasonable and practicable demands of the people. During the trying years since the end of the Ching Dynasty Chinese militarists have almost without exception disregarded the desires of the people and have disrupted China with their senseless wars. The Three Principles of Dr. Sun have for the first time announced concretely the obligations of patriotic leaders to the people. While admittedly not perfect, the San Min Principles are the best principles announced and the Kuomintang Party creditable for having adopted them.

Governor Yen observed the subversive Soviet influences at work in the Hankow group of the Kuomintang and refused to join them. However, after Chiang Kai-shek broke with Hankow, and declared his program of expelling the Communists and adhering to the San Min Principles, Yen conceived it his duty to join the Nationalist cause as led by Chiang Kai-shek, which he did. On being questioned as to the success of the application of the Principles in Nationalist territory, General Nan admitted that little benefit to the people had been derived to the present time. The necessity

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Yen Hsi-shan's Position as
Stated by General Wan Kuei-hsing.

of pursuing the war against the militarists and the total disruption of the normal progress of the movement by the Communists he attributed as reasons for the failure of the Principles to show their advantages.

Contrasting the Fengtien leaders with the Nationalists, he pictured the latter as obstinate reactionaries who never thought of the people's welfare. They ruled only with a view to benefitting themselves and their followers, attaining power and personal wealth. Although Governor Yen had adopted the Nationalist cause, he was much averse to further warfare, and had instead devoted himself to the task of influencing the Fengtien leaders voluntarily to follow the trend of the times, listen to the voice of the people and adopt the San Min Principles. He had exerted himself to great lengths to soften the hard Northern hearts. Efforts were still being made, but the chances of success were slight. General Wan said Yen would be infinitely patient to accomplish his purpose by peaceful means, but if there were no other way he would employ military force to free the people of arbitrary government. I never before heard as positive a statement as this made by a Shansi man, and I consider it significant.

Yen did not like Feng Yu-hsiang and suspected him of double dealings and Russian affiliations. Feng's representative in Taiyuanfu had been allowed to cool his heels without having conversation with Governor Yen. However, I gathered if no response from Fengtien in the way of change of political faith is forthcoming, it might be easier for Feng's man to get a sympathetic ear.

Governor Yen, in spite of his change of flag, we were assured still took pride in his ability and desire to protect foreigners and all their legitimate interests wherever his influence extended. He believed that all unequal treaties should be rewritten, but he strongly advocated the correction of treaty inequalities by recognized peaceful methods. He

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Yen Hsi-shan's Position as Stated by General Nan Kuei-hsing.

disliked and would not permit any forms of violence. Governor Yen had no radical social or economic ideas. He not only would protect native capitalist methods but would encourage foreign capital which came in under such safeguards that exist between equal countries. Extreme socialism is rigidly suppressed in Shansi.

In brief, it was evident from the expressed opinions that Governor Yen is in no sense a revolutionary; he is, as he has always been, a very enlightened and upright reformist. He was this as his very thriving, contented Province proves, before the Nationalists ever controlled the municipal area of Canton. No violent type of Nationalist can boast of practical accomplishments for the people as can Yen Hsi-shan, and his acceptance of the Kuomintang principles is the most genuine phenomenon of the revolution.

Aside from reiterating the application of the San Min Principles (which are subject to as many interpretations as the Bible) General Nan could not be pressed into stating any concrete reforms which the people demanded and which Governor Yen had in mind to enforce. An interesting explanation was given of why the people demanded the destruction of the militarists which incidentally showed a paramount provincial self interest. Shansi, General Nan said, was suffering from very high taxes caused by the necessity of maintaining an excessively large army which was forced by the constant need for defense against the surrounding militarists. Feng Yu-hsiang's 1926 attempts at invasion had originally demanded the unwelcome increases in the Shansi Army.

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G-2 Report.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Yen Hsi-shan's position as stated by General Nan Kuei-hsing.

RECEIVED G/2 W, D. SEP 21 1927

Supplementing Report No. 7108 of this office on "Yen Hsi-shan's Position as stated by General Nan Kuei-hsing", there is appended a Tohe report of an interview with General Nan as printed in the Peking "Leader", August 18, 1927. The statements of General Nan are reasonable and are believed to be authentic. Considerable interest attaches to them as indicating the present tendencies of Shansi policy in view of the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek on whom Yen Hsi-shan had pinned so many of his hopes.

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Major, G. S.,
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M/A China Report No. 7110, Aug. 18, 1927.

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Interviewed by a correspondent, a certain representative of Governor Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi stated that he did not know the exact reason that prompted General Chiang Kai-shek to resign, as he had received no information about it, but the severe reverse sustained by the southern army at the Tsin-Pu Railway front and the disagreement with General Li Tsung-jen seemed to be at the bottom of it.

3 The informant thought that his resignation will accelerate a compromise between the Nanking and Wuhan factions, the more so as Generals Tang Sheng-chih and Li Tsung-jen are class-mates. He doubted whether the combination will lead to a league with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang against the Fengtien clique.

The informant thought that the establishment of a compromise between the Nanking and Wuhan factions, if brought about, will not result in sudden warlike action on the Tsin-Pu Railway front, which is impossible as the Nanking side has much to do to straighten out its house, especially after the big defeat.

The Shansi representative believed that the Nanking faction will be split in two, one following General Chiang and establishing its foothold in Chekiang, and the other forming a compromise with the Wuhan government, by clustering about General Li Tsung-jen.

Questioned about the attitude of Shansi, he said that no matter what change the situation might take, Shansi would adhere to the Monroe Doctrine so far pursued, although its relations with the Nanking government would undergo some or less alteration in case General Chiang severed his connections with it altogether. Be that as it may, Shansi will continue in the work of introducing peace in the situation for the sake of happiness of the entire nation, he said.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces	Chang Tso-lin	
5th Army	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area	20,000
6th "	(Chang Tso-Hsiang) Kirin; Peking-Mukden line from Shanhaikwan to Peking; Peking-Hankow line to Paotingfu.)	20,000
7th "	(Hsing Shih-lien) Peking Garrison. . . .	15,000
8th "	(Wan Fu-lin) Paoting area to Chengtingfu.	18,000
9th "	(Kao Wei-yueh) Chahar area	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-cheng) Chengting area	17,000
11th "	(Chao En-chen) Central and Southern Chihli.	12,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun) Chengting area	20,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun) Paotingfu area	19,000
17th "	(Jung Chen) " "	18,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chiao) " "	8,000
Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall).		40,000
Peking Mukden Railway to Shanhaikuan		10,000
		232,000
Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh).		8,000
	Total	240,000

Change since last report. 29th Army, recently organized, added.

Chihli-Shantung Forces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang	
Shantung and Northern Kiangsu	100,000

It is estimated that Chang Tsung-chang has lost 10,000 men in battle losses during the recent fighting in Shantung and Kiangsu.

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces.	
Anhui and Kiangsu	60,000

Reduction in 10,000 due to estimated battle losses.

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN..... 400,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

NATIONAL ARMY AND ALLIED KUOMINCHUN.

National Army.

3rd Army	(Chu Pei-te)		12,000	
4th "	(Huang Chi-hsiang)	Under Chang	4,000	
6th "	(Cheng Chien)	Fa-kuei	3,000	
11th "	(Chu Hui-jih)		6,000	
	Total Chang Fa-kuei forces.....			25,000
2nd Army	(Liu Ti-ping)		10,000	
8th "	(Li Pin-hsien)		25,000	
12th "	(Yuan Tsu-min)		8,000	
13th "	(Chen Ming-shu)		10,000	
15th "	(Liu Tso-lung dismissed, present commander not known)	under Tang Sheng-shih	10,000	
35th "	(Ho Chien)		13,000	
36th "	(Liu Hsing)		12,000	
Central Ind. Division	(Hou Lien-ying)		7,000	
	Total forces under Tang Sheng-shih.....			95,000
1st Army	(Ho Ying-chin - operating with Li Tsung-jen but guards position in Fukien independently)		18,000	
7th "	(Li Tsung-jen)		17,000	
10th "	(Wang Tien-pei, executed, present commander not known)		12,000	
14th "	(Lai Shih-huang)	under Li	15,000	
17th "	(Tsao Wan-shun)	Tsung-jen	12,000	
19th "	(Chen Yi)		6,000	
27th "	(Wang Pu)	Ex-Chiang	5,000	
33rd "	(Wen-wei)	Kai-shek	18,000	
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	troops	14,000	
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu)		8,000	
44th "	(Yeh Kai-hsin)		8,000	
	Total forces under Li Tsung-jen.....			133,000
5th Army	(Li Chi-shen) Li was carried as C.G. 4th Army in previous reports, but is now in command of 5th Army.		20,000	
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)		20,000	
	Total forces under Li Chi-shen.....			40,000
26th "	(Chou Feng-chi)			8,000
31st "	(Pai Chung-hsi)			13,000
20th "	(Ho Lung)			18,000
	TOTAL KUOMINTANG.....			305,000

Reduction in strength from last report due to losses in recent campaigns.

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Kuominchun and Honan Allies.	Feng Yu-hsiang.	
Shensi and Honan		150,000
Feng's Honan allies, principally under Chin Yun-ao, are estimated at 50,000.		
Shansi Troops	Yen Hsi-shan. . .	100,000
Forces not participating in present conflict.		
Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)		305,000
Kweichow troops		30,000
Yunnanese "		40,000
Shensi "		70,000
Honnanese "		75,000

Honanese troops reduced by 50,000, as that number is now allied with the Kuominchun.

2. The last Situation Report, dated August 3rd, stated that the combined forces of Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang, who had been driving south on the Tientsin-Pukow railroad since about the 18th of July, were in possession of Suchow. Information received later showed this statement to be incorrect.

During the last days of July the Northern drive had in fact carried almost to Pengpu, but on the 1st of August, Chiang Kai-shek made a determined effort to recapture Hsuchow with his 10th and 37th Armies, pushing toward that point from the south up the railroad and also overland from the southeast. Chiang's forces succeeded in reaching the walls of Hsuchow and partially surrounded the city, but on the 2nd a counter-attack, said to have been led in person by Sun Chuan-fang and continuing on the 3rd and 4th, threw the Southerners back after desperate fighting. From that time on, Sun pushed steadily south. He captured Pengpu between the 8th and 10th of August, and occupied Pukow on the 20th. In Eastern Kiangsu his forces passed Haichow, which fell on the 15th, and moving down the Grand Canal took Yangchow on the 17th. His division under Cheng Chün-yen entered Tungchow (on the Yangtze) on the 24th.

Having fought his way to the Yangtze, Sun ignored the warnings of Ankuochun headquarters against a too hasty advance, and attempted to cross the river. On the 26th he succeeded in landing troops on the south bank in the neighborhood of Lungtan, a point 15 miles to the east of Nanking (not shown on map). Sun's first attempt to capture the city from the east was broken up by the combined attack of troops of the 7th Kuomintang Army (Li Tsung-jen) from Nanking, and the 31st Army (Pai Chung-hsi) from Chingkiang. The Kuomintang fleet also supported the Southern forces, making it difficult for Sun to receive reinforcements from Pukow and

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Kuaochow. As a result his troops around Lungtan were practically wiped out on the 29th, but since that time he has continued to send forces across in this vicinity and severe fighting is still in progress. Sun is also reported to have landed troops above Nanking on the 27th at a point about 20 miles below Wuhu, but definite reports as to the success of the crossing in this locality are lacking. His plain clothes troops have succeeded in crossing the river at a number of points between Nanking and Shanghai and have cut the railroad in several places.

Chang Tsung-chang's main body has not moved south of Hsuchow since the end of July, but on the Lunghai railway he has pushed Feng Yu-hsiang and his Honan allies back as far as Mamuchi, which was captured by the 6th Chihli-Shantung Army on the 17th of August. The 13th Chihli-Shantung Army, operating in western Shantung, captured Tsaochow on the 20th, and is now reported moving toward Kaifeng. The forces of Sun Tien-ying, Defense Commissioner of Chihli, and Commander of the 35th Shantung Division, operating with the support of the Fengtien 11th Army, have succeeded in driving Feng Yu-hsiang's troops out of southern Chihli. Chang Ching-yao, who nominally commands the Chihli-Shantung 2nd Army, but whse allegiance to the northern cause has at times been in doubt, has been driving toward Hofei (Luchow) in Anhui. Around the 20th of August he was reported to have captured this important strategic position on the right flank of Sun Chuan-fang's forces, but later despatches state that the place is still in the hands of the Kuomintang 27th and 33rd Armies.

Early in August, before the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, the forces of the Nanking and Hankow governments were concentrated in the Anking and Kiukiang areas, respectively. Chang Fa-kuei, then rated as a moderate Kuomintang leader, was in command of the Hankow troops. On the 4th of August, Ho Lung, leader of the 20th K.M.T. Army, and Yeh Ting, commanding the 27th Division, declared their independence at Nanchang. These two generals, representing the extremely communistic element among the Wuhan militarists, put up a determined fight against the troops despatched from Kiukiang by Chang Fa-Kuei, but they were unable to hold out for long, and Nanchang was taken on the 8th. The rebels fled with their forces into southern Kiangsi where they are now reported moving toward the border of Fukien. Since the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Sheng-chih, generalissimo of Honan and Hupeh, has declared his intention of assisting Li Tsung-jen (7th K.M.T. Army) in defending Nanking against Sun Chuan-fang, and has sent large forces, comprising principally the 35th and 36th Armies, down river to Anking, Wuhu, and eastward thereof. The advance elements of the 35th Army are reported to have reached Tsaishih on the 27th of August.

During the first part of August, Feng Yu-hsiang attempted an invasion of Shantung, evidently with the intention of threatening the right flank of the Chang Tsung-chang-Sun Chuan-fang forces, in order to relieve the pressure against the Southern troops on the Tientsin-Pukow railway. About the 7th he concentrated large bodies of troops near Taming, Chihli, and dispatched a column of two divisions toward Tsining, which point he attacked on the 9th. His forces were driven back into

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western Shantung and eastern Honan by the combined 10th and 15th Chihli-Shantung armies. During the latter part of August, Feng has commenced large troop movements toward Kweiteh, but whether he intends to operate against the Chihli-Shantung troops in the direction of Hsuchow or is merely reinforcing his somewhat shaky Honan allies in the Kweiteh area is not yet clear.

Yen Hsi-shan is reported to have withdrawn his forces from along the Peking-Hankow line from just north of Changte to Shihkiachuang, which place he shows no disposition to give up, in spite of the pressure exerted upon him by the Ankuochun leaders. Feng Yu-hsiang is stated to be still holding Changte, not daring to move further north because it would expose his right flank to attack from the Taming district.

There is much talk to the effect that Chang Tso-lin's troops will soon assume the offensive against Feng Yu-hsiang along the Peking-Hankow railway, but as yet no Fengtien troops have passed Chengtingfu, which is at present the farthest point to the south on the railroad held by Chang's Army.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

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1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin			
5th Army	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area		20,000
6th "	(Chang Tso-Hsiang) Kirin; Peking-Mukden line from Shanhaikwan to Peking; Peking-Hankow line to Paotingfu.		20,000
7th "	(Hsing Shih-lien) Peking Garrison		15,000
8th "	(Wan Fu-lin) Paoting area to Chengtingfu		18,000
9th "	(Kao Wei-yueh) Chahar area		15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-cheng) Chengting area		17,000
11th "	(Chao En-chen) Central and Southern Chihli		12,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun) Chengting area		20,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun) Paotingfu area		19,000
17th "	(Jung Chen) " "		18,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chiao) " "		8,000
Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall)			40,000
Peking-Mukden Railway to Shanhaikuan			10,000
			232,000
Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh)			8,000
		Total	240,000
Chihli-Shantung Forces. . . . . Chang Tsung-chang			
Shantung and Northern Kiangsu			100,000
Sun Chuan-fang's Forces			
Anhui and Kiangsu.			50,000
Reduction in 10,000 due to estimated battle losses.			
		Total Ankuochun	390,000

NATIONAL ARMY AND ALLIED KUOMINCHUN.

National Army

2nd Army	(Liu Ti-ping)		10,000
3rd "	(Chu Pei-te		12,000
8th "	(Li Pin-hsien		25,000
12th "	(Yuan Tsu-min		8,000
13th "	(Chen Ming-shu		10,000
15th "	(	Under Tang	10,000
35th "	(Ho Chien	Sheng-chih	13,000
36th "	(Liu Hsing		12,000
Central Ind. Division	(Hou Lien-ying		7,000
	Total forces under Tang Sheng-chih		107,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7139 September 29, 1927

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1st Army	(Ho Ying-chin) nominally allied with Li Tsung-jen, but is now seeking to gain an independent position in control of Chekiang, with a shadowy hold on Fukien.				18,000
6th "	(Cheng Chien	)		3,000	
7th "	(Li Tsung-jen	)		17,000	
10th "	(	)		12,000	
14th "	(Lai Shih-huang	)		15,000	
17th "	(Tsao Wan-shun	)		12,000	
19th "	(Chen-yi	)		6,000	
27th "	(Wang Pu	)		5,000	
33rd "	(Po Wen-wei	)	Under Li Tsung-jen	18,000	
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan	)		14,000	
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu	)		8,000	
44th "	(Yeh Kai-hsin	)		8,000	
	Total forces under Li Tsung-jen				118,000
4th "	(part - Huang Chu-hsiang)		under Chang	10,000	
11th "	(Chu Hui-jih	)	Fa-kuei	10,000	
	Total forces under Chang Fa-kuei				20,000

Figures for the strength of the 4th and 11th armies increased over those given in last report due to recruiting and incorporation of provincial troops.

4th Army	(part - Li Chi-shen)	10,000	
5th "	(Liu Fu-lin	) 10,000	
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng	) 20,000	
	Total forces under Li Chi-shen		40,000
26th "	(Chou Feng-chi)		8,000
31st "	(Pai Chung-hsi)		13,000
20th "	(Ho Lung)		18,000
	Total Kuomintang		342,000

Total strength shows an increase of 10,000 over last report (total of last report given as 305,000 instead of 332,000 due to error in addition).

Kuominchun and Honan Allies.

Feng Yu-hsiang	100,000

Decreased 50,000 by reason of disaffection of Chin Yun-ao, who has declared his independence.

Troops of Shang Chen	30,000

Nominally under control of Yen Hsi-shan, but with strong pro-Kuominchun tendencies.

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Shansi troops

Yen Hsi-shan	70,000

Decreased 30,000 because Shang Chen's forces are listed separately.

Chin Yun-ao and Allies.	50,000

Carried independently because although he has declared his independence of Feng Yu-hsiang, it is not known with whom he will ally himself in future.

Forces not participating in present conflict.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	305,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese "	40,000
Shensi "	70,000
Honanese "	75,000

2. After effecting a crossing to the south bank of the Yangtze River below Nanking during the last few days of August, Sun Chuan-fang was unable to hold his own against the combined forces of Li Tsung-jen from Nanking and two divisions of the 1st and 31st Armies despatched from Chinkiang by Pai Chung-hsi. On the afternoon of the 31st of August, all of his forces except a few in the neighborhood of Wulungshan, about fifteen miles below Nanking, either had been captured, killed, or driven back across the river to Pukow; and by the 2nd of September, no northern troops remained on the south bank. Sun lost about ten thousand men in this attempt to capture Nanking.

During his rapid advance south through Anhui, Sun Chuan-fang had never been able to capture Hofeihsien, from which locality the troops of the 33rd Kuomintang Army seriously menaced his right flank along the Tientsin-Pukow railroad line. Accordingly, after his defeat near Nanking, Sun found his position in Pukow too dangerous, and on the 2nd of September abandoned this place and withdrew the main body of his forces up the railroad to Minkuang, where he has established a position for the defense of Pengpu. His line now runs in general from a point below Mingkuang through Tingyuan, Loho, and to the northwest. Along the Grand Canal, Sun has also withdrawn to the north, Yangchow having fallen into the hands of the southern forces under Li Tsung-jen on the 5th of September. The capture of Chingkiangpu around the 20th of September is also reported, but it is believed that this place was occupied by irregular or bandit troops, and not by regular Kuomintang forces.

Since the withdrawal of Sun Chuan-fang to the general line of the Hwai River, the Kuomintang forces stationed along the railroad from Nanking to Shanghai have made no serious attempt to push him farther north. Parts of the 1st, 7th, 14th, 17th, 31st and 44th Armies have

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crossed the river from Nanking and Chingkiang, but have made no determined effort to advance up the Tientsin-Pukow railroad or the Grand Canal. It is now reported that since the 22nd of September, Li Tsung-jen has been withdrawing his forces back to the vicinity of Pukow and Yangchow, evidently because he fears an attack on Nanking by Tang Sheng-chih from up river.

Since the time of the last report, Tang Sheng-chih has continued to send large bodies of troops down river, the main body of which are now concentrated at Wuhu, from which point large numbers have advanced northward into Anhui. On the 5th of September the 35th Army under He Chien captured Showchow. At Wuhu Tang Sheng-chih has come into contact with the 27th and 37th Armies, which were formerly under C hiang Kai-shek, and are now supporting Li Tsung-jen. Chen Tiao-yuan, commanding the 37th Army, had made an attempt to establish himself as Tupan of Anhui, a move which was quickly frustrated by Tang. Although there has been no actual fighting Tang has adopted a very firm attitude toward the troops of the former Nanking Government, some of whom have been disarmed, while others have left for points down river.

On the 13th of September, Chin Yun-ao, Honan ally of Feng Yu-hsiang, with the bulk of his forces stationed near Yencheng, declared his independence of the Kuominchun leader, and seized Hsuchow (Honan). Feng immediately dispatched two divisions under Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san down the Peking-Hankow railroad to put down the rebellion, and on the 14th Chin was forced back to Yencheng, from which place he was driven out after a few days of hard fighting. Chin then moved his forces eastward toward Chowkiakow and attempted a drive against Kaifeng. This maneuver was met by Feng's forces under Cheng Chin-sheng, who advanced east over the Lunghai to the neighborhood of Kaifeng and then attacked Chin's troops south of the railroad. The Honan leader was defeated and fled to Nanyang with some of his forces. Scattered bodies of his troops are reported as moving eastward from Chowkiakow toward Anhui, where they intend to join with the Chihli-Shantung Army.

While Feng was engaged in suppressing Chin Yun-ao's rebellion, Chang Tsung-chang made no attempt to seize what appeared to be a favorable opportunity for a drive over the Lunghai railroad into Honan from Hsuchow. Feng still holds Kueiteh, which is garrisoned by his Shensi allies, concerning whose loyalty to the Kuominchun there is some doubt. In Western Shantung and northeastern Honan, the Chihli-Shantung armies have evidenced a little activity. Troops of the 3rd Army are reported to have captured Kaocheng around the 15th of September, from which point they seriously menace Feng's forces along the railroad from Lanfeng to Kueiteh.

Ankuochun headquarters in Peking have been talking for some time of an offensive against Feng Yu-hsiang to be begun concurrently by the Fengtien and Chihli-Shantung armies by the way of the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai railways, respectively. Up until the last few days, however, the presence of Yen Hsi-shan's forces in Shihkiachuang has constituted an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of any Fengtien operations against Honan. Chang Tso-lin has carried on lengthy negotiations with Yen Hsi-shan

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with a view to securing the withdrawal of the Shansi troops from the Peking-Hankow line, but Yen, although he has recalled his forces from between Shihkiachuang and Shunteh, has steadily refused to give up the former place. As a result, many of the Fengtien leaders have argued in favor of using force to coerce Yen, and during the past few days rumors of an impending Fengtien-Shansi break have been heard on all sides. On the 28th of September, Shang Chen, Tutung of Suiyuan, began to move troops from Tatung toward Kalgan by way of the Peking-Suiyuan railway. A clash took place at Chaikowpu between the Fengtien and Shansi troops, but the extent of the fighting and the result are as yet unknown. Shang C hen, though nominally under the control of Yen Hsi-shan, is strongly pro-Kuominchun, and whether his move against Kalgan is intended to divert the Fengtien leaders' attention from the proposed Honan drive, or is the result of orders received from the Shansi Governor in anticipation of an open conflict with Chang Tso-lin, is not yet clear. On the 26th all the Shansi troops except a small body were withdrawn from Shihkiachuang to Hwailu. In the event of a clash between Yen and Chang, a large Shansi force in Shihkiachuang would be in a dangerous position, whereas by withdrawing these troops to Hwailu, Yen concentrates his forces so as to maneuver with his main body against the flank of the Fengtien army should the latter move southward along the Kin Han.

Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, the communist rebels who were driven out of Wuchang by the forces of Chang Fa-kuei in August, suddenly appeared at Meihsin (Kiaying) Kwantung, on the 4th of September. At this point they were joined by large numbers of peasant irregulars and made an advance on Swatow. Li Chi-shen, commanding the Kuomintang troops in Canton, sent two divisions of the 4th Army to reinforce the Swatow garrison, but the combined forces were unable to withstand the attacks of the communists, and the city fell on the 24th of September. The rebels set up a communistic government in Swatow, but were threatened by a combined force of Kwantung provincial and 4th Army troops and compelled to evacuate the city on the 27th. They have now retreated to the Kiyang-Tenghai district.

The forces of Chang Fa-kuei, which had been pursuing Ho Lung and Yeh Ting through Southern Kiangsi, have now arrived at Shaochow, Kwantung, and are reported to be advancing toward Canton. Chang is a Cantonese, and it is generally believed that he will be able to edge Li Chi-shen and his Kwanghsi forces out of the provincial capital. As yet, however, there has been no evidence of any open hostility between Chang and Li, and the former is said to be trying to prevail on Chang to proceed against Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. There is some indication, however, that Chang has in reality established amicable relations with the communists near Swatow, thus making his position in Kwangtung more secure.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Political Background of the Mukden-Shansi War.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. NOV 16 1927

1. The factual background of the present Fengtien-Shansi war is comparatively simple. Following the Ankuochun reverses in May and June, Yen Hsi-shan, who has maintained himself as Governor of Shansi Province for the past sixteen years by a course of very clever fence-riding, announced his allegiance to the Kuomintang and made obvious preparations actively to support the Nationalist cause in the event of its expected complete victory. To counter this threat from Shansi the Ankuochun armies operating along the Kin-Han railway made no effort to defend the line of the Yellow River, but pulled back their concentrations to an area north of Shihkiachwang, junction point of the railway from Taiyuanfu with the Peking-Hankow line. Shihkiachwang was promptly occupied by Shansi troops. In June and July, as the rift in the Kuomintang widened, the Fengtien party took heart and began to contemplate expansion southwards. The location of Shansi province negatived any Fengtien advance down the Kin-Han line until either the cooperation or neutrality of Yen Hsi-shan was assured, and his recent actions caused the Peking government to decide that the only possible guarantee of neutrality on Yen's part would be his formal participation on their own side. Accordingly a political offensive was launched with the actual purpose of obtaining a clear road to the South along the Kin-Han, but nominally to secure Yen's adherence to a combined attack on Feng Yu-hsiang, in the latter's bolshevist rather than his nationalist capacity. The negotiations, coupled with counter demands from Yen that the Ankuochun adopt the insignia of liberalism, dragged through July and August without achieving any tangible result. Meanwhile the Fengtien armies had been rested and reorganized, and as diplomatic measures lagged it became more and more clear that Fengtien intended to bolster up its arguments by at least a show of force. Early in September there was talk in Peking of a coming demonstration in Suiyuan. In the latter half of the month the Kalgan garrison was reinforced by two brigades under Yu Chen, prominent because of his success at Nankow in 1926 and his defeat at Kaifeng in the current year. The Shansi response was the initiation of active hostilities and the sudden assumption of the offensive. On September 27th the Kin-Sui railway was cut near Chaikowpu, just inside the western boundary of Chahar, and Yu Chen, who was returning from an inspection tour of the light Fengtien garrisons at Pingtichwan and Fengchen, was detained at Tatung. Fighting occurred between Fengtien and Shansi advanced elements on September 27th-28th.

2. While from the occidental point of view this assumption of what might well be an offensive-defensive by Shansi is an obvious and self-sufficient course, prompt and decisive action of this nature is unusual in China and decidedly runs counter to the established conception of Yen Hsi-shan. The actual motives that led Shansi to forestall Fengtien action by force of arms are most involved and still remain shrouded in considerable mystery. The largest motivating factor is the internal situation in Shansi. In his rapprochement with the Kuomintang, Yen has been forced to surround himself with a considerable radical element, who have installed themselves securely in the provincial and military structure. These men see in any agreement with Fengtien the ruin of their local cause and of their personal careers. To them even a desperate struggle is preferable to unresisting

acquiescence in their own destruction. It is believed that it is this group that has succeeded in throwing the united strength of Shansi into the present war. Closely related to this group, and militarily forming an integral part thereof are the so-called "guest troops". Following the defeats of the Kuominchun in 1926 a large number of First Kuominchun elements, numbering about 30,000 men in all, were taken over in toto by Shang Chen, Tutung of Suiyuan. At the time they undoubtedly were the best fighting men in China. While personally originally loyal to Yen Hsi-shan, Shang Chen has been largely in the power of these units ever since. As a whole they have been consistently opposed to Fengtien, eager to settle old scores, and anxious to return to the broad plains of Chihli, from which most of them originate. Another group of "guest troops", some 20,000 former troops of the Second Kuominchun who had infiltrated into Shansi from Shensi, was stationed at Shihkiachwang. On the outbreak of hostilities it was first believed either that these "guest troops" were trying to commit Yen to action against Fengtien by straight military methods, or that the whole war was a clever scheme on the part of Yen to rid himself of his unwelcome "guests" with a view to eventual reconciliation with Fengtien; but the present commitment of the whole military strength of Shansi province to the attack would indicate rather that the action has been initiated by Nationalist politicians and ex-Kuominchun commanders acting in common, although it is uncertain which group first took the initiative. It seems most probable at present that this definite action has been taken in spite of Yen Hsi-shan, rather than by him. It may well be that his power in Shansi has been diminished, and that instead of getting off the fence, the fence has been taken away from underneath him.

3. The action of Shansi going out to battle in the plains against odds of approximately two to one, and with limited supplies of munitions, naturally gave rise to belief that this offensive was part of larger operations, or that assistance from the outside was expected. At various times it has been suggested that Shansi has been relying on: (1) Military aid from the southern nationalists, (2) military aid from Feng Yu-hsiang, (3) treachery in the Fengtien ranks, (4) financial assistance and supplies from the Soviets, (5) certain considerations from Japan. Nothing serious has really been expected from the South: Honan is too turbulent to permit of any outside troops crossing at the present time, and the route up the Tsin-Pu railway is effectively blocked by the local dissensions and squabbles around Nanking. Feng Yu-hsiang has taken no active steps to intervene in the present conflict. Though he probably promised great things before its outbreak, he could not have been taken seriously by the seasoned politicians at Taiyuanfu. No treachery has appeared in the Fengtien ranks, though here, too, it is by no means certain that no betrayals had been arranged. While the Shansi attack was creditably launched, the lack of suppleness in handling troops in the subsequent stages of the combat would seem to indicate that no Russian technical aid was available, and so far as is known the attacking troops do not possess Russian assistance of any charact er. Furthermore, isolated action of this nature does not seem characteristic of current Russian activities.

Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Political Background of the Mukden-Shansi War.

4. Japan's relation to the struggle has given rise to a host of conflicting reports. A threat to Chang Tso-lin's security at the present time would undoubtedly be of considerable value to the Japanese in their negotiations concerning railways and land ownership in Manchuria. Suggestions have also been made that Japan in her efforts to obtain economic control in Inner Mongolia is desirous of securing a hold on the Kin-Sui railroad and of working from East and West, instead of from East alone. The actual course of events would indicate that Japanese action has been exerted through the old Anfu clique, who seem to have evolved the thoroughly Chinese objective of control of North China by themselves, represented by Tuan Chi-jui, Shansi under Yen Hsi-shan, and the advanced element of the Mukden Party, probably with Han Lin-ch'un as its standard bearer. Such a solution would imply considerable defections in the Mukden ranks, would give the Shansi forces more than a fair chance of success, and would be easy of fomentation by the network of Japanese agents and advisers in North China. It has already been rumored that Japan has obtained from Fengtien the concessions desired by her, and accordingly was willing to see destroyed the alignment that had been created against the Peking government.

5. To sum up, there would seem to be no reasonable doubt that the impulse to war has come from the Shansi politicians in combination with the "guest troops". It would also appear that their action in sallying out of the province to fight must have been based on an understanding with outside forces. The combination of these outside forces must be understood as extremely fluid, and their inter-relation and degree of commitment probably will never become clear; but circumstances seem to point to Japan, the Anfu party and certain elements of the Fengtien clique all being involved.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Initial Operations in Shansi-Fengtien War.

(For political development preceding hostilities see Report No. 7142.)

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1. The outbreak of hostilities at Chaikoupu on the Peking-Suiyuan line on September 27th came as a complete surprise to the Fengtien military leaders, and caught them almost totally unprepared. In the Chahar area the only troops were those of Tatung Kao Wei-yueh, and these were not considered up to the standard of the average Fengtien organization, a large percentage of them being raw young recruits. Opposing them were the 1st Shansi Army under Shang Chen and the 5th Division under Liu Tse-sheng. Immediately after the first clash occurred to the west of Kalgan the Fengtien military authorities began to rush troops to the support of Kao Wei-yueh. The 6th Army, under Chang Tso-shang, Tupan of Heilungkiang; the 12th Army, Kirin troops, but placed for this campaign under the command of Tang Yu-lin, Tutung of Jehol; and part of Wan Fu-lin's 8th Army were sent up the Peking-Suiyuan Railway line. Most of these troops were in position by the 4th of October, but the main body was not sent beyond Huailai, as it was apparent that Kalgan would be difficult to defend. Chang Tso-chang was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces operating against Shansi in the north.

2. The fighting around Chaikoupu was not of a serious nature, and Kao Wei-yueh's 9th Army probably would have had no difficulty in delaying the Shansi advance from the west, but Shansi cavalry under Tan Ching-lin marched south from Tienchen on the Peking Suiyuan line, to Sining, from which point they advanced northwest to Huaian and threatened the flank of the Fengtien forces in Suanhua, thus making a withdrawal from Kalgan imperative. The city was occupied by the Shansi 5th Division on the afternoon of October 3rd.

3. By October 5th the main body of the Fengtien forces had developed along a defensive position just east of Hwailai, with advance elements at Hsiahwayuan (the first station east of Suanhwa). Fengtien headquarters were established at Kangchuang on the 7th. The same day, Tang Yu-lin, with the 12th Army (Kirin troops) pushed up the railroad to a point within 10 li of Suanhwa, where he was ordered to cease his advance.

4. Tang Ching-lin's Shansi cavalry, continuing their advance from south of the Kin Sui line, were reported near Hsinpaoan (halfway between Huailai and Suanhwa) on the 6th. They also occupied positions on the high ground near Shacheng, just west of Huailai.

5. Since about the 8th of October, the Fengtien troops on the Kin Sui have maintained a defensive attitude, confining their activities to skirmishing in front of their defensive position east of Huailai.

6. On the Kin Han line, hostilities opened shortly after midnight on September 29th, when skirmishes took place between Shihkiachuang and Chengting between the advance guards of the Shansi 3rd Army under Hsu Yung-chang (ex-Kuominchun 2nd Army) and troops of the Fengtien 3rd and 4th Army Group. Later in the day serious fighting occurred on the north

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Subject: Initial Operations in Shansi-Fengtien War.

bank of the Pute River (between Shihkiachuang and Chengting) when the Fengtien 15h Army engaged the Shansi 3rd Army, which by that time had been reinforced by the 2nd Army which had come up from Huailu. On the 30th Shansi plain clothes troops succeeded in getting in rear of the Fengtien Army and blew up the railroad line at Hsinan (first station north of C hengting). The 15th Army immediately evacuated Chengting, and, after burning or abandoning large amounts of rolling stock and supplies which they were not able to take with them, fell back to Hsinlo, which point they reached on the evening of the 2nd of October. At Hsinlo, the 16th and 17th Fengtien armies were entrenched on the north side of the Sha River, with the 10th Army in rear in the vicinity of Kuyang, defending the Lunchuankuan pass to the west. The Shansi forces attacked the position at Hsinlo with great vigor and on the 5th the Fengtien troops were driven back to Wangtu. At the same time the 10th Army retreated from Kuyang, thus permitting Shansi reinforcements to come in by way of Lunchuankuan. The fighting continued unfavorable to the Fengtien forces on the 6th and 7th, and at one time they were forced back to a point within 10 li of Paotingfu. This was the highwater mark of the Shansi advance.

7. Up to this time the Fengtien high command had attributed the reverses on the Kin Han entirely to the fact that the initial Shansi attack came as a complete surprise. While units were moving into their previously designated positions, the enemy attack had been enexpectedly fierce, necessitating temporary withdrawals along the whole front. By the 8th of October, however, the Fengtien concentration was completed, and with the enemy, far from his base, committed to the attack of a carefully prepared position, the opportune moment had arrived for assuming the offensive.

8. Early in the morning of the 8th of October, the Fengtien forces were disposed on a line running approximately northwest-southeast through Wangtu with the 10th Army on the right, the 16th in the center, and the 17th on the left. The 29th Army, in reserve, was in the Kaoyang area. When the Shansi forces, numbering 35,000, were definitely involved in the attack, the 29th Army began a turning movement against the Shansi right flank, and moving south, captured Chichow the same day. The next day Tingchow was occupied, completing the turning movement. This cut off a large number of Shansi troops north of Tingchow, forcing them to retreat off the railroad to the west. At Tingchow the 29th Army was joined by the 16th and 17th, which had been pushing south down the railroad while the 29th was turning the Shansi flank. These three armies are now continuing their drive down the Kin Han. Hsinlo was taken on the 11th and the report of the fall of Chengting is expected at any time, as this position is now menaced not only from the front but from the flank by the 10th Fengtien Army which had advanced south to the west of the railroad line.

9. To meet the turning movement of the 29th Army around their right flank, two Shansi brigades were dispatched from Shihkiachuang. These forces attempted to turn the left flank of the 29th Army, but the Fengtien high command had anticipated such a maneuver by ordering two divisions of the 11th Army to move southwest from Tsangchow, on the Tientsin-Pukow

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railway, toward Shihkiachuang. The two forces met at Jaoyang on the 9th and the Fengtien troops, reinforced by part of the 14th Chihli-Shantung Army from the neighborhood of Tsingho, succeeded in driving back the two Shansi brigades, and by ~~capturing~~ the 11th were threatening Shihkiachuang.

10. Fengtien headquarters in Peking announce that it is now planned to invade Shansi by two routes, one by way of the Chengtai Railway, and the other overland from Huailai to Tatung. For the present no attempt is to be made to recapture Kalgan. It is reported that a Shansi brigade commander stationed in the vicinity of Yenmenkuan, a pass of great strategic importance to the south of Tatung, has revolted against Yen Hsi-shan and desires to join with Fengtien. If this is the case, it would make the task of forcing a way into Shansi by way of the Tatung-Taiyuanfu motor road an easier one.

11. To guard against an invasion of Chihli from the direction of Tzechingkuan (west of Liangkochuang), part of the 8th Army occupied this position on the 8th of October. Previous to this time, however, Shansi troops to the number of about 1,000 had already filtered through, and on the 9th and 10th this force was reported as having made sporadic and ineffectual raids on Ichow and other points as far north as Mentoukow (15 miles due west of Peking), giving rise in Peking to sensational rumors of the near approach of Shansi troops.

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1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces. . . . . Chang Tso-lin

5th	Army	(Tsang Yu-lin) Jehol area	20,000
6th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) Kirin and Peking-Suiyuan line	10,000
7th	"	(Hsing Shih-liem) Peking Garrison	15,000
8th	"	(Wan Fu-lin) Peking Suiyuan R.R. and Liangkochuang area	18,000
9th	"	(Kao Wei-yueh) Peking-Suiyuan to west of Kalgan	15,000
10th	"	(Wang Shu-cheng) Tingshow and west . . .	15,000
11th	"	(Chao En-chen) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang.	12,000
12th	"	(Kirin troops under Tang Yu-lin) Peking-Suiyuan line to Kalgan	15,000
15th	"	(Chi Chin-chun) Chengting and west. . . .	15,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun) Chengting area	17,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen) " "	16,000
29th	"	(Chi Yi-chiao).	8,000
34th	"	(Yu Chi-shan) Peking area . . . . . (recently formed out of a division of the 6th Army)	10,000
Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall			30,000
Peking-Mukden R. R. to Shanhaikuan.			10,000
			226,000

Note: Reduction in numbers of various units since last report due to estimated battle losses. Three Eastern Provinces strength reduced 10,000 because of reinforcements sent within Wall.

Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh) 8,000

Total 234,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

Chihli, Shantung, Northern Kiangsu and Eastern Honan 120,000

Increased 20,000 by addition of Honan forces gone over to Chihli-Shantung Army.

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces

Anhui and Kiangsi. 50,000

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN. 404,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7147 October 24, 1927

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(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT.

1st Army	(Ho Ying-chin)		18,000
6th "	(Cheng Chien)		2,000
7th "	(Li Tsung-jen)		17,000
14th "	(Lai Shih-huang)		15,000
17th "	(Tsao Wan-shun)		12,000
19th "	(Li Tsung-jen)		10,000
26th "	(" ")		8,000
27th "	(Wang Pu)		5,000
31st "	(Pai Chung-hsi)		13,000
33rd "	(Po Wen-wei)		18,000
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)		14,000
40th "	(Ho Yüeh-tsu)		8,000
44th "	(Yeh Kai-shun)		8,000
		Total	140,000

(c) ARMIES IN SOUTHERN PROVINCES.

4th Army	(part - Huang Chi-hsiang)	Under Cheng	12,000
11th "	(Chu Hsi-jih)	Fa-kuei	13,000
		Total	25,000

(Increased 5,000 because of incorporation of troops of former 5th Army)

4th Army	(part - Li Chi-shen)	Under Li Chi-	10,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)	shen	20,000
		Total	30,000

(Decreased 10,000 because of disbanding of 5th Army)

TOTAL . . . 55,000

(d) TANG SHENG-CHIH

2nd Army	(Liu Ti-ping)	10,000
3rd "	(Chu Pei-te)	12,000
8th "	(Li Pin-hsien)	2 5000
12th "	(Yuan Tsu-ming)	8,000
13th "	(Chen Ming-shu)	10,000
15th "	( )	10,000
35th "	(Ho Chien)	13,000
36th "	(Liu Hsing)	12,000
Central Ind. Division	(Hou Lien-ying)	7,000
	TOTAL . .	107,000

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(e) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total forces 80,000

(Decreased 20,000 by disaffection of Liu Chen-hua and estimated battle losses)

(f) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd Army (Yang Ai-yuan) Huailu area and north to Fuping.
3rd " (Hsü Yung-chang) Huailu and north.
4th " (Fu T'sun-huai) Talungmen and west.
5th " (Fu Ju-chün) Chengtai R.R.
6th " (Feng Yü-tang) " "
1st " (Shang Chen) Tatung area
7th " (Cheng Chin-wu) Kin Sui line west of Kalgan.
8th " (Tan Ching-lin) Tsechingkuan area and Kin Sui Ry.
9th " (Cheng Tse-sheng) Kin Sui line west of Kalgan.
10th " (Li Wei-hsin) Suiyuan area.

TOTAL . . . 90,000

Strength of individual Shansi armies not known. Total decreased 10,000 due to recent losses. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

(g) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	305,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese "	40,000
Shensi "	70,000
Honanese "	75,000

2. Paotingfu-Shihkiachuang area.

At the time of the submission of the last Situation Report, the first engagements of the Fengtien-Shansi war were just taking place. For a detailed account of the early stages of the conflict, see Report No. 7143 - "Initial Operations in Shansi-Fengtien War". On the Kin Han railroad, the 16th, 17th and 29th Armies, after reorganizing at Tingchow, continued to push south, capturing Shihkiachuang on the 16th. Previous to this date, the 6th Fengtien Cavalry Division and the 14th Chihli-Shantung Army were both reported to have forced their way into Shihkiachuang, but the city did not fall entirely into Fengtien hands until the date mentioned above. After being driven off the railroad and out of Shihkiachuang, the Shansi forces, consisting of the 2nd Army (Yang Ai-yuan), 3rd Army (Hsu Yung-chang) and the 6th Division (Sun Chu), retired to a general line running approximately from Huailu north through Pingshan to Fuping (not on postal map, at 114 degrees 10 minutes-38 degrees 80 minutes). The Fengtien 10th 15th and 29th Armies are now engaged in attacking this line.

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3. Along the Kin Sui Railway.

On the Kin Sui railway the Fengtien operations have also been successful. Tang Yu-lin, who had advanced with the 12th Army from Husailu to a point within 10 li of Suanhua on the 7th of October, captured the latter position on the 10th. On the 14th he occupied Shalingtze (on the Kin Sui line halfway between Suanhwa and Kalgan), and on the 15th his 22nd Division entered Kalgan, which had been evacuated the day before by the Shansi troops under Chang Ching-wu. On the 16th, Kao Wei-yueh, Tutung of Chahar, and commander of the 9th Army, returned to Kalgan with his troops and staff and resumed the duties of his office. The 15th Kirin Division has now been sent west of Kalgan to attack the Shansi troops who have established a defensive position near Shaikowpu. The Fengtien 9th and 12th Armies meanwhile are reorganizing in Kalgan. South of the Kin Sui line Fengtien troops have pushed westward toward the Shansi border. On the 14th Fengtien cavalry was attacking in the vicinity of Hwaiyuan.

4. Raiding Operations Directed on Peking.

In spite of the presence of the 11th Division, 8th Fengtien Army, in the Tzechingkuan area (immediately to the west of Liangkochuang), considerable numbers of Shansi troops have succeeded in getting into Chihli from this region, as well as through passes further to the north. The mission of these forces was to cut the Kin Han railroad in rear of the Fengtien armies engaged south of Paoting. In spite of the defeat of the Shansi main body on the Peking-Hankow line, these troops, which are not believed to be more than a few thousand in number, have been active in the vicinity of Peking. On October 11th, a Shansi force composed principally of cavalry with some mountain guns, descended suddenly from the vicinity of Laishui upon Chochow, which at that time was held by only a small Fengtien garrison, and captured the city. On the 12th a force from Peking drove out the Shansi raiders and retook the position, but on the 14th the Shansi troops, who had merely retired to the vicinity of Toutien, a town a few miles north of Chochow, again returned and Chochow changed hands once more. Since that time the 34th Fengtien Army, under Yu Chih-shan, and a considerable force of artillery have been dispatched from Peking to attack the place from the north, while from the Paoting area, Chang Hsueh-liang has sent his bodyguard division under An Hsi-ku to invest the city from the south, but so far the combined efforts of these troops have not been sufficient to drive out the Shansi forces. It is believed that a determined Fengtien attack could easily capture Chochow, but it appears that Fengtien leaders are anxious to use as little force as possible in occupying the place in order to minimize the suffering of the civil population. The artillery action at Chochow is often audible from Peking.

Another flying column of Shansi troops from the Laishui area advanced northward toward Mentoukow (15 miles due west of Peking), appearing to the west of this place about the 12th of October. General Wang Chi, commanding the troops of the Metropolitan area, which includes Peking and a considerable number of small towns outside the walls of the capital, immediately despatched troops over the small branch railroad which runs to Mentoukou, and after several days of fighting the Shansi forces retreated to the west. It was at this time that the sound of firing could be heard

in the western part of Peking, giving rise to many wild rumors of the near approach of enemy forces. The attack on Mentoukou also caused considerable anxiety to Fengtien headquarters because at Sanchiatien, a nearby village, there is a large ammunition dump. At Talungmen (gate in the Great Wall due west of Peking) other Shansi troops have also entered Chihli, and are now operating in the mountainous country south of the Hun River. About the 14th, Shansi plain clothes troops and local bandits, said to be disbanded Kuominchun soldiers, captured Miyunhsien on the Peking-Jehol motor road. These forces are said to have come in through Kupeikow after having marched around by way of Dolonor. Miyunhsien was soon recaptured by troops of the 9th Fengtien Army under Tou Lien-fang, but on the 19th the irregular forces again appeared and after being driven off some are reported to have moved toward Kupeikow in an attempt to cut the Fengtien line of communication with Jehol, while others have occupied Yutien to the east of Peking.

5. Advance Against Feng Along the Lung Hai.

During the early stages of the Fengtien-Shansi war, some military observers expressed doubt as to whether Chang Tsung-chang would come to the support of the Chang Tso-lin armies by attacking Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan. On the 12th of October, however, the Shantung Tupan issued an order for a general offensive against the Kuominchun. After concentrating a large force, composed principally of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th and 13th Armies, in the vicinity of Tangshan, an advance west over the Lunghai was begun. Mamutsi was captured on the 13th, Kueiteh on the 17th, Kaocheng on the 21st, and Lanfeng on the 22nd. The Chihli-Shantung forces were aided in this operation by the disaffection of Liu Chen-hua, a Honan Ally of Feng's stationed in the vicinity of Kueiteh. Liu, after incorporating into his command some of Chin Yun-ao's remnants which had retreated into eastern Honan after Chin's defeat (described in the last situation report), threw his support to Chang Tsung-chang, thus weakening Feng's position on the Lung Hai. The effectiveness of the Chihli-Shantung attack on Kueiteh may be judged from the fact that General Cheng Chin-sheng, one of the principal Kuominchun generals in eastern Honan, was captured during the fighting. It now appears likely that Feng must soon abandon Kaifeng, and possibly Chengchow, since he is hard pushed not only on the Lung Hai but the 14th Chihli Shantung Army is now moving down the Kin Han from Shihkiachuang to attack him. This force took Changte on about the 18th of October and is now reported advancing on Sinsiang.

On the 13th of October, Feng Yu-hsiang sent a considerable force, estimated at around seven thousand, from Chengchow across the Yellow River into Shansi by way of the Kin Han and Taoching railways. These troops are reported to have proceeded to Taochow. Feng's purpose in this maneuver is not clear, but that Yen Hsi-shan regards the move with suspicion is evident from the fact that the 8th Shansi Division has been sent from Luan to the vicinity of Taohow.

6. Nanking Attacks Hankow.

After a period of comparative quiet, the Yangtze River has again become the scene of military activity. On the 18th of October, a clash occurred at Wuhu between the troops of the 6th Army, supporting the Nanking Government, and those of the 36th Army belonging to Tang Sheng-chih. On the 19th the 36th Army, under General Liu Hsing, withdrew from Wuhu to Anking.

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On the 20th the Nanking Government issued a proclamation denouncing Tang Sheng-chih and appointing Cheng Chien, commander of the 6th Army, to head a punitive expedition against him. In addition to the 6th Army, the 7th and 37th have already been sent to Wuhu and detachments of the 26th and 44th are reported to be under orders to proceed to that point.

7. Along the Tsin Pu Railway.

The Nanking Government has also declared its intention of initiating a new drive up the Tientsin-Pukow railway. On the 19th a force of about 15,000, composed of the 19th Army, recently organized out of the old 2nd Central Division, and part of the 44th Army, was sent across the river from Nanking to Pukow, but as yet these troops have not advanced any distance north.

It is believed that Sun Chuan-fang, now that the Chihli-Shantung armies are concentrating all efforts on the drive against Feng Yu-hsiang and are withdrawing troops from the areas in Sun's rear, will be forced to shorten his line on the Tientsin-Pukow. Already he has withdrawn his forces from Mingkuang, which has been his front line position for some weeks. On the 20th, however, his main body was reported as still at Pengpu, with a defensive position being organized in rear at Suchow.

8. Canton and Fukien.

Chang Fa-kuei's troops entered Canton on September 30th and disarmed a part of the 5th Army (Li Fu-lin) garrisoned there. Other 5th Army troops returning from Eastern Kwangtung, where they had been engaged with communist forces in and around Swatow, were disarmed at Tungti by Chang Fa-kuei's men. In Canton relations between Chang and Li Chi-shen are very strained, but as yet no armed conflict has occurred between the two leaders, both of whom were given places on the newly appointed Provincial Military Affairs Committee.

Five regiments of the 11th Army (under control of Chang Fa-kuei) entered Foochow, capital of Fukien, on the 13th. General Chiang Kuang-ting, second in command of the 11th Army and commander of the invading force, immediately disarmed the forces of General Tan Shu-ching, a former subordinate of Ho Ying-chin's who had been in power in Foochow for the past nine months. General Tan himself was placed under strict surveillance. The significance of this movement is not yet understood, but Chang Fa-kuei must be considered predominant in Fukien for the moment.

The communistic forces of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, who were driven out of Swatow on September 27th, have been either disarmed or scattered, and the city is now completely under the control of the Canton Government.

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CHINA (Military)

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1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The 3rd and 4th Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun)

8th	Army	(Wan Fu-lin) Chochow and Lisangkochuang areas.	18,000
9th	"	(Kao Wei-yueh) Kin-Sui line	15,000
10th	"	(Wang Shu-chang) Fuping area	15,000
11th	"	(Liu Wei) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang	12,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun) west of Shihkiachuang	17,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen) " " "	16,000
29th	"	(Chi Yi-chiao) Shihkiachuang area	8,000
15th	"	(Chi Chin-chun) " "	15,000

The 5th Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang.)

12th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Kin-Sui line	15,000
30th	"	(Yu Chih-shan)	18,000
6th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) Kin-Sui line	17,000
5th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area.	20,000

(Forces not Included in the Above)

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall	80,000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan.	10,000
Total.....	276,000

Changes since last report:

7th Army disbanded, strength divided between 6th and 30th Armies.
Strength of forces in Three Eastern Provinces increased by 50,000 as recent reports indicate previous figures as too low.

Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh) 8,000

Chihli Shantung Forces (2nd Army Group). . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

1st	Army	(Chang Tsung-chang) Tsinan area
7th	"	(Hsu Kum) Hsuchow area
11th	"	(Chang Tsung-fu) Hsuchow area
12th	"	(Ma Yu-jen) Hsuchow area.
14th	"	(Sun Kuei-yuan) Kinhan south of Shihkiachuang.

From M/A, China Report No. 7156 November 8, 1927

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17th Army	(Chu Tung-feng) Hsuchow area		
2nd "	(Chang Ching-yao) Lunghai railway		
3rd "	(Chang Kuo-jui) Lunghai railway		
5th "	(Fang Yung-chang) " "		
6th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan) " "		
10th "	(Tu Feng-chu) " "		
13th "	(Liu Chih-lu) " "		
20th "	(Li Tsao-lin) " "		
24th "	(Pan Hung-chun) " "		
		Total	120,000

(Strength of individual armies not known)

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces (1st Army Group)

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)		
2nd "	(Cheng Chun-yen)		
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)		
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)		
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)		
		Total	50,000

(Strength of individual armies not known)

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN 454,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

1st Army	(He Ying-chin)		18,000
14th "	(Lai Shih-huang)		15,000
17th "	(Tsao Wen-shun)		12,000
26th "	(Wu Wen-yuan)		8,000
27th "	(Wang Pu)		5,000
31st "	(Pai Chung-hsi)		13,000
33rd "	(Po Wen-yu)		18,000
40th "	(He Yueh-tsu)		8,000
2nd "	(Lu Ti-ping)		10,000
3rd "	(Chu Pei-teh)		12,000
6th "	(C heng Chien)		3,000
7th "	(Li Tsung-jen)	Engaged against	17,000
19th "	(Hu Tsung-te)	Tang Sheng-chih	10,000
13th "	(Chen Chia-yu)		10,000
	(newly organized)		
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)		14,000
44th "	(Yeh Kai-hsin)		8,000
		Total	181,000

Note: The 3rd Army is nominally neutral but seems to be leaning toward the Nanking Government.

Szechuan Ally . . . . . Yang Sen 90,000

TOTAL NANKING GOVERNMENT FORCES..... 271,000

Strength increased 122,000 because of addition of 2nd, 3rd, 13th armies, and Yang Sen.

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(c) ARMIES IN SOUTHERN PROVINCES

4th Army (part - Huang Chi-hsiang)	12,000	
11th " (Chu Huai-jih)	13,000	
Total		25,000
4th " (part - Li Chi-shen)	10,000	
5th " (Li Fu-lin)	5,000	
16th " (Fan Shih-sheng)	20,000	
Total		35,000

Increased 5,000 because later reports indicate 5th Army was not entirely disbanded.

(d) TANG SHENG-CHIH

8th Army (Li Pin-hsien)	25,000	
15th "	10,000	
35th " (Ho Chien)	13,000	
36th " (Liu Hsing)	12,000	
Central Ind. Division (Hou Lien-ying)	7,000	
Hupeh Provincial troops and miscellaneous forces	20,000	
Total		87,000

Decreased 20,000 since last report because 2nd, 3rd and 13th Armies are now carried under Nanking Government. The 12th Army has ceased to exist, its troops being re-organized into other forces.

(e) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 80,000

(f) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd Army (Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu area	
3rd " (Hsü Yung-chang)	Huailu and north	
4th " (Fu T'sun-huai)	Talungmen and west	
5th " (Fu Ju-chün)	Chengtai R.R.	
6th " (Feng Yü-tang)	" "	
8th " (Tan Ching-lin)	Tzechingkuan area	
1st " (Shang Chen)	Suiyuan area.	
7th " (Chang Chin-wu)	" "	
9th " (Cheng Tso-sheng)	" "	
10th " (Li Wei-hsin)	" "	
Total		90,000

Strength of individual Shansi armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

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(g) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	210,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Henanese	75,000

Decreased 90,000 because Yang Sen's forces are credited to the side of the Nanking Government.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

Northwestern Front. The last report found the main body of the Fengtien 9th and 12th Armies resting and reorganizing in Kalgan after the capture of this place on October 15th, with advance elements of these two commands attacking toward Chaikoupu, where Shansi troops had established a defensive position. On the 26th of October, Shansi forces counterattacked toward Kalgan from the Chaikoupu area, but Fengtien met this movement with an even more vigorous push to the west. Chaikoupu was taken by the Ankuochun on October 28th, and Chang Tso-lin's troops then advanced to other points to the west of Kalgan on the Kin-Sui, apparently meeting with very little resistance. Tienchen fell on the 30th of October, Yangkao on the 1st of November, and on November 3rd the 9th Army captured Tatung, while the 12th Army took Huaijen the same day. The 9th Army has continued its advance over the Kin-Sui, and is now reported engaged with the Shansi forces in the vicinity of Pingtichuan (unnamed point on postal map between Fengchen and Kueihwa). The main body of the Shansi troops has now withdrawn to Yenmenkuan, an important pass on the Great Wall just northwest of Taichow, Shansi.

While the 9th and 12th Armies were advancing westward from Kalgan, the 30th Army, composed entirely of Kirin troops, was operating to the South of the Kin-Sui line. This organization took Hwaian on the 30th of October, and continuing its push west, captured Yuchow on the 3rd and Kwangling on the morning of the 5th. Directly south of Kwangling is Lingchiu (unnamed point on postal map south of Kwangling and connected to it by a ray). This place is now being attacked by the 8th Fengtien Army, which has been stationed in the area Liangkochuang and west since about the 8th of October. West of Lingchiu there is a pass through the Great Wall at Pingchingkuan (not shown on postal map); hence if the 8th Army can take Lingchiu, the vital Shansi position at Yenmenkuan will be seriously menaced.

Operations near Peking. Chochow is still held by 2700 Shansi troops, in spite of the combined efforts of a part of the 8th Army, one regiment of the 30th Army, a division of Chang Tso-lin's bodyguard troops, and a large force of artillery - totaling 20,000 men. Various reasons are given for the Fengtien failure to take Chochow, a very specious one being that Shansi columns have come in from the west from time to time and attacked the beseigers, but the general opinion is that the Shansi garrison

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is able to hold out chiefly on account of its own stubborn resistance, and not because of any aid they have received from outside the city. The continued occupation of Chochow by Shansi troops has, however, very little bearing upon the general military situation, and in any event the fall of the place cannot be far off.

The large bodies of Shansi raiders which have been operating west of Mentoukou (15 miles due west of Peking) are now reported to have been driven back to the Shansi border by forces under General Wang Chi, commandant of the Peking Metropolitan Garrison. General Wang has been assisted in this operation by a regiment of Russian troops from Chang Tsung-chang's army.

Other bands stated to be composed of a mixture of Shansi cavalry, plain clothes troops, with a sprinkling of local banditti, have recently appeared to the east of Peking, and have extorted sums of money from towns and villages in the general vicinity of Yuhsien and Sanhohsien, and even as far east as Lwanchow. These irregular forces now appear to have been driven into the mountains near Kihsien, and nothing has been heard of them during the past week.

Paotingfu-Shihkiachuang Area. Since the time of the last report there has been little military activity on the Kin-Han line between Paotingfu and Shihkiachuang. To the west of the railroad, Fuping, which the last situation report stated was being attacked by the 10th Fengtien Army, was actually taken on the 22nd of October, but the news did not reach Peking until three days later. Around Husilu there has been little change in the relative positions of the Fengtien and Shansi armies. On the 28th October the 16th and 17th Armies were entrenched about a mile east of Husilu. On the 31st of October, the Shansi forces in this locality attacked vigorously toward Shihkiachuang, but the push was successfully resisted by the 15th, 16th and 17th Fengtien Armies, and the positions of the opposing forces remains about the same as before the attack.

The War in Honan. The advance of the Chihli-Shantung armies over the Lunghai, which was progressing so favorably at the time of the last report now appears, if not to have met with overwhelming disaster, to have at least suffered a very severe defeat. For a time it seemed likely that Chang Tsung-chang's forces would take Chengchow, and on the 26th of October it was reported that Feng was preparing to withdraw his forces to Honanfu. Kaifeng was reported taken on October 28th, and on the 30th the Kuominchun was very hard pressed in the vicinity of Chengmow. On the 1st of November, however, Feng Yu-hsiang threw in his best troops, including some portions of his old 1st Kuominchun, for a counter-attack. Lu Chung-lin took charge of the fighting on the Lunghai, establishing his post of command at Kaifeng, which it then developed had never been entirely cleared of Feng's troops. Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san with the 10th and 8th Kuominchun armies respectively then simultaneously attacked the enemy left under Chang Ching-yao, commanding the 2nd Chihli-Shantung army. Chang gave way, allowing the Kuominchun to threaten the rear of Chang Tsung-chang's forces along the railway line, and precipitated a general retreat toward Kueiteh, at which point heavy fighting is now in progress, with the issue still in doubt. On November 7th it was reported that Chihli-Shantung forces had resumed the offense, but no confirmation of any advance beyond Kueiteh has as yet been received.

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Besides the failure of the left flank under Chang Ching-yao, a further cause of the Chihli-Shantung debacle was due to the treachery, if such it may be called, of Lin Chen-hua, a former Kuominchun ally who having gone over to Chang Tsung-chang and been incorporated into his forces, was engaged with the Kuominchun near Lanfeng. His troops, when Feng initiated his counter attack, suddenly attacked the rear of the Chihli-Shantung 3rd Army. At the same time Kuominchun cavalry appeared near the railroad line at a point between L anfeng and Kueiteh, completing Chang Tsung-chang's rout.

Whereas the threat to Chengchow by way of the Lunghai is temporarily removed, to the north, the 14th Chihli-Shantung Army has continued its progress down the Kin-Han from Shihkiachuang, and after taking Weihwei on about the 1st of November, is now reported preparing to cross the Yellow River, the north bank of which is believed to be cleared of Kuominchun troops.

Situation on Tientsin-Pukow Line. Concurrent with its drive against Tang Sheng-chih, the Nanking government has announced its intention of pushing up the Tientsin Pukow line toward Pengpu, and has appointed He Ying-chin to command the expedition. He is reported to have crossed the Yangtze on the 4th of November, but as yet has made no active demonstration against Sun C huan-fang, who still holds the general line of the Hwai River, with concentrations at Suchow, Mengcheng, Hwaiyuan, Fengyang, Tingyuan, and Mingkuang. The initiative in this theatre of the war seems actually to have been taken by Sun C huan-fang, who on the 7th of November was reported attacking south in the vicinity of Changpaling. He Ying-chin has established his headquarters at Chuchow and fighting on the Tientsin-Pukow line may reasonably be expected in the near future.

The Nanking-Hankow War. Tang Sheng-chih, who began to retreat up the Yangtze before the forces of the Nanking Government on the 19th of October, has continued to withdraw his troops toward Hankow, and his main forces, consisting of the 35th and 36th Armies, are now concentrated in the Wusueh-Hwangmei area. The Nanking troops sent against Tang Sheng-chih number about 70,000 men, and include the 6th, 7th, 19th, 37th and 44th Armies. The 7th Army, under Li Tsung-jen, occupied Anking on October 27th, after the city had first been entered by marines under Yang Shu-chuang. The anti-Tang forces reached Hwayang on the 28th of October and Hukow on the 31st.

The 6th and 7th Armies, after concentrating in the Kiukiang area, attacked toward Wusueh and Hwangmei, which two points they captured on November 7th, apparently with little difficulty. The Wuhan forces are now falling back toward Hwangchow. Rumors are current that Ho Chien, commanding the 35th Army, is wavering to the support of Nanking. The Nanking Government has been trying for some time to enlist the support of Chu Pei-teh, who now controls Kiangsi, and whose troops are concentrated at Kiukiang, Juichang, and other points in the northern part of the province. On November 9th, a report, which still lacks definite confirmation, was received to the effect that the forces of Chu Pei-teh, together with a part of the 6th Army, were advancing on the Canton-Hankow railroad line, by way of Wuning and Ining.

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Tang Sheng-chih has also had his troubles above Hankow. On October 25th his forces clashed with the 2nd Kuomintang Army, which supports Nanking, and has been stationed at Ichang. The 2nd Army evacuated Ichang on the 31st of October, moving northward to the vicinity of Tangyang. Tang Sheng-chih has sent forces to this area and on the 7th of November was reported as driving the 2nd Army northwards towards Kingmen.

The departure of the 2nd Army from Ichang did not improve Tang Sheng-chih's position on the Yangtze to any great extent, for soon after the Nanking troops had left the city, it was taken over by the Szechuan forces of Yang Sen, who arrived on the 3rd of November. Yang Sen's men are in a position seriously to threaten Hankow, although the Szechuan general's intention in seizing Ichang may be only to secure for himself territory in Western Hupeh.

Situation in Kwangtung and Fukien. On October 25th, it was reported that Li Chi-shen, who now appears on the ascendancy in Canton in spite of the more or less open friction between him and Chang Fa-kuei, had decided to send an expedition into Hunan to attack Tang Sheng-chih. On October 27th, 20,000 Cantonese troops were reported concentrated at Shiuchow preparatory to moving north. The next day, however, these forces were ordered by Li Chi-shen to return to Canton, and the northern expedition was apparently abandoned. The political activities of Wang Ching-wei have probably forestalled the project to attack Tang, since Wang has definitely denied any antagonism to the Hankow branch of the Kuomintang party.

While the situation in Fukien remains perplexing, it now appears that the 11th Army, which was believed to be under the control of Chang Fa-kuei at the time it appeared in Foochow on October 13th and disarmed the forces of General Tan Shu-ching, was probably invited to enter the city by the Fukien Navy party. This faction has been in conflict with Tan Shu-ching for some time and was undoubtedly willing to adopt almost any expedient to get rid of him. If this is the case, the Navy party now has another problem on their hands to devise a means of ridding Foochow of the 11th Army, which it appears is firmly established there, in spite of the fact that its leaders have recently declared that they are only resting in the city preparatory to moving on to Kwangtung.

Tan Shu-ching, whose troops are known as "The Newly Enrolled Army", also has forces stationed at other points in Fukien, notably Hueian and Chuanchow. It is reported that the leaders of the troops at these points are now showing a disposition to unite with the Navy party.

Chen Ming-shu, who nominally commands the 11th Army, but who has been in Japan for some time, arrived in Foochow on the 3rd of November and immediately took charge of his forces in that place. Chen has been in very close touch with Chiang Kai-shek, and should the latter attempt a return to power, the 11th Army will probably support him.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The 3rd and 4th Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun)

8th	Army	(Wan Fu-lin) Chochow and Liangkochuang areas.	18,000
9th	"	(Kao Wei-yueh) Kin-Sui line	15,000
10th	"	(Wang Shu-chang) Fuping area.	15,000
11th	"	(Liu Wei) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang.	12,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun) west of Shihkiachuang	17,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen) " " "	16,000
29th	"	(Chi Yi-chiao) Paoting area	8,000
15th	"	(Chi Chin-chun) " "	15,000

The 5th Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

12th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Kin-Sui line	15,000
30th	"	(Yu Chih-shan) Shansi (east of Taichow) .	18,000
6th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) Kin-Sui line	17,000
5th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area.	20,000

(Forces not Included in the Above)

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall	80,000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan.	10,000
Total	276,000

Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh) 8,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces (2nd Army Group). . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

1st	Army	(Chang Tsung-chang) Tsinan area
7th	"	(Hsu Kun) Hsuchow area
11th	"	(Chang Tsung-fu) Hsuchow area
12th	"	(Ma Yu-jen) Hsuchow area.
14th	"	(Sun Kuei-yuan) Kinhan south of Shihkiachuang.
17th	"	(Chu Tung-feng) Hsuchow area
2nd	"	(Chang Ching-yao) L unghai railway
3rd	"	(Chang Kuo-jui) " "
5th	"	(Feng Yung-chang) " "
6th	"	(Hsu Yuan-chuan) " "
10th	"	(Tu Feng-chu) Tsining area.
13th	"	(Liu Chih-lu) " "
20th	"	(Li Tsao-lin) " "
24th	"	(Pan Hung-chun) " "

Total 110,000

(Strength of individual armies not known)
(Reduced 10,000 by battle losses)

From M/A, China Report No. 7166 November 22, 1927

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Subject: Situation Report.

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces (1st Army Group) Northern Anhui

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)	
2nd "	(Cheng Chün-yen)	
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)	
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)	
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)	
	Total	50,000
(Strength of individual armies not known)		
	TOTAL ANKUOCHUN . . .	444,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

1st Army	(Liu Chih)	)	25,000
3rd "	(newly organized - Wang Chün)	Northern	15,000
18th "	(" " Yang Chieh)	Expedi-	10,000
31st "	(Pai Chung-hsi)	tion under	13,000
26th "	(Chen Che)	Ho Yung-	8,000
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu)	chin	8,000
14th "	(Lai Shih-huang)		15,000
17th "	(Tsao Wan-shun)		12,000
33rd "	(Po Wen-yu)		18,000
1st Central Independent Army (formerly 27th Army)			5,000
2nd Army	(Lu Ti-ping)		10,000
6th "	(Cheng Chien)		12,000
7th "	(Hsia Wei)		17,000
10th "	(newly organized Hsia Tou-yin)	In occupation of Upper	15,000
13th "	(newly organized Chen Chua-yü)	Yangtze Valley	10,000
19th "	(Hu Tsung-to)		10,000
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)		14,000
44th "	(Yeh Kai-hsin)		8,000
3rd "	(Chu Pei-teh)	Under Chu Pei-teh.	20,000
9th "	(newly organized)	Nominally under Nanking Government.	10,000
		Total	255,000
Szechuan Ally - Yang Sen			90,000
		TOTAL NANKING GOVERNMENT FORCES.	345,000

Strength increased 74,000 by formation of new units.

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(c) ARMIES IN SOUTHERN PROVINCES

4th Army	(part - Huang Chi-hsiang)	Under Chang-	12,000	
11th "	(Chu Huai-jih)	Fu-kuei	13,000	
		Total		25,000
4th "	(part - Li Chi-shen)	Under Li	10,000	
5th "	(Li Fu-lin)	Chi-shen	5,000	
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)		20,000	
		Total		35,000

(d) HUNAN MILITARISTS

8th Army	(Li Pin-hsien)	25,000
15th "	(	10,000
35th "	(Ho Chien)	13,000
36th "	(Liu Hsing)	12,000
Central Ind. Division	(Hou Lien-ying)	7,000
Hupeh Provincial troops and miscellaneous forces		20,000
	Total	87,000

(e) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 30,000

(f) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . .Yen.Hsi-shan

2nd Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu area
3rd "	(Hsü Yung-chang)	Huailu and north
4th "	(Lu T'sun-huai)	Talungmen and west
5th "	(Fu Ju-chün)	Chengtai R.R.
6th "	(Feng Yü-tang)	" "
8th "	(Tan Ching-lin)	Tzechingkuan area
1st "	(Shang Chen)	Yenmenkuan area
7th "	(Chang Chin-wu)	" "
9th "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	" "
10th "	(Li Wei-hsin)	" "

Total 90,000

Strength of individual armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

(g) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	210,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Honanese	75,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

Fengtien-Shansi War. The last report stated that on the 9th of November the Fengtien 9th Army was engaged with Shansi forces near Pingtichuan (unnamed point on railway between Fengchen and Kueihua). Information received later disclosed that the Fengtien troops had actually advanced farther west at this time, as the 9th Army took Kueihua on the 9th and Paotou on the 10th. With the capture of Paotou, the entire Special Administrative District of Suiyuan fell into Fengtien hands, and on the 13th of November, Chi Chin-chun, Commander of the 15th Army, was appointed Tutung.

The Fengtien 9th and 12th Armies are now attacking toward Yenmenkuan from the north. At the present time they are reported to have reached Taiyueh (the unnamed point on the river west and slightly south of Yinchow, Shansi).

Shansi troops, under Shang Chen, are now concentrated at Taichow, immediately to the south of Yenmenkuan.

While the 9th and 12th Armies are preparing for a final attack on Yenmenkuan from the north, the 30th Army has already succeeded in forcing a passage through the Great Wall from the west. This organization, advancing south from Kwangling, took Lingchiu (unnamed point south of Kwangling and connected to it by a ray) on the 6th of November. It then turned west, capturing Pingchingkuan (point on Great Wall directly west of Kwangchang, Chihli) on the 12th of November. On the 20th the 30th Army was reported to have reached Tayingchen and to be advancing on Fanchihsien (both points on river east of Taichow, Shansi). Fan-Chihsien is reported to be held by the 14th Shansi Division under Li Fu-ying.

On the Kin Han line and to the west, there has been little activity since the last report. Shansi troops are reported to have captured Tzechingkuan (west of Liangkochuang) on about the 17th of November, and to have forced their way to the vicinity of Liangkochuang.

Lungchuankuan (on Shansi border west and slightly south of Paotingfu) was captured by a part of the 8th Fengtien Army on November 10th.

Chochow remains in Shansi hands. The siege of the city is now being conducted by General Wan Fu-lin, commander of the 8th Fengtien Army.

The War in Honan and Eastern Shantung. Chang Tsung-chang's losses in the operations on the Lunghai railroad described in the last report were very severe. The Kuominchun took 4,000 prisoners, of which 500 were Russians; four armored trains, 17 field guns, 100 trench mortars, and 10,000 rifles. Fortunately for him, however, Feng Yu-hsiang's ammunition does not fit these rifles.

From later and more detailed accounts of Feng's defeat on the Lunghai, it appears that at one time the Chihli-Shantung forces were driven back east of Tangshan to a point not far from Hsuchow. About the 12th of November, however, the Kuominchun advance was stopped, and on the

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13th Chang Tsung-chang's troops took Mamutsi, Yucheng, and Kueiteh railway station. The town of Kueiteh is reported to have been taken on the 18th, and since that date the center of hostilities has remained in this area.

Kuominchun troops from the Kaocheng area suddenly appeared near Tsaochow on the 10th of November, forcing Chihli-Shantung troops in this area to retreat toward Tsining, which point was in serious danger for several days. The 10th Shantung Army was immediately ordered to the area and drove Feng Yu-hsiang's troops back to the west. In addition the advance of Chang Tsung-chang's troops to the vicinity of Kueiteh has compelled the Kuominchun forces to the north of the Lunghai railway to withdraw to the eastward, and Tsaochow is now believed to be in Chihli-Shantung hands.

The 14th Chihli-Shantung Army, which in the last report was stated to be making preparations to cross the Yellow River near the Kin Han railway line, has been driven back toward the border of Chihli by Shensi troops under Yueh Wei-chun, which were ordered by Feng Yu-hsiang to proceed north from Sinyang, Honan, where they had been stationed, and across the river. The movement began on the 12th of November, and a few days later these Kuominchun allies occupied Sinsiang, thus removing, for the present at least, all danger of an attack on Chengchow from the north.

Situation on Tientsin-Pukow Line. Sun Chuan-fang, who at the time of the last report was thought to be taking the initiative on the Tsinpu line, has now been forced to abandon his defensive position on the Huai River, which he has held since early in September. Nanking Government forces under Ho Ying-chin took Linhuaikuan on the 14th of November. A few days later it was reported that Sun had counter-attacked and retaken this position, but the pressure against him from the south was too strong, and on the 19th he gave up Pengpu and withdrew to Kuchen where his main forces are now concentrated. On the 19th it was reported that the Kuomintang 1st, 3rd (newly organized) and 40th Armies had all arrived in Pengpu. Chang Tsung-chang has sent two divisions to reinforce Sun at Kuchen.

The Nanking-Hankow War. At the time of the last report the Wuhan forces, namely the 35th and 36th Armies under Ho Chien and Liu Hsing, respectively, were falling back on Hwangchow. On November 10th, the 7th and 10th Armies of the Nanking Government were attacking Hwangchow and Wuchang (East) by way of Tayeh; while the 19th, 37th and 44th Armies were pressing on Kichow. Farther south Cheng Chien with the 6th Army and the newly organized 13th Army were moving toward the Hupeh border from Juichang, Kiangsi; while the forces of Chu Pei-teh, who by this time had definitely aligned himself on the side of Nanking, were moving on Sienning by way of Wuning and Ihing.

On the 12th of November, Ho Chien suddenly returned to Hankow from the front and Tang Sheng-chih fled the city. The main body of the 8th Army, which was directly under Tang's command, retreated to Yochow. Ho Chian made no serious effort to defend the Wuhan cities and the 6th

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Army entered Wuchang on the 14th. Next day the troops of Hsia Tou-yin entered Hankow and Hanyang. By the 17th of November 50,000 Nanking Government forces were in Hankow. Cheng Chien arrived on the 18th and took over control of the Wuhan cities.

The old armies of Tang Sheng-chih have now withdrawn to Hunan; He Chien to Changteh, Liu Hsing to Changhsa, and Li Ping-hsien to Yochow. It is reported that after a few days rest Cheng Chien will move south from Hankow to attack these forces.

The Nanking military leaders are reported to have come to an agreement with Yang Sen, whose forces are now at Ichang, and the Szechuan leader is not expected to move on Wuhan.

Coup d'Etat in Canton. At the time of the last report, Li Chi-shen appeared to be gaining the ascendancy over his rival, Chang Fa-kuei, in Canton. On the 15th of November, General Li left Canton for Shanghai in order to attend the preparatory meeting for the conference of the Central Executive and Censors' Committees of the Kuomintang. Generals Huang Shao-hsiung, supporting Li Chi-shen; and Huang Chi-hsiang, adherent of Chang Fa-kuei, were left behind to look after affairs in Canton. On the evening of the 16th of November the forces of Huang Chi-hsiang, assisted by troops of Li Fu-lin's 5th Army and of the 2nd Division under Hsueh Yueh, disarmed the troops of Huang Shao-hsiung stationed in Canton. The cause of the outbreak was apparently the long standing jealousy between the Canton generals and the Kwangsi military leaders, whose power in Kwantung has been on the increase during the past half year, and more particularly the ambition of Chang Fa-kuei to dominate Canton. Very recently Huang Shao-hsiung has been believed to be massing his forces in Kwangtung for the purpose of ousting Chang Fa-kuei from Canton.

After disarming the troops of Huang Shao-hsiung in Canton, Huang Chi-hsiang proceeded to disarm other detachments at Humen and Kiangmen, near the capital; and then moved against Huang Shao-hsiung's forces stationed in the West and North River valleys. On the 21st of November a clash between the troops supporting Chang Fa-kuei and those of Li Chi-shen took place at Yingtak, the result of which is not known. In the West River valley, Chang Fa-kuei's troops have reached Samshui and the Kwangsi forces are retreating to the west.

In Eastern Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen has considerable garrisons at Swatow, Kaying, and Lungchen, and Chang Fa-kuei's troops may move against these in the near future.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 24 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The 3rd and 4th Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun)

8th	Army	(Wan Fu-lin) Chochow and Liangkochuang areas).	18,000
9th	"	(Kao Wei-yueh) Hunyuan area.	15,000
10th	"	(Wang Shu-chang) Lungchuankuan area. .	15,000
11th	"	(Liu Wei) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang	12,000
29th	"	(Chi Yi-chiao) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang	8,000
15th	"	(Chi Chin-chun) Shihchiachuang area. .	15,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun) Shihkiachuang and west . .	17,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen) " " " . .	16,000

The 5th Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

12th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Hunyuan area	15,000
30th	"	(Yu Chih-shen) Pingshingkuan area (east of Taichow	18,000
6th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) Hunyuan area . . .	17,000
5th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol area and Hunyuan area	20,000
Kirin Cavalry troops in Tehchow (Shantung) area			10,000

(Forces not Included in Above)

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall)	80,000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan	10,000
Total	286,000

Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh) 8,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces (2nd Army Group) . . . Chang Tsung-chang

1st	Army	(Chang Tsung-chang) Tsinan-Taian-Yenchow area. .	
3rd	"	(Chang Kou-jui) Tsinan-Taian-Yenchow area	
5th	"	(Feng Yung-chang) " " " "	
7th	"	(Hsu Kun) " " " "	
11th	"	(Chang Tsung-fu) " " " "	
12th	"	(Ma Yu-jen) " " " "	

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Chihli-Shantung Forces - cont'd.

17th Army	(Chu Tung-feng)	Tsinan-Taian-Yenchow area	
20th "	(Li Tsao-lin)	" " " "	
24th "	(Pan Hung-chun)	" " " "	
29th "		" " " "	
2nd "	(Chang Ching-yao)	Lincheng area	
6th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Lincheng area	
Honan Ally	(Yu Hsueh-chung)	" "	
10th Army	(Tu Feng-chu)	Tsining area	
13th "	(Liu Chih-lu)	" "	
14th "	(Sun Kuei-yuan)	Changte " (Kin-Hsn)	
		Total	100,000

(Strength of individual armies not known)
(Reduced 10,000 as result of recent fighting)

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces (1st Army Group) Lincheng-Hanchuang area.

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)		
2nd "	(Cheng Chun-yen)		
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)		
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)		
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)		
		Total	50,000

(Strength of individual armies not known)

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN 444,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

1st Army	(Liu Chih ")		25,000
3rd "	(newly organized - Wang Chun)		15,000
18th "	(" " - Yang C hieh)		10,000
26th "	(Chen Cho)	Northern	8,000
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu)		8,000
10th "	(Hsia Tou-yin)	Expedition	15,000
11th "	(newly organized)		
	Wang Tien-hsi)	under	10,000
14th "	(Lai Shih-huang)	Ho	15,000
17th "	(Tsao Wan-shun)	Ying-	12,000
33rd "	(Po Wen-yu)	chin	18,000
1st Central Independent Army (formerly			
27th Army (Chen Mao-chao)			5,000
2nd Army	(Lu Ti-ping)		10,000
6th "	(Cheng Chien)		12,000
7th "	(Hsia Wei)	In occupation	17,000
19th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	of Upper	10,000
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	Yangtze Valley	14,000
44th "	(Yeh Kai-hsin)		8,000

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3rd Army	(Chu Pei-teh)	Under Chu Pei-teh.	20,000
9th "	(newly organized)	Nominally under Nanking Government.	10,000
13th "	(Pai Chung-hsi)	Pai Chung-hsi in control of Shanghai-Nanking area.	10,000
31st "	(Pai Chung-hsi)	Pai Chung-hsi in control of Shanghai-Nanking area.	13,000
		Total	265,000
Szechuan Ally - Yang Sen			90,000
		TOTAL NANKING GOVERNMENT FORCES	355,000

Strength increased 10,000 by identification of new unit.

(c) ARMIES IN SOUTHERN PROVINCES

4th Army	(part - Huang Chi-hsiang)	Nominally supporting Chang-Fa-kuei.	12,000
5th "	(Li Fu-lin)		5,000
11th "	(Chu Huai-jih - part)		13,000
		Total	30,000
4th "	(part - Li Chi-shen)		10,000
7th "	(" - Huang Chao-hsiung)	Supporting Li Chi-shen	15,000
11th "	(Chen Ming-shu Fukien & Kwantung)		10,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)		20,000
		Total	55,000

(d) HUNAN MILITARISTS

8th Army	(Li Pin-hsien)	25,000
15th "		10,000
35th "	(Ho Chien)	13,000
36th "	(Liu Hsing)	12,000
Central Ind. Division (Hou Lien-ying)		7,000
Hupeh Provincial troops and miscellaneous forces		20,000
	Total	87,000

(e) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 90,000

(f) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu
3rd "	(Hsü Yung-chang)	Huailu and north
4th "	(Lu T'sun-huai)	Talungmen and west
5th "	(Fu Ju-chün)	Chengtai R.R.
6th "	(Feng Yu-tang)	" "
8th "	(Tan Ching-lin)	Tzechingkuan area
1st "	(Shang Chen)	Yenmenkuan area
7th "	(Chang Chin-wang)	" "
9th "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	" "
10th "	(Li Wei-hsin)	" "
	Total	90,000

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Strength of individual armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

(g) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	210,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Honanese	75,000

2. Developments Since Last Report.

Fengtien-Shansi War. Since the last report, no important developments have occurred on any of the Shansi fronts. In the north, the 5th, 9th and 12th armies, basing on Huayuan, are still threatening Yenmenkuan; while inside the Great Wall, the 30th Army with headquarters at Pinghsingkuan (point on Great Wall directly west of Kwangchang, Chihli) continues its attempt to take Yenmenkuan from the rear by way of Taichow, but as yet has not been able to capture Fanchihsien (first unnamed point on the river east of Taichow).

The 10th Fengtien Army is now holding Lungchuankuan (on Shansi border west and slightly south of Paotingfu) and skirmishing inside the wall with Wutai as its objective. The cold weather is greatly hampering military operations, and little progress may be expected in Shansi, at least in the north, before spring.

On the Kin Han, conditions remain as last reported. On the 17th, Shansi forces initiated an attack against Shihkiachuang from Huailu, but as yet this movement has not developed to any extent.

Feng Yu-hsiang's Operations in Shansi and Northern Honan. A report was received on the 28th of November that Feng Yu-hsiang was sending troops into Shansi by way of the moter road running from Yuncheng to Taiyuan, with the object of reinforcing the Shansi units defending Niangtzekuan. As yet, however, no information has been received of Kuominchun forces taking any active part in operations on the Chengtai Railway, although 2,500 of Feng's soldiers are reliably reported to have reached Taiyuan.

North of the Yellow River, Honan and Shensi allies of Feng Yu-hsiang, under Liang Shou-kai and Li Hu-chen, respectively, after pushing north on the Kin Han from Singhsiang and Weiwei, by the 5th of December had captured Changte and were threatening Taming. About the 10th, however, the Chihli-Shantung 14th Army, together with a Fengtien Division sent south from Shihkiachuang, were able to retake the former point and to drive the Kuominchun forces in the Taming area to the south.

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The War on the Lunghai and Tsinpu Lines. From the 22nd of November, the date of the last report, until the first few days of December, there was no fighting of importance on the Lunghai between the Kuominchun and the forces of Chang Tsung-chang. During this period the center of activity was between Tangshan and Kueiteh, with the fighting generally favorable to the Chihli-Shantung armies. On the first of December, however, Feng Yu-hsiang launched a determined offensive against Hsuchow, which by the 7th had reached almost to the city walls, and the fall of the place appeared imminent.

Concurrently with the Kuominchun drive over the Lunghai, the Kuomintang forces under Ho Ying-chin, who had been facing Sun Chuan-fang's troops in the vicinity of Nansuchow (Suchow) for several weeks, also assumed the offensive. Between the 2nd and the 4th of December, Sun Chuan-fang unexpectedly withdrew all his forces from Nansuchow and Hsuchow to the area of Lincheng. For a time it appeared that he had abandoned Chang Tsung-chang to his fate in Hsuchow, and rumors were even current that he intended to seize Shantung, but on the 7th he came to the rescue of the Chihli troops, not only throwing in his forces in the Lincheng area but also bringing up reserves which had been resting and reforming in Techow. Sun's arrival temporarily relieved the pressure on Hsuchow and by about December 12th the combined Sun and Chang forces were able to push the Kuominchun back as far as Tangshan.

On the 15th, however, while the forces on the Lunghai were apparently more than holding their own against Feng Yu-hsiang, Ho Ying-chin attacked Hsuchow from the south by way of the railway and the Grand Canal. The Northern troops were unable to hold out on the two fronts, and on the 16th Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang abandoned Hsuchow, offering practically no resistance, retiring to the line Hanchuang (on railway on Shantung-Kiangsu border) -Taierchuang. In rear of Hanchuang, the classic defense position is at Lincheng and the next at Yenchow. It is now reported that with the exception of a few units at Lincheng and a concentration at Tsining, all of Chang Tsung-chang's troops have been withdrawn to Yenchow and points north, leaving Sun Chuan-fang to defend the Hanchuang-Taierchuang front.

At the present time the Southern forces and the Kuominchun, after meeting in Hsuchow, are apparently exerting little if any pressure to the north. The Kuominchun is, however, still pushing north-west against Tsining and many Chihli-Shantung reinforcements have been rushed to this sensitive point.

Operations Against Hunan. As predicted in the last report, Cheng Chien, after establishing himself in Hankow, sent his 6th Kuomintang Army down the railway to attack Hunan, now held by Tang Sheng-chih's old armies. Operating with the 6th Army is the 44th Army, while units of Chu Pei-te from Kuangsi also have taken part in the movement by threatening Sienning from the east. The combined 6th and 44th Armies took Yochow on the 15th of December, and are now reported preparing to move on Changsha.

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From up river, Yang Sen has also moved on Yochow. On the 24th of November 30,000 of the Szechuan leader's troops were reported to have left Ichang for Shasi, and on the 10th of December part of these forces were moving still farther downstream from the latter point. While this movement of Yang Sen's is reported to be in cooperation with the Nanking Government's expedition against Hunan, his traditional opportunism creates doubt as to his sincerity.

The Situation in Kuangtung.

The salient features of the extremely complicated situation now prevailing in Kwangtung are as follows: After capturing Canton in the coup d'etat of November 16th, Chang Fa-kuei, through his lieutenant, Huang Chi-hsiang, proceeded to engage the Kwangsi forces (supporters of Li Chi-shen) in the West, North and East River Valleys. In the West River area, Huang Shao-hsiung's Kuangsi troops, after considerable fighting in the vicinity of Shiuhing and Takhing, were driven back to Wuchow, where they are at present facing the Cantonese forces. In the North River Valley, the entire Canton-Hankow railway fell into the hands of Chang Fa-kuei around the 24th of November, after the Kuangsi garrison had been driven out of Yingtak. In the East River Valley, the Chang Fa-kuei forces were resisted by a part of the 4th Army which has remained loyal to Li Chi-shen. On the 5th of December the opposing forces were engaged in the vicinity of Waichow. Li Chi-shen's adherents were de feated and retreated to Yungan.

On the 7th of December, Chen Ming-shu, whose 11th Army has occupied Foochow since October, declared for Li Chi-shen. Since that time he has sent several thousand troops to Amoy and Chuanchow with the declared intention of entering Kwangtung to support the forces of Li Chi-shen near Waichow.

On the night of the 10th and 11th of December, 1000 soldiers of the Canton garrison (Chang Fa-kuei's 4th Army) and about 1000/regulars from outside the city, made up of bandits, farmers and a ir few of He Lung's and Yeh Ting's old communist troops which have been in Swabue for several months, suddenly seized the city of Canton, driving Huang Chi-hsiang's troops across the river to Honam. The military revolutionists were augmented by about the same number of labor unionists and hastily armed rabble. Li Fu-lin, who had a large part of his 5th Army in Honam, counter-attacked the rebels on the 12th, and on the 13th succeeded in gaining control of the city, which he still holds. It will be remembered that Li Fu-lin was Chiang Kai-shek's appointee as Canton garrison commander at the time of the Northern Expedition and was gradually replaced by Li Chi-shen of the Kwangsi militarists, but actually retained a foothold in the Canton area with part of his forces. While Li now nomally supports Chang Fa-kuei, the atmosphere is so obscure in Canton that no predictions are warrnated as to future military predominance in the area.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 20 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The 3rd and 4th Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun)

8th	Army	(Wan Fu-lin) Chochow area	18,000
9th	"	(Kao Wei-yueh) Ningwu area.	15,000
10th	"	(Wang Shu-chang) Lungchuankuan area . . .	15,000
11th	"	(Liu Wei) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang	12,000
29th	"	(Chi Yi-chiao) Shunte area	8,000
15th	"	(Chi Chin-chun) Shihchiachuang area . . .	15,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun) Shihkiachuang and west . . .	17,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen) " " "	16,000

The 5th Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

12th	Army	(Tang Yu-lin) Yinchow area	15,000
30th	"	(Yu Chih-shan) Fanchih-Wutai area	10,000
31st	"	(Cheng Tso-sheng) Yinchow area.	18,000
6th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) " "	17,000
5th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) Jehol and Yinchow areas . .	20,000
Kirin Cavalry troops in Tehchow (Shantung) area			10,000

(Forces not Included in Above)

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall)	80,000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan	10,000
Total	296,000

(Increased 10,000 by identification of new unit)

Honan Ally (Kou Ying-chieh) 8,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces (2nd Army Group) . . Chang Tsung-chang

1st	Army	(Chang Tsung-chang)	Tsinan-Taian-Yenchow area
3rd	"	(Chang Kou-jui)	" " " "
5th	"	(Feng Yung-chang)	" " " "
7th	"	(Hsu Kun)	" " " "
11th	"	(Chang Tsung-fu)	" " " "
12th	"	(Ma Yu-jen)	" " " "

From M/A, China Report No.7198 January 17, 1928

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Subject: Situation Report.

Chihli-Shantung Forces - cont'd.

17th Army	(Chu Tung-feng)	Tsinan-Taian Yenchow area	
20th "	(Li Tsao-lin)	" " " "	
24th "	(Pan Hung-chun)	" " " "	
29th "	(	" " " "	
2nd "	(Chang Chiang-yao)	Lincheng area	
6th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	" "	
Honan Ally	(Yu Hsueh-chung)	" "	
10th Army	(Tu Feng-chu)	Tsining area	
13th "	(Liu Chih-lu)	" "	
14th "	(Sun Kuei-yuan)	Chengte " (Kin-Han)	
		Total	100,000

(Strength of individual armies not known)

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces (1st Army Group) Hanchuang and east to Jihchao

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)
2nd "	(Cheng Chun-yen)
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)
	Total 50,000

Strength of individual armies not known.

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN . . . 454,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

Commander-in-Chief . . . . . Chiang Kai-shek

1st Army	(Liu Chih)		25,000
3rd "	(newly organized - Wang Chun)		15,000
26th "	(Chen Cho)	Northern	8,000
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu)	Expedition	8,000
10th "	(Hsia Tou-yin)	under	15,000
11th "	(newly organized	He Ying-	
	Wang Tien-hsi)	chih	10,000
14th "	(		15,000
17th "	(Tsao Wan-shun)		12,000
33rd "	(Po Wen-yu)		18,000
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)		10,000
1st Central Independent Army (formerly) 27th Army (Chen Mao-chao)			5,000
		Total	141,000

3rd Army	(Chu Pei-teh)	Under Chu Pei-teh.	20,000
9th "	)	Nominally under Nanking Govt.	10,000
		Total	30,000

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(c) HUNAN MILITARISTS

8th Army (Li Pin-hsien)	25,000	
17th " (Chou Lan)	10,000	
35th " (Ho Chien)	13,000	
36th " (Liu Hsing)	12,000	
Hupeh Provincial troops and miscellaneous forces	27,000	
Total		87,000

(d) CANTONESE MILITARISTS

4th Army (part - Liao Pei-nan)	12,000	
5th " (Li Fu-lin)	5,000	
11th " (part -)	13,000	
Miscellaneous forces	10,000	
Total		40,000

(e) KWANGSI MILITARISTS

3rd Army (Liu Pao-ti)	Pai Chung-hsi		5,000	
13th " (Chen Chia-yü)			20,000	
7th " (Hsia Wei)	Li Tsung-jen		17,000	
18th " (Tao Chun)			8,000	
19th " (Hu Tsung-to)		Kwangsi Party in possession of Hupeh.	10,000	
2nd " (Lu Ti-ping)			10,000	
6th " (Cheng Chien)			15,000	
18th " (Yang Chieh)	Cheng Chien		10,000	
42nd " (Li Yen)			10,000	
44th " (Yeh Kai-hsin)			10,000	
Total				115,000
4th " (part - Li Chi-shen)			10,000	
7th " (" Huang Chao-hsiung)			15,000	
11th " (Chen Ming-shu Fukien & Kwantung)			10,000	
16th " (Fan Shih-sheng)			20,000	
Total				55,000
TOTAL KUOMINTANG . . .				468,000

(f) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 90,000

CHINA (Military)

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(g) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd	Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu
3rd	"	(Hsu Yung-chang)	Huailu and north
4th	"	(Lu T'sun-huai)	Talungmen and west
5th	"	(Fu Ju-chun)	Chengtai R.R.
6th	"	(Feng Yu-tang)	" "
8th	"	(Tan Ching-lin)	Tzechingkuan area
1st	"	(Shang C hen)	Yenmenkuan area
7th	"	(Chang Chin-wang)	" "
9th	"	(C heng Tso-sheng)	" "
10th	"	(Li Wei-hsin)	

Total 90,000

Strength of individual armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

(h) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	300,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Honanese	75,000

Szechuan forces increased 90,000 by addition of Yang Sen.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

Fengtien-Shansi War. As stated in the last report, the bitter cold now prevailing in Shansi has brought all important operations to a close for the time being. In the north, there have been only minor changes in the positions of the forces around Yenmenkuan. The 9th Fengtien Army is now attacking north of Ningwu, which is defended by the Shansi 9th Division. At Shangying (first unnamed point on river S.E. of Yinchow), in front of Yenmenkuan, the 12th Fengtien Army is operating against the 1st Shansi Division under Shang Chen. The newly organized 31st Army has recently moved from Suiyuan and on the 7th of January was reported to have taken Pienmen, a small and unimportant pass on the Great Wall east of Yenmenkuan and north of Fanchih (1st unnamed point on river east of Taichow). Inside of Pinhsingkuan (point on Great Wall directly west of Kwangchang, Chihli), a part of the Fengtien 5th Army is now threatening Fanchih, which is held by the 5th and 15th Shansi Divisions. The 30th Fengtien Army is attacking Fanchih and Wutai as well, the latter point being held by the 14th Shansi Division.

Farther to the south the Fengtien 10th Army has been unable to advance beyond Lunchuankuan (on Shansi border west and slightly south of Paotingfu). The situation around Shihkiachuang and to the west remains as at the time of the last report.

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Around the 10th of January the Fengtien 29th Army was sent from the Paoting area to the Shuntefu-Changte area in order to guard against a possible push by Feng Yu-hsiang up the Kin Han.

Chochow, which has been held by Shansi troops since the 11th of October, has finally capitulated. Hostilities ceased around this place during the last few days of 1927, and on the 11th of January the defending garrison was disarmed and reorganized into the Fengtien 36th Division. They are to be stationed, at least temporarily, at Tungchow, east of Peking. The fall of Chochow has released the main portion of the 8th Army as well as a considerable force of artillery forservice elsewhere. These troops will probably be sent south of Shihkiachuang on the Kin Han.

Situation in Northern Kiangsu, Shantung and Honan. Since the withdrawal of Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang from Hsuchow, the Kuomintang and Kuominchun forces which captured this point have made no attempt to push north on the Tsin Pu line. The front line against the Nationalists now runs in general east from Hanchuang (on Tsin Pu line at Shantung-Kiangsu border) through Yihsien, Taierchuang, Ichow and Jihchao. This line is held almost entirely by the forces of Sun Chuan-fang, with a few Chihli-Shantung troops on the extreme left flank.

The Southern armies entering Hsuchow consisted of the 1st, 9th, 10th and 40th Armies. Since around the 5th of January, a considerable number of these troops, reported to be mainly units of the 40th Army, have withdrawn to the south, so that a further advance up the Tsin Pu by the Kuomintang forces seems unlikely in the immediate future.

Feng Yu-hsiang, around the 21st of December, made a determined attack on Tsining, and for several days the fall of the city was momentarily expected, and in fact was several times reported. Heavy Chihli-Shantung reinforcements were rushed to the threatened area, however, and by the 25th of December the Kuominchun had been definitely repulsed. Feng has now withdrawn to Tsaochow, which point he still holds.

On the Lunghai, the Kuominchun forces have been withdrawn to the east of Lanfeng and are now concentrated at Chengchow from which point large numbers of troops have been despatched across the Yellow River. Feng is now reported to have about 50,000 men at Sinsiang and north under Sun Lien-chung, an old Kuominchun leader who recently replaced Liang Shou-kai in command in this area. The point of contact between the Kuominchun and the northern forces is at Chihsien. The northern troops in this district are under the command of Wang Yin-chuan, former governor of Honan, and consist of the Chihli-Shantung 14th Army and several independent divisions, the total strength numbering around 40,000. No Fengtien units have as yet been reported in the front line, though there are considerable concentrations in rear between Changte and Shunte. Wang Yin-chuan is reported to have organized the Red Spears in southern Chihli and northern Honan against Feng Yu-hsiang.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Whether Feng Yu-hsiang intends to attempt a push up the Kin Han, or is merely strengthening his positions in northern Honan against the possibility of a Fengtien, or, in the event of Chang Tso-lin and Yen Hsi-shan's being able to make peace, a Fengtien-Shansi drive south, remains to be seen. In any event, it would be a difficult and dangerous operation for Feng to attempt to move north up the narrow corridor of the Kin Han, with the Chihli-Shantung armies on his right, the Fengtien troops on his front, and a none too friendly Yen Hsi-shan on his left.

Hupeh-Hunan War. After a period of uncertainty, in which the alignment of a number of Kuomintang military leaders was difficult to determine, the line-up in the Hupeh-Hunan struggle now appears settled for the time being at least. Pai Chung-hsi resigned as garrison commander of Shanghai on the 21st, and proceeded to send his troops, consisting principally of the newly formed 13th Army up the river toward Hankow. For a time rumors were current that Pai and Li Tsung-jen were planning to unite with the Hunanese leaders (former Tang Sheng-chih army commanders) to eliminate Cheng Chien. The possibility of this alliance was removed, however, when Chiang Kai-shek, around the 5th of January gave $500,000 to the Hunanese leaders to aid them in their fight against the Kuangsi party in Hankow. This made it obligatory for the Kuangsi party to receive Cheng Chen into their ranks for an attack on Hunan.

At the time of the last report Cheng Chien's 6th Army and Yeh Kai-hsin's 44th Army had secured at least a foothold in Yochow, but around the first of January they were either forced out of this place or were withdrawn to Hankow because of fear of an attack on the part of Pai Chung-hsi.

After Cheng Chien had confirmed his alliance with the Kwangsi group, however, the troops from in and around Hankow were again moved south to the Hunan border and now concentrated in the vicinity of Puchi. The line of contact with the Hunanese forces runs in general from Tuncheng north through Puchi to the Yangtze River. As yet no serious fighting has been reported in this area.

Yang Sen, who at the time of the last report had advanced down river to Ichang and even beyond, has received a severe check. Around the 8th of January it was reported that he was being attacked from the west of Wanhsien by forces of Liu Hsiang, and that his troops in this vicinity had been forced down river to Kweichowfu. At the samt time, the announcement was made from Nanking that Yang Sen had been dismissed from his command in the Kuomintang forces, and a few days later Hu Tsung-to, with the 19th Army moved up river to occupy Ichang. By the 12th of January, however, Yang's situation had improved somewhat, as by that time he had apparently succeeded in holding Liu Hsiang to the west of Wanhsien. Hu Tsung-to is believed to have come to an agreement with the Szechuan leader whereby the 19th Army will not advance to Ichang.

Situation in Kuangtung.

As predicted in the last report, the situation in Canton did not remain stabilized for long. Chen Ming-shu, commander of the 11th Army, who recently declared himself a supporter of Li Chi-shen against Chang Fa-kuei, arrived in Swatow on the 15th of December, and on the 17th held

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

a conference with the generals of that portion of the 4th Army which had remained loyal to Li. At this conference it was decided to attack Canton from the West, North, and East River districts.

By the 25th of December these plans had developed to such an extent that it was apparent that Canton would soon fall. Fan Shih-sheng's forces took Szewui about the 24th, and at the same time Huang Shao-hsiung captured Shiuhing, forcing the Iron Army (forces of Chang Fa-kuei) back on Canton. In the East River area, Chen Chi-tang and Chien Ta-chun advanced to Waichow and Hoyun, while Chen Ming-shu supported them in the rear around Kityang. In the north river area, Fan Shih-sheng occupied Shaichow. On the 28th the combined "Iron Army" and Li Fu-lin troops in the West River area were unable to withstand the continued Kuangsi attack. Li's forces retired to Honan, while the Iron Army withdrew to the Hoyun, Lungmoon and Poklo districts.

The troops of Huang Shao-hsiung entered Canton on the 29th, and Li Chi-shen arrived the same day, taking over control of the city without disturbance from Li Fu-lin.

Chang Fa-kuei's defeated troops are now concentrated around Yungan and Lungchun, where they are being threatened from the east by the forces under Chen Ming-shu.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

2657-I-276

January 30, 1928

#7201

Subject: Siege of Chochow.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 5 1928

1. The accompanying report, "The Siege of Chochow" was prepared in collaboration by Captains T. J. Betts and D. D. Barrett. The map was drawn by Lieut. Clarence Kanaga, All of the above officers visited Chochow after its capitulation.

- - - - - - - -

1. Historical Sketch.

At the beginning of the Fengtien-Shansi war, the 4th Shansi Division, which prior to the outbreak of hostilities was reported stationed in Taiyuan, Shansi, was launched through Tzechingkuan Pass with the mission of causing disturbances in the Fengtien back areas. This division was approximately 10,000 strong, with an artillery complement of 22 - 75mm mountain guns. It was commanded by General Fu Tso-Yi, who had gained fame as a defense commander during the siege of Tatungfu in 1926 when his garrison successfully withstood the attacks of the Kuominchun over a period of over four months.

This division succeeded in forcing its way through Tzechingkuan, which was insufficiently held by the Fengtien 8th Army, around the first of October, and on the 11th suddenly descended from the Laishui area upon the city of Chochow, which is located on the Kin Han railway about 40 miles from Peking and 80 from Paotingfu. If this division had arrived on the 8th or earlier, it would have exerted an important and perhaps decisive effect on the Fengtien-Shansi operations on the Kin Han south of Paotingfu, which at this time found the Fengtien army in serious danger.

Upon reaching the railway, the Shansi forces proceeded to execute raiding operations in the Chochow-Changhsintien area. They were gradually checked by troops of the Peking garrison and detachments from the now victorious Fengtien Army in Paotingfu. By October 14th,

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From Oct 14 '27
Jan 11, '28

they had reconcentrated at Chochow approximately 8,000 strong, where they prepared to stand a siege. It is believed that this making of Chochow into a center of disturbance in the enemy's rear had been systematically planned by the Shansi military authorities, and that foodstuffs and forage had been stored there previous to the outbreak of the war. It is also reported, but not authenticated, that munitions, chiefly hand grenades, had also been introduced into the city at the same time through the medium of Shansi traders.

The Fengtien military authorities were at first averse to the use of formal siege methods in the attack of the town. With a view, either to luring the garrison into the open country to the west of the city, or what is more likely, of guaranteeing their retreat from a locality where they were most embarrassing to the line of communications, they purposely left the north and west sides of the city lightly covered. When it was found that the garrison could not be induced to budge and furthermore was replenishing its supplies from the unexposed sides, a complete blockade of the city was established on about the first of November, and a series of regular attacks was begun.

These attacks included bombardments, mining operations, and at least one attempt to storm the walls. None of these was successful, and about the first of December, formal attacks were discontinued, although the blockade was maintained with considerable rigor. With the cessation of the attacks, negotiations with the garrison commander, which had continued during the entire siege, were entered into seriously. This phase of the investment lasted until January 11th when, short of food, without any prospect of relief, and tempted by the offer of a large sum of money, General Fu capitulated. The terms of his surrender included the incorporation of his command into the Fengtien Army, with the understanding that in future they could be employed only to resist a foreign enemy or to suppress bandits.

2. Inspection of Chochow January 19-20, 1928.

a. General.

Chochow is a city of approximately 20,000 inhabitants, the southeast corner of which is about 1,000 yards to the west of the Kin Han railway line. The terrain surrounding the town is typical of the North China plain, excessively flat, and composed of rich, stoneless alluvial soil that excavates readily and lends itself admirably to field fortification. The countryside is thickly populated, and at certain points (see map) villages provide masks and mud wall protection from rifle fire to within two and three hundred yards of the city walls. The shape of

the city is a rough parallelogram, the northeast corner of which has been cut into by a right angled inset approximately two hundred and fifty yards on each face. The greatest length and breadth of the town are approximately 900 yards, respectively. The city is surrounded by a continuous wall 30 feet high, twenty feet broad at the top, and 30 feet broad at thebottom. The wall is faced on the outside by a casing of fired bricks three feet thick. On the inside the wall is either unfaced or has a thin layer of bricks or cement to withstand weathering. The remainder of the wall consists of earth, which has settled over a period of several hundred years into the consistency of chalk. The wall is surmounted by brick battlements. For additional details, see accompanying map.

b. Shansi Defense.

With the exception of a trench about two hundred yards long extending north from the extreme northeast corner of the wall, the defense of the town was conducted from the top of the wall itself. Here was invariably dug a shelter trench and in places where hostile fire was heavy, a firing trench was also excavated. Trenches were generally straight, bays were rare, and the depth about five feet. At points of heavy pressure, splinter proof dugouts were also constructed on top of the wall. The garrison when not on duty lived in dugouts cut in the reverse face of the wall and at the foot of this face. There was no organized inter-communicating dugout system as understood in western trench warfare. At points where the Fengtien approach trenches had pushed into dead ground, tunnels had been cut through the wall at a height of ten to fifteen feet to permit of effective fire. From identifications of graves, it was clear that sectors in the wall were allotted permanently to units, hence defense was inevitably passive and no general infantry reserve was held out.

Around the entire interior base of the wall, a counter-mine, varying from eight to fifteen feet in depth, was dug. It was reported that listening posts were established in this counter-mine at all times. When enemy mining activities were noted, counter tunnels were driven immediately. It was reported that counter mines had actually been fired, but no evidences of such action, aside from the tunnels, were observed.

The garrison appears to have relied for its defense upon rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. Because of the need for economy in the use of ammunition, fire seems to have been limited to the repelling of actual attacks. There seems to have been no interference with Fengtien intrenching operations. The Shansi artillery played un unimportant part in the siege. At the time of surrender, the Fengtien forces

reported the capture of between one and two thousand rounds of artillery ammunition with 22 mountain guns, and transport facilities could not have permitted the bringing in of more than two or three thousand rounds initially. The Shansi artillery made several attempts to destroy trains passing the city, but while they caused considerable inconvenience they did not succeed either in disabling the railroad or seriously damaging any rolling stock. Their failure in this regard can only be ascribed to ineptitude.

The Shansi force was equipped with a portable wireless apparatus that maintained efficient communications with Taiyuanfu throughout the siege.

The entire division had only one surgeon, who was killed early in the siege. There were no foreign trained doctors nor foreign surgical supplies in Chochow. In consequence the percentage of killed and wounded was high. It is reported that during the siege approximately 300 Shansi soldiers and 250 civilians were killed or died of wounds and sickness and an equal number were wounded.

c. Fengtien Investment.

The Fengtien formal investment was confined to the east and south of the city. On the west and north operations were confined to a blockade conducted at a distance of a mile and over with the object of intercepting supplies and communications. In this area were constructed only hasty and unorganized skirmish trenches. On the south and east sides the dispositions were as follows:

(1) Defense system against garrison sorties. This consisted basically of a single trench, about five feet deep, very slightly traversed and with no overhead cover. This trench ran roughly parallel to and 500 yards distant from the city wall. Sleeping accommodations consisted of unroofed excavations each capable of accommodating eight men, and spaced about fifty yards apart off-set from the trench line. This would indicate a permanent trench garrison of about one man for four yards of front, the bulk of the Fengtien forces being billetted in nearby villages, with which the trenches connected. In front of this trench line was sited at a distance of about fifty yards a continuous dry ditch, with no ramparts, eight feet deep and eight feet broad, constituting almost a complete defense against storming parties. At sensitive points the interior side of the ditch was bordered by a barbed wire fence. The only other approach to entanglements was the scattering of uncoiled barbed wire on the ground in front of the trenches. In addition to the

defenses described above, the Chochow railway station, 1200 yards from the city wall, was fortified by four lines of fire trenches on the city side, this obviously to prevent raids on Fengtien supplies stored there. Artillery was sited in open gun pits, permitting direct fire on the city at distances not greater than 1500 yards.

(2) Offensive works. Approach trenches and firing trenches had been constructed against the southwest face and lower northeast angle of the city wall to within a distance of 200 yards. In addition approach and firing trenches had been dug around the north end of the Fengtien ditch with a view to flanking the Shansi shelter trench to the north of the town. At least two important mine tunnels were driven against the southwest face and lower northeast angle of the wall respectively. It is reported that at the time the siege was raised, another tunnel was in construction against the southeast corner from the main line of investment. A Shansi counter tunnel was definitely located at this point. Of these tunnels only one was successfully completed to the wall, that to the southwest face. While the investment works were crude as judged by modern standards they more than fulfilled the requirements of the situation.

In the siege the Fengtien army employed twelve 155mm howitzers, four 105mm guns, thirty-six 75mm field guns and sixty trench mortars. Several of these last weapons were of 6-inch, but the great majority were of 3-inch calibre. In accordance with present Fengtien practice, they were used as light howitzers, rather than as accompanying weapons of the infantry. It is reported that the total expenditure of ammunition amounted to 20,000 projectiles of all calibers. The 155's were used principally in destruction bombardments of the city proper, special attention being directed upon the Shansi headquarters, which, however, was not seriously damaged. The 75's were primarily used as battering pieces.

The principal points and areas of concentration are indicated on the accompanying map. The two northeast angles and the southeast angle were so battered as to make ascent of the wall from the outside possible, though with difficulty. At a point on the east face of the north re-entrant the wall had been reduced to a slope that could be mounted easily. Both faces of the re-entrant had been subjected to a distributed fire that had removed the entire brick casing of the wall. A similar process had taken place on a section of the wall some two hundred yards long around the mined breach (see map). The 75mm shells, while not fitted with delayed action fuses, at the short ranges used were able to penetrate the entire depth of the wall casing. The earth of which the wall was composed crumbled readily under shell fire and if proper concentration had been employed, the production of slopes to the top of the

wall practicable for storming would have required a relatively small amount of ammunition. Actual breaching operations against this type of wall would be most expensive and with current Chinese defense tactics, would be unnecessary. The trench mortars were used for harassing fire against the trenches and shelters on top of the wall, and at its inner base. The Fengtien artillery totally neglected its opportunity to take the wall in reverse or in enfilade, and in consequence results of fire against personnel were inconsiderable. Two Shansi guns were disabled by artillery, which is a fair showing considering the few opportunities offered for fire on such a target. No evidence whatever of the use of shrapnel was found. A large proportion of 75 and 155 shells were duds. All observers unite in commenting upon the lack of coordination between the Fengtien artillery and infantry units. The artillery was administered as an independent command, selecting its own missions and executing fire at such times as it deemed proper. Artillery ammunition supply was unorganized and uncertain. No reserve supply was accumulated and this made cooperation with other arms still more undependable.

The role of the infantry during the siege was primarily that of a blockading force which confined its efforts to long range sniping at the walls. Only one series of attempts was made to storm the wall, in connection with the explosion of the previously mentioned mine against the southwest face of the wall. This mine was accurately located under the outer foot of the wall. Its effect was to tear a deep crater to the south and to reduce the whole frontal section of the wall at this point to an easy slope with a minimum width of ten feet. The earth in the wall was so solid that a total razing was out of the question, and if the mine had been centered under the wall, or located to the north, it is extremely probable that the slope would have been made on the wrong face. Three attempts were made to storm the wall at this point, but because of faulty Fengtien artillery cooperation, the defending garrison was able to repel the attacks by automatic rifle fire and the use of hand grenades from points on the wall immediately adjacent to the breach. During a period of a few days gas shells were employed which had been filled with chlorine at Mukden and which were fired under White Russian supervision. Probably because of faulty loading and insufficient concentration of fire, no advantages accrued from this effort. Attempts to force the southeast angle of the wall by eight Renault tanks were abortive, one of the tanks being knocked out by gunfire, and two others breaking down.

Lack of cooperation was manifest between infantry higher unit commanders. There was no unity of command and brigade and division commanders could not be compelled to support or assist in operations of which they disapproved or which did not seem expedient to them.

The Fengtien air service confined its efforts to bombing, generally using 100 pound bombs, and to the dissemination of propaganda leaflets. There is no evidence of airplanes being used for artillery adjustment, nor for ground attack.

3. Conclusions.

a. General.

The siege illustrates primarily the inefficiency of Chinese high command. The original mission of the Shansi raiding division - namely to harass the Fengtien rear areas at a critical moment - demanded that it should maneuver to the limit of its capacity. Absolutely no strategic advantage was to be obtained by standing a siege at Chochow. The passive defense of the city could result only in its ultimate capitulation, and its influence on the general course of the war was negligible. The siege of Chochow, however, demonstrates again, in company with those of Sian, Tatung and Wuchang that the walled city is still impregnable against Chinese attack. In consequence the defensive methods employed at Chochow are chiefly of value as a concrete example of standard Chinese technique at the present time. It is only reasonable to suppose that in the event of operations by foreign troops in China the capture of walled cities would be necessary from time to time.

The principal Fengtien deficiency was lack of cooperation between unit commanders. All centralized staff functions were lacking. The tactical handling of artillery was conspicuously bad. The infantry appeared to lack the spirit of the offensive. On the other hand the construction of field fortifications was in the main efficiently performed, although it must be remembered that elaborate works were unnecessary and that work was done under the most favorable conditions. The excavation of the tunnel and siting of the mine under the south wall would have done credit to western engineers.

Whereas both sides in this operation disregarded most ofthe principles of war, it must be remembered that political considerations, general and local, are never absent from Chinese operations and often force results which to the western military mind may appear ridiculous.

b. Attack of Chinese walled cities by foreign troops. The capture of a typical Chinese walled city by a composite foreign force of infantry, artillery and if possible aviation should present no difficulties. The following tactical devices should be borne in mind:

Attack should be directed at the wall rather than at gates.

The wall should be reduced to a slope practicable for infantry by the use of artillery firing delayed action fuzed projectiles. Center of impact should be placed at about one third the height of the wall. This mission can be accomplished by field pieces, but if practicable the use of medium artillery is recommended. It is estimated roughly that ten rounds of 155mm ammunition per linear yard of wall, fired at the short ranges made possible by passive defense, would be sufficient to accomplish this mission.

Prior to the assault full use should be made of enfilade fire to clear the top of the wall of defenders.

Enfilade fire can be supplemented or replaced if necessary by the use of attack aviation.

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Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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American Embassy

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
LONDON, ENGLAND.

1928 2657-9-276 MAR 16

CONFIDENTIAL

March 2, 1928.

213

No. 21329

Subject: Map of China.

To: A.C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 16 1928

1. There is attached hereto a map showing the location of the various factions in China, as of March 1, 1928, which has just been received from the British War Office.

2. It will be noted that this map is marked "confidential".

JOHN R. THOMAS, Jr.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Military Attache.

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1928 2657-9-27
MAY
WAR DEPARTMENT 224

G-2 Report. 6920.

CHINA-JAPAN (MILITARY).

Subject: Situation in China. -
China-Japan and the Washington
Agreement of 1921.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 29 1928

Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons on May 14th, 1928, with regard to the latest information in his possession concerning the situation in China, said:

"On the 9th of May Chang-Tso-Lin sent a circular telegram to all provinces stating that he had instructed his troops to cease hostilities, and adding that on the question of national politics he would accept a fair and impartial decision agreed to by the Chinese people. In accordance with these overtures, his troops are withdrawing on all fronts and no fighting is reported anywhere. Owing to the interruption of communications, I have no direct news from the Consul General at Tsinanfu, and such information as I possess regarding the situation in Shantung is derived chiefly from Japanese sources.

A report from the Japanese Consul at Tsinanfu dated 5th May gives an account of the commencement of the trouble. It states that the Northerners withdrew from Tsinanfu on the night of 30th April, the Southerners entering peacefully on the following day. On the 2nd May there was no sign of disorder, and the Southern Army requested that the Japanese should remove the protective safeguards that had been set up. This was agreed to, and the protective devices were removed by the Japanese at 11 p.m. On 3rd May, about 10 a.m. two Japanese police were despatched to a Japanese house on receipt of news of looting. They found the house completely looted, with five Chinese soldiers belonging to the Seventh Battalion of the Third Division of the Fortieth Army still there. The soldiers abused the police and threatened them. One policeman returned to the police station to report, and at this stage five Chinese and six more Chinese soldiers joined the first party, armed with revolvers. They shouted, "Kill the Japanese", and assaulted the police. A party of about 30 Japanese soldiers arrived under a lieutenant, whereupon the Chinese ran away and took refuge in a Chinese military depot with the flag of the Seventh Battalion, Third Division, on it. The Japanese soldiers pursued them, and when they reached the gate of the depot were fired on by Chinese soldiers from inside. To this fire they replied, and fighting then spread. At the time the Japanese General in command of the Division was making a round of calls and the Japanese Consul was having an interview with General Chiang-kai-shek. The Japanese Consul was of the opinion that the affair was due to systematic provocation by unruly elements among the Southerners and was the result of Communistic intrigue. Outrages on Japanese civilians, both men and women are also reported.

Report No.22018,
May 16, 1928.

The Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that as a result of these incidents the Japanese military authorities had demanded Chinese withdrawal to 21 li (about seven miles) from Tsinanfu and from either side of the railway within a time limit of 12 hours. These demands were presented on the 7th or 8th of May. There were also other demands, but the withdrawal and punishment of the guilty parties were the most important. The Chinese did not reply, whereupon Japanese troops proceeded to clear the Southern troops from the town, inside and outside the walls. According to a further report by the Japanese Consul at Tsinanfu, as a result of an agreement made between him and various local guilds, all Southern troops in the city were allowed to evacuate unarmed between 8 am. and 2 p.m. on 11th May. The city is now entirely in the hands of the Japanese and order is being maintained by the local Chinese authorities, backed by the Japanese military. I am glad to say that all British subjects in Shantung appear to be safe.

Neither of the parties involved in the trouble in Shantung has indicated that the intervention or mediation of His Majesty's Government would be acceptable, but a telegram bearing the name of General Tan Yen-kai, then Chairman of the Political Council at Nanking, has been received by the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations and circulated to States members of the Council. This telegram requests the summoning of a meeting of the Council and urges that the League shall request the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Japanese troops and their immediate withdrawal from Shantung.

British warships have been sent to Chinwang-tao, Wei-hai-wei, Chefoo and Tsingtao. Elsewhere in China normal precautions are being taken. A British warship is stationed at practically every port along the coast, and on the river wherever there are British residents."

Lieut. Commander Kenworthy asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Japanese Government has made any demarche or explanation or representation to His Majesty's Government with reference to the military operations now being conducted in the province of Shantung, as agreed upon under the terms of the Washington Agreement of 1921; and, if so, what are the terms of such communication and of his reply?

Sir Austen Chamberlain: "The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo of the intentions of the Japanese Government on the 20th April and 8th May. Similar communications were made by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in London to the Foreign Office on 23rd April and on 10th May. At the first interview the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires stated that he had been instructed to inform me that his Government had decided to send 5,000 troops to Tsingtao. In connection with this information he was to emphasize the following two points:

(1) That the despatch of troops again to Shantung Province was an unavoidable measure of self-protection, by no means implying anything in the nature of unfriendly intentions towards China and her people, or interference with the military operations of any of the Northern or Southern forces; and

(2) That, as soon as the Japanese Government considered it no longer necessary to maintain the troops for the protection of the Japanese residents in the affected area, the troops would be immediately withdrawn as on the last occasion.

At the second interview the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires left an aide-memoire, the text of which I will, with the hon. and gallant Member's permission, circulate in the Official Report. The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires briefly confirmed these statements to me at an interview on the 10th of May. I expressed my sympathy with Japan in the troubles with which she was now confronted and my hope that later information would not confirm the horrible account of outrages on Japanese nationals, and particularly on Japanese women, which I understood had been contained in the first reports received by the Japanese Government. I further expressed my satisfaction at the assurance that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn as soon as the safety of Japanese lives and property was assured."

Following is the text of the Aide Memoire:

"Statement issued in Tokyo by the Japanese Government on 9th May.

When recently disturbances in China threatened to spread to Tsinan the Japanese Government despatched troops for the protection of Japanese residents in that region and took occasion to explain their attitude in connection with that unavoidable course of action. It is now to be observed that since the occurrence of the deplorable incident at Tsinan the situation in that district has so much increased in gravity that the present strength of the Japanese troops there is insufficient for the protection of the Japanese residents. The Shantung Railway connecting Tsingtao and Tsinan is destroyed at various places, making it impossible as things stand at present to ensure means of communication by that route. In these circumstances it has been decided to despatch the Third Division to Shantung with the object of securing the necessary protection of Japanese residents and of ensuring communication by the Shantung Railway. The present despatch of additional troops being intended, as stated above, to protect Japanese residents in Shantung and to ensure communication by the Shantung Railway which is essential for that purpose, its object is in no way different from that of the first despatch of troops.

Together with the despatch of the Third Division, it has been decided to send from Japan Proper to Tientsin five other companies which were originally scheduled to be sent in June next as a periodical relief for the Japanese garrison in China; but the date of their departure has been advanced in view of the circumstances that part of the garrison has recently been sent to Tsinan as an emergency measure. It has also been decided to despatch an additional number of cruisers and destroyers to the Yangtse and to South China for the purpose of safeguarding Japanese residents in case unforeseen happenings should occur in the southern districts out of possible misunderstandings relating to Tsinan incident. The present despatch of additional troops and warships is intended for no other purpose than that of protecting the lives and property of Japanese residents against such unfortunate incidents as might possibly occur in connection with the Tsinan affair and it need scarcely be added that they will be withdrawn as occasion permits on the disappearance of the necessity for their continued maintenance."

M.A. London. Report No. 22018. May 16, 1928.

JOHN R. THOMAS, Jr.
Colonel, General Staff,
Military Attache.

G-2 Report

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6180
1928
2657-J-27
MAY 26
WAR DEPARTMENT
23

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 26 1928

1. Organization of Forces.

Due to the rapidly changing situation and the disintegration of many Northern units, no attempt will be made to show the composition of the main groups other than as generally pictured on the accompanying map.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General. The long heralded northern drive of the Nationalists commenced on the 10th and is still continuing, with a great deal of success. The Kuomintang forces assisted by those of the Kuominchun, meeting with but little resistance in Shantung, have swept everything in front of them and are now menacing Tsinanfu. In the Taming area the Chihli-Shantung forces under Chu Yu-pu are not in such a state of complete collapse as the Shantung armies. The fate of Taming is unknown but it is suspected that Chu Yu-pu is retiring to the northeast. On the Kin-Han railway the Fengtien troops, after a serious attempt to capture Changte, have been forced to fall back on the Chang River north of Fenglochen. The situation on the Shansi front remains unchanged since the last report. Elsewhere in China there have been no military developments of any importance.

Operations in Shantung and Southern Chihli. The Southern offensive in this sector started on the 10th at Taierchuang, which was the weakest point in the northern defense. It was successful here due largely to a surprise attack by several thousand bandits. The Nanking Government troops used in this attack were Liu Chih's 1st Kuomintang Army. Chang Tsung-chang had concentrated the mass of his troops between Lincheng and Hanchuang. After the fall of Taierchuang the Southern forces pushed through toward Tenghsien, leaving Chang Tsung-chang with a great unwieldy mass of troops in the Hanchuang-Lincheng area, which he was unable either through inability or other reasons to use to any advantage. When Taierchuang fell, Hanchuang became untenable, and on the 12th Chang's troops withdrew from Hanchuang to Chieh Ho, twenty miles north of Tenghsien, where he intended making a stand. He left a covering force of between four and five thousand troops in Tenghsien. Hanchuang was occupied by the Kuomintang on the 12th and an advance was started in the direction of Lincheng. Tsaochuang, east of Lincheng on the branch railway from Lincheng, was attacked and captured on the same day by the Nanking forces. A similar fate overtook Lincheng on the 13th, giving the Nationalists control of the railway from Lincheng to Taierchuang. Ichow, further east, fell on the 16th and Jichao was reported taken on about the 21st by the cavalry of the 17th Nationalist Army which advanced from Haichow up the coast. Six thousand of Sun Chuan-fang's troops in Tsingtao were reported to be advancing to meet this threat but were later diverted from this task and sent to Tsinanfu.

On the 17th, Sun Chuan-fang evacuated Tsining on the Tsin-Pu railway, due to the fact that Kuyeh and Yunchung had fallen on the 16th, and the units on his north flank retreated toward Yenchow. Kuominchun cavalry under Han Fu-chu, taking advantage of this favorable opportunity, entered the city of Tsining on the same day, sending a detachment in pursuit of Sun's retreating forces. (For action of Sun's main body, see below.)

CHINA (Military)

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On the 18th the news of the fall of Tsining reached Chang Tsung-chang and he, fearing that the Kuominchun might cut off his communications in the rear, started his retreat from the Chieh Ho line to Taian. The great majority of the troops in this retreat literally walked the soles off their shoes, and this combined with the scarcity of food and the total lack of shelter left the vast horde without any idea of further resistance when they arrived in Taian. It is small wonder then, that when Kuominchun cavalry appeared in front of Taian that the city was given up without a struggle at noon on the 23rd. Small detachments of Chang Tsung-chang's forces are still holding out near Chiehshou north of Taian, but the situation is grave as the mass of his troops are retreating in the direction of Tsinan where the people are in a panic; and three thousand Kuominchun cavalry under Lu Hsin-wen have reached Fei Chen, 30 miles southeast of Tsinan.

In the Taming area Chu Yu-pu appears to have held out better than could reasonably have been expected of him considering the poor quality of the troops under his command. This doubtless is due to the fact that very little pressure was brought to bear against him. The situation in this area is very obscure, and conflicting reports have been continually received regarding the fate of Taming. It is suspected however that Chu Yu-pu is retiring from Taming to the northeast.

Sun Chuan-fang's Debacle. Great perplexity has been felt in the north concerning the disappearance in the direction of Yutai, Fenghsien and Tangshan of a major portion of Sun Chuan-fang's forces, after which no news was heard of them . The following telegram from a foreign agent in Shanghai explains somewhat the puzzling development:

> "Hupeh and Hunan divisions, during first days of fighting, which General Chiang had placed at the front at Hsuchowfu, were very seriously defeated by Marshal Sun, defeat being practically routing the Nationalist troops retreating south of Hsuchowfu. Their own estimates are that approximately 10,000 men were lost owing to mined areas. Subsequently General Chiang put Chang Fa-kuei's 4th Army in front to take shock and they succeeded in breaking through. According to this account Marshal Sun followed up his initial victory with rapidity assuming that Chang Ching-yao was protecting his flank in region of Kueiteh. Chang Ching-yao's army however completely collapsed, leaving Sun's flank unprotected. It was understood at this moment that Feng Yu-hsiang came to the rescue of Chiang, captured Tsining and with assistance of Chiang Fa-kuei's troops annihilated very large part of Sun's army."

The reasons for the complete collapse in Shantung can be ascribed to the following causes: Unexpected strength of the Kuominchun in the Tsaochow area. These forces which it is believed Sun Chuan-fang thought he could deal with successfully, made an unexpectedly strong thrust in a northeasterly direction and cut off Sun's communications in rear, and at the same time forced the evacuation of Yenchow by Chang Tsung-chang; lack of proper coordination between Marshal Sun and

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Marshal Chang, suspicion and jealousy existing between the two, and the total lack of any system of communication between their respective forces. Most of all, however, was a complete lack of fighting spirit on the part of the Shantung troops.

Shansi Front. No fighting of any importance has occurred on any of the fronts since the last report. Intermittent attacks have been made by the Fengtien armies besieging Niangtzekuan pass, but without success. At present the Fengtien objective is Hsueh-hanshan, a pass about three miles west of Tsingsing. Without the occupation of this pass Tsingsing itself is untenable. Yen Hsi-shan regards Niangtzekuan as impregnable, and as a result has moved the major portion of his forces to the northern part of the province, probably with the object of sending them out through Yenmenkuan and operating down the Peking-Suiyuan railway in case Feng captures Shihkiakwang.

Operations on the Kin-Han Railway. The Fengtien order for the advance on the Kin-Han railway was issued on April 6th and the movement across the Chang River commenced on the same day. Two regiments of the 14th Brigade of the Kuominchun under the command of General Wei Feng-lou fought a rear guard action about a mile south of the Chang River; Feng Yu-hsiang's main forces being concentrated at Fenglochen, Angangtun and Changte, under command of Lu Chung-lin. The Fengtien advance guard crossed the Chang River on pontoon bridges. Before the crossing had been successfully completed the 5th Kuominchun Army launched a serious flank attack on the Fengtien troops that had crossed the river. Fierce hand to hand fighting ensued, the result of which was that Fengtien troops routed two brigades of the Kuominchun and captured one thousand prisoners. Fenglochen was occupied by Fengtien troops at 8:00 p.m. on the evening of the 6th. While the above mentioned battle was in progress the Fengtien commander ordered the pontoon bridges destroyed, the idea being that death was preferable to retreat, a typical Chinese gesture similar to C hang Tsung-chang's carrying his coffin to the front.

The Fengtien forces continued to concentrate at Fenglochen. After the loss of this place, Feng's main forces were massed at Changte and on the morning of the 8th launched a very serious counter attack which came very near to resulting in the recapture of Fenglochen. However they were finally repulsed by the Fengtien forces. In this engagement the killed and wounded on both sides amounted to about ten thousand men, including one Kuominchun division commander, and three brigadiers, and one Fengtien brigadier-general and three regimental commanders. In order to reap the fruits of this victory the Fengtien forces pushed on directly toward Changte without delay. On the morning of the 9th the Kuominchun began their retreat from Changte leaving a sufficient force in the city to cover the withdrawal. Through the combined use of armored trains, infantry and cavalry, the Fengtien forces succeeded in capturing the railway station at Changte. Feng's forces retreated southward from Changte offering little resistance. Within the city wall of Changte the Kuominchun, consisting of four divisions, continued to hold out stubbornly. On the 13th the city was bombarded from three sides and the same day Hanlinshan, a point southwest of Changte, fell into Fengtien hands. On

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the 14th Feng Yu-hsiang's reinforcements,consisting of several divisions, arrived and on the 15th counter attacked Hanlinshan but failed to recapture it. On the 19th and 29th Fengtien armies were still besieging Changte. Later, however, they have been withdrawn north of the Chang River, north of Fenglochen, due to a number of reasons, namely; a desire not to over extend their line after the reverses in Shantung, trouble in maintaining communications from front to rear due to depredations of the "Red Spear Society", and a threat on their flank from a part of the Kuominchun right flank which succeded in secretly crossing the Chang River north of Lincheng.

Miscellaneous.

General Li Chai-sun, the Kwangtung commander, is reported to have reached an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek to the effect that he will remit the sum of $2,000,000 monthly to the Nanking Government for the expenses of the northern campaign in lieu of sending troops to take part in this offensive, as he has no forces available for this purpose.

The Hankow authorities continue to maintain a lukewarm attitude toward the northern drive. So far no troops have been sent to northern Honan to assist the Kuominchun, although the Hankow and Changsha military leaders are massing heavy forces of Hunanese troops in Wuchang ostensibly for this purpose.

General Chu Pei-teh, the military governor of Kiangsi, is mobilizing his forces in Kiukiang with the object in view of sending them to the Shantung front. One division has already been dispatched to Pukow.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

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Office of the Military Attache, Peking, China, April 25, 1928, To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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6180
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 16 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The 3rd and 4th Army Groups
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun)

8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin)	Shunte-Tzechow area	18,000
9th "	(Kao Wei-yueh)	North of Yenmenkuan . . .	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-chang)	Lungchuankuan area. . .	15,000
11th "	(Liu Wei)	Paoting area & Shihkiachuang .	12,000
11th "	(Fu Shuang-ying)	(newly organized reserves) Peking . . .	15,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chiao)	Shunte-Hantan area . . .	18,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun)	Suiyuan area	15,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	Tingchow, Shihchiachuang and west	17,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	Tingchow, Shihchiachuang and west	16,000
20th "	(Yü Hsüeh-chung)	Hantan area	15,000

The 5th Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

12th Army	(Tang Yu-lin)	North of Yenmenkuan. . . .	15,000
30th "	(Yu Chih-shan)	Fanchih area	10,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	north of Yenmenkuan. .	18,000
Kirin "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	" " " . .	17,000
5th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Jehol & " area	20,000
Kirin Cavalry troops in Tehchow (Shantung) area. .			10,000

Forces not Included in Above

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall	80,000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan	10,000
Total	336,000

Increased 40,000 by recruiting, shifting of 20th Army from Chihli-Shantung to Fengtien control, and formation of new 11th Army reserves.

The 2nd Army Group.

Chihli-Shantung Forces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

3rd Army	(Cheng Kuo-jin)	Tsinan and Tsingtao
8th "	(Wang Tung)	Lincheng area
1st "	(Wang Chao-chung)	Tsaochuang-Taierchuang area
2nd "	(Chang Ching-yao)	Tsaochuang area

From M/A, China Report No. 7233 March 10, 1928

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7th Army	(Hsü Kun)	Tsaochuang area	
9th "	(Chu Pan-tsao)	" "	
25th "	( )	Taierchuang area	
10th "	(Tu Feng-chü)	Tsining area	
12th "	(Ma Yu-jen)	" "	
11th "	(Wang Han-ming)	Ichow "	
4th "	(Fang Yung-chang)	" "	
13th "	(Liu Chih-lu)	Tsaochow area	
23rd "	(Yang Ching-cheng)	" "	
30th "	(Mao Cheng-en)	Southwestern Shantung	
Honan Ally	(Kou Ying-chieh)	Tungchang area	
1st Fengtien Artillery Brigade	(Chin Ching-ching)	Techow	
6th Army	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Taming and Tunchang areas	
14th "	(Sun Tien-ying)	Taming area	
16th "	(Yuan Chen-ching)	" "	Total . . . 76,000

Strength reduced 15,000 by transfer of forces of Yü Hsueh-chung to Kin Han line, but total loss only 12,000 because of transfer of 1st Fengtien Artillery Brigade to Techow.

The 1st Army Group.

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces - Yenchow-Tsining and Western Shantung.

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)	
2nd "	(Cheng Chun-yen)	
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)	
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)	
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)	
	Total . . .	60,000

Strength of individual armies not known.
Strength increased 10,000 by recruitment.
Note: Sun Chuan-fang has control of the Chihli-Shantung armies on the front in southern Shantung.

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN . . 472,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT.

Commander-in-Chief . . . . . Chiang Kai-shek

1st Army	(Liu Chih)		25,000
6th "	(Shih Te-chün - newly organized)	Liu	15,000
9th "	(Ku Chu-tung)	Chih	15,000
10th "	(Yang Sheng-chih)		15,000

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Carried forward - forces under Liu Chih				70,000
27th Army (Hsia Tou-yin newly organized)	Chen			15,000
33rd " (Chang Ke-yao	Taio-			18,000
37th " (Chen Taio-yuan	yuan		Northern	16,000
17th " (Tsao Wan-shun			Expedition	12,000
26th " (Chen Cho	Ho		under	10,000
40th " (Ho Yueh-tsu	Yueh-		Chiang	16,000
Independent Divisions	tsu		Kai-shek	20,000
Iron Army (remnants of Chang Fa-kuei's forces)				6,000
Total				183,000

Increased 42,000 by reason of recruiting, organization of new units, and incorporation of Chang Fa-kuei's old forces.

3rd Army (Wang Chün) Under Chu Pei-teh			20,000
9th " (Ching Han-ting) Nominally under Nanking Government			10,000
Total			30,000

(c) HUNAN MILITARISTS

8th Army (Li Pin-hsien)			25,000
17th " (Chou Lan)			10,000
18th " (Yang Chieh)			10,000
35th " (Ho Chien)			13,000
36th " (Liu Hsing)			12,000
Provincial troops and miscellaneous forces			10,000
Total			80,000

The 18th Army, recently identified, is added but because of recent losses in other units no increase in strength is shown.

(d) KWANGSI MILITARISTS

3rd Army (Liu Pao-ti)	Pai Chung-hsi		5,000
13th " (Chen Chia-yu)	Pai Chung-hsi		20,000
7th " (Hsia Wei)			17,000
18th " (Tao Chun)	Li Tsung-jen	Kwangsi	8,000
19th " (Hu Tsung-to)	Li Tsung-jen	Party in possession of Hupeh	15,000
2nd " (Lu Ti-ping)			15,000
6th " (Cheng Chien)	Cheng Chien		15,000
43rd " (Li Yen-chih)			10,000
Wei Yi-San's troops			8,000
Total			113,000

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4th Army	(part - Li Chi-shen)		20,000
7th "	(" - Huang Shao-hsiung)		15,000
11th "	(Chen Ming-shu)	Kwangsi	
	Fukien & Kwantung)	Party	20,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)		20,000
5th "	(Li Fu-lin) under control of Li Chi-shen		
		Total	85,000

Increased 20,000 by incorporation of 5th Army and units formerly under Chang Fa-kuei.

TOTAL KUOMINTANG . . 491,000

(f) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 100,000

(g) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu area
3rd "	(Hsu Yung-chang)	" and north
5th "	(Fu Jun-chun)	Chengtai R.R.
6th "	(Feng Yu-tang)	" "
8th "	(Tan Ching-lin)	Lungchuan area
1st "	(Shang Chen)	Yenmenkuan "
4th "	(Lu T'sun-huai)	" "
7th "	(Chang Chin-wang)	" "
10th "	(Li Wei-hsin)	" "

Total 90,000

Strength of individual armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

(h) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	300,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Honanese	75,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

Fengtien-Shansi War. No fighting of importance has occurred on any of the fronts since the last report. The principal forces threatening Yenmenkuan, and Lungchuankuan (on Chihli-Shantung border directly west and slightly south of Paotingfu), the positions of which are indicated on the accompanying map, have confined their activities to skirmishing on their immediate fronts.

West of Tingchow and Shihkiachuang there has been no change in the situation. The 15th Army has been shifted to the Suiyuan area, where Chi Chin-chun, commanding this organization, has assumed office as Tutung of Suiyuan.

The Shansi troops who surrendered at Chochow and were later reorganized into a Fengtien Division with station at Tungchow, have all been sent to Manchuria where they are to be broken up into small detachments under the command of General Wu Chün-sheng, Tupan of Heilungchiang. It is reported that these troops numbered around seven thousand while stationed at Tungchow, but when the order was received sending them to Heilungchiang, all but about fifteen hundred escaped into the surrounding country.

War in Southern Chihli. At the time of the last report, the Kuominchun forces, which during the first few days of February were seriously threatening Taming, had been withdrawn to a line running approximately from just north of Changte on the Kin-Han, east to a point between Tsingfeng and Nanlo. At that time some of Feng's allies stationed to the south of Loyang and Kunghsien had rebelled against him and were threatening these points, hence further withdrawals of Kuominchun troops from southern Chihli were anticipated. Feng Yu-hsiang, however, promptly and apparently effectively settled the trouble in his rear by despatching troops under Han Fu-chu to the threatened areas, and since about the 15th of February the Kuominchun has again assumed an offensive attitude in Southern Chihli.

Feng's troops north of the Yellow River, numbering about 50,000, are now under the command of Lu Chung-lin, one of his ablest and most trusted generals. The Kuominchun have not as yet begun a general offensive but have kept up a series of sporadic attacks between Fenglochen on the Kin Han east to Taming. The area of heaviest pressure has been around Linchang, now reported in the hands of Feng's troops.

To meet the Kuominchun threat, or possibly to prepare for a general offensive in southern Chihli, Fengtien has concentrated practically the entire 8th and 29th Armies between Hantan and Tzechow, and in addition has transferred the 20th Army, a Honan ally of the Ankuochun, from the Tsinpu line to the Hantan-Tzechow area.

Chu Yü-pu is in command of the Chihli-Shantung troops in the Taming and Tungchang areas. The present state of morale in the Chihli-Shantung armies is very bad, and the capture of Taming would not be at all unexpected.

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Subject: Situation Report.

Feng's present activity in southern Chihli may later assume the aspect of a real drive to the north, or he may merely be attempting to lure Fengtien into concentrating a large force on his front in order to give Yen Hsi-shan a favorable opportunity to launch a sudden attack in either the northern Shansi or Shihkiachuang areas. Meanwhile only about a half of Feng's troops are equipped with rifles and his supply of ammunition is very meagre. It is difficult to believe that he can accomplish much against unshaken Fengtien troops.

Situation in Western Shantung. Sun Chuan-fang, whose troops have been holding the front of the Tsinpu line, has shifted his main body to Yenchow and Tsining, and is now in charge of operations in southwestern Shantung. Besides his own troops, he has under his control the 13th and 23rd Chihli-Shantung armies, both of which organizations have been attacking Tsaochow since about the 20th of February. On the 4th of March it was reported that this place had actually fallen to the 23rd Army, but was later recaptured by the Kuominchun. Feng Yu-hsiang's troops in the Tsaochow area are under the command of Liu Chen-hua, a former Honanese ally of Wu Pei-fu, who operated against the Kuominchun during the siege of Sianfu in the fall of 1926. His loyalty to Feng is questionable, and this fact, together with the necessity of withdrawing large numbers of troops for service in northern Honan and southern Chihli has greatly weakened the Kuominchun in southwestern Shantung.

Situation on the Tsinpu Line. Sun Chuan-fang's troops on the front line running approximately from Hanchuang east through Taierchuang and along the Shantung-Kiangsu border to the sea coast have been replaced by units of the 7th and 25th Chihli-Shantung Armies which are believed to be operating under Sun Chuan-fang. Thus all Chihli-Shantung units in southern Shantung are now under the control of Sun Chuan-fang, who has secured a firm hold on this large portion of the province.

The demobilization of the White Russian units, which was mentioned in the last report, was actually begun on February 1st, and now the only Russians left under the direct control of Chang Tsung-chang are the crews of four armored trains, numbering about 400 men. On January 1st, the Russians under Chang Tsung-chang numbered about 3,500 men, while on February 1st at the time the disbanding was begun, there were only about 1200, some of which are still awaiting disposition at Tsinanfu. This large decrease in such a short time was due to battle casualties and to lack of pay which caused large numbers of desertions. The disbanded Russians are being sent out of Shantung in detachments to various points in Manchuria.

There has been no fighting, other than a few skirmishes, on the Tsinpu line and to the east thereof since the last report. At the present time, however, Chiang Kai-shek is apparently preparing in earnest for his widely heralded anti-northern campaign, and has assembled a force estimated at about one hundred thousand men in the northern part of Anhui and Kiangsu, the main point of concentration being at Hsüchow. The general dispositions of these forces are shown on the accompanying map. Large quantities of munitions for this anti-northern army have been reported as being sent from Shanghai to Nanking for shipment up Tsinpu line, and a resumption of the offensive on the part of the Nanking Government forces is generally expected in the near future.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

If Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Yen Hsi-shan could unite on a definite and properly coordinated plan of campaign, the present position of the Ankuochun would be a very dangerous one. All three of these leaders, seem, however, disposed to adopt a policy of waiting, each hoping that one of the others will assume the offensive, leaving the remaining two in a position to reap any possible advantages. This state of affairs may continue for some time, or real fighting may break out on some front in the very near future.

Situation in Hunan. The Kwangsi militarists, since the last report, have continued to increase their power in Hunan. Ho Chien (35th Army) has retreated to Taoyuan, the 18th Hunan Army is shut up in Changte by the 2nd and 13th Wuhan armies, and the most of the remainder of the Hunan forces have now withdrawn to the vicinity of Paoking and Leiyang. Recent reports indicate that many of these ex-Tang Sheng-chih troops have turned communist and are spreading terror in southern Hunan and northern Kwangtung. Hengchow has been captured by the 7th and 19th Wuhan armies, and the early fall of Changte is expected. Negotiations are now in progress between the Kwangsi and Hunan forces, and it is very likely that a settlement will be reached in a short time which will terminate hostilities between organized armies for the present at least.

Chiang Kai-shek is trying to induce both the Wuhan and Hunan forces to join with him on the northern expedition. If conditions in Hunan become more settled, some of the armies of that province may support him, but it is not believed that any of the Kwangsi militarist group will rally to his standard.

Situation in Kwangtung and Fukien. Li Chi-shen has now succeeded in extending his influence over the province of Kwangtung, except in scattered areas where the communists are in control. Chen Ming-shu, commanding the 11th Army, who aided Li in his fight against the "Iron Army" forces of Chiang Fa-kuei, was given a political post in Canton, which he later resigned. He has still a considerable number of troops in the East River area, but Swatow, where he was in command at the time of the last report, is now under control of Chen Chi-tang, a subordinate of Li Chi-shen. Chen Ming-shu, foregoing empty civil honors, remains in Canton where he is engaged in trying to re-establish his depleted 11th Army.

The remnants of the "Iron Army" under the immediate command of Liao Pei-nan, are now oddly reported planning to move north through Kiangsi into Anhui to join Chiang Kai-shek in his anti-northern expedition.

All units of the 11th Army, with the exception of a very few troops in some ports in the southern part of the province, are now out of Fukien. The Fukien navy clique is again in control of the coast cities. Yenping is occupied by Lu Hsing-pang, who rules independently except that he gives lip service to Chiang Kai-shek. Banditry is rife in the interior.

G-2 Report 6180

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

General. During the period covered by this report, the military situation has been unusually quiet, but every indication points to a resumption of activity in the immediate future. Hence the disposition of the most important military units are shown in considerable detail on the accompanying map. Great quantities of munitions have been supplied the Ankuochun armies which now may be considered well prepared to face a Nationalist advance.

David D. Barrett
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Military Attache.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, Peking, China, March 10, 1928 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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1928 2657-D-278

April 26, 1928

222

#7259

Subject: Report by Captain Barrett on Visit to Shantung.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 26 1928

1. The following report by Captain David D. Barrett is forwarded as giving a picture of the conditions in the rear areas of the Shantung Army following its minor defeat on April 10th, and later general retreat. As someone aptly described it, "a Chinese army is like concrete without cement". Whereas the Shantung Army is notably bad, the best troops are not comparable to foreign forces.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache
per D. D. B.

Encls:
Report

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WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 28 1928

4.1
April 26, 1928 2657-D-276

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Trip to Shantung.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.

1. Itinerary.

Pursuant to your instructions, I left Peking for Shantung on April 2, 1928, and travelled in that province in accordance with the following itinerary:

April 2	Arrived Tsinanfu
April 8	Proceeded to Lincheng and Hanchuang
April 10	Left Lincheng and returned to Tsinanfu
April 12-13	Proceeded from Tsinanfu to Tsining, via Yenchow
April 15-16	Left Tsining and proceeded to Tsingtao via Tsinanfu
April 17-19	Proceeded from Tsingtao to Taianfu via Tsinanfu
April 21-22	Left Taianfu and returned to Peking.

2. Interesting Personages Interviewed on Trip.

The day after arriving in Tsinanfu, I called on Tupan Chang Tsung-chang and Marshal Sun Chuan-fang. My visit with the latter was brief, as he was preparing to leave for the front beyond Tsining the following day and was very busy. He received me, however, with the greatest courtesy and chatted pleasantly during the visit. Our conversation was confined to general topics, as several Japanese officials were present, so there was no opportunity for turning the talk into more serious channels.

Marshal Sun impressed me as being of a rather serious, scholarly type, very much of a gentleman, and to judge from appearances, a man of good character and one whom I would be inclined to trust. In manner he is unaffected and unaggressive, but beneath this quiet exterior one senses a strong will and unfaltering courage. He looks careworn and not particularly robust although he has a wiry physique which probably stands up well under the strain of active military life.

Chang Tsung-chang also received me most courteously and entertained me at dinner on the evening of the day after I called. He also subsequently invited me to accompany him on his private train to Hanchuang

for an inspection of the front line positions in that locality. I thus had the opportunity for considerable personal contact with the Tupan.

Chang Tsung-chang's outstanding characteristic is an extremely likable personality. While lacking much of the superficial polish which usually characterizes the Chinese in high official positions, he has a simplicity and straightforwardness of manner which appeals to a foreigner much more strongly than unctuous politeness. It seems to me that the description so often heard of Chang Tsung-chang as "a big coolie" gives an entirely erroneous idea. Though he may appear somewhat rough in comparison with a man like Sun Chuan-fang, nevertheless contact with the world and long experience in official and military life has knocked most of the rough edges off of him. When seated at his dining table in his gorgeous foreign style banquet room, handling with assurance a complicated array of knives and forks, he appears entirely at ease and there is nothing about him to suggest a dock hand who has risen to high position in life. As a matter of fact, Merkuloff, who has known him for many years, says Chang was never a coolie but was originally a labor contractor who supplied workers for various jobs in Shantung and the Three Eastern Provinces.

In appearance the Tupan reminds me somewhat of Jack Dempsey. He wears foreign clothes, especially evening dress, with ease and assurance, and in this costume his huge frame, which apparently carries very little excess weight, shows to particular advantage.

In spite of the personal charm which he exercises over all those who come in contact with him, any one who has travelled in Shantung will find his liking for Chang Tsung-chang somewhat tempered by thoughts of the ruinous conditions which have been brought about under his administration. I shall touch on his point later in describing the general situation in the province.

In Tsingtao I was very cordially received by Chao Chi, Director General of Kiao-Ao territory. "The Governor", as he is called, impresses one as a high type of official and all foreigners with whom I talked spoke

very well of him. The American Consul went so far as to say that he considered him the best Chinese official with whom he had ever come in contact, being sincere, hardworking, efficient and apparently honest in money matters. He is extremely well educated, speaks German fluently, and is now studying English. He got his start in Tsingtao under the German administration in some capacity connected with the police. As a result he is very friendly to the Germans. At a tiffin party which the Governor was so kind as to give for me, all the foreign guests with the exception of the American Consul, Vice-Consul and myself, were Germans, and included the consuls at Tsingtao and Tsinanfu, the head of a large mission school, several professional men, and other prominent members of the Teutonic community.

Chao C hi's hobbies are dancing (foreign style), raising and training German police dogs, and the maintenance of a system of making impressions of criminals' finger prints. It is interesting that the German under whom he worked in his early days in Tsingtao is now employed by the Governor as an advisor to the Chief of Police and is in direct charge of the dog raising and finger print recording.

On my trip I naturally met many military officials, the most prominent of whom were Generals Li Tsao-lin, Chief of Staff to Chang Tsung-chang; Chang Ching-yao, the notorious ex-Governor of Hunan who murdered an American missionary in cold blood in Changsha in 1920 and concerning whom the American Legation in Peking demanded of the Chinese Government that he should never again be employed in any official capacity; Hsü Kuo, commanding the 7th Chihli-Shantung army and formerly in charge of troops at Lincheng and Haochuang; and Cheng Kuo-jui, commanding the 3rd Chihli-Shantung Army. None of these officers made any impression upon me except that they seemed a very mediocre lot of men, judged even by Chinese standards.

I met a number of missionaries on the trip and while in Tsining I stayed with Dr. Seymour who has just been reported as having been shot through the heart on the 17th of April, two days after I left. He was a very fine type of man, quiet, kindly and broadminded. He had been a missionary doctor in China for 35 years, and although 65 years of age was still vigorous and active. In Taian I stayed at the house of Mr. Hobart, the senior missionary of the Methodist Church in China, who went through the siege of the legations in Peking during the Boxer uprising. He is another very fine man. I found that the older missionaries with whom I talked had a very reasonable attitude toward the Chinese and were singularly free from the tendency to overestimate their virtues, a tendency which is characteristic of the more newly arrived workers in the mission field. These older heads seem to feel that it is hopeless to expect the Chinese themselves to bring order out of the present chaos, and I honestly think that down in their hearts many would welcome a stronger American policy in China.

All the missionaries with whom I talked in Shantung were against Chang Tsung-chang, but on the other hand I could see no evidences of any decided pro-Nationalist sentiment. Feng Yu-hsiang, however, is still very much their hero, and many expressed the opinion that he is still a Christian and a fine man.

Mr. A. T. Harr, of the Standard Oil in Tsinanfu, and his two assistants, Mr. Avent and Mr. Wolf, were all very kind to me and give me much valuable information about local conditions in that province. Mr. Hand, of the Anderson Meyer Company, was also of assistance to me in gaining information, particularly about the Tsinanfu airdrome. Mr. Hand has had some experience in army intelligence work and is a valuable contact.

I had several interesting talks with Merkuloff, Chang Tsung-chang's Russian advisor. He is of course thoroughly acquainted with the inside facts of the present situation in Shantung, but just now his

opinions are to be taken with somewhat of a grain of salt as he is not on nearly so good terms with Chang Tsung-chang as he was formerly. About all that Merkuloff does now is to try and collect money owed him by the Tupan, a task in which he is apparently not having any great success.

3. Places of Interest Visited on the Trip.

Besides the front line at Hanchuang, to which I shall devote a separate paragraph, I visited the Tsinanfu Arsenal, the airdrome, and the Tupan's new military camp at Hsinchuang near Tsinanfu. The arsenal and the airdrome will be written up for the Digest. The Hsinchuang camp covers a very large area, about a square mile, just to the west of the city. The barracks are new, and well built, and the whole place is thoroughly policed. There is a fine parade ground large enough for the garrison training of at least a division of troops. The camp is connected with the city by an excellent macadam road, and is constructed in a manner which would do credit to a western military leader.

In Tsingtao I was refused permission to visit the arsenal and coast defenses. The American Consul stated that in his opinion the reason for this was the fact that both of these are of such small importance that the local military officials were actually ashamed to have a foreigner know the truth about them.

5. Observations on Visit to Front at Hanchuang.

I was originally informed that Tupan Chang Tsung-chang would probably leave for Hanchuang about 11:00 o'clock on the night of April 6th, but as a matter of fact his special train did not depart until 6:00 a.m. of the morning of the 8th. I was interested to observe that on the Tupan's train there was no regular assignment of space to anyone; it was simply a case of everyone securing for himself as good a place as his rank or influence would enable him to hold. At first I was crowded into a second-class compartment with three officers of the foreign relations section of his staff. We all were very uncomfortable, for although each

of us had a berth, with their numerous pieces of baggage there was scarcely room to turn around. It is a tribute to the innate courtesy of the Chinese that not once did I see one of these officers express a trace of annoyance at my presence in their compartment. As a matter of fact they made me feel as if my being there brought them the greatest pleasure, when I knew that the exact opposite was the case. After the train got under way I was given a first-class compartment all to myself in one of the Blue Express cars. Not to appear too selfish, I invited one of the officers whose compartment I had originally shared to occupy the new one with me.

At Yenchow, Marshal Sun Chuan-fang boarded the train and a so-called military conference was held. During this conference, I went into the Tupan's car to pay my respects to him and the Marshal and found them and their staffs engaged in what appeared more like an informal get-together than a meeting for the transaction of any serious business. There was no sign of any maps or of any other paraphenalia which one associates with a council of war. And yet this was supposedly the eve of a big push on the part of both military leaders.

En route to Lincheng and Hanchuang, guards of honor were paraded at every station of importance, but the Tupan did not once leave the car to inspect either these or any troops stationed in the larger towns.

We arrived at Lincheng on the afternoon of the 8th, and the following morning the special train proceeded to Hanchuang where the Tupan, his bodyguard and his entire staff detrained and proceeded to the front line. The defenses at Hanchuang consisted ofasimple fire trench dug on the south side of the Grand Canal. In all the Tupan inspected about a half mile of this trench extending to the west of the railroad. The inspection was carried out very casually, the Tupan sauntering over the ground in a most informal manner followed by his staff. There was

a splendid field of fire to the front of the trenches and this he scanned with field glasses for a possible glimpse of enemy outposts, but all any of us were able to see was two men in the distance who may or may not have been Kuomintang soldiers. None of the officers accompanying the Tupan seemed to know what was to be found in front of the position or where the enemy outposts, if any, were likely to be located. Apparently not a single map was brought along on the inspection, or if one was carried no one looked at it. The Tupan talked in a good natured manner to some of the soldiers posted as sentries in the front line trench, and seemed to be in an excellent humor. At one point he called me into a house, slightly in rear of the line and occupied by a squad which posted one sentry in the trenches. He told me that this squad had been constantly on duty for four months and as a reward for their faithfulness he gave the squad leader ten silver dollars and told him to buy the men some extra food.

There were no dug-outs or shell-proof shelters in the portion of the trenches inspected by the Tupan.

Counting his bodyguard and staff, there must have been at least five hundred persons accompanying the Tupan on his little tour of inspection, and if the Kuomintang had been at all alert in this vicinity it would have been dangerous for so large a party to march in broad daylight to a position supposedly so close to the enemy.

The inspection, such as it was, lasted about two hours, after which we all boarded the train again and went back to Lincheng. The next day I left Lincheng and returned to Tsinanfu. At that time I felt considerable confidence in Chang Tsung-chang's ability to hold at Hanchuang, or if he so desired, to conduct a fairly strong offensive from that point. The troops around Lincheng and Hanchuang had practically all been withdrawn to Tsinan after the defeat at Hsuchow last year and had been rested and reorganized. The majority were fairly well clothed, and

many had new rifles. On the Tupan's arrival a month's pay in hard cash was distributed to every soldier, which should have raised their morale to some extent. The very next day after the Tupan concluded his inspection, however, the Kuomintang attacked his position at Taierchuang and broke through with very little difficulty. On the 9th at Hanchuang, however, I am sure that Chang Tsung-chang had absolutely no idea that he was going to be attacked at this point.

6. Personnel of Chihli-Shantung and Allied Armies.

In spite of the reorganization and weeding out of undesirables which took place in Chang Tsung-chang's armies during the winter, his troops impress one as very poor. The majority are dirty, undisciplined, and very badly set up. There appears to be a total lack of any of the snap and aggressiveness which characgerize good troops. They apparently lack any fighting spirit whatsoever.

Poor as are the men, the officers appear even worse. The average company officer has nothing to distinguish him,as far as superiority in bearing or military appearance is concerned, from the rank and file, while officers of field rank in general are very young and obviously unfitted for positions of responsibility. The men have apparently very little respect for the officers and discipline appears to be badly maintained.

Many lieutenants and captains acting as aides to high civil and military officials perform duties of the most menial sort, and are in fact nothing but body servants. To allow officers to act in such capacity cannot but tend to lower the respect of enlisted men for commissioned rank. Rank has also been cheapened in Chang Tsung-chang's army by the giving of commissions to a vast number of persons, such as private secretaries, advisors, etc., who perform no military duty whatsoever.

Chang Tsung-chang's forces are tremendously overstaffed, and every officer who has a semblance of ability is generally doing some duty other than that of commanding troops, thus leaving only the worst sort

of incompetents to lead the men in actual combat. Many of the officers on important staff duty have had no experience in troop leading at all. An example of this is the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Chihli-Shantung Army. This officer told me himself that two years ago he was a newspaper reporter in Peking and joined the army because economic conditions became so bad that he found this business unprofitable. He rose to his present position without ever having been in command of troops. That the few good officers in Chang's army are fully aware of the shortcomings of the present commissioned personnel is evidenced by a statement which a major of the general staff made to me to the effect that he considered the average major now in command of troops as about the equal of a second lieutenant of two or three years ago.

Both the soldiers and officers in Sun Chuan-fang's forces are visibly superior to those under the command of the Tupan. The men are cleaner, better drilled, and better disciplined. It is also reported that they treat the civil population better. The officers are in general older, have a much better bearing, and are treated with more respect. The average age of the officers in Sun's army is greater and there are many less staff officers. Also, high rank has not been bestowed with such a liberal hand. All of these factors react favorably on the efficiency of Sun's commissioned personnel.

7. Training. I had little opportunity to make a study of training methods in either Chang's or Sun's forces. Such troops of the Tupan as I saw under instruction were receiving nothing but the usual perfunctory drill in marching, which consists of an almost laughable imitation of the German goose step. Non-commissioned officers were noticeably harsh in their treatment of the men, and almost all had the fault of keeping the men standing in the most awkward and constrained positions while explaining some movement of the goose step.

At Hsinchuang I saw a battalion of Sun's infantry in extended order drill. While this was carried out with too much emphasis on the maintaining of regular intervals and alignment, it was still a relief

from the interminable goose stepping of Chang's men.

8. Cause of the Debacle in Shantung.

The main causes of Chang Tsung-chang's recent defeat in Shantung are easily discernible. Besides the lack of fighting spirit in his men and the poor quality of his officers, which would naturally make his chances of success unlikely in the event of any determined attack, he made an exceptionally poor disposition of his forces along the Tsin-Pu line. He concentrated the main body of his troops between Lincheng and Hanchuang, where they were in a very unfavorable position to maneuver in the event of an attack on Taierchuang which was a weak spot on his left flank. If he had placed a large reserve at Yihsien he would have been in a position to rush reinforcements to any threatened point on his front, but as it was, after the enemy broke through at Taierchuang and threatened Lincheng from the rear, the large forces south of this point were practically useless and were thus compelled to withdraw without putting up a fight.

In addition, there was no proper coordination, and no little jealousy and suspicion between Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang. Neither knew much about what the other was doing, as is evidenced by the fact that when I left Tsining at noon on April 15th not a whisper of the defeat of Chang's troops at Lincheng and Taierchuang had reached this point. As a matter of fact, the situation was not fully understood even in Yenchow, through which I passed on Friday, April 13th. At that time aviators who had supposedly patrolled the front line the day before stated that there was no evidence of any unusual activity around Lincheng.

About the time that Chang Tsung-chang was being hard pressed south of Tenghsien, a report came from Tsining that the Kuominchun had taken Kuyeh and were pressing on Tsining and Yenchow. When this report, which was greatly exaggerated, was received the Shantung troops abandoned all attempts to resist the pressure from the south and retreated northward in confusion.

In my opinion failure to properly supply the troops at the front cannot be named as one of the causes of Chang's and Sun's defeat. I saw many train loads of ammunition and flour both at Lincheng and Tsining. Sun's ammunition was all supplied by Chang, and the Tupan apparently made an honest effort to give him good support in this respect. When it became apparent that defeat was inevitable in southern Shantung, most of this ammunition and flour was hurried to the rear, so that retreating troops were short of food for several days until they reached the vicinity of Taian.

9. Trips on Armoured Trains.

On April 20th I made a trip on the armoured train "Hu Kwang" from Taian to a point about four miles north of Yenchow. After passing Wutsun, which is about 20 miles north of Yenchow, we did not see a single northern soldier, and from that point on the train proceeded with great caution, with every man at his post and ready for instant action. No signs of the enemy were observed, although at Kufou the station police reported that Kuominchun cavalry patrols had been operating in the vicinity for several days and had cut the telegraph line to Yenchow.

After passing Kufou and arriving within about four miles of Yenchow, the train commander decided that it would be unwise to proceed farther on account of the danger of mines on the track and the possibility of being cut off in the rear, so we stopped and after firing three shells from a seventy-five in the direction of Yenchow railroad station, returned to Taian.

The next day I again boarded the armoured train, and this time I had a wonderful opportunity to realize what a complete defeat had been suffered in southern Shantung. The day before northern troops were to be observed withdrawing all along the line, but not in particularly large numbers, as the main body of the first forces to retreat from the battle areas had already reached Nanyi, Taweukou, and Taian by train, and those coming in on foot had not yet arrived near the railroad.

On the 21st, however, all the way from Taweukou to 20 miles south of Nanyi, the road on both sides of the track was jammed with a solid and unintermittent stream of defeated Chihli-Shantung and Allied (Sun Chuan-fang) forces together, but predominately the former, all making their way north. Besides those on the roads, many were walking across the fields and along the railroad tracks, no semblance of any march discipline being maintained.

It was a sad sight to watch the retreat of this vast horde, for at that time it could be described by no other name. Other than a general attempt to keep armies together, no effort was made to preserve the identity of units.

The majority of the men were in a pitiable condition, many having literally walked the shoes off their feet, and were making their way as best they could barefoot or with improvised rope sandals. All were foot sore and weary beyond description, besides being dirty, ragged, and in many cases badly in need of medical attention. Of course every man who could secure some kind of transportation by horse, donkey, cow, wheelbarrow, cart, or coolie had done so. The condition of the mounts was even worse, if possible, than that of the men. Many of the men had either sold or abandoned their arms, which will be quite a boon to the local bandits and Hung Chiang Hui.

I estimated the number of troops I saw on the road on this day as about 40,000, most of whom were without rations. At Nanyi and Taweukou, however, supplies of food were adequate, but no shelter could be provided except in the houses of the local inhabitants which were of course insufficient for such a large number of men. As a result the troops had to sleep on the ground in the open, and the nights were very cold.

It was evident that no possible reorganization of the defeated forces could have been effected south of Taian, and they were visibly incapable of putting up any sort of fight. Pursuit by even a small body

of either Kuominchun or Kuomintang troops would have thrown them into the most unutterable confusion, but as it was they were allowed to make their way north without hindrance of any kind except sore feet. Strange to say, the morale of the defeated troops did not appear as bad asmight have been expected. All were desperately tired, but most of them were still able to laugh and joke, and when bread was tossed to them from the train they scrambled for it in a perfectly good natured way. There appeared to be no disposition on the part of these troops to get out of hand, and in spite of the large numbers of them constantly arriving in Taian all shops were open and the merchants seemed to have no fear of looting.

At the time I made this last trip on the armoured train, it was evident that Chang would probably be unable to rally his forces sufficiently to hold Taian, even with fresh troops coming up from the rear to reinforce them.

Relations between the Russians on the armoured train and the Chinese troops appeared very friendly. On our second trip, the train personnel distributed large quantities of bread and cigarettes to the regreating troops besides entertaining quite a number of higher ranking officers on board the train itself. The morale of the Russians seems good and they reported that since the reduction in their numbers they have been paid regularly. I found several men of education and refinement among the officers of the train and they treated me with the greatest courtesy.

10. Treatment of Wounded.

As far as I could see, the treatment of wounded is nothing less than barbarous. There are no ambulances for the evacuation of the wounded from the battle fields, and such as reach the back areas do so by means of cart, wheelbarrow, litter, or by riding in an ordinary truck which can not be put to some better use. Those whose wounds permit often walk long distances to the rear.

No first aid packets are carried, and as far as could be observed no first aid of any kind was given on the battle field. I saw hundreds of soldiers whose wounds either had not been bandaged at all or the soldier had used some unspeakably dirty rag of his own to stop the flow of blood as best he could. Many were lying around on the station platforms in the sun or rain, as the case might be, with their uniforms stiff with the blood from their unattended wounds. The number of Red Cross, or Red Swastika men on duty with the wounded is utterly inadequate to look after them, and those that were on duty seemed to do practically nothing to relieve the sufferings of the men. I saw no doctors in attendance on the wounded. Some of the wounded had apparently been without food for some time, for many who could raise themselves to a sitting position or could drag themselves about were buying food from the peddlers around the station. I saw no evidences of any attempt to feed them in a systematic manner.

Military hospitals, in which the conditions are beyond all description, have been established at Tsinanfu and other points. En route to these the wounded are loaded into either box cars or open coal cars, and are given no attention at all en route. As a result large numbers die on the way to the hospitals. I even saw seriously wounded men riding on locomotive running boards and cow catchers, there being no room for them in the cars.

After arrival at the hospitals, the wounded are little better off than if they had been left on the field of battle, for no medical attention worthy of the name is given them. The number of military surgeons is extremely small, and with a few exceptions none of these are foreign trained. Hence, unless he has good luck, a severely wounded soldier can expect little but a slow death from infection. At one hospital in Tsinan I saw yards and yards of dirty bandages which had been carelessly washed and hung out to dry to be used again.

A missionary reported to me that some of the doctors made a very good thing out of selling opium to the wounded, many of whom are anxious to secure enough of the drug to make them temporarily forget their sufferings.

The Chinese soldier when wounded bears his sufferings with remarkable fortitude, and I heard no complaints out of even the serious cases.

11. General Conditions in Shantung.

Chang Tsung-chang has squeezed practically the last cent out of the province and as a result is cordially hated by the majority of the people. In spite of his likable qualities and undoubted personal courage, he is a very poor administrator, and is surrounded by an unusually incompetent and rapacious group of subordinate officials. As a result only a very small percentage of the sums which he wrings from the people reaches his hands for the support of his armies.

All militarists are selfish and Chang is of course no exception, but the general opinion is that he is no worse in this regard than the average and that he would really like to benefit the people of his province but is entirely at a loss as to how to go about it. That he knows many of his subordinates are not to be trusted may be seen from the fact that when he was reorganizing his troops in Tsinanfu last winter, he would not allow their commanding officers to pay them, but performed the duty in person.

Opium cultivation and smoking are very much on the increase. Missionaries in Tsining reported that the drug could be purchased there for one dollar and fifty cents Mex a pound, which is very cheap indeed in comparison with the former price. On the Tupan's train, a place was provided in the dining car for the special accommodation of opium smokers. I also saw smokers on many of the military trains and even one on the sleeper between Tsinan and Tsingtao.

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.6180
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WAR DEPARTMENT
MAY 14 1928

G-2 Report

4-1 1928

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 14 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The Third and Fourth Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang & Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin)	Shunteh-Tzechow area	19,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-chang)	Lungchuangkuan area. . . .	15,000
11th "	(Fu-Shuang-ying)	Shunte	16,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	Tzechow	18,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun)	Shihkiakwang	16,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	Tingchow, Shihkiakwang and west	18,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	" " " "	16,000
20th "	(Yu Hsüeh-chung)	Tzechow	21,000
28th "	( )	Shunteh-Hantan	15,000

The Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh)	North of Yenmenkuan	15,000
12th "	(Tang Yu-lin)	" " "	15,000
30th "	(Yu Chih-shan)	Fanchih area	10,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	north of Yenmenkuan . . .	18,000
Kirin "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	" " " . . .	17,000
5th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Jehol & " area . . .	20,000
Kirin Cavalry troops in Tehchow (Shantung) area . . .			10,000

Forces not Included in Above.

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall	80, 000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan	10,000
Total	349,000

Increased 13,000 by recruiting and additional units. The original 11th Army was disbanded in December, 1927, and replaced by the former 11th Army Reserves and is now known as the 11th Army.

The Second Army Group.

Chihli-Shantung Forces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

3rd Army	(Cheng Kuo-jin)	Tsining
8th "	(Wang Tung)	Lincheng area
1st "	(Wang Chao-chung)	Tsaochuang-Taierchuang area
2nd "	(Chu Hsing-peng)	Tsaochuang area

From M/A, China Report No. 7256 April 9, 1928

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

7th Army	(Hsü Kun)	Tsaochuang area
9th "	(Chu Pan-tsao)	" "
25th "	( )	Taierchuang area
10th "	(Tu Feng-chü)	Tsining area
12th "	(Ma Yu-jen)	" "
11th "	(Wang Han-ming)	Ichow "
4th "	(Fang Yung-chang)	" "
30th "	(Mao Cheng-an)	Southwestern Shantung
Honan Ally	(Kou Ying-chieh)	Tungchang area
1st Fengtien	(Artillery Brigade (Chin Ching-ching)	Techow
6th Army	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Taming and Tunchang areas
14th "	(Sun Tien-ying)	Taming area
16th "	(Yuan Chen-ching)	" "
20th "	( )	Lincheng area

Total 76,000

The First Army Group.

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces - Yenchow-Tsining and Western Shantung.

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)	
2nd "	(Cheng Chun-yen)	
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)	
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)	
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)	
13th "	(Liu Chih-lu)	Chihli-Shantung serving
23rd "	(Yang Ching-cheng)	with 1st Army Group

Total 67,000

Strength of individual armies not known.

Note: Sun Chuan-fang has control of the Chihli-Shantung armies on the front in southern Shantung west of the Tsin-Pu railway.

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN 492,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

Commander-in-Chief . . . . . Chiang Kai-shek

1st Army	(Liu Chih)	Liu Chih (1st Column)	12,000
9th "	(Ku Chu-tung)		12,000
10th "	(Yang Sheng-chih)		8,000
17th "	(Tsa Wan-shun)	Chen Tiao-yuan (2nd Column)	10,000
26th "	(Chen Cho)		12,000
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)		10,000
33rd "	(Chang Ko-yao)		12,000
27th "	(Hsia Tou-yin)	Ho Yueh-tsu (3rd Column)	12,000
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu)		12,000

Carried forward . . 100,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

		Brought forward . . .	100,000
32nd Army	(Chen Ta-chun)	General reserve	8,000
46th "	(Fang Ting-ying)	(Nanking)	7,000
4th "	(Liao Pei-nan)		5,000
11th "	(Fang Chen-wu)	In reserve on left	25,000
24th "	( )	of 3rd Column.	8,000
6th "	(Shih Te-chun)		5,000
12th "	(Jen Ying-chi)		6,000
Independent Divisions			20,000
		Total	184,000
3rd Army	(Wang Chün)	Under Chu Pei-teh.	20,000
9th "	(Ching Han-ting)	Nominally under Nanking Government	10,000
		Total	30,000

(c) REMNANTS OF OLD HUNAN MILITARISTS
(Probably affiliated with Chiang-Kai-shek)

18th Army	(Yang Chieh)		5,000
35th "	(Ho Chien		7,000
		Total	12,000

(d) KWANGSI MILITARISTS

3rd Army	(Liu Pao-ti)	Pai Chung-hsi	)	5,000
13th "	(Chen Chia-yu)		)	20,000
7th "	(Hsia Wei)		)	17,000
18th "	(Tao Chun)	Li Tsung-jen	) Kwangsi	8,000
19th "	(Hu Tsung-to)		) Party in	15,000
2nd "	(Lu Ti-ping)		) possession	15,000
6th "	(Cheng Chien)		) of Hupeh	15,000
43rd "	(Li Yen-chih)	Cheng Chien	) and Hunan	10,000
Wei Yi-san's troops			)	8,000
8th Army	(Wu Shang)		)	7,000
12th "	(Yeh Chi)		)	5,000
17th "	( )		)	6,000
36th "	(Liao Lei)	Li Pin-hsien	)	7,000
4th "	(part - Li Chi-shao		)	20,000
7th "	(" - Huang Shao-hsiung		)	15,000
11th "	(Chen Ming-shu		)	
	Fukien & Kwangtung		)	20,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng		)	20,000
5th "	(Li Fu-lin) under control of		)	
	Li Chi-shen		)	10,000
		Total		223,000

CHINA (Military)

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TOTAL KUOMINTANG . . . 449,000

Reduced 42,000 because of the disbandment of the 8th Hunanese Army and casualties incurred in the fighting in Hunan. The 17th and 36th Armies, former Hunanese armies which surrendered to Cheng Chien, and the newly organized 8th and 12th Armies are now incorporated in the forces under the Kwangsi militarists.

(e) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 100,000

(f) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd	Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu area
3rd	"	(Hsu Yung-chang)	" and north
5th	"	(Fu Jun-chun)	Chengtai R.R.
6th	"	(Feng Yu-tang)	" "
8th	"	(Tan Ching-lin)	Lungchuan area
1st	"	(Shang Chen)	Yenmenkuan area
4th	"	(Lu T'sun-huai)	" "
7th	"	(Chang Chia-wang)	" "
10th	"	(Li Wei-hsin)	" "

Total 90,000

Strength of individual armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS . . . 539,000

(g) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	300,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Honanese	75,000

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General. Since the last report the Ankuochun leaders, at a conference held in Peking about March 20th, decided to launch a general attack on Feng Yu-hsiang. More intensive preparations have been in progress on both sides in the way of moving up troops, supplies and munitions. While there have been no major operations during the period covered by this report, there have been limited attacks against Shansi resulting in the capture of the Tsingsing coal mines near Niantzekuan, minor operations in the Tzechow area resulting in the complete withdrawal of the Kuominchun forces to the south of the Chang River, which flows in an easterly direction between Tzechow and Fenglochen; general inactivity in Shantung; and a slight withdrawal of the Kuominchun in the Taming area. Aside from the collapse of the Hunan militarists and the taking over of that province by the Kwangsi faction, there have been no important military developments elsewhere in China.

Shansi Front. Up to April 1st, there had been no fighting of any importance on any of the fronts. However, on April 4th, the Fengtien troops at Shihkiachuang attacked up the Chengtai railway with considerable success. The objective was the coal fields at Tsingsing which they captured on April 5th and forced the Shansi troops back on Niangtzekuan. The Fengtien forces on the northern Shansi front in the vicinity of Yenmenkuan launched a limited attack on April 1st, which lasted for four days and resulted in a minor Fengtien victory, several small towns near the important pass being captured and occupied. On April 2nd near Shihkiachuang Shansi cavalry troops under the command of Wang Tung-hai transferred their allegiance to the Fengtien side and have since been reorganized as the 37th Cavalry Division.

The suspicion is not unwarranted that the Fengtien successes against Shansi have resulted from a secret arrangement between Fengtien and Shansi designed to provide Yen Hsi-shan with excuses for not rendering assistance to Feng Yu-hsiang.

Operations in Southern Chihli. Both Fengtien and Feng Yu-hsiang have been busily engaged in concentrating troops on the Peking-Hankow railway, Feng Yu-hsiang's main forces remain principally between Chengchow and Hsinhsiang and those of Fengtien being concentrated in the Shunteh-Tzechow area. All during April fighting has been reported along the Chang River, which flows eastward between Tzechow and Fenglochen. Feng Yu-hsiang has been compelled to withdraw all of his troops south of the Chang River, and Fenglochen has been reported in Fengtien hands. The offensive against Feng Yu-hsiang which was decided upon at the conference of the Ankuochun leaders about March 20th has been a very gradual development, but now seems to be serious along the Kin-Han. It is reported, however, that secret orders concerning the employment of all forces were issued to the commanders in the field on the 5th of this month by the Generalissimo, the details of which have not yet been divulged.

No fighting has taken place recently in the Taming area; however, on the 7th inst., the government was in receipt of a telegram from Chu Yu-pu stating that he had ordered a general offensive against the Kuominchun in this area. His troops have not the morale, discipline or equipment to exert any great influence. In fact it is doubted if Chu Yu-pu could withstand even a desultory attack from Feng's troops. After the evacuation of Linchang by the Kuominchun in the latter part of March, the Fengtien front line in this area is established on the Linchang-Nanlo line.

Note: The 15th Army which was erroneously reported to be in the Suiyuan area in the last report has now been positively located in the Shinkiakwang area.

Situation in Western Shantung. There has been no fighting and practically no contact in this sector since the last report. Tsaochow still remains in Kuominchun hands in spite of numerous reports to the contrary. Chang Tsung-chang has induced Sun Chuan-fang to withdraw most of his troops from the Tsin-Pu railway line to the Tsining front. At a military conference held in Tsinan on the 26th of March it was decided to send out 40,000 Shantung troops and 60,000 of Sun's soldiers to attack Tsaochow, Tingtao and Shanshien "from four directions". No such attack has been launched. It is not believed Sun will seriously attack to the southwest unless he is sure that Chiang Kai-shek's preparations are greatly delayed, as it appears highly improbable that Sun would expose his left flank to an attack from the south, with only Chang Tsung-chang to cover him from Chiang Kai-shek's main army.

Situation on the Tsin-Pu Line. Chang Tsung-chang, contrary to our previous information, controls the Tsin-Pu railway and commands the defenses of southern Shantung where a passive defensive appears to have been ordered. On April 9th he proceeded to Linchang to assume personal command. Aside from minor skirmishes, no fighting has taken place on this front.

General Chiang Kai-shek is proceeding with his preparations for carrying out the northern punitive expedition. He has been greatly delayed in launching his attack due to political and financial difficulties. His dispositions are generally as shown on the accompanying map. The right flank which is known as the Second Column is commanded by General Chen Tiao-yuan. The Central force is known as the First Column and is commanded by General Liu Chih, most of this force being concentrated in Suchow. The left flank which is known as the Third Column is commanded by General Ho Yueh-tsu. To the left and rear of the Third Column is another column, probably a local reserve, commanded by General Fang Chen-wei, which it is reported will be under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shekwhen the offensive starts. A general reserve composed of the 32nd, 46th and 4th Armies (the latter two armies being what was formerly known as Chiang Fa-kuei's "Iron Army" which recently joined Chiang Kai-shek from southern Kiangsi) is massed in the vicinity of Nanking. It is estimated that the mobile troops to take part in the so-called "northern expedition" will amount to about 150,000 men, 110,000 of whom are equipped with rifles, and 100-150 guns.

Note: On the last situation map Ho Yueh-tsu was reported to be in command of the right flank column and Chen Tao-yuan of the left flank. This was erroneous, their positions being reversed. The accompanying map has been changed to show this correction.

Situation in Hunan. The Hunanese generals, Li Ping-hsien, Liu Hsing and Chow Lan have surrendered to Cheng Chien, while Ho Chien, Yeh Chi and Yeh Kai-hsing are independent and have joined hands with Chen Chia-yu. Thus the old 8th Army of Tang Sheng-chih is liquidated, and Hunan is practically under the control of the Kwangsi faction. With the fall of Changsha on March 11th, the defenders of which surrendered unconditionally to the Kwangsi troops, large scale operations can be considered as ended at least for the time being. The main Kwangsi forces are now concentrated in the vicinity of Wuhan with no signs that they will immediately participate in the northern expedition.

Situation in Kwangtung and Fukien. There has been little activity in a military way in Kwangtung since the last report, except for sporadic attempts to subdue the Reds on the Kwangsi-Hunan and the Kwangtung-Hunan borders, and in the East River area.

In Fukien, Lu Hsing-fang has extended his influence toward the south and Chang Cheng has become firmly seated in the saddle at Amoy, the remainder of the coastal region remains in control of the navy clique.

3. Miscellaneous Notes (not recommended for Digest).

Following is roughly the military line-up in Szechuan:

Szechuan is practically free from outside influences. All important commanders are nominally members of the Kuomintang Party but Liu Hsiang, at Chungking, is probably the only one whose allegiance to the Party is genuine. While there are perhaps a dozen independent commanders fighting for existence or aggrandizement, the following are the only commanders of any consequence, and they at present fall into three main groups:

a) Liu Wen-hui controls Chengtu and some of the area between there and Chungking. Would tend to take common action with the Chungking group against group (c).

b) Liu Hsiang and Lai Hsin-whei hold Chungking and divide the area between there and Chengtu with Liu Wen-hui. Feeling is always antagonistic between this group and group (c) which controls the Yangtze below Chungking.

c) Yang Sen, Teng Hsi-hou, Liu Tsung-ho and Tien Sung-yao. This loosely affiliated group control the Yangtze Valley below Chungking approximately as far as the Hupeh border, and north and north-eastern Szechuan. Wu Pei-fu is being protected by this group and is sometimes advocated as leader about which this group can accomplish common purposes.

The latter is now at Suiting where he is intensively training some 3,000 men (2,000 rifles). It is said that he drills his troops five hours a day and for the rest of the day he studies Buddhistic Classics and writes poems.

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During the period of this report the following change has taken place in Yunnan, note of which is made on the accompanying map: General Tang Chi-yu has proclaimed his retirement from active life and is reported to be on his way to Japan via Burma. His forces are under the command of Chen Wei-keng, who has recently returned from Hongkong, and who moreover has repeatedly announced that he earnestly desires to make peace with General Lung Yun.

- - - -

A Tsinan telegram dated March 28th reports that the Shantung army is prepared to remove the airdrome to Yenchow in order to bomb Luchow when the general attack is launched.

- - - -

On March 10th, the Russian troops at Tsinanfu were paid, the officers receiving 30% less than was due them and the soldiers being paid in full. The disbanded troops have been divided into groups bound for various places seeking employment as follows: 500 to Shanghai, 175 to Tientsin and 265 to Harbin and the C.E.R. line. Certain Russians voluntarily remained in the service of the Chinese Army on new principles, and have signed yearly contracts. They are divided into cavalry detachments, armored train crews, and bodyguard cavalry for Sun Chuan-fang and Merkuloff; the total number not exceeding 680 men.

Distribution:
4 MID 1 Japan
1 Tientsin 1 Manila
1 Legation

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 1928
2657-D-276

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

March 28, 1928

WAR DEPARTMENT 217

#7241

Subject: Strength Report, British Troops in China.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 30 1928

1. In view of the recurrent question arising in Washington as to the strength of British forces in China, I am forwarding the accompanying strength report in detail as of March 1, 1928, furnished me by the British Military Attache. Accepting the figures furnished by the Consul General at Hongkong, who gives the Hongkong strength as about 4500, it is seen that the British have an aggregate 6783 plus 4500, or 11,283 men in China.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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MAY 1928 MILITARY DEPARTMENT
26 Jan 1928 276
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STRENGTH OF FORMATION AND UNITS NORTH CHINA COMMAND.
1st March, 1928.

Shanghai Area (including detachments at Nanking, Wei Hai Wei, and details Hong Kong)

No.	Formation or Unit.	Shanghai		Hong Kong		Wei Hai Wei or Nanking.		Total		Remarks.
		Offrs.	O.R's	Offrs.	O.R's	Offrs.	O.R's	Offrs.	O.R's	
1.	Command Headquarters.	# 48	#106	-	-	-	-	48	106	# Includes GS (Intelligance, but not 10 MT Drivers.
2.	Shanghai Area.	7	# 22	-	-	-	-	7	22	# 1 MT Dvr. not included.
3.	56th (Field) Coy. R.E.	4	109	-	-	-	-	4	109	
4.	Command Signals.	4	91	-	16	-	# 4	4	111	# Wei Hai Wei. 2 O.Rs. Tientsin not included.
5.	2nd Bn. Suffolk Regt.	18	909	-	-	-	-	18	909	
6.	1st.Bn.Bedfs & Herts Regt.	15	564	-	-	# 4 % 4	#149 %189	23	902	# Wei Hai Wei. % Nanking
7.	1st. North hamptonshire Regt.	23	880	-	-	-	-	23	880	
8.	2nd Bn. Welch Regt.	21	894	-	-	-	-	21	894	
9.	5th Armoured Car Coy.	10	180	-	-	-	-	10	180	
10.	No.12(MT) Coy.R.A.S.C.	5	#121	-	-	-	-	5	121	# Includes 12 Drivers Comd.H.Q. Shanghai Area & Det: Mil: Police.
11.	Supply Depot.	6	43	-	-	-	-	6	43	2 O.Rs. Tientsin not included.
12.	No.7 General Hospital	12	85	-	-	-	-	12	85	
13.	No.12 Field Ambulance	5	122	-	-	-	-	5	122	
14.	Ordnance Depot.	4	41	2	30	-	-	6	61	
15.	Ord: Mobile Workshops	2	20	-	-	-	-	2	20	
16.	Det: R.A.P.C.	5	24	2	13	-	-	7	37	2 O.Rs. Tientsin not included.
17.	Det: Military Police	-	26	-	1	-	-	-	27	Includes 2 O.Rs MPSC 7 O.Rs. Tientsin not incld.
18.	Det: R.A.M.C.	-	-	-	-	1	5	1	5	Wei Hai Wei.
19.	Details,1st Bn.Green Howards	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	
20.	Details,1st Field Bde. R.A.	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	
21.	N.A.A.F.I.	3	30	2	28	-	-	5	58	
	Total (excluding N.A.A.F.I.)	189	4240	4	50	9	347	202	4637	

WAR OFFICE
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 1928
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WAR DEPARTMENT

TIENTSIN AREA.

No.	Formation or Unit	Tientsin Offrs	Tientsin O.Rs	Peking Offrs	Peking O.Rs	Offrs	O.Rs	Remarks
1.	H.Q. and Details.	20	105	-	-	20	105	Includes 10R.RASC Wei Hai Wei.
2.	1st East Yorkshire R.	24	867	-	-	24	867	
3	2nd Border Regt.	20	608	8	292	28	900	
	Total	64	1580	8	292	72	1872	

Grand Total - North China Command.

Officers	Other Ranks	Aggregate
274	6509	6783

At Hongkong there are in addition to the details mentioned 3 white and 1 native Bns. of which 2 Bns. are the normal garrison. Total strength about 4500.

G-2 Report

4.1

2657-9-276
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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 19 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces. . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The 3rd and 4th Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Han Lin-chun)

8th	Army	(Wan Fu-lin) Shunte-Hantan area	18,000
9th	"	(Kao Wei-yueh) North of Yenmenkuan. . .	15,000
10th	"	(Wang Shu-chang) Lungchuankuan area . .	15,000
11th	"	(Liu Wei) Paoting area and Shihkiachuang	12,000
29th	"	(Chi Yi-chiao) Shunte-Hantan area . . .	8,000
15th	"	(Chi Chin-chun) Shihchiachuang area . .	15,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun) Tingchow, " and west . .	17,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen) " " " " . .	16,000

The 5th Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

12th	"	(Tang Yu-lin) North of Yenmenkuan . . .	15,000
30th	"	(Yu Chih-shan) Fanchih area	10,000
31st	"	(Cheng Tso-sheng) north of Yenmenkuan .	18,000
Kirin	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) " " "	17,000
5th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang) Jehol & " area	20,000
Kirin Cavalry troops in Tehchow (Shantung) area .			10,000

(Forces not Included in Above)

Three Eastern Provinces (exclusive of forces within the Wall)	80,000
Peking-Mukden railway to Shanhaikuan	10,000
Total -	296,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces (2nd Army Group) . . . Chang Tsung-chang

1st	Army	(Chang Tsung-chang)	Tsinan-Taian-Yenchow area			
3rd	"	(Chang Kou-jui)	"	"	"	"
5th	"	(Feng Yung-chang)	"	"	"	"
7th	"	(Hsu Kun)	"	"	"	"
11th	"	(Chang Tsung-fu)	"	"	"	"
12th	"	(Ma Yu-jen)	"	"	"	"
17th	"	(Chu Tung-feng)	"	"	"	"
20th	"	(Li Tsao-lin)	"	"	"	"
24th	"	(Pan Hung-chun)	"	"	"	"
29th	"		"	"	"	"

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2nd Army	(Chang Chiang-yao)	Lincheng area	
Honan Ally	(Yu Hsueh-chung)	" "	
10th "	(Tu Feng-chu)	Tsining "	
13th "	(Liu Chih-lu)	" "	
6th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Tehchow and Taming	
14th "	(Sun Kuei-yuan)	Taming area (Kin-Han)	
Honan Ally	(Kou Ying-chieh)	Tungchang area	8,000

Total 88,000

Strength of individual armies not known. Forces reduced 20,000 by recent reorganization of Chang Tsung-chang's forces but total reduction is only 12,000 because Kou Ying-chieh is transferred to Chihli-Shantung forces.

Sun Chuan-fang's Forces (1st Army Group) Henchuang and east to Jihchao

1st Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)	
2nd "	(Cheng Chun-yen)	
3rd "	(Li Pao-chang)	
4th "	(Peng Te-chuan)	
5th "	(Lu Tien-chen)	Total 50,000

Strength of individual armies not known.

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN - 436,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

Commander-in-Chief . . . . Chiang Kai-shek.

1st Army	(Liu Chih)		25,000
3rd "	(newly organized - Wang Chun)		15,000
26th "	(Chen Cho)		8,000
40th "	(Ho Yueh-tsu)		8,000
10th "	(Hsia Tou-yin)	Northern	15,000
11th "	(newly organized -	Expedition	
	Wang Tien-hsi)	under Ho	10,000
14th "	)	Ying-chih	15,000
17th "	(Tsao Wen-chun)		12,000
33rd "	(Po Wen-yu)		18,000
37th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)		10,000
1st Central Independent Army (formerly) 27th Army (Chen Mao-chao)			5,000

Total 141,000

3rd Army	(Chu Pei-teh)	Under Chu Pei-teh	20,000
9th "	(	Nominally under Nanking Government	10,000

Total 30,000

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(c) HUNAN MILITARISTS

8th Army (Li Pin-hsien)	25,000	
17th " (Chou Lan)	10,000	
35th " (Ho Chien)	13,000	
36th " (Liu Hsing)	12,000	
Provincial troops and miscellaneous forces	20,000	
Total		80,000

Reduced 7,000 on account of losses incident to recent operations.

(d) CANTONESE MILITARISTS

4th Army (part - Liao Pei-nan)	6,000	
5th " (Li Fu-lin)	4,000	
11th " (part)	6,000	
Miscellaneous forces	4,000	
Total		20,000

Reduced 20,000 on account of losses incident to recent fighting.

(e) KWANGSI MILITARISTS

3rd Army (Liu Pao-ti)	Pai Chung-hsi	)	5,000	
13th " (Chen Chia-yu")		)	20,000	
7th " (Hsia Wei)		)	17,000	
18th " (Tao Chun)	Li Tsung-jen	)Kwangsi	8,000	
19th " (Hu Tsung-to)		)Party	10,000	
		)in pos-		
2nd " (Lu Ti-ping)		)session	10,000	
6th " (C heng Chien)	Cheng Chien	)of Hupbh	15,000	
18th " (Yang Chieh)		)	10,000	
43rd " (Li Yen-chih)		)	10,000	
Wei Yi-San's troops)		)	8,000	
Total				113,000

Reduced 10,000 by loss of Yeh Kai-hsin's forces. 8,000 of this loss made up by addition of Wei Yi-san.

4th Army (part - Li Chi-shen)			10,000	
7th " (" Huang Shao-hsiung)			15,000	
11th " (Chen Ming-shu		)Kwangsi		
Fukien & Kwantung		)Party	20,000	
15th " (Fan Shih-sheng)			20,000	
Increased 10,000 by incorporation of former Chang Fa-kuei troops				
Total				65,000
TOTAL KUOMINTANG				449,000

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(f) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 100,000

Increased 10,000 as recent reports indicate 90,000 as too low an estimate of these forces.

(g) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd	Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Huailu
3rd	"	(Hsu Yung-chang)	" and north
4th	"	(Lu T'sun-huai)	Talungmen and west
5th	"	(Fu Jun-chun)	Chengtai R.R.
6th	"	(Feng Yu-tang)	" "
8th	"	(Tan Ching-lin)	Tzechingkuan area
1st	"	(Shang Chen)	Yenmenkuan "
7th	"	(Chang Chin-wang)	" "
9th	"	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	" "
10th	"	(Li Wei-hsin)	

Total 90,000

Strength of individual armies not known. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

(h) FORCES NOT PARTICIPATING IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

Szechuan (nominally Kuomintang)	300,000
Kweichow troops	30,000
Yunnanese	40,000
Shensi	70,000
Honanese	75,000

2. Developments Since Last Report.

Fengtien-Shansi War. There have been no developments of importance on any of the fronts since the last report. Threatening northern Shansi, the Fengtien 9th, 12th, 5th (Kirin), 31st and 30th Armies are disposed from west to east in the order named along the line shown in the accompanying map from Shohchow to Fanchih (first unnamed point on river west of Taichow). The 10th Army remains in the Lungchuankuan area (on Chihli-Shantung border directly west and slightly south of Paotingfu).

In the area west of Tingchow-Shihkiachuang are the 15th, 16th and 17th Armies. Despite rumors of impending Shansi attacks in this area, little activity is to be expected in the near future.

War in Southern Chihli and Western Shantung. Feng Yu-hsiang has continued to withdraw his forces from the eastern section of the Lunghai railway and from the Tsaochow area in Western Shantung and to send large bodies of troops north across the Yellow River. He now has around 50,000 men from Sinsiang and Weihwei north. From about the 25th of January on, Feng's troops were moving on Taming, a point of strategic importance as a road center, and at that time garrisoned by only a few

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

thousand troops of the Chihli-Shantung 14th Army. Concurrently, troops of Liu C hen-hua, one of Feng's allies, crossed the Yellow River from Tungming and captured Puchow, threatening Tungchang. By the 2nd of February the Kuominchun, having met little or no resistance, was reported 10 li to the south of Taming. At this time the Fengtien forces which had been occupying C hangte withdrew across the Changho to the vicinity of Hantan.

As soon as it became apparent that Feng was menacing Southern Chihli, both the Fengtien and Chihli-Shantung military authorities began to send reinforcements to the threatened areas. The Fengtien 8th Army and severalindependent divisions were despatched south on the Kin Han to reinforce the 29th Army in the Shunte-Hantan area; while the 6th Chihli-Shantung Army was sent from Tehchow to the relief of the garrison in Taming. The troops on the Kin Han and those in the Taming area established contact during the first few days of February, forming a fairly continuous line between Taming and Hantan. During the past few days, the Kuominchun forces attacking the former point have withdrawn to the south of Nanlo. On the Kin Han, however, the Fengtien armies have not pressed the Kuominchun in their withdrawal and are still north of Tzechow, although Fengtien headquarters daily intimate a coming push south.

On the 9th of February, a report reached Peking to the effect that some of the forces of Yueh Wei-chun, and Fan Chung-hsiu, Shensi and Honan allies, respectively, of the Kuominchun, had revolted against Feng Yu-hsiang on the Lunghai west of Chengchow and were threatening Loyang. This difficulty in his rear may account for Feng's failure to capture Taming.

Situation on the Tsin Pu Line. No operations other than minor skirmishes have taken place to the south of Hanchuang (on Tsin Pu line on Shantung-Kiangsu border) since the last report, and no change has taken place in the relative positions of the Sun Chuan-fang and Kuomintang forces, which are still opposed on the general line running eastward from Hanchuang through Yihsien, Taierchuang, Ichow and Jihchao to the sea coast.

Reliable reports have been received that Chang Tsung-chang's forces are in a state of approaching demoralization because of failure to receive pay for some months back. Because of this condition, all Chihli-Shantung forces were withdrawn from the Hanchuang front before Chinese New Year's (January 23rd), and the entire sector turned over to Sun Chuan-fang's troops. That discontent is rife in the Chihli-Shantung forces is evidenced by the fact that on about the 8th of February an entire regiment, including all officers from the colonel on down, stationed at Yangliutsing near Tientsin on the Tsin Pu line, mutinied and moved northward with all their arms and equipment, plundering several villages on the Peking Mukden line west of Tientsin. The military significance of this occurence is slight, but it shows the present state of morale of Chang Tsung-chang's troops.

Because of lack of funds, Chang Tsung-chang has recently made material reductions in his forces, his idea being to get rid of as much deadwood as possible. In addition to the reorganization of Chinese units, all of the White Russians, except those of the bodyguard cavalry and the crews of the armored trains, are reported to have been dismissed, with their arrears of pay only partially settled.

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War in Hunan. At the time of the submission of the last report, the Wuhan armies (Kwangsi militarists) were pressing on Yochow, but had not as yet advanced to any extent south of the Hupeh-Hunan border. The forces attacking Hunan comprised the 7th, 13th, 19th, 6th and 44th Armies, under Hsia Wei, Pai Chung-hsi, Hu Tsung-to, Cheng Chien, and Yeh Kai-hsin, respectively. The first three named generals are all staunch Kwangsi party men, all having at one time been mixed brigade commanders in the 7th Army under Li Tsung-jen. The other two are Hunanese, allied with the Kwangsi faction.

The Wuhan forces began a determined push into Hunan around the 18th of January. Yochow was taken about the 20th, and on the 25th forces of Pai Chung-hsi entered Changsha. During the fighting around Yocho, the 44th Army was suspected of having gone over secretly to the Hunanese. Part of this command was disarmed, and the rest fled eastward into Kiangsi. The present whereabouts of the remnants of the 44th Army are not definitely known, but it is reported that some units of considerable size are still in occupation of the area just east of Yochow, where they are said to be menacing the Wuhan line of communications.

After the capture of Changsha, the Hunanese forces fled into western and southern Hunan. Ho Chien is reported as still holding out in Changteh, while Liu Hsing and Li Pin-hsien are defending Paoking, Hengchow and Chenchow, upon which points forces of the 7th, 13th, 19th and 21st Armies are now moving from Changsha. To prevent the Hunanese from entering northern Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen, now in control in Canton, is reported to be sending forces to the North River area.

Yang Sen Withdraws from Hupeh. About the middle of January the troops of Wei Yi-san (30th Kuomintang Army) and Li Yen (43rd Kuomintang Army) moved up river to attack Ichang. On the 29th of January Yang Sen was reported to be evacuating this point, which was occupied a day or so later by the troops from down river. The 30th, and 43rd Armies moving by way of the north and south banks of the Yangtze, respectively, are now reported to be following the retreating Szechuan forces to the west and presumably operating in cooperation with the Wuhan faction.

Situation in Kuangtung. The Kwangsi party is now firmly established in Canton, while eastern Kwangtung is in the hands of Chen Ming-shu, who is apparently on the best of terms with Li Chi-shen, and dominates the Fukien situation. The remnants of Chang Fa-kuei's troops, stated in the last report to have been driven into the Yungan-Lungchuan district, have either surrendered to Chen Ming-shu or have fled into southern Kiangsi.

Attitude of Kiangsi. Chu Pei-teh, who controls the province of Kiangsi, has maintained a neutral attitude during the recent fighting between Hupeh and Hunan. It is believed, however, that he probably inclines slightly more to the side of Chiang Kai-shek than to that of the Kwangsi party. At the present time the forces under his control are disposed so as to afford the maximum amount of protection to the Kiangsi border to an attack from Hunan or Kwangtung.

David D. Barrett,
Captain, Infantry,
Assistant Military Attache

G-2 Report

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

1928

2657-D-2336

WAR DEPARTMENT 226

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Sino-Japanese Collision at Tsinanfu
(Including Events up to Noon, May 7th)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 12 1928

Decision to Dispatch Troops and Chinese Protests.

While the circumstances attending the clash on May 3rd, 4th and 5th between the Southern forces at Tsinanfu under Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese expeditionary forces there are still more or less obscure, and widely varied reports as to the causes leading up to it are being published by both sides, the following facts stand out as incontrovertible.

After Sun Ch'uan-fang's and Chang Tsung-chang's debacle on the southern borders of Shantung around the middle of April resulting in the loss to the North of the whole southern section of the province and the practical certainty of the further loss of all of Shantung up to the Yellow River, theJapanese Government, on April 19th, decided to despatch troops to Shantung for the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese in that region. Simultaneously with the despatch of these troops an official explanation was issued by the Government to the effect that troops were being sent solely to protect Japanese lives and property, and the Japanese Minister in Peking, in a Memorandum to the Chinese Foreign Office dated April 20th, officially notified the Chinese Government to the same effect. (For full text of these explanations see Appendix.)

The Peking Government, on April 29th, filed a vigorous formal protest against this despatch of troops, to which the Japanese Government replied immediately, reiterating the reasons stated in the official explanation issued previously. A second protest was filed by the Peking Government on April 21st in which the despatch of troops to Shantung was held as a violation of China's sovereign rights, and in which it was stated that the Chinese Government would be responsible for the protection of foreign lives and property and the Japanese should rely on this protection as a matter of course.

Likewise, the Nanking Government, on April 21st, lodged a vigorous protest with the Japanese Foreign Office, recalling a similar protest a year ago when Japan sent troops to Shantung, and stating that not only was Japan's action a flagrant violation of international law and treaty stipulations, but might also "give rise to serious consequences the responsibility for which would be difficult to determine". A second protest of the same nature was filed by Nanking on April 26th. Similar protests were filed by Chang Tsung-chang and the Civil Governor of Shantung, and announcements were issued by the Hankow and Wuhan Chambers of Commerce calling for a Japanese boycott. Several popular meetings were held in various cities to denounce the Japanese but there had so far been no violance of any kind reported.

(For full texts of the Peking and the first Nanking protests see Appendix. The text of Nanking's second protest is not available.)

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Sino-Japanese Collision at Tsinanfu.

Despatch of Troops.

In spite of Chinese protests the despatch of troops originally decided upon was carried out, 3 infantry companies from Tientsin of a strength of about 475 men proceeding directly to Tsinan, arriving there on April 20th, and the major part of the 6th Infantry Division, about 5000 men, from the Kumamoto garrison, sailing for Tsingtao on April 22 to be stationed along the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway.

The 6th Infantry Division despatched to Tsingtao was made up of 8 battalions of infantry, one battalion of field artillery, one platoon of cavalry, 4 companies of machine guns, one sapper battalion and railway and communications detachments, under the command of Lieut. General Fukuda. The first contingent, about 1400 men, arrived at Tsingtao on April 25th, 600 of them leaving the same day for Tsinan, arriving there on the morning of the 26th, and about 416 for Poshan. The second contingent arrived on the morning of April 27th and detachments numbering 1000 men, including artillery, were despatched at once to points along the railway, probably Tsinan and Poshan. The rest of the expedition arrived at Tsingtao on April 28th. In addition to the Army troops above mentioned, there were by April 28th about 700 Marines at Tsingtao, 500 ashore and 200 aboard ships.

The Japanese Commander in Shantung, General Fukuda, arrived at Tsingtao with his headquarters on the 25th and the next day issued a statement to Chang Tsung-chang, Sun Chuan-fang, Chiang Kai-shek, and Feng Yu-hsiang saying that the Japanese troops had come to Shantung solely to protect Japanese lives and property and that the forces of either side could use the Shantung railway provided they did so properly, but that if any attempt was made to interfere with the working of the line he would take such action as was necessary to keep it open, the maintenance of operation being essential to the carrying out of the purpose of the despatch of troops.

Meanwhile, the despatch of troops along the railway continued and at the time of the fall of Tsinan on April 29th there were about 3000 regular Japanese troops in the city, 616 at Poshan, 133 at Fangtse, several hundred railway troops and 700 Marines at Tsingtao, and the remainder of the expeditionary forces under General Fukuda at Changtien en route to Tsinan, having been unable to proceed farther due to the railway having been cut the night before at Mingshui and Lungshan by the Southern forces. Telegraphic communication between Tsinan and Tsingtao was interrupted at the same time. Finding themselves held up at Changtien the column under General Fukuda sent officials forward to Tailinchih for the purpose of negotiating with the Southerners who held positions along the railway, with the result that they were allowed by the Southerners to proceed toward Tsinan. Due to other breaks in the line between themselves and Tsinan, however, this column did not reach there until about 11:00 a.m. of May 2nd.

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Evacuation of Tsinan and Occupation by Southern Troops.

When the evacuation of Tsinan by the Northern troops commenced on the 29th, the Japanese forces there began enclosing and fortifying two areas comprising part of the foreign settlement. The evacuation was completed on the 30th and the first Southern forces entered the city on the morning of May 1st. During the evacuation by the Northerners considerable looting went on all day, according to reliable Japanese reports, some Japanese suffering as well as Chinese. Japanese troops eventually stopped the looting of Japanese houses, one Chinese soldier being killed during the confusion. Some looting by Chinese soldiers was also reported from other places along the railway, particularly at Weihsien. There were no reports of looting or disturbances of any kind by Southern soldiers during the occupation of the city on May 1st and 2nd. On the contrary, reliable reports from Tsinan stated that everything was quiet, that comparatively good discipline was being maintained by the Southern leaders, and that the Japanese and Southern troops were cooperating in maintaining order.

Telegraphic communication between Tsingtao and Tsinan was restored on May 2nd but railway communications were still interrupted and trains from Tsingtao could operate only as far as Fangtze, retreating Northern troops having cut the line on May 1st at the Tzeno River bridge west of Changtien. Japanese railway troops were sent from Tsingtao to repair the break on the afternoon of May 3rd, at which time it was also reported that the Weihsien-Chefoo motor road was blocked by Northern troops retreating from Weihsien and Fangtze.

On May 1st reliable press reports from Tsinan stated that the city was quiet and that General Fang Chen-wu, commanding the Southern troops so far in Tsinan, had called on General Saito, commanding the Japanese brigade there, to pay his respects and to express his admiration for the strict neutrality maintained by the Japanese forces in the city. Chiang Kai-shek was reported from Tsinan as having arrived there on May 2nd and as having, on his arrival, sent his representative to General Fukuda (who reached Tsinan that day) to present his compliments and ask him to withdraw his troops as soon as possible as the Southern army would exert every effort for the maintenance of peace and order and the protection of foreign residents in Shantung. Other reports from there the same day stated that Chiang had requested Huang Fu, Nanking Minister of Foreign Affairs then at Yenchow, to come to Tsinan at once for the purpose of negotiating with the Japanese for the withdrawal of their troops. What action was taken as a result of these negotiations was not reported at the time.

The Clash.

The next reports received from Tsinan, all from Japanese sources, were to the effect that a clash occurred there at about 10:00 a.m. on May 3rd between the Japanese forces and Southern soldiers. Reports from all sources agree that the fighting became general and for some time was

rather severe; that it continued until about 8:00 p.m. on the 3rd and intermittently all night. There was a lull on the morning of May 4th but fighting again broke out about noon of that day and continued with varying intensity throughout the day, stopping about 7:00 p.m. that night. From that time on the Japanese troops were in a virtual state of siege in the protected concession area, where it is believed most of the foreigners had taken refuge, and communication between the troops and the outside was for the time cut off when the wireless station at the Japanese consulate went out of order and the military radio at Tsinan failed to get messages through. Fighting still continued on the morning of Saturday the 4th, but an American arriving at Tsingtao from Tsinan on May 7th on a Japanese military train reported that by the time he left on the late afternoon of the 6th the city was much more quiet, the Japanese troops being in complete control of their area and all Southern troops withdrawn from it.

A radio report received by the American Consul in Shanghai on May 5th from the American Consulate in Tsinan (apparently over Southern Army radio) confirmed all of the above on the fighting and stated further that the American Consulate endeavored to persuade both sides to cease firing on the 3rd, but each side claimed that while strict orders had been issued to that effect, the other side continued the firing, the fact appearing that units from both sides had become isolated and orders could not be got through; that Japanese artillery had destroyed the Chinese radio station at Tsinan; that Chinese troops were apparently eventually withdrawn from the foreign settlement and by the evening of the 4th it was clear of them; that negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and General Fukuda took place on the night of May 4th, the principal result of which was apparently that Nationalist troops should be withdrawn 20 li from the Foreign Settlement; that the American, British and French Consuls were requested by the Chamber of Commerce and other Chinese organizations to mediate, but beyond using their good offices to further persuade both sides they could do nothing; that representatives of Chiang Kai-shek called at the American Consulate on the night of May 4th offering safe conduct to the Nationalist headquarters which was declined; but that a Special Police guard for the Consulate was accepted. His despatch further stated that all American lives were believed safe, but that certain foreign properties had been looted.

During the course of the fighting at Tsinan the railway between there and Tsingtao was cut in several places by Southern troops, some reports stating in 10 places along the line, the first break about 60 miles from Tsingtao. These breaks in the railway made the sending of reinforcements to Tsinan very difficult, and the blowing up of the bridge across the Yellow River just north of Tsinan on May 5th by the retreating Northern troops made the sending of further troops from Tientsin impossible. The remaining troops in Tsingtao, however, about 900 in number, started out for Tsinan on the evening of May 4th. One hour after these troops had passed Yaokochuang, just west of Kaomi, the railway was cut behind them by plain-clothes men. This column did not reach Tsinan in time to participate in the fighting there.

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Troops Involved, Casualties, Etc.

The number of Japanese troops in Tsinan during the fighting apparently was about 3000 regular troops and about 1000 Reservists, including infantry and machine gun units, and detachments of field artillery, sappers and communications troops. The Chinese forces first engaged in the fight are claimed by the Japanese to be those under Ho Yueh-Tsu, composed chiefly of the 27th, 40th and 4th Armies, some of the latter army having been formerly in the Communist Army of General Chang Fa-k'uei and some of whom participated in the Nanking affair a year ago. The 9th Army under General Ku Chu-tung was also claimed to be involved.

The Japanese military casualties up to and including May 6th were officially reported as 12 killed and 30 wounded, and the civilian casualties as 8 killed, number of wounded unknown. Three other bodies found were reported as so badly mutilated as to make identification impossible. The search for Japanese casualties continued at the time of the last reports from Tsinan. The Chinese casualties are unknown, but it is believed they number several hundred killed, the Southern headquarters claiming over a thousand, civilian and military. Up to the present (May 8th) no foreign casualties other than Japanese have been reported, the American arriving at Tsingtao from Tsinan on the 7th stating that all British, American and German residents were safe when he left on the 6th.

Several thousand Nationalist troops are claimed by the Japanese to have been disarmed during the clearing of the protected area of Southern soldiers following the conference between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Commander. Reliable reports state that certain Southern units assisted in clearing the area of the soldiers participating in the outbreak.

Further Despatch of Troops.

In consequence of the affair at Tsinan 4 battalions of infantry from Manchuria, an airplane corps from Korea consisting of 18 planes and a railway corps from Japan, numbering in all about 3000 men, were despatched on the 5th for Tsingtao. The first contingent of about 1000 men, including part of the air force, arrived there on the afternoon of May 6th and left the following day for Tsinan. The second and last contingent, about 2000 men, arrived on the morning of the 7th, but due to lack of railway rolling stock were unable to proceed to Tsinan. In addition to the above forces, about 5000 Reservists in Tsingtao were called out, and the mine layer Tokiwa ordered to Tsingtao on the 5th. Four destroyers ordered to Tsingtao on May 4th were directed to proceed to Shanghai in anticipation of possible trouble in the South. Three other destroyers already at Tsingtao were also ordered to Shanghai, and two others sent on May 4th to Cheefoo and Lungkow where trouble was expected, a party of Marines landing at the latter place. Reports from Tokyo dated May 7th said that the naval authorities had decided to send 8 destroyers from Kuro to the Yangtze, 7 more from Sasebo to Swatow and Canton. Authority for the despatch of the infantry of the Nagoya Division to Tsingtao, and 5 infantry companies to Tientsin was expected that day. General Ugaki has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the whole expeditionary force in Shantung, which will total about 13,000 men. More Nationalist troops have meanwhile arrived at Tsinan and it is estimated that between 50,000 and 60,000 were in and around the city by May 6th.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Sino-Japanese Collision at Tsinanfu.

The Japanese Version of the Affair.

(This account consists of an abstract of the incident as stated by various Japanese sources.)

The Japanese version of the incident, including official reports from the Japanese commander in Tsinan, is that at about 10:00 a.m. on May 3rd Nationalist soldiers started looting Japanese houses in the area which Japanese troops had decided to guard, the foreign settlement area lying between the railway station and the walled city of Tsinan. When Japanese troops protested against this looting they were fired upon by the southern soldiers and were forced to return the fire. Other Chinese troops in the vicinity immediately joined in the fighting and it soon became more or less general. Just before the fighting started a representative of General Fukuda had left Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters following negotiations for compliance with his request to withdraw Japanese troops from the city. Up to this time order had been maintained and the Japanese representative was prepared to report in favor of compliance. On his way back he saw the disturbance, returned to Chiang's headquarters and suggested that the withdrawal be postponed.

The fighting continued with varied intensity during the rest of Thursday (May 4th) and Thursday night. A number of Chinese soldiers had during this time penetrated the protected area and shot at Japanese from windows and roof-tops. Further negotiations between the Japanese and Chiang were carried on in the meantime, and on the morning of May 4th Chiang Kai-shek issued orders that the Chinese troops evacuate the protected area. This order was obeyed only in part, but things quieted down and Japanese and Nationalist troops, together with Chinese gendarmes, proceeded to disarm the Chinese soldiers remaining in the area. Shortly after 11:00 a.m. on May 4th Southern soldiers began to mass at the east entrance to the area and at 11:30 a determined assault was made. The J apanese had in the meantime re-erected the sand bag and other barriers which had been thrown around the protected area when they arrived but had been partially taken down when, after the Nationalists first arrived, it looked as though there would be no trouble. Communication between the Japanese troops inside the area and the Japanese and other foreigners outside were cut off in the meantime, making it impossible for the defending troops to learn what was happening to the foreigners who had remained in their homes after Chiang Kai-shek's assurances that foreign lives would be protected. Subsequent reports stated that it was still impossible to determine the extent of the damage sustained by Japanese residents, but the bodies already recovered were in all cases badly mutilated, ears and noses being cut off, eyes gouged out and some remains charred. The corpses of the women so far recovered bear evidences of unspeakable brutalities, and one report claimed that during the disorders five Japanese, including three women, were stripped naked and paraded around the city exposed to mockery and insult of all kinds before being murdered.

Lieut. Col. Sasaki, the Japanese officer who had come up to Tsinan from Nanking with Chiang Kai-shek,was assaulted while on his way back to the defense area after an interview with the Southern leader, was badly beaten, had his arm broken, and was about to be shot when a higher Southern staff officer came along and rescued him.

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In a telephonic report to Tsingtao Saturday night, May 5th, the Japanese Consul General at Tsinan stated that measures to prevent looting were taken on May 2nd, and that the following morning he went to see General Chiang Kai-shek at his headquarters to explain the purpose of the Japanese Government in sending troops to Tsinan. On his way back to his own office he noted that looting had already begun. Attempts to prevent the looting were made by the Japanese troops, whereupon the Chinese opened fire and the J apanese were forced to reply in kind. It was agreed at noon that day by the Japanese and the Chinese authorities that firing should cease, and the Japanese did stop, but many of the Chinese failed to obey the order and fighting continued in several places. The consul further stated that he had tried without result to get in touch with Chiang Kai-shek until 6:00 p.m. that day (May 3rd) when a letter was got to him, the result of which was that a representative of Chiang met the Consul and a Japanese staff officer at the Tsin-Pu railway building that night. It was agreed there that the Southerners should withdraw from the settlement and that they should leave only police in the settlement for the maintenance of order. T his agreement was to be effective from 6:00 a.m. May 4th. The Japanese, acting on this agreement, shortened their guard lines but the Southerners failed to comply and fighting began again. The Consul made another agreement with the Chinese military authorities the next day to the effect that fighting should be stopped, and no more fighting occurred thereafter. There is much evidence, the Consul's report continued, that the Southerners had sent parties of plain clothes men into Tsinan to enter the settlement and murder the Japanese. Food in the settlement is scarce, and the electric light and telephone services were put out of order shortly after the trouble began.

General Fukuda's official report from Tsinan emphasises the fact that there was every indication that the outbreak was prearranged, citing a printed leaflet found on a prisoner taken by them, and the fact that many of the Southern soldiers were equipped with hand grenades in anticipation of street fighting. The heavy casualties among Japanese troops and civilians were stated by General Fukuda to be due firstly to the removal of the defense works after Chiang Ka i-shek's assurances of safety and secondly because the attack was launched simultaneously from the front and rear of the Japanese, thus rendering it difficult to rescue civilians outside the guarded area. Twice agreements were made to cease fighting, according to his report, but each time they were violated by lawless elements among the Chinese. Finally, after communication between various sections of the Japanese troops had been broken, the Japanese managed to sweep the guarded area clear of Southern soldiers, many rescued civilians having been concentrated there in the meantime. Communication between the various units was re-established after the area had been cleared of Chinese.

In connection with the Japanese version of the affair, the reports to this office from the Japanese Military Attache in Peking are of considerable interest as indicating a possible effort early in the affair to mould public and official opinion favorable to Japan. A representative of the Japanese Attache called upon the other foreign military attaches with the first news of the clash, and reported on it officially, laying particular emphasis on the fact that the fighting took place with individual Chinese

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soldiers engaged in looting and acting entirely on their own initiative, without knowledge or sanction of their commanders. In further reporting on the affair the next day he stressed the opposite version of the cause of the outbreak, stating emphatically that the attack was premeditated and planned, and carried out under the direction of Southern officers. The latter contention with some modifications is still held by the Japanese officials in Peking.

The Chinese Version.

(This account consists of an abstract of the incident as stated by various Chinese sources.)

An entirely different story is told by Chinese reports from Tsinan reaching Shanghai via Nanking. According to these reports the Japanese at first refused to permit the Nationalists to enter the city. This objection was later overcome by negotiation but a number of Chinese speakers and soldiers going peacefully about their business were arrested. Some Southern soldiers were also prevented by the Japanese from crossing the protected area on their way to the railway station to board trains for the north. On May 3rd, according to the protest to the Japanese Premier by Huang Fu, Nanking Foreign Minister who was in Tsinan when the trouble started, the Japanese commenced firing on Chinese soldiers and civilians for no reason whatsoever. Chiang Kai-shek ordered his men to keep away from the protected area and sent officers to the Japanese headquarters to arrange measures for avoiding a clash. These officers were repeatedly insulted, according to Huang Fu, and the Japanese used machine guns on the Chinese and turned their artillery on government buildings, destroying the Chinese Radio Station, while negotiations with the Japanese Chief of Staff were going on. It is further claimed by the Chinese that Japanese soldiers were sent to attack the office of the Shantung Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, and after cutting off his ears and nose, murdered him and all the members of his staff, 16 in number. The office occupied by Huang Fu himself was fired on and searched by Japanese troops, continues the protest, and countless Chinese citizens and soldiers were murdered.

The report relating to the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and his staff is officially denied by the Japanese Government, an official report from Tsinan stating that they are all alive; that the office of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs is in the area protected by Japanese troops and that he and his staff were protected there throughout the trouble by the Japanese. The Chinese story that the offices occupied by Huang Fu were fired on and searched is also denied by the Japanese officials in Peking, who state that Huang Fu was at Japanese Brigade Headquarters at Tsinan during the worst fighting, where he was given protection by Japanese troops.

Helmer W. Lystad

Helmer W. Lystad,
1st Lieutenant, Infantry

1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, May 9, 1928:
To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded with approval.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

JAPANS OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO SHANTUNG. APRIL 20th.

"At the previous occasion of withdrawing troops from Shantung, a declaration was made specially, stating that the imperial government, whilst having no intention of supporting this or that particular faction involved in the internal war in China, would be compelled to take proper defence measures should peace happen to be disturbed in a territory inhabited by a large number of Japanese, and should there be the apprehension of their being exposed to danger. Now that the disturbance is spread to the refion populated by Japanese, in consequence of a sudden turn of the war situation in Shantung, the government is compelled, in pursuance of the principle contained in that declaration, to despatch a detachment of troops numbering about 5,000, by way of Tsingtao, to places along the Kiao-chow-Tsinan Railway, for the prupose of pretecting the resident Japanese. Pending their arrival three companies out of the infantry stationed in China will be sent to Tsinan as an emergency measure."

NOT UNFRIENDLY STEP

"Troops are in this way to be sent to Shantung, but it is a measure taken inevitably for the sake of self-defence. It is scarcely necessary to add that Japan entertains no unfriendly intention towards China and her nationals; much less does she intend to interfere with military actions of the southern or northern army. As soon as the necessity of stationing troops in the region for the pretection of the Japanese is considered to exist no longer, they will be withdrawn at once, as they were in the former occasion."

JAPANESE LEGATIONS FIRST NOTE TO CHINESE FOREIGN OFFICE, APRIL 20TH, REFERENCE DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO SHANTUNG.

The Japanese legation in Peking addressed three official communications to the Peking foreign office on the subject of the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung. The official translation of these documents was given out to the press yesterday by the Japanese legation. These are published nelow.

The first is the formal first statement on the subject by the Japanese. This crossed in delivery the first Chinese protest. The Japanese legation sent its second note(April 20; II, below) in reply to the Chinese protest. The third Japanese note (April 23; III, below) is in reply to the second Chinese (April 21).

The texts of the Chinese documents was published in the Leader on April 24.

1. The Japanese legation have the honor to remind the waichiaopu of the fact that, as was notified in the memoranda of June 9th and Augusst 20th last, the Japanese government despatched troops to Tsingtao and Tsinan last year for the necessary measures of self defence with a view to insuring the safety of the lives ond properties of the Japanese nationals residing in Shantung and that as soon as the ~~war~~crisis was over and the need warranting such stp disappeared, the said troops were entirely withdrawn.

Now that in consequence of a recent sudden turn of the war situations along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, the disturbances are spreading to the whole province of Shantung, the regions about Tsinan are threatened to be exposed to hostilities, and the railway communications between Tsingtao and Tsinan are feared to be intercepted. The lives and properties of the Japanese nationals in Shantung are consequently faced again with great imminent dangers.

SELF DEFENCE NECESSARY

In the circumstances, the Japanese government are compelled, in pursuance of the declaration contained in the memorandum of August 30th with respect to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops,to resort to the self defence measures and to despatch a detachment of troops numbering about 5,000 men from Japan by way of Tsingtao to places along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents, and, as an emergency measure, in view of the growing seriousness of the situation there, pending their arrival, to send to Tsinan three companies outof the Japanese infantry stationed in China. These companies left Tientsin in the morning of April 20th.

NOT UNFRIENDLY ACT

2. It is clear, as has been explicitly stated in those memoranda, that

the despatch of the Japanese troops is nothing but a measure inevitably taken for the sake of self defence of the leves and properties of the Japanese residents. It does not imply any change of the traditional cordiality entertained by the Japanese government and the people toward China and her people. It scarcely requires to add that Japanese government have no slightest intention of interfering with the internal affairs of China, much less to obstruct or to support, directly or indirectly, the military actions either of the Southern of of the Northern army. It is a matter of couse that as soon as the necessity of stationing troops in the region, as a measure of self defence for the protection of the Japanese residents there, in considered to exist no longer, they will be withdrawn.

WOULD AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING

3. The Japanese legation, while informing the waichiaopu of the above, are instructed to convey the sincere request of the Japanese government that, as the despatch of the Japanese troops is the inevitable measure for the protection of the Japanese nationals, the Chinese government should take such steps as needed to avoid and misapprehension which might be entertained, with respect to the intentions of the Japanese government, by the Chinese officials and people in the Shantung province and other parts of China and at the same time to expedite not to impede the friendly relations existing between the two nations of Japan and China.

PEKING GOVERNMENT FIRST PROTEST APRIL 20TH

The following note was handed to the Japanese legation in Peking by the foreign office under date of April 20, (official translation)

"This Ministry is in receipt of telegraphic information from our Minister in Tokyo to the effect that is is reported that the Japanese Cavinet has decided for the second time to send Japanese troops to Shantung.

"It may be recalled that when, in June of last year, Your Excellency's Government despatched troops to Tsingtao and Tsinan, this Ministry formally protested against such despatch of troops. Subsequently when, in September, the above-mentioned troops were withdrawn, this Ministry, in a memordndum addressed to your Legation, expressed the hope that Your Excellency's Government would refrain from further illegal acts of the same nature.

"Now that our Minister in Tokyo has reported as aboce, this Ministry has the honour to request Your Excellency speedingly to move Your Excellency's Government, in the event that the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung is to be repeated, to abandon the contemplated action in order to preserve the friendly relations subsisting between our two nations."

JAPAN'S REPLY TO PEKING'S FIRST PROTEST

The Japanese legation pay their compliments to the waichiaopu and have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of His Excellency Dr. Lo, the foreign minister, dated April 20th addressed to the Japanese minister to the effect that, according to telegraphic reports from the Chinese minister in Tokyo, the Japanese government have decided to despatch troops from Japan to Shantung, while the waichiaopu formally entered their protest against the despatch of troops by the Japanese government, in June of last year, to the district of Tsingtao and Tsinanfu and also subsequently, in September last, when the above mentioned Japanese troops were withdrawn, the waichiaopu, in a note addressed to thethe Japanese legation, expressed their hope that the Japanese government would refrain from f rther such illegal acts and, if the above telgraphic reports are well founded, the waichiaopu have the honor to request the Japanese minister to advise his excellency's government to abandon immediately the contemplated despatch of troops in order to prrserve the cordial friendship existing between the two nations.

The Japanese legation, however, have the honor to request the waichiaopu to refer to their memorandum addressed, on April 20th, to the latter in which the circumstances and reasons that necessitated the Japanese government to despatch troops for the second time to Shantung are fully expounded.

PEKING GOVERNMENT SECOND PROTEST, APRIL 21ST

The following note was handed to the Japanese legation in Peking by the foreign office under date of April 21. (official translation)

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have duly noted the contents of the two memoranda which Your Excellency's Legation sent this Ministry on 20th instant.

The Chinese Government, however, are unable to acquiesce in the alleged justification for the despatch of Japanese trrops to Shantung, since the question concerns China's soverign rights. The Chinese Government will be responsible for the protection of Japanese nationals in China and on such protection the aforesaid nationals should rely as a matter of couse. This is the customary practice in international law---a point which scarecely requires further elaboration.

In the circumstances, on begalf of the Chinese Government, I have the honor to enter a rigorous pretest against such despatch of Japanese troops and to request Your Excellency immediately to move the Japanese Government ro rescind the decision governing such desptach of troops and recall the troops already despatched to Shantung, so that no adverse effects may be prodeuced on the friendly relations existing between the two nations.

I hope that Your Excellency will favour me with a reply and avail myself of this opportunity, etc.

JAPANESE REPLY TO PEKING'S SECOND PROTEST, APRIL 23RD

The Japanese legation present their compliments to the waichiaopu and have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of His Excellency Dr. Lo, the foreign minister addressed to the Hapanese minister under date of the 21st, instat, stating that the Chinese government are unable to acquiesce in the despatch of the Japanese troops to Shantung, as the alleged justifications for the despatch being a matter concerning China's sovereign rights, and the Japanese nationals should rely solely upon the pretection by the Chinese government and also requesting the Japanese minister to move his government ro rescind the decision governing such despatch of troops and to recall immediately the troops already despatched to Sahntung.

The Japanese legation, in reply, have the honor to refer the waichiaopu to their memorandum of the 20th instant in which the reasons whixh necessiated the despatch of the Japanese troops to Shantung were fully expounded. The lives and property of the Japanese nationals residing in Sha tung are now exposed to such a great imminent crisis that they are unable to rely solely upon the protection on the part of the Chinese authorities.

In the circumstances, the Japanese government, in pursuance with the principle contained in the memorandum of August 30th last, were compelled to resort again to the measure of self defence in order to protect the resident Japanese Nationals.

NANKING GOVERNMENT'S PROTEST, APRIL 21ST

(A full text of this protest is not available. The following is the Reuters report of it).

On April 21, General Huang Fu, Nationalist Foreign Minister at Nanking, addressed a protest to the Japanese Foreign Minister on the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung. The note recalls that the Nationalists government last May protested to the Hapanese government with regard to the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung and says that although these troops were subsequently withdrawn a sense of resentment is still felt by the Chinese. It points out that since the establishment of the Natio alist government at Janing orders have repeatedly been given to the military and civil authorities fully to protect the lives and property of the nationals of friendly powers.

It then says: "Unfortunately the Japanese government utterly disregards these facts and a time when the Natuona ist armies are engaged on the second northern expedition and when the goal of China's unification is in sight again propoese to

despatch troops to Shantung. It goes on to say that in so doing the Japanese Government is looking upon the situation in the same false light as lat May. Such attitude is warranted neither by the existing condition nor by legal sanctions. This action is not only a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and treaty stipulations but may also, it is feared, give rise to serious consequences, the responsibility for which would (?not) be difficult to determine.

The note concludes: "Against this step of despatching troops to Shantung, the Nationalist foreign minister is constrained to lodge a strong protest with the Japanese foreign minister and to request the Japanese government, in view of the friendly and amicable relations between the two peoples, to reconsider their action and immediately to stop sending the forces destined for Shantung to the end that the cordial relationship happily subsisting between the two nations may be maintained".

G-2 Report

4-1

6180

2657-D-276

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 12 1928

1. Organization of Forces.

Due to the changing situation and the almost continuous movement of troops from one area to another, no attempt will be made to show the composition of the main forces except as pictured on the accompanying map.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General: The outstanding developments since the last report have been the gradual withdrawal of the Northern armies on all fronts, the fall of Tsinanfu, and the clash which occurred between the Nationalist forces and the Japanese garrison which was sent to Tsinanfu for the protection of Japanese lives and property at that place. This event, which is covered in a separate report (No. 7261), has served to halt, at least temporarily, the further advance of the Southerners in Shantung, thus giving the Northern commanders time to reorganize their forces and to make the necessary concentrations to meet the Nationalist drive. The Kiaochow-Tsinan railway has been cut in ten places on various dates between Tsingtao and Tsinan, but at present is operating with difficulty.

During the period covered by this report there have been no battles of any importance except at Changte on the Kin-Han railway. In Shantung the Northerners made little if any resistance, their main object apparently being to put as much territory as they possibly could between themselves and the advancing armies of Chiang Kai-shek. Tsinan was given up without a struggle and Techow in northern Shantung has now become the rallying point for the disorganized forces of Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang. It is a definitely established fact now that Chu Yu-pu is withdrawing from the Taming area. The Ankuochun Headquarters in Peking reported the capture of Changte on May 2nd, but it is thought that Feng Yu-hsiang's troops evacuated the city due to trouble in the rear caused by the reported revolt of an ex-brigand named Fan Chung-hsin, supported by other commanders. At all events the Fengtien armies on the Kin-Han railway began their retreat almost simultaneously with the Kuominchun withdrawal, so that even if they did take Changte it was a futile victory since their furthest outpost on this line is now in the vicinity of Shunteh. On the Shansi front reverses have also been sustained by the Fengtien armies resulting in the loss of the Suiyuan area and the Tsingsing coal mines, and the placing of their forces on the defensive.

Operations in Shantung and Southern Chihli. At the close of the last report the mass of Chang Tsung-chang's and Sun Chuan-fang's disorganized forces were at Tsinanfu with small detachments at Chiehshou, north of Taian, covering the retreat. It was then decided to hold the line running approximately from west to east as follows: Pingyin (on the Yellow River), Feicheng, Chiehshou, thence along the line of mountains to Poshan. The main force consisting of between thirty and forty thousand men was to be placed at Chiehshou, the remainder of the line being only thinly held. On the 25th Laiwu was taken by the Southerners, and the following day a detachment advanced to Hekou about 10 miles south of Poshan threatening the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway. On the 27th fierce fighting

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

took place at a point about 5 miles south of Mingshui, the attacking force being made up mostly of local bandits supported by Chen Tiao-yuan's Nationalist troops. At 10:00 p.m. on the 28th the railroad and telegraph were cut at Mingshui, which place was occupied the following day. The Shantung troops in this sector retreated to Lungshan which fell slightly later. On the same day at 6:30 p.m. the first defense line in the direction of Taian was occupied by Southern troops, and later on the advance positions at Chiehshou were taken. On the 29th at 9:00 a.m. Chiehshou fell into the hands of the Southerners whereupon the evacuation of Tsinan commenced and was completed on the 30th, the first Nationalists arriving on the same day. On the morning of May 1st there were no Northern soldiers remaining in Tsinan. On May 3rd a clash occurred between Nationalist troops commanded by Ho Yueh-tsu, composed chiefly of the 27th, the 40th and the 4th armies, (the latter army it will be remembered was formerly a part of Chiang Fa-kuei's "Iron Army"), and the Japanese garrison sent to Tsinanfu for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of their nationals. The 9th Army of Ku Chu-tung was also reported involved. The details of this affair are covered in Report No. 7261, as it may have far reaching consequences. The immediate result has been to slow up the Nationalist drive in Shantung. Although Southern detachments are operating to the north toward Yucheng, north of the Yellow River, up to date there has been no advance in force from Tsinanfu. However, after having received a report from General Chiang Kai-shek regarding the Tsinan incident, the committee of the Nationalist Government passed a resolution to the effect that the troops shall be advanced to the north in order to complete the northern campaign in as short a time as possible. Accordingly the armies under Ho Yueh-tsu were directed to move north of the Yellow River while those of Fang Cheng-wu have surrounded Tsinan, in close contact with the Japanese garrison.

Eastern Shantung is still nominally in the hands of the North; however, Lu Chih-lu, who has taken the title of Eastern Shantung Defense Commissioner, is rumored to be wavering in his allegiance to the northern cause. He appears to be an opportunist who, if he has not already gone over to the Nationalists is at least prepared to enter into negotiations with them for his own personal aggrandizement. The Kiaotsi railway in his territory is subject tofrequent interruption by marauding bands of Nationalist irregulars.

In the last report Chu Yu-pu was suspected of having withdrawn from the Taming area. It is now definitely known that he managed to hold out in this sector because little or no pressure was brought to bear on him, and that he began his withdrawal on about May 3rd simultaneously with that of the Fengtien forces on the Kin-Han railway. His main forces are now in the vicinity of Lintsing.

Shansi Front. In northern Shansi the Fengtien armies have suffered reverses due to Shansi activity from the Yenmenkuan area and are on the defensive. The 15th Army has withdrawn to a point south of Tatung leaving the Suiyuan area in the hands of a bandit chieftan named

China (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Man-tai. At the present time trains on the Peking-Suiyuan railway run as far as Tatung only. On the Niangtzekuan front the Fengtien armies have also been compelled to fall back to a position about 20 miles west of Shihkiakwang, thus losing the Tsingsing coal mines.

Operations on the Kin-Han Railway. Following the submission of the last report, the Fengtien forces on the Kin-Han railway made a further attempt to capture Changte, besieging the city from three sides. The city was defended by Kuominchun forces composed of the 9th Army Corps under Lu Chung-lin, the 2nd Army Corps under Sun Lien-chung, and the 3rd Army Corps under Han Fu-chu. A series of formidable defensive lines had been constructed around the city. On the 25th of April the commanders of the 3rd and 4th Fengtien Army Group, hearing of the defeat in Shantung, determined to cross the Chang River suddenly and make a direct attack on Changte in the hopes of getting to the Lunghai railway to cut off Feng Yu-hsiang's line of communications with Shantung. The attack was a success due possibly to troubles in the Kuominchun rear. According to various reports in the Chinese press, Fan Chung-hsin, an ex-brigand leader, had revolted against Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan, and two brigades under Yeh Chi stationed at Yencheng which were sent to assist Feng from Wuhan, had combined with the revolting troops with a view to attacking Feng's rear. Other nondescript Honan forces under Li Chen-ya and Yueh Wei-chun were said to be participating in the move against Feng. Whether it was for this reason or because he was forced to do so, Feng actually evacuated Changte and the 29th Fengtien Army under Chi Yi-chiao entered the city. Due however to the Shantung debacle, almost immediately Chang Hsueh-liang ordered the withdrawal of the Fengtien armies to the northward. Whatever may have been Feng's difficulties, he apparently was able to settle them sufficiently to dispatch cavalry to pursue and harass the retreating Fengtien troops. His infantry crossed the Chang River on May 3rd and later occupied Tzechow. The general withdrawal of the Fengtien armies then began in earnest, during which they suffered casualties and left behind quantities of military supplies. At the present time there are no Fengtien forces south of Shunteh on the Kin-Han line. Feng's plain-clothes troops are operating as far north as Hantan.

3. Miscellaneous. (Not intended for Digest.)

Reliable information has been received by the American Consul in Mukden to the effect that the Mukden Arsenal has procured a site at Newchwang for the erection of a branch arsenal. No construction work however has been started as yet.

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General Feng Yu-hsiang is reported to have sent General Ma Fu-hsiang to confer with General Li Tsung-jen regarding the military situation in Central China, after which General Ma will proceed to Changsha to confer with Generals Pei Chung-hsi and Chen Chien, with the idea of persuading them to send all of their troops to participate in the anti-Northern drive. So far the following Hupeh and Hunanese armies have been dispatched to Shantung: The 11th Route Army, composed of the 34th, 41st, 43rd and 47th armies, and the 7th, 30th and 36th armies.

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Information has been received by Captain J. P. Ratay, who is now in southern China, that a former German General Staff officer named Colonel Bauer is now connected with Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters. Captain Ratay knew Col. Bauer personally in Munchen, Germany. At that time he was known as Dr. Bauer. During the war he was Ludendorff's right-hand man, and has the reputation of being the foremost artillery tactician, and possibly technician, in Germany. He is reported to be responsible for the "Big Bertha" shelling of Paris. Colonel Bauer is reported to have arrived in Canton in January and later to have joined Chiang Kai-shek and prepared his plan of attack against the North, but to have advised Chiang not to attack this spring as he was not ready. He is further reported to have returned to Germany in March for the purpose of collecting a staff of military experts, returning with them in the late summer. In any event, whether or not the above information is true, Captain Ratay reports that the Germans are held in high esteem by the present Nationalist regime.

J. W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

Distribution:
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1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, May 9, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

1928 2657-J-27 JUN 13

WAR DEPARTMENT 228

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

May 9, 1928

No. 7263.

Subject: Letter Reports of Captains Ratay and Barrett.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 12 1928

1. I am forwarding herewith copies of a series of letters received from Captain J. P. Ratay, who is now on a trip of observation in Nationalist territory, and from Captain D. D. Barrett, who is observing the situation along the Tsinpu railway. The permanent information obtained by these officers will in time be incorporated in the Digest. Therefore it is not desired that the material contained in them be used by the Division other than as background material. I do however feel that these hasty day-to-day accounts express the confusion that really is China more accurately than do more studied reports and biased newspaper accounts.

2. Further letters will be forwarded as received.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
4-1 1928 2657-9-2 JAN 12
WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 2. April 23, 1928 - 12:00 a.m.

Tsingtao.

Dear Major:

Arrived in Tsingtao at 8:45 a.m. yesterday, leaving today at 4:00 p.m. on the Tientsin Maru for Shanghai.

Called on the Consul this morning. Mr. Dorsey had no news. He only said that he had heard,and believed it to be true, that Southern troops were within 10 miles of Chucheng on the 19th. He also stated that the Defense Commissioner had only 300 very poor soldiers to defend Tsingtao - all other troops were sent to the Tsinpu front. But no doubt the consul has telegraphed that to the Legation.

This morning I also went to the docks and took a good look at Shantung refugees trying to leave here for Dairen. I believe everything Gorman says is true.

Talked to a missionary by name of Grafton who has been living for about a year in Tsingtao as a refugee from the Presbyterian Mission at Haichow. He gave me some graphic descriptions of the destruction of their mission there by Southern soldiers.

On the train from Tientsin to Tsinan I travelled with a German business man - it seems to me that he is a chief gunrunner from Shanghai - by name of William Weber. I shall check up on him in Shanghai. He told me before he knew that I was an A merican connected with the Legation, that a former German General Staff officer by name of Colonel Bauer, the right-hand man of Ludendorff - in charge of artillery - inventor of "Big Bertha", etc., arrived in Canton in January and later joined Chiang Kai-shek. That Colonel Bauer prepared Chiang Kai-shek's plans for the attack against the North but advised Chiang not to attack this spring as he was not ready. Chiang disregarded the advice of Col. Bauer and went ahead with the attack. Colonel Bauer then left Chiang's headquarters. A good story! I know Colonel Bauer personally and will check up in Shanghai.

Yours respectfully,

J. P. RATAY

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No. 3. April 25, 1928 - 8:00 p.m.

Shanghai.

Dear Major:

Today I sent a telegram through the Consulate "Arrived this morning. Going with T.V. Soong to Nanking tonight. Will make arrangements to go north".

I arrived at 7.00 a.m. Called on the Consul in the morning and heard the news about the capture of Tsinan which had been telegraphed to you. I explained to the Consul General that I intended to go to the front and see what is happening. He suggested that if I waited until Saturday he would mention the matter to Huang Fu who is expected on that day in

Shanghai. I told him that I would try to arrange this matter in another way. You can imagine what would have happened if the Consul took this matter up officially. I would be waiting here for about 10 days for a reply - and this reply would most likely have been an evasive one - with an uncomfortable feeling on both sides.

So I called up Sokolsky, called on him and put the proposition up to him. He came across in great style. He called up T.V. Soong. Together we walked over to T.V. S's office, explained the matter to him - also why I did not take up through the Consul - he (T.V.) telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek and I am leaving tonight with T.V.S. for Nanking - and shall await there the reply of Chiang Kai-shek which can hardly be anything but favorable. Then I shall go as far north as I can, and see how the Southern soldiers are behaving, talk to missionaries on the way, etc.

T. V. Soong and the rest of the Nanking crowd seem to be much wrought up about the actions of Feng Yu-hsiang - they talk of ingratitude, treachery, etc. They say "How could Feng do it? Didn't Chiang finance him? Didn't he address Chiang as his commander-in-chief!" Something interesting there - but not surprising.

Yours respectfully,

J. P. RATAY

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No. 4 April 27, 1928 - 10:00 a.m.

Nanking.

Dear Major:

My note which Barrett brought from Tsinan was No. 1; the note from Tsingtao was No. 2; and the note from Shanghai was No. 3. I hope that in the future I will not be so careless or in such a hurry as to forget the numbering.

I arrived here yesterday morning on a very comfortable and clean train. T. V. Soong sent me from the station in an official car under proper escort to a Chinese hotel or inn, which is crowded with office seekers from all parts of the country. This hotel is only 2 minutesfrom Soong's house.

Yesterday while waiting for a return telegram from Chiang Kai-shek in regard to the trip to the front, I took a three-hour ricksha trip and explored the city of Nanking. Throughout all my travelling through the various parts of the city I did not see a single foreigner. In the afternoon I took a trip to the river and saw Mr. Palmer at the Standard Oil Company office, who had just arrived by boat from Chinkiang and who will remain here in charge of the local office. Until the present time a Chinese was in charge here and all important business was handled by Mr. Palmer while living on a boat in Chinkiang. This time he brought his wife along and they will live in a part of the office building. I took a walk with Mr. Palmer to Socony Hill and other parts of what used to be the

foreign residential district. Practically all houses have all windows, doors, fittings and floors torn out. In some of them the walls have been torn down and the bricks carried away. Only a few of the foreign buildings are occupied now by soldiers, as there are very few soldiers in Nanking at present. Whenever a troop movement takes place in the vicinity of Nanking all these wrecks of houses are filled with soldiers who continue the work of destruction. I haven't seen the American Consulate as yet, but I shall try to do that today.

I had dinner last night with Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, the local Customs Commissioner. They are living in one of the Customs residences which during the trouble were only looted but not wrecked. There are only a few foreigners here. Today I shall try to get in touch with some of the missionaries and with Tang Yueh-liang.

This morning at 7:30 Soong sent his secretary and asked me to come to his house. We had a talk which lasted more than one and one-half hours. He admits now that the report about the capture of Tsinan and Taian was all wrong, blaming Feng for misinformation. This crowd here is worried. They are doubtful about Feng. Distrust has set in. They are wondering whether Chang Tso-lin is not too strong and too well equipped for them, how difficult it will be to capture Taian, Tsinan or even Tehchow. Soong asked me whether I didn't think that their own troops, especially the infantry, were better than Chang Tso-lin's. I told him that I would tell him after I had seen their troops in action and on the drill field. He will send a man today to take me around and show me the troops around Nanking, of which there are only few. Soong is going to Shanghai tonight but one of his secretaries will make the necessary arrangements for me to go north <u>as soon as the telegram from Chiang arrives</u>.

I have heard in Shanghai and later I read in the papers about the murder of a missionary by name of Seymour at Tsining. If I get as far north as that I shall look into this matter.

As to the line-up of troops, every one I asked is rather vague around here. I believe they really don't know. When I get to Chiang's headquarters I shall <u>try</u> to get some definite data.

Yours respectfully,

J. P. RATAY

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NO. 5. April 30, 1928

Nanking

Dear Major:

I came here Thursday and today is Monday and I am still in Nanking. They tell me that today there will certainly be a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek in regard to my trip.

Friday afternoon I called with a letter from T.V. Soong and with a secretary from the Ministry of Finance on General Ho Ying-chin, the Chief of Staff of Chiang and in charge of the rear areas.

General Ho Ying-chin lives, as all officials here do, in a foreign style house. He is a young man of about 35 years. He appeared dressed in an ordinary foreign civilian suit, an O.D. shirt and surrounded by several hunting dogs. Although a Kueichow man, he speaks a fairly good brand of Mandarin and we got along very well. We had a long talk, and he promised to send an officer early Saturday morning to take me around and show me troops at drill. Saturday morning, however, it rained and although the officer showed up we did not go. Today (Monday) I am supposed to see the Cadet School, but as it is raining again I don't know as yet whether we are going or not.

When I asked an official why this Chief of Staff was not at the front, I was told that Chiang Kai-shek wanted to fight this war according to his own ideas and did not want a Chief of Staff to interfere.

Yesterday I visited the French Catholic Mission and talked to Père Verdier. He showed me the Mission which is totally destroyed. He also described the shooting of the two French fathers at which he was present. There was none of the "turn the other cheek" in his attitude. He claims that such an outbreak might reoccur at any time here, and is certain to happen if the Southern forces suffer reverses.

Later I went to the Nanking University. I was shown the wrecked buildings, and again told the whole story of the "Incident". I had tiffin there with the four foreign members of the faculty who are still there. Their wives are not in Nanking. At the Girls' College are about 8 or 10 foreign women teachers.

According to local Chinese papers the whole of Shantung is in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Tso-lin is getting away from Peking, etc. The trash people are expected to believe here - and actually believe - is really astounding. The Shanghai papers which I can get here in a round about way are usually two days old.

I have not been able to get in touch with Tang Yueh-liang as he is in Shanghai at present.

Since my arrival here I have been talking to practically all foreigners, a number of officials and other Chinese people. The following are my impressions gained from these conversations and from observation:

a) Chiang Kai-shek's power is a soap-bubble. When, last March, some of the higher officials rented houses belonging to missions, they obtained documents with the seal of Chiang Kai-shek, ordering the soldiers occupying these houses to evacuate. The officers in command of these soldiers spit on the seal of Chiang, saying "who is this _____ that wants us to evacuate". This right at Nanking - the capital.

b) Soldiers in any of the armies do not acknowledge any authority except that of their immediate superiors.

c) The soldiers who wrecked, plundered and killed foreigners in Nanking were disbanded and then reenlisted in other organizations. They are right now in Shantung.

d) The Communists are better organized than the Kuomintang. Anti-foreign incidents are expected to be engineered by the Communists during the present campaign, in order to discredit the Kuomintang. That although apprehensive, the Kuomintang did not give warning to foreigners, believing that it would lose "face" in doing so.(Source indirect, higher official Foreign Office.)

e) No foreigner or Chinese, with the exception of officials, has anything good to say for the present regime. Even some officials admit that the people here would rather have Sun Chuan-fang.

f) Nanking is still far from being orderly. Some time ago two guards at the Ministry of Justice (in the former Language School) took hold of a passerby and robbed him. I am told that no foreigner dares to go out at night.

g) The Chinese system prevails in the government administration. There are fifty officials on the pay rolls where two could do the work (Muomintang Customs). Officials in cars with Government pennants are racing around the streets with outriders hanging on - much more numerous and more in evidence than in Peking.

Yours respectfully,

J. P. RATAY

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No. 6. May 2, 1928

Nanking

Dear Major:

The telegram from Chiang Kai-shek arrived here Monday (April 30th) evening, saying that at present it is too dangerous at the front for military observers, and that I should wait a few days.

Next day Tang Yueh-liang, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, came back from Shanghai. I saw him but he could do nothing about my trip to the front. He was very nice however, and volunteered to give passes for the Lunghai and Kin-Han railways, and a letter of introduction to Feng Yu-hsiang at Chengchow. I accepted with thanks and expect the papers this afternoon.

I got in touch again with Gen. Ho Yin-ching, the Chief of Staff and asked him whether I could go as far as Yenchow and Tsining. He said that he would have to telegraph to Chiang Kai-shek first, whereupon I thanked him for his kindness and told him that I would go to Hankow first.

My plans now are to go to Hankow and if possible farther up the river. Then returning to go to Chengchow on the Kin-Han railway, to Kaifengfu - to Suchow and then go either north to Tsinan or south to Nanking and Shanghai and back to Peking. I hope that this will meet with your approval.

The official people here have been extremely nice to me. The reason that I did not succeed in going to the front seems to be that Chiang Kai-shek has some people on his staff (perhaps foreigners) who do not want a foreign observer around his headquarters. That much was intimated to me here by someone who should know.

As to happenings at the front I am absolutely ignorant. There are no sources of information in this part of the country such as we have in Tsinan for instance. The local Chinese papers are nothing but propaganda sheets and the ordinary people as well as most officials do not know what is actually happening. I am afraid I shall find out little as to organization and strength of the armed forces. Those of the officials who are willing to talk do not know, and those who know, know enough not to talk. The shop people and such, distrust everyone and especially a foreigner who asks questions. There is none of that open-mindedness here which we usually meet with in the North. For instance, it is quite impossible to approach an enlisted man and to find out about rank insignia of enlisted men!

Well - one thing, however, I succeeded in finding out. I picked out Colonel Hon (the recent graduate of Temple University of Philadelphia, mentioned in the school report) as the victim. I asked him point-blank "When is my German friend Dr. Bauer coming back?" Whereupon he replied, "In the late summer". He looked rather confused, but since I seemed to know all about it (see my letter No. 2), he stated when I further questioned him that Dr. Bauer has gone to Germany in March to collect a staff of military experts and that he will return in the late summer.

I knew Col. Bauer quite well in Munchen, Germany, when I had some conferences with Ludendorff. He at that time was also known as "Dr." He was during the war Ludendorff's right-hand man and has in Germany the reputation of being the foremost artillery tactician and some say also a technician. He is reported to be responsible for the "Big Bertha" shelling of Paris. In fact, I seem to remember that he wrote an article for one of the American magazines (perhaps Heart's) about the "Big Bertha" about five years ago. Karl H. von Wiegand, the Hearst man in Europe who was in Peking last year, is one of his best friends. Col. Bauer has a very nice personality. If he has gone to Germany to collect a staff, he will get, with the assistance of Gen. Ludendorff who is the president of the "Deutsche Offiziers' Verein", the best of the old German general staff officers. That is, provided satisfactory financial arrangements have been made, guarantees, etc. How effective this crowd of experts will be under Chinese conditions remains to be seen.

Enclosed in this letter is a report on the inspection of the Nanking Officers' Training School. Adjoining this school in very (?) barracks a school for officers has been opened two days ago. About 2000 enlisted men and civilians are being trained there to be officers, the duration of their course is to depend on the war situation. I wanted to see the place but was told that it was not ready for inspection by a critical observer. I might see it, however, later if I return this way.

Enclosed is also a brief description of the rank insignia of Kuomintang officers.

No. 6 - cont'd.

I should like to know how the reverses of the Northern forces are affecting the situation in Peking. Yesterday I heard again that Tsinan had been captured and I suppose it is true this time.

Yours respectfully,

J. P. RATAY

P.S. Germany seems to stand ace-high with this regime. One German - rather comfortable looking - arrived today and is stopping at this inn. The first foreigner since my arrival.

Tehchow, May 2, 1928

Dear Major Magruder:

There has been very little change in the situation since yesterday. Trains continue to come in from the south but they are still carrying headquarters personnel, such as bodyguard units, pistol corps, transportation outfits and the like. So far the only regular fighting (?) units which I have identified are the 4th and 10th Divisions of Sun's army, and Chiang's 3rd Army.

I saw the chief of Chiang's air service this morning and he says that very little is known of the actual state of affairs south of here, but he intimated that there was fighting between here and the Yellow River. He says that his planes are doing very little reconnoitering to the south because of lack of gasoline. At the same time he said that they got all the air service materiel out of Tsinanfu early last week and that all the planes flew here in safety. He says he doesn't know whether they are going to stay here or not, although they have established a temporary flying field. The chief seemed badly worried about conditions, and while he treated me with courtesy he did not talk nearly so freely or act in as friendly a manner as he did when I met him at Yenchow on the 13th.

He says only one plane has flown to the south since they came here and that reported no fighting between here and the river. I asked him whether the troops were making a stand anywhere and he said he didn't know, although he thought they would try to hold on the north bank of the Yellow River.

I really think that the same kind of a retreat as took place north of Yenchow is now taking place to the south, and as a matter of fact both the chief of air service and another aviator who flew in yesterday told me that defeated troops which are marching north should begin to arrive in a day or so.

Of Chiang's armored trains, only the Hu Kuang has arrived here, and that proceeded north this morning. There are no armored trains running south of here and with the air service not functioning Chang Tupan knows very little about the situation toward the south.

Sun Chuan-fang may be attempting to rally the defeated troops for a stand on the north side of the river, as he is reported (by the chief of air service) at Sangtzetien, a place 5 stations south of here.

Tupan Chang's train came into the yards yesterday afternoon and he is now located in the arsenal where he has a wireless set up.

Wang Chi, Commander of Peking Gendarmerie, is here and part of his 135th Brigade. This morning I met the colonel from his headquarters who supplied me with so much information in Peking. He said he would look after my safety, not that I asked him to but it was courteous of him to offer to do so. He is in charge of a battalion of military police here, although his rank is colonel and in Peking he was chief of the aides' (fu kuan) section of gendarmerie headquarters. Part of the 135th Brigade is still in Peking.

No wounded from the last fighting around Tsinan have come in yet.

There is absolutely nothing moving to the south here, so I have no means of finding out much of what is going on. I have hopes that in a day or so the Hu Kwang may make a trip and I shall try to catch a ride on it.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

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Tehchow, May 2, 1928

Dear Major Magruder:

Chu Yu-pu, Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang are now all three here, hence my first upon today that Sun was at Sangtzetien was incorrect.

Although it is reported that a stand will be made on the north bank of the Yellow River with defensive positions at Yucheng or Sangtze-tien, troop trains continue to come in from the south. There are now no less than nine trains on the line south of here. One unit I am sure is on these trains is the 5th Chihli-Shantung army, and another is the 14th Chung Chuang Chih Tui. As to the number of troops now coming in I can't tell as yet, but it apparently is not large. Tomorrow I am hoping to be able to ride a tank car to Yucheng, but this is very uncertain. If I go there I shall not stay but shall come back here.

Station officials here report that only a comparatively small number of troops are coming beyond Yucheng, the majority detraining there. I will be able to tell more about this when I see what is on these last trains which came in.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

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No. 3.

Tehchow, Shantung,
May 2, 1928.

Dear Major Magruder:

This afternoon after I scribbled that Number 2 report to you, I walked out toward the south where those trains I mentioned were waiting to come in. The troops on board belonged almost entirely to units which had been stationed in and around the Tupan's Yamen in Tsinanfu. The largest unit was the one I mentioned, the 14th Chung Chiang Chih Tui. They reported that the 5th Army was following along behind them. The 5th Army was one of the units which was stationed at Lincheng and Hanchuang when I was there, but whether or not they took part in the last fighting around Tsinanfu I don't know. So far none of the troops which have come in here did any fighting at Tsinan at all.

The men of the 14th Chung Chiang Chih Tui report that there is no large number of troops at Yucheng, and they did not think that a defensive position would be established there. They stated that the main body of the Chihli-Shantung and Allied Armies was retreating northward on foot toward Techow, and that by tomorrow the first ones should begin to arrive here. I can imagine the shape they will come in, after having been on the road since Monday with probably nothing,or very little at most, to eat.

The men of this command, who are part of the Tupan's bodyguard troops, seemed quite positive that they were going to continue on to Tientsin to guard the Tupan there, but of course they would not be likely to know much about it. Anyhow, as I stated, Chang, Chu and Sun were all in consultation here this afternoon. I think Chu is going north, for while I was in the station this afternoon one of his aides came in and was very insistent in his demand for a flat car to send the Chihli Tupan's automobile north.

While a great number of trains have come in during the last few days and are still coming in, there aren't a great many troops on board and this has made me think that a defensive position might be in process of establishment south of here. It seems impossible to think that Chang wouldn't try to defend the north bank of the Yellow River, but these soldiers this afternoon were quite positive that all the troops were retreating northward. They said that at the time they left Tsinanfu, which was day before yesterday, some of Sun's men were still holding out at Lokow.

A man from the Bank of China in Tsinanfu who came in on the Tupan's train yesterday told me that it was Liu Chih-lu's 13th Chihli-Shantung Army that was engaged with Chen Tiao-yuan's forces on the Kiao-Chi railroad east of Tsinanfu. He said that this force had succeeded in linking up with troops of the 65th Division from Tsingtao and had made their way to that port.

A number of soldiers have reported that when the northern troops were leaving Tsinanfu, the Japanese troops took over the police of the settlement and enforced martial law to prevent looting. I have heard nothing more of any Japanese troops being engaged with the Southerners, and I imagine that any reports of that sort are pure bunk.

There was a passenger train, so called, out of here yesterday, but none today. They say the Blue Express has been cancelled. From the looks of things, however, I think possibly the train situation is going to improve a little in the next few days.

Tehchow is perfectly quiet and good discipline is being maintained. All shops are open and apparently doing a good business. This place is surely no prize and I can't see why anyone would put up much of a fight over it.

Still no sign of any Kirin or Fengtien troops. By the way, I saw a battery of artillery here this morning, which had only two guns. I asked one of the men what had become of the other guns and he said: "Oh, you heard about us losing our guns, did you?" It was the same outfit who ran off and left the six guns near Kufou. I am building up quite a list of acquaintances among the soldiers whom I have run into in Lincheng, Tsining, Taian and Tsinan. They always seem glad to see me but I know they can't imagine why on earth I am still hanging around.

I am very comfortably located here, although the mission is a long way from the railway station. However, I guess the exercise of walking back and forth does me good. There are no rickshaws on the streets here, or if there are any they have quit doing business since the influx of soldiers.

Sincerely,

BARRETT

Tehchow, May 3, 1928.

Dear Major Magruder:

This morning the first lot of retreating troops which I have seen came in by marching arrived. There was only a small number, about two hundred, and they were part of the 6th Hsiao Chiang Chih Tui. They had been at Tsining but had retreated from there to Taian, from there to Tsinanfu and then here. They had not engaged in any severe fighting at Tsinan. The men were tired and dirty but in much better shape than the majority of those I saw south of Taian. They were stepping right along, so I suppose the weak sisters had long since fallen by the wayside, and those remaining were well hardened.

They said that there were many troops following along behind, but not very near and it would probably be tomorrow before any very large number showed up here.

They are making preparations to sort out a lot of retreating troops here, and have signs up directing the various organizations where to go. So far no important organizations other than those I have already mentioned have designated rendez-vous points.

The Tupan (Chang) proceeded by motor car to Yucheng this morning, so he may be looking over the ground preparatory to making a stand there, but I really don't think he knows himself what he is going to do.

I just saw one of the Tupan's right hand men, or at least he used to be. I mean the gentleman whom Ratay entertained at tiffin not long after you came to China and all the office staff were present. He asked me not to mention him by name but I am sure you know whom I mean. He says that the Tupan's train didn't leave Tsinanfu until about twenty minutes past ten on last Sunday night and that there was a lot of fighting at the Yellow River bridge in which the Tupan's bodyguard and the Russions of the armored train acquitted themselves very creditably. According to him the Russians took the situation in hand, and disposed the Chinese troops to the best advantage, and the Chinese were very glad to take orders from them.

He says he is sure that a peaceful entry was made into Tsinanfu by the south, and that the Japanese had wire entanglements erected at the entrances to many of the important streets.

According to him, the Tupan has no definite plans and he doesn't think he (Chang) knows what he is going to do or what plans of campaign (if any) he is going to try and put into effect. Of one thing he feels sure, however, and that is that Chang Tso-lin will not kick the Tupan out, and that the Tupan will not desert Chang Tso-lin.

My informant says that apparently reliable reports have been received to the effect that 1,000 Southerners were across the Yellow River yesterday, and he does not consider it at all unlikely that they will come on up here in the very near future. According to him, one section of the Yellow River bridge at Lokow was blown up after the troops and armored trains were across. He says no armored trains were lost and practically all of the railroad rolling stock was gotten out of Tsinanfu.

The railroad officials certainly have my sympathy. Every minute or so some high ranking officer dashes in, followed by a flock of body-guards, all armed to the teeth, and demands a train at once. Or else some cocky aide comes in armed with a signed order and makes the same demand. If anything the aides are the worst to handle because they are

afraid to go back and report to their commanding officers that they have not been able to carry out their instructions. Through all this the railroad officials work patiently, persistently; and considering the almost impossible obstacles they are up against, with considerable efficiency. Many of them haven't slept for nights and they are nearly worn out, but they hang on. And for all their efforts they get maybe three months pay out of a year and most of that is in coal.

Part of the Tupan's bodyguard and some of his "model training regiment" are going north today, they say to Tientsin. I don't know whether that presages a move on the Tupan's part or not. He has plenty left to guard him here. It's too bad that his best equipped and apparently best drilled outfit, which is his bodyguard brigade, has to be kept useless on a job which one company could perform, when they could use some good men to great advantage on the front.

Wounded are beginning to come in, but not in large numbers. I see a sign outside here which says "All wounded of the Allied Army (Sun's) assemble on the railway station platform". So far, however, not many have "assembled".

I am still hunting for a chance to go south on something but have had no luck. The water tank hasn't been able to get its engine repaired yet and they seem rather hazy about whether it will ever go.

So far there has been no passenger tain out of here today, making two days since one left.

Chu and Sun are said to be still here. Chang is making only a flying visit to Yucheng and is expected back tonight.

Respectfully,

BARRETT.

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Tehchow, May 4, 1928. 10:00 a.m.

Dear Major Magruder:

The Tupan's Russian cavalry are all loaded on a train here and they say they are going to Yucheng, and I am going with them if the train starts south. Just how long it will be before they start no one can tell, but I am going to stand by and see whathappens.

Sun Chuan-fang's headquarters are all entrained here and some of them say they are moving north to Sanyuan,which is only a short way from here. There is also a lot of Tupan Chang's headquarters personnel entrained such as his headquarters wireless, and they say they think Chang is going to move to Sanyuan.

The wireless men say that the main body of Chang's troops stopped at Yucheng and are establishing a defensive position there, and that those straggling in here are only the very poorest troops who are coming back to be reorganized.

Defeated troops continue to struggle in, but not in large numbers like the way they came into Taian. Many of those who do come in, however, are in terrible shape; only once in a while do you see one with a rifle. Many of them are unrecognizable as soldiers.

There seem to be more of Sun's men than of the Shantung troops and the above description does not apply so much to them. They came in with some march discipline and under their own steam, i.e., without coolies to carry their stuff. It is the Shantung troops who are the sad looking specimens.

Yesterday afternoon I identified the 2nd Division (Sun Chuan-fang); the 32nd Mixed Brigade (Sun Chuan-fang); the 30th mixed Brigade (Sun Chuan-fang); the 1st Army (Chihli-Shantung); the Military Base troops of the 16th Army (Chihli-Shantung); 105th Brigade, 27th Division (Chihli-Shantung); 2nd Hsiao Chiang Chih Tui (Chihli-Shantung); also the 5th Hsiao Chiang Chih Tui (Chihli-Shantung).

I hope you will pardon the terrible looks of this letter, but I am writing on the top of an ammunition case in a gondola car and the wind is blowing like the very devil.

I wouldn't be surprised if Sun were going to Tientsin, as that is where some of the men in his train say they are going, but on the other hand they may stop at Sanyuan.

Nowhere near the same confusion prevails here as did at Taian, largely because the number of troops arriving is so small in comparison. They have a regularly organized outfit to go out and meet the morning troops and direct them to the proper place.

The wounded, however, are still pretty much out of luck, for while they are on the trains they haven't gone yet and it has been at least five days since they were wounded and they have had no other care. This train may not pull out for hours or maybe not until tomorrow, but at least there is an engine attached to it and that is always an encouraging sign.

This is certainly the way to learn about the Chinese language and people. In a week of this sort of life you can pick up more valuable experience than you could in Peking in a year. I am enjoying myself hugely.

The Tupan has returned from his inspection trip to Yucheng.

I surely hope this train goes south and am very anxious to take a look at conditions around Yucheng.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

P.S. The wind was so bad yesterday no planes could go up, so I imagine the Tupan doesn't know much about conditions on the north bank of the Yellow River.

No. 2 May 4, 1928 - Techow

Dear Major Magruder:

The Russian cavalry is still waiting in the station and it is now 4:15 p.m. It is reported from several sources, which for obvious reasons I do not like to state, that about 60 li south of here there has been a mutiny or an outbreak of the Hung Chiang Hui. One report says it was the 57th Brigade, 9th Army, and the other says it is the Hung Chiang Hui under the leadership of the local Hsien Chih Shih.

A soldier on a train which has just come in says that the fighting had been going on for about two hours when he came through and that it was going against the insurrectionists.

Part of the 7th Chihli-Shantung Army has just come in and reports that the 7th Army commander, Hsü Kuo, and a large part of his forces are at Hwang Ho Yen, the first station south of here.

I just heard the stationmaster say that with the exception of the train at Hwang Ho Yen with Hsu Kuo, all trains from the south were now in.

I identified the following men from the following units this afternoon: Sun's 11th, 12th, 13th Divisions, 2nd Hsiao Chiang Chih Tui (Ch-Sh); 17th Army, 18th Hsiao Chiang Chih Tui (Ch-Sh).

I am still hoping that the Russians may yet go. Anyhow I'll stand by for a while longer.

Sun's headquarters are still here, all entrained.

Chang Tupan went to Yücheng again this morning.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

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Tehchow, May 5, 1928

Dear Major Magruder:

All is peaceful here in Tehchow this morning. I have not been able to find out anything definite concerning the situation at Pingyuan except what I wired you last night.

The Tupan is now reported at Pingyuan. One report, too general to be of much use, is that the insurrection, mutiny, or whatever it was which broke out there yesterday was pretty well quelled by evening, but during the night conditions got worse again.

Absolutely nothing is moving out of here to the south by rail. The Russian cavalry bodyguard squadron is still entrained at the station here, and so is Marshal Sun's headquarters. Apparently Chang Tupan is not considering moving his headquarters now. The wireless outfit which is on Sun's train has evidently been attached to his headquarters for duty from Chang's forces.

Last night, because of the mutiny at Pingyuan, military law was enforced with great strictness. I went into town from the mission to send the wire, and had a hell of a time, being challenged about every hundred yards. I finally made it to the telegraph office, however, and hope you got the message and were able to decipher it.

Last night the general commanding the 23rd Army, Yang Ching-chien, was shot in the arsenal compound on the charge of having, while stationed at Yucheng, (1) enrolled bandits,(2) padded the pay roll, (3) allowed his officers to oppress the people, (4) refused to obey orders, (5) by his poor enforcement of discipline and bad control of his troops caused the defeat of the forces at Yucheng.

Two soldiers were beheaded last night, and their heads now adorn a telegraph pole near the station, a charming sight. The charge was refusal to fight in the face of the enemy, and this will surely be a good lesson to them.

The 23rd Army can be crossed off the books as either disbanded or gone over to the K.M.C.

I just saw the Tupan's Chief of Bureau of Foreign Affairs and he tells me they hear the Japanese are engaged with the Southerners at Tsinanfu but he has no confirmation of the report and is exceedingly anxious to find out.

Sincerely,

BARRETT

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Tehchow, May 6, 1928.

Dear Major Magruder:

I made a trip to Pingyuan yesterday with the Tupan's Russian cavalry bodyguard which accompanied the Tupan on a trip of inspection to that place. Everything is quiet at that point now and the mutiny has all been quelled. As I reported, it was two brigades of the 7th Army together with some of the local police of Pingyuanhsien who mutinied. They fought all day on the 4th, but by evening the show was over.

The mutineers were inside the city, and the armored trains fired 500 75mm shells into the place, besides a great many trench mortar bombs. I did not go inside the city but they say it is terribly shot up.

A Russian on the staff of the armored train says they shot about two hundred of the mutineers, while killed in action numbered about 500 on the side of the insurrectionists, while the 10th Army and the part of the 7th which didn't go over lost only thirty men.

I saw nine of the men who had been shot still lying on the ground by the station. They were both soldiers and police. One of them was still alive and able to talk. He asked for water but the soldiers ~~surely~~ MERELY stood around and did nothing either to relieve him or put him out of his misery. Finally, to the surprise of everyone, he got to his feet and started to run away - pretty groggy but nevertheless headed north and away from the soldiers. A soldier ran after him with a kaoling cutting knife, knocked him down and hacked his head off as he lay, still struggling, on the ground. It must have taken fifty strokes to get his head separated from his body. It was a fine sight as you may imagine. Why they didn't shoot him, either

before or after he got up, I can't imagine. None of the soldiers seemed to think the business at all horrible, and many of them laughed quite heartily. This may have been the result of a desire on their parts to avoid suspicion, but if anyone was shocked he managed to conceal his feelings very well indeed. After hacking off the head, the soldier with the knife brought it back to the station and threw it in a hole alongside the platform.

After a while a Red Cross unit, the first I have seen, came and buried the dead. They certainly treated the corpses with scant courtesy, simply dragging them into a shallow trench and ~~covering~~ SHOVELING the over-hanging bank in on top of them. Last of all someone picked up the head and tossed it in with the corpses.

The bodyguard cavalry stayed at Pingyuan, but the Tupan went on to Yucheng. We waited for him to return and the bodyguard and the armored trains accompanying Chang all came back here together. They report all quiet in Yucheng.

The general feeling around here has improved in comparison with day before yesterday, since the quelling of the insurrection.

There was a report current last night that an armored train would go to the north bank of the Yellow River today, but this morning they say the Hu Kwang has gone to Tientsin, but the Min Che may go south later in the day. I shall try to go with it, but it's pretty uncertain.

This letter is being carried to Peking by a missionary leaving here for Tungchow today. The station reports that a passenger train will leave today.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

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Tehchow, May 7, 1928

Dear Major Magruder:

I made a trip on the armored train "Min Che" to a point within about twenty li north of Yucheng yesterday. There we met the train "Chiang Kiang" on which I returned to Techow, as the "Min Che" remained there and I wanted to get off a telegram to you as I thought the news about the present position of the Northern forces quite important.

Yesterday the "Chang Kiang" reconnoitered south of Yucheng toward Yencheng, and between these two points, about thirty li south of Yucheng, they encountered a Southern cavalry patrol (180 men) on which they fired. One officer was dismounted and when the train opened fire his horse ran away. He was captured and brought back to Techow last night on the "Chang Kiang". He stated that he belonged to the 42nd Army. I was present while he was being questioned by General Chang Ching-yao, who is in command of the troops south of here. The prisoner was a Chihli man, a captain. Of course I have no way of telling whether he was telling the truth or not, but he seemed perfectly frank in his manner and more than anxious to please by answering questions fully and readily.

According to him, large numbers of Southern troops, at least ten thousand, have crossed the Yellow River on both sides of the Yellow River bridge and are moving north. He said he had been informed that Techow had been abandoned by the North, hence he had been taking no particular precautions in moving toward Yucheng. The Southern main body, according to him, is around Sangtzetien.

Yesterday there were a few scattered troops at Changchuang, north of Yucheng,but the most of the Northern forces, such as they are, are at Pingyuan where all is now quiet, the insurrection having been entirely stamped out. South of Yucheng about fifteen or twenty li they were digging rifle pits on each side of the track. The soldiers at this point told me that the line of rifle pits, which they may possibly connect up later, extended twelve li to the west and four li to the east of the railroad line. The forces at this point are Chang Tupan's first army, which are said to be pretty good troops. I met their Commanding General in Hanchuang. His name is Chang Chün. He impressed me as a very smart, capable officer, younger than the average army commander.

Unless all appearances are very deceiving, there is certainly no great concentration around Pingyuan. I would estimate the number at about 10,000 at the very most. The forces comprise the 1st, 7th and 10th Chihli-Shantung Armies. The 7th isn't worth much on account of the recent mutiny of its two brigades in Pingyuan.

In quelling the insurrection at Pingyuan, the trains, the part of the 7th Army which remained loyal, and the 10th Army attacked the city from the east and north, so that a large number of the rebels got out the south gate and fled toward Taming. There aren't enough of them to do much damage.

My estimate of the situation is that within a day or so the south will have occupied Yucheng and will probably come right on up here. There may be some kind of a stand made to the south of Pingyuan, but I don't think Chang's troops are capable of putting up much of a fight. I don't believe any attempt will be made to hold Techow after Pingyuan goes. These predictions may all prove incorrect, but I know you won't feel hard toward me if they do for you fully appreciate the difficulty of telling what Chinese troops will do. If the past is any indication of the future, however, Chang's big blue train will soon be on its way north.

Here at the Mission there will be no foreigners left after today except one woman nurse who is bucking for a chance to be martyred. One girl left day before yesterday, a man left yesterday, and Dr. Parsons leaves today. I don't think they were afraid but they had sense enough to realize that it isn't worth the risk to stay here and face it out. The nurse who is hanging on is doing it mostly for the sake of making a big lot of face with the local Chinese and I suppose also with her mission headquarters. Personally, I think she will be disappointed if she doesn't run into some kind of danger.

As far as I am concerned, I have an excellent stand-in with the station officials as well as with the Russians on the armored trains, and if it gets too hot here I can easily pull out. All the rolling stock is in the yards and it won't be hard to tell when the last trains are about to go. But unless I am greatly mistaken things will remain in status quo for a few days longer at least.

Please assure Beth that while some missionaries may be anxious to be murdered in their beds, or under them, I have no such desire and will take good care of myself.

I haven't seen anything more of the Tupan's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, so maybe they found out about the situation in Tsinanfu without having to call on me for help.

I shall be able to stay on here at the Mission even after the doctor leaves as he is keeping his servants here and not closing the house.

Sincerely,

BARRETT

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928 2657-J-2336
3820
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report. Japan(Political)

Subject: The China Situation.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 12 1928

(a) The Tsinan Incident -

It is very easy to say, after the event, that, if protection of nationals and their property in Shantung were the only reason for the despatch of Japanese troops, it could have been accomplished much more cheaply, and perhaps as effectually, by other means. Japanese living in Shantung could have been collected in Tsingtao while the Nationalist Government could have been held solely responsible for Japanese property. In addition, Japan would have been spared the not inconsiderable losses in personnel and much of the cost of the expeditionary force, not to speak of certain bad results that are sure to follow the collision in Tsinan.

In attempting to discover the various motives which must have actuated the Premier in his decision, it must be borne in mind that he is a soldier as well as a politician. The soldier seeks, usually, to arrive at his goal by the most direct route, while his pride impels him to avoid anything savoring of timidity or even of overcaution. As a politician, General Tanaka was in a most difficult position. His Cabinet had just been able to scrape through the extraordinary session of the Diet, and the growing unpopularity of his party augurs almost certain dissolution of the coming Diet and its probable defeat in the ensuing election. Here was a chance to rehabilitate the Seiyukai in the eyes of the people, by something noteworthy in China. The Japanese, as a race, are prone to plunge headlong into an enterprise without any great regard for its ultimate outcome. In this particular case, conditions seemed hopeful, for the people can still be counted upon to unite against a foreign enemy, whatever the circumstances - and there has undoubtedly been an increasing feeling of irritation between the two peoples.

#3510.

The incidents at Tsinan have been published to the world from both the Japanese and Chinese points of view. Of the two it is probable thatthe Japanese version will receive the more credence from the world at large. Chinese actions during the past few months have heen such that the Japanese accountsof what happened at Tsinan appear easily credible. It seems most probable that Chinese soldiers began looting- when have they done otherwise? - and it is easyto see what would happen to them when Japanese soldiers caught them in the act. On the other hand it might seem that General Fukuda was a bit high-handed in expelling all Chinese soldiers from the vicinity of Tsinan - yet when a force of some 5000men is surrounded by more than 50,000, the man on the spot isx apt to be the best judge of the necessary military measures to adopt in order to insure the safety of his command.

Japanese action in this instance undoubtedly constituted a kind of intervention. The Tisnan incident, however, can probably be settled without any great difficulty, especially as the Chinese side appears to be anxious to liquidate the incident. Its what may happen inthe future, now that the ball is started rolling, that is of the greatest interest.

The Japanese people are taking affairs very calmly. Undoubtedly, the great majority were opposed to the dispatch of troops; but now that there has been a collision between the two armies, they are lined up back of the Government, whatever their private opinions may be. They are apprehensive,-not of China, but of some possible trouble with other powers in China.

(b) Mobilization of the Third Division:

The mobilization of the Third Division to war strength came as something of a surprise, as thereis nothing in the present situation to indicate any necdssity of calling out a large number of reservists. Such action works a very real hardship

on the men and their families, which could easily have been ~~obtained~~ avoided by sending two peace strength divisions. It seems most probable that the military authorities took advantage of the occasion to have a practice mobilization, which would have been impossible under ordinary circumstances.

(c) The Peking-Tientsin Area:

General Tanaka has made it very clear that the provisions of the Boxer Protocol with reference to Tiantsin, Peking and the Tientsin-Peking railroad, willbe enforced by Japanese troops, whether the Powers help or not. He is very anxious to have the Powers cooperate in this mission - in fact, the co-operation of the Powers in China has beenconstantly harped upon by him ever since he became Premier. His stand upon this subject appears reasonable - otherwise it is difficult to see just why foreign troops have been stationed in China since 1900. His action may be instrumental in preventing the humiliating spectacle of one or more foreign legations fleeing from Peking to take refuge in Tientsin or on board a ship-of-war.

(d) Manchuriam and Civil War:

In a previous report mention was made of a rumor that the the Japanese had offered to protect Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, if he would withdraw his forces there without a fight. General Tanaka has practically made him that proposition in a recent note, and much depends upon his answer. If he withdraws quietly, in good order, without a fight, the Southern Army will not be allowed to cross the dead-line at Shanhaikwan. If he fights, is defeated (as would seem probable), and then attempts to reach Manchuria with his disorganized rabble, he will find the gate shut at Shanhaikwan with consequent disastrous results to himself. While, just at present, he appears stubbornly to hold fast to his "delusions of grandeur", the Japanese believe

that he must give in, because his subordinates will no longer remain loyal to him. The next few days will see events that may have a far reaching influence upon the immediate future of China.

It must be admitted that Japan's action in this situation is high-handed in the extreme. Her only plea is one hallowed by time and tradition - the law of national necessity - and no Power is at all likely to challenge her decision. And if the Japanese people, at heart, are rather luke-warm over the Shantung adventure, its a vastly different matter when their interests in Manchuria are threatened. General Tanaka will have the support of the whole nation in whatever measures he takes for the preservation of Japan's claims in Manchuria.

(e) The Immediate Future -

The Japanese General Staff believes that the Nationalist Army will take Tientsin and Peking in the near future. They forsee, however, trouble between Feng and Chiang at no distant date, with consequent continuation of civil war. Between Feng and Chiang, it may be easily deduced that they would favor the latter which, to say the least, would be by no means detrimental to Chiang's fortune.

C. Burnett
Lieut. Colonel, Cavalry,
Military Attache.

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OPNAV Chief of Staff
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

1928 JUN 13

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WAR DEPARTMENT 230

American Embassy

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
TOKYO, JAPAN.

No.3513. 23 May 1928

Subject: General Staff Account Tsinan Atrocities.

To: A.C.of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 12 [redacted]

1. There is attached hereto an account of the Tsinan Incident together with photographs of atrocities upon Japanese subjects by Chinese. This account and the pictures were given to the Military Attache by the Japanese General Staff.

C. Burnett
Lieut. Colonel, Cavalry,
Military Attache.

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
265?-0-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report.

Subject: Detailed Account of the Tsinan Incident.

In spite of the fact that the atrocities committed by the Chinese troops incident to the Tsinan affair are beyond description in the language of civilized people, the Chinese, in order to cover up these atrocities, are manufacturing absolutely false propaganda in the attempt to mislead public opinion and arouse sympathy for themselves, but such a shameless policy should be abhorred and any explanation considered valueless. In the explanation of the affair which is given below, it is clear thatvthere can be no doubt left as to where the blame lies.

The Southern Army spread reports that the Japanese troops committed atrocities against some of the Negotiation Committee officials (i.e., Nanking Negotiation Committee according to the newspapers) while said officials were within the area which was under control of the Japanese troops, but the fact is that these officials were given full protection. Mr. Tsai, oneof the Negotiation Committee officials, was not even atthe place described when the affair occurred. Mr. Huang-Fu, another official of the Committee, spent ~~same~~ the entire day at our Brigade Headquarters after thw affair had broken out and he, without any doubt, recognized the lawlessness of the actions of the Chinese and so stated, expressing regret for the whole affair.

A part of one Chinese barracks and part of a wireless station were blown up by a mine which was ~~fired~~ buried by the Northern troops and our troops can in no way be held responsible for these occurrences.

The following is an account of the murders and atrocities committed by the Chinese soldiers and which were con-- firmed by our troops immediately after the affair (The names are known but they are omitted here).

A Japanese man, while talking ~~with~~ in the house of a Japanese outside of the Fuki gate, was approached by a number of Chinese soldiers who stated, "We should kill you," and upon these words threatened him with pistols and rifles and robbed him, after which they stripped a Japanese woman of her clothing and outraged her.

An unknown Japanese man was murdered in Tsi Ba street, his eyes were gouged out and his face completely plastered over with dirt.

Troops under a captain belonging to Ho Shin-hai's Army on May 3rd at 10.00 a.m., after looting Japanese houses on Kirin-sho street, took three men and two women as prisoners, stripped them off their clothing and in broad daylight compelled them to walk along the street, kicking their buttocks and threatening the husbands of the women with pistols held at their backs, exposing them all to the public who applaudedand reviled them for a distance of over two (2) miles.

The following events occurred near Tate-eki street:

"After murdering a Japanese woman, they stripped her, gouged out both eyes and cut out her private parts.

They murdered a Japanese man, cut off his private parts and exposed them on his chest.

They murdered a Japanese man by splitting his head open with a broad sword.

According to the reports of newspaper correspondents, the atrocities were so dreadful as to be unprintable. In this document, onlythe important points are officially reported.

Damages among foreigners were as follows:

3 houses of Germans looted.
1 American missionary murdered.

These are known facts.

The official report of the known damages and injuries among the Japanese up to May 5th is as follows:

Killed	13	
Whereabouts unknown	28	
Suspected killed	2	
Outrages on women	2	
Wounded	9	(among them 4 women)
Looting incidents	22	

Reports and photographs of these atrocities committed by the Chinese soldiers against our men and women residents are expected to arrive soon.

It is the mission of our expeditionary force to guard the distfict in which our people live. This has been published both at home and abroad.

We harbor no hostile feelings towards any of the Chinese parties who are fighting as shown by our policy of non-interference when the Northern Army retreated from Tsinan and the Southern Army entered that place.

When the Southern Army offered the proposal that "Unlessthe Japanese troops consider the Southern Army as an enemy it is desired that you discontinue and remove the defensive measures which you are now engaged in organizing," our troops expressed the sincerity of their intentions, but since the Nanking incident the anti-Japanese spirit has sprung up and Ko Yo So's troops have shown their contempt for our troops, even going so far as to display placards with "Destroy little Japan," "Down with Japanese Imperialism," etc. written on them right in front of our lines of security. This was clearly insulting and when we even endured it, they finally held our military dignity in such contempt that they entered our security area, brazenly looting and even firing upon our officers and men who ~~are~~ were engaged in preventing these practices. In the attempt to oppose our activities, they simulatneously opened a preconcerted attack against our ~~lines~~ entire line. At the same time they engaged in committing unspeakable atrocities against our resident people, especially against the women and children who are powerless to oppose them and entirely innocent and harmless. These facts have been heretofore stated.

It was not sufficient that we inflict punishment for these atrocities which are unbearable in the eyes of God and man, but our troops also desired to prevent the harmless Chinese civilians from coming under fire, so upon agreement with the Southern Army, we eventually consented to suspend action. However, the orders of the Southern Army Headquarters could not be enforced with any expediency, with the result that meanwhile certain Chinese troops cruelly handled our liaison officers and otherwise displayed insincerity and bad faith in the conduct of our mutual agreement.

For these reasons we were unable to recognize any sincerity on their part nor could we believe that any authority over the Chinese troops existed. We then attempted positive remedial action by making demands in order to enable us to accomplish our mission, but the Southern Army continued a policy of futile procrastination until we were finally forced to recognize that they had no intention of recognizing our demands. So at dawn, May 8th, we commenced disarming the Southern Army troops and a general engagement continued all of that day resulting in the sweeping away of most of the Southern Army.

As previously shown, our tropps were unavoidably forced to fight by reason of their mission which was to use every means to protect residents, and finally in self-defense.

There is not onepoint during this time which can be adversely criticized from the pointof view of fairness and justice, but in spite of this, the Southern Army has attempted to traduce us by spreading false propaganda. This propaganda is unthinkable and we pity the baseness of such a policy.

It is our recollection that since the China-Japan and Russo-Japanese wars, our troops havehad a reputation for fairness and justice as their actions have clearly shown. This is recognized throughout the world. And now the Southern Army spreads contumaceous false propaganda which thoughtful people will merely hold up to laughter. However, we cannot guarantee that this persistant injurious propaganda will not be used with evil motives by certain people who would seek to employ it for selfish purposes. Therefore, we herewith without delay make clear the real facts, which are based upon official reports already received.

NOTE: Please bear in mind that, ~~of~~ for various related ~~courses,~~ affairs, there are many facts in the above report which we have avoided making publin in the press.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

1 - The Chinese hope to cover up their atrocities by the circulation of false reports, especially regarding the alleged murder of the Negotiation Committee member, Mr. Tsai, although, according to the official reports made by our troops, the facts were, that at thevery time when this event was supposed to have taken place, steps for diplomatic ~~xxxxxxxx~~ negotiations were being formally undertaken by ourselves and Mr. Ma Tong Wei, and our troops were in ignorance of there being a person named Tsai as a member of the Committee. Also at that time the offices of the Commission were occupied by Chinese troops who opened fire upon our troops with the result that we suffered many casualties and were unavoidably compelled to result to force in the disarming of the Chinese troops. While this was going on a number of Chinese soldiers who opposed us were killed, but naturally their names are unknown.

2 - According to the propaganda spread by the Chinese, our troops fired at random, with the house of the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee,Mr. KoKaku,as their target, although from the commencement of the affair Mr. KoKaku was under the protectiom of our troops and was received and treated with every consideration at our Brigade Headquarters. He signed a statement in which he greatly regrets the violence of the Chinese troops and confirms the fact that our troops were attacked. In the evening he was sent back to Sho-Kai-seki.

3- Of the great amount of proof on hand, the two examples which follow give ample proof of the intention to ~~xxx~~ drive out the Japanese and the Japanese troops:

1 - Before the incident occurred, a detachment of Chinese troops entered the house of a Mr. Ho Ei Sho, which is on the waterfront, and a search conducted later on resulted in the discovery of the following documents:

"The revolutionary Army, acting as a unit, will annihilate the Japanese.
The Revolutionary Army must overthrow the Japanese.
The Revolutionary Army will succeed in this.
The Chinese should always bear in mind that the Japanese must be conquered.
It is right that Japan be attacked."

2 - On the 15th certain troops of the 2nd Army Southern Force investigated the German Church which is near the Gakugen Gate inside of the Walled City, and subsequently took possession of the Church and of the Primary School belonging to it. These facts are evident, for "Down with the foreigner" was written in large characters on the blackboard of the school and a number of rounds of rifle ammunition and grenades were scattered all about.

According to an American newspaper, the Washington Post, through a Shanghai dispatch, it is stated that the Japanese troops who were in Tsinan had entered and searched the University there which is under American management, but the facts of this affair are described below in order to give a clear understanding to everybody:

"On May 9th, during the attack, certain of our detachments just outside the Taihan Gate, received heavy riflem fire from the direction of theUniversity, which is under American management,and suffered many canualties for they were under observation from the high ground on which the University is and this high ground was also used to send signals, for the silhoutte of man was recognized. That night there was continuous signalling by lamp or seatchlight between the University and the Gakugen Gate. On the 11th, after entering the city at 11.00 a.m., a party was posted outside the University and with the approval of the representative of the Head of the University. Military Police made a searchof the place and found 30 rounds of rifle ammunition, one anti-Japanese propaganda pamphlet, 1 military cap, 1 pamphlet about the invasion of the North, all of which were confiscated after receivi ng official recognition of the act from both the Head of the University's representatives and from the American who is the treasurer of the institution. The representative of the Head of the University submitted a written promise that in the future anti-Japanese propaganda and the harboring of Chinese soldiers would be prohibited."

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Resume of the Statement Issued May 17, 1928.

As a result of the hostilities which have been in progress for a long time in China, the very existence of the people is insecure and China is rapidly falling into a condition of complete exhaustion.

Conditions are such that the foreigners residing there have no assurance that there will be any safety or stability for their various callings. Everyone desires that hostilities will some day soon come to an end and that a peaceful China will emerge.

The members of the Corps Diplomatique ardently desire this, especially those of countries adjacent to China and those who ~~have~~ *have* the interests of the Empire deeply at heart. But now the distrubed conditions in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin is spreading, generally toward Manchuria, where its influence is being felt.

With the peace of Manchuria in mind, the situation is being very carefully watched by the Empire and if that peace is disrupted the Imperial Government, by very strenuous means, intends to check the source of this disruption of Manchuria's peaceful conditions because, in case of hostilities, at present being carried on in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin, ~~become~~ *become* more widely spread and the disturbance extends to Manchuria, the Imperial Government must take the necessary steps to insure peace in Manchuria and put into force effective means of controlling the situation. However, an attitude of strict neutrality must be maintained towards the various belligerent groups.

The policy of the Imperial Government has undergone no change whatsoever in this respect, as stated above; in case it becomes necessary to take over control of the situation, the methods employed towards both belligerents will show the utmost impartiality. We affirm that the greatest care will be exercised in this regard.

G-2 Report

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 26 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

The following composition and distribution of forces pertains only to those units that are known to be actually engaged in the present conflict in North China. Forces in rear areas are considered as having no material bearing on the present situation, as such are identified as moving up they will be included in later reports.

(a) ANKUOCHUN . . . . . Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

The Third and Fourth Army Group
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin)	Paotingfu area	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-chang)	Mancheng	13,000
11th "	(Fu Shuang-ying)	Tsing Hai	12,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	Kaoyang	8,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun)	Hsia Hua Yuan	15,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	Paotingfu area	15,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	" "	13,000
20th "	(Yu Hsüeh-chung)	Hokien area	13,000
28th "	(Yueh Chao-lin)	" "	15,000
30th "	(Yu Chih-shan)	Laiyuan	10,000
		Total -	129,000

25,000 dropped because of casualties suffered in the fighting along the Kin-Han railway.

The Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh)	Kalgan area	15,000
12th "	(Tang Yu-lin)	Huailai	15,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	Fengchen	18,000
Kirin "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Nankou	17,000
Kirin Cavalry troops on Tsin-Pu railway			10,000
		Total -	75,000

Any casualties suffered by this group have been filled by replacements from Kirin Province.

The Second Army Group

Chihli-Shantung F orces . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

1st Army	(Wang Chao-chung)	Tsangchow
3rd "	(Cheng Kuo-jin)	"
4th "	(TangYung-chang)	"
5th "	(Wang Tung)	"
7th "	(Hsu Kun)	"

From M/A, China Report No. 7268 May 24, 1928

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

The Second Army Group - continued.

9th	(Chu Pan-tsao)	Tsangchow
10th	(Ju Feng-chu")	"
11th	(Wang Han-ming)	"
13th	(Liu Chih-lu)	Eastern Shantung
20th	(Chu Hsiang-pen)	Kiachow
31st	(Wu Yen-chou)	Tsangchow

Total - 30,000

Seventh Army Group
(Chu Yu-pu)

6th	Army	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Tsangchow area
14th	"	(Sun Tien-ying)	" "
16th	"	(Yuan Chen-ching)	" "

Total - 20,000

The First Army Group
(Sun Chuan-fang)

1st	Army	(Sun Chuan-fang)	Machang area
2nd	"	(Chang Chun-yen)	" "
3rd	"	(Li Pao-cheng)	" "
4th	"	(Peng Te-chuan)	" "
5th	"	(Lu Tien-chun)	" "

Total - 30,000

The armies of the Second, Seventh and First Groups have been badly disorganized and it is difficult to state whether or not they are intact at the present time. During the retreat, however, efforts were made at each halting place to sort out the men into the respective armies.

The strength of the individual armies is not known.

TOTAL ANKUOCHUN - 284,000

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

Chiang Kai-shek . . . . . Commander-in-Chief

1st	Army	(Liu Chih)	12,000
9th	"	(Ku Chu-tung)	12,000
10th	"	(Yang Sheng-chih)	8,000
17th	"	(Tsa Wan-shun)	10,000
26th	"	(Chen Cho)	12,000
37th	"	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	10,000
33rd	"	(Chang Ko-yao)	12,000
27th	"	(Hsia Tou-yin)	12,000
40th	"		12,000
32nd	"	(Chen Ta-chun)	8,000
46th	"	(Fang Ting-ying)	7,000
4th	"	(Liao Pei-nan)	5,000
11th	"	(Fang Chen-wu)	25,000
24th	"	(	8,000
Independent Divisions			20,000

Total - 184,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

3rd Army (Wang Chün)	Under Chu Pei-teh	20,000
9th " (Ching Han-ting)	Nominally under Nanking Govt.	10,000
11th Route Army, consisting of the 34th, 41st, 43rd, 47th, 7th, 30th and 36th armies		70,000
	Total -	284,000

(c) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

Total Forces 100,000

(d) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

2nd Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Paotingfu area
3rd "	(Hsu Yung-chang)	" "
5th "	(Fu Ju-chün)	Kin-Han R.R.
6th "	(Feng Yu-tang)	" "
8th "	(Tan Ching-lin)	Lunchuankuan area
1st "	(Shang Chen)	Yenmenkuan "
4th "	(Lu T'sun-huai)	" "
7th "	(Chang Chia-wang)	" "
10th "	(Li Wei-hsin)	" "
	Total -	80,000

Reduced 10,000 because of fighting in the past six weeks. Strength of individual armies unknown. Of above total Shang Chen is estimated to have 28,000.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS - 464,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General. The period covered by this report has been characterized by the further withdrawal of the Northern armies on all fronts, the vacillating policy of Chang Tso-lin as to whether he should attempt further resistance or quietly retire north of the Wall; and finally the gradual shifting of troops with the apparent intention of resisting the Southern advance. It is as yet difficult to determine which policy the Dictator has decided to follow; however, present indications point to an Ankuochun decision to hold the territory now in their possession. At all events they have stiffened their resistance on the Paotingfu-Hokien-Tsangchow line to which they had withdrawn since the last report and within the past few days have even taken the offensive in several instances at the first mentioned place.

Whether or not the warning issued by the Japanese to all of the warring generals as to the policy of the Imperial Government "to take appropriate and effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria", in case this is menaced by disturbances in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin, had any effect on the Dictator's decision to turn on the Southern allies is a matter of conjecture at the present time. The fact remains however that the Fengtien retreat has stopped temporarily at least, and fighting has taken place in the vicinity of Paotingfu. Minor engagements have been fought between the Fengtien forces at Hokien and advance elements of Kuominchun cavalry. Chang Tsung-chang is holding Tsangchow assisted on his right flank by the Chihli-Shantung troops under Chu Yu-pu. In northern Shansi the 5th Army Group has also effected a retirement on the Peking-Suiyuan railway to the Kalgan area and Huailai. There has been no appreciable movement of troops north of the Great Wall, which in itself is further evidence that a stand is contemplated on the present line.

Operations on the Tsin-Pu Front. The last report closed with the disorganized forces of Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang weakly holding along the north bank of the Yellow River, and concentrating at Techow, with Chu Yu-pu's main forces at Lintsing on the right flank; while on the Kin-Han railway there were no Fengtien troops south of Shunteh. Since the Northern left flank on the Tsin-Pu railway was obviously their weakest point, reinforcements consisting of Heilungkiang and Kirin troops were hurriedly sent down from the north while various units from the Kin-Han, including Tsou Tso-hua's artillery brigade and the 11th Army were transferred from the Kin-Han line.

A small body of the Nationalists continued their advance to the Yellow River, crossing the bridge which shortly thereafter was blocked by the Japanese troops from Tsinan. This detachment established a junction at Yücheng with a part of Feng Yu-hsiang's command which was marching northward from the direction of Lintsing. Feng's forces in this vicinity advanced along the Grand Canal toward Techow from Taming. They include the 9th Army Corps under Iu Chung-lin, the 21st Army under Lu Hsin-wen, cavalry under Cheng Ta-chang, and a portion of the 18th Army, numbering in all approximately 30,000 men. About the 10th inst., Feng's

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cavalry appeared at Fowchang north of Techow and threatened the Northerners' line of communications. This combined with the fact that the Northerners had made no effort whatever to defend Techow necessitated a further withdrawal to Tsangchow, at which place they have intrenched and still hold. Although the Shantung troops are better organized than at any time since the retreat started, they are still woefully lacking in the powers of resistance and cannot be expected to show much fighting spirit. Techow was occupied by the Kuominchun on the 11th of May, and at the present time Feng's cavalry on both sides of the Tsin-Pu railway have advanced northward as far as Potowchen.

The main Nationalist forces were withdrawn to Taian after the encounter with the Japanese at Tsinan mentioned in the last report, and according to Japanese reports are now moving to the west of Tsinan and are crossing the Yellow River in three places between Pingyin and Tsiho. In eastern Shantung, Liu Chih-lu is still nominally in command of scattered remnants of the Shantung armies. Tsingtao and a strip of territory north of the Kiao-Chi railway extending as far west as Weihsien, including the territory which forms the Shantung peninsula,are still under his control. If the Japanese refuse to permit the Nationalists to cross the railway, this portion of Shantung may remain in Northern hands indefinitely. The former Tupan, Chang Tsung-chang, has about 30,000 troops in Tsangchow and still retains command of the front line in the Tsangchow area. He is supported on his right flank by the Chihli-Shantung troops under Chu Yu-pu. Chu's right flank connects with the left flank of the 3rd and 4th Army Group. The 2nd line of defense at Machang is commanded by Sun Chuan-fang while the 11th Fengtien Army is in reserve in the Tsing Hai area.

<u>Operations on the Kin-Han Front</u>. At a conference of Ankuochun officials held on May 9th, it was decided to issue a circular telegram to the civil and military governors of the entire country in which the Dictator proposed the cessation of internal strife in view of the Tsinan incident. Whatever the reason for this, whether to prove that he was not allying himself with the Japanese or whether it was used as a "face saving" device to cover a contemplated complete withdrawal of the present regime in Peking to Manchuria, or whether for other reasons is not quite clear. In any event, it made no visible impression on the Nationalist leaders.

In accordance with this telegram the Fengtien retreat already begun on the Kin-Han continued. Shunteh was evacuated on the 11th. Later Shihkiakiang also was evacuated in turn and the entire 3rd and 4th Army Group retired in good order to the vicinity of Paotingfu where the various armies remained for several days apparently not knowing whether or not a further withdrawal was contemplated. In this connection, it is interesting to note that during this period of indecision on the part of the Ankuochun General Headquarters, excellent order was maintained in Paotingfu, and no looting was indulged in by any of the retreating soldiery.

As soon as the Kin-Han railway was cleared of Fengtien troops between Shihkiakiang and the neighborhood of Paotingfu, the Shansi troops began to pour out of all of the passes in the mountains in eastern Shansi. Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, having suffered a severe defeat at

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Subject: Situation Report.

Changteh during the early part of May, were unable to follow up the Fengtien retreat in any force, therefore the troops most closely pressing the Fengtien forces in the Paotingfu area are principally those of Yen Hsi-shan, and are of an inferior calibre to the Kuominchun. Southwest of Paotingfu in the vicinity of Wangtu and Wanhsien fighting has been going on since the 16th, consisting principally of minor engagements between Shansi advance elements and Fengtien covering detachments. No major engagements have been fought on this front during the period covered by this report.

Operations on the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. It can no longer be said that there is a northern Shansi front, since the 5th Army Group formerly stationed in that area has retired down the Kin-Sui railway to Kalgan, Kanchuang and Huailai, leaving the 31st Army at Fengchen north of Tatung to cover this withdrawal. The 31st Army, according to the only information available, is said to be made up of units recruited from the Suiyuan area; therefore in case of a Fengtien withdrawal to Manchuria, it will in all probability not accompany the 5th Army Group, but may possibly affiliate itself with the Shansi Army. This doubtless accounts for its being left in the area north of Tatung. The movement was effected without fighting and apparently was part of the concerted Ankuochun plan to shorten the front, and if necessary to withdraw entirely. Meanwhile considerable organization is said to be in progress in the heights east of Huailai where a serious stand might be expected in the event the Ankuochun holds.

Miscellaneous. According to information from the Consul General at Hankow, at the end of April Hankow troops had not participated either in any effort to suppress General Fan Chung-shin's revolt against Feng Yu-hsiang, mentioned in the last report, or in any operations of Feng's army against Chang Tso-lin's forces on the Kin-Han. This confirms the general impression entertained in Hankow that the Hankow faction will not participate in the Northern campaign unless driven to it by force of circumstances or unless some new political alignment should make active cooperation with Feng expedient. While the enmity toward Feng is quite evident, it is far less noticeable than that which is directed against Chiang Kai-shek. The lukewarmness of the Hankow faction for the northern campaign can be said to be largely due to a combination of unfortunate and disappointing experiences which it has had with Feng and Chiang. It is not believed that the Hankow faction has made any definite commitment as regards active participating in the campaign, except possibly that which may be necessary to preserve intact the position it now holds. While the exact number of Wuhan troops sent to Honan is not known, it is believed that about 30,000 have been dispatched and these are scattered along the railway.

John W. Carroll,
Captain, Cavalry

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, May 23, 1928 - To: The A.C.of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and forwarded with approval.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G- 2 Report

2657-9-276

CHINA

Subject: Sino-Japanese Collision at Tsinanfu.

(Events from noon, May 7, to May 22 incl. Continuation of M/A Report No. 7261)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 26 1928

2657-9-276/226

Chinese Protests on May 3rd Clash.

As stated in Report No. 7261, order was finally restored in Tsinanfu by the Japanese troops by May 6th and communication by rail was re-established with Tsingtao on the same day. After the cessation of hostilities and the reopening of communications further reports on the clash became available with the arrival at Tsingtao of various foreigners who had been in Tsinan during the fighting, all of which confirmed the earlier reports on the incidents leading up to the outbreak and subsequent events. A very graphic account of the occurrences will be found in report L No. 8, May 5/28, American Consul, Tsinanfu.

At this time the texts of the Peking and Nanking protests to Japan, which followed immediately after the initial outbreak, also became available, the Nanking note charging the Japanese with "the most provocative acts" and with "firing ruthlessly at our soldiers and people". The protest of the Peking Government charging the Japanese with provoking the trouble was looked upon in Peking as purely a matter of form in view of a statement by the Japanese Military Attache that Chang Tso-lin had offered to loan the Japanese in Tsinan guns and mortars if they needed them. The Japanese of course refused the offer and let it be understood that they would resist any attempt of the Northerners to take advantage of the situation in Tsinan and move southward.

The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai issued a manifesto on May 5th "for the information of the world public", blaming the Japanese for the incident and claiming that their real motive was evidently to hamper the progress of the Nationalist military campaign.

Mutual recriminations continued on both sides as further reports from Tsinan were published, student bodies and associations of various kinds all over China adding their voices to the general storm of protest by declarations and manifestoes. Assurances were given by the local authorities in all of the large cities, however, that no violence of any kind would be permitted and that full protection would be given Japanese lives and property. (For texts of all protests, etc., see appendices.)

Japanese Ultimatum.

In the meantime, while the Government in Tokyo considered what steps to take in connection with the developments in Shantung, the Japanese troops in Tsinan continued to consolidate their position and to completely clear the guarded area of Southern troops. After the cessation of fighting on May 5th, a house to house search for snipers was carried out and all Japanese civilians in outlying parts of the city were brought in to the defense zone.

While the work of clearing the settlement was in progress, certain Southern troops, reported to be divisions of the 40th Army, about 10,000 in number, remained in and about the native city, apparently having refused to comply with the terms of the agreement reached between the

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Japanese and Southern commanders on May 6th for the withdrawal of all Southern forces 20 li from the commercial area of Tsinan. No fighting occurred on the 6th or 7th, but the Southern troops remained in the vicinity and at 4:00 p.m., May 7th, General Fukuda, Japanese Commander in Chief, issued an ultimatum to the Nationalist authorities to the following effect:

"All official negotiations will be conducted by the Government of Japan with the Chinese authorities. Meanwhile,

1. The high officers in charge of the Nationalist troops who caused the trouble on May 3rd must be severely punished.

2. All Nationalist troops formerly in the foreign settlement must be disarmed.

3. All anti-Japanese propaganda by Nationalist troops must be stopped.

4. Nationalist troops must be withdrawn a distance of 20 li each side of the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway.

5. The Hsinchuang and Changchuang barracks must be vacated by Nationalists and will be occupied by Japanese troops during the period of consultation.

6. The above terms must be complied with within 12 hours from 4:00 p.m., May 7th.

The Nationalist headquarters replied at 4:00 a.m., May 8th, to the effect that, in view of the absence in Taian of the Commander-in-Chief, General Chiang Kai-shek, further time was needed for the carrying out of the demands. The extension of time requested was refused by General Fukuda, but he had privately directed his command not to commence operations until 9:00 a.m., according to the report of the Japanese Consul at Tsinan to the American Consul there.

On learning of the ultimatum, the Consular Body in Tsinan called on the Japanese Consul to verify the report and request an international train for the evacuation of their nationals, fearing that serious trouble would again break out. This request was readily granted by the Japanese, and a reply to a request on the Chinese for safe passage for the train was received late that night (May 7th) stating that they would guarantee such passage. A train was accordingly assembled on the night of the 7th and left for Tsingtao on the morning of the 8th with most of the foreigners in Tsinan other than Japanese, the foreign consuls, and a few missionaries aboard, arriving there that night.

Fighting Again Breaks Out.

At about 9:00 a.m. on May 8th, according to the official report of the American Consul at Tsinan, Japanese artillery opened fire on several hills overlooking the city from the south, and at the same time an infantry unit advanced in the same direction. Shortly afterward part

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of the 13th Infantry regiment, which had been sent out along the Tsin-Pu railway to clear it of Southern troops, was fired upon from the Chinese barracks at Hsinchuang. A brief skirmish ensued, during which a Chinese powder magazine was exploded, destroying the Hsinchuang barracks, and resulting in the forced evacuation of the Nationalist soldiers barricaded there.

Four train-loads of Japanese infantry arrived from Tsingtao at 10:00 a.m. that morning (May 8th) and were at once sent out in two columns, one southward along the Tsin-Pu line to join in the attack on Hsinchuang, the other along the Kiaochow-Tsinan line to guard against an attack from that direction. Some fighting also occurred on the 8th at the bridge across the Yellow River just north of Tsinan, where Japanese troops had been sent earlier in the day to prevent southern troops from proceeding northward over the T sin-Pu line.

The fighting that ensued during that day appears from later reports to have been only in the nature of skirmishes, although both sides used artillery, the Japanese confining their efforts largely to the occupation of the railway station, telegraph and telephone stations, and other strategic points in the city. During the first day's fighting most of the Southern troops around the city, except those of Gen. Chen Fang-wu, withdrew to the south. The latter, however, remained in the native walled city, which had evidently been avoided by the Japanese troops for fear of injury to the civilians who were still inside, and closed the gates at 4:00 p.m. on the 8th, refusing to withdraw. The Japanese thereupon opened fire on the city with rifles and light mortars, and desultory firing continued until about 6:00 p.m. when the local Chamber of Commerce requested the Japanese to cease firing while they prevailed upon the troops in the city to withdraw. The Chinese troops refused to leave, however, and that evening Gen. Fukuda issued a proclamation stating that

> "The Chinese by evasive and insincere tactics have negatived all Japanese attempts to reach an understanding, and furthermore, have persisted in a stand of open belligerency; therefore, in order to punish the guilty and uphold the prestige of the Japanese Empire, he (Fukuda) had determined to take such measures as he deemed necessary."

The attack on the walled city was resumed the next morning, when a determined resistance was made by the Nationalist troops holding the city, about 5000 in number. Other means failing to dislodge them, the Japanese turned artillery and mortars on the walls and gates on the afternoon of the 10th, and after battering down the gates occupied the city on the morning of the 11th. Most of the Southerners had left during the night via the south gate; the rest surrendered and gave up their arms when the Japanese troops entered.

With the expulsion of the Southern troops from the walled city hostilitied ended, with the Japanese in firm control of Tsinan and the surrounding country for 8 miles and in control of the Tsin-Pu railway bridge over the Yellow River to the north of the city, the Chinese having withdrawn to the south, at Taian, and some westward, apparently with a view to joining Feng's troops in that direction. The Japanese commander at once issued instructions to discontinue the pursuit of scattered Chinese troops

and to engage in no further firing except at snipers, or unless Southern or Northern troops attempted to cut the railway or to force an entrance into Tsinan without prior arrangements with him. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce was requested to establish a temporary civil government, police force, etc., which it apparently attempted to do, Chinese police being later reported as cooperating with the Japanese in the maintenance of order in the city.

There have been no further clashes between the Japanese and Southern troops since the evacuation of the walled city on the night of May 10th.

Casualties.

The Japanese military casualties in the last outbreak are officially reported as 9 killed, 49 wounded. No civilian casualties as a result of the later fighting are reported, but a Tokyo despatch of May 11th reports that the total Japanese casualties in Shantung are now: Military, 21 killed, 79 wounded; civilian, 13 known killed, 9 wounded, and 28 still unaccounted for.

The Chinese casualties are unknown, but it is believed that several hundred more were killed during the fighting on May 8th, 9th and 10th, including many civilians.

Japanese Version of Second Clash.

The ultimatum issued by General Fukuda was a measure prompted by "military necessity", according to the report made by the Japanese Consul in Tsinan to the American Consul there on May 7th, the military necessity arising from the fact that Nationalist troops had taken up positions on the hills dominating the city and had artillery trained on the foreign settlement. In order to relieve the situation, immediate action was necessary, and no extension of the time limit for compliance was possible. Furthermore, according to the Japanese, the Nationalists made no effort to comply with the terms of the ultimatum, and also failed to send a proper representative of Chiang Kai-shek, sending only the newly appointed Chief of the Political Department who, having no credentials from Chiang Kai-shek, was not received.

When asked by the American Consul whether General Fukuda's ultimatum was issued on instructions from Tokyo, the Japanese Consul stated that he thought not; he himself did not know the terms of the ultimatum until some time after the American Consul had requested information regarding it. The Japanese Consul at Tsingtao also expressed surprise on learning of the ultimatum and Gen. Fukuda's manifesto of the 8th, and stated that the Commander-in-Chief had apparently acted on his own initiative.

In an official statement on the affair given to the press on May 11th, Gen. Fukuda stated that the insincere and unsatisfactory replies of the Chinese to his demands that they withdraw from the city of Tsinan, as the only means of safeguarding foreign lives in the city, coupled with the information received by him that Chinese had placed artillery on the

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hills overlooking the city ready to open fire at any time, made the use of force in expelling the Southern troops from the city a matter of necessity. Certain gates of the city were left open as a means of escape for any Chinese wishing to leave the city and avoid the danger resulting from any ensuing military operations, with assurances that they would not be fired upon between 8:00 am. and 2:00 a.m. on May 11th, continues Gen. Fukuda's statement, and handbills notifying the people in all parts of the city of the above arrangement were distributed by airplane earlier in the day. (See appendix.)

The Japanese Government is understood to be preparing an official statement on the whole Shantung affair for publication abroad explaining how she was obliged to send troops to Shantung for the protection of Japanese residents in view of the Nanking outrage and various reports received prior to the arrival of the Nationalist forces at Tsinan, and how the fighting was provoked by Chinese soldiers, every statement of which is to be substantiated by concrete evidence.

Chinese Version of Second Clash.

The Chinese version is that expressed in the appeal to the League of Nations made on May 11th, which stated that the Japanese made unreasonable and impossible demands, allowing only 12 hours for compliance, and without waiting for a reply "started war-like action on a more extensive scale than during the previous clash". They claim that Chiang Kai-shek, who had previously gone to Taian, was not informed of the ultimatum until after the time limit had expired.

Further Despatch of Japanese Troops.

As a result of the resumption of hostilities on May 7th, the Japanese Cabinet decided to bring the Nagoya (Third) Division, already ordered to Shantung, up to a war strength of about 18,000 men and to despatch it at the earliest possible moment; to send the five infantry companies previously designated for Tientsin earlier than was at first intended, and to send more warships to the Yangtze for the protection of the Japanese residents there. The despatch of these reinforcements was sanctioned by the Emperor on May 9th and the first contingent of the Nagoya Division, about 2100 men, with the advance headquarters echelon of 60 officers, arrived at Tsingtao on May 14th. 2100 more infantry troops arrived there on May 17th, with one battery of field artillery, and another contingent of the same strength on May 18th; the balance of the Division, less one war strength infantry regiment and a battalion of field artillery, which will be diverted to Tientsin, is scheduled to arrive there on May 22, 23 and 24th. The dispositions of this Division will not be known until General Ukagi, Division Commander, arrives in a few days.

The three companies sent to Tsinan from Tientsin on April 20th were withdrawn via Tsingtao on May 14th in anticipation of trouble in the Peking-Tientsin area, and orders were issued on May 17th for the return to Dairen of the 2000 troops who reached Tsingtao from there on May 7th. The Dairen brigade is now concentrating at Tsingtao and is scheduled to leave about May 23rd.

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The five infantry companies from Japan ordered to Tientsin some time ago (about 800 men) arrived there on May 19th. Two companies (284 men) were sent to Peking on May 21st and one company of Shanhaikuan; the other two companies will remain in Tientsin.

The total number of Japanese troops in Shantung at this time (May 22) is 16,500. With the arrival of the balance of the Nagoya Division and the withdrawal of the Dairen brigade, on May 24th or 25th, the movement of Japanese troops to Shantung in connection with the Tsinan incidents will be completed, and the total forces there will number about 21,500 men.

The infantry regiment and the battalion of field artillery of the Nagoya Division diverted to Tientsin in view of the danger of outbreaks there, are scheduled to arrive in Tientsin on May 26th or 27th, completing the present plans for Japanese troops in the Peking-Tientsin area.

With the despatch of the Nagoya Division, the Japanese Government issued a second statement on the Shantung expedition, stating that the Nagoya Division was being sent to Shantung because the troops there were not sufficient to protect Japanese residents and keep the railway open to Tsingtao, and that as soon as conditions warrant it the Japanese forces will be withdrawn.

Further Chinese Protests and Decisions of Japanese Government.

Ho Cheng Chen, Chief Counsellor for the Nationalist Army, left Nanking for Tsinan on May 7th for the purpose of negotiating with the Japanese, and on May 10th the Nanking Government sent an appeal to the League of Nations asking it, under article 11 of the Covenant, to call an immediate meeting of the Council in order to request Japan to cease further hostilities in Shantung and withdraw her troops; and to despatch a commission to Shantung to investigate the affair and fix the responsibility.

On the same day (May 10th) China's Ministers abroad sent a telegram to the Peking Foreign Office asking that the factions in China cease fighting so that the country might be united in dealing with Japan on the Shantung affair, and on May 11th the Nanking Government handed to the American Consul at Shanghai for transmission to President Coolidge, the Secretary of State and Congress, a request that the United States act as mediator. The Peking Government again filed a protest with the Japanese Minister in Peking on May 12th. Appeals for national unity were made by Chambers of Commerce and various other associations and bodies in Peking, Shanghai and other large cities, asking the Peking and Nanking Governments to forget their differences and get together on the Shantung incident, and resolutions for the support of the government in dealing with the Japanese were adopted by various organizations all over the country.

The protests of the Nationalist Government and civic and commercial bodies in all parts of China were immediately followed on May 9th by a circular telegram to the civil and military authorities of the whole country from the Peking Dictator, Chang Tso-lin, proposing

immediate cessation of all hostilities in view of the Tsinan incidents, and calling on the Chinese people to come to their senses and save the country from destruction. Simultaneously, orders were issued to his troops on all fronts to cease hostilities pending a reply from the Nanking Government and the other factions opposing him, but no response having been received from any but his own subordinate commanders, a punitive order against Feng Yu-hsiang was issued some days later and preparations for continuing his "campaign against bolshevism" continued. Speculation in Peking was rife for several days after the above-mentioned circular telegram was published as to just what it meant, many taking it as a preliminary to his withdrawal to Mukden, but subsequent events have not borne out this view and it appears now that he merely took advantage of the situation created by the Shantung occurrences to make peace offers to the Southerners on the grounds of a common cause and thereby strengthen his position with the Chinese people and justify any later operations of his own in connection with the present northern expedition of the Nationalists.

Meanwhile, conferences were held daily between representatives of the Japanese Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Navy office to decide the steps to be taken in China, and on May 14th the following demands were decided upon, and after obtaining the approval of the Cabinet, were wired to Gen. Fukuda:

1. G eneral Chiang Kai-shek shall offer a formal apology for the incident.

2. General Ho Yao-tsu and several other leaders who are responsible for the outrage shall be severely punished.

3. Disarmed Southern soldiers shall be liberated at once, but the arms taken away from them shall be detained until some opportune time in the future.

4. Fighting between the Northern and Southern armies not only shall not be allowed to take place in the zone 20 li along the Kiao-Tsi and sin-Pu railways, but until the situation has come to be assured, the passage of armed soldiers through the prescribed region, and propaganda work and military installation therein shall not be permitted.

5. The representatives of the Chinese side must produce a formal letter of attorney signed by Chiang Kai-shek at the time of negotiations with the Japanese commander.

6. As to the matter relating to indemnity for the loss sustained by the Japanese army and residents, and apologies therefore, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried out at a later date.

These demands were modified by a decision reached at a further conference between war office and foreign office representatives on May 17th, when it was decided that the military demands be limited to demands as regards the protection of Japanese residents; the demands regarding the maintenance of the prestige of the Japanese army, and those regarding

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the apology and indemnities by the Nanking Government to be left entirely to the discretion of the foreign office. Views were also exchanged in regard to the reply from Ho Cheng-chun, alleged representative of Chiang Kai-shek, to Gen. Fukuda's ultimatum, and the decision was eventually reached that as it was still unascertained whether or not he formally represented Chiang Kai-shek, he should be asked to present his credentials, and when it has been found that he is satisfactorily qualified, formal negotiations will be made with him; that Chiang Kai-shek beagain urged to apologize to Japan in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army; and that China be urged to yield to Japan's proposal to hold Tsinan and the territory 20 li on either side of the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway during the stay of her army, no mention being made of the duration of this stay.

The question of the passage of Nationalist troops through Tsinan station was also considered by the Japanese Cabinet at this time, when it was decided that as the Japanese Government had no intention of stopping the northern advance of the Southern army, should the latter show their sincerity toward Japan and acknowledge the demands made on them, pledging themselves to not injure Japanese property or residents, they will be allowed to pass through Tsinan northward. Passage on the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway would be denied, however, as this line must be kept open for the Japanese army to communicate between Tsinan and Tsingtao. This decision was also telegraphed to General Fukuda.

None of the terms of the Japanese ultimatum have yet been formally complied with except the withdrawal of the Nationalist forces from Tsinan, the preliminary negotiations having broken down between Mr. Nishida, the Japanese Consul in Tsingtao, who was named as the Japanese diplomatic representative in Shantung pending the appointment of a representative with the rank and powers of a Minister at such time as the Japanese Government felt that formal negotiations with the Nationalist could be opened, and Gen. Ho Chen-Chun and Mr. Tsai Shih-chun, new commissioner for foreign affairs at Tsinan. It was announced by the Nationalist Government on May 13, however, that Gen. Ho Yao-tsu, who commanded the Southern troops involved in the outbreak on May 3rd, had been relieved of his post as commander of the Third Army Corps. While the reason given for his being relieved from command was that he was guilty of several blunders in connection with the northern expedition, it is believed that the real reason was his connection with the Tsinan incident. Although his dismissal was one of the demands of the Japanese Commander in Chief, his relief from command in this devious manner is not considered by the Japanese as a compliance with their demands, holding that he was dismissed on this pretext by the Nanking Government so that dismissal for the Tsinan incidents would be impossible. It is further pointed out by the Japanese in this connection, that the mere dismissal of one of the generals responsible for the May 3rd outbreak would not constitute a compliance with their demands, as two other generals were also involved, and the dismissal of all of them, together with an apology from the Nanking Government by declaring that the Southern army was responsible for the incident, is the only acceptable compliance with these particular demands.

Helmer W. Lystad

Helmer W. Lystad
First Lieutenant, Infantry

Report No. 7269

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, May 24, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Appendix 1.

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Peking Protest on May 3 clash.

Encl 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928 265.7-J-27
234
WAR DEPARTMENT

PEKING'S PROTEST

The following is a translation, issued by the Waichiaopu, of the latest protest to the Japanese Government regarding Tsinan.

"In connexion with the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung this Ministry has more than once lodged protests with your Excellency's Government, considering that China's rights of sovereignty have been involved therein and that the foreign residents in this country should rely upon the protection of the Chinese Government, and declared that your Excellency's Government should be held responsible for whatever misunderstandings might arise thereunder. This Ministry therefore urged your Excellency's Government to rescind its original decision to despatch such troops and withdraw them from Shantung.

Protest Vigorously

"Unfortunately Your Excellency's Government up to date has failed to appreciate the Chinese Government's point of view. Now it is reported that yesterday, on May 3, clashes occurred between Japanese troops and Chinese troops in Tsinan and that Your Excellency's Government contemplates the despatch of additional contingents to North China. Inasmuch as such despatch of troops is calculated to produce further misunderstandings, the Chinese government is constrained vigourously to protest again and to request Your Excellency to move the Japanese Government speedily to withdraw the troops already sent to Shantung as well as to abandon the intention to despatch additional contingents, so as to obviate the recurrence of further untoward incidents arising therefrom."

Appendix 2.

Nanking Protest on May 3 Clash.

NANKING'S NOTE

SHANGHAI, May 5:—General Huang Fu, Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs who is now in Tsinan, has instructed his commissioner for Foreign Affairs here to telegraph the following note to Premier Tanaka.

"The despatch of troops to Shantung by Japan violates China's territorial sovereignty and the Nationalist Government has twice protested against this action and declared that should unfortunate consequences result therefrom the Japanese Government would have to bear the responsibility etc.

Chinese Innocent!

"To my great surprise the Japanese soldiers in Tsinan in the early morning of May 3 and for no reason whatsoever committed very provocating acts and fired ruthlessly on our soldiers and people. Thereupon the Nationalist commander-in-chief, Gen. Chiang Kai-shih, ordered his troops to keep away from the region occupied by the Japanese soldiers and simultaneously instructed high military officers to hasten to Japanese headquarters to arrange measures for the prevention of a possible clash.

"Our representatives were repeatedly insulted and no result was reached. The Japanese troops swept the neighbourhood with machine guns and repeatedly directed their big guns against the buildings of the Government and against the people.

Tsai Slain In Cold Blood?

"A group of Japanese soldiers was sent to attack the office of the Shantung commissioner for Foreign Affairs and after cutting off the ears and nose of Mr. Tsai Kung-hsi, the commissioner, the soldiers murdered him and all the members of his staff then present in cold blood. The temporary office of the Nationalist Foreign Minister was also fired on and searched by organised Japanese soldiery and countless Chinese soldiers and citizens were murdered.

"The Japanese troops invaded the region occupied by the Nationalist soldiers and compelled them to disarm but the Nationalist troops refrained from opposing them. At 11 o'clock on Thursday evening while our high military officers were negotiating with Kuroda, the Japanese chief of staff, for the best steps to be taken the Japanese soldiers fired their artillery and also were sent to destroy our wireless station on May 4.

"Although not a single Chinese soldier remains in the neighbourhood of the region occupied by Japanese troops firing by the Japanese continues and business has been brought to a standstill.

"Condemnable actions like these are not only trampling underfoot completely China's sovereign rights but also are absolutely impermissable by human justice. Therefore the Nationalist Government again has to lodge with the Japanese Government the strongest protest and has to request the Japanese government to instruct its troops in Tsinan to forthwith stop their firing and withdraw at once.

"All questions relating to violation of international law and treaty stipulations as a result of the stationing of Japanese troops in Shantung shall be settled through proper procedure and the Nationalist Government wishes also now to declare that it reserves the right to present all necessary demands. It is presumed that the Japanese government is not willing to assume an outrageous, intolerable and hostile position against the whole Chinese race, which position is also against the dictates of justice and humanity. Huang Fu."—Reuter.

Appendix 3

Statement of General Fukuda on second outbreak.

How Fighting Resumed

TSINAN, May 11:—The following is the account of how General Fukuda decided to dislodge southern troops from the walled city of Tsinan:

On the 5th, fighting was suspended between the Chinese and Japanese armies for a time. In view of the depraved condition of the Chinese troops, which would not ensure the safety of Japanese residents as long as they are stationed at and near Tsinan, the Commander of the Japanese army asked General Chiang Kai-shih to withdraw his troops from regions about Tsinan, otherwise he would be compelled to disarm them. The reply of the Chinese authorities to the request of the Japanese commander, which was made by him as the indispensable measure for safeguarding his nationals, was found to be wanting in sincerity, and unsatisfactory. Pledged word having been broken by the Nationalist Army on the 3rd and again on the 4th, General Fukuda thought it unsafe to depend upon their promise. Furthermore, he was informed that Chinese artillery forces established their guns on hills in the neighbourhood of Tsinan, ready to open fire on the city. These state of affairs made General Fukuda decide upon demanding that the Chinese soldiers in Tsinan vacate the city. As they offered resistance, he was obliged to use force to expel them.—Toho.

Appendix 4.

Official statement of Japanese Government on later despatch of troops to Shantung.

"Recently when disturbances in China threatened to spread towards Tsinan, the Japanese government despatched troops for the protection of Japanese residents in that region, and took the occasion to explain their attitude in connection with that unavoidable course of action. It is now observed that since the occurrence of the deplorable incident at Tsinan, the situation in that district increased in gravity so much that the present strength of the Japanese troops there is insufficient for the protection of Japanese residents. The Shantung Railway connecting Tsingtao and Tsinan was destroyed at various places, making it impossible, as things stand, to presently ensure the means of communication by that route. Under these circumstances it has been decided to despatch the third division towards Shantung, for the object of securing necessary protection to the Japanese residents and ensuring communication by the Shantung Railway.

To Protect Nationals.

"The present despatch of additional troops being intended, as stated above, for the protection of Japanese residents and ensuring communications by the Shantung Railway, which is essential for that purpose, its object is no way different from the first despatch of troops.

"Together with the despatch of the third division, it has been decided to send five other companies from Japan proper towards Tientsin. They were originally scheduled to be sent in June next as a periodical relief for the Japanese garrison in China, but the date of their departure has been advanced in view of the circumstance that a part of the garrison was recently sent from Tientsin as an emergency measure. It has also been decided to despatch an additional number of cruisers and destroyers towards Yangtze and South China for the purpose of safeguarding Japanese residents in case of unforeseen happenings taking places in southern destricts out of possible misunderstanding relating to the Tsinan incident.

"The present despatch of additional troops and warships are intended for no other purpose than that of protecting the lives and property of Japanese residents against such unfortunate incidents as might possibly occur in connection with the Tsinan affair, and it need scarcely be added that they will be withdrawn as occasion permits on disappearance of necessity for their continued maintenance."

Appendix 5.

Nanking appeal to League of Nations.

NANKING'S APPEAL TO LEAGUE

Charges Against Japan: China's Case International Inquiry

Nanking, May 11.

The following is a communication addressed to Sir James Eric Drummond, Secretary-General to the League of Nations, by General Tan Yen-kai, Chairman of the Nationalist Government Council:

"Sir James Eric Drummond,

"Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Geneva.

"On behalf of the Nationalist Government of the Chinese Republic, I, the chairman of the said Government, beg to draw your attention to the grave situation which arises from the despatching of large numbers of Japanese troops into the Chinese Province of Shantung, and their hostilities committed therein, which amount to acts of war against China.

Without Provocation

"On May 3, the Japanese troops at Tsinan, capital of Shantung, fired upon Chinese soldiers and civilians without any provocation on the part of the latter, and then turned their guns on surrounding residential quarters with the result of more than one thousand casualties. (Here the allegation of the murder and mutilation of a Chinese official is repeated.—Ed.).

"On May 7, the Japanese military authority at Tsinan sent a note with unreasonable and impossible demands to our Commander-in-Chief and set 12 hours for reply. Without waiting for our reply, the Japanese troops again started warlike actions on a more extensive scale, which have not ceased at the time of wiring. Besides, more Japanese landed and naval forces are being despatched to Chinese territories. In spite of all this, our military and civil authorities have, throughout the time, acted with the utmost self-restraint in conformity with government orders.

You are urgently requested to summon a meeting of the Council of the League in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the League Covenant. It is earnestly urged that the League shall request the cessation of hostilities on the part of Japanese troops and their immediate withdrawal from Shantung. As regards the final settlement of the whole affair, the Nationalist Government being fully conscious of the righteousness of its cause, is prepared to agree to any proper arrangement for an international inquiry or arbitration.

"(Signed) TAN YEN-KAI,
"Chairman Nationalist Government Council."

Appendix 6.

Nanking appeal to the U.S.

Text Of Wire

SHANGHAI, May 12:—General Tan Yen-kai, chairman of the Nanking government council, has addressed the following appeal to the Washington government:

"Japan has sent troops to Shantung, killed our commissioner of foreign affairs at Tsinan, repeatedly fired on our troops and people, despatched reinforcements to the province and committed other acts of war and conquest against us. In the name of the chairman of the Nanking nationalist government, I draw your attention to these tense acts. China is convinced that the maintenance of world peace and upholding of justice and righteousness is a duty which devolves on all nations alike. China has borne the violent deeds of Japan with utmost patience.

Thanks to the mediation of the powers, particularly the United States, for which the Chinese people are still grateful, the Shantung question was settled at the Washington conference. Both the Chinese government and people are anxious to know your attitude in regard to the grave situation created by the acts of Japanese troops in Shantung."—Kuo Wen.

Appendix 6

Peking Protest on second Tsinan outbreak.

The following is a translation of the second note of protest which the Chinese Government addressed to Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese minister to Peking, last Saturday on the subject of Tsinan affair:

Monsieur le Ministre

In the course of our last conversation at this Ministry, Your Excellency stated that instructions have been received from the Japanese Government to the effect that since the occurrence of the Tsinan incident, conditions there seemed to have become more and more serious and that with a view to affording effective protection to the Japanese residents in that city and assuring uninterrupted communication along the Miaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, the third division of the Japanese army has been ordered to start for Shantung. Your Excellency further stated that the motive of the despatch of the said division is similar to that of the previous troop movements, that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn as soon as the situation quiets down and that matters relating to compensation, etc. resulting from the incident will be settled by diplomatic means.

Regrets Decision

The Chinese Government deeply regrets that the Japanese Government should take the Tsinan incident as a cause for further despatch of troops. I therefore pointed out to Your Excellency, on that occasion, that the most important question at present is the withdrawal of Japanese troops as soon as possible in order to remove the causes of misunderstanding. As to the responsibility of the incident I have made it clear in my previous notes. The Chinese Government reserve the right of bringing up in the future the question of damages sustained by the Chinese when the incident occurred. Please transmit the content of this note to Your Excellency's Government.

I avail, etc.

May 12, 1928.

Appendix 8.

Circular telegram of Chang Tso Lin.

Text Of Wire

"Civil war has been going on for several years since the Communists attempted to ruin the country. The southeastern provinces have repeatedly gone through indescribable sufferings of which I have heard a good deal and invariably with a feeling of pain. I could not bear to see the bolshevization of this nation and it was in response to the call of the Providence that I determined to lead my troops against Bolshevism. From the very beginning I declared that I would regard my personal foes as friends if only they concurred with me in the suppression of Bolshevism. On the other hand, I made up my mind to deliver a decisive blow to the Communists with a view to its total elimination. Wherever my troops went, strict orders were issued to them for the maintenance of discipline and the protecton of lives and property of both Chinese and foreigners, for I always feared that civil war might effect diplomacy and thereby impair China's friendly relations with the Powers.

Suspends Hostilities

"During the last year or two unfortunate international incidents have happened in Canton, Hankow, Nanking and Tsinan. It is highly regrettable that foreigners should be involved [illegible] domestic struggles. If [illegible] of affairs should be allowed to continue I shall be unable to face the whole nation as well as our friendly Powers. In view of this situation I have ordered my victorious troops at Changteh and along the Cheng-Tai Railway to cease hostilities at once. As regards national politics I will not be insistent if our people can agree on a fair and impartial decision. The question of right and wrong rests with the people. I have been in military service ever since I was a youth. As an old resident in Manchuria I know perfectly well the evil influences of Communism and the preventive measures taken by other nations, indeed I feel that my personal experience along that line qualifies me to give a better view of the whole question than many of our prominent men in the country. Knowing that certain traitors, ignorant of the consequences that carry in its wake, have been deeply imbued with the idea of communism and are sure to bring havoc to the country, I considered the extermination of communism and the extreme caution to be taken in our diplomatic dealings as the sole means of attaining our independence. Recently there seems to be no end to our civil strife and the ship of state is sinking rapidly. I hope our people will come to their senses and save this country from destruction. This, in brief, is my appeal and I hope to hear from you all.

(Signed) Chang Tso-lin.

May 9th.

4-1 1 Encl

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

2657-9-276

May 24, 1928

WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 7270

Subject: Letter Reports of Captains Ratay and Barrett.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G-2 W.D. JUN 26 1928

1. Reference my letter No. 7263, herewith are copies of further letters from Captains Ratay and Barrett.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

3 encls.
elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT
4-1 19928 265-7-276
WAR DEPARTMENT 233

Tsangchow, Chihli, May 12, 1928

Dear Major Magruder,

On May 9th the news was received in Techow that Lintsing had been taken the day before, although the actual capture may have been before that. As soon as I heard Lintsing was gone I thought they would be pulling out of Techow, so when I went down to the station the next morning I was not at all surprised to see preparations being made to move north. Troops had been going north for several days both by train and by marching, but I thought the fact that the southerners were not pressing at all from the north bank of the river might make it possible for Chang to hold on for a while longer in Techow.

On Thursday, May 10th, however, the stationmaster told me that Chang would leave at 1:00 a.m. Friday and that by morning of that day everything in the way of rolling stock would be on its way north. So I put my baggage on the Tupan's train and stood by to see what was going to happen.

Preparations for leaving Techow were made in the most leisurely fashion, for of course they knew there was no danger from the south and they had the Russian cavalry out in the flank toward Lintsing. So they must have felt pretty secure in spite of the fact that on Thursday the K.M.C. cavalry were reported at Hsiaching, this side of Lintsing and about 100 to 120 li southwest of Techow.

About six o'clock in the evening (May 10th) I saw the armored train "Yün Kwei" preparing to go south so I jumped on, as I was interested to see how the land lay in that direction. We went only as far as Hwang Ho Yen, on the north bank of the old Yellow River channel. There were still a few of Chang's 5th Army there. In Hwang Ho Yen we met the armored train "Chang Cheng" which had come from Yucheng so I got aboard this and went back to Techow. The "Chang Cheng" reported all northern troops out of Yucheng and the advance southern elements probably there. As telegraphic communication had been out since noon, I imagine it had been occupied that morning. The train reported a considerable number of southern troops at Yencheng, but how many they did not know.

Chang Ching-yao got on the "Chang Cheng" at Hwang Ho Yen. I kept out of his way as I have no liking for the old devil, but he sent for me, the C. O. of the train having told him there was an American officer aboard. He rememberedme from the time I met him on the Tupan's train and was very friendly and talked a lot. He said that up until a short time ago things on that front had been under Hsü Kun (7th Army), Cheng Kwo-jui (3rd Army) and Wang Tung (5th Army), but that now he was in command. He went on to say, under considerable pressure, that from now on things would go better in that sector, which was a trifle unconvincing as the train was bearing him, his staff, and all his baggage toward Techow and parts north as fast as the locomotive would drag us along.

When we got back to Techow it was about 10:30 and the Tupan's train hadn't gone yet. I got on board and found a place in the drawing room car where I could have been very comfortable but I couldn't make up my mind whether to go on that train or stay and see the last of the boys out of Techow.

I thought I would get off and look around a bit and think it over, so I took my musette bag so as to be on the safe side (the rest of my stuff was in Merkuloff's compartment) and stood around on the platform for a time. While I was still pondering the question, the engine gave one long toot and the Tupan's train slid out of the station. So I saw Chang leave Shantung soil, for a while anyhow, and I can assure you there was no flare of bugles or presenting arms by the bodyguard this time. He got on and they went and that was all.

I went back to the "Chang Cheng" and spent the night on board. Next morning we were still in Techow, but outside of our armored train everything that would roll on a railroad track was gone. It was the most deserted looking place I have ever seen, in contrast with the awful jam that had prevailed there most of the time since I arrived. There were still a few scattered troops left in Techow but they were preparing to move north on foot. During the night, while the last of the forces were entraining, there was no confusion of any kind and the loading and despatch of trains was accomplished in very decent fashion.

The armored train got to Tsangchow about 5:00 or 6:00 o'clock yesterday afternoon (May 11th) and I dropped off several li from the station and found my way to the London mission where a most delightful man, Dr. Bryson, took me in. He is the best missionary I have met to date, really human. Unfortunately, he is leaving here tomorrow so I don't know exactly where I shall be after that time but if you want to telegraph me, "Tsangchow" will be sufficient address as I have asked the telegraph office to take care of any messages that may come. I shall probably be either at the Standard Oil place or with the Catholic priest, but I am sure I can find a decent place to stay.

Old Chang Ching-yao accompanied us to Tsangchow and insisted on my having dinner with him (at the expense of the Russians as they were providing the food on the train). The old boy got a couple of glasses of vodka under his belt and waxed very loquacious. In fact he remarked as to how this vodka was pretty weak stuff for strong men, and sent for his own canteen of kaoliang wine and insisted on all hands around having a good shot of this. Due to your kindness in having presented me with some of Chang Tso-lin's private stock, I knew what was coming and was able to down my share with credit, but some of the Russians officers made a pretty wry face over theirs. After having absorbed the vodka and samshu, Chang was willing to tell the story of his life and broke down and confessed that Hsü Kun, Cheng Kuo-jui, Wang Tung, et al, were the most pusillanimous lot of military incompetents who ever tried to command troops, and that if Chang Tsung-chang would only turn complete command of the army over to him, he (old man Chang's boy, Ching-yao) would whip the Kuomintang with no trouble at all. He further went on to admit, much as his natural modesty forbade, that he had no fear of any of the leaders on the southern side and furthermore that any of them who were worth a tinker's damn had learned all that they knew of military art from him in the first place.

He described in detail how he had settled, with master strategy, the revolt at Pingyuan, where he said he was opposed by five thousand rifles, which sounded like a lie on the face of it but no one argued with him about it. His strategy, as he related it to us, consisted in surrounding the city on three sides with the troops loyal to him and then having the armored trains cover all the city gates as well as the area inside the walls with artillery fire. I asked him if he didn't leave the

south gate open, but this he vehemently denied, which was another untruth unless the others who told me about the fighting were all liars. By the use of these masterly tactice he succeeded in quelling the mutiny in about five or six hours. He got quite worked up as he told about it, especially when he showed us how he fortified his courage with a good slug of samshu from his trusty canteen and directed the attack in person, I suppose from the cover of one of the armored trains.

All this was quite amusing, but none of it changed my original estimate of Chang Ching-yao as a thoroughly bad egg.

He asked me what I thought of the Japanese fighting against the southern army. I express no opinion, but he was perfectly frank in saying that he hated it like hell, even if they (the Japs) were attacking the outfit against which Chang Tsung-chang's forces were engaged. He said that his country would welcome interference from America in their internal struggles, but would not stand for Japan's butting in. Of course I took the first part of this statement for just what it was worth.

Chang Tsung-chang has a few men at Potou, south of here, but I don't think he will attempt to stand either there or at this point. Many of his troops have already gone on north, doubtless to Machang. There is one division of Fengtien troops here, the 13th, the first of Chang Tso-lin's forces which I have seen on the Tsinpu line except a very little artillery and some air service.

A missionary came in here today from Wutung, which point he left on Sunday. When he left the city was occupied by Chang Tsung-chang's men, he didn't know what unit, but they had been there for some time. A day or so before he left, considerable numbers of Sun's men came to Wuting, having retreated from around Tsinan, he said. When they first arrived, Chang's men wouldn't let them into the city and things were strained for a time, but later everything was apparently smoothed out.

Tomorrow I am going to do my best to help Dr. Bryson and a lot of other British missionaries who have come in from out-of-the-way stations to get out of here on a military train. I don't think they shall have much trouble as the officers in charge of the military transport were always very decent about letting foreigners ride out of Techow, and I imagine they will be the same here.

I hope to catch an armored train going south tomorrow or next day and then I shall have something more definite to report.

Sincerely,

BARRETT

- - - - -

Tsangchow, May 13th.

Dear Major Magruder:

The armored train "Yün Kwei" came in from the south this afternoon and reported that all the trains were now north of Techow, not being able to go into that point for fear of being caught by raiding parties tearing up the track in rear. Officers on the train say that all the Kuomintang troops have withdrawn across the Yellow River, though what their source of this information is I was unable to find out. They said "a wire from Tsinanfu" but of course that sounded impossible.

Wire communication is out with Techow so the advance elements of the Kuominchun have probably reached the place.

The military train despatcher here says he thinks Chang will stay here for about three days more and then retire as he did from Techow. Trenches are being dug near Potow, where there are a considerable number of troops, but I imagine they are only for the purpose of holding an unexpected attack long enough to give the main body time to clear out of here with the rolling stock. There aren't very many troops here, no where near the number there were in Techow.

The military train despatcher also says Ho Feng-lin is beheading both Chang's and Sun's soldiers who attempt to go through Machang to Tientsin.

Missionaries arriving here today from a point 150 li due west of Techow report that all troops in that area have been marching north to this point during the past few days.

With the reports of Fengtien reverses on the Kin-Han and Peking-Suiyuan, a pretty gloomy atmosphere prevails here and many officers say they don't know whether any attempt will be made to stand at Machang. Personally I think if one is made, it must be by Fengtien troops. Chang is through, unless I am very much mistaken. He has no army left, only a small force of dirty, undisciplined, ragged, dispirited troops, thoroughly beaten and altogether accustomed to constant retreat.

The Chinese way of doing things gets more and more on one's nerves the longer he observes it. Oh, but they are rotten! They seem to have the faculty of ruining everything they touch. Every place they occupy becomes a pig sty. I wish you could see the Blue Express dining car on Chang's train - dirt two inches on the floor, many tables broken, the woodwork scratched and marred, and the whole place filled with dirty, spitting, gambling, opium-smoking soldiers, to say nothing of tons of officers' baggage. In the drawing room part of another Blue Express car is a heterogeneous mess of junk that was salvaged at the last minute out of Chang's Tsinanfu residence. I noticed among other things an equestrian statuette of Napoleon, several oil portraits of the Tupan in full uniform (some life-size), a few landscape pictures, a number of pieces of bric-a-brac, some pedestal lamps, and a lot of other miscellaneous stuff. The top berth in Merkuloff's compartment is filled with the cushions off the chairs in the Tupan's banquet hall, which some thoughtful soldier snatched up at the last minute. As Merkuloff says, they would bring this stuff and leave the wounded, the ammunition and the old people behind.

I forgot to say in my letter yesterday that I surely appreciated your telegram which I received the night before Chang left Techow. I am awfully glad if my reports have been any good to you, for I must admit that they haven't seemed of very much amount to me at times. But I have hoped that perhaps something in them could be fitted in with information from other sources to make the intelligence picture a little more complete.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

Potouchen, Chihli.

On board armored train "Min Che"
May 16, 1928

Dear Major Magruder:

Yesterday Chang Tsung-chang made a speech to the troops in Tsangchow, having them all drawn up in mass formation on a big open space by the railroad station. It was a perfectly awful day, the wind blowing a perfect gale and raising such a dust that you couldn't see one hundred yards in front of you. I couldn't even catch a glimpse of the Tupan, let alone hear what he said, but I suppose it was the usual bunk.

I estimated the number of troops present at around 30,000, more or less. They were all jammed together in a most irregular fashion, and there was no review held after the speech, so it was very difficult to estimate the number but I think that 30,000 can't be much off. The wind and dirt made it impossible to identify units by their guidons, but I know the 6th, 7th, 10th, 14th and 15th Chihli-Shantung armies were all represented. There were no troops of Sun Chuan-fang or Wu Chün-shang in the number. Altogether there weren't over 20 pieces of artillery, although there were many trench mortar units. There were at least 2000 cavalry, most of which belonged to the 6th Army.

The report is current in Tsangchow that Chang Tso-lin has ordered Chang Tsung-chang to make a stand at Tsangchow and it looks as if he might possibly do so. The troops around Tsangchow, while they are very much war worn and their morale is very low, are at least in such shape that they can be disposed for action. I was very much surprised yesterday when they turned out the number they did, as one doesn't see very many soldiers on the streets or around the station. This shows that they are encamped in definite locations near the city and judging from the amount of flour one sees daily hauled through the streets to the surrounding villages, they are being regularly supplied with rations.

Most of them were withdrawn from Techow by train so that they arrived in Tsangchow in good shape. I particularly observed the troops yesterday, and while they are certainly nothing to look at and their uniforms and equipment are in bad shape, still they are in better condition than the units were around Techow, and of course many times better then the rabble at Taian.

I got on the "Min Che" this morning and we went as far south as Lienchen, to the south of Tungkuanghsien. About 25 or 30 li south of Tsangchow, quite a decent line of firing trench has been dug, with fire steps and traverses, and all in one continuous line. The parapet has been smoothed down so that the trench is not conspicuous from the south. There is only one single line, and I could see no covered positions. When we passed there were no troops in the trench. I do not know how far the line runs to the east and west of the railroad.

There is one regiment of 6th Army cavalry at Potow, but south of that we saw no more northern troops. Between Tungkuang and Lienchen we sighted a small body of enemy cavalry, reported to be Kuominchun moving north to the east of the railway. The commanding officer of this train has just told me that the force manning the trench line south of Tsangchow consists of two brigades of the 6th Army. The officers on the

train told me that the small body of cavalry which we saw was part of a much larger force, about one regiment, which is moving north to the east of the railway. They also say that along with the cavalry is one division of infantry. They say these troops belong to Fang Chen-wu. Armored train intelligence also reports Yücheng occupied by troops of the 1st Kuomintang Army, but only Kuominchun troops in Techow.

We opened up on the cavalry with two machine guns and some rifle fire. The enemy, which was distant about 1000 yards, did not reply, but galloped north hell for leather. It would make a much better story, of course, if I could tell you that the air was filled with flying bullets, but truth compels me to admit that I have yet to hear a shot go past in anger. The fire of the machine guns was directed by an officer who stood on the top of the car between the two turrets. The shooting was bad, the majority of the shots - from the gun I was near at least - kicking up the dirt about one hundred yards from the train. The machine gun captain did a lot of shooting at this gun, but the crew seemed to be unable to adjust their fire. The other gun fired to better advantage, I think, although I wasn't in a position to observe the strike of its bullets. We did not open up with our main battery, that is, the 75's. All the time we were firing we were moving slowly north and gradually seemed to get away from the enemy cavalry. Just as we started back from Lienchen a small mine which the K.M.C. has planted under a culvert exploded but did no more damage than a giant firecracker. We were about 100 yards from the culvert when the mine went off but if it had been under us I don't think it would have done any harm. We were the last toward the south of four armored trains, and we all moved north in column, at distances of about a mile. All the trains fired on the enemy cavalry, and some men, I hear eight, were hit on the "Yün Kwei" and Chang Kiang". Now we are at Potowchen where we shall spend the night.

The train commanders are a bit worried because they are responsible for about 30 miles of railway south of Potow without a single soldier to support them and the enemy moving in considerable force on their left (east) flank. As a matter of fact, they aren't in much danger as far as I can see, as with four trains working together, the enemy doesn't dare come near to the track for long enough at a time to do much damage. I should say, however, that Chang had better get busy to protect his left front at Tsangchow or he may have the Kuominchun on his neck before he knows it.

When I got to the train this morning, they were all turned out in their best clothes and the train was cleaner than I ever saw it before. The reason for all this was that the Tupan had announced that he was going to the front with them, but later he changed his mind and we went without him. Maybe some of his staff heard there might be fighting and talked him out of going. Certain it is that the Tupan didn't back out because of timidity, as everyone agrees that he has great personal courage.

All the missionaries from Tsangchow and parts adjacent have gone now, so I am staying at the Standard Oil Company, where I am very comfortable.

I get a lot of amusement out of talking to Merkuloff. Of course he is fed to the teeth with this whole show, and a lot of his conversation is taken up with useless ravings, but on the other hand he has been with the Tupan for a good many years and he knows him and the Shantung military situation like a book. As a result much of what he says is interesting and well worth hearing.

He says Chang really has some very sound ideas about troop disposition, but that after issuing orders to his subordinate army commanders to take up certain positions he does not, or can not, check up to see whether or not his orders have been carried out. As to the reports of others concerning dispositions and the like, they are utterly unreliable, so that often the Tupan is forced to try and carry on military operations with absolutely incorrect information not only of the enemy but of his own troops.

There is one thing I feel that the Tupan is absolutely to blame for and that is the pitiable condition of the Tsinpu railroad. There is no reason why he should allow thousands of his troops to use the rolling stock as barracks, not only ruining the cars but hopelessly blocking the tracks so that no traffic can be carried on. Many cars which are not occupied as headquarters or barracks are used as stables.

The conductor on a mail train which came in from Tientsin day before yesterday told me that between that point and Tsangchow, he did not take up a single ticket. As no freight is being handled, it is not hard to see that the line is not taking in a single cent, while ruinous expenses continue all the time. Somebody or something will have to come to the rescue of this line p.d.q. or there won't be any. I heard that Ho Feng-lin was wild about the way Chang had allowed the road to go to ruin, but if his report (if any) on this subject did any good, I haven't noticed it. And yet the railroad officials hang on, working like dogs without a cent of pay, and doing their best to save a little of the road out of the wreck.

A great curse of this army is "fu kuans". The best way to make a good army out of this mob would be to equip a lot of strong men with horsewhips and have a general housecleaning of all the worthless, lousy, bums who are hanging around headquarters. It takes a young army to wait on the Tupan and his staff, to say nothing of those who serve highranking officers such as army commanders. Not only does this army of blood suckers reduce the fighting force, but they impede the transaction of every kind of business to such an extent that nobody can do anything. Every officer charged with high command is so surrounded with supernumerary subordinates of all kinds that he is all gummed up like a fly on a sheet of tanglefoot.

Don't let Beth get the idea that there is any risk in riding these armored trains. After all, they are worth a lot of money and the Tupan is very careful about keeping them out of danger.

Sincerely,

BARRETT

Tsangchow, May 18, 1928

Dear Major Magruder:

I surely got my fill of armored trains in the last day or so. Day before yesterday, as I wrote you, I got on the "Minche" and went south to Potow and Lienchen. I didn't have a thing with me, as hitherto there have always been trains coming back from the front the same day as I went. This time, however, there was nothing going back to Tsangchow, all the trains staying at various points south of Potow. So I had to spend the better part of 3 days in the vicinity of Potow before I finally caught a train back today.

Yesterday nothing of either interest or importance happened - we simply spent the whole day in Potow station and I was never so fed up on a place in my life. There is absolutely nothing there, and the officers of the armored trains, while they are very decent to me, are not much in the way of company as they can't speak English. To make matters worse I didn't have a thing with me, not even a toothbrush, so I was pretty wretched, as I had been out two days and greatly felt the need of a general clean-up.

This morning the Kuominchun gave us a little excitement by circling around to the north of Potow about 4 miles, and tearing up a section of the track. They took out 4 rails, threw them down the bank and set fire to the ties. This damage the crew of our train repaired in about an hour and a half. We did not see a thing of any enemy all day long, but there is no doubt of it that they are working steadily to the north, travelling to the east of the railroad. It is reported here that they have arrived at Nanpihsien, which is directly east of Potow. I don't think there can be any very large number and they must consist pretty much of cavalry

I finally caught one of the armored trains going back to Tsangchow this afternoon and I was surely glad to reach this place and clean myself up. It is reported here that troops are beginning to move north by rail now and that large quantities of supplies are being shipped north by the canal. This may or may not presage an evacuation of this point. If Chang Tsung-chang and Chu-Yu-pu wanted to put up any kind of resistance, I think they could hold Tsangchow without must trouble, as I don't believe the Kuominchun has many troops to the southeast of here. But the general opinion is that neither the Shantung northe Chihli troops have any fight left in them and for that reason it won't be possible to make a stand here even against the weak forces now approaching this point.

On my return I found your telegram informing me that I could use my judgment about returning to Peking. I shall stay here a day or so longer and see if this place is going to be evacuated. If it is, I shall pull out and go straight to Tientsin. On the other hand, if it looks as if they were going to hold out for a while I may remain in observation a little longer in the event that I might be of some use to you.

Tsangchow is awfully quiet without Chang Tsung-chang and all his gang of bodyguards and hangers on. It makes an appreciable difference in the looks of the station to have his train out of here.

A Russian who is on the Staff of the Chief of Armored Trains told me that Chu Yu-pu told him the other day that he (Chu) was determined to stay in Tsangchow no matter what happened, and that if he pulled out of here he (the Russian) could slap his face as many times as he wished. A likely story, except for the fact that Russians are inclined to lie outrageously. For instance, the commander of our train told me with his

own mouth that eight men were hit on the trains day before yesterday. During the last two days I inquired particularly of the officers on all the trains south of Tsangchow if anyone had been wounded, and they all reported that not a soul got a scratch. But I have learned before this never to believe anything a Russian told me.

I must admit, however, that the Russians on the armored trains have treated me with the utmost courtesy, and have been the greatest help to me in trying to keep in touch with the situation. It is certainly worth a lot to be able to climb on any of the trains at any time and go wherever they are going. There is no beating around the bush and hemming and hawing as there is when you want to ride on a train under the command of a Chinese. If the armored trains were commanded by Chinese, I know I should never get on one unless I went to the Tupan first and that would be an awful job.

The Russians are the soul of hospitality, and such as they have, they offer you without stint. On the "Min Che" they went to considerable trouble to give me a bunk and bedding, for room on the trains is at a great premium and an extra man causes considerable inconvenience.

Respectfully,

BARRETT

Letter No. 7

On board of the Kungwo

May 4, 1928

Dear Major,

My letters to you are only disconnected notes on various subjects which I intend to use later in writing my report.

After one week in Nanking in a Chinese hotel it seems like the utmost in luxury to be on board the Kung Wo, supposedly the largest, newest and best of the river boats. I cannot say much for the best Chinese hotel (there are no foreign hotels) in the Southern Capital. It was just as bad as any of the country inns, except that some of the rooms were furnished with semi-foreign furniture, which did not compare very well with that of a bedroom of a sing-song girl in a second class tea house in Peking. I did not mind so much the swarms of mosquitoes and the biting of bed bugs, but I was very much annoyed by rats trying to chew my toe nails and racing around on top of my bedcover. The food there (only Chinese) was terrible, and the prices were not much lower than those of a foreign hotel. This hotel, however, is quite in keeping with the city of Nanking which shows none of the supposedly progressive spirit of the Southern regime.

Tang Yüeh-liang, the vice-minister of foreign affairs in Nanking, is still the director of foreign affairs for Feng Yu-hsiang. The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Kaifeng, by name of Tsu, is only acting. A coalition government! Tang gave me letters of introduction to both Feng and Tsu.

Tang in Shanghai gave out an interview last Monday (April 30th), which appeared in the Shanghai press, to the effect that sweet harmony existed between Chiang and Feng, and that the attack of Feng's cavalry on the Tsinpu railroad, ahead of Chiang's troops, was a pre-arranged plan. On April 27th when I was talking to T. V. Soong, he was raving about Feng's attack on the Tsinpu. "Feng had no business to do it. He was only to command the Western Column and advance by way of Taming. Instead he took advantage of the confusion caused by Sun Chuan-fang's attack and butted in on the railway line". It was most evident when T.V. Soong was talking to me that he was very apprehensive and most doubtful about the harmony existing between Feng and Chiang.

Since writing letter No. 6, I have heard from a reliable source that there is at least one German adviser with Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters. The Chinese in Nanking refer to Colonel (Dr.) Bauer as the "Kao teng chüan shih ku wen" or the "High Military Adviser". General Galen had the same title.

All civil officials I met in Nanking spoke foreign languages, most of them English, and were young men between 25 and 40 years of age. They were most discreet as regards extraterritoriality, unequal treaties, etc., and evaded the discussion of them, whenever they were mentioned. Just the opposite, however, was true of the military officers whom I met, especially the younger men. They did not want to talk about military matters, but every possible opportunity they would bring up the subject of extraterritoriality, and talk like fanatics. They would repeat like parrots everything the Russians taught them at Whampoa. Listening to them was just like reading the Soviet outline for political instructions which we have on file. They know this subject as a catholic knows his catechism. They assured me most earnestly that as soon as they reach Peking they will abolish extraterritoriality. This of course might sound like an empty boast or threat to us, but they are serious about it!

The high Kuomintang authorities, civil as well as military, are assuring us that foreigners and foreign property will be protected, but they themselves are most doubtful as to their ability to do so. They cannot control the troops, who, as mentioned in a previous letter, respond only to the commands of their immediate commanding officers, who are as much anti-foreign and greedy for loot as their men. (I mentioned in a letter a week ago that officers spat on the order signed by the commander-in-chief.) That military men are anti-foreign is evident. When I was looking at the wrecked buildings in Nanking officers and soldiers passing by would stop, laugh at me and make remarks which could not have been complimentary.

Officials are unwilling to assume responsibility, and there is an atmosphere of mistrust and lack ofconfidence between individual officials and governmental departments. The "ministries" feel that they are impotent. When I requested a Waichiaopu pass to go to Sūchow I was told frankly that I would be better off without a pass, and the Ministry of Communications told me practically the same thing. "Passing the buck" seems to be the principal occupation of officials in Nanking.

The only foreigners of whom the Chinese speak well are the Germans. The officers never fail to point out how well the Germans are doing without extra-territoriality, that they have no trouble at all and that they are the only friends China has. It seems to me that there must be pro-German propaganda carried on among the troops. The love which they professed for the Russians two years ago, they are now professing for Germany. Is it possible that Germany wants to assume in a modified way the former role of Soviet Russia and act as the guiding spirit of revolutionary China? The South needs friends and Germany might find it most advantageous to be the only friend. The Germans are different from the Russians, and in their ways most practical. They would win no matter what form the present chaos in China finally takes.

As to extra-territoriality, the German business men whom I have met on my way to Shanghai, and those who are on this boat, have an entirely different story to tell than the Chinese about the advantages of being under Chinese jurisdiction. They tell me that they are now much more particular than formerly about guaranties, advance payments, etc., before entering into any kind of a business deal with the Chinese. If they have to sue a Chinese, they go to a Chinese lawyer who has the proper connections, and after the usual bargaining sometimes as much as 50% of the sum involved in the litigation is paid over to the lawyer and the case is won, provided the defendant does not outbid the plaintiff. Court proceedings take place as a matter of form. Germans never sue their own countrymen in Chinese courts but settle their differences before their consuls. Mr. Weber of Shanghai told me that he does not dare to drive his car but has a chauffeur because if an accident should occur no matter whether it were his fault or not he would be kept in jail until "squeezed" dry. When asked for specific court cases he stated that no German dares to make public such cases. Anyone who would want to publish anything of that sort would have to leave China first and never return. Publishing such cases would only do harm to Germans and German enterprise in China. The Germans all admit that they are faring much better now than they would fare if extraterritoriality for all nationals were abolished.

This letter will be mailed from Kiukiang this afternoon. I shall arrive in Hankow tomorrow, Saturday the fifth.

Yours respectfully,

/s/ J. P. RATAY

WAR DEPT. GEN. STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-D-276
6180 289
JUL 1928

Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 23 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces

Due to the complete collapse of the Fengtien resistance and the fact that the major portion of the Northern armies are withdrawing to Manchuria there will be no distribution of forces reported. As there is no longer a front line no situation map will accompany this report.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General. The period covered by this report is characterized by minor engagements in the vicinity of Paotingfu followed by the gradual withdrawal of the Ankuochun forces on all fronts, the departure of Chang Tso-lin as dictator, the complete collapse of the Fengtien Party government in Peking and the withdrawal of all Manchurian forces from the Peking-Tientsin area.

Operations on the Kin-Han. The last report closed with the Fengtien Army on the defensive in the vicinity of Paotingfu. Fighting continued in this vicinity in the region west of the railway with varying successes for both the Ankuochun and the Shansi forces until the latter part of the month. East of the railway, in the vicinity of Chichow, a Fengtien attempt to outflank the Shansi troops was halted by a thrust from a Kuominchun force composed of six divisions. No decisive engagement was fought in this area. As a result of internal differences among the Fengtien leaders as to the advisability of withdrawing intact to Manchuria or fighting to a decision, and to Japanese pressure, confusion arose and certain units began a voluntary withdrawal from the front. This necessitated a general withdrawal of all Third and Fourth Army units from the Paotingfu area. The evacuation of Paotingfu was started at 3:00 o'clock on the morning of the 30th of May, and at 10:00 o'clock on the morning of May 31st Shansi troops occupied the civil offices in the city. The Fengtien front line was then established at Kaopeitien, south of Chochow, while the second line of defense was at Liuliho, north of Chochow. No attempt is being made to hold at either place, an agreement apparently having been reached whereby the Fengtien forces will be permitted to withdraw to Manchuria without interference. At all events this withdrawal, which started on June 2nd and is still continuing both by rail and overland, is expected to be completed within the next few days. At this time only Fengtien cavalry detachments remain west of Fengtai.

Operations on the Tsin-Pu Front. On the Pukow line in the vicinity of Tsangchow, a considerable gap apparently existed between the opposing forces, the only fighting being skirmishes between outposts. Chang Tsung-chang remained in command of the Tsangchow area supported on his right flank by the Chihli-Shantung forces under Chu Yu-pu. In order to meet a threat in the Hokien area a part of Sun Chuan-fang's troops were moved to that point from Machang and Sun himself assumed command of the center of the line. A part of the 11th Army was moved from Tsinghaihsien to Pachow and held in reserve. This condition existed until the order for withdrawal was received, whereupon the forces on this front likewise withdrew without combat. The ultimate disposition of the troops of Chang Tsung-chang, Chu Yu-pu and Sun Chuan-fang is one of the most difficult features of the negotiations now in progress in Peking

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between representatives of Chang Tso-lin, Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan designed to permit the peaceful occupation of the Peking-Tientsin area by Shansi troops. It now appears that Sun Chuan-fang's troops may be incorporated into the Nationalist armies but those of Chang Tsung-chang and Chu Yu-pu remain in the immediate area of Tientsin as an embarrassing factor to both sides.

Operations on the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. There has been no fighting whatever on this front. During the latter part of May the headquarters of the Fifth Army Group under the command of Chang Tso-hsiang were moved to Yangtsun on the Peking-Mukden railway. A part of the Fifth Army troops also were moved to this vicinity, the object being to use it as a general reserve wherever needed. Other units of this Army Group have been passing through the vicinity of Peking with a view to their being transported back to Manchuria by rail; while still others are moving by road in the direction of Jehol, which place it is reported the Aakuochun contemplates retaining. The Ninth Army is still at Nankow Pass but will doubtless be withdrawn within the next few days. Shansi troops under command of Shang Chen have advanced down this line to a point slightly north of Huailai.

3. Miscellaneous.

At 1:15 a.m. on the morning of June 3rd Chang Tso-lin, accompanied by his cabinet ministers and bodyguard, departed for Mukden on a special train, closely followed by two trains, one containing the military and political staff and the other forming the rear guard. As Marshal Chang's train was approaching Mukden at about 5:30 on the morning of June 4th, would be assassins dropped two bombs onto the train. The train was badly smashed and several persons on it were killed and wounded, including Marshal Chang himself who received wounds reported as slight but, according to Japanese sources, really serious but not fatal. General Wu Chun-sheng, the Military Governor of Heilungchiang, was severely wounded and later died from his injuries.

The commanders of the Third and Fourth Army Groups, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Yu-ting, left Peking on the night of June 4th, ostensibly for an inspection of their troops and to attend to the retirement of the forces under their command. They will doubtless accompany these troops to Mukden without further return to the capital. Both Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese, however, report that a covering position will be maintained in the Lwanchow area.

Due to the movement of troops northward, traffic other than military has been entirely suspended on the Peking-Mukden railway since June 3rd.

Prior to his departure, Chang Tso-lin turned over the Metropolitan District to a group of elder statesmen among whom is General Wang Shih-chen, who is charged with the safety of the capital. General Wang held this same position during the Kuominchun-Fengtien turn-over in 1926. The 47th Fengtien Brigade has been left in the city for the purpose of assisting the local police and gendarmes in maintaining order until the arrival of the Shansi troops.

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The Fengtien retirement has been accomplished in an admirable manner without the customary looting and other disturbances usually attendant upon the retreat of Chinese soldiers.

The Nationalist Government has appointed General Yen Hsi-shan as Garrison Commander of the Peking and Tientsin areas. Both Tang Ching-lin and Hsu Yung-chang have been mentioned as Yen's appointees as his military representative in Peking. Feng Yu-hsiang while publicly reported to have acquiesced in the appointment of Yen, is suspected of harboring plans to enter the capital prior to Yen. His forces are now reported to be 30 miles south of Peking.

- - - -

At an extraordinary meeting of the Hupeh Branch Political Council it was decided to place General C hen Chien, Commandant of the Sixth Nationalist Army Corps, under surveillance and also to petition the Nanking Nationalist Government for his dismissal from all substantive and concurrent posts for insubordination and subversive activities within the Kuomintang. His dismissal was later approved by the Nanking authorities. It will be recalled that General Chen was responsible for the Nanking outrages of last year.

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General Li Tsung-jen has announced his acceptance of the post of Commander of the Fourth Group of Armies. There are at present four group army commanders in the Nationalist military heirarchy: General C hiang Kai-shek, commander of the First Group Army Corps in addition to his title of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army; Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang commands the Second, while General Yen Hsi-shan is commander of the Third Group Army Corps. As the name indicates, a group army corps is made up of various army corps, therefore a commander of a group of armies may be described as a super-commander.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, June 4, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File
1 Legation
1 Tientsin
1 Tokyo
1 Manila

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

Owing to the fact that the armies of the various leaders are continually moving about from place to place, it is impracticable to give any distribution of forces or to plot them accurately on the map.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General. The outstanding events which have occurred since the last report are the peaceful occupation of Peking by the Shansi forces, the evacuation of Tientsin by the Chihli-Shantung troops and the taking over of the city by the Nationalists, the re-establishment of railway communications between Tientsin and Peking, and the complete withdrawal of the Fengtien armies to the vicinity of Shanhaikuan. With the exception of slight skirmishes in the Tientsin area between disorganized elements in the Chihli-Shantung armies and the Nationalists, the above enumerated events have taken place without fighting.

Activities in the Peking Area. With the departure of Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Yu-ting from Peking late on the night of June 4th, the Committee of Safety mentioned in the last report assumed control of the city. Prior to taking over their duties, the prospective heads of this Committee had petitioned the Nanking Government to issue the necessary orders to permit the 47th Fengtien Brigade under General Pao Yu-lin to remain in the city, in order to help in preserving order until the arrival of the troops which were to take over. The Diplomatic Body also sent a telegram to Nanking to the same effect. The Nanking Government agreed to this, and accordingly issued the necessary instructions to the various group army corps commanders.

Meanwhile both Kuominchun and Shansi forces were approaching from the west and south. A part of the 3rd Kuominchun Army Corps under Han Fu-chu were the first troops actually to get close to the city, having arrived at Nan Yuan early in the afternoon of the 6th. Later in the day Shansi troops also were reported to be outside the city walls. This situation led to some doubt on the part of observers as to whether Feng Yu-hsiang intended to keep faith and allow Yen Hsi-shan to take over the city as planned. However, the commanders of both forces communicated their arrival to the Committee of Safety and the Shansi commander asked if his troops could come in. He was requested to wait until arrangements for the evacuation of Pao's Fengtien Brigade had been completed, to which he agreed. Accordingly on the morning of June 8th, Pao's troops marched out of the city and almost simultaneously the Shansi forces under Shang Chen entered. The turnover was accomplished without disorder of any kind. The Fengtien Brigade which had started toward Tungchow was met en route by a delegation of Kuominchun officials who after some polite ceremonial made it clear that the passage of the brigade would be resisted. After some confusion General Pao marched his troops back to a village near Peking and camped for the night. On the morning of June 9th they were surrounded, disarmed, and marched to Nan Yuan under the orders of the Kuominchun commander Han Fu-chu, this despite the fact

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that they were to be allowed to proceed to Manchuria armed and with the full honors of war, according to the assurances of Nanking. This episode, which has not yet been settled, demonstrates the lack of authority of the Nanking Government over its subordinates, and is another example of the perfidy of Feng Yu-hsiang.

Further activities in the vicinity of Peking have been confined to troop movements. The Kuominchun forces continued to advance toward Tientsin in small numbers, but the main body which was stationed at Nan Yuan has moved during the past week to Kuan and Hsin Cheng, south of Peking, and the detachments in the Tientsin area also withdrew southward. It is now clear that the Kuominchun do not intend to occupy either Peking or Tientsin at the present time. Their place at Nan Yuan has been taken by Wuhan troops under the command of Pai Cheng-hsi, who is second in command of the Fourth Group of Armies. Wuhan troops in the vicinity of Peking number three armies (probably 40,000) none of which are stationed in the city proper.

Activities in the Tientsin Area. At the close of the last report the forces under Sun Chuan-fang and the Chihli-Shantung troops of Chang Tsung-chang and Chu Yu-pu had commenced their withdrawal on Tientsin. Due to their long and almost continuous retreat from Shantung and southern Chihli, very little resistence could be expected from these troops. Practically all available rolling stock on both the Peking-Mukden and the Tientsin-Pukow railways was utilized by the retreating Fengtien troops, so that the above mentioned forces were compelled to withdraw on Tientsin as best they could. Most of these troops avoided Tientsin as far as possible, marching toward Yangtsun, Peitsang and thence east around the city to Chunliancheng. On the evening of June 8th a temporary line outside of Tientsin had been established, extending from the Lao Chung-tang---Tientsin-Pukow branch line, to Peitsang. Chu Yu-pu had 15,000 troops on the right of this line and Chang Tsung-chang 20,000 on the left. Slight skirmishing occurred between these forces and Kuominchun cavalry. In the meantime Sun Chuan-fang's forces circling Tientsin moved east and eventually arrived in Lutai.

Chang Tsung-chang had stated that he would hold Tientsin, but later at a conference of the Chihli-Shantung military commanders, it was decided that their position was untenable. Hsu Yuan-chuan, commanding the 6th Army, decided to go over to the Nationalists with the remnants of his army amounting to approximately 4,000 men; and maintain order in Tientsin until the arrival of whatever Nationalist forces were to take over the city. He appointed himself Defense Commissioner, and on June 12th hoisted the Nationalist flag in Tientsin. Chang Tsung-chang with what troops he was able to gather together withdrew to Lutai. Chu Yu-pu is reported to be a refugee in the French Concession, where he is said to have retired with $500,000 furnished by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for the payment of his troops.

Hsu Yuan-chuan being unacceptable to the Shansi representatives of Yen Hsi-shan in Tientsin, his place was taken by Fu Tso-yi, formerly the commander of the besieged Shansi garrison in Chochow, whereupon Hsu is reported to have resigned. General Fu apparently has the preservation of peace and order in the Tientsin area well in hand, assisted by troops of the 15th Shansi Division which arrived in Tientsin on the 14th. Two other Shansi divisions are en route to Tientsin, and at present it appears

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that Shansi troops will form the garrison for the city as originally planned. Chiang Kai-shek in an order issued to the Nationalist Commanders on the Tsin-Pu line is reported to have prohibited troops of the First and Second Groups of Armies from entering Tientsin. In accordance with this order the forces of Fang Chen-wu, Cheng Ta-chang and Chen Tiao-yuan are withdrawing from the vicinity.

Just what Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang are contemplating doing is not quite clear at the present time. It seems quite probable however that they will withdraw their forces to the vicinity of Lwanchow to be under the protection of or to cooperate with the Third and Fourth Fengtien Army Group. The headquarters of this Group are at Yang Ping and they are entrenching in the Lwanchow, Chinwangtao area. It is difficult to prognosticate future military events in China due to the political phases which cloud all military issues; however, should Chang Tso-lin be dead, as is now generally believed, and should the Japanese persist in their policy of disarming all forces before permitting them to proceed north of the Great Wall, it is not unlikely that Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Yu-ting would capitulate with the Nationalists and come to some sort of agreement whereby the Three Eastern Provinces would constitute another military region under the nominal control of Nanking.

3. Miscellaneous.

It will be recalled that several of the Shantung armies under the nominal leadership of Liu Chih-lu were cut off from the main body of the retreating Shantung armies when Chiang Kai-shek made his drive up the Tsin-Pu line; and were left along the Kiao-Tsi railway in eastern Shantung. These forces were warned by the Japanese to keep twenty Chinese miles north of the railway. Although no intimidation was implied in this warning, it was tacitly understood that the Japanese would use force if their request were disregarded. Accordingly, these troops moved in a northeasterly direction into the Shantung peninsula where they became embroiled with bandit forces which had been incorporated into the Southern Army. About June 11th the various leaders of these disorganized armies, hearing of the general Northern withdrawal to Manchuria, concluded to make their peace with the Southerners and their forces are now organized into four armies, under the Nationalist flag, thus bringing military operations in Eastern Shantung to a close. Shantung is thus divided into the northern area the affiliation of whose military commanders is vague, the Japanese-controlled railway zone, and the Southern area under Chiang Kai-shek's control. Due to the political difficulties occasioned by the Japanese and the generally wretched condition of the armies, Feng Yu-hsiang is avoiding the responsibility of taking over Shantung.

After a break of thirteen days, passenger traffic was resumed on the Peking-Mukden railway between Tientsin and Peking on Saturday, June 16th. On June 13th, a train from Chengchow arrived in Peking. A train is reported to have left Hankow for Peking on the 18th. Should this train arrive in Peking it will mean a resumption of traffic between these two cities for the first time in over two years.

John W. Carroll

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

G-2 Report

4.1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY DIV.
6180
AUG 1928
2657-9-226
2B
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 7 1928

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

The following composition and distribution of forces pertains only to those units that have actually been located as taking part in the present military activities in North China. No deductions as to relative strengths can be made from these figures until more complete identifications have been made.

(a) ANKUOCHUN

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Hsueh-liang

The Third and Fourth Army Group
(Yang Yu-ting)

10th Army	(Wang Shu-chang)	Luanchow area	
11th "	(Fu Hsuang-ying)	"	"
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	"	"
17th "	(Jung Chen)	"	"
20th "	(Yu Hsueh-chung)	"	"
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	"	"

Total. . . 60,000

Strength of individual armies unknown; however, according to Japanese reports there are 60,000 men left in this Group of Armies. The Fifth Group of Armies managed to withdraw north of the Great Wall; the 9th and 12th Armies by marching via Kupehkow and the Kirin Army by rail. The 31st Army, which was made up of local bandits in the Suiyuan area, dispersed and has not been heard of since.

The Second Army Group.

Chihli-Shantung . . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

These armies became very disorganized in the disturbances around Tientsin and many units went over to the Nationalists. It is estimated that approximately 15,000 made their escape to Lutai and Tongshan, where they are causing trouble among the civilian populace at the present time.

The Seventh Army Group.
(Chu Yu-pu)

This Group became completely disrupted in the Tientsin area and its commander is now reported to be in Dairen.

The First Army Group
(Sun Chuan-fang)

About 10,000 men of this Group have been transported by rail to the vicinity of Chinchow, north of the Great Wall, where they have apparently affiliated with the Third and Fourth Group of Armies.

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Total Ankuochun south of the Great Wall 75,000

Note: Of the above total only the 60,000 in the Third and Fourth Group of Armies are dependable troops.

(b) NANKING GOVERNMENT

Commander-in-Chief . . . . . Chiang Kai-shek

First Group of Armies.
(Chiang Kai-shek)

1st	Army	(Liu Chih) Yenchow	12,000
9th	"	(Ku Chu-tung) Pengpu	12,000
10th	"	(Chiang Han-ting) Techow	8,000
17th	"	(Tsao Wan-shun) Tsang Yuan	10,000
26th	"	(Chen Cho) Tsinghsien	12,000
37th	"	(Chen Tiao-yuan) Yangliutsing	10,000
33rd	"	(Chang Ko-yao) Tachenghsien	12,000
27th	"	(Hsia Ton-yin) Hsing Chi Chen	12,000
46th	"	(Fang Ting-ying) Taian	7,000
4th	"	(Miao Pei-nan) Suchow	5,000
11th	"	(Fang Chen-wu) Machang	8,000
41st	"	(Pao Kang) Hsing Chi Chen	8,000
34th	"	(Juan Yu-hsuan) Tsangchow	10,000
42nd	"	(Wu Chi)(Tsinghai)	11,000
47th	"	(Kao Kuei-tsu) Nanpihsien	12,000
7th	"	(Hsia Wei) Yu Cheng	12,000
		Total	161,000

(c) KUOMINCHUN AND HONAN ALLIES . . . . . Feng Yu-hsiang

The Second Group of Armies

Feng Yu-hsiang . . . . . Commander-in-Chief
Lu Chung-lin . . . . . Second in Command

3rd Army Corps	(Han Fu-chu) Hsiunghsien, N.E. of Paotingfu	20,000
8th " "	(Liu Chen-hua) Langfang	25,000
Cavalry Corps	(Cheng Ta-chang) Lihsien	10,000
Other Kuominchun forces at Tingchow		15,000
	Total	70,000

There are no other Kuominchun forces north of Honan.

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(d) SHANSI FORCES . . . . . Yen Hsi-shan

The Third Group of Armies

Yen Hsi-shan . . . . . Commander-in-Chief
Shang Chen . . . . . Second in Command

2nd Army	(Yang Ai-yuan)	Shihkiachuang	10,000
3rd "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Paotingfu	10,000
5th "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Laishiu-Yichow	8,000
6th "	(Feng Yu-hsi)	Suiyuan	10,000
8th "	(Tang Ching-lin)	S. W. of Jehol	12,000
1st "	(Shang Chen)	Peking area (less 14th & 17th Divisions)	12,000
4th "	(Fu T'sun-huai)	Kalgan	8,000
7th "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking area (less 16th Div)	10,000
10th "	(Li Wei-hsin)	Changhsintien	9,000
12th "	(Chang Chan-ao)	Shihkiachuang	8,000
15th "	(Wang Ying)	Taiyuanfu	10,000
17th, 14th, 16th Divisions	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	10,000

Newly organized Chihli-Shantung forces formerly belonging to Chang Tsung-chang.x

11th Army Corps (Commanding General, Hsu Yuan-chuan) consisting of:

1st Div.	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Kichowpeh	
2nd "	(Tsun Tien-ying)	"	
3rd "	(C hang Kuan-wu)	"	
25th "	(Chang Ying-fang)	North of Sanhoksien	
1st Independent Div.	(Chang Ying-wu)	Miyun, north of Peking	
2nd " "	(Chang Ting-hsun)	" " " "	
		Total of 11th Army Corps -	20,000
		Total	137,000

xNote: It is difficult to determine the number of troops in this Corps; however, a conservative estimate would be approximately 20,000.

(e) WUHAN FORCES . . . . . Li Tsung-jen

The Fourth Group of Armies

Li Tsung-jen . . . . . Commander-in-Chief
Pai Chung-hsi. . . . . Second in Command

36th Army	(Li Yen)		15,000
12th "	(Li Pin-hsian)	Changhsintien	10,000
30th "	(Wei I-san)	Tungchow	10,000
8th "	(Yeh Ch'i)	Chochow	10,000
13th "	(Pai Ching-hsi)	Nan Yuan	13,000
Two Independent Regiments		at Hsi Yuan	3,000
8th Independent Hupeh Division	(Liu Chun-jung),	Hsi Yuan	8,000
		Total	69,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS 437,000

This total, it will be noted, is a reduction of 27,000 from the last report in which an estimated strength was given, and can be accounted for by the fact that several armies and independent divisions previously reported as being in North China cannot now be accounted for as being present in the Northern campaign. Their removal from the list has been counterbalanced in part by the addition of new units.

2. Developments Since Last Report.

General. From a military standpoint, the period covered by this report has been one of exceptional calm. On the 21st of June, the Mukden authorities officially announced the death of Chang Tso-lin, which undoubtedly occurred on the same day as the bombing of the train on June 4th, which was mentioned in the last report. The position of Governor of Fengtien Province has been taken over by Chang Hsueh-liang, the former Dictator's eldest son, who entered on his new duties on June 20th. Japanese sources consider it quite certain that in addition the "Young Marshal" will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief of Peace Preservation in the Three Eastern Provinces, although he has not actually done so yet. Negotiations between the Fengtien Party and representatives of the Nanking Government have been going on, with the object of establishing peace and bringing Manchuria into the Nationalist fold. Meanwhile the Third and Fourth Fengtien Army Group continues entrenching in the Lwanchow-Shanhaikuan area apparently with a view of resisting any efforts on the part of the Nationalists to enter Manchuria, should these negotiations break down.

After a long period of quiet, fighting has again broken out in Szechwan between Yang Sen and allied forces on one side, and Liu Hsiang and affiliated militarists on the other. Li Tsung-jen has dispatched troops to the aid of Liu Hsiang in this conflict.

Activities in North China. Strictly speaking, an acute military situation does not exist at the present time in North China. The Nationalists after taking over the Tientsin area lost complete contact with the Northern armies and have made no attempt to regain it, contenting themselves with reorganizing former Chihli-Shantung troops in the Tientsin area and incorporating them in the Nationalist Army. This failure to take full advantage of their successes in the North and push the war on into Manchuria can be ascribed to political rather than military reasons. The Japanese dominate the situation in Manchuria and have firmly stated that they will permit nothing that would tend to disturb the peace in the Three Eastern Provinces. Although neither side may admit being influenced by the views of the Japanese, yet both are fearful of the consequences of making any move contrary to the wishes of Japan. Keeping this in mind, the lull in activities is easily explained. It will probably be continued

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until the negotiations now pending between the Mukden authorities and representatives of the Nanking Government have definitely failed or have been concluded satisfactory to the Japanese as well as to the contending Chinese factions. With the death of Chang Tso-lin, which was officially announced June 21st, the chances for a peaceful solution of differences have been enhanced, as the attitude of his successor, the "Young Marshal" toward the Nationalist Government appears to be conciliatory. He has stated publicly that he is ready to discuss any peace terms on a basis of equality, but Manchuria being an important part of China, he could not approve of any scheme aiming at the exclusion of these three provinces from a voice in the country's affairs, and that he was firmly resolved to use all in his power to frustrate such attempts. In keeping with the latter part of this statement, the Third and Fourth Fengtien Army Group continues to entrench in the Lwanchow-Shanhaikuan area with the evident intention of resisting any attempt on the part of the Nationalists to invade Manchuria, should the peace negotiations break down.

Sun Chuan-fang's troops, which were previously reported at Lutai, have been transported by rail to Chinchow north of the Great Wall, and in all probability will form a part of the Third and Fourth Fengtien Army Group Reserve. Small remnants of Chang Tsung-chang's forces still remain in the Lutai-Tongshan area, where they constitute a sufficient menace to lives and property to necessitate the sending of one battalion of British troops to Tongshan for the protection of the interests of Great Britain in that locality. These former Chihli-Shantung troops cannot now be said to belong to either side, since neither the Nationalists nor the Fengtien forces want them.

To attempt to prophesy the final outcome of these peace parleys would be futile, the main difficulty in the way of an amicable agreement apparently being that the Nationalist leaders are themselves in disagreement as to their policy regarding Manchuria. Meanwhile the Nationalists continue their plans for an invasion to the line Shanhaikuan-Jehol. This operation and the policy regarding Manchuria will doubtless be discussed in the coming conferences between the important militarists in Peking.

Feng Yu-hsiang's troops have withdrawn to points south of Peking and east of the Peking-Hankow railway, and are in a position to prove an embarrassment both to Yen Hsi-shan and Pai Ching-hsi should the occasion arise. Fan Ching-hsiu, the ex- brigand leader mentioned in Report No. 7262 of May 9th, is again causing trouble in the Kuominchun rear, thereby keeping Feng occupied and causing him to be less of a menace to the commanders in the Peking area than otherwise would be the case. It is not improbable that these difficulties in Feng's rear are instigated by the Hankow group, as it is a well known fact that all factions in the Nationalist regime are antagonistic to Feng. In the meantime, Feng persists in his attitude of acquiescence to the dictates of the Nanking Government, although it is quite obvious to the initiated that he is dissatisfied with his share of the spoils of war and is only awaiting a favorable opportunity to assert himself and claim what he considers his just reward.

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Activities in Szechwan. According to consular reports the province of Szechwan is again the scene of military disorders, after a long period of quiet in which the status quo of the various militarists was preserved simply because none dared encroach upon the territory or rights claimed by another for fear of losing his own holdings. Yang Sen, who has long been a thorn in the side of the other Szechwan militarists, was upon their representations relieved of command of the 20th Army by the Nanking Government early this year. General Yang however refused to comply with this order and continued to retain his post of command, in addition to which he further outraged the feelings of all concerned by inviting Wu Pei-fu to reside in Szechwan under his protection.

Early in May a conference was held between various generals in the territory controlled by Liu Hsiang, at which General Kuo Ju-tung was urged to assume command of Yang Sen's forces. His attempts to do this being frustrated, he commenced preparations for hostilities with Yang Sen, and in addition arrived at an agreement with other militarists to assist him in eliminating General Yang. About May 14th, Yang Sen hurriedly evacuated Wanhsien and later at Kaihsien he met and defeated the forces allied against him, whereupon he reoccupied Wanhsien and began preparations for military operations against Liu Hsiang, who is established in Chungking.

According to newspaper reports the militarists of eastern Szechwan have joined hands in a declaration of war against the Kuomintang, and General Yang Sen is reported to have asserted his independence of the Nanking Government.

Whatever may be the true state of affairs in Szechwan, it would appear that the arrangement effected at Chengtu in 1925 through the efforts of Liu Hsiang, under which territory and revenues of the province were amicably allotted to various military leaders, has definitely broken down and theunusually long period of comparatively uninterrupted peace which Szechwan has enjoyed is at an end.

Later reports in the vernacular papers state that an alliance between Yang Sen and Cheng Chien, former commander of the 6th Nationalist Army had been formed and that Li Tsung-jen dispatched troops from western Hunan and Hupeh to assist Liu Hsiang in eliminating Yang Sen and Wu Pei-fu from Szechwan. This probably accounts for the arrest of Cheng Chien in Wuhan by Pai Ching-hsi.

A brief outline of the military line-up in Szechwan was given in Report No. 7256, dated April 9, 1928.

3. Miscellaneous.

The following is quoted from a report of the Consul General, Canton:

> "There has been much talk of the organization and equipment of a "Fifth Army" to rank with the commands of Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Li Tsung-jen. According to newspaper reports, this army will be under Li Chai-sum, but it is to have two 'routes', one under Chen Ming-shu and the other under Huang Shao-hung. From confidential talks, however, one gets the impression that this army is not likely to materialize in the near

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future, if ever, and that the reports of its organization are being spread merely for political effect."

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Information has been received from Canton to the effect that on June 6th Li Chai-sum received a slight bullet wound in the left arm, the shot being fired by a member of his bodyguard; and that on June 18th thirty of this bodyguard were secretly executed. This has not been reported in the press and if true constitutes the third attempt on his life.

Judging from reports from Canton, it would appear that Li Chai-sum's break with Chiang Kai-shek, which would include the elimination of Chiang's men in Kwangtung, has started. On June 15th, the 6th anniversary of Chen Chiung-ming's ejection of Sun Yat-sen from Canton, official speeches were made in that city warning the people against the possible return to power of Chen, and his followers, all of whom it is claimed are enemies of the San Min Chu I (The Three Principles). Chen Chiung-ming's troops, which are about half bandits, have had a brush with the Kwangtung troops on the Kiangsu-Kwangtung border. Chen Ming-hsu, who is a puppet of Chen Chiung-ming's, has troops stationed in this area and in the vicinity of Pakhoi, and reports are continually received in Canton concerning bandit activities in this region. These bandits may possibly be Kwangsi troops as Kwangsi has always wanted a seaport and has created Pakhoi and the southwestern strip of Kwangtung. It is possible that with a Kwangsi man in the saddle in Canton now, Kwangsi troops will occupy this portion of Kwangtung, thus giving Kwangsi a seaport, making feasible the building of the Wuchow to Yamchow area of the old Chuchow-Chinchow railway, and giving both Nanning and Wuchow rail connection with a deep harbor.

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - July 2, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Disbandment of Troops in the Chinese Armies.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 21 1928

1. Introduction.

In view of recent and past agitations the question of disbanding the vast number of men under arms in China has again come to the foreground. Since the Nationalists now apparently consider that warfare has come to an end, they are occupying their minds with this problem as many of their predecessors in the Seats of Power have done in the past. It will be interesting to note whether or not their efforts along this line will be crowned with more success than formerly has been the case.

This question first came up almost immediately after the birth of the Republic, when it was proposed that a loan be floated to take care of the disbanding of troops not actually needed for national defense. In accordance with this plan, altogether, 18,720 officers and 316,000 enlisted men were discharged and each man was given three months pay as well as receiving any arrears due him. From that time on the army was increased rather than decreased until by 1919 it was estimated that there were a million and a quarter soldiers in the country. The money required to maintain this establishment was greatly in excess of the amount available, therefore, if disaster were to be averted it was quite clear that drastic cuts must be made in the military establishment. Plans were made for a gradual disbandment in 1919 to be carried out over a period of from a year to a year and a half. The opportunities of employment offered to disbanded soldiers were agriculture, reclamation road making, conservancy work and police service. In spite of repeated mandates and promises nothing in the way of reduction was attempted; on the contrary, with the splitting up of the armed forces into several armies under military governors there was an increase. At the close of the civil strife in 1920 some units actually

were disbanded, but as the members were in all probability enlisted in other units, they could not be taken into consideration as a reduction. Since that time this same thing has happened numberless times. During the Washington Conference various plans on this subject were submitted which were only listened to with pretended interest by the militarists. The defeated troops disbanded as a result of the fighting in several provinces in the spring of 1922 certainly did not equal the numbers which the disrupted political situation, following the fighting, permitted the various commanders to recruit.

Under Tuan Chi-jui's administration in 1925, a reorganization conference was called with disbandment as its principal object, but its proposals came to nothing, not even a paper scheme being adopted. In view of these discouraging and half-hearted attempts in the past, it would take an optimist indeed to look forward with any hope toward a reduction in the future.

2. Various Recent Proposals.

(a) Yen Hsi-shan's Proposal.

On June 19, 1928, Yen Hsi-shan in a telegram to Nanking suggested the immediate calling of a conference to discuss the reduction of armaments. General Yen proposes that superfluous and undisciplined troops be weeded out, and that the military power be vested in the central government. In the same telegram he stated that arrangements should be made whereby all monies collected on behalf of the central government should be remitted to Nanking, and payments for military and other expenses be duly made from that center. His proposals were referred for consideration to the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, scheduled to be held in August, 1928.

(b) Chiang Kai-shek's Proposal.

On July 2, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek submitted a memorandum proposing that the government should organize a commission at once for the discussion of disarmament, and that a start should be made immediately with the First Group of Armies of which he is Commander-in-Chief. An outline of his proposal is as follows:

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1) The military expenditures of the government should not exceed sixty per cent. of the national income.

2) That the division be made the unit of the Chinese army, which shall not exceed 70 or 80 divisions.

3) Reorganization should be started with the 1st, 9th, 17th and 33rd armies of the First Group of Armies, and the troops of the garrison commandants of Peking and Tientsin.

4) That the transfer or appointment of divisional commanders be made by the Nationalist Government.

5) That officers and soldiers be forbidden to interfere with administrative affairs.

6) That funds for the upkeep of the army be guaranteed.

7) That military education be subject to the control of the Central Government.

For an interview of Chiang Kai-shek in which he outlines the plan to be submitted to the government by the four chief military commanders, see Appendix 2.

(c) Kwangsi Faction Proposals.

Li Tsung-jen, Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Group of Armies, supports the "Soldier Labor Policy", and advocates that the Central Government set forth a few principles in accordance with this policy, as for instance, the number of troops needed for the whole country; how to distribute the number of soldiers for each locality; how to discharge the unfit and retain the able. If these principles be adopted it becomes necessary to find the correct method of training the strong men for national defense, and demobilize the weak and make a proper settlement so that the latter will not become bandits and resort to crimes around the different districts. Above all, General Li desires that the above should be minutely planned and carried out gradually.

General Pai Chung-hsi, Deputy Commander of the Fourth Group of Armies, has suggested the organization of two commissions in connection with the disbandment of troops. In the first place he proposes that a military commission should be formed, to be composed of the military authorities above the rank of army commander, and members of the military council of the government for the discussion of questions concerning disarmament and national defense.

Secondly, General Pai favors the establishment of a soldier labor commission, the duty of which is to solve the problem as to how the soldiers should be employed after disbandment.

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(d) Feng Yu-hsiang's Proposals.

In a circular telegram issued on July 6, 1928, Feng Yu-hsiang made the following proposals:

1) All army posts of command above that of a divisional commander should be abolished.

2) All Nationalist armies should be placed under the direct control of the Central Executive Committee.

3) A disbandment commission should be established.

Later Feng expressed himself on disbandment, stating that the work should be done on an efficiency basis. He does not think that it is fair for Chiang Kai-shek, for example, to disband a hundred thousand untrained soldiers from some of his lesser units, and declare that Feng should dispose of an equal number of men.

Feng considers his troops superior in training to the other troops under the Nationalist banner, and rightly so; therefore, should attempts be made to disband his armies on an equal basis with the rest strenuous opposition can be expected from him.

(e) Proposal of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce.

In a memorandum submitted by the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce to the Nanking Financial Conference which was held between July 1st and July 10th, a drastic cut in the armed forces of the country was strongly advocated for financial reasons, and the use of ex-soldiers in a colonization scheme for the frontiers of China was proposed.

In this memorandum it was pointed out that the suggestion to send soldiers who had property back to their homes and trades was impractical because only a very small number have either property or a trade. Suggestions to put demobilized soldiers to work on railroad construction, road building, etc., or in factories established for the purpose of giving them employment, were likewise deemed impractical. In the case of construction work, as soon as the work terminates the question again arises as to their future disposition. In the latter case, only a limited number could be taken care of in factories, in addition to which huge capital would be required for the erection of these factories.

The Chamber of Commerce therefore recommends the sending of disbanded soldiers to the northwestern boundaries of the Republic where millions of settlers can be accommodated, and where the soldiers may live upon the land they cultivate and develop the resources during their lifetime for themselves and future generations. Since all of the soldiers have a turn for such work, they can easily be educated in farming methods.

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Subject: Disbandment of Troops of the Chinese Armies.

As to the funds required for setting this plan in operation, the government must raise them through the issue of public loan bonds to the people to support the soldiers, give them their fares to the frontier, and supply them with farming implements for a start; they in turn to pay a tax on the land they cultivate for repayment of the funds.

4. Actual Conditions.

Despite all the talk of disbandment and disarmament, Yen Hsi-shan continues incorporating former Chihli-Shantung troops into his armies. The future disposition of these troops is vague, but it seems clear that Yen and Chiang Kai-shek are adding to their forces with a view to curtailing the influence of Feng Yu-hsiang. Recruiting is actually in progress on the streets of Peking, while the conversations on disbandment are being given full publicity.

As a matter of fact, soldiers in the raw and untrained condition which prevails in most of the Nationalist armies are a drug on the market in China. It is the arms belonging to the disbanded troops which count as the major factor in the eyes of the militarists. With a sufficient store of the accoutrements of war on hand, any military leader can recruit an army in little or no time, should the necessity for one arise. Therefore all of the present agitation for reduction can be taken with a decided grain of salt, since each leader knows in his own mind that without an army to back him up his power is nil.

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - July 16, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

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APPENDIX I.

Estimated Strength of Armed Forces Since 1919.

1919.	1,250,000	
1920.	1,369,000	
1921		
1922.	1,332,000	
1923.	1,050,070	
1924.	1,404,000	
1925.	1,883,300	to 1,933,300
1926		
1927.	1,576,000	

While the figures set forth above may not include the total number of men in army uniforms, it is believed that these figures amply cover the number of men actually under arms in China, both in the past and at the present time.

APPENDIX II.

Report on the Reorganization of Nationalist Troops to be Submitted to the Government by The Four Principal Military Commanders and the Representative of the Nationalist Naval Commander.

General Chiang Kai-shek in an interview with a party of Chinese and foreign journalists in the Western Hills on July 13th, announced that as a result of the discussions of the past few days, the four Nationalist military leaders now in Peking and Admiral Chen Shao-kuan, who represents Admiral Yang Shu-chwang, Nationalist naval commander, had signed a report on the reorganization of Nationalist troops. The salient points of the report are as follows:

A commission on the reorganization and disbandment of troops shall be organized, to be composed of commanders of the four group army corps, the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist navy, the chief and vice chief of staff, and three or five members appointed by the Nationalist government. The commission shall be known as the revolutionary army reorganization and disbandment commission and shall be subject to the control of the government. As soon as the commission is organized, all the titles of generalissimo, group army commander and naval commander-in-chief will be abolished.

Fifty divisions or probably sixty at the start shall be organized from among the existing forces of the first, second, third and fourth group army corps. In selecting men, consideration will be given to their efficiency, equipment and war service. These troops will be first placed under the control of the central government. The size of the national army should be determined by a committee on national defence.

In peace time the division should be made the unit of the Nationalist army. The organization of a division together with its equipment and training should be based on uniform regulations made by the commission on reorganization and disbandment of troops. The divisions should also be subject to the control of the commission.

Subordinate officers of the new divisions will be given uniform training in the central military academy. They will be allowed to rejoin their divisions upon completion of their advanced studies. Those who are rich in experience and possess advanced knowledge will be appointed training officers or sent abroad for higher education.

Those officers who have rendered meriterious war services and are regarded as men of exemplary conduct, will be given new ranks in the army and pay on the recommendation of the reorganization and disbandment commission. Those who have held positions higher than that of army corps commander, will be appointed members of the military commission. If they want to go to Europe or America for advanced education or to investigate conditions, the government will arrange to give them suitable travelling expenses. Opportunity also will be given to improve their knowledge at home.

In organizing new divisions no line should be drawn between the former affiliations of troops. Thus a reorganized division may consist of troops and officers drawn from all the four group army corps, the idea being to build an army whose loyalty is due to the state, and not to a particular commander. In short, the Chinese army should belong to the state instead of being the personal chattel of its commander.

Training grounds should be established at the principal cities of China.

In addition to other necessary organs, the commission should establish five departments; the department for the organization and training of the national army; the department for the organization and training of gendarmes; the department to work out a scheme for police and a "Paoan" corps; the department on soldier-labor and the department on colonization.

A gendarmerie of 200,000 men will be organized from among the balance of the troops left over after the organization of fifty or sixty new divisions. The gendarmes will be distributed among the various provinces of the country for the protection of railways and ports. They will be subject to the control of the central government and the officials of the district where they are stationed. The gendarmes are to be divided into three classes: garrison gendarmes, patrolling gendarmes and emergency gendarmes.

A force of water gendarmes will also be organized from among the men now in the service of the inland river fleet. A training school will be established to develop the necessary staff for the gendarmerie. The organization of the gendarmerie will be along the same line as the national army.

A police force and a "Paoan" corps shall be organized from among the men left over after the organization of the national army and the national gendarmerie. The two forces shall be distributed among the various provinces and subject to the control of the provincial authorities. A national training school for police officers should be established.

The report concludes by suggesting that disbanded troops should be employed on construction works, such as the building of roads, highways, and the irrigation of the Huai River.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Special Report on the Present Status of the Manchurian and Former Chihli-Shantung Allied Troops.

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1. Since Report No. 7287 of June 30, 1928 was submitted there have been no military operations of sufficient importance to warrant a new Situation Report. However, certain movements and changes have been made in the line-up of the Manchurian troops and their former Chihli-Shantung allies, which may have a bearing on future military events.

2. Activities of the Chihli-Shantung Troops. In Report No. 7287 the remnants of the Chihli-Shantung armies, commanded by Chang Tsung-chang, were located in the Lutai-Tangshan area. These forces, estimated to be about 20,000 in number, are now strung out along the Peking-Mukden railway from Lutai to Lwanchow, occupying intermediate points of importance at Tangshan, Kuyeh and Fengjen. These troops, which previously were in a frightful state of disorganization, have now been reorganized into some semblance of order. They continue to be a menace to the local inhabitants because of their demands for food supplies. The Fengtien authorities are doing their best to alleviate this condition by sending them supplies; however, the quantities are insufficient to cover their needs.

Chu Yu-pu, who has been variously reported as having escaped to Dairen, is now believed to be in Lwanchow where his headquarters and bodyguard troops are. Chang Tsung-chang has established his headquarters at Changli. He has been appointed in command of the first line of defense by Chang Hsueh-liang. Two lines of trenches along the north bank of the Lwan River extending from Loting to Tsienan, previously constructed by the Fengtien troops, have been turned over to Chang Tsung-chang and are now occupied by his forces in conjunction with the Fengtien troops. Since these trenches are rather elaborately constructed, it would be possible for good troops to resist strongly along the Lwan. The past performance of Chang Tsung-chang's troops does not however warrant the expectation of any serious resistance from them.

3. Activities of the Fengtien Troops South of the Great Wall.

The second line of defense on the Peking-Mukden railway extends from the vicinity of Peitaiho railway station straight north to the Great Wall. As in the Lwanchow area, two lines of trenches have been constructed extending over 40 English miles in length. These trenches, which constitute a reserve position, have been built to withstand a much more severe attack than those at Lwanchow.

The troops in the Peitaiho-Shanhaikuan area comprise 6 regiments of infantry, with accompanying artillery (three brigades), cavalry, engineers, air service, armored trains and bodyguard troops. In advance of this area in the Lwanchow-Yungping-Changli region the following units or parts of units have been identified: 11th, 15th, 29th, 16th, 17th and 10th armies. The total number of Northern troops south of the Wall is estimated to be approximately 40,000 men. This Army Group, the headquarters of which is at Shanhaikuan, is now commanded by Yang Yu-ting and Han Lin-chun.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Special Report on the Present Status of the Manchurian and Former Chihli-Shantung Allied Troops.

Two divisions of the 20th Army are reported to have passed through Chinwangtao from Changli on the 11th of July en-route to Shanhaikuan, and to be endeavoring to go beyond the Great Wall. At the same time large numbers of 6" field pieces and disassembled airplanes were reported by the U. S. Army officer stationed at Chinwangtao as being shipped north. This may mean a forerunner of a general withdrawal north of the Wall; while the armies are still intact, as the Japanese policy to permit no disorganized soldiery to enter Manchuria, which was previously reported, still holds good. Another factor which may have an influence toward a further withdrawal of the Fengtien troops is that the present time units of the Fourth Nationalist Group of Armies under command of Pai Chung-hsi are under orders to proceed northward along the Peking-Mukden railway, while Fang Cheng-wu's troops now in the area south of Tientsin have orders to move on Jehol in cooperation with the Shansi troops now in that area, although at the present writing neither one of these movements has commenced. The general impression however is that the Fengtien and Chihli-Shantung allies will withdraw into Manchuria without fighting.

4. Activities of the Fengtien and Kirin Troops North of the Great Wall. Manchurian troops are stationed at various points along the Peking-Mukden railway from Suichung to Kowpangtze. Kirin troops are placed at intermediate points along the railway line in this area constituting a general reserve.

The situation in the Jehol area is somewhat obscure. It is known however that the 9th Army under Kao Wei-yueh, the 12th Army under Tang Yu-lin and the 30th Army under Yü Chih-shan occupy this region as well as a part of the 31st Army and bandit forces which have affiliated themselves with these armies. A large proportion of these troops is cavalry. Japanese estimates give these forces a strength of about 35,000 men. Rifles and ammunition have been sent to these troops from Mukden, but they are dependent upon local chambers of commerce for support where food supplies are concerned.

5. Miscellaneous. Following is the available information regarding Sun Chuan-fang. His 2nd Army, commanded by Cheng Chun-yen, went over to the Nationalists of the Third Group of Armies. About 2,000 troops of the 3rd Army under Li Pao-chang are now stationed at Ningho north of Lutai. Sun himself still commands the 1st Army composed of about 7,000 troops, and 3000 bodyguards. According to the latest information one division and Sun's bodyguard brigade were at C hangli, where he has his headquarters; the remainder have passed north of the Wall for reorganization.

During the early part of the month the former Chihli-Shantung forces that were incorporated into the Nationalist Army, gave considerable trouble to their new masters. One brigade of Chu Yu-pu's former bodyguard which was reorganized after his departure from Tientsin, and placed in the 3rd Shansi Army, made good its escape from Tientsin on July 1st and is now at Lwanchow. Other units mutinied and attempted to escape north to join Chang Tsung-chang and Chu Yu-pu, urged on by promises of three months' pay in advance and other inducements. Two regiments did succeed in escaping while others stationed at the Chihli Law College after mutinying surrendered and were disarmed and allowed to return to their homes peaceably.

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - July 18, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Miscellaneous Notes on Military Acticities in China.

1. Activities in Northern Chihli.

The Nationalists have at last arrived at a decision to push northeastward with the object of clearing Chihli Privince of the Fengtien armies and their Chihli-Shantung allies.

During the latter part of July preparations were completed and the northward movement of troops was started. This expedition which is under the command of General Pai Chung-hsi, second in command of the Fourth Nationalist Group of Armies, is a composite force of four groups. It has been organized into three columns, the commanders and routes of which are as follows:

(a) Right flank - commanded by Han Fu-chu,, Second Group of Armies

Route - Peking-Mukden Railway.

Objective - Shanhaikuan.

(b) Center - commanded by Hsu Yung-chang, Third Group of Armies.

Route - Peking - Shanhaikuan motor road.

Objective - Shanhaikuan.

(c) Left flank - commanded by Li Pin-hsien, Fourth Group of Armies.

Route - Territory left of Peking-Shanhaikuan motor road.

Objective - Shanhaikuan.

On the extreme left flank Fang Chen-wu commanding units of the First Group of Armies is cooperating with Shansi troops under Tan Ch'ing-lin to drive the Fengtien Fifth Army Group out of the Kupeikow-Jehol area.

The expedition started moving out about July 26th. On the right flank no movement has been observed north of Tientsin. The center and left flank columns have proceeded beyond Yutien in a northeasterly direction. At Yutien, where a garrison consisting of former Chihli-Shantung troops reorganized into the Nationalist army was stationed, a minor engagement took place between this force and the 12th Nationalist Army, in which there were casualties on both sides. The trouble ended only when the incoming troops succeeded in disarming the local garrison. The first resistance from bona fide northern troops in this area is expected to be met with in the vicinity of Tangshan.

At Kupeikow and at Hsifengkow where the Lwan river flows through the Great Wall, fighting has taken place between T'and Yu-lin's Manchurian troops and units under the command of Feng Chen-wu, as a result of which, in the neighborhood of five hundred wounded have been evacuated to Peking.

T'ang Yu-lin is reported to have telegraphed the four Nationalist Army Group Commanders announcing his obedience to Kuomintang rule. The above mentioned fighting combined with the fact that General T'ang is aware that the Nationalists desire the area now occupied by his troops to be placed under

the control of either Fang Chen-wu or Hsu Yung-chang, would lead to a disbelief as to the accuracy of this report.

The amount of resistance that the Northern armies intend putting up before this new advance is a matter for conjecture. It is believed however the Third and Fourth Fengtien Army Group is merely remaining in the Lwanchow-Shanhaikuan area in order to prevent their former Chihli-Shantung allies under Chang Ts'ung-chang and Chu Yupu from entering Manchuria.

2. Recent events in the Chefoo district of Shantung.

1. A situation has recently arisen in the Chefoo district in Eastern Shantung the underlying motives for the creation of which are at present obscure. Before proceeding with the details of this affair, it might be well to give a brief resume of events which have taken place in the Shantung peninsula since this region was last reported upon. In the first part of June this portion of Shantung came under the nominal rule of the Nationalists due to the turnover of various northern generals occupying this area, the most prominent of whom were Liu Chih-lu and Fang Ying-ch'ang. The Nationalist form of government was introduced, the Kuomintang flag was hoisted throughout this part of the province and the various former northern troops were organized into four Nationalist armies, all of whcih did not serve to curb the turbulent spirits of the military commanders in their desire for supremacy in the affairs of this section of the province. The struggle finally resolved itself into an actual conflict between the forces under the leadership of the two commanders mentioned above. Intermittent fighting contined throughout the month of June, and until the latter part of July when the advent of a third element, which provides the reason for this report, caused an abrupt change in the situation.

2. On July 19th a band of former Chihli-Shantung soldiers, numbering in the neighborhood of a thousand or more men, under the leadership of one Chung Chen-kuo, set sail for Chefoo from Pehtang, just north of Tangku. Upon arrival in Chefoo this force posed as adherents to the Nationalist cause. On the night of July 22nd fighting suddenly broke out between these troops and those under Colonel Tze, representing the Nationalists, in which the latter were defeated. A coup d'etat was then carried out by General Chung in the name of Chang Tsung-chang and the five-barred flag was flown in Chefoo. General Chung claimed to have orders from the former Tupan of Shantung to drive out all communists, and apparently considered all those differing from his chief to be of this clan. According to the senior American Naval officer in Chefoo, General Chung is in alliance with Fang Yung-chang who is reported to have about 10,000 men, and is further said to have defeated Lu Chih-lu.

During the fighting whcih resulted from the revolt of Chung's troops and which continued intermittently throughout the night of July 22-23, one American sailor, a member of the landing party for the protection of American lives and property, was injured in the hand be a stray bullet. Nationalist officials who recently assumed office were either arrested or sought refuge in the Japanese Consulate. No antiforeignism was apparent and the situation soon quieted down and has remained so until the present time. General Chung has declared himself as respnnsible for foreign live and property and left $1,000 U.S. currency at the American Consulate as compensation for the injury suffered by the American sailor during the fighting. The Nationalists naturally are highly incensed at actions of General Chung and state that troops will be dispatched forthwith to re-establish control over

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the city of Chefoo.

What General Chung or his chief Chang Tsung-chang can hope to accomplish by this coup d'etat is distinctly puzzling to an observer. Possibly they consider that due to the unsettled conditions in the interior of the peninsula and the difficulties the Nationalists would have to overcome in ousting them, because of the Japanese barrier along the Kiao-Tsi railway line, that they might be able to establish themselves indefinitely in Eastern Shantung, and provide a temporary haven at least for the forces of Chang Tsung-chang should these be persona non grata in Manchuria. On the other hand this situation may be merely the flare-up of a band of adventurers and have no political or military significance whatsoever. In any case these troops even if reinforced can not hope to hold out in this locality for any great length of time, should the Nationalists make a determined effort to rid the area of their presence.

John W. Carroll,
Captain, Cavalry.

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, - August 2, 1928. - To: A.C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Miscellaneous Notes on Military Activities in China.

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1. Activities in Northern Chihli.

The expedition under Pai Chung-hsi formed for the purpose of clearing Chihli province of Manchurian troops, which was started in July, has been slowly continuing its northeastward movement with Shanhaikuan as its objective.

The right flank column, previously reported as under the command of Han Fu-chu but now known to be commanded by Hsu Yung-chang, has pushed its advance elements to the vicinity of Lutai. Pehtang, north of Tangku, defended by a small force of former Chihli-Shantung troops, has been captured, but on the whole very little fighting has taken place in this sector due to the fact that it contains only scattered remnants of Chang Tsung-chang's troops which, for one reason or another, were unable to get to a place of safety. The headquarters of the right flank column are in Tientsin. The personnel is composed of Shansi troops of the Third Group of Armies.

The center column has established its headquarters at Langfang on the Peking-Mukden railway southeast of Peking. It is composed of units of the 3rd Kuominchun Army of the 2nd Group of Armies. It is commanded by Han Fu-chu and not Hsu Yung-chang as previously reported. This column has advanced to the neighborhood of Sianho and Paoti. Since there are no northern troops in this sector, except scattered bands of former Chihli-Shantung soldiers now turned bandits, no resistance has been met with by this column.

The left flank column, which is made up of elements of the Fourth Group of Armies including the 12th, 30th and 36th Armies under command of Li Pin-hsien, has advanced to the vicinity of Tsunhwa. Chihli-Shantung troops under Cheng Kuo-jui have fought several minor delaying actions, but have not succeeded in materially impeding the advance of this column. General Li's headquarters are established at Yutien.

Desultory fighting still continues in the Kupeikow-Jehol area between the Fengtien forces under Tang Yu-lin and the Nationalists from the First and Third Groups of Armies under Fang Chen-wu. According to Japanese reports the Fengtien authorities have ordered Tang Yu-lin to withdraw the main portion of his force from the Jehol area to Chaoyang, and in addition have ordered the Third and Fourth Army Group on the Peking-Mukden railway to withdraw from Lwanchow to the Changli-Funing area. The reason given for this move is that the Fengtien side wishes to show its sincerity regarding the compromise with Nanking. Other reports state that Chiang Kai-shek has issued orders halting the advance of Pai Chung-hsi's expedition for the same reason.

Yen Hsi-shan has reduced the Peking and Tientsin garrison to three divisions each. The remainder of the Shansi troops not taking part in the expedition to clear Chihli province of the Manchurian forces have been moved back either to their home province or to points

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on the Peking-Suiyuan railway. This move may mark the beginning of the end of Yen's activities outside of his own province. He is too astute a politician not to realize that his position in Chihli is being undermined more and more as time goes on through the machinations of Feng Yu-hsiang. That the latter has cast covetous eyes on Chihli province from the time the Nationalists first entered northern territory has been quite apparent even to the most casual observer. Yen's appointment as Defense Commissioner of the Peking-Tientsin area temporarily thwarted Feng's ambitions. This setback only caused Feng to redouble his efforts with the result that his appointees were granted all of the lucrative positions in this area from which revenue could be derived, thus depriving Yen of the wherewithal to provide for the maintenance of his troops and compelling the withdrawal of all his forces except those actually needed for garrison purposes. Later, when the expedition under Pai Chung-hsi was organized, it is a significant fact that three out of the five principal commanders either are at present, or were formerly, subordinates of Feng, to wit: Han Fu-chu, commander of the 3rd Kuominchun Army at the present time; Hsu Yung-ch'ang, formerly a Honan militarist affiliated with Feng; Fang Chen-wu, formerly in command of the 4th Kuominchun Army. It is one of Feng's well known characteristics that he has always been able to retain the loyalty of anyone who has ever served under him. If this holds true, it can easily be seen that he has the balance of power in his hands in the expedition sent out for the purpose of bringing Chihli province under Nationalist control.

In addition to the above, Feng has done everything in his power to improve his position with Chiang Kai-shek, with the result that the two are on very amicable terms at the present time. What could be more natural then, than Feng's appointment to succeed Yen Hsi-shan in Chihli in the event that the latter felt it incumbent upon himself to retire in order to attend more closely to affairs in his own province. Yen is at present on sick leave in Taiyuan, ostensibly suffering from an attack of appendicitis contracted while he was on the train en-route to Nanking to attend the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

2. Japanese Activities in Manchuria.

At a meeting of the Seiyukai in Tokyo on August 9th, Premier Tanaka stated that Japan had no intention whatever of meddling in the domestic administration of China. He further stated that Japan had issued no warning to Chang Hsueh-liang in respect to his compromise with Nanking; that the Japanese Government had merely notified Chang that it would not approve the extension to the Three Eastern Provinces of the influence of the Nationalists, whose government had notified Japan of the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese treaty, disregarding international faith and international law. The Japanese Government had no intention however of taking drastic action in case of the notice being disregarded by General Chang Hsueh-liang.

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On the same date, according to a telegraphic report from the American Consul in Mukden, Baron Hayashi, who was in Mukden supposedly for the purpose of attending the funeral of Chang Tso-lin, informed Chang Hsueh-liang that the Japanese Government haddecided to act with a free hand in case the "notice" mentioned above was disregarded and the Nationalist flag hoisted. Japan further undertook to offer Chang armed support in case he met with opposition in complying with Japan's desires.

The matter was referred to the Peace Preservation Committee with the result that this body decided definitely on a compromise with Nanking; not, however, before first coming to an agreement with the Japanese wherein it was agreed that the Nationalist flag would not be flown for three months, with the further understanding that there would be no objection thereto at the end of that period and that there would be no interference from the Japanese in any way.

3. Activities in Szechwan.

Szechwan continues to be the scene of civil strife between the adherents of the rebel, Yang Sen, and those of the Nationalist leader, Liu Hsiang, but little authentic information regarding the situation leaks out of the province. Wu Pei-fu has been gaining in popularity for some time and Nationalist controlled news services report that he is in actual command of the anti-Liu Hsiang forces. His popularity is based on three things:

a) That he is one of the very few Chinese war lords who when pressed never fled into a foreign concession for protection.

b) That he does not "squeeze" the populace.

c) That his word is his bond, a maxim which present day generals appear to have discarded.

Before the rebel forces can put up a determined fight it is essential that they be supplied with ammunition. According to persistent reports this is furnished principally through Hunan and Indo China, although smuggling of munitions is carried on to a certain extent in the Yangtze Valley.

There is no indication that the internal strife in Szechwan will be terminated in the near future.

4. Plans for Disbandment.

In a memorandum on the military rehabilitation of the country which will be submitted to the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, now in session in Nanking, General Chiang Kai-shek states that disbandment and reorganization must proceed

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hand-in-hand with the maintenance of an efficient and well equipped army for national defense and preservation of internal peace and order. In the actual carrying out of the government's disbandment scheme and the reorganization of the country's military administration, General Chiang proposes that the government convene a special military rehabilitation conference for the special purpose of dividing the country into a definite number of military districts, determining the number of soldiers needed for national defense, and the military expenditure involved. Representatives from the Central Executive Committee, the Chairman of the Government Military Council, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Commanders of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Groups of Armies will attend this special conference. The plan adopted by the conference will be submitted to the Government for promulgation and enforcement.

The troops disbanded under this plan are to be employed for road construction, river conservancy, reforestation, colonization and development of mines. The expenses incidental to the disbandment of so many troops may be met by floating a domestic military rehabilitation loan of from thirty to fifty million dollars.

The following scheme for the division of the country into military districts is also included in General Chiang's memorandum:

The entire country shall be divided into 12 military districts to be garrisoned by from 40,000 to 50,000 men each, as follows:

1st	District:	Kiangsu, Anhwei and Kiangsi
2nd	"	Chekiang and Fukien
3rd	"	Kwangtung and Kwangsi
4th	"	Hupeh and Hunan
5th	"	Szechwan
6th	"	Yunnan and Kweichow
7th	"	Shensi and Kansu
8th	"	Shantung and Honan
9th	"	Chihli and Shansi
10th	"	Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan
11th	"	The Three Eastern Provinces
12th	"	Sinkiang and Kokonor.

Separate arrangements for the garrisoning of Tibet and Outer and Inner Mongolia will be made by the Military Council.

The above scheme looks very well on paper. However, with four army group commanders all jealous of each other, and no inspectorate general to see that the various groups of armies are actually reduced proportionately, the question immediately arises as to what methods are to be used in accomplishing this plan. The four Nationalist commanders are repeatedly issuing statements regarding the cutting of their respective armies, but little credence can be given to these statements when recruiting can be seen going on daily in the streets of Peking.

John W. Carroll.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

For and in the absence of:

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Miscellaneous Notes on Military Activities in China.

1. Activities in Northern Chihli.

Except for minor skirmishes between advance elements of Pai Chung-hsi's expedition and small former Chihli-Shantung units in the region east of Yutien, there has been no fighting in northern Chihli during the latter half of August. On the surface this lack of activity would appear only natural in view of the Mukden-Nanking compromise. However, there are underlying reasons, the importance of which cannot be overlooked, as to why the Nationalist northern expedition does not proceed to rid the province of these Chihli-Shantung remnants. The first and most important of these is that no one in the Nationalist camp is desirous of undertaking this unpleasant and thankless task, the resultant benefits of which are too uncertain and too meager to be tempting.

The leaders of the three columns composing Pai's forces are each willing to have either or both of the others get the credit for this work. Hsu Yung-ch'ang has an insufficient number of troops to accomplish the task alone, even though he were willing. Han Fu-chu is loath to leave his base at Langfang on the Peking-Mukden railway, for reasons best known to himself but which may come to light later in case Feng Yu-hsiang succeeds in superseding Yen Hsi-shan as Garrison Commander of Peking and Tientsin. From present appearances, Han prefers holding his troops in support rather than taking the offensive. Li Pin-hsian's column is composed of troops from the Fourth Group of Armies. Since this force is ill equipped for cold weather operations, and its only base of supply is distant Hankow, Li is averse to becoming too involved in any campaign which might keep his troops in a rigorous climate through the autumn months.

Chang Hsueh-liang is reported to have offered to dispose of the Chihli-Shantung troops north of the Lwan river, but to have stated that he could not control those south of that line. Meanwhile Chang Tsung-chang and Chu Yu-pu continue levying taxes and otherwise assuming the rights of independent authorities in the territory controlled by them. They have employed the Matsura Maru, a Japanese ship, to transport large quantities of munitions and other military supplies from Chinwangtao to Chefoo. This ship has been making frequent trips between these two ports and in addition to the cargo mentioned above, has also been carrying soldiers in small numbers.

There are rumors that the Japanese are interested in having Chang Tsung-chang maintain himself in Chihli, which may be borne out by the fact that on August 19th 52 boxes containing approximately one hundred and fifty thousand dollars arrived in Chinwangtao from Tsingtao and were shipped to Tangshan, the shipment being accompanied by three Japanese in plain clothes.

The withdrawal of the Third and Fourth Army Group to stations north of the Wall has been started but the movement is progressing very slowly. Large quantities of military supplies are continually being reported by the U.S. Army Intelligence Officer in Chinwangtao as being transported to Manchuria. This officer also reports that commencing

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A ugust 28th, 38 train loads of Fengtien troops will be moved out of the Anshan district to points in Manchuria. The total number expected to be moved is in the neighborhood of 70,000. Upon completion of this movement practically all Fengtien forces will be cleared from Chihli province.

2. The Mongol Raids.

Beginning on August 15th, a series of raids were made on the western branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway by armed bands of Mongols. Traffic has been seriously interfered with along the line necessitating the sending of several brigades of troops to put a stop to these disturbances. Wan Fu-lin, Tupan of Heilungkiang, having insufficient troops at his disposal to cope with the situation, called upon Chang Hsueh-liang for assistance. The latter has agreed to dispatch the 10th Fengtien Army to aid in the operation against the Mongols.

At the present time regular traffic on the railway has been resumed and there appears to be a temporary cessation of hostilities while negotiations are being carried out between representatives of Wan Fu-lin and the Mongols for a peaceful settlement of this matter.

This affair, which at first glance appears to be merely another incident of banditry so common in China, may be part of a serious move which could be the cause of a grave situation arising in the future. Therefore a summary of the causes of these raids, as nearly as they can be unravelled from the veil of obscurity surrounding them, might not be out of place at this time.

Since its creation several years ago, the Outer Mongolian Soviet Republic organized by Red Russians, has contemplated the annexation of Barga in the northeastern part of Inner Mongolia between the Soviet border and the Hingan mountains in Manchuria intersected by the western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Barga itself has quite an interesting history. The district declared its independence of China just prior to the World War, assisted by Imperial Russia. Under Russian pressure China recognized Barga's autonomy. A few years later, during the Russian revolution, China revoked this autonomy and since that time Barga has remained a Chinese semi-protectorate incorporated in the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces. The capital has been at Hailar under Mongol direction. Halha, the district adjoining Barga, is under Red influance. According to reports the government of Outer Mongolia, taking advantage of the present internal crisis in Manchuria, called upon the amban (ruler) at Hailar to declare his independence of China and join the Halha confederacy. The amban refused and a part of the Red Mongolian army is said to have crossed the frontier and sent an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities to evacuate all territory west of the Hingan range of mountains. There can be little doubt that these raids by Red Mongols into Bargut territory are instigated by Soviet agents in Halha, possibly either to cause the withdrawal of the Fengtien troops from the vicinity of the Great Wall or to hasten the signing of the Mukden-Nanking compromise.

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Should these disturbances along the Manchurian border assume such proportions as to affect the general security of the Three Eastern Provinces, Japan may feel constrained to take a hand in quelling them, thus bringing her into conflict with Soviet Russian interests, an eventuality which would prove a grave menace to peace in the Far East.

3. Uprising Against Feng Yu-hsiang in Shensi.

According to reports in the vernacular papers, General Wu Hsin-tien, a former adherent of Wu Pei-fu, is staging a revolt against Feng Yu-hsiang's authority in Shensi. The remnants of the forces under Feng's old enemy Fan Chung-hsiu are reported to have joined with the reactionary forces under General Wu. This necessitates the sending of additional Kuominchun forces to the Honan-Shensi border, and may have the effect of weakening Feng's activities in the Peking-Tientsin area.

4. Red Activities on Hunan-Kwangtung Border.

Hunan is showing less progress in the direction of recovery from the blighting effects of communism than any of the provinces in south or central China. Although organized effort has been made to suppress communistic uprisings in this province, they continue to flourish.

Recently remnants of Cheng Chien's disbanded Hunanese 6th Army together with bands of Tang Sheng-chih's former soldier, and local brigands, established themselves in Ichang in southern Hunan and using this place as a base of operations started depredations over the border in northern Kwangtung. Sih Ngok, formerly second in command of the old "Ironsides" or 4th Army, is said to be the guiding spirit in this movement.

About August 1st, these Red troops moved into Kwangtung and attempted to capture the important pass at Lokchong, north of the Yueh-Han railhead at Shuichow with the intention of raiding either Kwangsi or the North River district of K wangtung. That the Kwangsi leaders in Canton considered this Red move a distinct menace is proved by the fact that they dispatched about 12,000 picked troops to Shuichow from both Swatow and Wuchow in order to put a stop to it. After some fairly heavy fighting in which the Reds were at first successful, they were later driven back to their stronghold in Ichang.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies.
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st Division	(Liu Chih	) Suchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung	) Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd "	(Chen Ta-chun	) Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan	) Taian	(Shantung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Kiukiang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
6th "	(Ch'en Cho	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	12,000
7th "	Wang Chun	) Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang	) Hufei	(Anhui)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	) Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying	) Tsingkiang	(")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun	) Suchow	(Anhui)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	) Kungchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin	) Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000

Note: The above list represents the reorganized units of the First Group of Armies in accordance with the disbandment plan. As far as is known, there has been little change except the substitution of the word division for army. Small numbers of the most unfit among the troops have been disbanded, but not enough to change the organization materially. The following troops of the First Group of Armies have not been reorganized.

42nd Army	(Ma Wen-te	) Techow	(Shantung)	12,000
41st "	(Pao Kang	) Tsangchow	(Chihli)	12,000
47th "	(Kao Kue-tze	) Hsifengkow	(")	12,000
43rd "	(Wu Chi	) Tuluchun	(")	12,000
33rd "	(Chang Ke-yao	) Langfang	(")	12,000
37th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	) Lutai	(")	12,000
40th "	(Mao Ping-wen	) Tsingchang	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Yang Sheng-chih	) Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
34th "	(Yuan Li-wu	) Tsinghai	(Chihli)	12,000
		Total		264,000

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Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command, Lu Chung-lin)

1st Division	(Han Fu-ch'u)	Kuan	(Chihli)	12,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
3rd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang)	Sinsiang	(Honan)	12,000
4th "	(Feng Chih-an)	Chengchow	(")	12,000
5th "	(Shih Yu-san)	Loyang	(")	12,000
6th "	(T'ing Yu-chen)	Yingchih	(")	12,000
7th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng)	Hsincheng	(")	12,000
8th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Tungkuan	(Shensi)	12,000
9th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Kaolan	(Kansu)	12,000
10th "	(Liu Ju-ming)	Changan	(Shensi)	12,000
11th "	(Tung Lin-ke)	Fenghsiang	(")	12,000
12th "	(Tsun Lien-chung)	Hsuch'ang	(Honan)	12,000

Note: As in the case of the First Group of Armies, the above units of the Kuominchun have been reorganized into divisions.

7th Army	(Yueh Wei-chun)	Linying	(Honan)	14,000
8th "	(Liu Chen-hua)	Langfang	(Chihli)	14,000
Cavalry Division	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Lutai	(")	7,000

Total 179,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command, Shang Chen)

1st Army	(Yang Shih-yuan)	1st Div.	(Huang Kwang-hua)	Paoting, (Chihli)	9,000
	)	3rd "	(Cho Hsu-cheng		
2nd "	(Sun Ch'u)	6th "	(Meng Hsien-chung)	Pinting (Shansi)	
	)	24th "	(Ch'en Kwang-tao)	Shihkiachuang (Chihli)	9,000
3rd "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	21st "	(Huang Te-hsin)	Fengtai &	
	)	22nd "	(Wang Feng-fei)	Lutai (Chihli)	9,000
4th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	10th "	(Ch'in Hsiao-kuan)	Tatung	
	)	12th "	(Chang Wan-hsun)	(Shansi)	9,000
5th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	9th "	(Ch'en Chang-chieh)	Tientsin	
	)	15th "	(Tuan Hsu-hua)	(Chihli)	9,000
6th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	5th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	Peking & Tient-	
	)	13th "	(Wang T'ing-ying)	sin (Chihli)	9,000
7th "	(Li Fu-ying)	14th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	
	)	18th "	(Hsu Chin-yuan)	(Chihli)	9,000

Carried forward - 63,000

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Subject: Situation Report.

				Brought forward -	63,000
8th Army	(Chao Ch'eng-hsiu)	2nd Div.	(Chao Cheng-hsin)	Taiyuan	9,000
		17th "	(Meng Fu-hsing)	(Shansi)	
9th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	8th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan	9,000
		20th "	(Chin Chu-cho)	(Shansi)	

Independent Divisions.

4th Division	(Pai Ju-ch'ing)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	7,000
11th "	(Tu Ch'un-ch'i)	Tatung	(")	7,000
7th "	(Chang Hui-chao)	Kalgan	(Chihli)	7,000
16th "	(Kao Hung-wen)	Peking	(")	7,000
19th "	(Kuo Tsung-hua)	Suiyuan		7,000
23rd "	(Cho Yuan-chien)	Suiyuan		7,000

The Shansi armies have been reorganized into divisions as indicated but continue to retain their army designation.

Total 123,000

Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

12th Army	(Li Pin-hsien)	Yutien	(Chihli)	12,000
17th "	(Cho Lan)	Hsinyang	(Honan)	12,000
30th "	(Wei I-san)	Fengjen	(Chihli)	12,000
36th "	(Miao Yen)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)	Kwangshui	(Chihli)	12,000
13th "	(Pai Chung-hsi)	Ningho	(Hupeh)	12,000
19th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Tangyang	(")	12,000
7th "	(Hsia Wei)	Wuchang	(")	12,000
18th "	(Tao Chun)	Wuchang	(")	12,000
8th "	(Huang Chi)	Hwangmei	(")	12,000
14th "	)	Yuehcho	(Hunan)	12,000
22nd "	)	Changsha	(")	12,000

Independent Divisions

4th Division	(Chang Yun-ch'ing)	Ichang	(Hupeh)	8,000
5th "	(Tsao Yun-chiao)	Wushengkwan	(")	8,000
8th "	(Liu Chun-jung)	Hsialiuho	(Chihli)	8,000

Total 168,000

The above figures are only approximate for the four groups of armies and are based on 100 men for infantry rifle company. Theoretically 120 men constitute a company and about 15,000 men a regiment. However it is believed that this is a trifle in excess of the actual numbers. Whenever definite figures can be obtained on any of the larger units, alteration will be made accordingly in later reports.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Independent Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow	
Troops of Huang Shao-hsiung	16,000
Yunnan	
Troops are divided into 20 regiments	24,000
Kiangsi	
Three divisions of 6th Army	10,000
Kwangtung	
Troops of Li C hai-sum	30,000
Fukien	30,000
Sinkiang	
Troops of Chin Hsu-jen	10,000
Szechwan	
21st Army (Liu Hsiang)	40,000
22nd " (Lai Hsin-hui)	6,000
23rd " (Liu Wen-hui)	50,000
24th " (Liu Tsun-hou)	6,000
28th " (Cheng Hsi-ho)	60,000
Troops of Tien Sung-yao	30,000
" " Yang Sen	40,000
Eastern Shantung	
Troops of Hsieh Wen-ping (Anch'iu)	6,000
" " Liu Chih-lu (Chuch'eng)	7,000
" " Liu Chen-nien (Shoukwang)	12,000
Troops formerly under Fang Yung-chang (Yehsien)	3,000
" " " Chung Chen-kuo (Chefoo)	2,000
Total	382,000

No figures available as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including irregulars 1,116,000

(b) MANCHURIAN TROOPS - Chang Hsueh-liang, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces

The Third and Fourth Army Groups
(Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army( )	Changli	(Chihli)	15,000
10th " (Wang Shu-chang)	Heilungkiang province		13,000
11th " (Fu Shuang-ying)	Yunping	(Chihli)	12,000
29th " (Chi Yi-chao)	(")		8,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject : Situation Report.

			Brought forward-		48,000
15th	(Army	(Chi Chin-chun)	Funing	(Chihli)	15,000
16th	"	(Hu Yu-kun)	Anshan	(")	15,000
17th	"	(Jung Chen)	"	(")	13,000
20th	"	(Yu Hsueh-chung)	Shanhaikuan	(")	13,000
28th	"	(Yueh Chao-lin)			15,000
30th	"	(Yu Chih-shan)			10,000
			Total		129,000

T he Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh)	Jehol-Chaoyang area		15,000
12th "	(Tang Yu-lin)	"	" "	15,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	"	" "	18,000
Kirin "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	"	" "	17,000
Kirin Cavalry troops				10,000
		Total Manchurian Forces		204,000

The above figures have been taken from Report No. 7268. Since the Manchurian forces have engaged in no fighting to speak of since that report was submitted, it is believed that the strength of the various armies is fairly accurate.

(c) CHIHLI-SHANTUNG TROOPS - Chang Tsung-chang

1st Division	(Chu Yu-pu)	
2nd "	(Hsu K'un)	
3rd "	(Chang Tsung-chang)	Loting-Shanhaikuan area.
4th "	(Wang Tung)	
5th "	(Tao Shang-ming)	
6th "	(Yuan Chen-ch'ing)	
2 Cavalry Brigades		
1 Artillery "		
	Total.	30,000

All that remains of the former First, Second and Seventh Ankuochun Army Groups is included in the above list. The re-organization into divisions was effected by Chang Tsung-chang after his troops were forced out of Tientsin.

Total Forces Under Arms in China, not including unidentified irregulars. 1,350,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Activities in Northern Chihli.

On September 1st, General Pai Chung-hsi, commander-in-chief of the northern expedition, called on a number of the foreign legations in Peking to explain that the launching of the long contemplated drive against the Chihli-Shantung remnants was at last to take place. General Pai informed the legations that he had been ordered by General Chiang Kai-shek to clear Chihli province of the Chihli-Shantung remnants since their presence constituted not only a danger but a serious inconvenience politically and commercially. In accordance with this order, Nationalist troops were concentrated at strategic points by July 27th. At this juncture negotiations were entered into with the Fengtien authorities with a view to disposing of these troops without resorting to force. However since much time had elapsed without anything definite having been accomplished toward a peaceful withdrawal of these remnants, General Chiang Kai-shek again ordered the northern expedition to proceed with its mission. General Pai concluded by stating that he considered that the operations would take approximately a month and when they were completed railway communications through to Shanhaikuan would be restored.

On September 2nd, General Pai moved his headquarters to Tientsin. The line up of the various columns has undergone some change during the period of inactivity and at present is roughly as follows:

Right Flank Column:

Commander, Hsu Yung-ch'ang, concurrently with Ch'en Tiao-yuan.
Troops - 3rd Army (Second Group of Armies)
37th " (First " " ")
Route - Peking Mukden Railway.

Center Column:

Commander, Pai Chung-hsi, concurrently with Wei I-san.
Troops - 30th Army (Fourth Group of Armies)
36th " " " " "
8th Independent Division (Fourth Group of Armies)
Route - Tientsin-Tungfengtai.

Left Flank Column:

Commander, Li Pin-hsien, concurrently with Fang Chen-wu.
Troops - 12th Army (Fourth Group of Armies)
41st " (First " " ")
47th " " " " "
Route - Peking-Shanhaikuan motor road (Old Mandarin Road)

General Reserve in Rear:

Commander, Liu Chen-hua.
Troops - 8th Army)
3 divisions of the 9th Army) Second Group of
1 Cavalry Division) Armies

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Shortly after General Pai's arrival in Tientsin the general offensive was started. The left column had advanced to Fengjen by about September 5th, while the flank cavalry detachments were in the neighborhood of Tsinhwa and Hsifengkow. By September 8th Lutai and Ningho had fallen into Nationalist hands, and on the morning of September 9th advance elements of the right flank column were attacking on the outskirts of Tongshan. Later on the same day, because of a threat from units of the center column on the northeast, the city was evacuated by the Chihli-Shantung forces and was occupied by the Nationalists. Except for minor brushes between scouting parties, no serious fighting has been reported. Chang Tsung-chang's troops are apparently falling back without offering any resistance.

The movement of Fengtien troops to stations north of the Wall continues. Chu Yu-pu is at present in Mukden probably attempting to persuade the Fengtien authorities to permit the withdrawal of the Chihli-Shantung remnants into Manchuria. It seems certain however that Mukden will use force if necessary to prevent any influx of these troops north of the Wall.

3. Activities in the Chefoo District of Shantung.

On August 30th, Fang Yung-ch'ang's troops at Lungkow and Laichow went over to the Nationalists. Fang himself is reported to have escaped to Chinwangtao on the Matsura Maru. General Chung Chen-huo, who engineered the coup d'etat in Chefoo in June which resulted in ousting the Nationalists from that port, decided that he was unable to offer further resistance to the Nationalists. He thereupon resigned, turning over his authority to subordinates who capitulated to the Nationalist General, Liu Chen-nien, who is conducting operations in this area. On September 3rd, the Kuomintang flag was hoisted in Chefoo and the city reverted to Nationalist control. The transfer was a peaceful one and consisted merely in changing the badges worn by the soldiers and the police.

The reversion of Chefoo to the Nationalists constitutes a distinct loss to Chang Tsung-chang, who quite evidently contemplated establishing himself at that place if forced out of northern Chihli.

4. The Uprising Against Feng Yu-hsiang.

The uprising directed against Feng Yu-hsiang by Wu Hsin-tien assisted by Fan Chung-hsiu on the Shensi-Honan border, which was mentioned in Report No. 7316, appears momentarily to have been suppressed by Lu Chung-lin's Kuominchun troops. Fan's troops have been put to flight and are reported to be retreating to Chumatien and Hsinyang in Hupeh. Fan himself is said to be a refugee in Hankow. For months past Fan has been a fly in the ointment for Marshal Feng. When the latter was in Nanking in August he attempted to have a punitive mandate issued against Fan. This proposal was blocked by influential members of the Kuomintang. In the light of this and other circumstances, it is not unlikely that the Kwangsi leaders in Hankow, ever jealous of Feng's growing power, look upon Fan's activities in Feng's rear with a benevolent eye, if they are not actually backing him.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Recent reports from Kansu indicate that there has been considerable activity among the Mohammedans all summer which has embarrassed Feng Yu-hsiang. Details of the disorders are lacking but it is now reported that Feng is contemplating a personal visit to that disturbed area.

5. Disorders in Kiangsi.

According to reports from Kiangsi, the Sixth Army is causing considerable trouble in that province. This army has been a rebellious unit for a long time. It was formerly commanded by Cheng Chien who was relieved because of his communistic tendencies. It was later reorganized and placed under the command of Shih Te-chun. Elements of this army were ordered to be disbanded in Hankow in June of this year. They resisted and the authorities were compelled to resort to forceful methods to relieve them of their arms.

Three divisions of the army have stationed themselves in the vicinity of Nanchang in northern Kiangsi for the past several months where they have been creating chaos in that area. Third Army troops sent to prevent the entrance of these troops into the provincial capital have joined them, thus swelling their ranks. The general commanding these three divisions was recently murdered by his own soldiers. Since this force maintains itself as an independent unit it is feared that it may join the communist organizations on the Kiangsi-Honan-Kwangtung borders, thus strengthening them and proving a serious menace to Nationalist authority in Kiangsi.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - September 12, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G-2 Report

4-1

6180

1928

2657-D-276

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 WAR DEPARTMENT AUG 29 1928

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd "	(Chen Ta-chun)	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	12,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan)	Taian	(Shantung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Ch'en Cho)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanch'ang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Hufei	(Anhui)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Tsingkiang	(")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Suchow	(Anhui)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kungchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000

The following units of the First Group of Armies have not been reorganized into divisions as yet:

10th Army	(Yang Sheng-chih)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
33rd "	(Chang Ke-yao)	Yenshan	(Chihli)	12,000
34th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Techow	(Shantung)	12,000
37th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	12,000
40th "	(Mao Ping-wen)	"-Lwanchow area	")	12,000
41st "	(Pao Kang)	Fengjen	(Shantung)	12,000
42nd "	(Ma Wen-te)	Hsifengkow	(Chihli)	12,000
43rd "	(Wu Chi)	Tuluchun	(")	12,000
44th "	(K'ou Ying-chieh)	Tsangchow	(")	12,000
47th "	(Kao Kuei-tze)	Hsifengkow	(")	12,000

The following troops formerly formed a part of the forces of Sun Ch'uan-fang. After the capture of Tientsin they were gradually incorporated into the Nationalist forces and now form a part of the First Group.

1st Army	(Cheng Chun-yen)	Hsuanhua	(Chihli)	8,000
2nd "	(Li Pao-chang)	Hsinpaoan	(")	8,000
3rd "	(Ma Pao-yen)	Hwaili	(")	8,000

The following troops formerly formed a part of the Chihli-Shantung forces. After the capture of Tientsin they were gradually incorporated into the Nationalist forces and now form a part of the First Group.

1st Army	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Miyün	(Chihli)	10,000
2nd "	(Chang Kwan-wu)	Yenking	(")	10,000
3rd "	(Sun Tien-ying)	K'angchwang	(")	10,000

Total 330,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7326 September 24, 1928

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

1st Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Kaifeng	(")	12,000
3rd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang)	Sinsiang	(")	12,000
4th "	(Feng Chih-an)	Chengchow	(")	12,000
5th "	(Shih Yu-san)	Loyang	(")	12,000
6th "	(T'ung Yu-chen)	Yench'eng	(")	12,000
7th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng)	Hsincheng	(")	12,000
8th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	12,000
9th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Kaolan	(Kansu)	12,000
10th "	(Liu Ju-ming)	Changan	(Shensi)	12,000
11th "	(Tung Lin-ke)	Fenghsiang	(")	12,000
12th "	(Tsun Lien-chung)	Hsincheng	(Honan)	12,000

The following units of the Second Group of Armies have not been reorganized into divisions as yet.

7th Army	(Yueh Wei-chun)	Fuyang	(Anhui)	14,000
8th "	(Liu Chen-hua)	Siangho-Lutai area	(Chihli)	14,000
Cavalry Division	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Chengchow	(Honan)	7,000

Total . . . . . , 179,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

1st Army	(Yang Shih-yuan)	1st Div.	(Huang Kwang-hua)	Paoting	9,000
	)	3rd "	(Cho Hsu-cheng)	(Chihli)	
2nd "	(Sun Ch'u)	6th "	(Meng Hsien-chung)	Pintang (Shansi)	
	)	24th "	(Ch'en Kwang-tao)	Shihkiachuang (Chihli)	9,000
3rd "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	21st "	(Huang Te-hsin)	Lwanchow	
	)	22nd "	(Wang Feng-fei)	(Chihli)	9,000
4th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	10th "	(Ch'in Hsiao-kuan)	Tatung	
	)	12th "	(Chang Wan-hsun)	(Shansi)	9,000
5th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	9th "	(Ch'en Chang-chieh)	Tientsin	
	)	15th "	(Tuan Hsu-hua)	(Chihli)	9,000
6th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	5th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	Peking & Tientsin	
	)	13th "	(Wang T'ing-ying)	(Chihli)	9,000
7th "	(Li Fu-ying)	14th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	
	)	18th "	(Hsu Chin-yuan)	(Chihli)	9,000
8th "	(Chao Ch'eng-hsiu)	2nd "	(Chao Cheng-hsin)	Taiyuan	
	)	17th "	(Meng Fu-hsing)	(Shansi)	9,000
9th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	8th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan	
	)	20th "	(Chin Chu-cho)	(Shansi)	9,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Brought forward - 81,000

Independent Divisions.

4th Division	(Pai Ju-ch'ing)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	7,000
7th "	(Chang Hui-chao)	Kalgan	(Chihli)	7,000
11th "	(Tu Ch'un-ch'i)	Tatung	(Shansi)	7,000
16th "	(Kao Hung-wen)	Peking	(Chihli)	7,000
19th "	(Kuo Tsung-hua)	Suiyuan		7,000
23rd "	(Cho Yuan-chien)	"		7,000

Total 123,000

The Shansi armies have been reorganized into divisions as indicated but continue to retain their army designation.

Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

1st Division	(Pai Chung-hsi)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsia Wei)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
3rd "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Wuch'ang	(")	12,000
4th "	(T'ao Chun)	Wuch'ang	(")	12,000
5th "	Lu Tiao-p'ing)	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	12,000
6th "	(Ho Chien)	Changsha	(")	12,000

The above list represents the reorganized units of the Fourth Group of Armies. The new divisions are formed from the former 7th, 13th, 14th, 18th, 19th Armies, and the17th and 19th Divisions. The following units of the Fourth Group have not been reorganized.

8th Army	(Huang Chi)	Hwangmei	(Hupeh)	12,000
12th "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Lwanchow	(Chihli)	12,000
17th "	(Chow-lan)	Hsinyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	( )	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
30th "	(Wei I-san)	Lwanchow	(Chihli)	12,000
36th "	(Miao Yen)	"	(")	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)	Kwangshui	(Hupeh)	12,000

Independent Divisions and Brigades.

8th Division	(Liu Chun-jung)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	8,000
1st Brigade	(Wu Shang - former 5th Div.)	Ichang	(Hupeh)	8,000
2nd "	(Liu Ho-ting " 4th ")	"	"	8,000

Total 180,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow		
Troops of Huang Shao-hsiung		16,000
Yunnan		
Troops are divided into 20 regiments		24,000
Kiangsi		
Three divisions of 6th Army		10,000
Kwangtung		
Troops of Li Chai-sum:		
4th Army (Li Lo-tang)		10,000
5th " (Hsu Ching-t'ang)		10,000
11th " (Ch'en Ming-hsu)		10,000
Fukien		30,000
Sinkiang		
Troops of Chin Hsu-jen		10,000
Szechwan		
12th Army (Lai Hsin-hui)		6,000
20th " (Yang Sen)		40,000
21st " (Liu Hsiang)		40,000
23rd " (Kuo Ju-tung)		6,000
24th " (Liu Wen-hui)		50,000
28th " (Cheng Hsi-ho)		60,000
29th " (Tien Tsung-yao)		30,000
Eastern Shantung		
Troops of Hsieh Wen-ping	(Anch'ui)	6,000
" " Liu Chih-lu	(Chuch'eng)	7,000
" " Liu Chen-nien	(Shoukwang)	12,000
" formerly under Fang Yung-ch'ang	(Yehsien)	3,000
" " " Chung Chen-kuo	(Chefoo)	2,000

No figures available as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.

Total 382,000

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including irregulars 1,194,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

(b) MANCHURIAN TROOPS - Chang Hsueh-liang, Commander-in-Chief.

Fengtien Forces

The Third and Fourth Army Groups.

(Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army	( )	Changli (Chihli)	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-ch'ang)	Fengtien & Heilungkiang Prov.	13,000
11th "	(Fu Shuang-ying)	Yungping (Chihli)	11,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	" "	8,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun)	Funing "	15,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	Changli "	14,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	" "	11,000
20th "	(Yu Hsueh-ching)	Shanhaikuan-Liushowying area	13,000
28th "	(Yueh Chao-lin)	Lingyuan-Jehol area (Jehol)	15,000
30th "	(Yu Chih-shan)	" " " "	10,000
		Total	125,000

Reduced 4,000 by casualties incurred in the recent fighting in the Anshan district.

The Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh)	Changli (Chihli)	15,000
12th "	(Tang Yu-lin)	Jehol-Chaoyang area	15,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	" " "	18,000
Kirin "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin Province	17,000
Kirin Cavalry troops		" "	10,000
		Total	75,000

A fair number of Manchurian troops above are in Heilungkiang province, the stations of which are not known.

(c) CHIHLI-SHANTUNG TROOPS - Chang Tsung-chang.

1st Division	(Chu Yu-pu)	Lwanchow-Changli area)	
2nd "	(Hsu K'un)	" " ")	
3rd "	(Chang Tsung-chang)	) Awaiting re-	
4th "	(Wang Tung)	Lwanchow, Chihli) organization.	
5th "	(Tao Shang-ming)	" - Changli area)	
6th "	(Yuan Chen-ch'ing)	" " ")	
2 Cavalry Brigades			
1 Artillery "			
		Total	25,000

Total forces under arms in China, not including unidentified irregulars. 1,419,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Operations in Northern Chihli.

As stated in the last Situation Report (No. 7319), Tangshan was taken on the 9th of September. The Nationalists continued their advance up the Peking-Mukden railway, the towns of Kaiping, Kuyeh and Lwanchow being occupied in quick succession on the 10th, 12th and 13th respectively. The Nationalist advance then rested and by a pre-arranged agreement the Fengtien troops were left to deal with the retreating Chihli-Shantung remnants. The latter, after having offered little or no resistance to the Nationalists, suddenly turned on their former Fengtien allies with unexpected ferocity. Heavy fighting took place at Anshan and later at Changli between the 14th and 18th of September, during which severe casualties were inflicted on both sides, thirty-one carloads of Fengtien wounded being transported through Chinwangtao to Mukden. One division of the 16th Fengtien Army was reported to have been disarmed by the Chihli-Shantung forces. The most formidable obstacle which the Fengtien forces encountered in their attempts to disarm the "remnants" was the fighting spirit exhibited by the Russian contingent of Chang Tsung-chang's forces. These latter troops at first resisted all efforts toward disarming them, but subsequently were persuaded to submit peacefully.

A conference was held at Lwanchow on September 20th between representatives of Chang T'sung-ch'ang, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Chiang Hsueh-liang, the purpose of which was ostensibly to effect some sort of compromise between the three factions, whereby the disposition of the "remnants" could be accomplished to the satisfaction of all concerned. Since an arrangement is understood to have been agreed upon by Chang Hsueh-liang and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, prior to the start of the campaign, as to the distribution of Chang Tsung-chang's troops between them, there seemingly remained only one thing for this conference to decide, namely, the division of the spoils and probably the future status of the area between the Lwan River and the Wall. As the campaign with its attendant loss of life was necessitated solely due to the obstinacy of Chang Tsung-chang in refusing to submit peacefully to disarmament, it is only natural that the forces sent against him should desire some compensation in the way of arms, munitions and equipment, hence the conference, in order to insure that both Fengtien and the Nationalists received what each faction considered its just share of the above mentioned war materiel. Whatever may have been the real object of the conference, an agreement was evidently arrived at since instructions were at once issued to cease fighting. Although the details of the compromise have not been made public, there has been no resumption of hostilities up to the present time.

3. Activities in Szechwan.

Naval Intelligence from the Yangtze valley reports that during the early part of September the forces of Generals Lai Hsin-wei and Kuo Ju-tung combined with a Kweichow army to attack Yang Sen. The latter offset the preponderence of force against him by an alliance with Liu Hsiao-yen, the plan of campaign being for Liu to draw away the Kweichow forces opposing Yang by entering Kweichow province from Hupeh. Liu Hsiang, hearing of this, either ordered or requested the above mentioned Szechwanese

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combatants to drop their differences and ally themselves against a threatened attack by a combination of the Chengtu generals, which was about to take advantage of the dissension in eastern Szechwan. Liu then returned to Yang Sen an army which he had taken from the latter during their disagreement of last May. From this it would appear that the Szechwanese militarists regard their quarrels as private affairs and resent any interference from outsiders, even to the point of burying their own differences and uniting against the intruders.

4. The Revolt Against Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan.

Reports from Honan indicate that General Yueh Wei-chun, commanding the 7th Kuominchun Army, has been in secret alliance with General Fan Chung-hsiu who for some months has been in uprising against Feng Yu-hsiang. It appears that Yueh Wei-chun offered to assist in suppressing Fan but in reality offered him supplies. When Fan's effort failed, General Yueh is reported to have withdrawn to the south of Juning, in southeastern Honan.

Marshal Feng is said to have sent one of his generals to negotiate with General Yueh but the latter instead of meeting Feng's emissary retired with his troops in the direction either of Northern Hupeh or Anhui. Kuominchun troops are reported as having been sent to suppress him.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - September 26, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd "	(Chen Ta-chun)	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	10,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Ch'en Cho)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanch'ang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Hufei	(Anhui)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Tsingkiang	(")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Wuhu	(Anhui)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kungchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000

Note: The troops of the former 40th and 10th Armies have been placed in the 8th and 10th divisions, respectively. As these divisions were incomplete the figures have not been changed. The former 44th Army has been completely disbanded.

The following units of the First Group of Armies have not been reorganized into divisions as yet:

33rd Army	(Chang Ke-yao)	Yenshan	(Chihli)	12,000
34th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kupeikow	(")	12,000
37th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Tangshan	(")	12,000
41st "	(Pao Kang)	Fengjen	(Shantung)	12,000
42nd "	(Ma Wen-te)	Hsifengkow	(Chihli)	12,000
43rd "	(Wu Chi)	Tsunhwa	(")	12,000
47th "	(Kao Kuei-tze)	Hsifengkow	(")	12,000

The following troops formerly formed a part of the forces of Sun Ch'uan-fang. After the capture of Tientsin they were gradually incorporated into the Nationalist forces and now form a part of the First Group.

1st Army	(Cheng Chun-yen)	Paoting	(Chihli)	8,000
2nd "	(Li Pao-chang)	"	(")	8,000
3rd "	(Ma Pao-yen)	Shihkiachuang	(")	8,000

The following troops formerly formed a part of the Chihli-Shantung forces. After the capture of Tientsin they were gradually incorporated into the Nationalist forces and now form a part of the First Group.

1st Army	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Miyün	(Chihli)	10,000
2nd "	(Chang Kwan-wu)	Yenking	(")	10,000
3rd "	(Sun Tien-ying)	K'angchwang	(")	10,000
			Total	292,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7355 October 22, 1928

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Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

1st Division	(Han Fu-chu	Tungkwan	(Shensi	12,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuan-ying	Tsining	(Shantung	12,000
3rd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang	"	("	12,000
4th "	(Feng Chih-an	Chengchow	(Honan	12,000
5th "	(Shih Yu-san	Changan	(Shensi	12,000
6th "	(T'ung Yu-chen	Yench'eng	("	12,000
7th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng	Hsincheng	("	12,000
8th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	Tungkwan	("	12,000
9th "	(Tsung Che-yuan	Kaolan	(Kansu	12,000
10th "	(Liu Ju-ming	Changan	(Shensi	12,000
11th "	(Tung Lin-ke	Kaolan	(Kansu	12,000
12th "	(Tsun Lien-chung	Loyang	(Honan	12,000

The following units of the Second Group of Armies have not been reorganized into divisions as yet.

7th Army	(Yueh Wei-chun	Fuyang	(Anhui	14,000
8th "	(Liu Chen-hua	Machang	(Chihli	14,000
Cavalry Division	(Cheng Ta-chang	Chengchow	(Honan	7,000

Total 179,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

1st Division	(Li P'ei-chi	Peking & Tientsin	(Chihli	9,000
2nd "	(Sun Ch'u	"	("	9,000
3rd "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang	Chunliang-ch'eng	("	9,000
4th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao	Kalgan	("	9,000
5th "	(Li Sheng-ta	Peking	("	9,000
6th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	"	("	9,000
7th "	(Li Fu-ying	Suiyuan		9,000
8th "	(Chao Ch'eng-hsin	Shihkiachuang	"	9,000
9th "	(Kuan Fu-an	Taiyuan	(Shansi	9,000
10th "	(Chang K'uei-chao	Kalgan	(Chihli	9,000
11th "	(Chang Yin-wu	Peking	("	9,000
12th "	(Fu Tso-yi	Tientsin	("	9,000
15th Army	(Wang Ying	Peking	("	8,000
16th "	(Chang Ying-wu	Tientsin	("	8,000

Total 124,000

While Yen Hsi-shan was in Taiyuanfu during September he reorganized the troops under his command as outlined above. However, the carrying into effect of this plan is still in a most chaotic condition, generals in several instances not knowing the designation of the units which they command. This condition will be further complicated when these units are renumbered again as contemplated in the plan mentioned in paragraph 6 of this report.

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Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

1st Division	(Pai Chung-hsi)	Wushengkwan	(Hupeh)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsia Wei)	Hankow	(")	12,000
3rd "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Wuch'ang	(")	12,000
4th "	(T'ao Chun)	"	(")	12,000
5th "	(Lu Tiao-p'ing)	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	12,000
6th "	(Ho Chien)	Changsha	(")	12,000

The following units of the Fourth Group have not been reorganized.

8th Army	(Huang Chi)	Hwangmei	(Hupeh)	12,000
12th "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Lwanchow	(Chihli)	12,000
17th "	(Chow-lan)	Hsinyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	( )	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
30th "	Wei I-san	Lwanchow	(Chihli)	12,000
36th "	(Miao Yen)	"	(")	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)	Kwangshui	(Hupeh)	12,000

Independent Divisions and Brigades.

8th Division	(Liu Chun-jung)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	8,000
1st Brigade	(Wu Shang - former 5th Div.)	Ichang	(Hupeh)	8,000
2nd "	(Liu Ho-ting " 4th ")	"	"	8,000

Total 180,000

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow
Troops of Huang Shao-hsiung 16,000

Yunnan
Troops are divided into 20 regiments. 24,000

Kiangsi
Three divisions of 6th Army. 10,000

Kwangtung
Troops of Li Chai-sum:

4th Army	(Li Lo-tang)	10,000
5th "	(Hsu Ching-t'ang)	10,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ming-hsu)	10,000

Kwangsi 20,000

Fukien 30,000

Sinkiang
Troops of Chin Hsu-jen 10,000

Carried forward - 140,000

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Szechwan		Brought forward --	140,00
12th Army	(Lai Hsin-hui)		6,000
20th "	(Yang Sen)		40,000
21st "	(Liu Hsiang)		40,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tung)		6,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)		50,000
28th "	(Cheng Hsi-ho)		60,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)		30,000
Eastern Shantung			
1st Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo & Fushan	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kai-tai)	Hwanghsien, Laichow	6,000
3rd "	(Ho I-san)	Muping (Lungkow	3,000
4th "	(Li Hsi-tung)	Tengchow	3,000
5th "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	Laiyang	2,000
Independent Div.	(Liu Ching-shan)	Changi	4,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			6,000
Former Chihli-Shantung troops captured in the Lwanchow area but not as yet incorporated into any organization.			20,000
No figures available as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.			
		Total	422,000

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars. . . 1,197,000

(b) MANCHURIAN FORCES - Chang Hsueh-liang, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces
The Third and Fourth Army Groups
(Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin)	Tsitsihar, Heilungkiang	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-ch'ang)	Chinchow- Fengtien and Shanhaikuan, Chihli	13,000
11th "	(Fu Shuang-ying)	Chinchow, Fengtien and Changli, Chihli	11,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun)	Shanhaikwan area	5,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	" "	14,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	" "	11,000
20th "	(Yu Hsueh-ching)	" "	13,000
28th "	(Yueh Chao-lin)	Lingyuan-Jehol area	15,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	Chaoyang & Ningyan, Jehol	8,000
30th "	(Yu Chih-shan)	Pingch'uan, Jehol	10,000
		Total	125,000

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The Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh)	Luanp'ing, Jehol	15,000
12th "	(T'ang Yu-lin)	Chengteh "	15,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	Fungning "	18,000

Kirin Army:

15th Division	( )	Kirin, Kirin	
16th "	(Li Ch'en-sheng)	Lungan "	
10th Brigade	( )	Kirin)	
26th "	)	Harbin)	
8th Cavalry Brigade	(Chang Yu-chun)	Fufu)	
10th " "	(Ch'ang Y'ao-ch'en)	Lungan)	
8th Mixed Brigade	(Ch'en Yu-kun)	Changchun)	Kirin
9th " "	(Li Tu)	Lanhsing)	
13th " "	(Wang Hsing)	Yenchihsien)	
18th " "	(Tung Chao)	Harbin)	
21st " "	(Chao Cho-hsiang)	Ningan)	
			27,000

Total 75,000

Former Chihli-Shantung troops taken over in the Lwanchow area by the Manchurian forces 15,000

TOTAL MANCHURIAN FORCES 215,000

A fair number of Manchurian troops are in Heilungkiang province but with the exception of the 8th Army mentioned above, the numbers and stations are not known.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA,
not including unidentified irregulars: 1, 412,000

NOTE: A map showing the general distribution of the various forces in China is furnished with the original copy of this report. Owing to the fact that the photostat is not available at this time, it is impracticable to provide additional copies of this map.

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2. Activities in Northern Chihli.

As a result of the conference held in Lwanchow on September 20th, which was mentioned in the last Situation Report (No. 7326), the former Chihli-Shantung troops were disposed of as follows: 15,000 were reorganized and incorporated into the Fengtien Army, 20,000 were taken into the Nationalist Army, and the remainder were disbanded. Chang Tsung-chang himself fled to Port Arthur. The arms and ammunition of the "remnants" were divided between the victors; Fengtien receiving 20,000 rifles, 1,000 machine guns, 100 field pieces, 4 armored trains, 13,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 20,000 shells. The Nationalists received approximately an equal amount of the above mentioned materiel of war. The accounts of both Chang Hsueh-liang and Pai Chung-hsi approximately agree as to the above distribution of spoils.

Up to the present no decision has been reached as to who will control the area between Lwanchow and the Great Wall, negotiations on the subject being still in progress. Chang Hsueh-liang's idea is to have both the Fengtien forces and those of the Nationalists withdraw simultaneously from the area in question to Shanhaikwan and Tangshan respectively, and to have the intervening territory placed under the control of troops from both factions. Whether or not the Nationalists will consent to the formation of what amounts to a buffer district between themselves and their former enemies is as yet undetermined.

The Mukden authorities continue to retain the rolling stock seized by the Northern forces in their retreat into Manchuria, and appear to be decidedly loath to relinquish it. As a consequence the main trunk lines in China proper are in an extremely crippled condition. The Nationalists are moving their troops back from the former war area around Lwanchow as fast as the shortage of rolling stock permits. The process of relieving northern Chihli of the burden of supporting enormous numbers of troops would be greatly expedited should the Fengtien leaders acquiesce in the demands of the Nationalists that they release some 200 engines and 1,000 cars belonging to the Peking-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways.

3. Activities in Jehol Area.

The situation which has arisen from the desire of both Mukden and Nanking to control the Jehol area has been growing increasingly grave during the past month. In report No. 7305 of August 2nd, T'ang Yu-lin was reported to have stated his desire to turn over to the Nationalists, but the authenticity of this statement was doubted. Recent events have proven that these doubts were well founded. General T'ang has not only shown no inclination to relinquish Jehol to the Nationalists but on the contrary he has been exceedingly active in his preparations to resist any attempts of the latter to wrest control of this area from his grasp. His efforts have received the full support of the Fengtien authorities, who are just as determined as he that the lucrative Jehol area shall not fall into Nationalist hands. Chang Hsueh-liang has made repeated attempts to come to an amicable agreement with the Nationalist authorities regarding Jehol but so far the result of his efforts has been nil. Sometime ago he suggested that General T'ang, the present Tutung, be appointed a

CHINA (Military)

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member of the provincial committee. Nanking was favorably disposed toward this arrangement but the Jehol people insisted that nothing short of a complete dismissal of T'ang, who is highly unpopular, would be satisfactory to them. Chang then proposed three other substitute candidates, namely, Kao Wei-yueh, Chu Yi-chao and Yu Chih-shan, but these were rejected by Nanking. Although Chang has agreed to the committee system of government for Jehol, he demands that the chairman be an appointee of the Fengtien Party. It now seems definitely established that Chang will support T'ang Yu-lin for the position, since all of his other nominees were rejected.

At the present time T'ang Yu-lin's forces occupy roughly the east bank of the Lwan River from Hsifengkow, northeast of Tsunhwa to Luant'ing, west of Jehol, where they have intrenched strategic positions. Facing them are the Nationalist forces under Fang Chen-wu (at most 48,000) consisting of the 47th Army under Kao Kuei-tze at Hsifengkow, the 34th Army under Juan Hsuan-wu at Kupeikow and the 42nd Army under Ma Wen-te at Hsifengkow. The 43rd Army under Wu Chi is en route from Tungchow to the front. The distance between the opposing forces varies between three and twenty English miles. This close proximity to each other combined with Chang Hsueh-liang's vital interest in the administration of Jehol affairs, makes the situation an extremely delicate one; however, the present indications are that since Fang Chen-wu is allied with Feng Yu-hsiang he may expect little support from the other Nationalist factions.

3. Affairs in Shantung.

Consular reports indicate that a struggle for the control of southern Shantung is being carried on between Feng Yu-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek, in which the latter has a little better of the argument. "Events which have occured during the past month tend to confirm this suggestion. Between September 23rd and 24th there occurred a series of episodes all along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway from Taian to south of Yenchow, descriptions of which vary from disbandment to mutiny of a Nationalist force referred to as the 44th Army under command of one K'ou Yin-chieh. These troops were forcibly disarmed by units of the First Group of Armies and in the process one train was wrecked, a bridge blown up and an indeterminate number of soldiers killed".... (Report of Consul, Tsinanfu.) Although there were Kuominchun troops in this area, they took no part in the disarming. Immediately following there was a redistribution of troops in this area. A glance at the accompanying map will show that Chiang Kai-shek units now control the Tientsin-Pukow Railway from Tsinan to the Yangtze and the Lunghai Railway from the sea practically to the Honan border. This however does not mean that Feng has been pushed out of Shantung. He still occupies more actual territory in the province than does Chiang, besides a small section of the Tientsin-Pukow railway north of Tsinan. A later consular report from Tsinanfu indicates that Feng Yu-hsiang's control in the Taian area is tightening. But Chiang controls, for the present at least, the main transportation arteries.

Feng is having his troubles in the peninsula of eastern Shantung as well. This region is occupied by a bandit rabble which alternates between allegiance to Chang Tsung-chang and to the Nationalists. The present regime in this section is supposed to be Nationalist. The present head of the local government in Chefoo, General Liu Chen-nien, was requested by delegates of Feng to retire peacably and evacuate the city.

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On October 10th General Liu had these delegates arrested and shot, and on the following day sixteen more were taken outside the city and murdered in cold blood. According to latest newspaper reports Marshal Feng intends taking strong action in the near future against the forces of General Liu.

4. Self Government for Barga.

During the last week in September a representative of the Barga Mongols who raided the Chinese Eastern Railway zone during the latter part of the past summer, met Chinese representatives in Mukden. According to the press, an agreement was reached whereby Barga will have self-government but will remain under Chinese sovereignty. A council will be created consisting of representatives of each district in Barga which will be responsible for administration, legislation and supervision there. The Chinese agreed to withdraw all of their expeditionary forces to Manchuria and promised that none of those who took part in the revolt should be punished. Thus ends what looked for a time to be an exceedingly serious situation.

5. The Mohammedan Revolt in Kansu.

According to local news reports an official message from Sianfu under date of October 1st states that bandit activities in Kansu have now ceased. Ma Ting-hsiang, the Mohammedan general who led the revolt against Feng, has disappeared, and two Mohammedan leaders loyal to Marshal Feng have arrived in the Kansu capital to assist the political committee. During the first part of October Feng was met in Sianfu by his two commanders from Kansu. Two interpretations have been placed on this event; one that conditions in Kansu had so improved as to permit the departure of the two commanders; the other that conditions there are so bad that they wished to forestall Feng's visit to Lanchow.

6. Army Reorganization Plans.

Upon the recommendation of the military commission, reorganization of the existing four Nationalist groups of armies into forty-three divisions was approved on October 2nd by the Nanking Government. Chiang Kai-shek was allotted 13 divisions, Feng Yu-hsiang 12, Yen Hsi-shan 12, Li Tsung-jen 6. Commanders for the forty-three divisions were appointed and a resolution passed to the effect that the names of the four groups of armies be abolished at once. The army group designation is, however, still in practice. The Nanking designation of consecutive divisional numbering from one to forty-three has not been put into effect as yet.

At a meeting of the National Budget Committee held on October 4th, it was decided that the strength of the national army should not exceed sixty divisions, which is probably a modification of the forty-three divisions formerly announced.

By abolishing the various "Groups of Armies" it is the hope of the Nationalists to destroy the predominating influence of one or two leaders in each "group" and thereby to create a truly national army owing its allegiance solely to a central authority rather than to the leaders

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of the various factions, as is now the case. Unfortunately, however, each leader is only too well aware that his voice in national affairs is in direct proportion to the number of troops which he has available to enforce his ideas. That any of the present leaders is altruistic enough to step aside voluntarily and give up the power insured by the troops under his command is far too much to expect at the present time. Therefore although the term "group of armies" may be abolished, the influence of the leaders will in no way be changed.

7. Disbandment.

A report from the Shanghai Consul General for September in mentioning disbandment states that very little progress has been made in this direction up to date. After mentioning several instances of enlistment of disbanded soldiers into other units, the report concludes with the statement that there is much evidence to show that the so called disbandment amounts to little more than an exchange of troops between military commanders in adjoining areas.

John W. Carroll.
John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - October 23, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

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Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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JAN 1929
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G-2 Report 6180

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)

(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd "	(Chen Ta-chun)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Ch'en Cho)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanch'ang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Hufei	(Anhui)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Tsingkiang	(")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Wuhu	(Anhui)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kungchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Showchow	(Anhui)	12,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kupeikow	(Chihli)	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang)	Fengjen	(Shantung)	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	12,000
47th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	Paoting	(")	20,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Hsuwanhua	(")	24,000

Note: The troops of the former 34th, 41st and 37th Armies have been reorganized and now form the 44th, 45th and 46th divisions respectively. The 47th division is composed of the troops formerly carried under the heading of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies former Sun Chuan-fang troops. The 48th division is composed of troops formerly carried under the heading of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies former Chihli-Shantung troops.

The following units of the First Group of Armies have not been reorganized into divisions as yet:

33rd Army	(Chang Ke-yao)	Yenshan	(Chihli)	12,000
42nd "	(Ma Wen-te)	Hsifengkow	(")	12,000
43rd "	(Wu Chi)	Tsunhwa	(")	12,000
47th "	(Kao Kuei-tze)	Hsifengkow	(")	12,000
			Total.....	282,000

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
22nd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang)	"	(")	12,000
23rd "	(Feng Chih-an)	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000

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24th Division	(Shih Yu-san)	Changan	(Shensi)	12,000
25th "	(T'ung Yu-chen)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng)	Hsincheng	(")	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Tungkwan	(")	12,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Kaolan	(Kansu)	12,000
29th "	(Liu Ju-ming)	Changan	(Shensi)	12,000
30th "	(Tung Lin-ke)	Kaolan	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Tsun Lien-chung)	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000

The twelve divisions of the Second Group have been renumbered from 20 to 31 inclusive.

The following units of the Second Group of Armies have not been reorganized into divisions as yet.

7th Army	(Yueh Wei-chun)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	14,000
8th "	(Liu Chen-hua)	Machang	(Chihli)	14,000
Cavalry Division	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Chengchow	(Honan)	7,000

Total.....179,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Peking & Tientsin)	Chihli,)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	")	")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliang ch'eng)	")	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Kalgan)	")	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Peking)	")	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	")	")	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Suiyuan)		9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'eng-hsin)	Shihkiachuang	")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan)	Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan)	Chihli)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking)	")	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin)	")	9,000
Peace Preser-	( )	)	)	
vation Force	(Wang Ying)	Peking)	")	8,000
Railway guards	(Chang Ying-wu)	Tientsin)	")	8,000

Total.....124,000

The twelve divisions of the Third Group have been renumbered from 32 to 43 inclusive. The former 15th and 16th armies have been renamed the Peace Preservation Force and Railway Guards respectively.

Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

1st Division	(Wei Yun-sung)	Wushengkwan)	Hupeh)	12,000
15th "	(Hsia Wei)	Hankow)	")	12,000
16th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Wuch'ang)	")	12,000
17th "	(T'ao Chun)	")	")	12,000
18th "	(Lu Tiao-P'ing)	Yuehchow)	Hunan)	12,000
19th "	(Ho Chien)	Changsha)	")	12,000

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The former 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th divisions have been renumbered as shown above. The 1st division continues to retain its former numerical designation, but will doubtless become the 14th division in the near future.

The following units of the Fourth Group have not been reorganized.

8th Army	(Huang Chi	Hankow	Hupeh	12,000
12th "	(Li Pin-hsien	Lutai	Chihli	12,000
17th "	(Chow-lan	Hsinyang	Honan	12,000
22nd "	(	Changsha	Hunan	12,000
30th "	(Wei I-san	Tangshan	Chihli	12,000
36th "	(Miao Yen	Yutien	"	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen	"	Hupeh	12,000

Independent Divisions and Brigades.

8th Division	(Liu Chun-jung	Tungchow	Chihli	8,000
1st Brigade	(Wu Shang - former 5th Div)		Ichang (Hupeh)	8,000
2nd Brigade	(Liu Ho-ting " ")		" "	8,000

Total.....180,000

Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow		
15th Army	(Huang Hsiao-hsuing)	16,000
1 Training Division -	(Huang Hsu-chi)	3,000
Yunnan		
Troops are divided into 20 regiments		24,000
Kwangtung		
4th Army	(Ch'en Chi-Fang)	10,000
5th "	(Hsu Ching-tsing)	10,000
11th "	(Che'n Ming-hsu)	10,000
3rd Ind. Div.	(Hsu Ke'-hsiang)	3,000
Kiangsi		
Three divisions of 6th Army.		10,000
Kwangsi		
16th Army	(Fan Shih-sheng)	15,000
1st Ind. Div.	(Tseng Yueh-chun)	4,000
1 Regt. Body Guard Troops	(Cheng Yen-hua)	1,000
Fukien		
4th Ind. Div.	(Chang Chen)	12,000
14th Ind. Div.	(Liu Hsing Pang)	12,000
1 Trainging Regt.	(Hsiao Han Hsian)	1,000
1st Ind. Reg.	(Chen Kuo-hui)	1,000
2nd Ind. Reg.	(Kuo Feng Ming)	1,000
Marines		
1st Brig.	(Lin Chung)	2,000
2nd Brig.	(Lin Hsiu Kuo)	2,000

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Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen		10,000

Szechwan

12th Army	(Lai Hsin-hui)		6,000
20th "	(Yang Sen)		40,000
21st "	(Liu Hsiang)		40,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)		6,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)		50,000
28th "	(Cheng Hsi-ho)		60,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)		30,000

Eastern Shantung

1st Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo & Fushan	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kui-tai)	Pingtu	6,000
3rd "	(Ho I-san)	Muping	3,000
4th "	(Li Hsi-tung)	Huanghsien	3,000
5th "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	Laiyang	2,000
Independent Div.	(Liu Ching-shan)	Chiuchow	4,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			6,000

Former Chihli-Shantung troops captured in the Lwanchow area but not as yet incorporated into any organization. 20,000

No figures available as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu

Total.....429,000

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars.....1,194,000

(b) MANCHURIAN FORCES - Chang Hsueh-liang, Commander-in-Chief

Fengtien Forces
The Third and Fourth Army Groups.
(Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin)	Tsitsihar, Heilungkiang	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-ch'ang)	Chinchow-Fengtien and Shanhaikuan, Chihli	13,000
11th "	(Fu Shuang-ying)	Chinchow, Fengtien and Changli, Chihli	11,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-chun)	Shanhaikuan area	15,000
16th "	(Hu Yu-kun)	" "	14,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	" "	11,000
20th "	(Yu Hsueh-ching)	" "	13,000
28th "	(Yueh Chao-lin)	Lingyuan-Jehol area	15,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	Chaoyang & Jehol	8,000
30th "	(Yu Chih-shan)	Lingyuan	10,000

Total.....125,000

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(The Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

9th Army	(Kao Wei-yueh)	Luanp'ing, Jehol	15,000
12th "	(T'ang Yu-lin)	" "	15,000
31st "	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	Fungning "	18,000

Kirin Army:

15th Division	( )	Kirin, Kirin		
16th "	(Li Ch'en-sheng)	Lungan "		
10th Brigade	( )	Kirin	)	
26th "	( )	Harbin	)	
8th Cavalry Brigade	(Chang Yu-chun)	Fufu	)	
10th " "	(Ch(ang Y'ao-ch'en)	Lungan	)	
8th Mixed "	(Ch'en Yu-kun)	Changchun	)	Kirin
9th " "	(Li Tu)	Lanhsing	)	
13th " "	(Wang Hsing)	Yenchihsien	)	
18th " "	(Tung Chao)	Harbin	)	
21st " "	(Chao Cho-hsiang)	Ningan	)	
				27,000

Total.....75,000

Former Chihli-Shantung troops taken over in the Lwanchow are by the Manchurian forces.....15,000

TOTAL MANCHURIAN FORCES.....215,000

A fair number of Manchurian troops are in Heilungkiang province but with the exception of the 8th Army mentioned above, the numbers and stations are not known.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA,
not including unidentified irregulars: 1,409,000

Note: The figures on the strength of the various armies and divisions are manifestly not as uniform as set forth above. In the absence of definite information, these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops the totals are approximately correct. Whenever definite figures on the strength of any units are ascertained changes will be made accordingly.

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2. Activities in the Jehol Area.

As far as military activities are concerned, the situation in the Jehol area remains practically unchanged since last report. The opposing forces commanded by Tang Yu-lin and Fang Chen-wu respectively, continue to face each other along the Lwan river. Unconfirmed reports state that the city of Jehol (Chengteh) is in Nationalist hands, and that Tang's forces have moved into the eastern part of the district. Information from various sources tends to prove the unreliability of the above reports and makes it practically a certainty that this city is still held by Tang's forces. As a matter of fact the advent of winter will in all probability put a stop to any contemplated military operations in this region, as the severity of the climate is not conducive to winter campaigning. According to an eye witness, both forces have already dug themselves in for the winter. This will give Nanking and Mukden several months of grace in which to settle the question around the conference table as to the control of this district.

The strategic importance of Jehol with relation to the Three Eastern Provinces cannot be over-estimated. Chang Tso-lin regarded Shanhaikwan as the front door to Mukden and Jehol as the side entrance, and the control of the latter place was held by him of such importance that he declared that to lose Jehol was to lose his northern empire. That this view continues to be held by the authorities not only in Mukden but in Nanking as well, is evident from the bitter struggle that has been waged for the control of this district, ever since the Nationalists gained the ascendency in North China.

3. Activities in Szechwan.

The situation in Szechwan is so obscure and muddled as to be almost incomprehensible. Yang Sen has again been dismissed from his command, forgiven for his past delinquincies and reinstated, all in a period of one month, simply because the Nanking Government lacks the power to compel obedience to its wishes. In Report No. 7326 of September 24th, certain Szechwan generals were said to have formed an alliance with a force of Kweichow troops, the object being the elimination of Yang Sen. It now appears that these Kweichow troops were dispatched by the Nanking Government for the ostensible purpose of assisting General Liu Hsiang, much against the wishes of the latter, in his military operations against Yang Sen. Furthermore this order of the Nanking Government was supplemented by an invitation to the Kweichow commanders from three of Liu Hsiang's subordinate generals, without the knowledge or consent of the latter, General Liu promptly patched up his differences with General Yang; his subordinates, however, continued to harbor plans for military operations against Yang. In this, they were in all probability encouraged by the Nanking Government, because at a meeting of the Central Political Council early in October a resolution was passed to the effect that Yang Sen should be dismissed. Within a month this order was rescinded because "he had shown repentance and sincerity to do good".

At the present time General Ho Ying-chin a member of the Government Committee, and Mr. Tai Chi-tao, a member of the Central Executive Committee, are said to have decided upon a tentative plan for the solution of the

situation in Szechwan. So far as can be ascertained the plan provides for the reorganization of the various Szechwan armies recognized by the Central Government. A reduction of forces to twelve divisions is contemplated. Generals Liu Hsiang, Liu Wen-hui, Yang Sen and Teng Shih-hu each to have three divisions.

It appears to be the stand of the Central Government that a new start should be made in Szechwan, and for this reason the government is willing to ignore the past political affiliation and records of the various leaders. If they still insist on allowing their factional differences to prevent a general settlement, the government will be forced to send troops into the province. Nanking's efforts to effect a solution in Szechwan are timely. If they succeed Nanking will have accomplished a notable task in reconstruction.

4. Activities in Kweichow.

According to consular advices from Yunnanfu, dated November 7th, Yunnan forces are being mobilized on the Kweichow frontier. Li Shao-yin, commanding the 6th Nationalist Army is said to be invading Kweichow from Hunan with a part of his forces. The Consul states it is believed that a general attack on Chou Hsu-chen, governor of Kweichow, is imminent, apparently with the consent of the Nanking government.

The inconsistences of reports from Hankow to the effect that Kweichow troops were operating against Yang Sen at the instance of Nanking, and the report from Yunnanfu that Nanking is preparing an attack on the governor of Kweichow is evident. No information is at hand to clear the question. It is conceivable, however, that Chou Hsu-chen occupies one position vis-a-vis the Central government and his subordinates another.

5. Miscellaneous.

The following information is furnished by the Consul at Mukden :

The reduction and reorganization of the military forces of the Three Eastern Provinces has been under consideration for several months. In October a reorganization plan was decided upon, according to which the forces will be limitedto 30 brigades of about 10,000 men each, Fengtien to have 15, Kirin 8 and Heilungkiang 7. Under this plan divisions and army corps are to be abolished and consequently there will be a large reduction of officers, reported to be about 10,000. For the time being these are to be given official employment of various kinds, such as advisors, counsellors, etc.

It is reliably reported that Chang Hsueh-liang has given about sixty plots of land to high military officers ranging between one and three mou each for a brigadier-general, major general and lieutenant general, respectively. besides the plot of land a loan of silver $10,000 for the purpose of building a house is made to anyone desiring it. It is understood that the loan practically amounts to a gift. This is a novel means of keeping these high officers in Mukden and of insuring their loyality to him.

The Japanese press reports that a battalion will consist of 4 companies of 300 men each, a regiment will have three battalions, and brigade will be made up of 3 regiments, two being infantry, and the third being a regiment of auxiliary arms.

It is planned to hold a competitive examination for all officers, those officers who pass with the highest marks to be retained, the others

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to be placed in the reserve on part pay, subject to recall to the colors, while the remainder, consisting of those who have failed, will be discharged with two month's pay.

John W. Carroll,
Captain, Cavalry.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - November 20, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1929 6180
2657-D-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D FEB 5- 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies.
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd "	(Chen Ta-chun)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Ch'en Cho)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanch'ang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Hufei-Showchow	(Anhui)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Tsingkiang	(")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Wuhu	(Anhui)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kungchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Mengcheng	(Anhui)	12,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kupeikow-Peking	(Chihli)	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang)	Tsunhwa-Tungchow	(")	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Lutai	(")	12,000
47th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	Hsuanhwa	(")	20,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Yench'ing	(")	24,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-ch'i)	Techow	(Shantung)	12,000

Note: The former 33rd, 42nd and 47th Armies have been incorporated into the 1st, 44th and 45th divisions, respectively. During the early part of December the former 43rd Army became completely disorganized, a part fleeing to Shantung to become bandits and the remainder being scattered between Tsunhwa and Tientsin. Some of these troops have been rounded up but their disposition is unknown at the present time. The Commanding General, Wu Chi, has been executed

Cavalry Divisions of the First Group:

1st Cavalry Div.	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	(Jehol)	10,000
2nd " "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Kuchen	(Anhui)	10,000
		Total		266,000

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
22nd	(Chi Hung-ch'ang)	"	(")	12,000
23rd	(Feng Chih-an)	Sinsiang	(Honan)	12,000

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24th Division	(Shih Yu-san)	Changan	(Shensi)	12,000
25th "	(Shih Ching-t'ing)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng)	Hsincheng	(")	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Kaolan	(Kansu)	12,000
29th "	(Liu Ju-ming)	Changan	(Shensi)	12,000
30th "	(Tung Lin-ke)	Kaolan	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Tsun Lien-chung)	Hsining	(")	12,000

Note: The former 7th Army under Yueh Wei-chun has been reorganized into the 13th, 14th and 15th divisions. The 17th Division is composed of Kansu cavalry formerly in the 8th Army. The 18th division is composed of Shensi militia. The 19th and 20th divisions were formed from the former 8th Army.

13th Division	(Wei Ting-I)	Fuyang	(Anhui)	
	)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	5,000
14th "	(Chi Yuan-lin)	"		5,000
15th "	(Liu Peng-wei)	"		5,000
17th Cav. "	(Ma Hung-K'uei)	Taming	(Chihli)	10,000
18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(Shensi)	10,000
19th "	(Wan Hsuan-ts'ai)	Tungchow	(Chihli)	12,000
20th "	(Liu Mao-en)	Pachow	(")	12,000
Ind. Cav.Div.	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Chengchow	(Honan)	7,000

Total 210,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Peking &	(Chihli)	9,000
	)	Tientsin	( )	
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliang-	(")	9,000
	)	ch'eng	( )	
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Tatung	(Shansi)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-hsin)	Shihkiachuang	(")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chihli)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking	(")	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000

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The former Peace Preservation Force and the Railway Guards, under Wang Ying and Chang Ying-wu, respectively, have been reorganized into the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th brigades.

25th Brigade	(He Shao-nan)	Peking-Shihkiachwang	(Chihli)	6,000
26th "	(He Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	(An Hsi-ku)	Chungliangcheng	(Chihli)	6,000
28th "	(Chang Ying-fang)	Hsiyuan-Peking	(")	6,000

Artillery Forces - Chow Tai.

4th Brigade	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Shansi
5th "	(Liu Kuang)	Taiyuanfu, Shensi
6th "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Peking, Chihli
7th "	(Peng Chi)	Tientsin & Peking, Chihli
Cavalry Corps	(T'an Ch'ing-lin)	Kupeikow, Chihli

Figures on the strength of the artillery and cavalry estimated at approximately 15,000

Total 147,000

Fourth Group of Armies.
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

1st Division	(Wei Yun-sung)	Nanyuan	(Chihli)	12,000
15th "	(Hsia Wei)	Hankow	(")	12,000
16th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Wuch'ang	(")	12,000
17th "	(T'ao Chun)	"	(")	12,000
18th "	(Lu Tiao-p'ing)	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
19th "	(Ho Chien)	"	(")	12,000
7th "	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Hengyang	(")	12,000
8th "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	12,000
9th "	(Yeh Ch'i)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
10th "	(Miao Yen)	Kaiping	(Chihli)	12,000
11th "	(Wang Tso-min)	Kuyeh	(")	12,000
Peace Preservation Force	(Li Yen)	Tsangjen	(Kweichow)	12,000

Total 144,000

Note: The former 12th Army now forms the 8th Division. T he former 13th and 17th and 22nd Armies now form the 9th Division. The former 30th and 36th Armies now form the 10th and 11th Divisions, respectively. The former 8th Indenpendent Division now forms a part of the 1st Division. The former 1st and 2nd Independent Brigades now form the 7th Division. The former 43rd Army now forms the Peace Preservation Force.

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)		12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)		10,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		3,000

Yunnan

38th Army	(Lung Yun)		20,000
7th Ind. Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)		4,000

Kwangtung - Li Chai-sum

4th Army	(Chen Chi-tang)	West River area	12,000
5th "	(Hsu Ching-tsing)	Waichow-Swatow area	11,000
11th "	(Chen Ming-hsu)	S.W. Kwangtung and Hainan Island	13,000
15th "	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	Kwangtung-Kwangsi border	12,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Kwangtung-Hunan border	12,500
Kwangtung Provincial Defense Forces consisting of 6 regts.			4,000

Kiangsi

Three divisions of 6th Army.	10,000

Kwangsi

1st Ind. Div. (Tseng Yuen-chun)	4,000
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops (Cheng Yen-hua)	1,000

Fukien

4th Ind. Mixed Div.	(Chang Chen)	S.W. Fukien	8,000
14th " " "	(Liu Hsing-pang)	S.E. "	15,000
1st Provincial Defense Regiment	(Chen Kuo-hui)	S.W. "	1,000
2nd " " "	(Kuo Fang-ming)	S.W. "	1,000
1st Ind. Regiment	(Ho Hsin-tsun)	Foochow area	1,000
2nd " "	(Chuang Cheng-chow)	" "	1,000
1st Reserve Regt.	(Chen Chin)	" "	1,000
Marines			
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)		1,000
2nd "	(Lin Hsin-kuo)		1,000

Chekiang

Six regiments Provincial Defense Force	
Two reserve regiments	
One Gendarmerie Battalion	
One Artillery Corps	
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	
	10,000

#7404

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen		10,000

Szechwan

20th Army	(Yang Sen)	40,000
21st "	(Liu Hsiang)	40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)	6,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)	6,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	50,000
28th "	(Cheng Hsi-ho)	60,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)	30,000
Szechwan-Shansi Border Defense Force	(Liu Chuan-hou)	3,000
Yunnan " " "	(Hu Yueh-yu)	3,000

Eastern Shantung

1st Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo & Fushan	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kui-tai)	Pingtu	6,000
3rd "	(Ho I-san)	Maping	3,000
4th "	(Li Hsi-tung)	Huanghsien	3,000
5th "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	Laiyang	2,000
Independent Div.	(Liu Ching-shan)	Chiuchow	4,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			6,000

Former Chihli-Shantung troops captured in the Lwanchow area are now included in the figures of the Four Groups of Armies.

No figures ava ilable as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars - 1,218,000

(b) MANCHURIAN FORCES - Chang Hsueh-liang, Commander-in-Chief

The Third and Fourth Army Groups
(Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Yu-ting)

8th Army	(Wan Fu-lin)	Tsitsihar and other districts in Heilungkiang	15,000
9th "	(Kao Wei-yueh)	Luanp'ing-Jehol	15,000
10th "	(Wang Shu-ch'ang)	Chinchow, Fengtien & Shanhaikuan, Chihli	13,000
11th "	(Fu Shuang-ying)	Chinchow and Ch'angli	11,000
12th "	(Tang Yu-lin)	Chengteh, Jehol	15,000
15th "	(Chi Chin-ch'un)	Shanhaikuan, Chihli	15,000
16th "	(H u Yu-kun)	Shanhaikuan-Changli, Chihli	14,000
17th "	(Jung Chen)	" " "	11,000
20th "	(Yu Hsueh-chung)	"	13,000
28th "	(Yueh Chao-lin)	Lingyuan, Jehol	15,000
29th "	(Chi Yi-chao)	Ch'aoyang-Ningyuan area Jehol	8,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

30th Army (Yu Chih-sha n)	Fench'eng-Antung area, Fengtien	10,000
31st " (Cheng Tze-sheng)	Funing, Jehol	18,000
10th Div. (Wang I-chi)	Mukden, Fengtien	5,000
Training Brigade (Wang Jui-hua)	" "	2,000
32nd Div. (Chang Hsien-t'ao)	Taonanfu, Fengtien	5,000
	Total	185,000

The Fifth Army Group (Kirin Armies)
(Chang Tso-hsiang)

15th Div.	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin,	Kirin
16th "	(Li Chen-sheng)	Lungan,	"
10th Brig.	(Chang Tso-chow)	Kirin,	"
26th "	(Li Kuei-lin)	Harbin	"
8th Cav. Brig.	(Ch'ang Yu-ch'en)	Fuyu	"
10th " "	(Ch'ang Yao-ch'en)	Lungan	"
8th Mixed "	(Ch'en Yu-kun)	Ch'angch'un,	"
9th " "	(Li Tu)	San Shang	"
13th " "	(Wang Hsing)	Yenchihsien,	"
18th " "	(Ting Chao)	Harbin,	"
21st " "	(Chao Chi-hsiang)	Ninganhsien	"

Forest Protection Force (Chao Wei-cheng)
1 Regiment (Tupan's Bodyguard) 30,000

Former Chihli-Shantung troops taken over in the Lwanchow area by the Manchurian Forces are now included in the totals.

TOTAL MANCHURIAN FORCES . . . . . 215,000 ✓

✓ TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA,
not including unidentified irregulars . . . . . 1,433,500 ✓

Note: The figures on the strength of the various armies and divisions are manifestly not as uniform as set forth above. In the absence of definite information, these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops the totals are approximately correct. Whenever definite figures on the strength of any units are ascertained changes will be made accordingly. In This report there is an increase over the last report in the "Total Forces Under Arms in China" of 24,500. This is due to the picking up of units not previously known to exist. The new figures on Kwangtung, Chekiang and Kweichow have been obtained from British sources.

A Situation Map is being prepared and will be forwarded in the next pouch.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. General.

The year closed with peace in the north, with the possible exception of Jehol, where the forces of Tang Yu-lin and Fang Chen-wu continue to face each other along the Luan River. However, since Manchuria hoisted the Nationalist flag on December 29th this situation in all probability will be cleared up in the near future.

A new war has broken out in Szechwan which bears all the earmarks of a revolt against Nationalist control of the province. Fighting is also occurring in Kweichow between Kweichow troops which have been stationed in Szechwan for some time and the forces of the present governor of the province.

A conference for the purpose of dicussing plans for disbandment has been called in Nanking and is scheduled to start on January 4th. All the leading militarists have been invited to attend.

3. Activities in Szechwan.

In Report No. 7369 it was stated that Nanking was making desperate efforts to devise a plan whereby the difficult situation in Szechwan might be solved, and for that reason was prepared to ignore the past affiliations and records of the various leaders. In fact, the government appeared to be willing to do almost anything in order to preserve the peace in that war torn province. Early in December, Nanking informed the Szechwan authorities that the province was expected to pay an annual sum of over a million dollars from its salt revenues to the Ministry of Finance in order to meet the loans secured on the national salt revenue. In reply Generals Liu Hsiang and Liu Wen-hui are said to have stated that these were the only funds available for the support and reorganization of the army and requested that the province be relieved of the liability for the time being. This refusal was followed by mobilization moves on the part of all the leading generals of the province. Later, for reasons not clear at present, General Lai Hsin-hui suddenly parted company with Liu Hsiang and Liu Wen-hui and joined hands with Yang Sen, thereby ending the triumvirate which has maintained whatever peace there has been in Szechwan in the past several months. This sudden accretion of strength to Generals Yang Sen and Cheng Hsi-ho (Teng Hsi-hou) provided one of the principal causes for the tense situation which arose later.

By the 19th of December, according to newspaper reports, hostilities between the two factions had commenced in the vicinity of Wanhsien and Chunking. Forces under Generals Lai Hsin-hui and Kuo Ju-tung are reported to have moved on Chungking to attack General Liu Hsiang, the latter being a nominee of Nanking on the Executive Committee of the Szechwan Provincial Government. Yang Sen, for a time delayed entering the conflict but later gave military support to Lai Hsin-hui in his efforts to oust Liu Hsiang from Chungking. Lo Tze-chow, a Kweichow leader, also joined hands with Yang Sen. At the present time the forces of the above mentioned leaders as well as those of Kuo Ju-tung and Lai Hsin-hui are fighting in the vicinity of Chungking. From

consular sources it is learned that fighting on a considerable scale is possible in Szechwan. Unconfirmed rumors state that Li Tsung-jen is giving his moral support at least to the rebel faction. If these rumors prove to be true, the conflict may have far reaching results.

The situation in Szechwan is closely connected with that of Kweichow and Yunnan. In all three provinces there are factions which are allied to the Nanking Government and opposing factions which more or less favor the Kwangsi Party. The Nationalist Government in Szechwan is represented by Liu Hsiang and adherents, in Yunnan by Governor Lung Yun, and in Kweichow by Li Yen. The Kwangsi faction is represented in Szechwan by Yang Sen and adherents and in Kweichow by Governor Chow Hsi-ch'eng.

4. Activities in Kweichow.

Fighting on a small scale is occurring on the Szechwan border and in northern Kweichow at the present time between the forces of Governor Chow Hsi-ch'eng and Li Yen. The troops of the latter were formerly sent into Szechwan for the purpose of operating against Yang Sen. Li now desires to return to Kweichow apparently with the idea of seizing the reins of government from the hands of Chow Hsi-ch'eng. Consular reports indicate that he has the tacit support of the governor of Yunnan in this move. At any rate Yunnan troops were mobilized on the Yunnan-Kweichow border late in November ostensibly to partake in this effort to oust Governor Chow, provided that the movement on the part of Li was successful. Up to date, however, Li has made little headway against Chow and has received no support from the Yunnan forces.

5. Disbandment Plans.

A conference, the purpose of which is to provide a plan for the disbandment of large numbers of the troops now under arms in China, was scheduled to be held in Nanking on December 26th. Due to the fact that Li Tsung-jen and Li Chai-sum had not arrived on the appointed day, the conference was postponed until January 1st and later to January 4th. According to newspaper reports the following subjects will be taken up at the conference:

1) The total number of national troops will be determined.
2) Garrison areas will be assigned to the various troops.
3) Regulations will be drafted governing the dismissal of superfluous troops.
4) A budget will be prepared to take care of the expenses of the disbanded troops.

6. Miscellaneous.

Manchuria marked its formal adherence to the Nationalist Government on December 29th when all government buildings and business houses in the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol hoisted the Kuomintang flag. The situation in the Jehol area remains unchanged and should be settled peaceably now that Manchuria has formally raised the Nationalist flag.

John W. Garroll

John W. Garroll
Captain, Cavalry

No. 7404 1st Ind. JM

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, January 3, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D MAR 7 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

Due to the fact that there has been no movement of troops of sufficient importance to cause any particular change in the distribution as outlined in Report No. 7404, an abstract only, showing the disposition of the principal forces, is submitted with this report. Whenever any changes occur in the general line-up of the principal forces sufficient to warrant a new detailed distribution, one will be furnished. Until that time, however, the distribution as shown in Report No. 7404 and the map which accompanies it can be considered approximately correct.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

Located in general in southern Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, with small units in northern Chihli and Jehol.

Number of infantry divisions - 19
" " cavalry " - 2

Total 266,000

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

Located in general in Kansu, Shensi, Honan, southern Chihli, Shantung, with small units in northern Chihli.

Number of infantry divisions - 18
" " cavalry - 2

Total 210,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

Located in general in Suiyuan, Chahar, Shansi and Chihli.

Number of infantry divisions - 12
" " separate infantry brigades - 4
" " artillery brigades 4
Cavalry Corps 1

Total 147,000

Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

Located in general in Hupeh, Hunan and northern Chihli.

Number of infantry divisions - 11
Peace Preservation Force - 1

Total 144,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7432 January 31, 1929

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow	30,000
Yunnan	24,000
Kwangtung	64,000
Kiangsu	10,000
Kwangsi	5,000
Fukien	30,000
Chekiang	10,000
Sinkiang	10,000
Szechwan	238,000
Eastern Shantung	30,000
TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars	1,218,000

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES - Chang Hsueh-liang, Commander-in-Chief.

Located in general in Manchuria and Jehol with the exception of five brigades which still remain south of the Great Wall in northern Chihli.

Total . . .	215,000
Total Forces Under Arms in China, not including unidentified irregulars	1,433,500

Note: The total number of forces under arms in China is believed to be approximately correct. It should be understood, however, that these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops, the totals should approximate those set forth hereon. Whenever definite figures on the strength of any units are ascertained changes will be made accordingly. The total strength of Chinese armed forces mentioned at the Disbandment Conference is 1,600,000. Political considerations affecting this figure place it in the category of estimates. In round numbers one and one-half million men is a convenient figure.

2. Situation in Szechwan.

Conditions in Szechwan continue to remain disturbed and little information on the fighting in that province is obtainable. General Yang Sen, as stated in Report No. 7404, threw in his lot with those opposed to Liu Hsiang and Liu Wen-hui. The results of this move on Yang Sen's part have proved disastrous to him as later events have shown.

While no detailed information regarding the fighting during the latter part of December and the early part of January is available, according to consular reports it is clearly established that Yang Sen, Lai Hsin-hui and their associates have suffered decisive defeat. The Consul at Chungking states that reliable foreign sources report that Yang Sen has lost Wanhsien and on date of report, January 21st, is in the interior of Szechwan north of Wanhsien with the remnants of his forces; that Yang Sen's associates have also been decisively defeated and that Liu Hsiang and Liu Wen-hui can now with justice claim to be in control of a considerable section, if not all, of the province of Szechwan.

Reports from both the Chinese and foreign press state that General Yang Sen has been superseded as leader of the anti-government forces by General Cheng Hsi-how (Teng Hsi-hou) and that the former has accepted an appointment as field commander under the latter.

On January 15th the Nanking government issued a mandate dismissing Yang Sen from all of his offices and ordering an investigation with a view to punishing him for his past offenses.

According to newspaper reports General Lung Yun, Chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government and General C how Hsi-ch'eng, Chairman of the Kweichow Provincial Government, have reached an understanding not to interfere in Szechwan. It also appears that the fighting in Kweichow in which General Li Yen was attempting to overthrow General Chow Hsi-ch'eng has ceased and his forces have fled to eastern Szechwan. The Consul at Yunnanfu reports:

> "The disposition of the Yunnan military forces was not materially altered during the month (December).... ....
>
> "However, it is obvious that the relations between the two provinces continue to be strained. The presence of the forces of the ejected Yunnanese militarists, Hu Jo Yü and Chang Ju Yi, associates of General Chou Hsi Chen of Kweichow, in the districts of Szechuan and Kweichow adjacent to Yunnan, is a thorn in the flesh of the local authorities, who demand that these insurgent commanders be outlawed and dispersed. As Chou is probably not in a position to do so, the existing hostility will doubtless continue indefinitely.
>
> "It is believed probably that this situation bears some relation to the fighting at present in progress in Szechuan, but the position is obscure and it is not clear what the connection may be. It seems that Kweichow is leaning towards the so-called Kwangsi Party."

3. <u>Disorders in Eastern Shantung</u>.

On January 22nd a mutiny occurred among the troops of Liu Kai-tai at Lungkow. They succeeded in cutting the telephone communications between Chefoo and Lungkow and in addition held up the motor service between these two points. Order, however, was restored within a few hours by the cavalry forces of Liu Chen-nien.

The Consul at Chefoo reports that General Liu Chen-nien who controls the Chefoo district, was being plotted against by General Liu Kai-tai who planned General Liu Chen-nien's overthrow. As soon as the latter heard of this he threatened to attack Liu Kai-tai unless he

(Liu Kai-tai) resigned. Fearful of his own safety and that of his family,which Liu C hen-nien was holding as hostages in Chefoo, Liu Kai-tai boarded a Japanese ship and fled to Dairen, whereupon a certain number of his troops which had not been paid for several months mutinied. On January 20th an organized body of "Red Spears" attacked the garrison at Weihsien. The prompt personal intervention of Liu Chen-nien succeeded in settling this disturbance. It seems clear that the Nationalists by intrigues with Liu's subordinates are conducting a campaign to oust him.

Both the Consuls at Chefoo and at Tsinan report disorders at Weihsien on the Kiao-Tsi railway. This information is obtained from missionary sources. From these reports it appears that Weihsien has been the object of intermittent attacks by armed bands of independent brigand-military units during the month of January, the purpose of these attacks being to extort money from the inhabitants. Weihsien is in the railway zone under the control of Japanese troops. Apparently the Japanese have not only taken no action to prevent these marauding bands from entering the 20 li zone, but have actually connived with the leaders and have supplied them with rifles and ammunition. The Chinese official, together with the troops under him, who resisted these attacks on the city, was ordered to leave by the Japanese. One missionary reports that large numbers of the marauders arrived in the vicinity of Weihsien on the train, making little effort to conceal the fact that they were armed. Upon disembarking from the train they mingled freely with the Japanese soldiery and later carried out an attack upon the city.

It is not clear why the Japanese should permit disorders of this sort to take place within the 20 li zone as it is distinctly to their advantage to demonstrate that law and order exist wherever they have established themselves. Nor does there appear to be any good reason why these bands of marauders should not be ordered out of the 20 li zone.

4. <u>National Reorganization and Disbandment Conference</u>.

The National Reorganization and Disbandment Conference was opened in Nanking on January 1st. Beginning on the 8th, plenary sessions were hold on Tuesdays and Fridays and various committee meetings were held on the other week days.

Four sub-committees were appointed, namely: General Affairs, Reorganization of Troops, Distribution of Troops and Finances. The heads of the sub-committees are, respectively, General Li Chai-sum, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, General Yen Hsi-shan and Mr. T. V. Soong,

On January 11, T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, submitted to the conference a remarkable analysis of the present financial condition of the government in which he showed that if material reduction of forces and the centralization of finances were accomplished "the Ministry of Finance will be ready to meet regularly and without fail at due dates the annual military expenditure of $192,000,000, in addition to reasonable disbandment expenses. If not, the future is dark indeed". This plan of Mr. Soong's was adopted "in principle" by the conference.

The only other known authorized statement as to the resolutions adopted by the conference is contained in the following article published by the official Kuo Min News Agency on January 17, 1929. It is as follows:

"Judging from the momentous decisions made, the 4th general session of the National Reorganization and Disbandment Conference held this afternoon, was the most important meeting since the Conference was convened. All delegates to the Conference were present including Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, Generals Yen Hsi-shan, Li Chung-jen, Ho Ying-ching, Li Chi-sen, Messrs. Hu Han-min, Tan Yen-kai, C. T. Wang, T. V. Soong, etc.

"A resolution to abolish all posts of group commanders-in-chief and other high military commanders established during the civil war, and to put all armies of China under the unified command of a Commission on Disbandment was passed. This means abolition of group armies as such; and the National Government will be in direct control of all armies of the country.

"The Conference also adopted a resolution to put all arsenals under the direct control and supervision of the Central Government.

"In carrying out the practical part of the disbandment programme the C onference decided to divide the laborious task of disbandment into six regions geographically. The first four regions will correspond to the first four group armies, the fifth will be in charge of disbandment of troops in the Three Eastern Provinces; and the sixth in charge of disbandment of troops in Szechuan, Yunnan and Kweichow.

"The present programme of disbandment is to reduce the whole national army of the Chinese Republic to a maximum of 65 divisions, each division having about 11,000 men. In other words, this will mean a reduction of more than half of the present armies.

"The number of soldiers, even after reorganization and disbandment, will continue gradually to be decreased until the amount of money needed to support them will not exceed 40 per cent. of the total revenue of the National Government.

"Definite plans were passed by the Conference also for taking care of the disbanded soldiers. Funds will be allowed to pay pensions to the disabled, and others will be sent to industrial or vocational schools for training for a period of one to three years.

"The Conference further resolved that as soon as regional and district offices of the Disbandment Commission are established, all revenues throughout China will be collected and controlled by the Ministry of Finance of the National Government. Payment of troops will be made by the Ministry of Finance to the Disbandment Commission which will in turn make disbursements according to the various units. The above resolutions were unanimously passed and will be submitted to the Government for approval and promulgation.

"In brief, the general programme fixes the authorized strength of the National Army at 65 Divisions totalling approximately 800,000 men (half of the present number of soldiers) at an annual expenditure of $192,000,000 (41 per cent. of the Government's yearly revenue as recommended by Finance Minister T. V. Soong).

"To prevent continuation of the system of regional military control, the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders of the various Group Armies, the various Field-Commanders as well as the various Central military organs are to be forthwith abolished with the supreme military authority of the Government vested in the Central Disbandment Committee which shall control all military movements throughout the entire country.

"To expedite the carrying out of the various reorganization measures, branch offices of the Disbandment Committee will be established in the various military centres and all arsenals of the Government will stop the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Membership of the branch Committees of the Disbandment Committee will be composed of representatives of the original Group Army Commanders concerned and those from the Central Party Headquarters and the National Government.

"No single branch Committee of the Disbandment Committee may have under its control more than 11 Divisions of soldiers and no troop manoeuvres of any nature will be permitted without express authorization from the Disbandment Committee. Since all military disbursements must only be remitted by the Ministry of Finance, unauthorized requisition of military expenses from any local authority will be strictly prohibited.

"Three principal measures of disbandment will be employed by the Committee. Firstly, all officers and soldiers who are judged too old and those who wish to return to their former occupations will be retired on pension according to their rank; secondly, all officers above the rank of major who are properly qualified and wish to pursue further studies in their respective fields of specialization will be awarded scholarships to study abroad or in the country according to their qualifications; and thirdly, the surplus minor officers will be given training as supervisors or overseers in the Government's various construction schemes such as river-conservancy, reclamation, afforestation, road-building and other industrial and engineering enterprises.

"For the purpose of assisting local police forces in maintaining peace and order, the various provincial authorities may organize a Provincial Militia not exceeding three thousand troops who, however, must be maintained at the expense of the Provincial Government concerned."

Eleven members were elected to the standing committee on disbandment as follows: General Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, Generals Yen Hsi-shan, Li Tsung-jen, Li Chai-sum, Chang Hsueh-liang, Ho Ying-chin, Admiral Yang Shu-chwang, Messrs. Wu Chih-hui, Tan Yen-kai and T. V. Soong. This committee will remain in being indefinitely and is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the resolutions adopted by the Conference.

The Conference adjourned on January 25th after the sixth plenary session.

5. <u>Miscellaneous</u>.

"In connection with the reorganization of the Mukden army, it has been learned on good authority that General Chang Hsueh-liang intends to send about 100 young officers to France for military training at Saint Cyr. The officers have not yet been selected. French instruction is apparently to supersede Japanese." (Report of American Consulate General, Mukden, December 31, 1928.)

On January 20, 1929, 1300 officers were graduated from the "Officers Corps" of the Central Military Academy at Nanking. These officers were young men who had reached subordinate grades during actual operations but who had had little theoretical instruction. They were given a ten-month course and are now being returned to their units.

During the month there have been several movements of troops in northern Chihli the significance of which is not clear at the present time. These movements are as follows:

(a) The 48th Division (First Group of Armies) from Yenching, Chihli, to Suchow, Anhui.

(b) One Brigade of the 31st Division (Second Group of Armies) from Changteh, Honan to Tangshan, Chihli.

(c) The 11th Division (Fourth Group of Armies) from Lwanchow to Peking.

On December 28, 1928, Chang Hsueh-liang was appointed by Nanking as Commander-in-Chief of the North-eastern Frontier Defense Force, with Chang Tso-hsiang and Wan Fu-lin as assistants.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

Distribution:
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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, January 30, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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G-2 Report

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 1 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies.
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd "	(Mao Ping-wen)	"	(")	10,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tse)	Soochow	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanch'ang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Hufei-Showchow	(Anhui)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Tsingkiang	(")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Wuhu	(Anhui)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kungchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Mengcheng	(Anhui)	12,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kupeikow-Peking	(Chihli)	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang)	Tsunhwa-Tungchow	(")	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Lutai	(")	12,000
47th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	Hsuanhwa	(")	20,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	24,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-ch'i)	Techow	(")	12,000

Cavalry Divisions of the First Group:

1st Cavalry	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	(Jehol)	10,000
2nd "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Kuchen	(Anhui)	10,000
			Total	266,000

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
22nd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang)	Tsining	(")	12,000
23rd "	(Feng Chih-an)	Sinsiang	(Honan)	12,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san)	Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
25th "	(Shih Ching-t'ing)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
26th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng)	Sincheng	(Honan)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	12,000
29th "	(Liu J u-ming)	Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
30th "	(Tung Lin-ke)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Tsun Lien-chung)	Hsining	(")	12,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7452 March 1, 1929

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

13th Division	(Wei Ting-I)	Fuyang	(Anhui)	5,000
	(	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	5,000
14th "	(Chi Yuan-lin)	"	(")	5,000
15th "	(Liu Peng-wei)	Suchow	(")	10,000
17th Cav. "	(Ma Hung-K'uei)	Techow	(Shantung)	10,000
18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
19th "	(Wan Hsuan-ts'ai)	Tungchow	(Chihli)	12,000
20th "	(Liu Mao-en)	Techow	(Shantung)	7,000
x 21st "	(Yang Hu-ch'en)	Ichow	(")	10,000
Ind.Cav. Div.	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Tungchang	(")	
			Total	220,000

x The 21st Division is composed of former independent units in Shantung which were incorporated into the Second Group on about February 1st.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Peking & Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliang-ch'eng	(")	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Tatung	(Shansi)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-hsin)	Shihkiachuang	(")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan F u-an)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	Peking-Shih-kiachwang	(Chihli)	6,000
26th "	(He Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	(An Hsi-ku)	Chungliang-cheng	(Chihli)	6,000
28th "	(Chang Ying-fang)	Hsiyuan-Peking	(")	6,000

Artillery Forces - Chow Tai.

4th Brigade	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Shansi
5th "	(Liu Kuang)	Taiyuanfu, Shansi
6th "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Peking, Chihli
7th "	(Peng Chi)	Tientsin & Peking, Chihli
Cav. Corps	(T'an Ch'ing-lin)	Kupeikow, Chihli

Figures on the strength of the artillery and cavalry estimated at approximately 15,000

Total 147,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Fourth G roup of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Second in Command - Pai Chung-hsi)

1st Division	(Chang Ting-fan)	Nanyuan	(Chihli)	12,000
15th "	(Hsia-Wei)	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
16th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Wuch'ang	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th "	(T'ao Chun)	"	(")	12,000
18th "	( )	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
19th "	(Ho Chien)	"	(")	12,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Hengyang	(")	12,000
51st "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	12,000
52nd "	(Yeh Ch'i)	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
53rd "	(Miao Yen)	Kaiping	(Chihli)	12,000
54th "	(Wang Tso-min)	Peking-Hsiyuan	(")	12,000
Peace Preser-	( )		( )	
vation Force	(Li Yen)	Tsangjen	(Kweichow)	12,000

Total 144,000

The former 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Divisions have now become the 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd and 54th Divisions, respectively. Lu Tiao-ping, Commander of the 18th Division, has fled from Changsha and it is not known where he is at present.

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)	10,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	3,000

Yunnan

38th Army	(Lung Yun)	20,000
7th Ind. Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	4,000

Kwangtung

4th Army	(Chen Chi-tang)	West River area	12,000
5th "	(Hsu Ching-tsing)	Waichow-Swatow area	11,000
11th "	(Chen Ming-hsu)	S.W. Kwangtung and Hsinan Island	13,000
15th "	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	Kwangtung-Kwangsi bdr.	12,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Kwangtung-Hunan border	12,500
Kwangtung Provincial Defense Forces consisting of 6 regts.			4,000

Kiangsi

Three Divisions of 6th Army	10,000

Kwangsi

1st Ind. Div. (Tseng Yueh-chun)	4,000
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops (Cheng Yen-hua)	1,000

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Fukien			
4th Ind. Mixed Div.	(Chang Chen)	S. W. Fukien	8,000
14th " " "	(Liu Hsing-pang)	S. W. "	15,000
1st Brig.Provincial Defense Army	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)	S. W. "	2,000
2nd Brig. Provincial Defense Army	(Kuo Fang-ming)	S. W . "	2,000
Marines			
1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)		15,000
2nd Brigade	(Liu Shou-kuo)		15,000
Chekiang			
Six regiments Provincial Defense Force			
Two reserve regiments			
One Gendarmerie Battalion			
One Artillery Corps			
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)			10,000
Sinkiang			
Troops of Chin Hsu-jen			10,000
Szechwan			
20th Army	(Yang Sen)		40,000
21st "	(Liu Hsiang)		40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)		6,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)		6,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)		50,000
28th "	(Cheng Hsi-ho)		60,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)		30,000
Szechwan-Shansi Border Defense Force	(Liu Chuan-hou)		3,000
Yunnan " " "	(Hu Yueh-yu)		3,000
Eastern Shantung			
1st Division	)	Chefoo & Fushan	6,000
2nd "	)	Pingtu	6,000
3rd "	)	Laichow	3,000
4th "	)	Huanghsien	3,000
5th "	)	Laiyang	2,000
Independent Div.(Liu Ching-shan)		"	4,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			6,000

No figures available as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars - 1,255,000

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Second in Command - Wan Fu-lin

Located in general in Manchuria and Jehol with the exception of five brigades which still remain south of the Great Wall in Northern Chihli.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

These troops are undergoing reorganization, the details of which are not known at the present time. As soon as definite information is available it will be forwarded.

TOTAL 215,000

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA,
not including irregulars 1,470,500

Note: The figures on the strength of the various armies and divisions are manifestly not as uniform as set forth above. In the absence of definite information, these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops the totals are approximately correct. Whenever definite fig ures on the strength of any units are ascertained changes will be made accordingly. The total strength of Chinese armed forces mentioned at the Disbandment Conference is 1,600,000. Political considerations affecting this figure place it in the category of estimates. In round numbers one and one-half million men is a convenient figure.

2. Disorders in Eastern Shantung.

The disturbances which started on January 22nd in Eastern Shantung with a mutiny at Lunkow were closely followed by other disorders of a similar nature. According to the American Consul at Chefoo, Liu Kai-tai, mentioned in the last report as having left for Dairen, returned secretly on the night of January 24th, surrounded himself with some of his followers and proceeded to Hwanghsien, where the garrison of about 1500 strong rallied around him, killing off in a cold blooded manner most of their officers as well as a number of local officials. After thoroughly looting the Chinese city, they marched to Lungkow which they treated in a like fashion. A Japanese naval force arrived in Lunkow during the night of January 25-26th, whereupon this band of marauders fled southward toward Chaoyuan into an area in which the "Red Spears" are exceptionally strong. Order in the Lunkow area was restored later by the Third Division under Ho I-san which remained loyal to Liu Chen-nien.

By February 6th the forces at Laiyang had declared against Liu Chen-nien joining up with the independents. The leaders opposing Liu Chen-nien are Li Hsi-tung, commanding the 4th Division, and Huang Fang-chi, presumable a bandit chief. The opposition forces, estimated at 3,000, arrived at Lunkow from Laichow on the 11th of February and issued a proclamation stating that Liu was to be ejected from Shantung. General Shih Shu-chun, formerly a general under Chang Tsing-ch'ang, was appointed head of the opposition.

On February 12th General Ho I-san surrendered Hwanghsien to the opposition. The following day General Liu decided definitely to fight. He established three lines of defense, the first being at Tengchow, the second at Fresh Water River near Fushan, about four miles from Chefoo, and the third at Ninghai where Liu has his base of supplies.

By the 19th of February, Hwang Fang-chi with his forces had arrived at Hwanghsien where he raised the five barred flag. Liu Kai-tai, with part of the old 2nd Division which had recently looted Hwanghsien and Lunkow, and miscellaneous brigand forces totalling about 3,000, occupied Chaoyang and, combined with other forces, started toward Fushan, the immediate objective of the advancing forces, which evidently intended an encircling movement.

Chang Tsung-chang sailed secretly from Dairen on a chartered boat for Lunkow on February 19th for the purpose of directing the opposition against Liu Chen-nien. Chang was accompanied by Wu Kuan-hsin, Chu Yu-pu, and a number of other followers. This is the first definite proof that the former Tupan of Shantung and other malcontents who have been intriguing in Dairen had anything to do with the uprising in the Shantung peninsula.

On February 21st Liu's forces and those of Huang Fang-chi clashed at Kaotingchi west of Fushan, the engagement resulting in the routing of Huang's forces.

Chu Pan-tsao's forces from the Weihaiwei area, estimated at 15,000, have joined Chang Tsung-chang and at the present time it looks very much as if Liu Chen-nien would be overwhelmed by force of numbers unless he is reinforced. In this connection, the American Consul at Chefoo reports that General Liu had received a personal telegram from Pai Chung-hsi requesting him to hold out at any cost for at least ten days, before which time reinforcements would be sent from Tongku. The Kuo Min News Agency reports that the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief has issued separate telegraphic instructions to General Jen Ying-chi, stationed at Haichow, and General Chang Hsueh-liang in Mukden, instructing them to dispatch fresh troops to Chefoo to strengthen General Liu's offensive. Gunboats belonging to the Northeastern Squadron have also been ordered to blockade Lunkow in order to cut off Chang Tsung-chang's retreat. If true, this means that either Feng Yu-hsiang or the Central Government has decided to support Liu Chen-nien either temporarily or permanently. At all events, the American Consul reports that Liu is receiving financial support from outside sources, and his troops are better equipped than those of Chang Tsung-chang.

3. Hunan Coup d'Etat.

In a petition to the Central Government, dated February 19th, the Wuhan Branch Political Council recommended that General Lu Ti-ping be dismissed from the position of Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Council and that General Ho Chien, Bandit Suppression Commander for the province of Hunan and Kiangsi, be appointed in his stead. In this petition General Lu was charged with being guilty of financial corruption, negligence in the suppression of communist activities and generally obstructing the carrying out of various government measures. Without waiting for this petition to be acted upon by the Central Authorities, Generals Ho Chien and Yeh Chi executed a coup d'etat at Changsha early in the morning of February 21st. General Lu was taken completely by surprise due to the suddenness of the attack and was forced to flee for his life. He later arrived in Nanking where he reported the circumstances of his removal to Chiang Kai-shek, whose appointee he was. His troops have moved to Pinghsiang in Kiangsi. Provincial feeling runs high in Hunan.

Ho Chien and Yeh Chi are themselves Hunanese and it is not clear at present whether or not they acted on their own initiative in ousting General Lu. At all events they received the support of the Wuhan Branch Political Council and Li Tsung-jen after the coup was accomplished. This body appointed Ho Chien to the office of Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government, which action was later confirmed by Nanking as a temporary measure.

The regulations governing the functions of branch political councils,and the recent order of the Disbandment Conference that no troops should be moved without the express order of the Central Government, were both violated by the Wuhan authorities. This violation of existing orders coming as it does almost directly after the close of the Disbandment Conference is significant in that it shows that the harmony between the various military leaders and the Central Government is not as complete as Nanking would lead outsiders to believe.

4. Miscellaneous.

A small clash occurred on the Honan-Hupeh border between forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Tsung-jen, the explanation being that each mistook the other for bandits. Lu Chung-lin, Assistant Minister of War, has issued an official announcement that this was due to misunderstanding.

The Kuo Min News Agency reports that the communist-bandits in southern Kiangsi under the notorious bandit leader, Chu Mo, have been completely exterminated by the troops of General Ho Chien, Commander of the bandit suppression for Kiangsi and Hunan. The remnants of the bandit horde are being pursued by Kiangsi forces and will probably be surrounded by the Fukien divisions under General Lu Hsin-pang, who has been notified of the approach of the retreating bandits.

John W. Carroll.
John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - March 1, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

4-1 2657-9-276
1929 259
MAR 12

G-2 Report. 6180.

CHINA (MILITARY).

Subject: British Troops in China.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAR 11 1929

Infantry Battalions stationed in China will be disposed of as follows:-

2	Infantry Battalions	... ...	Shanghai.
3	" "	... ...	Hong Kong.
2	" "	... ...	Tientsin.

It is stated that, should the situation permit, the Shanghai Battalions will be transferred to Hong Kong.

M.A. London. Report No. 24337. February 25, 1929.

JOHN R. THOMAS, Jr.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Military Attache.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 16 1929
4-1 2657-D-276
6180 262
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 16 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

There has been considerable movement of troops to the Yangtze Valley since Report No. 7452 was submitted. Chang Kai-shek has moved a total of nine divisions from their former stations and in addition five divisions of the Fourth Group have been moved. In view of the fact that this movement has not been completed as yet, many units still being en route to new stations, an abstract only showing the disposition of the principal forces is submitted with this report.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

Located in general in southern Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, with small units in northern Chihli and Jehol.

Number of infantry divisions, 19
" " cavalry " 2

Total 226,000

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
(Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin)

Located in general in Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Honan, Shantung, with small units in northern Chihli.

Number of infantry divisions, 19.
" " cavalry " 2

Total 220,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

Located in general in Suiyuan, Chahar, Shansi and Chihli.

Number of infantry divisions 12
" " separate infantry brigades 4
" " artillery brigades 4
Cavalry Corps

Total 147,000

Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)
(Acting Second in Command - Li Pin-hsien)

Located in general in Hupeh, Hunan and northern Chihli, with small units in Kweichow and Kiangsi.

Number of infantry divisions, 11
Peace Preservation Force 1 Total 144,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7468 March 13, 1929

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control.)

Kweichow	30,000
Yunnan	24,000
Kwangtung	64,000
Kiangsi	10,000
Kwangsi	5,000
Fukien	57,000
Chekiang	10,000
Sinkiang	10,000
Szechwan	238,000
Eastern Shantung	30,000

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars . . . 1,255,000

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Second in Command - Wan Fu-lin

Located in general in Manchuria and Jehol with the exception of five brigades which still remain south of the Great Wall in northern Chihli.

Total 215,000

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,470,000

Note: The total number of forces under arms in China is believed to be approximately correct. It should be understood, however, that these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops, the totals should approximate those set forth hereon. Whenever definite figures on the strength of any units are ascertained, changes will be made accordingly. The total strength of Chinese armed forces mentioned at the Disbandment Conference was 1,600,000. Political considerations affecting this figure place it in the category of estimates. In round numbers one and one-half million men in a convenient figure.

2. Situation in Eastern Shantung.

There has been very little fighting in eastern Shantung since the last report. Hostilities between Chang Tsung-chang's forces and those of Liu Chen-nien ceased pending the result of negotiations between the two with a view to having the latter throw in his lot with Chang. Liu has submitted the following five conditions to Chang, which if agreed to by the latter will result in Liu's turning over:

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Subject: Situation Report.

1. Liu is to retain, under Chang, nominal control of the Chefoo-Ninghai district.

2. Liu is to retain command of his present division (about 4,500 men).

3. Expenses of the upkeep of Liu's forces to be guaranteed from taxation levied in the Chefoo area.

4. Liu is to receive an appointment in the so called Republican Alliance consistent with his present position and rank.

5. A reasonable sum placed at $100,000 to be paid him as a personal gift for his good will and action in turning over.

In a telegram dated March 6th, the American Consul in Chefoo states that negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily and that indications are that they will be concluded in a few days. It appears that Chang is prepared to accept Liu's terms with the exception of the number of men allowed under command of the latter. Chang insists that Liu turn over two-thirds of his forces; the remaining third to be retained under Liu's command as Garrison Commander of the Chefoo district.

At the present time eastern Shantung can be said to be in the hands of Chang Tsung-chang, although according to Kuo Min News Agency reports, Feng Yu-hsiang has ordered the 17th Cavalry division under Ma Hung-kwei and the 21st Division under Yang Hu-chen to advance toward Chefoo north of the railway zone to assist in quieting disturbances in that region. These units have orders to disarm all miscellaneous troops encountered en route in the regions beyond the 20 li zone of the Kiao-Tsi railway.

Chang Hsueh-liang when called upon by Chiang Kai-shek to send war ships from the northeastern squadron to Shantung, stated that the squadron needed a thorough overhauling and that most of the crews were former Shantung men and were liable to be won over by Chang Tsung-chang. He further refused to send land forces stating that they were needed to cope with the situation which might arise in Jehol.

3. Situation in the Yangtze Valley.

As a result of the coup d'etat in Hunan mentioned in last report, in which Chiang Kai-shek's appointee, Lu Ti-ping, was dismissed from the position of Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Council by the action of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, relations between Wuhan and Nanking have been strained to the breaking point.

Chiang Kai-shek has moved a total of nine divisions to the Yangtze Valley and the Kiangsi-Hunan border in three routes, the general plan being as follows:

Northern Route: Two divisions will move from northern Anhui toward Wuhsueh and Hwangmei.

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Middle Route: Five divisions will move by river and concentrate at Kiukiang.

Southern Route: Two divisions will be concentrated at Nanch'ang and will advance toward Changsha via Pinghsiang. Chu Pei-teh, C hairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, has been appointed commander-in-chief on this front.

It can thus be seen that Chiang Kai-shek has three fronts to protect from possible encroachment by the Wuhan faction, one north of the Yangtze from Hwangmei to a point slightly east of Wuhsueh, the second from Kiukiang running in a southwesterly direction along the Kiangsi-Hupeh border,and the third along the Kiangsi-Hunan border. In addition to this he is compelled to keep a sufficient number of troops in the vicinity of Pukow to cope with any menace from the direction of Honan or Shantung which Feng Yu-hsiang might precipitate. His general reserve will doubtless beheld in the vicinity of Nanking.

Up to date the Wuhan authorities have moved troops as follows:

One and one-half divisions to Wuhsueh and Hwangmei, one division is being sent to Kiangsi to pursue the defeated troops of Lu Ti-ping, while two divisions are to move on Ining (Siushuihsien) in Kiangsi to cooperate with the troops of Huang Shao-hsiung, which are expected to invade Kiangsi from Kwangtung. The Wuhan troops are disposed in general on an irregular line running from Kwangshui on the Kin-Han railway, along the north bank of the Yangtze to Wuhsueh and thence along the Hunan-Kiangsi border. The Wuhan authorities will also be compelled to keep sufficient troops in northern Hupeh to protect against a possible attack from the rear by the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang.

On March 8th, Li Tsung-jen tendered his resignation as a member of the State Council as a protest against the military preparations going on in the lower Yangtze Valley while negotiations were still proceeding for an amicable settlement of the Hunan controversy.

The America n Consul at Nanking reports that efforts at mediation on the part of Tsai Yuan-pei, Wu Tso-hui and other elder statesmen have thus far proved ineffective and that Chiang seems determined to force a military issue with Hankow. Opinion within the government appears to be sharply divided and no order has been issued by the Central Political Council for a punitive expedition up to date.

Feng's attitude is not yet clear but apparently he feels aggrieved at not having been consulted and will continue neutral for the time, holding himself in readiness to throw in his lot on either side. He is reported, however, to have distributed his forces along the Honan-Hupeh border which move is interpreted as supporting Nanking vis-a-vis W uhan. It is significant however that Lu Chung-lin and all other Feng subordinates have left Nanking.

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Under Chiang's general mobilization order troop movements up the Yangtze continue and advance guards of the opposing forces are said to have already clashed near Wuhsueh. What the outcome will be is difficult to prophesy although from present dispositions war between the two factions is easily possible.

4. Miscellaneous.

There are evidences now that Chang Tsung-chang's movement in Shantung was accompanied by something more than a mere local effort, and that Chang and former allies have launched an attack both openly and under cover upon the established government of North China. It is significant that hard upon Chang's appearance in Shantung should come a number of arrests and executions in Tientsin, the garrison authorities there acknowledging that the men disciplined were conspiring on behalf of Chang Tsung-chang and Chu Yu-pu to seize control in Tientsin and Peking. A few hours after the incident in Tientsin, Nationalist troops took special precautions at Taku and Tongku where disturbances were feared, and at the same time proceedings were commenced to disarm former units of Chang Tsung-chang and Chu Yu-pu in Peking.

It appears that Yen Hsi-shan received information that a coup was to be attempted in Peking and accordingly that he directed Shang Chen, the Garrison Commander, to take special precautions with respect to the former Chihli-Shantung troops. On the morning of March 2nd the latter disarmed the 125th brigade of the 42nd Division. Some fighting ensued but in a short time this unit was completely disarmed and order restored.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, March 15, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
ARMY
2657-D-2765
6180
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 30 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

(First Group of Armies)
(Chiang Kai-shek)
(Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin)

1st	Division	(Liu Chih)	Linkiang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
2nd	"	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Anching	(Anhui)	12,000
3rd	"	(Mao Ping-wen)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	10,000
4th	"	(Miao Pei-nan)	Kaoan	(")	12,000
5th	"	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th	"	(Fang Tso)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th	"	(Wang Chun)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th	"	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Yinghsiang	(Anhui)	12,000
9th	"	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
10th	"	(Fang T'ing-ying)	"	(")	12,000
11th	"	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Kiukiang	(")	12,000
12th	"	(Chin Han-ting)	Pinghsiang	(")	12,000
13th	"	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Lotien	(Hupeh)	12,000
14th	"	(Liu Chun-jung)	Nanyuan	(Chihli)	12,000
18th	"	(Liu Tiao-ping)	Hsinyu	(Kiangsi)	12,000
44th	"	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kupeikow-Peking	(Chihli)	12,000
45th	"	(Pao Kang)	Tsunhwa-Tungchow	(")	12,000
46th	"	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Lutai	(")	12,000
47th	"	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	Hsuanhwa	(")	20,000
48th	"	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Suchow	(Anhui)	24,000
49th	"	(Jan Ying-ch'i)	Techow	(")	12,000
50th	"	(Fan Tao-yuan)	Changteh	(Hunan)	12,000
51st	"	(Li Pin-hsien)	Tongshan	(Chihli)	12,000
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing)	Kaiping	(")	12,000
54th	"	(W ei I-san)	Hsiyuan	(")	12,000

Cavalry Divisions of the First Group:

1st	Cavalry	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	(Jehol)	10,000
2nd	"	(Chang Li-sheng)	K uchen	(Anhui)	10,000
			Total		338,000

The 14th, 18th, 50th, 51st, 53rd and 54th Divisions, formerly of the Fourth Group, are now added to the First Group for the following reasons:

The 14th, 51st, 53rd and 54th were formerly under Pai Chung-hsi and have now been taken over by Tang Sheng-chih, who came north at the behest of Chiang Kai-shek to take charge of Pai's troops. The 18th, under Liu Tiao-ping, deposed Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Council, and the 50th, under Tan Tao-yuan, Liu's ally, have severed connections with the Kwangsi Group.

From M/A, China Report No. 7474 March 28, 1929

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Subject: Situation Report.

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
22nd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang)	"	(")	12,000
23rd "	(Feng Chih-an)	Sinsiang	(Honan)	12,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san)	Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
25th "	(Shih Ching-t'ing)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
26th "	(Ch'eng Hsi-sheng)	Sincheng	(Honan)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	12,000
29th "	(Liu Ju-ming)	Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
30th "	(Tung Lin-ke)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Tsun Lien-chung)	Hsining	(")	12,000
13th "	(Wei Ting-I)	Fuyang-	(Anhui)	5,000
	)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	5,000
14th "	(Chi Yuan-lin)	"	(")	5,000
15th "	(Liu Peng-wei)	"	(")	10,000
17th Cav.Div.	(Ma Hung-k'uei)	Hsiachin	(Shantung)	10,000
18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
19th "	(Wan Hsuan-ts'ai)	Tungchow	(Chihli)	12,000
20th "	(Liu Mao-en)	Techow	(Shantung)	7,000
21st[x] "	(Yang Hu-ch'en)	Kaomi	(")	10,000
Ind.Cav. Div.	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Tungchang	(")	
			Total	220,000

[x]The 21st Division is composed of former independent units in Shantung which were incorporated into the Second Group on or about February 1st. Feng is reported to be concentrating troops on the Hunan-Hupeh border, but the number and designation of units is unknown.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
(Second in Command - Shang Chen)

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Peking & Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliang-ch'eng	(")	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Tatung	(Shansi)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-hsin)	Shihkiachuang	(")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	Peking-Shih-kiachuang	(Chihli)	6,000
			( )	6,000
26th "	(He Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	(An Hsi-ku)	Chungliang-cheng	(Chihli)	
			( )	
28th "	(Chang Ying-fang)	Hsiyuan-Peking	(")	6,000

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Artillery Forces - Chow Tai.

4th Brigade	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Shansi
5th "	(Liu Kuang)	Taiyuanfu, Shansi
6th "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Peking, Chihli
7th "	(Peng Chi)	Tientsin & Peking, Chihli
Cav. Corps	(T'an Ch'ing-lin)	Kupeikow, Chihli

Figures on the strength of the artillery and cavalry estimated at approximately 15,000

Fourth Group of Armies - Li Tsung-jen Total 147,000

15th Division	(Hsia Wei)	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	12,000
16th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Ichow	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th "	(T'ao Chun)	Hwangchow	(")	12,000
19th "	(Ho Chien)	Changsha	(Hunan)	12,000
52nd "	(Yeh Ch'i)	Changte-Luijang	")	12,000
55th "	(Ch'eng Ju-huai)	Wuchang	(Hupeh)	10,000
56th "	(Chang I-ch'un)	Hankow	(")	10,000
Peace Preser-vation Force	(Li Yen)	Tsangjen	(Kweichow)	12,000

Total 92,000

The 55th and 56th Divisions are composed of troops formerly under Wu Hsin-tien and Ma Wen-te, which have now been incorporated into the Fourth Group.

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow			
25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)		12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)		10,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		3,000
Yunnan			
38th Army	(Lung Yun)		20,000
7th Ind. Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)		4,000
Kwangtung			
4th Army	(Chen Chi-tang)	Hsiaokuan area	12,000
5th "	(Hsu Ching-tsing)	Waichow-Swatow area	11,000
11th "	(Chen Ming-hsu)	S.W.Kwangtung and Hsinan Island	13,000
15th "	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	Kwangtung-Kwangsi bdr.	12,000
16th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Kwangtung-Hunan "	12,000
Kwangtung Provincial Defense Forces consisting of 5 regiments			4,000
Kiangsi			
Three Divisions of 6th Army			10,000

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kwangsi	
1st Ind. Div. (Tseng Yueh-chun)	4,000
1 Regt.Bodyguard Troops (Cheng Yen-hua)	1,000
Fukien	
Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)	
1st Brigade (Kuo Feng-ming)	2,500
2nd " (Ch'en Kuo-hui)	2,500
Training Regt (Hsiao Shu-hsuan)	2,000
Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)	
1st Brigade (Liu Chung)	4,000
2nd " (Li Shou-kuo)	4,000
Provisionally Incorporated Nationalist Troops	
1st Division(Chang Chen)	9,500
2nd " (Lu Hsing-ming)	8,000
Marines	
1st Brigade (Liu Chung	15,000
2nd " (Liu Shou-kou	15,000
Chekiang	
Six regiments Provincial Defense Force	
Two Reserve Regiments	
One Gendarmerie Battalion	
One Artillery Corps	
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	
	10,000
Sinkiang	
Troops of Chin Hsu-jen	10,000
Szechwan	
20th Army (Yang Sen)	40,000
21st " (Liu Hsiang)	40,000
22nd " (Lai Hsin-hui)	6,000
23rd " (Kuo Ju-tang)	6,000
24th " (Liu Wen-hui)	50,000
28th " (Cheng Hsi-ho)	60,000
29th " (Tien Tsung-yao)	30,000
Szechwan-Shansi Border Defense Force (Liu Chuan-hou)	3,000
Yunnan " " " (Hu Yueh-yu)	3,000

Eastern Shantung

1st Division	(Liu C hen-nien)	Chefoo & Fushan	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kui-ta i)	Pingtu	6,000
3rd "	(Ho I-san)	Maping	3,000
4th "	(Li Hsi-tung)	Huanghsien	3,000
5th "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	Laiyang	2,000
Independent Div.	(Liu Ching-shan)	"	4,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			6,000

No figures available as to numerour irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars - 1,280,500

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(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
C hang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brig.	(Wang Yi-che)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Hsinminhsien	(")	10,000
3rd "	(He Chu-kuo)	Ch'aoyang	(Jehol)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei)	Suichung	(Fengtien)	11,000
5th "	(Ting Ying=pin)	Kaochiao	(")	10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Changli	(Chihli)	11,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Ying-he)	Funing	(Chihli)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu)	Tungliao	(Fengtien)	11,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Fakuhsien	(")	10,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	Taonan	(")	11,000
23rd "	(Ma T'ing-fu)	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	10,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang)	Lingyuan	(Jehol)	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Yungping	(Chihli)	10,000

Cavalry

1st Cav. Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng)	Yunping,Chienan	(Chihli)	6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Lengkow	(")	6,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art.Regt.	- Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	"	(")	6,000
4th " "	"	(")	6,000
5th " "	"	(")	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(")	6,000
7th Heavy Art.Regt.	Peicheng	(")	6,000
8th " " "	"	(")	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu and Kaiyuan	(Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow	(Fengtien)	800

Total 220,600

In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

It will be noted that the artillery regiment appears to be excessively large, the reason being that the present regiment corresponds roughly to the former brigade.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brig.	(Li Kuei-lin)	Changchun	(Kirin)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to)	Yilan	(")	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui)	Yenchi	(")	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin, Wuchang	(")	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao)	Harbin	(")	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng)	Suiyuan	(")	10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan)	Fuyu	(")	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in)	Muling	(")	8,000
		Total		72,000

Heilungkiang

1st Brig.	(Shih Mei-feng)	Siutung	(Heilungkiang)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Na n-p'ing)	Payen	"	7,000
17th "	(He Shuan-shan)	Fulaerdi	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen)	Hsinglungchen	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia)	Manchouli	"	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-e)	Heihe	"	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan)	Hulan	"	4,000
		Total		37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE 329,600

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

Jehol.

7th Brig.	(Chang Shen-yun)	Jehol	(Jehol)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un)	Luanping	"	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting)	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st "	Liu Hsiang-chin)	Fengning	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shan-sheng)	L inhsi	"	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng)	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng)	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu)	Jehol	"	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua)	Luanping	"	4,500
31st Army	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chihfeng	"	8,000
		Total		56,500

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,666,600

#7474

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. War in the Yangtze Valley.

Since last report the war clouds in the Yangtze Valley have daily become more and more threatening. Li Chai-sum, upon his arrival in Nanking to attend the party congress, was placed under arrest by Chiang Kai-shek although his personal safety had been guaranteed by several senior members of the Kuomintang. This action caused a furor in Kwangtung and an ultimatum was despatched forthwith demanding his release. The time limit on the ultimatum expired on the night of March 25th. Since no action was taken by Nanking in this matter, it can be expected that Kwangtung will throw in its lot with the Wuhan faction, particularly as all of the leaders with the exception of Ch'en Ming-shu, who at present is in a hospital in Hongkong, are members of the Kwangsi faction. Indeed, all reports indicate that both Kwangtung and Kwangsi have for some time been mobilizing troops for the purpose of coming to the aid of their Wuhan allies, should the occasion for such action arise.

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek has continued despatching troops to the Yangtze Valley in large numbers, and at the same time has been attempting to gain the consent of the Central Government to the issuance of a punitive mandate for the suppression of the Wuhan leaders. The last signature necessary on this mandate was obtained late in the afternoon of March 26th. War, therefore, appears to be inevitable. Clashes have already occurred north of the Yangtze on the Hupeh-Anhui border and south of the river in the vicinity of Changte and on the Kiangsi-Hunan border near Wantsai and Tungkuo.

Chiang Kai-shek has despatched the 1st, 2nd, 8th, 9th and 13th divisions along the north bank of the Yangtze to invade Hupeh through Susinghsien and Yingshan on the Hupeh-Anhui border. South of the river the 10th and 11th divisions are to advance on Hunan via Ining and Sinchang, while the 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th divisions have been ordered to advance from Nanchang to Pinghsiang via Wantsai and Yuanchow. To meet this, the Wuhan forces are disposed as follows: The 15th division holds the sector from Lotien to Hwangmei, the 17th west of Wusueh, the 55th from Hwanchow to Tungshan, the 52nd and 56th west of Pinghsiang and the 16th in reserve in Wuchang.

At the present time the front line can be said to extend roughly from north to south as follows: Machang, Kichow, Wusueh, Kwangmei, Hingkwochow, Tungshan, Chungyang, Tungcheng in Hupeh to Yochow, Pingkiang, Liuyang, Pinghsiang and Chaling, all of which are in Hunan with the exception of Pinghsiang, where a salient into Kiangsi occurs in the line.

It is estimated that Chiang Kai-shek has about one hundred and thirty-five thousand (135,000) men in the zone of operations, while the Kwangsi faction has but half that number according to units which can be identified. However, the latter have the advantage of being in possession of the Hanyang arsenal which will insure a regular supply of ammunition, and in addition Kwangtung and Kwangsi can be expected to throw approximately 40,000 men into the impending conflict on the side of the Kwangsi faction.

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Subject: Situation Report.

Feng Yu-hsiang has resigned as Minister of War, but has recommended his second in command, Lu Chung-lin, as his successor. He continues to remain neutral in the present dispute, however, reaffirming his allegiance to the Central Government. Feng has mobilized troops at Wushankuan, Hupeh, and Kweiteh, Honan; number of troops and designation of divisions unknown at present.

Li Tsung-jen is said to have escaped from Shanghai to Canton from which place he left for Nanning, Kwangsi, by airplane on the 25th of March. He and Huang Shao-hsiung are reported to have arrived in Nanning on the 26th. Pai Chung-hsi's whereabouts is still a matter of conjecture. His troops in North China were taken over by Tang Sen-chih who was sent from Nanking by Chiang Kai-shek immediately after the disappearance of Pai. The turnover was accomplished without incident probably due to the fact that General Tang was amply supplied with funds by General Chang for the payment of the troops, whose pay had been in arrears since last summer. So far none of these troops have been ordered south to take part in the impending conflict in the Yangtze Valley.

3. Situation in Eastern Shantung.

Chaos reigns supreme in eastern Shantung. Extortion, pillage, murder and rape appear to be the order of the day in the territory controlled by Chang Tsung-chang. Nor is the end in sight. The Nanking authorities are too occupied with their own troubles to give any heed to the deplorable conditions in the Shantung peninsula.

The American Consul at Chefoo reports that according to reliable information from persons close to Chang Tsung-chang and Liu Chen-nien, the negotiations mentioned in last report were successfully concluded on March 14th; but that in spite of this Liu continues to pretend to be Nationalist and has threatened to court martial any officers who discuss the situation, stating that there is no truth in the rumors regarding his coming to terms with Chang. The Consul hazards the guess that there is a possibility of a mutual face saving arrangement whereby Chang's troops will be permitted to break through and "capture" Chefoo. Be that as it may, fighting has been resumed in the Chefoo area and according to consular reports Chang Tsung-chang has been successful in his attempt to oust Liu Chen-nien from Chefoo and has raised the five-barred flag again on March 27th. Liu Chen-nien is retreating in an orderly manner toward Ninghai. The attack was made from three sides and although Liu successfully repulsed the attackers in the early stages of the fight, later he was unable to resist the onslaught of Chang's troops and was forced to retire. Unless something unforeseen happens, Liu's forces will be forced to surrender, being cut off near Ninghai by Sun Tien-ying's troops under command of Ch'u Yu-pu.

Meanwhile, conditions among the civilian populace continue to go from bad to worse, particularly among the villages to the south and southwest of Tengchow where the people are refusing to pay further levies to the military. Many are joining the "Red Spears" while similar bands are being forced in revolt against the soldiery. These activities have resulted in terrible reprisals on the part of the soldiers who are robbing,

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

murdering and raping throughout the countryside. No effective steps have been taken by the Central Government to put a stop to these chaotic conditions, although there has been some talk of launching an expedition into the Shantung peninsula from Techow. According to newspaper reports Feng Yu-hsiang has ordered Liu Chen-nien's troops at Langfang and Yangtsun to Yenchow to check the activities of Chang Tsung-chang.

4. Communist Uprisings.

Communist activities which have been carried on for several years, sometimes secretly and sometimes openly in the provinces south of the Yangtze, can always be expected to flare forth in the form of uprisings whenever serious trouble of any nature appears imminent. The present Nanking-Wuhan dispute furnishes just the opportunity for which the communists have waited. Thus uprisings have occurred within the past two weeks in southern Kiangsi and southwestern Fukien.

The American Consul in Canton was forced to call upon the authorities in Kwangtung to send troops to southern Kiangsi for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of American missionaries which were being seriously threatened by the activities of communist marauders. On March 21st troops were despatched from Kwangtung for this purpose.

About the same time as the above incident a communist band invaded Fukien from southern Kiangsi. The American Consul at Foochow, in a telegram dated March 23rd, described the raid as follows:

"It has been confirmed that Tengchow and Shantung in the Amoy Consular District have been captured by a communist force from Kiangsi said to have five Russian advisers and to number six thousand. Their plan of operations is understood to embrace a two column advance to Jungchaping, one via Lungyen and the other via Yungan, which is also reported captured.

"The Provincial Government, who in the absence of Admiral Yang, lack leadership and force, are in a state of trepidation and while the coup is probably an opportunist adventure which speculates upon hoped-for disorder in Nanking and the Yangtze Valley, there are several unfortunate circumstances in the situation. The marines and provincial defence forces cannot be considered formidable. Local subversive elements have never been suppressed and of late have been increasingly active and Liu Hsin-pang at Yenping, commanding the Nationalist 2nd (Provisional) Division, cannot be expected to do more than cherish his own security."

John W. Carroll.
John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry.

1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - March 29, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 15 1929
3890-9-276
1020
267
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

Y-1

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Agreement Settling Tsinan Incident.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAY 14 1929

1. Herewith is a Kuo Min News Agency account of the agreement settling the Tsinan incident which is complete so far as known to the public.

Nanking, March 28. -- The Sino-Japanese agreement settling the Tsinan Incident of May 3, 1928 was signed by Dr. C. T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. K. Yoshizawa, Japanese Minister, following a formal conference this morning at the residence of Minister Wang.

The agreement is composed of (1) an exchange of notes between Mr. Yoshizawa and Minister Wang, (2) a protocol and (3) a joint declaration. The salient features of the document are as follows:

1. Within a period of at most two months from the date of signing of the agreement, the Japanese Government will withdraw all Japanese troops from Shantung. The National Government, after the withdrawal of all Japanese troops, will bear full responsibility for the protection of Japanese lives and property in China, as it has repeatedly declared, and will hold itself responsible, according to international law, for affording adequate protection to all foreigners in China.

2. A Sino-Japanese Joint Commission, consisting of an equal number of Commissioners from each country, appointed by their respective governments, will be established for the investigation and adjustment of the question of losses sustained by both countries due to the Tsinan Incident.

3. In view of the existing friendship between the two peoples, the Chinese and the Japanese Governments extremely deplore the unfortunate Tsinan Incident of May 3 of last year. Now the Chinese and the Japanese governments and peoples sincerely hope for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relationships. In order to achieve this end, they regard the unhappy feeling resulting from the Tsinan Incident as past and hereby make this joint declaration.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

From M/A, China Report N o. 7485 April 10, 1929

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 15
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAY 14 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

(First Group of Armies)
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin.

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Siaokan	(Hupeh)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Kishui	(")	12,000
3rd "	(Mao Ping-wen)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan)	Linkiang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tso)	Kikiawan	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Twanfeng	(Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Hankow	(")	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Juichang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Kienchang	(")	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Ining	(")	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Shenkiaki	(Hupeh)	12,000
18th "	(Liu Tiao-ping)	Pingkiang	(Hunan)	12,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kupeikow-Peking	(Chihli)	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang)	Tsunhwa-Tungchow	(")	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Lutai	(")	12,000
47th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan)	Hsuanhwa	(")	20,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Kuchen	(Anhui)	24,000
49th "	(Jan Ying-ch'i)	Techow	(Shantung)	12,000
50th "	(Fan Tao-yuan)	Changteh	(Hunan)	12,000
14th "	(Liu Chun-jung)	Nanyuan	(Chihli)	7,500
54th "	(Wei I-san)	Hsiyuan	(")	7,000
51st "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Tongshan	(")	16,000
53rd "	(Liu Hsing)	Kaiping	(")	18,000

Cavalry Divisions of the First Group.

1st Cavalry	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	(Jehol)	10,000
2nd "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Hweichow	(Anhui)	10,000

Former Fourth Group Forces Reorganized and Taken Over by First Group of Armies.

6th Division	(Ch'eng Ju-huai)	Wu-Han	(Hupeh)	10,000
9th "	(Yang Teng-hui)	" "	(")	4,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui)	" "	(")	4,000
16th "	(Li Shih-chiao)	" "	(")	4,000
17th "	(Shih Yu-lin)	" "	(")	4,000
19th "	(Ho Chien)	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	12,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chao Wen-tien)	Wu-Han	(Hupeh)	4,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin)	" "	(")	4,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su)	" "	(")	4,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh)	" "	(")	4,000
7th " "	(Liu Ho-ting)	" "	(")	4,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-le)	" "	(")	4,000
			Total	400,500

From M/A, China Report No. 7487 April 10, 1929

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

The 14th, 54th, 51st and 53rd Divisions, former Pai Chung-hsi's troops taken over by Tang Sheng-chih, have recently been organized into the 5th Army under the command of Tang Sheng-chih. The 5th Army and the 6th, under Fang Chen-wu, have both been placed under Yen Hsi-shan.

The 18th Division, under Liu Tiao-ping, deposed Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Council, and the 50th under Tan Tao-yuan, Liu's ally, severed connections with the Kwangsi group in March.

A large number of Fourth Group units have been taken over by the First Group since the fall of Hankow, but under the present chaotic conditions existing in the Wuhan area it is impossible to determine exactly which units and the number of troops taken over.

The commanders shown in the above list of reorganized units have been appointed to reorganize and command the units shown, and lacking definite information, it has been assumed that their troops went over with them.

The 6th Division under Cheng Ju-huai was formerly a brigade of the 55th Division of the Fourth Group; the 9th Division, under Yang Teng-hui, was formerly an independent brigade of the Fourth Group (Pai Chung-hsi's old bodyguard); the 15th Division the 43rd Brigade of Hsia Wei's 15th Division; the 16th Division a brigade of the 17th Division under Tao Chun; and the 17th Division a brigade of Wuhan's old 16th Division. The 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Independent Brigades were formerly brigades of the 52nd and 56th Divisions. The identity of the troops of the 1st and 8th Independent Brigades is not known. The 19th Division turned over to Nanking on March 30th and participated in the remainder of the campaign against Wuhan.

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
Second-in-Command - Lu Chung-lin

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu	Siaokan	(Hupeh	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	Taian	(Shantung	12,000
22nd "	(Chi Hung-ch'ang	"	("	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	Sinyang	(Honan	12,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san	Siangyang	(Hupeh	12,000
25th "	(Chang Chi-tze	N. Hupeh- P - H Ry.		12,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-kai	Sincheng	(Honan	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	N. Hupeh- P - H Ry.		12,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan	Lanchow	(Kansu	12,000
29th "	(Chang Hsi-hsiang	N. Hupeh- P - H Ry.		12,000
30th "	(Tung Lin-ke	Lanchow	(Kansu	12,000
31st "	(Tsun L ien-chung	Hsining	("	12,000
17th Cav. Div.	(Ma Hung-k'uei	Tsingcheng	(Shantung	10,000
18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	Yulin	(Shensi	12,000
19th "	(Wan Hsuan-ts'ai	Tungchow	(Chihli	12,000
20th "	(Liu Mao-en	Techow	(Shantung	7,000
21st[x] "	(Yang Hu-ch'en	Kaomi	("	10,000
Ind. Cav. Div.	(Cheng Ta-chang	Tungchang	("	5,000
1st Prov. "	(Yueh Wei-chun	Wuhu	(Anhui	15,000
			Total	215,000

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

xThe 21st Division is composed of former independent units in Shantung which were incorporated into the Second Group on or about February 1st. The former 13th, 14th and 15th Divisions have been reorganized into the 1st Provisional Division under Yueh Wei-chun.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second-in-Command - Shang Chen.

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Peking & Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliangch'eng	(")	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Tatung	(Shansi)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-hsin)	Shihkiachuang	(")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	Peking-Tsechow	(")	6,000
26th "	(He Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	(An Hsi-ku)	Chungliangcheng	(")	6,000
28th "	(Chang Ying-fang)	Hsiyuan-Peking	(")	6,000

Artillery Forces - Chow Tai

4th Brigade	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Shansi
5th "	(Liu Kuang)	Taiyuanfu, Shansi
6th "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Peking, Chihli
7th "	(Peng Chi)	Tientsin & Peking, Chihli
Cav. Corps	(T'an Ch'ing-lin)	Kupeikow, Chihli

Figures on the strength of the artillery and cavalry estimated at approximately 15,000

Total 147,000

Fourth Group of Armies
(Li Tsung-jen)

15th Division	(Hsia Wei)	S. W. Hupeh	(	8,000
16th "	(Hu Tsung-to)	Shasi	(Hupeh)	8,000
17th "	(T'ao Chun)	Sientaochen	(")	8,000
52nd "	(Yeh Ch'i)	North of Yuehchow	(Hunan)	4,000
56th "	(Chang I-ch'un)	" " "	(")	4,000
Peace Preservation Force	(Li Yen)	Yuyang	(Szechuan)	12,000

Total 44,000

CHINA (Military)

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Forces Affiliated With Fourth Group.

Kwangsi

4th Army	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	Wuchow	(Kwangtung)	12,000
5th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Chengchow	(Hunan)	12,000
1st Ind. Div.	(Tseng Yueh-chun)	Kwangsi		4,000
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops	(Cheng Yen-hua)			1,000
			Total	29,000

The 55th and 56th Divisions are composed of troops formerly under Wu Hsin-tien and Ma Wen-te, which were incorporated into the Fourth Group.

Little information is available on the location or strength of any of the Fourth Group divisions since the defeat of Wuhan and the fall of Hankow on April 5th. The remnants of the Wuhan forces have been retreating toward the Hunan border and most of them are believed to be in that vicinity at the present time. As there is no definite information on the number of troops surrendered or turned over to Nanking the above figures are necessarily rough estimates. The former 19th Division, the 52nd Division, and certain units of others are, however, definitely known to have been taken over by the First Group. (See Notes on First Group.)

The 4th Army shown above is the old Kwangtung 15th Army and the 5th Army the old Kwangtung 16th Army, previously carried under Kwangtung forces. As these two divisions, the designations of which have been changed, are known to be affiliated with the Fourth Group they will henceforth be carried as such.

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under Nationalist Control)

Kweichow				
25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)	Sankiang	(Kweichow)	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)		"	10,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		"	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		"	3,000
Yunnan				
38th Army	(Lung Yun)	Yunnan		20,000
7th Ind. Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	"		4,000
Kwangtung				
1st Army	(Ch'en Chi-t'ang)	Canton		12,000
2nd "	(Hsu Ching-t'ang)	Waichow (Swatow area)		11,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Ming-hsu)	Pakhoi & Hainan Is-		13,000
1st Ind. Brigade	(Teng Hsi-tseng)	Kwangtung	(land	4,000

The above named armies are the old 4th, 5th and 11th Armies, respectively. The designations of all Kwangtung units have recently been changed.

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Kiangsi			
Three Divisions of 6th Army			10,000
Fukien			
Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)			
1st Brigade	(Kuo Feng-ming)		2,500
2nd "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)		2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsiao Shu-hsuan)		2,000
Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)			
1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)		4,000
2nd "	(Li Shou-kuo)		4,000
Provisionally Incorporated Nationalist Troops			
1st Division	(Chang Chen)		9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)		8,000
Marines			
1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)		15,000
2nd "	(Liu Shou-kou)		15,000
Chekiang			
Six regiments Provincial Defense Force			
Two Reserve R egiments			
One Gendarmerie Battalion			
One Artillery Corps			
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)			10,000
Sinkiang			
Troops of Chin Hsu-jen			10,000
Szechwan			
20th Army	(Yang Sen)	Chuhsien (Szechwan)	40,000
21st "	(Liu Hsiang)	Chungking (")	40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)	Hokiang (")	6,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)	Fowchow (")	6,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu (")	50,000
28th "	(Cheng Hsi-ho)	Szechwan	60,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)	"	30,000
Szechwan-Shansi Border Defense Force		(Liu Chuan-hou)	3,000
Yunnan " " "		(Hu Yueh-yu)	3,000
Eastern Shantung			
1st Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Ninghai	4,000
2nd "	(Liu Kai-tai)	E. Shantung	4,000
3rd "	(Ho I-san)	Ninghai	3,000
4th "	(Li Hsi-tung)	"	3,000
5th "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	E. Shantung	2,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			10,000

There is no reliable information on the location or strength of many units in Eastern Shantung. No figures available as to numerous irregular organizations in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Shensi and Kansu.

TOTAL NATIONALISTS, not including unidentified irregulars - 1,290,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Forces under Chang Tsung-chang (C hefoo-Ninghai area) 20,000

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brig.	(Wang Yi-che)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Hsinminhsien	(")	10,000
3rd "	(He Chu-kuo)	Ch'a oyang	(Jehol)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei)	Masanchia	(Fengtien)	11,000
5th "	(Ting Ying-pin)	Chinchow	(")	10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Changli	(Chihli)	11,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Ying-he)	Funing	(Chihli)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu)	Tungliao	(Fengtien)	11,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Kirin	(Kirin)	10,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	Taonan	(")	11,000
23rd "	(Ma T'ing-fu)	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	10,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang)	Lingyuan	(Jehol)	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Yungping	(Chihli)	10,000

Cavalry

1st Cav. Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng)	Yunping, Chienan	(Chihli)	6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Lengkow	"	6,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	"	(")	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy Art. Regt.	Peicheng	(")	6,000
8th " " "	"	(")	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu and Kaiyuan	(Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow	(Fengtien)	800
Total		220,600

In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

It will be noted that the artillery regiment appears to be excessively large, the reason being that the present regiment corresponds roughly to the former brigade.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brig.	(Li Kuei-lin)	Changchun	(Kirin)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to)	Yilan	(")	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui)	Yenchi	(")	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin,Wuchang	(")	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao)	Harbin	(")	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng)	Suiyuan	(")	10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan)	Fuyu	(")	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in)	Muling	(")	8,000
		Total		72,000

Heilungkiang

1st Brig.	(Shih Mei-feng)	Siutung	(Heilungkiang)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing)	Payen	"	7,000
17th "	(He Shuan-shan)	Fulaerdi	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen)	Hsinglungchen	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia)	Manchouli	"	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-e)	Heiho	"	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan)	Hulan	"	4,000
		Total		37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE 329,600

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

Jehol.

7th Brig.	(Chang Shen-yun)	Jehol	(Jehol)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un)	Luanping	"	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting)	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin)	Fengning	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shan-sheng)	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng)	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng)	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu)	Jehol	"	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua)	Luanping	"	4,500
31st Army	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chihfeng	"	8,000
		Total		56,500

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,696,100

Note: The figures on the strength of the various armies and divisions are manifestly not as uniform as set forth above. In the absence of definite information, these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops the totals are approximately correct. Whenever definite figures on the strength of any units are ascertained changes will be made accordingly. The total strength of Chinese armed forces mentioned at the Disbandment Conference is 1,600,000. Political considerations affecting this figure place it in the category of estimates.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. The War in the Yangtze Valley.

The punitive expedition against the Kwangsi faction at Wuhan which commenced on March 26th was brought to a speedy and successful conclusion on April 5th by the occupation of Hankow. The Nanking forces, advancing in four columns, the main force on the north bank of the Yangtze, one on the south bank, one from the direction of Nanchang and Pinghsiang, and another under Han Fu-chu advancing down the Peking-Hankow railway, met with very little resistance, and aided by the refusal of the Kwangtung leaders to participate in the campaign against Nanking and the outright defection of several Wuhan units, put the Wuhan Army to route and took over Hankow and Eastern Hupeh scarcely more than a week after hostilities commenced. The turnover in Hankow was accomplished with little difficulty or confusion, and the change in government was made with an unusual lack of disorder. Nanking troops are still engaged in reorganizing and taking over defected Wuhan units and stragglers, and the remnants of the Fourth Group of Armies are reported to be in western Hupeh and on the Hunan border, attempting to effect an entrance into Hunan, but apparently cut off from so doing by Ho Chien's former 19th Division which went over to Nanking, and Liu Tiao-ping's 18th Division, both operating against Yuehchow. The forces which retreated up the Yangtze towards Shasi and Kinchow are being pursued by gunboats and the early fall of these places is expected. Considerable apprehension was felt by Nanking for several days following the Wuhan break-up over the intentions of Feng Yu-hsiang, whose seven divisions under Han Fu-chu had penetrated Hupeh as far as Siaokan and were reported to be moving eastward, but this anxiety is believed to have been dispelled by several conferences between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng's representatives, and Han Fu-chun's column is now reported to be preparing to return to Honan. The situation remains quiet in Canton but there is still believed to be some uneasiness concerning the probable attempt of the defeated Kwangsi forces to force an entrance into Kwangtung Province.

It will be recalled from the last report that after several minor clashes on the Hupeh-Anhui border and on the Kiangsi-Hunan border, in which the Wuhan forces apparently took the initiative, and after several unsuccessful attempts to arbitrate a punitive mandate against the Wuhan forces was issued on March 26th and another issued on the same day dismissing Li Tsung-jen, Li Chai-sum and Pai Chung-hsi from the party and from their commands.

Mobilization was accordingly commenced at once and orders were issued for General Liu Chih to command the 1st, 2nd, 8th, 9th and 13th Divisions, composing the First Route Army and the main force, and attack Hankow along the north bank of the Yangtze from the vicinity of Susing-hsien and Yingshan; the Second Route Army composed of the 10th and 11th Divisions was ordered to advance on Hunan via Ining and Sinchang, and the Third Route Army, to be composed of troops furnished by Feng Yu-hsiang and commanded by General Han Fu-chu to move down the Peking-Hankow railway against Hankow. A Fourth Route Army composed of the 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th Divisions was ordered to advance from Nanchang to Pinghsiang via Wantsai and Yuanchow. General Chen Tiao-yuan was appointed to command the forces in the rear in Anhwei and General Yen Hsi-shan and General Chang Hsueh-liang were charged with the preservation of peace in North China.

CHINA (Military)

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To meet the Nanking advance the Wuhan forces were disposed as follows: The 15th Division, the sector from Lotien to Hwangmei; the 17th Division west of Wusueh; the 55th from Hwangchow to Tungshan; the 52nd and 56th west of Pinghsiang and the 16th in reserve at Wuchang. The Kwangsi forces in Kwangtung were at the same time mobilized at Shaokwan, northern Kwangtung, and were organized into two columns for an advance against Kiangsi, despite urgent telegrams from General Chen Ming-shu, Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Government urging Kwangsi leaders in Kwangtung to stop military preparations.

Although considerable doubt existed at the time as to whether Feng Yu-hsiang would support the government in the campaign, a telegram was received from him on March 28th promising his support and requesting instructions as to how his forces were to be distributed and employed, and his 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 29th and 19th Divisions were at once turned over to Han Fu-chu's Third Route Army and mobilization at Sinyang, southern Honan, and movement down the Kin-Han railway commenced simultaneously with the advance up the Yangtze.

After several initial minor reverses, Tienchiachen above Wusueh, was taken on the 28th, the Wuhan forces falling back to positions in the vicinity of Kichun and Yangsin. A general offensive was launched on the following day and on the 30th government troops occupied Kwangtsi and Kichow, both about 25 miles northwest of Wusueh, and on the 31st Liu Chih's 1st Army took Wusueh, driving the opposing forces back in the direction of Hwangchow. Kwangchi and Kichun fell on the same day and it was claimed by Nanking that by the 31st the Wuhan forces had evacuated the entire eastern corner of Hupeh below Hwangchow and were falling back to their second line of defense.

In the meanwhile, General Ho Chien, commanding the Wuhan 19th Division, on March 30th announced his allegiance to Nanking, stating that he was commencing operations against Yuehchow, and on the 31st the Kwangtung leaders, Generals C hen Ming-shu, Chen Chi-tang, Chen Cheh, Chiang Kwang-nei and Tsai Ting-chieh whose attitude had been somewhat doubtful, issued a circular telegram declaring their allegiance to the National Government and General Chen Chi-tang, special representative ofthe Disbandment Committee in charge of reorganization and disbandment of all troops in Kwangtung, issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of all Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung within 24 hours. These troops had all left Canton for Kwangsi by April 2nd. To prevent the Wuhan forces from joining with Yang Sen the State Council ordered General Liu Hsiang in Szechuan to advance into western Hupeh, and Kweichow and Yunnan forces were at the same time ordered to concentrate at Sankiang and Fuchow within 10 days and move on Kwangsi.

Following the general advance of the government forces and the loss of the financial and military support of Kwangtung, the main Wuhan forces under Hu Tsung-to and Hsia Wei began a general retreat on April 1st, falling back to Chilino near Hwangchow to await reinforcements, and the Kwangsi leaders in Hankow were reported from there to be making preparations to leave the city. The government forces reached Paho and Hwangchow on April 1st, driving the Wuhan forces back to the Hwangpai-Yanglo line where an elaborate defense system had been constructed and against which a joint attack was made by Admiral Chen Shao-kwang's gunboats and

CHINA (Military)

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the main government forces on the 2nd, on which date Macheng was also taken. After practically no resistance, Yanglo and Hwangpei were both evacuated on the 2nd, the defending forces under Yeh Chi, Tao Chun, Chang Shun-I and Hsia Wei falling back to a line about 15 miles below Hankow while government troops advanced to within 25 miles of the city, Han Fu Chu's Third Route Army meanwhile moving down to Wushengkuan and Kwangshuai, Hupeh. Tsingshan, a point 10 miles from Wuchang, was occupied by Nanking forces on the night of April 3rd, and the final break-up came on the 4th when General Li Ming-hui, commanding a brigade of the 15th Division at a vital point in the Wuhan line in front of Hankow refused to continue the fight and turned over to the government forces. The whole Wuhan defense thereupon collapsed, a general retreat was ordered, and the remaining Wuhan forces retreated in confusion toward western Hupeh and Hunan. A peace preservation committee was hastily formed in Hankow and martial law proclaimed, and government forces entered the city and took over control on the afternoon of the 5th, Chiang Kai-shek himself arriving on that day. Large contingents of Wuhan troops still in the vicinity were rounded up and the process of reorganization and absorption commenced, and by the following day Hankow and the Wuhan cities had returned to a practically normal condition.

Owing to the defection of General Ho Chien practically no fighting took place in southern Hupeh,and the fall of Hankow found his 19th Division and the 18th Division under Liu Tiao-ping in possession of Pinghsiang and advancing on Yuehchow, cutting off the retreat into Hunan of the defeated Kwangsi forces, the exact location of which is not yet known. Likewise, the whereabouts of the Kwangsi units coming to the assistance of Wuhan from Kwangtung is also unknown, except that it has been ascertained that they have not got far beyond the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border. Encountering practically no resistance en route, Han Fu-chu's column advanced down the railway as far as Siaokan, Hupeh, at which place his main force is still believed to be.

3. <u>Situation in Shantung</u>.

Last report found Chang Tsung-chang in control of Chefoo with Liu Chen-hien's forces in retreat toward Ninghai (Muping). It is not yet clear why the plans for the turnover of Chefoo which were presumably completed on March 14th were not carried out. Probably due to lack of faith in each other their plans miscarried and Chang attacked Chefoo in earnest; and after capturing the city drove Liu into the walled city of Muping where the latter still remains. The American Consul at Chefoo reports that Liu is evidently desirous of surrendering, but that up to date Chang has refused to entertain his overtures. Latest reports state that Chang is moving troops to Weihsien via Lungkow.

Elsewhere in Shantung disturbances occurred during March which were not previously reported. Due to the fact that a good many of the smaller towns in Shantung are not garrisoned by regular troops of the Provincial Government but are protected merely by their own militia, and that the Provincial Government at first appeared to be strongly apathetic toward the activities of reactionary Chang Tsung-chang elements, they were able to stir up a brief revolt of the Red Spear Society in Tenghsien and Tsining in southern Shantung and in northwestern Shantung were able to seize Tungchangfu and four or five other towns in this area. According to consular reports the local militia in the various places appeared to be particularly susceptible to promises of honors and official appointments made by agents of Chang Tsung-chang, substantiated by the distribution of hard cash. The activities of these reactionary elements

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were at first wholly unopposed by the authorities at Taian and it was not until several towns had been captured and the situation had begun to assume serious proportions that General Ma Hung-kuei, commander of the 17th Cavalry Division, was ordered to clear out the Lintsing area. In this he was to some extent assisted by troops under the command of General Jen Ying-chi at Techow. A portion of the 22nd Division commanded by General Ch'eng Hsin-ming at Taian was also despatched to this area to assist in suppressing these reactionary elements.

Sun Tien-ying has established himself in the area between the Kiao-Tsi railway and the Yellow River with headquarters at Sincheng. His position vis-a-vis the Nationalists and Chang Tsung-ch'ang is difficult to determine. The American Consul at Tsinan states that reliable Chinese reports indicate that General Sun despatched a force of some three thousand men to assist Chang Tsung-chang while Catholic missionaries report that he is flying the Nationalist flag throughout the area controlled by him and prefers to be an adherent of the National Government. On March 30th a clash occurred in the vicinity of Taitze between Sun forces and those of Jen Ying-chi which had crossed the Yellow River. This is perhaps an indication that he is persona non grata with the Taian Government and the forces under its control. Latest reports indicate that he has combined forces with Jen Ying-chi with the object of attacking Chang Tsung-chang. Little confidence however can be placed in either of these generals by the National Government.

During March the troops of the Provincial Government under General Yang Hu-chen have been engaged in pursuing the combined forces of Generals K u-chen and Liu Hei-chi, who formerly controlled the Ichowfu area as nominal Chiang Kai-shek adherents. The forces of Ku Chen and Liu Hei-chi are reported to have retreated north of the Kiao-Tsi railway and are said to be operating in the Laiyung area and surrounding districts in the name of Chang Tsung-chang. The Consul at Tsinan believes that it is doubtful whether General Yang's force will pursue these reactionary elements further at the present time, it being more probable that his troops will take over the Tsingtao and Kiaochow area on behalf of Feng Yu-hsiang now that they are in a position to do so. Furthermore since the Tsinan incident has been settled and the Japanese troops are to evacuate the railway zone, Feng's regular troops will in all probability be used to take over Tsinan, Tsingtao and the railway zone, which from Liu's standpoint is much more worth while than despatching an expedition to suppress Chang Tsung-chang and clear up eastern Shantung. Feng would undoubtedly prefer to use other units than his own, such as those commanded by Jen Ying-chi and Fang Chen-wu for disagreeable work of this sort. For this reason the activities of the former Tupan may not be suppressed for some time to come.

4. Communist Activities.

Communist uprisings in south Kiangsi, Fukien and southern Kwangtung, which commenced immediately following the outbreak of hostilities between Nanking and Wuhan, continued during the period covered by this report. Press reports from Swatow state that communist troops, believed to belong to the same forces that have recently been active in south Kiangsi, where American Catholic Missions at Hingkwo, Kanchow and Yuanshingkuo have been reliably reported to have been burned, have captured

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the city of Tingchow and destroyed the premises of the London Missionary Society there. Martial law was declared on April 4th at Amoy, Fukien, where outbreaks were expected, and communist plots have been discovered in Foochow.

Government troops promised for the suppression of Red activities in southern Kiangsi have so far failed to materialize and the situation in that province remains practically unchanged.

Helmer W. Lystad
Helmer W. Lystad
First L ieutenant, Infantry

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, April 13, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 11
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUN 11 1929

1. **Composition and Distribution of Forces.**

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Regular Forces

1st Division	(Liu Chih	Hankow	(Hupeh	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung	Yuehkow	("	12,000
3rd "	(Mao Ping-wen	Pushan	(Shantung	10,000
4th "	(Miao Pei-nan	Ichang	(Hupeh	18,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui	Shanghai	(Kiangsu	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tso	Nanking	("	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	Kienchang	(Kiangsi	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang	Sianyang	(Hupeh	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	Kanchiachi	("	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying	Chienli	("	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun	Tungshan	("	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	Kanchow	(Kiangsi	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin	Fancheng	(Hupeh	12,000
18th "	(Liu Tiao-ping	Wuchang	("	12,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	Lokow	(Shantung	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang	Tsowping	("	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	Taian	("	12,000
47th "	(Chen Tiao-yuan	Hsuanhwa	(Chihli	20,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan	Suchow	(Anhui	24,000
49th "	(Jan Ying-ch'i	Lungkow	(Shantung	12,000
50th "	(Fan Tao-yuan	Itu	(Hupeh	12,000
14th "	(Liu Chun-jung	Nanyuan	(Chihli	7,500
54th "	(Wei I-san	Hsiyuan	("	7,000
51st "	(Li Pin-hsien	Tongshan	("	16,000
53rd "	(Liu Hsing	Kaiping	("	18,000
1st Prov.Div.	(Yueh Wei-chun	Wuhu	(Anhwei	15,000
2nd Cav. "	(Chang Li-sheng	Hweichow	("	10,000
1st Ind. Brig	(Ch'en Yueh-han	Nanking	(Kiangsu	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying	Laiyang	(Shantung	5,000
3rd " "	(Yuen Chia-sheng	Nanking-Shanghai Ry.		5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Tze-yu	Tsinan	(Shantung	3,600

Former Fourth Group Forces Reorganized and Taken Over by First Group of Armies.

5th Division	(Li Chi-tsai	Fancheng	(Hupeh	4,000
7th "	(Ho Chien	Hengchow	(Hunan	4,000
8th "	(Chow Lan	Sinning	(Hunan	4,000
9th "	(Yin Ch'eng-kang	Ichang	(Hupeh	4,000
10th "	(Li Yu-hsuan	"	("	4,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	Anlu	("	6,000

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16th Division	(Li Shih-chiao)	Hwangchow (Hupeh)	6,000
17th "	(Shih Yeh-ling)	Shasi (")	6,000
19th "	(Liu Chen-hsu)	Yungchow (Hunan)	10,000
52nd "	(Wu Shang)	Ningyuan (Hupeh)	6,000
55th "	(Cheng Ju-huai)	Ichang (")	4,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting)	Wuhu (")	4,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui)	Anlu (")	6,000
1st Ind. Brig.	(Chao Wen-tien)	Wu-Han area (")	2,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin)	Macheng (")	2,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su)	" (")	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh)	" (")	2,000
7th " "	( )	" (")	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-le)	" (")	2,000
5th Army (Kwangsi)	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Chenchow (Hunan)	12,000
Hupeh Peace Preser-vation Forces	(Li Yen)	N.E. Kweichow	10,000
		TOTAL	470,100

Notes: The 1st Provisional Division (former 13th, 14th and 15th Divisions) under Yueh Wei-chun, is now being carried under the First Group of Armies instead of under the Fourth Group, it having become apparent since the recent difficulty between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang that Yueh Wei-chun, whose allegiance has been doubtful, has no further connection with Feng and is actually under Chiang Kai-shek.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Independent Brigades are apparently recently organized units and have not been carried heretofore. The Nanking Gendarmerie, heretofore regarded as a local police force, has now been moved to Tsinan to occupy that city and is therefore being carried as a regular First Group unit.

Although the reorganization and assimilation of the former Fourth Group troops is now practically complete, and the designations of the new units quite definitely known, the strength of each is still unknown. Since the former eight Fourth Group divisions have now been reorganized into fourteen divisions and six independent brigades, former brigades have obviously been made divisions, and certain regiments independent brigades. An arbitrary strength approximating the strength of old Fourth Group brigades and regiments has therefore been assigned the new divisions and independent brigades, bringing the total of former Fourth Group troops to 90,000, allowing for a loss of 2,000 due to casualties, desertions, stragglers, etc.

The Kwangsi 5th Army turned over to Chiang Kai-shek after the fall of Hankow.

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Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin

Original First Kuominchun Units, Mainstay of Second Group.

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	25,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	11,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-peng)	"	(")	10,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou)	Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san)	Nanyang	(")	35,000
25th "	(Chang Chi-tsung)	Lanfeng	(")	10,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-kai)	Minkiang	(")	10,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Kiaoshan	(")	10,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Sian	(Shensi)	10,000
29th "	(Chen Hsi-yen)	Hsuchow	(Hunan)	10,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang)	Ninghsia	(Ninghsia)	10,000
31st "	(Sung Chung-li)	Sining	(Kansu)	10,000

Miscellaneous Units

14th Division, temporary	(Pan Ping-shun)		(Honan)	10,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsin)	Yulin	(Shensi)	10,000
19th "	(Fan Hsieh-san)	Pachow-Tacheng	(Chihli)	10,000
20th "	(Liu Mao-en)	" "	"	10,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin)	Honanfu	(Honan)	10,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi)	Honan-Shansi border		10,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Hsieh Shih-hsiu)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Chen Ta-chang)	Kweiteh	(")	6,000
17th " "	(Ma Hung-kuei)	Taokow	(")	8,000
8th " "	(Chao Hsieh-pin)	Kansu		3,000
9th " "	(Hsu Yu-sung)	"		3,000
1st Mixed Brig	(Meng Chi-tsung)	Ninghsia		4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en)	Kansu		4,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen)	"		4,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	4,000
5th " "	(Pei Chien-chen)	Shensi		4,000

TOTAL 269,000

The above figures, which show a number of units not previously carried, were obtained from a source very close to Feng Yu-hsiang's staff and are believed to be accurate as to the strength and designation of units and unit commanders. As little information on the movement of Feng's forces has been received since his withdrawal from Shantung the exact location of his units is in most cases unknown.

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Third Group of Armies.
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command - Shang Chen.

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Peking & Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliangch'eng	(")	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Tatung	(Shansi)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-hsin)	Shihkiachuang	(")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan	6,000
26th "	(He Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	(An Hsi-ku)	Peking-Tsechow	(Chihli)	6,000
28th "	(Chang Ying-fang)	Hsiyuan-Peking	(")	6,000

Cavalry

1st Cav. Div.	(T'an Ching-lin)			
1st Brigade		Tatung	(Shansi)	3,000
2nd "		Fenchen	(Suiyuan)	3,000
2nd Cav. Div.	(Wang Ying)	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
" "	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	(Chihli)	4,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu)	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000

Artillery Forces - Chow Tai.

4th Brigade	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Taiyuanfu	(Shansi)	2,500
5th "	(Liu Kuang)	"	(")	2,500
6th "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Hsiyuan	(Chihli)	2,500
7th "	(Peng Ch'i)	Tientsin-Peking	(")	2,500

TOTAL 160,000

The increase in strength of the Third Group of Armies over that shown in last report is due to the fact that two divisions of cavalry, not previously carried, have definitely been located at Paotou, and one division of cavalry at Dolonor, formerly carried as a First Group unit, has been taken from the First Group and placed under the Fourth, where it properly belongs.

Fourth Group of Armies

Reorganized and taken over by First Group of Armies.

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangtung

1st Division	(Chen Chi-t'ang)	Chaoking	(Kwangtung)	12,000
2nd "	(Teng Yen-hua)	"	(")	12,000
3rd "	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	"	(")	13,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Teng Hsi-tseng)		"	4,000

As no information on the strength or location of Kwangtung forces can be obtained, the above list probably does not represent Kwangtung's entire strength. Furthermore, several units of the Kwangtung forces, the identity of which is unknown, are reported to be either neutral in the present conflict with Kwangsi or actually taking sides with Kwangsi.

Yunnan

38th Army	(Lung Yun)	Kwanghsi	(Yunnan)	20,000
7th Ind.Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	"	(")	4,000

Szechuan

21st Army	(Liu Hsiang)	Patung	(Hupeh)	40,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)	Peichow	(Szechwan)	8,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(")	60,000

Units of Doubtful Allegiance

28th Army	(Teng Hsi-ho)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	40,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)	Tzechow	(")	20,000

Kiangsi

Three Divisions of 6th Army	10,000

Fukien

Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Kuo Feng-ming)	2,500
2nd "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsiao Shu-hsuan)	2,000

Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)	4,000
2nd "	(Li Shou-kuo)	4,000

Provisionally Incorporated National Government Troops.

1st Division	(Chang Chen)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)	8,000

Marines

1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)	15,000
2nd "	(Liu Shou-kou)	15,000

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Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen	10,000

Chekiang

Six regiments Provincial Defense Force Two Reserve Regiments One Gendarmerie Battalion One Artillery Corps Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000

Eastern Shantung

1st Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo & Tengchow (Shantung)	4,000
2nd "	(Liu Kai-tai)	E. Shantung	4,000
3rd "	(Ho I-san)	Ninghai	3,000
4th "	(Li Hsi-tung)	"	3,000
5th "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	E. Shantung	2,000
21st "	(Yang Hu-chen)	Laiwu (Shantung)	8,000
Irregular or guerilla forces			5,000

The 21st Division (Yang Hu-chen) composed of former miscellaneous units in Shantung, was incorporated in the Second Group of Armies about February 1, 1929. Since Feng's withdrawal from Shantung it has apparently been abandoned there by him, the loyalty of the Division never having been certain, and it is believed that it should now more properly be carried as nominally under the First Group of Armies.

TOTAL 354,500

TOTAL NATIONALIST FORCES 1,253,600

Miscellaneous Forces Actually at War with or Opposed to National Government.

Kwangsi

4th Army (Huang Shao-hsiung)	20,000
1st Ind. Div. (Tseng Yueh-chun)	12,000
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops (Cheng Yen-hua)	5,000

As no information on Kwangsi forces has been obtainable for some time, the above figures are purely estimates and probably do not represent the actual strength of Kwangsi in the present war against Kwangtung. It is fairly certain, however, that their strength is about equal to that of Kwangtung.

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Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)	Kweichow	12,000
43rd "	(Li Yen)	"	10,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000

Szechwan

20th Army	(Yang Sen)	Anyu	(Szechwan)	40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)	Lochih	(")	10,000
7 Brigades	(Lo Tse-chou)		"	20,000
2 "	(Li Ch'i-shang)		"	3,000

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(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES —

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brig.	(Wang Yi-cho)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Hsinminhsien	(")	10,000
3rd "	(He Chu-kuo)	Ch'aoyang	(Jehol)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei)	Masanchia	(Fengtien)	11,000
5th "	(Ting Ying-pin)	Chinchow	(")	10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Changli	(Chihli)	11,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Ying-he)	Funing	(Chihli)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu)	Tungliao	(Fengtien)	11,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Fakuhsien	(")	10,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	Taonan	(Kirin)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma T'ing-fu)	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	10,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang)	Lingyuan	(Jehol)	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Yungping	(Chihli)	10,000

Cavalry

1st Cav. Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng)	Yunping, Chienan (Chihli)	6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Lengkow "	6,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	"	(")	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(")	6,000
7th Heavy Art.Regt.	Peicheng	(")	6,000
8th " " "	"	(")	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
TOTAL	220,600

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In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

It will be noted that the artillery regiment appears to be excessively large, the reason being that the present regiment corresponds roughly to the former brigade.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brig.	(Li Kuei-lin)	Changchun	(Kirin)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to)	Yilan	(")	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui)	Yenchi	(")	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin,Wuchang	(")	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao)	Harbin	(")	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng)	Suiyuan	(")	10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Chengshan)	Fuyu	(")	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in)	Muling	(")	8,000
			Total	72,000

Heilungkiang

1st Brig.	(Shih Mei-feng)	Siutung	(Heilungkiang)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing)	Payen	"	7,000
17th "	(He Shuan-shan)	Fulaerdi	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen)	Hsinglungchen	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia)	Manchouli	"	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-e)	Heiho	"	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan)	Hulan	"	4,000
			Total	37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE 329,600

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

Jehol.

7th Brig.	(Chang Shen-yun)	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un)	Luanping	"	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting)	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin)	Fengning	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shan-sheng)	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng)	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng)	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu)	Jehol	"	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua)	Luanping	"	4,500
31st Army	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chihfeng	"	8,000
			Total	56,500

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Note: A reorganization of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces into a certain number of divisions is understood now to be in progress, but no reliable information on the reorganization is yet obtainable.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,783,700

Note: The figures on the strength of the various armies and divisions are manifestly not as uniform as set forth above. In the absence of definite information, these figures are based merely on an estimate of 100 men per company of infantry. Counting the auxiliary troops the totals are approximately correct. Whenever definite figures on the strength of any units are ascertained changes will be made accordingly. The total strength of Chinese armed forces mentioned at the Disbandment Conference is 1,600,000. Political considerations affecting this figure place it in the category of estimates.

2. General.

Since last report the center of interest in China has rapidly shifted from Hankow and the punitive expedition against Wuhan to a threatened clash between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang, and finally to the south, where war clouds have been gathering for some time against the National Government and where Kwangsi and Kwangtung are now engaged in a new war which may have a very far reaching effect upon all of China.

3. Reorganization and Assimilation of Fourth Group of Armies.

The reorganization of the defeated troops of the former Fourth Group of Armies and their absorption by the First Group, commenced immediately after the fall of Hankow, is now practically completed. Generals Hu Tsung-to and Tao Chun, who retreated up the river in an effort to reach Kwangsi via Kweichow, were surrounded in the vicinity of Shasi by government troops sent in pursuit from Hankow and Liu Hsiang's Army from up the river in Szechwan, and surrendered about April 20th after repeated promises of amnesty by Chiang Kai-shek. The remnants of the Hunanese forces, which retreated south into Hunan, were rounded up by Ho Chien's 8th Army which, by the end of April, was in possession of all of Hunan. Ho Chien reports he is pressing Kwangsi units in the direction of Kweilin.

Practically all of the former Fourth Group commanders have been retained in command of their former units except Hu Tsung-to and Tao Chun, who have been pardoned by the government and are being sent abroad to "continue their military education".

4. Threatened Clash Between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang.

Immediately after the cessation of hostilities about Hankow interest was again focussed upon Feng Yu-hsiang, whose attitude during the campaign had caused Chiang Kai-shek considerable anxiety, and whose position then seem threatening. His column under Han Fu-chu which had

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stopped its advance down the Peking-Hankow Railway at Siaokan, did not at once begin its withdrawal to Honan as urged by the Nanking authorities, but remained in northern Hupeh apparently for the purpose of influencing the appointment of Feng adherents to the important posts of Chairman and Finance Commissioner of the Hupeh Provincial Government. Feng's efforts to gain control of Hupeh were, however, successful, only Chiang Kai-shek adherents receiving appointments in Hupeh, and Chiang at once turned his attention to the question of control of Shantung, soon to be evacuated by the Japanese and still in control of Feng. The withdrawal of Feng's troops back up the Kin-Han Railway commenced shortly after but stopped in the vicinity of Wushengkwan on the Honan-Hupeh border and Chiang's forces sent against Hankow augmented by most of the troops of the former Fourth Group, all remained in the Wuhan area, obviously for the purpose of watching Feng.

Plans had been completed by both the Chinese and the Japanese for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Tsinan on April 17th, and troops of the 21st and 22nd Divisions under Sun Liang-cheng, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government, and a Feng adherent, had begun moving up the railroad toward Tsinan from the vicinity of Taian when suddenly the Nanking authorities requested the Japanese to delay their departure for a short time, ostensibly because of the fear of the rebel forces in eastern Shantung taking advantage of the situation, but actually, it is believed, because the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng as to who should have control of Shantung had not yet been settled and Chiang did not want Sun Liang-cheng to get control of Tsinan. The movement of Sun's troops stopped and a unit which had reached Tangchiachwang moved back to Taian, when on April 17th Sun was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek again to proceed with the taking over of Tsinan, and the movement of troops from Taian again commenced, although no new date for the withdrawal of the Japanese had yet been set.

The defeat of Chang Tsung-chang in eastern Shantung on April 22nd, entirely eliminating him as a factor in the province, was followed very promptly by preparations of the National Government to take over all of Shantung as the Japanese withdrew, and on April 26th a mandate was issued dividing the area to be evacuated into three zones, Feng's subordinate, Sun Liang-cheng, to get Tsinan and the western part of the province; Fang Chen-wu, now under Chiang but a former Feng man whose 44th and 45th divisions had been moving down to Tehchow from the Peking area since the 8th, to get the area from Weihsien eastward; and two special regiments of Chiang's Nanking gendarmes to take over Tsingtao. Sun Liang-cheng, who had protested previously that his orders regarding Tsinan were too vague, at once announced his displeasure with these arrangements, stating that as head of the Provincial Government he must have full control, and asked for a week's sick leave.

The 46th Division, which had previously been moved from Lutai, Chihli, to Pengpu, Anhwei, had in the meantime started up the Tientsin-Pukow Railway upon the cancellation of Sun Liang-cheng's first orders to take over Tsinan, apparently for the purpose of closing in on Feng's troops in conjunction with Fang Chen-wu's 44th and 45th Divisions moving down from the north, and by the 26th had reached Tsowhsien, Shantung.

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The general belief that an actual clash between Feng and Chiang was imminent was substantiated on April 27th when Sun Liang-cheng with all of his troops suddenly withdrew by train to Tsining and were a few days later reported to be completely withdrawn within the Honan border. At the same time Lu Chung-lin, General Hsiung Pin and Mr. Y. L. Tong hastily left Nanking for Shanghai and a general exodus of Feng officials to foreign concessions and other places of refuge was reported. The withdrawal of Feng Yu-hsiang's forces from Shantung was completed within a week of Sun's withdrawal, leaving the entire province in the possession of Chiang's troops.

Although the movement of Feng's troops has been effected with considerable secrecy, it is generally believed that his main forces have been concentrated between Chengchow and Tungkwan Pass, with covering forces in southern and eastern Honan. Several of Feng's divisions were also reported to be en route to Ninghsia avowedly for the purpose of suppressing a Moslem uprising in that area but it is generally suspected that these troops may be designed for an invasion of Suiyuan.

Although protestations of friendliness on both sides have been forthcoming, and Chiang has decided not to issue an official denunciation of Sun Liang-cheng for his unauthorized withdrawal from Shantung, it is believed that an open break between the two is inevitable unless the present conflict between Kwangsi and Kwangtung results in such reverses for Chiang that he will be unable longer to carry out his apparent intention of forcing Feng out of Shantung and Honan.

5. War Between Kwangsi and Kwangtung.

The Kwangsi militarists, headed by General Hwang Shao-hsiung, whose provincial forces remained practically intact after the defeat of the Wuhan forces at Hankow in April, and whom Chiang Kai-shek ordered Kwangtung to exterminate on the conclusion of the Wuhan campaign, themselves assumed the offensive against Kwangtung on May 7th, and their armies, numbering about 20,000 men and reported to be led by Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi are advancing overland on Canton in two columns, one from Dosing on the West River and another in the direction of Yingtak on the Canton-Hankow Railway. The American Consul at Canton reported that on the 6th, Kwangtung forces were being rushed to Samshui, where a defense line is being established, and on May 8, reported that trains had stopped running on the Canton-Hankow Railway and that, due to the unwillingness of several Kwangtung units to fight against Kwangsi, including the Navy under Admiral Chen Chat, the Canton defense was on the verge of collapse. Shiuhing was reported by the press to have been taken by Kwangsi on May 8, and the Chinese in Canton and elsewhere are predicting the occupation of Canton within a few days.

Although General Ho Chien, a former subordinate of Tang Sheng-chih, has been ordered to invade Kwangsi from Hunan in order to divert the Kwangsi attack on Kwangtung, he has so far not advanced beyond Yungchow on the Hunan-Kwangsi border, or diverted any considerable Kwangsi force. It is not believed that he has either the desire or the strength seriously to enter into the conflict.

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This turn of events was not altogether unexpected, as Chiang's instructions to Kwangtung to move against Kwangsi issued several weeks ago received little response in Canton, and with the support of Kweichow in the rear and apparently some understanding with Feng Yu-hsiang, it seems fairly certain that unless reinforcements can quickly be sent to Canton from the Yangtze, Kwangsi will shortly again be in control of Kwangtung and a new and powerful alliance in the south formed against Chiang Kai-shek.

Apparently fully aware of the danger to his position in the Kwangtung situation, Chiang Kai-shek is now, after a hasty conference on May 8th with Generals Ho Ying-chin and Ho Yueh-tsu, preparing to move troops from the Hankow area to Canton, and three shiploads of troops from Nanking are reported to be already en route. Eight steamships are reported to have been chartered at Hankow for the transport of the 15th and 57th Divisions, former Wuhan units, to Canton, and another report states that General Chang Fa-kwei's famous "Ironsides" Division, now at Ichang, is being rushed to the Kwangtung front. It is not believed, however, that any of these forces can arrive in Canton in time to render immediate assistance.

6. Situation in the Southwest.

The present conflict between Kwangsi and Kwangtung again brings into prominence the situation in the southwest, where Yang Sen in Szechwan, opposed to the National Government, is operating against Liu Hsiang's forces in the southern part of the province. Kweichow, aligned with Kwangsi, may be expected to neutralize the threat to Kwangsi of the Yunnan forces under Lung Yun, who are being financed to some extent by Chiang Kai-shek. The present conflict will undoubtedly resolve itself, therefore, into a decisive battle for the control of the whole southwest, and a victory for Kwangsi would mean the loss to Nanking of all of the five southwestern provinces.

7. Chang Tsung-chang and Eastern Shantung.

Chang Tsung-chang's effort to establish himself in eastern Shantung came to an abrupt and unexpected end on April 22, when he was forced from Chefoo by the forces of Liu Chen-nien, who entered the city and raised the Nationalist flag on the 23rd, and from Lungkow on the 26th, from where he was compelled to flee to one of the small islands lying off Tengchow, the Japanese authorities having announced that he would not be allowed to land at Dairen. Six small Chinese boatloads of troops escaped from Lungkow with Chang, all of which have since been rounded up by a Fengtien squadron off Shantung. The remainder of Chang's troops, except those under Chu Yu-pu, have all been dispersed. Chu Yu-pu, with several thousand men, is still holding out against Liu Chen-nien at Fushan, but his surrender at any time is expected. With the defeat and dispersal of the forces of Chang Tsung-chang, who has since been allowed to enter Japan, eastern Shantung, except for Fushan, is again completely under National Government control, under Liu Chen-nien, Sun Tien-ying and Jan Yen-chi.

Helmer W. Lystad.

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Reviewed and concurred in.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUN 22 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second inCommand - Ho Ying-chin

Regular Forces.

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Hsintien	(S. Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Wushengkwan	(Hupeh-Honan bdr)	12,000
3rd "	(Mao Ping-wen)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
4th "	(Chang Fa-kuei)	Wusueh	(Hupeh)	18,000
5th "	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tso)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Sianyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Wushengkwan	(Hupeh-Honan bdr)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Anking	(Anhwei)	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Kwangshui	(N. Hupeh)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Fancheng	(N. Hupeh)	12,000
18th "	(Liu Tiao-ping)	Wuchang	(")	12,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang)	Pengpu	(Anhwei)	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Weihsien	(Shantung)	12,000
47th "	(Li Chia-yu)	Hsuanhwa	(Chihli)	20,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Yingchow	(Anhui)	24,000
49th "	(Jan Ying-ch'i)	Lungkow	(Shantung)	12,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Ichang	(Hupeh)	12,000
14th "	(Liu Chun-jung)	Tsining	(Shantung)	9,000
54th "	(Wei I-san)	"	(")	15,000
51st "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Tehchow	(")	16,000
53rd "	(Liu Hsing)	Kaiping	(Chihli)	18,000
1st Prov. Div	(Yueh Wei-chun)	Pengpu	(Anhwei)	15,000
2nd Cav. "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Kwoyang	(")	10,000
1st Ind. Brig	(Ch'en Yueh-ha n)	Suchow	(")	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying)	Laiyang	(Shantung)	5,000
3rd " "	(Yuen Chia-sheng)	Nanking-Shanghai Ry.		5,000
--- " "	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan)	Tsinan	(Shantung)	5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Tze-yu)	Tsingtao	(Shantung)	3,600

Miscellaneous Units Reorganized and Taken Over By First Group of Armies.

3rd Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo-Tengchow	(Shantung)	25,000
5th "	(Li Chi-tsai)	Siangyang	(N. Hupeh)	4,000
7th "	(Ho Chien)	Yungchow	(Hunan)	4,000
8th "	(Chow Lan)	Kweilin	(Kwangsi)	4,000
9th "	(Yin Ch'eng-kang)	Siangyang	(N.Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Li Yu-hsuan)	Shihnan	(W. Hupeh)	4,000

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11th Division	(Yang Hu-ch'en	) Poshan-Changtien	(Shantung)	10,000
12th "	(Hu Ju-yu	) Hsuchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi	) "	(")	6,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Pengpu	(Anhwei)	6,000
16th "	(Li Shih-chiao	) Hwangchow	(E.Hupeh)	6,000
17th "	(Shih Yeh-ling	) Shasi	(")	6,000
19th "	(Liu Chen-hsu	) Hingan	(Kwangsi)	10,000
19th "	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	) Yangtsun	(Chihli)	10,000
20th "	(Liu Mao-en	) Pachow	(")	10,000
52nd "	(Wu Shang	) Pinglo	(Kwangsi)	6,000
55th "	(Cheng Ju-huai	) Shasi	(W. Hupeh)	4,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	) Wuhu	(Anhwei)	4,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Pengpu	(")	6,000
1st Ind. Brig.	(Chao Wen-tien	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	2,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin	) Hwangan	(N.Hupeh)	2,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	) Kingmen	(W.Hupeh)	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh	) Kienli	(N.Hupeh)	2,000
7th " "	(	) Twanfeng	(E.Hupeh)	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-le	) Anlu	(W.Hupeh)	2,000
--- " "	(Kao Kuei-tzu	) Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	3,000
5th Army (Kwangsi)	(Fan Shih-sheng	) Pinglo	(Kwangsi)	12,000
Hupeh Peace Preser-vation Forces	(Li Yen	) N.E. Kweichow	(	10,000
			TOTAL	554,600

Notes: The --- Ind. Brig. (Yueh Sheng-hsuan) is a brigade of Chen Tiao-yuan's forces not previously carried on these lists.

The situation in Shantung with regard to Chang Tsung-chang, Chu Yu-pu and other insurgent leaders having ended with their dispersal by Liu Chen-nien, his 3rd Division, formerly carried under "Troops in Eastern Shantung", will henceforth be carried under the First Group of Armies.

The 11th Division (Yang Hu-ch'en) is the old 21st Division composed of former miscellaneous units in Shantung taken over by Feng Yu-hsiang about February, 1929. This division turned over to Chiang Kai-shek after Feng's withdrawal from Shantung in April.

The 12th and 13th Divisions are new units organized by Chiang Kai-shek from miscellaneous border defence units in Szechwan.

The 19th and 20th Divisions are the former 19th and 20th Divisions of the Second Group of Armies, under Liu Chen-hua, which remained in Chihli after Feng Yu-hsiang's withdrawal from Shantung in April, and which have now gone over to Chiang Kai-shek and have been incorporated into his forces as the 11th Route Army.

The --- Ind. Brigade (Kao Kuei-tzu) is a brigade of Fang Chen-wu's forces the existence of which was not formerly known.

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Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)

Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin.

Original First Kuominchun Units, Mainstay of Second Group.

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	25,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Loyang	(")	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-peng)	"	(")	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou)	Nanyang	(S.W.Honan)	12,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san)	"	(" " ")	35,000
25th "	(Chang Chi-tsung)	Sungyang	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-kai)	Minkiang	(")	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Hsuchow	(S.Honan)	12,000
28th "	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien)	Nanyang	(S.W.Honan)	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang)	Ninghsia	(Ninghsia)	12,000
31st "	(Sung Chung-li)	Sining	(Kansu)	12,000

Miscellaneous Units

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-shun)	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsin)	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
22nd "	(Ma H ung-pin)	Tungkwan	(")	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi)	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Hsieh Shih-hsiu)	Mienchih	(W.Honan)	8,000
2nd " "	(Chen Ta-chang)	Taokow	(N. Honan)	8,000
17th Mixed Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
8th Cav. Brig.	(Chao Hsieh-pin)	Kansu	(	4,000
9th " "	(Hsu Yu-sung)	"		4,000
1 st Mixed Brig.	(Meng Chi-tsung)	Ninghsia		5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen)	W. Honan		5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pei Chien-chen)	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yü-lin)	Chengchow	(Honan)	4,000

TOTAL . . . 293,000

Notes: As Feng Yu-hsiang's recent troop movements have been carried out with great secrecy little definite information on the location of his units is available. His main concentration is apparently between Chengchow and Tungkwan, with covering forces on the Peking-Hankow Railway, on the northern and southern borders of Honan, on the Han River approach to Honan near Hanyangfu, and on the Lunghai Railway east of Kaifeng.

In addition to the above forces, Feng is also known to have a considerable number of local troops corresponding to militia, organized from local bandit bands, Red Spear organizations, etc., the strength and designations of which cannot be determined

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It being known that units of the Second Group of Armies have recently been enlarged in anticipation of hostilities with the government forces, the strength of most of the units shown above has been slightly increased, giving a total strength of 293,000, as compared with 269,000 shown in last report. Although most estimates are much higher, these figures are believed fairly to represent Feng's present strength, not counting local militia units.

Third Group of A rmies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command - Shang Chen.

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(Chihli)	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-ch'ang)	Chunliangch'eng	(")	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Shihchiachuang	(")	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-hsin)	Shihchiachuang	(")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Pinyangfu	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	Peking-Peiyuan	(Chihli)	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	6,000
26th "	(Ho Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	(An Hsi-ku)	Peking-Tsechow	(Chihli)	6,000

Cavalry

1st Cav. Div.	(T'an Ching-lin)			
1st Brigade		Tatung	(Shansi)	3,000
2nd "		Fenchen	(Suiyuan)	3,000
2nd Cav. Div.	(Wang Ying)	Paotou	(")	3,000
--- " "	(Wang Kuei-to)	Dolonor	(Chihli)	4,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu)	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000

Artillery Forces - Chow Tai

4th Brigade	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Taiyuanfu	(Shansi)	2,500
5th "	(Liu Kuang)	"	(")	2,500
6th "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Hsiyuan	(Chihli)	2,500
7th "	(Peng Ch'i)	Tientsin-Peking	(")	2,500

TOTAL 160,000

Note: In addition to the above named units, the Third Group of Armies is known to include a considerable number of local units, roughly corresponding to our militia. No information on the strength or disposition of these forces can be obtained.

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangtung

1st Division	(Chen Chi-t'ang)	Canton area	(Kwangtung)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsu Ching-tang)	" "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	" "	"	13,000
1 st Ind.Brig.	(Teng Hsi-tseng)	" "	"	4,000

The situation around Canton has shifted so rapidly and so little reliable information has been allowed to reach the outside world from this area, that it is impossible to state with any degree of accuracy exactly where any of the Kwangsi or Kwangtung units are, except that they are all within a 50-mile radius of Canton, on the West, North and East rivers.

Yunnan

38th Army	(Lung Yun)	Kwanghsi	(Yunnan)	20,000
7th Ind. Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	Yunnanfu	(")	4,000

Szechuan

21st Army	(Liu Hsiang)	Patung	(Hupeh)	40,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)	Peichow	(Szechwan)	8,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(")	60,000

Units of Doubtful Allegiance

28th Army	(Teng Hsi-ho)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	40,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-yao)	Tzechow	(")	20,000

Kiangsi

Three Divisions of 6th Army	10,000

Fukien

Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Kuo Feng-ming)	Fukien	2,500
2nd "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsiao Shu-hsuan)	"	2,000

Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)	"	4,000
2nd "	(Li Shou-kuo)	"	4,000

Provisionally Incorporated National Government Troops.

1st Division	(Chang Chen)	Tapu	(Kwangtung)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)	Fuchow	(Fukien)	8,000

Marines

1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)		(Fukien)	15,000
2nd "	(Liu Shou-kou)		"	15,000

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Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen	10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Force Two Reserve Regiments One Gendarmerie Battalion One Artillery Corps Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000
TOTAL	325,500
TOTAL NATIONALIST FORCES.	1,036,100

Miscellaneous Forces Actually at War With or Opposed to National Government

Kwangsi

4th Army	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	W. Kwangtung	20,000
1st Ind. Div.	(Tseng Yueh-chun)	" "	12,000
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops	(Cheng Yen-hua)	" "	5,000

Little reliable information can be obtained on the exact location of Kwangsi units since the breakdown of their offensive about May 17th.

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)	Kweichow	12,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000

Szechwan

20th Army	(Yang Sen)	Anyu	(Szechwan)	40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)	Lochih	"	10,000
7 Brigades	(Lo Tse-chou)		"	20,000
2 "	(Li Ch'i-shang)		"	3,000

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CHINA (Military)

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(a) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - C hang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1 st Brig.	(Wang Yi-cho)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Hsinminhsien	(")	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Ch'aoyang	(Jehol)	10,000
4th Div.	(Liu Yi-fei)	Changli	(Chihli)	11,000
5th Brig.	(Ting Ying-pin)	Kaokiao	(Fengtien)	10,000
6th Div.	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Yungping	(Chihli)	11,000
12th Brig.	(Chang Ting-shu)	Suichung	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th Div.	(Hsu Ying-ho)	Funing	(Chihli)	10,000
16th Brig.	(Ying Chen-fu)	Tungliao	(Fengtien)	11,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Fakuhsien	(")	10,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	Taonan	(Kirin)	11,000
23rd Div.	(Ma T'ing-fu)	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	10,000
24th Brig.	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang)	Lingyuan	(Jehol)	10,000
27th Div.	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	10,000

Cavalry

1st Cav. Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng)	Yunping, Chienan	(Chihli)	6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Lengkow	"	6,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	"	(")	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(")	6,000
7th Heavy Art.Regt.	Peicheng	(")	6,000
8th " " "	"	(" ")	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan(Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
TOTAL	220,600

In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

It will be noted that the artillery regiment appears to be excessively large, the reason being that the present regiment corresponds roughly to the former brigade.

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brig.	(Li Kuei-lin)	Changchun	(Kirin)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to)	Yilan	"	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui)	Yenchi	"	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin,Wuchang	"	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao)	Harbin	"	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng)	Suiyuan	"	10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li C heng-shan)	Fuyu	"	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in)	Muling	"	8,000
			Total	72,000

Heilungkiang

1st Brig.	(Shih Mei-feng)	Siutung	(Heilungkiang)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing)	Payen	"	7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan)	Fulaerdi	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen)	Hsinglungchen	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia)	Manchouli	"	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o)	Heiho	"	4,000
12th " "	(Ma C han-shan)	Hulan	"	4,000
			Total	37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE . . . . . 329,600.

No further information has been obtained on the reorganization of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces mentioned in last report, except in the case of the units shown above as divisions. It is not believed, however, that these units, all of which have been sent inside the Wall, have actually been reorganized in any sense of the word, the change being merely one of designa tion.

Jehol.

7th Brig.	(Chang Shen-yun)	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un)	Luanping	"	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting)	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin)	Fengning	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shan-sheng)	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng)	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng)	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu)	Jehol	"	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua)	Luanping	"	4,500
31st Army	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chihfeng	"	8,000
			TOTAL	56,500

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,792,700

China (Military)

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2. General.

While confusing in several of its aspects the present situation in China is clearly the most critical one yet faced by the National Government and a definite crisis in the career of Chiang Kai-shek. With a serious revolt in Kwangsi and Kwangtung involving the control of all of the southwestern provinces going none too satisfactorily for the government forces, Chiang Kai-shek is now faced with the absolute necessity of suppressing Feng Yu-hsiang with forces some of which are of extremely doubtful loyalty. The government forces have been steadily mobilizing on the approaches to Honan in Hupeh, Anhwei, Shansi and Chihli, and a formal punitive mandate and the beginning of the attack are expected at any time. While no defections have yet occurred rumors are rife as to probable cleavages within the government forces and the situation is undoubtedly viewed with considerable apprehension in Nanking.

3. Kwangtung-Kwangsi War.

The war between the forces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi which has been in progress around Canton and in northern Kwangsi since May 7th has favored one side and then the other with such rapidity that it has been impossible to know exactly what has been taking place, and even the latest reports are so conflicting that an accurate estimate of the situation there cannot be made.

Following the defection of several Kwangtung units about Canton early in May and the failure of support from Nanking to arrive, the fall of Canton at any moment seemed practically certain. Communist activities among the Kwangtung forces resulted in several other Kwangtung units assuming an independent attitude and about May 8th Kwangsi launched a general offensive against Samshui on the West River and down the Canton-Hankow Railway on the north, while a column composed of defected Kwangtung units advanced down the East River from the direction of Waichow. Aided by the revolt of more Kwangtung units in Swatow, the Kwangsi attack met with general success, Samshui falling on May 10th, the column on the East River advancing as far as Sheklung, and the forces on the railway pushing the defending force back on Canton.

The Fukien forces under Chang Chen, numbering about 10,000 men, were meanwhile hastily mobilized to assist Canton, and by the 14th had crossed the frontier and were well within the Kwangtung border, while in the northern part of Kwangsi the H unan column under Ho Chien had pushed the Kwangsi forces on this front out of Chuanchow. Yung Lun with 20,000 men was also reported at this time to be moving on Kwangsi from Yunnan. With this unexpected turn of events, coupled with the timely arrival in Canton of several gunboats from Nanking, the Kwangsi attack on Canton collapsed and Sheklung was retaken on May 15th and Samshui the following day, the Kwangsi forces falling back on Wuchow. Kwangtung successes on all fronts followed, Kweilin and Pinglo having fallen to Ho Chien on May 14th and 15th, and the forces on the East River retook Waichow on the 17th, while Chang Chen continued his advance from Fukien and occupied Taipu on May 16th. Although subsequent reports have been conflicting, both sides claiming important victories, the Kwangtung

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counter-attack apparently broke down and Kwangsi again took the offensive on May 17th, retaking Samshui on the 18th, and launching a general attack on the whole line on the 19th. On the morning of the 20th, Kwangsi armies were reported to be on the outskirts of Canton, the Kwangtung forces in Canton having retired towards Sheklung, leaving only a small number of troops in the city, and for a second time the fall of Canton seemed assured. For reasons still not clear, however, the Kwangsi advance suddenly stopped, their forces falling back up the West and North rivers, and Kwangtung again occupied the city in strength. Although reports are still conflicting, Canton is still held by Kwangtung forces, with the Kwangsi Army believed to be astride the Canton-Hankow Railway close to Canton, and Ho Chien is reported advancing in the direction of Wuchow with the intention of forming a junction there with Kwangtung.

So far as is known, no reinforcements except gunboats have yet arrived from the Yangtze Valley, although several units have been reported en route, and with the expected Chiang---Feng clash imminent, it is not believed that any further help from this quarter will be forthcoming. The Kweichow forces, which have been aligned with Kwangsi, have likewise not yet rendered any assistance to Kwangsi.

4. Impending Chiang Kai-shek—Feng Yu-hsiang Conflict.

Following the withdrawal of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops from Shantung the early part of May, the threatened clash between him and Chiang Kai-shek has gathered such momentum that a decisive conflict is now inevitable, and with the opposing armies drawn up in readiness, hostilities are expected to commence within a short time. Although no formal declaration of war has yet been issued by either side, recent pronouncements of Chiang Kai-shek and Ho Ying-chin indicate that a mandate against Feng is being prepared and that the offensive will be assumed shortly after June 1st, after the official burial in Nanking of Sun Yat-sen, unless circumstances force earlier action to be taken. A recent telegram from Han Fu-chu and twenty other Kuominchun leaders in reply to Chiang's demand that Han release the Kin-Han rolling stock seized by him, calling on Feng to lead a punitive army against Chiang, leaves little doubt as to the attitude adopted by Feng's adherents.

Government troops have steadily been mobilizing since early May for an advance against Honan and their concentrations are now believed to be complete and the stage set for the attack, the main forces at present being on the Kin-Han Railway and in the Han River valley of northern Hupeh. Chiang's forces on this front, composed of about eight of his old divisions and six divisions and five independent brigades of former Wuhan troops, comprise a total of about 130,000 men. Of this number, four dependable divisions and one independent brigade of former Wuhan troops, about 45,000 men, are in the area of Wushengkwan, and two dependable divisions, two former Wuhan divisions, and one independent brigade of a total strength of about 35,000 men are in the H an River valley near Fancheng and Siangyang. The remainder of the forces on this front are in and north of Hankow, between Hankow and the Hupeh-Honan border.

On the eastern front where Chiang's main attack will probably be made, the government forces are composed of about eleven divisions, of a total strength of about 127,000 men. The main concentrations in this area are on the Hwai River approach to Honan, at Pengpu and northwest

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of Pengpu, on the L unghai Railway from Hsuchow west as far as Tangshan, and at Tsining, in southwestern Shantung. The forces in the Pengpu area and on the Lunghai, comprising the 6th Route Army of about 75,000 men under the command of Fang Chen-wu, are composed of Fang's own two divisions and one brigade, and three old First Group divisions and two recently taken over from Wuhan. The forces at Tsining, which have been designated the 5th Route Army, are composed of Tang Sheng-chih's four divisions of about 53,000 men, two of which are still en route from Tangshan (Hopei).

In addition to the aforementioned concentrations, several divisions, including Chang Fa-kuei's famous 4th Division, are now en route down the Yangtze from Hankow, evidently intended for the Anhwei front. The remainder ofthe former Wuhan troops recently reorganized and taken into the First Group Armies are still in the vicinity of Shasi where General Ho Kuo-kung has just been sent to take command, obviously for the purpose of preventing a possible defection of these units. Liu Chen-hua's 19th and 20th Divisions, which remained in Chihli after Feng's withdrawal from Shantung and openly turned over to Chiang shortly after, are rumored to be preparing to move down the Kin-Han Railway in cooperation with Yen Hsi-shan's forces.

On the northern front, Yen Hsi-shan's concentrations are on the Kin-Han Railway between Shihchiachwang and Shunteh, and in the Feng River valley of southern Shansi, in the vicinity of Pingyang. Although little information is available on the strength of Yen's forces in the Shasi valley, it is believed that in addition to the two regular divisions and two artillery brigades known to be in the province, he has a considerable force of local militia temporarily organized as a provincial defense force. On the Kin-Han railway he has at present four of his regular divisions, and with units which can be spared from other areas under his control, it is believed that he will have about 90,000 men available for use in the coming campaign.

Although there has been much speculation as to the part Chiang Hsueh-liang will play in the approaching conflict, it was announced by him on May 18th that he will support the government and if necessary send troops to the front. His troops have been reported to be moving inside the Wall for some time, and he is at present known to have five infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade in the area between Shanhaikwan and Lwanchow under the command of Yu Hsueh-chung. It is also reported that these troops will take over the garrisoning of the Peking-Tientsin area if it becomes necessary for the Shansi forces now occupying it to go to the front, but to date no definite information on this question has been received, and there are no indications of a Shansi withdrawal for the present.

Although Feng's movements have been conducted with great secrecy and little is known of the exact location of his troops, it is believed that his main force is concentrated between Chengchow and Tungkwan, with a fairly large force at Nanyang on the Han River in southwestern Honan to meet a possible attack from that direction. Covering forces are still centered at Minkiang, Kaifeng, Taokow and Sinsiang, and the railway approaches to Honan from the south and east have been blocked by the destruction of bridges and sections of track between Sinyang and Minkiang on the Kin-Han, and east of Kweiteh on the Lunghai. There has been no rail communication with Honan from the north since May 9th, when traffic was suspended on orders from Chiang Kai-shek to prevent the seizure of rolling stock by Feng.

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Although no accurate figures are available it is estimated that Feng has a mobile strength of about 200,000 men, as compared to a government force of nearly 350,000, not counting Fengtien forces which may be sent in case of need. Feng's troops are, however, undoubtedly superior to those of Chiang Kai-shek, many of whom are of doubtful loyalty, particularly certain former W uhan units and the troops of Tang Sheng-chih and Fang Chen-wu, both of whom are believed to be but very loosely allied with Chiang, and the impending struggle will probably not be at first as overwhelmingly in favor of Chiang Kai-shek as figures would indicate.

Although no actual clashes have yet occurred, it is rumored that Feng has crossed the Yellow River and occupied southeastern Shansi. This report has not been confirmed, however, and it is not believed that Feng will take the offensive, but will wait for Chiang to attack. That he will make a determined stand in Honan seems practically certain, and a fairly long drawn out struggle, with the odds pointing to his ultimate elimination, is expected.

5. Situation in Shantung.

With the capitulation of Chu Yu-pu to L iu Chen-nien at Fushan on May 10th, and an understanding arrived at between Liu and Jan Ying-chi as to a division of control in eastern Shantung, conditions in that province are again comparatively settled. With the complete evacuation of the Japanese troops on May 20th, the railway zone has been entirely taken over by Nanking troops, with one brigade under Fang Chen-wu at Tsinan, the 11th Division formerly under Feng Yu-hsiang at Poshan, the 46th Division under Fan Hsi-shi at Weihsun, and a brigade of Nanking gendarmes under Wu Tze-yu in control of Tsingtao. Liu Chen-nien is still in control of Chefoo, and Jan Ying-chi is reported to be leaving Lungkow to take over the area east of Tehchow. Sun Tien-ying's division occupies the area in and around Laiyang. It is expected that all of these troops will remain in the province, their presence there being necessary to keep down unruly elements still in outlying districts, and will not be diverted for use in the coming campaign against Feng.

Helmer W. Lystad
Helmer W. Lystad
First Lieutenant, Infantry

No. 7533 1st Ind. JM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, May 21, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to the last sentence in Section 4, I think that Feng must ultimately assume the offensive or succumb by attrition. Without political and military changes of allegiance the odds are clearly against Feng.

2. I have reviewed the foregoing report and consider it an excellent account of the situation.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6180
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

2657-D-272

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUL 8 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

HUPEH FRONT
(Ho Ying-chin.)

2nd Route Army — Peking-Hankow Railway, North Hupeh. . . . Liu Chih

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Mingkiang	(S.Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Wushengkwan	(N.Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	"	(" ")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun)	Kwangshui	(" ")	12,000
18th "	(Liu Tiao-ping)	Kwangshui-Hwayuan	")	12,000[x]
			Total	60,000

- Route Army — Han River Valley . . . . . Chu Hsiao-liang

8th Division	(Chu Hsiao-liang)	Fancheng	(N.Hupeh)	12,000
5th "	( )	Siangyang	(" ")	4,000
9th "	(Yin Chang-kang)	"	(" ")	4,000
13th "	(Hsia Tao-yin)	Fancheng	(" ")	12,000
5th Ind.Brig.	(Wei Chung-su)	Kingmen	(" ")	2,000
8th " "	(Ho Tien-le)	Anlu	(" ")	2,000
			Total	36,000

Wuhan Garrison. . . . . Liu Tiao-ping

16th Division	(Li Shih-chiao)	Hwangchow	(N.Hupeh)	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chao Wen-tien)	Hankow	(" ")	3,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin)	Hwangan	(" ")	3,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh)	Kienli	(" ")	2,000
7th " "	(Liu Ho-ting)	Twanfeng	(" ")	2,000
			Total	16,000

3rd Route Army, — Shasi Area and Wusueh. . . . . Chang Fa-kuei

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei)	Wusueh	(E.Hupeh)	20,000
17th "	(Shih Yeh-ling)	Shasi	(W. ")	6,000
55th "	(Cheng Ju-huai)	"	(")	4,000
			Total	30,000

Miscellaneous Garrison and Bandit Suppression Units.

10th Division	(Li Yu-hsuan)	Shihnan	(W.Hupeh)	4,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Ichang	(")	12,000[x]
			Total	16,000

TOTAL HUPEH FRONT 158,000

From M/A, China No. 7531 June 5, 1929

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EASTERN FRONT

5th Route Army — (S. W. Shantung)			**Tang Sheng-chih**	
14th Division	(Liu Chun-jung)	E.Honan, N.of Lunghai Ry	15,000x	
54th "	(Wei I-san)	Tsaochow (Shantung)	16,000x	
51st "	(Li Pin-hsien)	Kufow (")	12,000x	
53rd "	(Liu Hsing)	Tsining (")	15,000x	
		Total		58,000
6th Route Army — Lunghai Railway and N.W. Anhwei . .			**Fang Chen-wu**	
1st Prov. Div.	(Yueh Wei-chun)	Pengpu (Anhwei)	15,000x	
3rd Division	(Mao Ping-wen)	Suchow (Kiangsu)	12,000	
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Kweite (Honan)	12,000x	
45th "	(Pao Kang)	Yingchow (Anhwei)	12,000x	
2nd Cav. Div.	(Chang Li-sheng)	Kwoyang (")	10,000x	
1st Ind. Brig.	(Ch'en Yueh-han)	Suchow (")	5,000x	
- " "	(Kao Kwei-tzu)	Tangshan (Kiangsu)	3,000x	
		Total		69,000
TOTAL EASTERN FRONT.				127,000

NORTHERN FRONT

11th Route Army — Peking-Hankow Railway, North Honan -			**Liu Chen-hua**	
3rd Division	(Liu Mao-en)	Changteh (N.Honan)	10,000	
4th "	(Wan Hsuan-tsai)	Paoting en route to N.Honan	10,000	
		Total		20,000

KWANGSI FRONT

7th Route Army — E. Kwangsi			**Ho Chien**	
5th Division	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Pinglo (Kwangsi)	12,000	
7th "	(Ho Chien)	Kweilin (")	4,000x	
8th "	(Chow Lan)	Wuchow (E.Kwangsi)	4,000	
19th "	(Liu Chen-hsu)	Liuchow (")	10,000	
52nd "	(Wu Sha ng)	Wuchow (E. ")	6,000	
Kwangtung				
15th Division	(Li Ming-jui)	Canton (Kwangtung)	6,000	
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui)	Takhing (")	6,000	
		Total		48,000

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Shantung Garrison Forces . . . . . Chen Tiao-yuan				
3rd Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo	(Shantung)	25,000
11th "	(Yang Hu-chen)	Changtien	(")	6,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Weihsien	(")	12,000x
49th "	(Jan Ying-chi)	Tehchow	(")	12,000x
2nd Ind.Brig	(Sun Tien-ying)	Laiyang	(Shantung)	5,000
- " "	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan)	Tsinan	(")	5,000x
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Tze-yu)	Tsingtao	(")	3,600
			Total	68,600
Other Units of First Group of Armies				
5th Division	(Hsung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tse)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
10th "	(Fang T'ing-ying)	Anking	(Anhwei)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
47th "	(Li Chia-yu)	en route from Hsuanhwa, Chihli to Yenchow, Shantung.		28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-ch'uan)	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	24,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting)	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	4,000
3rd Ind.Brig.	(Yuan Chia-sheng)	Chenkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000x
Hupeh Peace Preservation Forces	(Li Yen)	Kweichow		10,000
12th Division	(Hu Ju-yu)	Hsuchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi)	"	(")	6,000
			Total	143,000
TOTAL FIRST GROUP OF ARMIES				564,600

Note: No marks — Old Chiang Kai-shek divisions. Dependable.

x - Nanking Government troops as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's own troops. Certain of these divisions, notably those under Tang Sheng-chih and the 44th and 45th under Fang Chen-wu, are of extremely doubtful loyalty and are known to have leanings toward Feng.

Underscored — Newly acquired divisions, principally former Wuhan troops, and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions. Many of these divisions are very undependable. The division commanders of the 5th, 9th and 55th were recently arrested for conspiring with Feng Yu-hsiang.

The 3rd and 4th Divisions comprising the 11th Route Army are Feng Yu-hsiang's former 20th and 19th Divisions, respectively, which turned over to the government after Feng's withdrawal from Shantung in April.

The 15th and 57th Divisions were sent to Kwangtung from the Yangtze Valley to assist the Kwangtung forces against Kwangsi.

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The 47th Division stationed at Hswanhwafu, Chihli (former Sun Chuan-fang troops) is reported to be moving to Yenchow, Shantung.

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin

1st Route Army — Loyang-Tungkwan Area . . . . . Sun Liang-cheng

21st Division	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Loyang	(W.Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming)	"	(" ")	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou)	Sunghsien	(" ")	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Shanchow	(" ")	12,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Hsieh Shih-hsiu)	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	8,000
2nd " "	(Chen Ta-chang)	Kaifeng	(E.Honan)	8,000
3rd Mixed Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen)	Loyang	(W. ")	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin)	Lingpao	(W. ")	4,000
			Total	73,000

2nd Route Army — Chengchow area . . . . . Han Fu-chu

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	25,000
14th "	(P'ang Ping-shun)	Jungyang	(")	12,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-kai)	Chengchow	(")	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien)	Hsuchow	(")	12,000
17th Mixed Div	(Ma Hung-kuei)	Hsinghsiang	(")	12,000
			Total.	73,000

3rd Route Army — Nanyang and Hsuchow areas . . . . . Shih Yu-san

24th Division	(Shih Yu-san)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	35,000
25th "	(Chang Chi-tsung)	Nanyang	(")	12,000
			Total	47,000

4th Route Army — Sianfu area . . . . . Tsung Che-yuan

28th Division	(Tsung Che-yuan)	Sianfu	(Shensi)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(")	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin)	Tungkwan	(")	12,000
5th Mixed Brig.	(Pei Chien-chen)	Tungkwan	(")	5,000
			Total	41,000

Other Units of First Group of Armies

30th Division	(Chi Hung-chang)	Ninghsia	(Ninghsia)	12,000
31st "	(Sung Chung-li)	Sining	(Kansu)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi)	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
1st Mixed Brig.	( )	Ninghsia	(Ninghsia)	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin)	"	"	5,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsieh-pin)	Ninghsia	(Ninghsia)	4,000
9th " "	(Hsu Yu-sung)	Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
			Total	59,000

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TOTAL SECOND GROUP OF ARMIES 293,000

Notes: No marks — Original First Kuominchun units.

Underscored — Miscellaneous units.

Little information is still available on the movements of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops or his intentions.

Although it is still repeatedly reported by Nanking that Han Fu-chu, Shih Yu-san and Ma Hung-kuei have turned over to the government, these reports are generally accepted as part of Nanking's propaganda campaign and not worthy of belief. The most credible theory is that the above named commanders are merely forcing an armed neutrality in the interest of Feng Yu-hsiang and have not, and will not actually turn against him.

Feng's main concentration is believed still to be between Chengchow and Tungkwan.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command — Shang Chen.

Southwest Shansi . . . . . Ku Jen-fa

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi.)	Yuncheng	(S.W.Shansi)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Chiehchow	(" " ")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Puchow	(" " ")	9,000
4th Art.Brig.	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Taiyuanfu	(Shansi)	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang)	Kiangchow	(S.W.Shansi)	2,500
		Total		32,000

Peking-Hankow Railway . . . . . Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(Chihli)	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Shihchiachwang	"	9,000
39th "	(Chao Chen-hsiu)	"	"	9,000
27th Brigade	(An Hsi-ku)	Chengting	"	6,000
		Total		33,000

Peking-Tientsin Area . . . . . Shang Chen

34th Division	(Hsu Yung-chang)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	"	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	"	"	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	"	9,000
6th Art.Brig.	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Peking	"	2,500
7th " " "	(Peng Ch'i)	Tientsin	"	2,500
		Total		41,000

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Suiyuan Area			**Hsu Yung-Chang**	
37th Division	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan (Suiyuan)		9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	" (")		6,000
26th "	(Ho Yuan-pi)	Tatung (")		6,000
1st Cav.Div.	(T'an Ching-lin)	Tatung-Fenchen ")		6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying)	Paotou (")		3,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu)	" (")		4,000
			Total	34,000
Chahar Area			**Yang Ai-yuan**	
41st Division	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan (Chahar)		9,000
3rd Cav. Div.	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor (")		4,000
			Total	13,000
TOTAL THIRD GROUP OF ARMIES				153,000

Notes: **No mark** — Old Shansi units.

Underscored — More recently acquired units.

Although the movements of Yen Hsi-shan's forces in the Suiyuan area, the Peking-Tientsin area, and on the Peking-Hankow railway are fairly well known, little definite information on his dispositions in Southwestern Shansi has been received. It is known, however, that in addition to the regular forces shown above, he has a considerable force of local militia in this vicinity, the strength of which can not be determined.

One brigade of the 34th Division, stationed at Tangshan, Chihli, has moved to Suiyuan.

The 42nd Division stationed at Tientsin is reported to be preparing to move by motor bus and marching to Paotingfu, Chihli. This report, however, has not been confirmed.

Miscellaneous Units.

(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangtung				
1st Division	(Chen Chi-t'ang)	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsu Ching-tang)	Hweichow	(Kwangtung)	12,000
3rd "	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	Canton	(Kwangsi)	13,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Teng Hsi-tseng)	Wuchow	(Kwangtung)	4,000
Yunnan				
38th Army	(Lung Yun)	Kweiyang	(Kweichow)	20,000
7th Ind.Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	Yunnanfu	(")	4,000
Szechuan				
21st Army	(Liu Hsiang)	Patung	(Hupeh)	40,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tang)	Peichow	(Szechwan)	8,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(")	60,000

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Szechuan - cont'd.

Units of Doubtful Allegiance

28th Army	(Teng Hsi-ho)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	40,000
29th "	(Tien Tsung-hao)	Tzechow	(")	20,000

Kiangsi

Three Divisions of 6th Army	10,000

Fukien

Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Kuo Feng-ming)	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)	(")	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia-Shu-hsuan)	(")	2,000

Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)	(Fukien)	4,000
2nd "	(Li Shou-kuo)	(")	4,000

Provisionally Incorporated National Government Troops

1st Division	(Chang Chen)	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)	Fuchow	(Fukien)	8,000

Marines

1st Brigade	(Liu Chung)	(Fukien)	15,000
2nd "	(Liu Shou-kou)	(")	15,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen	10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Force	
Two Reserve Regiments	
One Gendarmerie Battalion	
One Artillery Corps	
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000

Total Miscellaneous Units 325,500

TOTAL NATIONALIST FORCES - - - - 1,336,100

Miscellaneous Forces Actually at War With or Opposed to National Government.

Kwangsi

4th Army	(Kweihsien)	(Kwangsi)	20,000
1st Ind. Div.	(Pingnan)	"	12,000
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops	(Kweihsien)	"	5,000

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Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)	N. Kwangsi	12,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000

Szechwan

20th Army	(Yang Sen)	Anyu	(Szechwan)	40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)	Lochih	"	10,000
7 Brigades	(Lo Tso-chou)		"	20,000
2 "	(Li Ch'i-shang)		"	3,000
			Total	130,000

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikwan-Lwanchow area . . . . . **Yu-Hsueh-chung**

4th Division	(Liu Yi-fei)	Changli)		10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Yungping)		11,000
14th "	(Hsu Ying-ho)	Funing)		10,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu)	Shanhaikuan)		10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Lwanchow)	Chihli	10,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng)	Lengkow)		6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Yunping)		6,000
31st Army	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Liushowying)		8,000
			Total	71,000

Manchuria

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Hsinminhsien	(")	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	10,000
5th "	(Ting Ying-pin)	Kaokiao	(Fengtien)	10,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Suichung	(")	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu)	Tungliao	(")	11,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Fakuhsien	(")	10,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	Taonan	(Kirin)	11,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang)	Lingyuan	(Jehol)	10,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art.Regt.	(Shanhaikwan)	Chihli	6,000
2nd " "	(Chinchow)	Fengtien	6,000
3rd " "	(")	"	6,000
4th " "	(Chaoyang)	Jehol	6,000
5th " "	(Chinchow)	Fengtien	6,000
6th " "	(Mukden)	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	(Peicheng)	"	6,000
8th " " "	(")	"	6,000

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Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total, not including 31st Army (Jehol troops), near Shanhaikuan	220,600

In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

It will be noted that the artillery regiment appears to be excessively large, the reason being that the present regiment corresponds roughly to the former brigade.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brigade	(Li Kuei-lin	)	Changchun	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	)	Yilan	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	)	Yenchi	)	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	)	Kirin, Wuchang	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	)	Harbin	) Kirin	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	)	Suiyuan	)	10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	)	Fuyu	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	)	Muling	)	8,000
				Total	72,000

Heilungkiang

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	)	Siutung	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	)	Payen	)	7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan	)	Fulaerdi	) Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen	)	Hsinglungchen	)	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	)	Manchouli	) lung-	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	)	Heiho	)	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	)	Hulan	) kiang	4,000
				Total	37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE - 329,500

No further information has been obtained on the reorganization of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces mentioned in last report, except in the case of the units shown above as divisions. It is not believed, however, that these units, all of which have been sent inside the Wall, have actually been reorganized in any sense of the word, the change being merely one of designation.

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Jehol.

7th	Brigade	(Chang Shen-yun)	Jehol)		6,000
22nd	"	(Fu Ch'un)	Luanping)		6,000
38th	"	(Tung Fu-ting)	Chaoyang)		7,000
51st	"	(Liu Hsiang-chin)	Fengning)		7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shan-sheng)	Linhsi)	Jehol	4,500
2nd	" "	(Chia Kuo-cheng)	Pingchuan)		4,500
3rd	" "	(Chao Kuo-tseng)	Chefeng)		4,500
17th	" "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu)	Jehol)		4,500
19th	" "	(Shih Wen-hua)	Luanping)		4,500

Total, including 8,000 troops of 31st Army inside Great Wall. . . . 56,500

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,852,100

1. General.

With the Sun Yat-sen ceremonies successfully ended and troops in readiness on all fronts, the long expected drive against Feng Yu-hsiang has yet failed to materialize and the general situation has become more confusing than ever. Several minor clashes are reported to have occurred, but these reports cannot definitely be confirmed or refuted. The ring thrown around Feng's forces in Honan by Chiang Kai-shek has slowly been closing in until in the south, east and north, government troops are now within the Honan borders, with a fairly large concentration of Yen Hsi-shan's forces in the vicinity of Yuncheng, southwestern Shansi. Far greater activity has been shown during the past two weeks, however, in mutual denunciations and efforts to bring about Feng's downfall by other means than fighting, the most important events in this connection being the reported betrayal of Feng Yu-hsiang by Generals Han Fu-chu, Shih Yiu-san, Ma Hung-kuei and several other old Kuominchun commanders, and promises of retirement reported to have been made by Feng to Yen Hsi-shan. Yen Hsi-shan's attitude is still doubtful, although he continues to move troops from the Tientsin-Peking area to the passes in southwestern Shansi and Suiyuan, at the same time inviting Feng to take a trip abroad with him. There have been no further indications as to the part that Mukden will play in the coming struggle, except a manifesto condemning Feng issued shortly after the Military Conference at Mukden on May 27th.

With Nanking's propaganda campaign against Feng in full swing and the war with "silver bullets" at its height, this situation and its possibilities are so confusing that no predictions are possible and anything may result. With little heart for fighting in either camp and a variety of interests and ambitions involved, it would not be surprising now if the status quo obtained for some time, with the forces under Han Fu-chu, Shih Yiu-san, Ma Hung-kuei and Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi preserving the balance of power by maintaining a buffer state between Feng's main forces and Chiang Kai-shek.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

In the South the conflict between Kwangtung and Kwangsi has ended with the complete collapse of Kwangsi. Wuchow and Swatow are now both occupied by government troops, with the Kwangsi forces on the western front in full retreat into Kwangsi, and those in eastern Kwangtung scattered throughout the province; Lung Yun in Yunnan is reported to have made a successful drive against the Kweichow forces, cooperating with Kwangsi, and driven them back inside the Kwangsi border. Although the Kwangsi troops have withdrawn into the province with comparatively few losses, they are now completely surrounded by troops loyal to the government, and with no means of renewing their supplies, the Kwangsi venture is believed to be ended.

3. Chiang Kai-shek——Feng Yu-hsiang.

As mentioned above, the past two weeks have been marked by great activity directed towards the defeat of Feng without resort to force, the results of which are still impossible to estimate. Following the publication of a telegram from Feng Yu-hsiang to the foreign ministers in Peking and the consuls in Shanghai on May 20th accusing Chiang and the government of violating the regulations of the Kuomintang and monopolizing the recent party congress, and stating that he, Feng, was leading a punitive expedition against Chiang, the Central Executive Committee on May 23rd voted that Feng should be dropped from membership in the party and dismissed from all posts in the government, and called on all Kuominchun commanders to desert him. Ten charges against Feng were made, among them that he is taking arms and money from Russia and has entered into a secret treaty with the Soviet, and that he had conspired with the Kwangsi party against the government. At the same time the heads of the five chief departments of the government issued a statement pledging full support to Chiang, and 68 divisional commanders in a circular telegram renewed their pledges of support to the government. The Central Propaganda Bureau on May 30th announced that $500,000 would be set aside for propaganda against Feng, and a large number of men sent into Shensi and Kansu to undermine his position there. On May 23rd it was announced from Nanking that Han Fu-chu, one of Feng Yu-hsiang's leading generals, had telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek on May 23rd pledging his allegiance to the Central Government and announcing that he had concentrated 100,000 troops east of Loyang and was awaiting instructions from the government. Several days later Shih Yiu-san, Ma Hung-kuei, and several other leading Kuominchun commanders were reported to have also announced their allegiance to Nanking and their readiness to obey the government's commands. In the meantime, Yen Hsi-shan was reported to have sent an inyitation to Feng to meet him at Yuncheng to discuss a trip abroad together, and Feng is said to have replied that he had prepared his resignation, which would be issued soon, would be glad to go abroad with Yen, and would meet him as soon as possible. C hiang immediately telegraphed Feng suggesting that he act on Yen's proposal to go abroad, and promised protection to him of he would actually leave the country.

The reports of Feng's betrayal by Han Fu-chu, Shih Yiu-san, Ma Hung-kuei and the others have persisted, and are claimed by usually reliable sources to be true, and a clash between Han's troops and those of Sun Liang-chang is reported to have occurred at Tengfang, Honan, about May 30th. Shih Yiu-san is reported to have conferred with Ho Ying-chin at Hankow on the situation and to be now withdrawing from Nanyang to

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Suchow, on the Lunghai Railway. Yen Hsi-shan is said to be at Yuncheng awaiting Feng's arrival there, and a special train arranged for their departure, and Japanese sources claim that steamship reservations for Yen and Feng have been made at Tientsin.

Notwithstanding the above alleged turn of events, however, nothing definite has yet developed and there is little either to deny or confirm the many rumors afloat. There has been little military activity on the Hupeh front except the replacing of several unreliable former Wuhan divisions by two good divisions from the Nanking area and a slight advance of Liu Chih's army on the Kin-Han Railway to within the Honan border. On the eastern front, however, the advance guards of the armies under Tang Sheng-chih and Fang Chen-wu have been pushing westward from Tsining along the Lunghai Railway, and up the Ta Sha Ho from Yingchow, Anhwei, and are now well within the Honan border. Latest reports state that these forces have been ordered to make a general advance on Kaifeng in conjunction with an advance up the Kin-Han Railway on Chumatien by Liu Chih, and an advance down the Kin-Han against Sinsiang by the forces under Liu Chen-hua. The latter forces, until recently under Feng Yu-hsiang, were suddenly moved from Yangtsun and Pachou, Chihli, to the Chengte area about two weeks ago. Chiang Kai-shek has established his headquarters at Hsuchow, Anhwei, and the various route commanders of the anti-Feng campaign have been named.

In spite of the persistent reports as to Han Fu-chu's loyalty to the government, no reports indicate any cooperation between Chiang's present movements and those of Han Fu-chu, nor has any explanation been made as to why, with Han Fu-chu in control of the Chengchow area for the government, Chiang's advance into this area is making such slow progress. The action of Han and the other Kuominchun commanders concerned is generally regarded, therefore, as merely a ruse de guerre resorted to by Feng to retain possession of Honan and at the same time prevent decisive action by the government against the remainder of his forces in western Honan and Shensi. Yen Hsi-shan, while avowedly at Yuncheng waiting for Feng Yu-hsiang to go abroad with him, is still moving troops from the Tientsin area to southwestern Honan, and is reported to be erecting strong fortifications at Yuncheng and near Tsikowchen, on the Yellow River in western Honan. Defensive measures are also still in progress in Suiyuan.

As usual, little is known of Feng's movements. It appears, however, that Han Fu-chu with about five divisions is in and south of Chengchow, with Ma Hung-kuei's cavalry forces covering the approaches from the north and east. Shih Yiu-san's forces of two or three divisions are still in the Nanyang area and at Suchow on the Kin-Han Railway south of Chengchow, and the remainder of Feng's main forces are distributed between Loyang and Tungkwan, where several strong defensive positions are believed to have been constructed.

The Fengtien forces inside the Wall, which were expected to take over the Peking-Tientsin area under certain eventualities are still in the Shanhaikuan-Lwanchow area. Although one brigade of the 3rd Group Division now garrisoning Tangshan has been moved to Suiyuan, there are still no further indications of Fengtien forces moving in to this area except the recent transfer of the 8th Jehol Army from Jehol to Shanhaikwan. This move may indicate that a new garrison force at Shanhaikwan is being moved in to enable Yu Hsueh-chung's forces to move up the railway towards Tientsin when the occasion arrives.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

4. Kwangsi-Kwangtung War.

Kwangsi's last attack on Canton, which stopped suddenly on May 20th, completely collapsed on May 22nd when supplies gave out, and the Kwangtung forces, reinforced by two divisions and an air squadron sent down from the Yangtze Valley, drove the opposing forces back in the direction of Wuchow. Following up the advantage, the reinforced Kwangtung forces pushed on up the West River, and in conjunction with the Hunan forces under Ho Chien converging on Wuchow from the north, took that city with little opposition on June 2nd.

In the east, Chang Chen's Fukien column advancing on Swatow scattered the pro-Kwangsi units in that vicinity and by May 30th was in complete control of the eastern part of the province.

The Kwangsi forces in the west are now retreating westward into Kwangsi in the direction of Kweiyang, pursued by Kwangtung troops, while one division of Ho Chien's column has arrived in Liuchow, attempting to cut off the Kwangsi retreat.

The Yunnan forces under General Lung Yun, who launched an attack on the pro-Kwangsi Kweichow forces under Chow Hsi-cheng and captured Kweiyang on May 27th, have driven the Kweichow forces into Kwangsi and are now advancing eastward with a view to joining the Hunanese column in cleaning up the remnants of the Kwangsi forces.

Surrounded on all sides and with government troops closing in from several directions, it is expected that the rebellious Kwangsi troops will shortly be entirely dispersed and that Kwangsi province will again soon be under National Government control.

Helmer W. Lystad.
Helmer W. Lystad,
First L ieutenant, Infantry.

Distribution:
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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - June 5, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

Parker G. Tenney
Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 28 1929
2657-D-27
273
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

G-2 Report. 6910.

CHINA (MILITARY)

Subject: Situation in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 26 1929

Mr. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, gave the following statement as to the situation in China in the House of Commons on the 15th. July. In adding to this report he stated, "Perhaps the item of major interest concerns the report that the Soviet Government have issued an ultimatum to the Chinese Government arising out of the situation in Manchuria. On this matter I have no information except that which has appeared in the Press".

"During the month of May there was a serious invasion of the province of Kwangtung by Kwangsi forces. The invasion was repelled and Kwangtung troops advanced into Kwangsi. The Canton authorities claim that they have now captured Nanning, the capital of the province, and have broken the power of the Kwangsi faction.

The strained situation between Feng Yuhsiang and the National Government developed into a state of war towards the end of May, when Marshal Feng destroyed the railways giving access to his territory and the State Council issued a mandate ordering his subjugation and accusing him of receiving a monthly subsidy from the Soviet Government and of being in league with Communists.

The subsequent campaign involved very little actual fighting, Marshal Feng standing strictly on the defensive, while Yen-Hsi-shan, the Governor of Shansi, who has been ordered to assist in the attack on him, maintained a attitude of detachment. On 28th June, Marshal Chiang Kaishek arrived in Peking, followed two days later by Yen-shan, Marshal Chang Hsuehliang also arrived in Peking from Manchuria on 7th. July, Both Chiang Kia-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang left Peking on 10th July, the former for Nanking and the latter for Mukden, and the position between Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Chiang Kai-shek remains obscure.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Harbin reports that the Chinese authorities took over the Chinese Eastern Railway Telegraph Administration on 10th July. Various Russian institutions were closed on the same day by the police on account of their alleged propagandist activities. The Communist employes of the railway are being kept under strict surveillance; 35 of them were deported on 10th July, and, according to the Consul's information, a further batch, including the general and assistant managers, was to be deported on 11th. July.

M. A. London. Report No. 25537. July 16, 1929.

The general and assistant managers of the railway and the Soviet heads of all the departments, have been dismissed and replaced by Chinese."

M. A. London. Report No. 25537. July 16, 1929.

JOHN R. THOMAS, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Military Attache.

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. AUG 3 1929

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

HUPEH FRONT
(Ho Ying-chin)

2nd Route Army -- Peking-Hankow Railway, North Hupeh . . . . Liu Chih

1st Division	(Liu Chih	)	Yencheng	(S.Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung	)	Wushengkuan	(N.Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	)	"	(" ")	12,000
11th "	(Tsao Wan-hsun	)	"	(" ")	12,000
18th "	(Liu Tiao-ping	)	Kwangshui-Hwayuan	(" ")	12,000x
				Total	60,000

- Route Army -- Han River Valley . . . . . Chu Shao-liang

8th Division	(Chu Shao-liang	)	Fancheng	(N.Hupeh)	12,000
5th "	(	)	Siangyang	(" ")	4,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	)	"	(" ")	4,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	)	Huangchow	(E. ")	12,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	)	FanCheng	(N.Hupeh)	24,000
5th Ind.Brig.	(Wei Chung-su	)	Anlu	(" ")	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-le	)	"	(" ")	2,000
				Total	60,000

Wuhan Garrison . . . . . Liu Tiao-ping

1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	)	Hankow	(N.Hupeh)	3,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin	)	Kwangan	(" ")	3,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh	)	Kienli	(" ")	2,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	)	Chishui	(E. ")	5,000
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao	)	Hankow	(N. ")	2,000
				Total	15,000

3rd Route Army -- Shasi Area and Wusueh . . . . . Chang Fa-kuei

4th Division	(Chu Hui-jeh	)	Ichang	(W.Hupeh)	20,000
11th Ind.Brig.	(Wan Yu-wu	)	Huangchow	(" ")	6,000
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu	)	"	(" ")	4,000
				Total	30,000

Miscellaneous Garrison and Bandit Suppression Units.

10th Division	(Li Yu-hsuan	)	Shihnan	(W.Hupeh)	4,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan	)	Ichang	(" ")	12,000x
				Total	16,000

TOTAL HUPEH FRONT 181,000

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EASTERN FRONT

5th Route Army -- (S. W. Shantung) . . . . . **Tang Sheng-chih**

4th	Division	(Liu Kuei-tang)	Tsining	(Shantung)	6,000
14th	"	(Liu Chun-jung)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	15,000x
54th	"	(Wei I-san)	"	(")	16,000x
51st	"	(Li Pin-hsien)	"	(")	12,000x
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing)	"	(")	15,000x
1st	Cav.Div.	(Kung Hao-sheng)	Lanfeng	(")	6,000x
				Total	70,000

6th Route Army -- Lunghai Railway and N. W. Anhwei . . . **Fang Chen-wu**

3rd	Division	(Mao Ping-wen)	Kueite	(Honan)	12,000
44th	"	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Hsuchang	(")	12,000x
45th	"	(Pao Kang)	"	(")	12,000x
2nd	Cav.Div.	(Chang Li-sheng)	"	(")	10,000x
1st	Ind.Brig.	(Kao Kwei-tze)	Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	3,000x
1st	"	(Chen Yueh-han)	Suchow	) Anhwei)	5,000x
				Total	54,000

TOTAL EASTERN FRONT 124,000

NORTHERN FRONT

11th Route Army -- Peking-Hankow Railway, North Honan - **Liu Chen-hua**

3rd	Division	(Liu Mao-en)	Changteh	(N.Honan)	10,000
4th	"	(Wan Hsuan-tsai)	Paoting	(Chihli)	10,000
				Total	20,000

KWANGSI FRONT

7th Route Army -- E. Kwangsi . . . . . **Ho Chien**

5th	Division	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Pingfan	(Kwangsi)	12,000
7th	"	(Ho Chien)	Kueiping	(")	4,000x
8th	"	(Chow Lan)	Nanning	(W. ")	4,000
19th	"	(Liu Chen-hsu)	"	(" ")	10,000
52nd	"	(Wu Shang)	Kueilin	(N. ")	6,000

Kwangtung

15th	Division	(Li Ming-jui)	Nanning	(W.Kwangsi)	6,000
57th	"	(Yang Teng-hui)	"	(" ")	6,000
				Total	48,000

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Shantung Garrison Forces				Chen Tiao-yuan
3rd Division	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo	(Shantung)	25,000
11th "	(Yang Hu-chen)	Poshan	(")	6,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Weihsien	(")	12,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-chi)	Techow	(")	12,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan)	Tsinan	(")	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying)	Kiaochow	(")	5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Tze-yu)	Tsingtao	(")	3,600
		Total		68,600

Other Units of First Group of Armies

5th Division	(Hsiung Shih-hui)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tse)	Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
10th "	(Fang Ting-ying)	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
47th "	(Li Chia-yu)	Hsuchow	(Shantung)	28,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting)	Tungcheng	(Anhwei)	4,000
3rd Ind.Brig.	(Yuan Chia-sheng)	Chenkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000x
Hupeh Peace Preservation Force	(Li Yen)	Anshan	(Kueichow)	10,000
12th Division	(Hu Jo-yu)	Hsuchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi)	"	(")	6,000
7th Ind.Brig.	(Li Ch'i)	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000
1st Prov.Div.	(Yueh Wei-chun)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	15,000x
		Total		136,000

TOTAL FIRST GROUP OF ARMIES. 577,600

Note: Not underscored -- Old Chiang Kai-shek divisions. Dependable.

X - Nanking Government troops as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's own troops.

Underscored -- Newly acquired divisions, principally former Wuhan troops, and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions. Many of these divisions are very undependable.

The 48th division of Hsu Yuan-chuan has moved to Fancheng in Hupeh and is placed under Chu Shao-liang. The 16th division of Li Shih-chiao was changed to 13th Ind. Brig., with appointment of Hsu Chia-yu as its commander, and some 1,000 men have been disbanded. The 14th Ind. Brig. under Peng Chi-piao is organized from an old emergency brigade in Hupeh. Chu Hui-jeh is now acting commander of the 4th division in the 3rd Route Army. The 11th and 12th Ind. Brigs. under Wan Yu-wu and Hsu Shen-yu respectively were changed from the 55th and 17th divisions. The 4th division of Liu Kuei-tang and the 1st cavalry division of Kung Hao-sheng are newly organized units under Tang Sheng-chih of the 5th Route Army. The 7th Ind. Brig. under Li Chi has moved to Wuhu from Tuanfeng. The 1st Prov. Div. under Yueh Wei-chun has moved to Hankow from Pengpu.

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Second Group of Armies.
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin

1st Route Army -- Loyang-Tungkwan area . . . . . Sun Liang-cheng

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-shun)	Loyang	(W.Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	"	(" ")	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming)	Tungkuan	(" ")	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou)	Sunghsien	(" ")	12,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-hai)	Shenchow	(" ")	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Loyang	(" ")	12,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih)	Tungkwan	(" ")	8,000
2nd " "	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Kaifeng	(E.Honan)	8,000
3rd Mixed Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen)	Loyang	(W. ")	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin)	Lingpao	(" ")	4,000
			Total	97,000

2nd Route Army -- Chengchow area . . . . . Han Fu-chu

20th Division	(Han Fu-chu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	25,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien)	"	(")	12,000
17th Mixed Div	(Ma Hung-kuei)	Kueite	(")	12,000
			Total	49,000

3rd Route Army -- Nanyang and Hsuchow areas . . . . . Shih Yu-san

25th Division	(Chang Chi-tsung)	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
			Total	12,000

4th Route Army -- Sianfu area . . . . . Sung Che-yuan

28th Division	(Sung Che-yuan)	Sianfu	(Shensi)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(")	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin)	Shenchow	(")	12,000
5th Mixed Brig.	(Pai Chien-shen)	Tungkuan	(")	5,000
			Total	41,000

Other Units of Second Group of Armies

24th Division	(Shih Yu-san)	Pochow	(Anhui)	25,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang)	Ninghsia	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Sung Lien-chung)	Sining	(")	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi)	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
1st Mixed Brig.	(Men Chih-chung)	Ninghsia	(Kansu)	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en)	Lanchow	(")	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin)	"	(")	5,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsieh-pin)	Ninghsia	(")	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng)	Chungwei	(")	4,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang)	Chinchow	(")	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen)	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua)	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
			Total	130,000

TOTAL SECOND GROUP OF ARMIES 329.000

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Notes: Not Underscored -- Original First Kuominchun units

Underscored -- Miscellaneous units.

Little information is still available on the movements of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops. Feng is said to be ready for trip abroad with Yen Hsi-shan prior to retirement.

The 24th division under Shih Yu-san, who is said to have turned against Feng Yu-hsiang, has been removed to Pochow, Anhwei, by the Nanking Government.

The 1st, 2nd and Training divisions are newly organized units, as reported.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command -- Shang Chen.

Southwest Shansi . . . . . Ku Jen-fa				
26th Division	(Ho Yuan-pi)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Chiehchow	(S.W. ")	9,000
32nd "	(Li P'ei-chi)	Yuncheng	(" " ")	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Puchow	(" " ")	9,000
4th Art.Brig.	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Taiyuan	(")	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang)	Kiangchow	(S.W. ")	2,500
			Total	38,000
Peking-Hankow Railway . . . . . Shang Chen				
33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(Chihli)	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Shihchiachuang	")	9,000
39th "	(Chao Chen-hsiu)	"	(")	9,000
27th Brigade	(An Hsi-ku)	Chengting	(")	6,000
			Total	33,000
Peking-Tientsin area . . . . . Shang Chen				
34th Division	(Hsu Yung-chang)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(")	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	"	(")	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	(")	9,000
6th Art.Brig.	(Chow Chun-chieh	Peking	(")	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i)	Tientsin	(")	2,500
			Total	41,000
Suiyuan area . . . . . Hsu Yung-chang				
37th Division	(Wang Ching-huo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	"	(")	6,000
1st Cav.Div.	(T'an Ching-lin)	Tatung-Fenchen	")	6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying)	Paotou	(")	3,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu)	"	(")	4,000
			Total	28,000

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Chahar Area				Yang Ai-yuan
41st Division	(Chang K'uei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
3rd Cav.Div.	(Wang Kuei-to)	Dolonor	(")	4,000
			Total	13,000
TOTAL THIRD GROUP OF ARMIES				153,000

Notes: Not Underscored -- Old Shansi units.

Underscored -- More recently acquired units.

One brigade of the 34th division, stationed at Tangshan, Chihli, has moved to Suiyuan.

The 137th Brigade of the 34th Division under Fu Tso-yi, stationed at Tientsin, has returned to Taiyuan, Shansi.

Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangtung				
1st Division	(Chen Chi-t'ang)	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsu Ching-tang)	Lungyen	(S. Fukien)	12,000
3rd "	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	Canton	(Kwangtung)	13,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Teng Hsi-tseng)	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	4,000
Yunnan				
38th Army	(Lung Yun)	Kueiyang	(Kwangsi)	20,000
7th Ind.Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	4,000
Szechuan				
21st Army	(Liu Hsiang)	Patung	(Hupeh)	40,000
23rd "	(Kuo Ju-tung)	Peichow	(Szechuan)	8,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(")	60,000
Units of Doubtful Allegiance				
28th Army	(Teng Hsi-hou)	Chengtu	(Szechuan)	40,000
29th "	(Tien Sung-yao)	Tzechow	(")	20,000
Kiangsi				
Three Divisions of 6th Army				10,000

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Fukien

Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Kuo Feng-ming)	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan)	"	2,000

Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo)	"	4,000

Provisionally Incorporated National Government Troops

1st Division	(Chang Chen)	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)	Fuchow	(Fukien)	8,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen, Commander of 8th Army.	10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Force	
Two Reserve Regiments	
One Gendarmerie Battalion	
One Artillery Corps	
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000

Total Miscellaneous Units..... 295,500

TOTAL NATIONALIST FORCES - - - - 1,355,100

Miscellaneous Forces Actually at War With or Opposed to National Government.

Kwangsi

4th Army	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	Nanning	(Kwangsi)	20,000
1st Ind.Div.	(Teng Yen-huei)	Pingnan	"	12,000
1 Regt.Bodyguard Troops		Kweihsien	"	5,000

Kwaichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)		(N.Kwangsi)	12,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		"	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		"	3,000

Szechuan

20th Army	(Yang Sen)	Neikiang	(Szechuan)	40,000
22nd "	(Lai Hsin-hui)	Lochih	"	10,000
7 Brigades	(Lo Tso-chow)		"	20,000
2 "	(Li Ch'i-shang)		"	3,000

Total 130,000

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(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikwan-Lwanchow area . . . . . **Yu Hsueh-chung**

4th	Division	(liu Yi-fei	Changli		10,000
6th	"	(Li Chen-t'ang	Yungping		11,000
14th	"	(Hsu Ying-ho	Funing		10,000
23rd	"	(Ma Ting-fu	Shanhaikuan		10,000
27th	"	(Liu Nai-ch'ang	Lwanchow	Chihli	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng	Lengkow		6,000
3rd	" "	(Chang Shu-seng	Yunping		6,000
31st	Army	(Cheng Tso-sheng	Liushowying		8,000

Total 71,000

Manchuria

1st	Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd	"	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	Yingkow	(")	10,000
3rd	"	(Ho Chu-kuo	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	10,000
5th	"	(Ting Ying-pin	Kaokiao	(Fengtien)	10,000
12th	"	(Chang Ting-shu	Chinchow	(")	10,000
16th	"	(Ying Chen-fu	Tungliao	(")	10,000
19th	"	(Sun Te-chuan	Fakuhsien	(")	11,000
20th	"	(Fu Chan-k'uei	Taonan	(Kirin)	11,000
24th	"	(Huang Shih-yueh	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th	"	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang	Lingyuan	(Jehol)	10,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st	Art.Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd	" "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd	" "	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th	" "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th	" "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th	" "	Mukden	(")	6,000
7th	Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	(")	6,000
8th	" " "	"	(")	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800

Total, not including 31st Army (Jehol troops) near Shanhaikuan 220,600

In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

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It will be noted that the artillery regiment appears to be excessively large, the reason being that the present regiment corresponds roughly to the former brigade.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brigade	(Li Kuei-lin	) Changchun	)		7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Yilan	)		8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Yenchi	)		7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Kirin,Wuchang	)		15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Harbin	)	Kirin	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Suiyuan	)		10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) Fuyu	)		10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) Muling	)		8,000
				Total	72,000

Heilungkiang

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Siutung	)		7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payen	)		7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan	) Fulaerdi	)	Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen	) Hsinglungchen	)	lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) Manchouli	)	kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)		4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)		4,000
				Total	37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE - 329,500

No further information has been obtained on the reorganization of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces mentioned in last report, except in the case of the units shown above as divisions. It is not believed, however, that these units, all of which have been sent inside the Wall, have actually been reorganized in any sense of the word, the change being merely one of designation.

Jehol

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)		6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Luanping	)		6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)		7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)		7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	)	Jehol	4.500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)		4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)		4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)		4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Luanping	)		4,500

Total, including 8,000 troops of 31st Army inside Great Wall. . . . 56,500

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,881,100

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General

With the exception of the change of station effected by Tang Sheng-chih's troops from Shantung into Chengchow and the movement further westward of the troops of Fang Chen-wu there has been very little movement during the period under review. Mandates have been issued ordering Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san to move back into the areas vacated by Tang Sheng-chih and Fang Chen-wu respectively, in Shantung and eastern Honan, but the movement had not started when this report closed.

The mandate mentioned above is significant in that it shows that Nanking does not deem it adviseable to have the disaffected troops in close contact with those of Feng. It would seem as though Nanking had adopted the viewpoint held universally in the North, - that Han et al, are still at heart Feng men.

Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Yen Hsi-shan.

On June 25th Chiang arrived in Peking, and on the same date Feng reached Taiyuanfu. On the 30th Yen came to Peking, leaving Feng in a famous temple, Chintze, near Taiyuan.

These movements portend a peaceful settlement of the Chiang-Feng controversy, although there remain many questions to be settled before Chiang and Yen return to their capitals. Feng, as reported previously, is in no position to fight, and Chiang's main purpose in coming north is to get him to leave China and to persuade Yen Hsi-shan to take over his troops.

Since Feng has come to Shansi the Nanking attitude towards him has changed completly. In an address by Chiang to Peking newspaper correspondents, Feng was recently referred to as the head of the "Reorganizationists", - those who believe the government is not perfect and wish to change it. The week previously he and his men had been called rebels.

If Feng does go, and reservations from Tientsin have been made, Yen will probably go too, because of the fact that he does not wish the doubtful honor of commanding the Kuominchun. Feng's army is stationed in the famine stricken and poor provinces of Shensi and Kansu. These provinces are not able now to provide sustenance for their civilian population to say nothing of Feng's army.

The Kuominchun is in arrears in pay. If Yen were to assume command, the responsibility of paying these men and feeding them would be largely his. Of course the Nanking government has promised to pay and ration these troops, but in the event that there were "no fund available" this White Elephant would eat Yen out of house and home in a few months - and the coffers of Shansi would resemble those of Shensi. Yen is a model provincial governor. His dreams do not run beyond his own province, and so long as Shansi is peaceful and its inhabitants well-fed, Yen has no axes to grind. Therefore the commad of this other army, which to an ambitious man might have its appeal, to Yen is fraught with danger.

To all of Chiang's appeals that Yen remain, so far he has remained obdurate. Great presure, however, is being brought to bear on him. Not a day passes but that emissaries from the South reach Peking to add their pleas to those of China's President.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

This discussion should not be closed without drawing attention to the fact that Feng has trusted himself to Yen. Without a doubt these two are closer now than ever before and closer than are Chiang and Yen. In the event that Feng does not retire, a close co-operation may be expected between them.

As in the past, the military and political situation are so closely intertwined, that it is impossible to classify most events as either military or political, and for this period when there has been strictly speaking almost no military activity, this report might seem to be largely political. Yet here in China, political and military issues more nearly merge, than in any other country in the world. Nothing is ever effected without compromise, and the political situation nearly always controls the military.

Kwangtung-Kwangsi

The resistance of the old Wu-han clique in Kwangsi, reported as weakening in the last Situation Report, has practically collapsed. Nanning has fallen and Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung are reported to have fled. Pai Chung-hsi with a few loyal remnants is still in the mountain of South-west Kwangsi, where due to the topography of the country and to the Chinese dislike of direct action, he will probably be allowed to remain.

Ho Chien, the governor of Hunan is withdrawing his troops to his own province because of the fact that the Kwangtung forces were able to consolidate their gains more rapidly than was he. Ho Chien was forced to move by land, - the Cantonese had the river system to aid them - and while Ho Chien was anxious to have Kwangsi under his sway, his inevitable slowness of movement precluded the possibility.

Parker G Tenney

PARKER G. TENNEY,
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

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2657-D-276
1929
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WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

June 28, 1929

No. 7551

Subject: "A Revaluation of the Revolution"

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. AUG 3 1929

1. The enclosed article, which appeared in the June 15, 1929 issue of "The China Weekly Review" is believed to have been written by Y. L. Tang, until recently Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

2. It is desired to invite attention particularly to the paragraph "Indifference of the People". This paragraph, and in fact the whole article, expresses opinions which have often been voiced by this office, opinions which are coming to be held by more and more observers, both Chinese and foreign.

For the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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A REVALUATION OF THE REVOLUTION

Editor, The China Weekly Review:

Sir:

The Na tional Revolution has been waged by the Kuomintang and the chief instrument of the Kuomintang is the Three People's Principles.

While Dr. Sun lived there was no question as to leadership; his word was law, not only to the Party but to the Nationalist Government as well. To be sure, there were serious disagreements and personal differences among the Party leaders; but so great was Dr. Sun's authority that Party solidarity was never threatened. He had only to pronounce his opinion and at once there was unity. Had he lived to this day, China's internal situation as well as its international position would have been vastly different from what they are today. That he should have died when he did, was, no doubt, not only a fatal blow to the political party which he founded but also a great misfortune to hundreds of millions of humanity who were looking forward to seeing a regime which would govern in the interest of the people. But with his passing, the National Revolution also lost its meaning, and the movement which had been started against a personal dictatorship of militarists and had, as its object, the establishment of a popular government of the people, for the people and by the people, through the instrumentality of the People's Congress, as instructed by the late Party Leader before his death, degenerated into another struggle among selfish and ambitious militarists of a new type. For after the conclusion of the Northern Punitive Expedition the shifting of power, which fact must be regarded as the only sign of the success of the Revolution, never took place. Just as after the Revolution of 1911, when instead of a republican national congress giving expression to the wishes of the people, a group of powerful mandarinate militarists seized control of the government and immediately fell to scrambling for territory, so after the conclusion of the military stage of the National Revolution in 1928, a new crop of Kuomintang militarists challenged one another in the same struggle for power, and Dr. Sun's death-bed message for the convocation of a National People's Congress was like a voice in the wilderness, drowned in the din of the battle cry of the "New Republic". In the light of the present situation the following prophetic words of the late Leader ring reproachingly in our ears:

Men Who Want to be King

> "So we in our Revolution have chosen Democracy, first, that we may be following the world current, and second, that we may reduce the period of civil war. From ancient times in China, men of great ambition have all wanted to be king. Thus, when Lin Pang saw Chin Shih Hwang riding out, he said, 'That is tne way for men of valor', and Hsiang Yu also said, 'Let me usurp his place'. From one generation to another, there has been no end to this unscrupulous greed for power. When I launched the Revolution, six or seven out of every ten who came to our support had imperialistic ideas, but after we made it known that our revolutionary principles aimed not only at the overthrow of the Manchus but also at the establishment of a republic, this group gradually got rid of their selfish

ambitions. But there are still a few among them who, even in this thirteenth year of the Republic, cling to the old hope of becoming king, and this is the reason why even among our followers there were some who fought against each other. When we first proclaimed our Revolution, we lifted up the rights of the people as the basis upon which to build our Republic, with the hope that this would prevent the rivalry for imperial power. But, alas! there are some people who are stupid and unreformable; you can do nothing with them."

And it is the same in the eighteenth year of the Republic as it was in the thirteenth. The number of those who "wanted to be king" may have been considerably reduced and the present "rivalry for imperial power" may better be described as an attempt at personal dictatorship by this "stupid and unreformable" aspirant to the throne. But the fact that a modern Liu Pang or Hsiang Yu exists, masquerading, though he is, under the cloak of the Three People's Principles and The Five Power Constitution, at the same time showing an "unscrupulous greed for power" is reminiscent of the days of Yuan Shih-kai and Wu Pei-fu.

What's Wrong With the Kuomintang?

If, as has been said, the National Revolution has failed, it would be pertinent to ask why it has failed. The answer must be found in the inefficacy of the Kuomintang.

In point of number the Kuomintang possesses a membership of not over one million persons which figure represents but a very small percentage of the entire population of the country. For such a small organization to be effective in enforcing its will upon the entire Chinese people, it must devise a dictatorial system. That this was fully realized by the Party leaders is evidenced by the fact that one of the major Kuomintang slogans is "Rule the country through the Party". But unfortunately the Party leaders have wrongly interpreted it, either unknowingly through lack of knowledge or deliberately for ulterior motives. Instead of a dictatorial Party regime, it has, since the death of its founder, degenerated into a bureaucratic despotism which now, due to the stupidity of one and the cowardice of the rest, is gradually assuming the aspect of absolute autocracy.

It will be asked, perhaps, why personal dictatorship has succeeded in other countries, notably in Italy, Turkey and Russia, but failed in China? The obvious answer is that such a system of despotism would have succeeded even in China if the would-be dictator were a man of the calibre of Mussolini, Kemal Pasha or Lenin. Had Dr. Sun lived and had he aspired to the role he would undoubtedly have succeeded. But like all real leaders of men, he was a great Commoner; one of them, eager and willing to work with the people and for the people, but not over them.

Indifference of the People.

The other and perhaps the more fundamental reason for failure of the Kuomintang is due to the resistance and indifference of the people towards it. As a race, we are a peace-loving and peaceful people; but it is not in our nature to submit ourselves meekly to any dictation. We are essentially a compromising people and in the tendency to compromise in

almost everything lies both our strength and our weakness. The momentous events of China during the past two decades have shown that no political issue, ideal or principle was too fundamental to admit of a compromise. Moreover, the idea of a Pa rty domination, in the modern sense of the term, was something new in our experience. In the course of five thousand years of our known history we had developed a system of government suitable only to our peculiar nature— a <u>laissez faire</u> system and an attitude of indifference. Though decidedly a homogeneous race, we are, all of us, individualists, each minding his own business and taking little or no interest in the other fellow's affairs. For centuries we have been taught "to sweep the snow before our own door and take no heed of the frost on our neighbor's roof".

For this reason, it is quite questionable whether, with the dictatorship of the Party firmly established, the Kuomintang could have carried out its program. Its superficial contact with the masses, coupled with the lack of a political consciousness on the part of the latter, would soon undermine this dictatorship and render the Party useless. Paradoxical as it may seem, the Kuomintang is at once the producer and the product of the National Revolution. Its value to the country, therefore, is not as a Revolutionary Party; for as such, it no longer exists. Rather, its value lies in its spirit and principles which will continue to serve as the goal toward which the enlightened leaders of China will strive to attain. When the Kuomintang will have sunk into oblivion its principles of a Modern Government for China will still be the underlying principles of the government of New China.

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G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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SEP 6130

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2657-D-276 1929
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 31 1929 WAR DEPARTMENT

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

HUPEH FRONT
(Ho Ying-chin)

2nd Route Army -- Peking-Hankow Railway, North Hupeh ..... Liu Chih

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Hsingyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung)	Liulin	(Hupeh)	12,000
4th "	(Chu Hui-jih)	Ich'ang	"	20,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Kuangshui	"	12,000
11th "	(Ch'eng Chi-cheng)	Tenghsien	(Honan)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin)	Huangchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
18th "	(Liu Tiao-ping)	Kuangshui-Huayuan	"	12,000x
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Chienli	"	12,000x
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien)	Hankow	"	3,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin)	Kwangan	"	3,000
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao)	Hankow	"	2,000
			Total	112,000

9th Route Army -- Han River Valley..... Chu Shao-liang

8th Division	(Chu Shao-liang)	Tsan	(Hupeh)	12,000
5th "	(Tang Ying)	Nanyang	(Honan)	4,000
9th "	(Yin Ch'eng-kang)	Siangyang	"	4,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Suihsien	(Hupeh)	24,000
5th Ind.Brig.	(Wei Chung-su)	Anlu	"	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-le)	"	"	2,000
			Total	48,000

Wuhan Garrison..... Liu Tiao-ping

6th Ind.Brig.	(Men Ping-yuah)	Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu)	Chishui	"	5,000
			Total	7,000

3rd Route Army -- Shasi Area and Wusueh..... Chang Fa-kuei

10th Division	(Li Yu-hsuan)	Shihnan	(Hupeh)	4,000
11th Ind.Brig.	(Wan Yu-wu)	"	"	6,000
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu)	Shashih	"	4,000
			Total	14,000

TOTAL HUPEH FRONT 181,000

From M/A, China Report No.7566 July 30, 1929.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

EASTERN FRONT

5th Route Army -- (S.W. Shantung-Honan)..... Tang Sheng-chih

4th	Division	(Liu Kuei-tang)	Tsining	(Shantung)	6,000
14th	"	(Liu Chun-jung)	Loyang	(Honan)	15,000x
54th	"	(Wei I-san)	Yingtse	"	16,000x
51st	"	(Kung Hao)	Changchow	"	12,000x
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing)	Loyang	"	15,000x
1st	Cav.Div.	(An Chun-tsai)	"	"	6,000x
				Total	70,000

6th Route Army -- Lunghai Railway and N.W. Anhwei..... Fang Chen-wu

3rd	Division	(Mao Ping-wen)	Kweite	(Honan)	12,000
44th	"	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Loho	"	12,000x
45th	"	(Pao Kang)	Hsuchang	"	12,000x
2nd	Cav.Div.	(Chang Li-sheng)	"	"	10,000x
	Ind.Brig.	(Kao Kuei-tze)	"	"	3,000x
1st	" "	(Chen Yueh-han)	Suchow	(Anhwei)	5,000x
				Total	54,000

TOTAL EASTERN FRONT 124,000

NORTHERN FRONT

11th Route Army -- Peking-Hankow Railway, North Honan..... Liu Chen-hua

3rd	Division	(Liu Mao-en)	Hsinhsiang	(Honan)	10,000
4th	"	(Wan Hsuan-tsai)	Changte	"	10,000
				Total	20,000

HUNAN FORCE

7th Route Army - ..... Ho Chien

5th	Division	(Fan Shih-sheng)	T'aohsien	(Hunan)	12,000
7th	"	(Ho Chien)	Ch'angsha	"	4,000x
8th	"	(Chow Lan)	Wukang	"	4,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu)	Hengchow	"	10,000
52nd	"	(Wu Shang)	Ch'angte	"	6,000
2nd	Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung)	Lichow	"	4,000
3rd	" "	(Li Yun-chieh)	Hsiangt'an	"	4,000

KWangtung

15th	Division	(Li Ming-jui)	Liuchow	(Kwangsi)	6,000
57th	"	(Yang Teng-hui)	Nanning	"	6,000
				Total	56,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Shantung Garrison Forces ..... Chen Tiao-yuan

3rd Division	(Liu Chen-nien	) Chefoo	(Shantung)	25,000
11th "	(Yang Hu-chen	) Poshan	"	6,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	) Weihsien	"	12,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-chi	) Techow	"	12,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan	) Tsinan	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying	) Kiaochow	"	5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Tze-yu	) Tsingtao	"	3,600

Total 68,600

Other Units of First Group of Armies

5th Division	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tse	) Nanking	"	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	) Nanchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
10th "	(Fang Ting-ying	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	) Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu	)	(Yunnan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi	)	"	6,000
20th "	(Han Fu-chu	) Kaifeng	(Honan)	25,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san	) Pochow	(Anhui)	25,000
47th "	(Li Chia-yu	) Hsuchow	(Shantung)	28,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	) Yinshan	(Anhwei)	4,000
17th Mixed Div	(Ma Hung-kuei	) Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
3rd Ind.Brig.	(Yuan Chia-sheng	) Chenkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000x
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	) Tsunfen	(Anhwei)	2,000
1st Prov.Div.	(Tsao Wan-shun	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	15,000x
Hupeh Peace Preservation Force	(Li Yen	)		10,000

Total 198,000

TOTAL FIRST GROUP OF ARMIES 647,600

Note: Not underscored -- Old Chiang Kai-shek divisions. Dependable.

X - Nanking Government troops as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's own troops.

Underscored -- Newly acquired divisions, principally former Wuhan troops, and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions. Many of these divisions are very undependable.

Liu Chih, Commander of the 2nd Route Army, is the most favored general under Chiang Kai-shek; and a larger number of troops has been placed under his control than under the control of any other general.

Li Pin-hsien, Commander of the 51st Division, has been replaced by Kung Hao, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, while the vacant post in the latter division has been filled by the promotion of An Chun-tsai, Second in Command.

As war is over in Kwangsi, the Hunanese forces under Ho Chien have been withdrawn to their former stations in Hunan.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

The 12th and 13th divisions under Hu Jo-yu and Chang Ju-chi respectively are reported to be operating against Lung Yun of Yunnan at present. Briefly the situation in Yunnan is as follows; when Lung Yun recently invaded Kweichow, leaving his own province devoid of his personal soldiery, his two subordinates, Hu Jo-yu and Chang Ju-chi, revolted and attempted to seize control of the province. In the middle of this month Lung Yun returned to Yunnan when he is at present engaged in an attempt to put down the rebellion in north eastern Yunnan. Press despatches, unconfirmed, have credited Lung Yun with a minor victory over the rebels. It is impossible to obtain exact information of this struggle.

Large numbers of troops of the 17th Mixed Division and the 20th and 24th Divisions under Ma Hung-kuei, Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san, who went over to the Nanking Government, are said to have returned to Feng Yu-hsiang, but the exact number is not yet known.

Second Group of Armies
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin

1st Route Army -- Tungkuan area..... Sun Liang-cheng

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-shun	Minhsiang	(Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	Shenchow	"	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	Lingpao	"	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	Ch'aoyi	"	12,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-hai	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	"	"	12,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih	Tungkuan	(Honan)	8,000
2nd " "	(Cheng Ta-chang	Hanch'eng	(Shensi)	8,000
3rd Mixed Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen	Hsingan	(Honan)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	Kuanyint'ang	(")	4,000
			Total	97,000

4th Route Army -- Sianfu area..... Sung Che-yuan

18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	P'uch'eng	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	Sianfu	"	12,000
5th Mixed Brig.	(Pai Chien-shen	Tungkuan	(Honan)	5,000
			Total	41,000

Other Units of Second Group of Armies

23rd Division	(Ma Chi	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
25th "	(Chang Chi-tsung	Weinan	(Shensi)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	Lushihhsien	(Honan)	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	Lanchow	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Sung Lien-chung	Sining	"	12,000
1st Mixed Brig.	(Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	"	"	5,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsieh-pin	Ninghsia	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	"	4,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	Chinchow	"	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	Tungkuan	(Honan)	12,000
			Total	119,000

TOTAL SECOND GROUP OF ARMIES 257,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Notes: Not Underscored -- Original First Kuominchun units.

Underscored -- Miscellaneous units.

The 2nd and 3rd Route Armies have been abolished, Commanders Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san having gone over to the Nanking Government.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command -- Shang Chen.

Southwest Shansi..... Ku Jen-fa

26th Division	(Ho Yuan-pi)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
32nd "	(Li P'ei-chi)	Yuncheng	"	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Puchow	"	9,000
4th Art.Brig.	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Taiyuan	"	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang)	Kiangchow	"	2,500
			Total	29,000

Peking-Hankow Railway..... Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u)	Shunteh	(Chihli)	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ao)	Shihchiachuang	"	9,000
39th "	(Chao Chen-hsiu)	"	"	9,000
27th Brigade	(An Hsi-ku)	Chengting	"	6,000
			Total	33,000

Peking-Tientsin area..... Shang Chen

34th Division	(Hsu Yung-chang)	Tangshan	(Chihli)	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	"	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	"	9,000
42nd "	(Chang Yin-wu)	"	"	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	"	9,000
6th Art.Brig.	(Chow Chun-chieh	Peking	"	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i)	Tientsin	"	2,500
			Total	50,000

Suiyuan area..... Hsu Yung-chang

37th Division	(Wang Ching-kuo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
25th Brigade	(Ho Shao-nan)	"	"	6,000
1st Cav.Div.	(T'an Ching-lin)	Tatung-Fenchen	"	6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying)	Paotou	"	3,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu)	"	"	4,000
			Total	28,000

Chahar area..... Yang Ai-yuan

41st Division	(Chang Kuei-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
3rd Cav.Div.	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	"	4,000
			Total	13,000

#7566

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Provincial Garrison Forces ..... Ku Jen-fa				
1st Division	(Wang Tse	) Tat'ungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	) Yusmp'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	) P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	) Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	) Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	) Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	) Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	) Yuneh'eng	"	8,000
			Total	64,000

TOTAL THIRD GROUP OF ARMIES 217,000

Notes: Not Underscored -- Old Shansi units.

Underscored -- More recently acquired units.

The 36th division under Li Sheng-ta has returned to Tientsin.

The 137th brigade of the 43rd division under Fu Tso-yi has returned to Tientsin from Taiyuanfu.

The Provincial Garrison forces are old units, information of which was lately obtained.

Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangtung

1st Division	(Chen Chi-tang	) Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsu Ching-tang	)		
3rd "	(Chiang Kuang-nai	) Canton	(Kwangtung)	13,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Teng Hsi-tseng	) "	"	4,000

The 2nd division under Hsu Ching-tang, which fled from Swatow into southern Fukien is reported to have been disarmed.

Yunnan

38th Army	(Lung Yun	)	(Yunnan)	20,000
7th Ind.Div.	(Tang Chi-lin	) Yunnanfu	"	4,000

Kwangsi

4th Army	(Huang Shao-hsiung)	
1st Ind.Div.	(Teng Yen-huei)	
1 Regt. Bodyguard Troops		

Kwangsi troops have practically collapsed. They have been reorganized, but the details are not yet obtainable.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Fukien

Provincial Defense Forces (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Kuo Feng-ming)	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan)	"	2,000

Naval Constabulary (Yang Shu-chuang)

1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo)	"	4,000

Provisionally Incorporated National Government Troops

1st Division	(Chang Chen)	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)	Fuchow	(Fukien)	8,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Hsu-jen, Commander of 8th Army.	10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces	
Two Reserve Regiments	
One Gendarmerie Battalion	
One Artillery Corps	
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000

Szechuan

Those under or allied with Liu Hsiang, Commander of 21st Army.

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun)	Ich'ang &	Chungking	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu)	Lingshui	(Szechuan)	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chou)	Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def. Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng)	Lingshui	"	10,000
23rd Army	(Kuo Ju-tung)	Fowchow	"	10,000
24th "	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	"	60,000
	(Hsu Shao-tsung)	Yungkuan	"	6,000
	(Yang Kuo-chen)	Kiangtsing	"	4,000

Those under or allied with Lai Hsin-hui, Commander of 22nd Army.

3rd Division	(Lai Hsin-hui)	Chih-shui	(Szechuan)	8,000
	(Li Chia-yu)	Suining	"	10,000
	(Lo Tse-chow)	Shunking	"	20,000

Independent Generals

20th Army	(Yang Sen)	Chuhsien	(Szechuan)	30,000
28th "	(Teng Hsi-hou)	Chengtu	"	40,000
29th "	(Tien Sung-yao)	"	"	20,000
Border Def. Troops	(Liu Tsung-hou)	Suitingfu	"	25,000

The military organization in Szechuan is very complicated. The above information is but recently obtained and is the best available.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)	(Kwangsi)	12,000
1 Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	(Kweichow)	5,000
1 Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000

Kweichow is said to have allied with Lai Hsin-hui of Szechuan.

Total Miscellaneous Units 403,500

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikwan-Lwanchow area..... Yu Hsueh-chung

4th	Division	(Liu Yi-fei)	Changli)		10,000
6th	"	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Yungping)		11,000
14th	"	(Hsu Yung-ho)	Funing)		10,000
23rd	"	(Ma Ting-fu)	Shanhaikwan)		10,000
25th	"	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang)	Chinwangtao)	Chihli	10,000
27th	"	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Lwanchow)		10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-p'eng)	Lengkow)		6,000
3rd	" "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Yungping)		6,000
31st	Army	(Cheng Tso-sheng)	Liushowying)		8,000

Total 81,000

Manchuria

1st	Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd	"	(Ting Hsi-ch'ung)	Yingkow	"	10,000
3rd	"	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	10,000
5th	"	(Ting Ying-pin)	Kaokiao	(Fengtien)	10,000
12th	"	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	"	10,000
16th	"	(Ying Chen-fu)	Tungliao	"	10,000
19th	"	(Sun Te-chuan)	Fakuhsien	"	11,000
20th	"	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	Taonan	(Kirin)	11,000
24th	"	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	(Fengtien)	10,000

The 25th Brigade under Sun Hsu-ch'ang has been removed from Jehol to Chinwangtao in Chihli.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art.Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total, not including 31st Army (Jehol troops) near Shanhaikwan	220,600

One artillery regiment, designation unknown, has been transferred to Heiho in Heilungkiang and two regiments to Manchouli since the disagreement between China and Russia.

In addition to the above there are 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry in the Fengtien Provincial Defense Force numbering 22,000 in all. These units are not included in the totals because they are used primarily as a bandit suppression force and although they could be turned into active soldiers if the necessity arose, are not carried as such at present.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

8th Brigade	(Li Kueilin)	Muling)		7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to)	Yilan)		8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui)	Yenchi-Hulin)		7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang)	Kirin, Wuchang)		15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao)	Suifen)	Kirin	7,000 ✓
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng)	")		10,000 ✓
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan)	")		10,000 ✓
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in)	Harbin)		8,000
		Total		72,000

Since the begining of the disagreement between China and Russia there have been some troop movements in Manchuria. Chang Tso-hsiang, Chairman of Kirin, is reported to have been appointed by Chang Hsueh-liang as commander-in-chief of Northeastern forces on all fronts. The former also made Ting Ch'ao, Commander of 19th Brigade, commandant of the Suifen area (Pogranichnaia), where there are concentrated three brigades, as stated above, to protect the provincial border from possible attack.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Heilungkiang

1st	Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Manchouli	)	7,000
2nd	"	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Nunkiang	)	7,000
17th	"	(Ho Shuan-shan	) Hailar	) Hei-	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chen	) Manchouli	) lung-	4,000
2nd	" "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd	" "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th	" "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
				Total	37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE - 329,800

Wan Fu-lin, Chairman of Heilungkiang, is commander-in-chief in the Manchouli-Hailar area, where four brigades, as given above, are being massed. Three Fengtien artillery regiments have been despatched to reinforce troops in the province.

Although the opponents are facing each other on two frontiers, Suifen and Manchouli, in Manchuria, it is apparent that neither China or Russia desires a conflict if it is possible to avoid it.

Jehol

7th	Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd	"	(Fu Ch'un	) Luanping	)	6,000
38th	"	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st	"	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd	" "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd	" "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th	" "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th	" "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Luanping	)	4,500

Total, including 8,000 troops of 31st Army inside Great Wall . . . 56,500

The Jehol forces are not carried as a part of the forces of the Three Eastern Provinces because the feeling between the two is not particularly friendly at the present time even though Tang Yu-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are ostensibly allies.

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,911,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. General Remarks.

China Proper. In spite of the bellicose utterances of the Chairman of the National Government, in connection with the Russian situation, there have been no preparations for war in China proper. No mobilization was affected; there was no speeding up of arsenals; there was no more than the usual recruiting. Perhaps mobilization is unnecessary, since the saturation point has long been passed, and every man that can be fed is already a soldier. It is worthy of comment that since before Captain Tenney's trip to Hankow and Nanking, that is since the April 10, 1929 Situation Report, we have added 215,100 soldiers—no mean army in itself—to the strength report. It is not unlikely that this process may go on for some time, and based on our findings of the past six months it would seem that in all, China may have two and one-half million men wearing some kind of uniform.

The man in the street is not interested in Russian war talk. I asked a group of merchants the other day why they wanted to fight Russia. They all laughed and said that it was no affair of theirs; that if the government wanted war, it was up to the government. Outside of a demonstration arranged by the Kuomintang in Shanghai there has been no demonstration against Russia. True, feeling in Canton runs high, but Canton is still smarting from the wounds of 1927, and Canton is many miles away from Manchouli. A number of news organs, until quieted by Nanking, demanded an immediate attack on Russia and waved the White Sun flag in a warlike manner, but the readers did not respond. Except for the student class, no one has paid any attention to the war talk.

On August 1st in Nanking there will open another Reorganization and Disbandment Conference, and while it is too early to make any predictions it would seem that some real reduction might eventuate. There is an attempt on the part of Nanking to take power away from the military element and give it to civilians, and the urge to reduce the armies, outside of the Armies themselves, is universal.

There has been no change worthy of comment in China proper since the last Situation Report was submitted.

Manchuria. In spite of the rumors of war, and the hysteria of the foreign press, there have been only a few troop movements in Manchuria. As noted above, three brigades are concentrated in the Suifenho area, and four in the Manchouli district. This office has no first hand information of the provincial troops of Kirin and Heilungchiang, and it seems likely that the units mentioned in our tables may be supplemented by them. They are being used for patrol work.

Probably the most salient fact is that Fengtien has rendered very little aid to Chang Tso-hsiang. With the exception of sending some artillery, Chang Hsueh-liang has sent no troops; yet his soldiers are far and away the best trained and equipped in China. It seems probable that on the Chinese side, there is no intention of hostilities and it is likely that if the Russians should invade Manchuria they would meet with no more resistance than the Japanese do on their periodic expeditions into Shantung.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

There is none of the spirit of war in Manchuria; the soldier might fight if ordered to do so, but the population would remain apathetic.

Japan remains the most interested observer, though unless the Russians reach South Manchuria, it is not believed that she would act. There are rumors, categorically denied, that the Japanese garrison has been reinforced at Changchun. We have not been able to get any definite information.

During the past week a neutral zone has been formed at Manchouli and Suifenho, approximately 20 miles wide——10 miles in Russian and 10 miles in Chinese territory. Chinese and Russian troops have been withdrawn behind this line, and so theoretically at least, there are no Chinese or Russian soldiers within 20 miles of each other. This action has been taken to preclude the possibility of any junior bringing on hostilities at a time when pacifistic argumentation seems to be the order of the day.

Briefly, neither side wants war. Should Russia invade she would meet little or no opposition. Japan is keeping her hands clean in an exemplary manner.

Siberian Forces. The most authentic estimates from various sources indicate that the Russians have assembled about 50,000 men from Irkutsk east of Vladivostok. This 50,000 is composed of 4 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry brigades and an aviation group at Spassk. No troop movements have been reported in the Lake Baikal sector.

For the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache

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G-2 Report

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2657-D-276
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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

With the exception of the reorganization of the old Kuangsi troops into the provincial garrison force after its defeat in the province, a few changes in Kuangtung and Szechuan, and some troop movements in Manchuria for defence against Russia, there has been very little movement during the period under review. Therefore, the composition and distribution of forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Groups of Armies are not reiterated in this Situation Report. Changes since the last report are given below:

Kuangsi - Provincial Garrison Force

1st Division	(Lu Huan-yen	) Nanning	(Kuangsi)	8,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Ch'i-ming	) Liuchow	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Nanning	"	4,000
			Total	16,000

Kuangtung

58th Division	(Wen Hung-en	) Wuchow	(Kuangsi)	8,000
59th "	(Yu Han-mou	) Canton	(Kuangtung)	8,000
60th "	(Tsai T'ing-kai	) Huichow	"	8,000
61st "	(Chiang Kuang-nai	) "	"	8,000
62nd "	(Hsiang Han-pin	) Canton	"	8,000
63rd "	(Li Yang-ching	) Chaochow & Swatow	"	8,000
			Total	48,000

The 58th division was reorganized from the defeated or disarmed old Kuangsi troops; the 59th and 62nd divisions from the old 1st Kuangtung division; the 63rd division from the old 2nd Kuangtung division under Hsu Ching-tang, which has fled from Swatow and which has been disarmed in southern Fukien; and the 60th and 61st divisions from the old 3rd Kuangtung division.

Szechuan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chou	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Independent Div.	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

From M/A, China Report No.7583 August 29, 1929.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying)		(Kueichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan)		"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng)		"	3,000
			Total	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao)	Fowchow	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu)	"	"	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting)	"	"	7,000
			Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(Szechuan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i)	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun)	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Lan Ying-tung)	Szechuan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin)	Chengtu	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu)	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung)	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow)	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi)	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung)	Tungchuan	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng)	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun)	"	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Min-chang)	"	"	6,000
			Total	30,000

Border Defence Troops

	(Liu Tsung-hou)	Suiting	(Szechuan)	10,000

Total Szechuan Forces 264,000

As previously reported, the military organization in Szechuan is very complicated. The above information is but recently obtained and is believed to be accurate.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikuan-Lwanchow area ..... Yu Hsueh-chung

6th Brigade	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Yungping	)		11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikuan	)		10,000
25th "	(Sun Hsu-ch'ang	) Chinwangtao	)	Chihli	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang	) Lwanchow	)		10,000
31st Army	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Liushowying	)		8,000
				Total	49,000

Manchuria

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Mukden		(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Yingkow		"	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Chaoyang		(Jehol)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu	) Tungliao		(Fengtien)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Fakumen		"	11,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan		(Kirin)	11,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	) Changwu		(Fengtien)	10,000
				Total	73,000

First Army - Wang Shu-ch'ang

4th Brigade	(Liu Yi-fei	)		)	10,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	)		)	10,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Harbin		) Kirin	6,000
1st Art.Regt.	(	)		)	6,000
6th Eng. Bn.	(	)		)	800
				Total	32,800

Second Army - Hu Yu-k'un

5th Brigade	(Ting Ying-pin	)		)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho	) Tsitsihar -		) Hei-	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig.	(Chang Shu-seng	) Hailar		) lung-	6,000
5th Art.Regt.	(	)		) kiang	6,000
1st Eng. Bn.	(	)		)	800
				Total	32,800

Fengtien has organized two armies to reinforce the troops of Kirin and Heilungkiang. They have been despatched to points, as stated above, where they will be transferred to the Western and Eastern fronts as ordered.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

2nd Art.Regt.	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Battalions stationed in Fengtien	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total, not including 31st Army (Jehol troops) near Shanhaikuan	220,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	( )	Suifen	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Suifen	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Harbin	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Suiyuan	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) "	)	10,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) Harbin	)	8,000
			Total	88,000

The 7th and 10th brigades are old units, information of which was lately obtained.

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Manchouli	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Nunkiang	)	7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan	) Hailar	) Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Manchouli	) lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	37,000

TOTAL NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE FORCE - 345,600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. General.

From a comparison of the foregoing with the last report it will be seen that, following the order from Nanking, Chang Hsueh-liang has despatched about sixty thousand troops to the North. Accompanying these troops are airplanes, armored trains and tanks, the exact numbers being unknown. The airplanes would not stand up under the conditions exacted by war. While they may make an occasional flight, the everyday, gruelling of combat would soon incapacitate all but a very few. The tanks, of which the Young Marshal has about 48 that will still function, come in the same category as the airplanes.

There has been no movement towards the north of any troops other than those of Chang Hsueh-liang. The Nationalist Government, according to reports, has offered to send troops, but Fengtien has declined on the grounds that Manchuria has enough troops to meet any crisis. According to other reports Nanking has sent $2,000,000 to the Young General to assist him in his efforts. Tang Sheng-chih has been mentioned by Nanking as the commander of the reserve——the troops in China proper, which will be sent to Manchuria in case of need.

For the past six days even the raids along the frontier have ceased. The frontier near Manchuli has never been surveyed and raids in the past into Chinese territory have been reported by the Chinese which might not have crossed the frontier. An observer near Suifenho reports that he held conversation with members of a body of 1,200 White Russians just returning from a raid in Soviet territory. These "Whites" were complaining bitterly over the arms and especially the ammunition with which they had been supplied by the Chinese. They stated that the majority of the rifle and machine gun cartridges they had been given missed fire, and that they received a hot reception from the Reds.

While here in China it is difficult to verify the report that Chinese soldiers are raiding in Russian territory, there is probably truth in Moscow's statements. Certainly White Russians with Chinese assistance are raiding, and in the eyes of the Soviet Republic there could be no worse crime.

The Consul General at Harbin reports persistent rumors that Chang Hsueh-liang, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan are all urging Nanking to be more lenient in her demands, fearing further Nationalist influence in the north and northwest.

It is apparently well authenticated that Gen. von Blucher, whose nom de guerre is Galen, has been ordered to assume command of the Russian forces in the Far East. This report has been verified by a Russian Soviet officer, and if true would place at the head of the Russian Army the one foreigner who knows more about the Chinese Army than any other. Von Blucher is generally credited with being a military genius, and in all likelihood would have on his staff many of the Russian officers who were under him in China.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Apparently both Russia and C hina are intensely desirous of favorable world opinion, because for six weeks neither has done much else than solicit it. Whether there will be war is still a moot question. Both sides are concentrating troops, yet there is something lacking in the gesture. One may say that troop concentrations usually lead to war, and so they do, but there are reasons why both China and Russia do not want war. In Nanking it must be well known that a reverse in Manchuria would mean the overthrow of the present government, freeing as it would the tongues of countless enemies now dormant but far from dead. The country has one financial foot in the grave and a war of any dimensions would bring the other close to or over the brink. Consolidation of divergent political interests by the government has but begun, and a losing war would undo all that has been accomplished. The people of China are not interested in the crisis and in the event of war would give little backing to the government.

Russia knows that eventually she must lose the Chinese Eastern, and would certainly rather be recompensed for the loss over the council table than on the field of battle. Many of the officers in the Soviet Armies were commissioned during the Czarist regime and their loyalty is none too certain. Even now it is reported that the regular troops will not fire upon invading Whites, and why, if Russia really wanted war, has she failed to seize Sinkiang, and why has she delayed after giving her three-day ultimatum? Russian finances are none too steady; the Russian Government none too secure in the saddle.

Russia and China have as yet failed to see Japan's hand, and until they know exactly what Japan will do, neither is in a position to take any long chances. For Japan after all is the master of the situation.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache

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CHINA (Military) 8-1 2657-D-276

Subject: Situation Report.

I. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	(Liu Chih	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung	) Wuchang	"	12,000
3rd "	(Mao Ping-wen	) Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
4th "	(Chu Hui-jih	) Ich'ang	(Hupeh)	20,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tse	) Nanking	(")	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	) Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
8th "	(Chu Shao-liang	) Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	) Kuangshui	(Hupeh)	12,000
10th "	(Fang Ting-ying	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Chi-ch'eng	) Tenghsien	(Honan)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	) Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	) Huangchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
			Total	164,000

The above are Chiang Kai-shek's own divisions and are dependable.

Central Government Troops

14th Division	(Liu Chun-jung	) Loyang	(Honan)	15,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Liuchow	(Kuangsi)	6,000
16th "	(Lu Huan-yen	) Nanning	(")	8,000
17th Mix. Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	) Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
18th Division	(Chang Hui-tsan	) Chiench'ang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th "	(Liu Chien-hsu	) Hengchow	(Hunan)	10,000
20th "	(Han Fu-chu	) Kaifeng	(Honan)	25,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san	) Techow	(Shantung)	25,000
44th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	) Shouchow	(Anhui)	12,000
45th "	(Pao Kang	) Wuhu	"	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	) Weihsien	(Shantung)	12,000
47th "	(Wang Chin-yu	) Tsinan	"	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	) Hsingyang	(Honan)	24,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-chi	) Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan	) Fuchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
51st "	(Kung Hao	) Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
52nd "	(Wu Shang	) T'aoyuan	(Hunan)	6,000
53rd "	(Liu Hsing	) Loyang	(Honan)	15,000
54th "	(Wei Yi-san	) Hsuchang	(")	16,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	) Amoy	(Fukien)	4,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Nanning	(Kuangsi)	6,000
			Carried Forward	284,000

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		Brought Forward		284,000
58th Division	(Wen Hung-en	) Wuchow	(Kuangtung)	8,000
59th "	(Yu Han-mou	) Canton	"	8,000
60th "	(Tsai T'ing-kai	) Huichow	"	8,000
61st "	(Chiang Kuang-nai	) "	"	8,000
62nd "	(Hsiang Han-pin	) Canton	"	8,000
63rd "	(Li Yang-ching	) Chaochow & Swatow		8,000
1st Cav. Div.	(An Chun-tsai	) Loyang	(Honan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Chang Li-sheng	) Pochow	(Anhui)	10,000

Lu Tiao-ping has been promoted to the Chairmanship of Kiangsi and the vacancy thereby created in the 18th Division has been filled by Chang Hui-tsan.

Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st Division	(Tsao Wan-shun	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	15,000
1st "	(Chang Chen	) Liangkuan	(Fukien)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang	) Fuchow	"	8,000
3rd "	(Liu Chen-nien	) Chefoo	(Shantung)	30,000
3rd "	(Liu Mao-en	) Hsinhsiang	(Honan)	10,000
4th "	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	) Changte	"	10,000
4th "	(Liu Kuei-tang	) Tsining	(Shantung)	6,000
5th "	(Teng Ying	) Nanyang	(Honan)	4,000
5th "	(Fan Shih-sheng	) Taohsien	(Hunan)	12,000
7th "	(Ho Chien	) Changsha	"	4,000
8th "	(Chow Lan	) Wukang	"	4,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	) Siangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Li Yu-hsuan	) Shihnan	"	4,000
11th "	(Yang Hu-ch'en	) Laohok'ou	"	6,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu	)	(Szechuan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi	)	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	3,000
1st " "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	) Suchow	(Anhui)	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying	) Kiaochow	(Shantung)	5,000
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	) Chengkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin	) Kwangan	(Hupeh)	3,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	) Chienli	(")	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh	) "	"	2,000
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	) Wuhu	(Anhui)	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	) Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
10th " "	(Kao Kuei-tze	) Tsinan	(Shantung)	3,000
11th " "	(Wan Yi-wu	) Shihnan	(Hupeh)	6,000
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu	) Shashih	")	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	) Chishui	"	5,000
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao	) Hsienning	"	2,000
			Total	535,500

Total First Group of Armies 699,500

The above troops consist principally of former Wuhan forces and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions, or have been reorganized from defunct armies. Many of them are very undependable.

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Provincial Garrison Forces

1st Ind.Brig.	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan)	Tsinan	(Shantung)	5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu)	Tsingtao	"	3,600
2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung)	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
3rd " "	(Li Yun-chieh)	Hsiangt'an	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming)		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)		"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan)		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo)	" "	"	4,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Ch'i-ming)	Liuchow	(Kuangsi)	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih)	Nanning	"	4,000
			Total	39,600

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

Second Group of Armies

Honan Area - Sun Liang-cheng

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun)	Minhsiang	(Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Shenchow	"	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming)	Lingpao	"	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou)	Ch'aoyi	"	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi)	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien)	Lushihhsien	"	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua)	Tungkuan	"	12,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih)	"	"	8,000
3rd Mix.Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen)	Hsingan	"	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen)	Tungkuan	"	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin)	Kuanyingt'ang	"	4,000

Shensi Area - Sung Che-yuan

18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin)	P'uch'eng	"	12,000
25th "	(Chang Chi-tsung)	Weinan	"	12,000
26th "	(Tien Ching-hai)	Hanchung	"	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	"	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan)	Sianfu	"	12,000
2nd New Div.	(Tung Yu-chen)	Hanchung	"	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Hanch'eng	"	8,000

Kansu Area - Liu Yu-fen

30th Division	(Chi Hung-chang)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	12,000
31st "	(Sung Lien-chung)	Sining	"	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang)	Chinchow	"	12,000
1st Mix.Brig.	(Men Chih-chung)	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en)	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin)	"	"	5,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsieh-pin)	Ninghsia	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng)	Chungwei	"	4,000
Total Second Group of Armies				257,000

As Feng Yu-hsiang is ostensibly in retirement, his troops have been placed under his three most favored generals, Sun Liang-cheng, Sung Che-yuan and Liu Yu-fen, as given above. Much, even of the detailed work of administration, however, is being done at Chintze, Feng's abode in retirement.

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Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command -- Shang Chen

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi	) Paoting	(Chihli)	9,000
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u	) Shunte	(")	9,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-chang	) Tangshan	"	9,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	) Shihchiachuang	"	9,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	) Tientsin	"	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	) Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Yu-ying	) Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-shou	) Shihchiachuang	"	9,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	) Yunch'eng	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	) Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	) Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	) Tientsin	"	9,000
1st Cav. Div.	(T'an Ching-lin	) Tatung-Fengchen		6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Wang Kuei-te	) Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
25th Ind.Brig.	(Ho Shao-nan	) Suiyuan	"	6,000
26th " "	(Ho Yuan-pi	) Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku	) Chengting	(Chihli)	6,000
4th Art.Brig.	(Tseng Yen-yi	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang	) Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh	) Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i	) Tientsin	"	2,500

Provincial Garrison Force - Ku Jen-fa

1st Division	(Wang Tse	) Tat'ungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	) Yuanp'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	) P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	) Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	) Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	) Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	) Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	) Yunch'eng	"	8,000

Total Third Group of Armies 217,000

Chang Yin-wu has been promoted to the mayorship of Peking, and the vacancy thereby created in the 42nd Division has been filled by Feng Hung-chi.

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan

38th Army	(Lung Yun)		(Yunnan)	20,000
7th Ind.Div.	(Tang Chi-lin)	Yunnanfu	"	4,000

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng)		(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		"	5,000
Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		"	5,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army	10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces Two Reserve Regiments One Gendarmerie Battalion One Artillery Corps Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000

Szechuan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao)	Chuhsien	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang)	"	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung)	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun)	Chungking	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu)	Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chou)	Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng)	Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai)	Chungking	"	5,000
Independent Div.	(Wang Chao-kuei)	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying)	(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan)	"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng)	"	3,000
		Total	10,000

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Szechuan (continued)

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	)	Fowchow	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	)	"	"	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	)	"	"	7,000
				Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	)	Chengtu	(Szechuan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	)	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	)	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Len Ying-tung)		Szechuan-Hsikang		14,000
				Total	50,000

28th Army under Tang Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	)	Chengtu	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	)	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-mung	)	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	)	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	)	Chengtu	"	10,000
				Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	)	Tungchuan	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	)	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	)	"	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun	)	"	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Min-chang	)	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defence Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechuan)	10,000

Total Szechuan Forces . . . 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 328,000

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NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikuan-Lwanchow Area ..... Yu Hsueh-chung

6th	Brigade	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Yungping)		11,000
23rd	"	(Ma Ting-fu)	Shanhaikuan)	Chihli	10,000
27th	"	(Liu Nai-ch'ang)	Lwanchow)		10,000
				Total	31,000

Manchuria

1st	Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd	"	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Yingkow	"	10,000
3rd	"	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Chinchow	"	10,000
16th	"	(Ying Chen-fu)	Manchouli	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
19th	"	(Sun Te-chuan)	Fakumen	(Fengtien)	11,000
20th	"	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	T'aonan	"	11,000
24th	"	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Changwu	"	10,000
25th	"	(Yao Tung-fan)	Chinchow	"	10,000
				Total	83,000

First Army - Wang Shu-ch'ang

4th	Brigade	(Liu Yi-fei)	Harbin)		10,000
12th	"	(Chang Ting-shu)	Yimienp'o)		10,000
1st	Cav.Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Fuchinhsien)		8,000
1st	" "	(Kuo Hsi-peng)	Harbin)	Kirin	6,000
1st	Art.Regt.	( )	")		6,000
6th	Engr. Bn.	( )	)		800
				Total	40,800

The 1st Cav. Division under Cheng Tse-sheng has been reorganized from the 31st Army formerly stationed at Liushowying in Chihli.

Second Army - Hu Yu-k'un

5th	Brigade	(Ting Ying-pin)	)		10,000
14th	"	(Hsu Yung-ho)	Tsitsihar -)	Hei-	10,000
3rd	Cav.Brig.	(Chang Shu-seng)	Hailar)	lung-	6,000
5th	Art.Regt.	( )	)	kiang	6,000
1st	Engr. Bn.	( )	)		800
				Total	32,800

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Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

2nd Art. Regt.	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Battalions stationed in Fengtien	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total	227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Suifen	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Suifen	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Harbin	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Suiyuan	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) "	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) "	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

The 26th Brigade under Ting Hsien-chin is an old unit, information of which was lately obtained.

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Manchouli	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Nunkiang	)	7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan	) Hailar	) Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Manchouli	) lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	37,000

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 360,600

Jehol

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Luanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Luanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,950,200

2. General Remarks.

As will be noted in the body of this report, there have been very few troop movements, and those practically all in Manchuria, since our previous Situation Report.

A change in the form of the report has been made, since the Route Armies, although in some cases still retaining that nomenclature, have ceased functioning as such, and since at the Disbandment Conference provisions were made for their dissolution.

Reports from creditable observers from the northwest indicate that no disbandment is taking place in that region, while in Manchuria the armies are growing because of the Russian threat with vigorous recruiting being carried on even as far south as Tientsin. This office is unable to report any reduction in the size of the Chinese armies, even in those directly under the Central Government, as a result of the recent Disbandment Conference, where such a large reduction was promised.

The military situation in Manchuria continues to be fraught with possibilities. From the beginning of the last week in August until September 6th there was a lull in the Soviet raids, but on the 6th, they broke out again. In the Suifenho area, on September 7th Russian airplanes dropped bombs in Chinese territory. This is the first authenticated instance where orders certainly must have come directly from the highest authority for an invasion of Chinese territory. These raids, both in the air and on the ground, are probably in the nature of a reply to the alleged ill-treatment of Soviet nationals in China, and in return for alleged raids by White Russians and Chinese forces in Soviet territory. They may well be considered also as a political move to hasten negotiations, which apparently are dragging. No further importance should be attached to them.

Bandit suppression is being undertaken on a somewhat larger scale than is usual in the provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung, Honan and Hunan. Bandit Suppression Headquarters have been established in critical centers in these provinces, and the often repeated and often repudiated experiment of attempting to put down Chinese bandits with other than local Chinese forces is being tried again.

A new body, known as The Military Advisory Council, has been recently established by the Legislative Yuan in Nanking. This Council will function under the direction of the State Council and act in an advisory capacity on military affairs to that body.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - September 13, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY DIV
NOV 11 2657-6180-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

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With the exception of large troop movements of the First Group of Armies and a few changes in the province of Yunnan, there have been practically no changes during the period under review. Therefore, the composition and distribution of forces of the 2nd and 3rd Groups of Armies are not reiterated in this Situation Report. Changes in the First Group of Armies since the last report are given below. All other units are unchanged since on No.7589.

I. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	(Liu Chih	)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung	)	Wuchang	(")	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	)	Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
4th "	(Chang Fa-kuei	)	Ch'enchow	(Hunan)	20,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	)	Shanghai	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Pao Kang	)	Anking	(Anhui)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	)	Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen	)	Canton	(Kuangtung)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	)	Kuangshui	(Hupeh)	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	)	Suhsien	(Anhui)	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	)	Tenghsien	(Honan)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	)	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	)	Shashih	(Hupeh)	12,000
				Total	164,000

Part of the 3rd Division under Ch'en Chi-cheng has been sent to Kuangtung for operation against Kuangsi.

The 4th Division under Chang Fa-kuei has rebelled and is forcing its way into Kuangsi to join with rebellious Kuangsi troops against Chiang Kai-shek. Chu Hui-jih is "field commander" under Chang Fa-kuei.

Part of the 5th Division under Hsiung Shih-hui has been transferred to Nanking to maintain peace and order in the city.

Central Government Troops

14th Division	(Liu Chun-jung	)	Hsuchang	(Honan)	15,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	)	Kueiling	(Kuangsi)	6,000
16th "	(Lu Huan-yen	)	Pingle	"	8,000
17th Mix.Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	)	Tsining	(Shantung)	12,000
18th Division	(Chang Hui-tsan	)	Kienchang	(Kuangsi)	12,000
19th "	(Liu Chien-hsu	)	Hengchow	(Hunan)	10,000
20th "	(Han Fu-chu	)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	25,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san	)	Techow	(Shantung)	25,000
			Carried Forward		113,000

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	Brought Forward			113,000
44th Division	(Fang Ting-ying	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
45th "	(Fang Tse	Wuhu	"	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	Weihsien	(Shantung)	12,000
47th "	(Wang Chin-yu	Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	Yencheng	(Honan)	24,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-chi	Suhsien	(Anhui)	12,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan	Shaokuan	(Kuangtung)	12,000
51st "	(Kung Hao	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
52nd "	(Wu Shang	T'aoyuan	(Hunan)	6,000
53rd "	(Liu Hsing	Loyang	(Honan)	15,000
54th "	(Wei Yi-san	Hsuchang	"	16,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	Amoy	(Fukien)	4,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	Liuchow	(Kwangsi)	6,000
58th "	(Wen Hung-en	Huichow	(Kuangtung)	8,000
59th "	(Yu Han-mou	Wuchow	(")	8,000
60th "	(Tsai T'ing-kai	Kaichien	"	8,000
61st "	(Chiang Kuang-nai	Chaoching	"	8,000
62nd "	(Hsiang Han-pin	Pingle	(Kuangsi)	8,000
63rd "	(Li Yang-ching	Chaoching	(Kuangtung)	8,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih	Kaifeng	(Honan)	8,000
1st " "	(An Chun-tsai	Loyang	"	6,000
2nd " "	(Chang Li-sheng	Pochow	(Anhui)	10,000
			Total	356,000

The 15th Division under Li Ming-jui and the 57th Division under Yang Teng-hui have joined with the Kuangsi party, operating against Chiang Kai-shek in the province.

The 115th Brigade of the 45th Division under Fang Tse has been transferred to Nanking.

The 50th Division under Tan Tao-yuan has moved from Fuchow Kiangsi, to Shaokuan, Kuangtung, reinforcing Kuangtung troops.

Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st Division	(Tsao Wan-shun	Ichang	(Hupeh)	15,000
1st "	(Chang Chen	Liangkuan	(Fukien)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang	Fuchow	"	8,000
3rd "	(Liu Mao-en	Shunte	(Honan)	10,000
3rd "	(Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	(Shantung)	30,000
4th "	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	Changte	(Honan)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Kuei-tang	Tsining	(Shantung)	6,000
5th "	(Teng Ying	Nanyang	(Honan)	4,000
5th "	(Fan Shih-sheng	Chinchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th "	(Ho Chien	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	4,000
8th "	(Chow Lan	Wukang	"	4,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	Siangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Li Yu-hsuan	Shihnan	"	4,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu		(Szechuan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
14th "	(Yang Hu-ch'en	Nanyang	(Honan)	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	Hankow	(Hupeh)	3,000
1st " "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	Suchow	(Anhui)	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying	"	"	5,000
			Carried Forward	151,500

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		Brought Forward			151,500
3rd Ind.Brig.	(Yuan Chia-sheng	)	Chengkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin	)	Kwangan	(Hupeh)	3,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	)	Chienli	"	2,000
6th " "	(Man Ping-yueh	)	Ch'angte	(Hunan)	2,000
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	)	Wuhu	(Anhui)	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	)	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
10th " "	(Kao Kuei-tze	)	Mengying	(Shantung)	3,000
11th " "	(Wan Yi-wu	)	Shihngn	(Hupeh)	6,000
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu	)	Shashih	"	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	)	Chishui	"	5,000
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao	)	Ichang	"	2,000
				Total	187,500

Total First Group of Armies 707,500

Designation of the 11th Division under Yang Hu-ch'eng has been changed into the 14th division.

The above troops consist principally of former Wuhan forces and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions, or have been reorganized from defunct armies. Many of them are very undependable.

Provincial Garrison Forces

1st Ind.Brig.	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan)	Tsinan	(Shantung)	5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu)	Tsingtao	"	3,600
2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung)	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
3rd " "	(Li Yun-chieh)	Hsiangt'an	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming)		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)		"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan)		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo)	" "	"	4,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Ch'i-ming)	Liuchow	(Kuangsi)	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih)	Nanning	"	4,000
			Total	39,600

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han)	Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung)	"	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-chun)	"	"	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung)	Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind.Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling)	Chaotung	"	2,400
Body Guard Corps	(Yen Chia-hsun)	Yunnanfu	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua)	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan)	Amichow	"	400
6 corps of Border Defense Forces				3,100
			Total	26,500

The above information recently obtained is believed to be correct.

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2. The foregoing partial situation report is submitted in order to show the changes in the First Group of Armies. The shifting of troops and shifting of allegiances are still in progress and what is happening in Kwangsi is still vague. A complete report, with narrative of events, will be forwarded in the next pouch.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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4 MID
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G-2 Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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NOV 25 1929
2657-J-278
281
WAR DEPARTMENT
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I. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	(Liu Chih	) Hsinyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-t'ung	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	) Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Nanking	"	12,000
6th "	(Pao Kang	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	) Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen	) Canton	(Kuangtung)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	) Hsinyang	(Honan)	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	) Suhsien	(Anhui)	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	) Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	) Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	) Hsinyang	(Honan)	12,000
			Total . . .	144,000

Part of the 3rd Division under Ch'en Chi-cheng which had been sent to Kuangtung for operations against Kuangsi is now reported to have received orders to return.

Central Government Troops

14th Division	(Liu Chun-jung	) Chengchow	(Honan)	15,000
16th "	(Lu Huan-yen	) Hohsien	(Kuangsi)	8,000
17th "	(Sun Kuang-chien	) Techow	(Shantung)	12,000
17th Mix. Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	) Tsining	"	12,000
18th Division	(Chang Hui-tsan	) Kienchang	(Kuangsi)	12,000
19th "	(Liu Chien-hsu	) Hengchow	(Hunan)	10,000
20th "	(Han Fu-chu	) Tsaochow	(Shantung)	25,000
24th "	(Shih Yu-san	) Techow	"	13,000
44th "	(Fang Ting-ying	) Hsuchang	(Honan)	12,000
45th "	(Fang Tse	) Anking	(Anhui)	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	) Weihsien	(Shantung)	12,000
47th "	(Wang Chin-yu	) Hsuchang	(Honan)	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	) Yencheng	"	24,000
49th "	(Jen Ying-chi	) Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan	) Shaokuan	(Kuangtung)	12,000
51st "	(Kungh Hao	) Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
52nd "	(Wu Shang	) T'aoyuan	(Hunan)	6,000
53rd "	(Liu Hsing	) Hsuchang	(Honan)	15,000
54th "	(Wei Yi-san	) Chengchow	"	16,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	) Amoy	(Fukien)	4,000
			Carried Forward	272,000

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		Brought Forward		272,000
58th Division	(Wen Hung-en)	Huichow	(Kuangtung)	8,000
59th "	(Yu Han-mou)	Hsikiang	"	8,000
60th "	(Tsai Ting-kai)	Kaichien	"	8,000
61st "	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	Chaoching	"	8,000
62nd "	(Hsiang Han-pin)	Hsikiang	"	8,000
63rd "	(Li Yang-ching)	Chaoching	"	8,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(An Chun-tsai)	Chengchow	(Honan)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih)	Tsaochow	(Shantung)	8,000
2nd " "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Hsuchang	(Honan)	10,000
1st Ind.Art.Regt.	(Yang Yung-an)	Chengchow	"	2,500
2nd " " "	(Fan Chu)	Pukow	(Kiangsu)	2,500
4th " " "	(Lu Tsun-ching)	Hsuchow	"	2,500
			Total . . .	351,500

The 17th Division under Sun Kuang-chien is a newly organized unit. It is reorganized from the 24th Division under Shih Yu-san.

The Independent Artillery Regiments are old units, information of which was lately obtained.

Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st Division	(Tsao Wan-shun)			
1st "	(Chang Chen)	Liangkuan	(Fukien)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang)	Fuchow	"	8,000
3rd "	(Liu Chen-nien)	Chefoo	(Shantung)	30,000
3rd "	(Liu Mao-en)	Shunte	(Honan)	10,000
4th "	(Wan Hsuan-tsai)	Changte	"	10,000
4th "	(Liu Kuei-tang)	Tengfeng	"	6,000
5th "	(Teng Ying)	Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000
5th "	(Fan Shih-sheng)	Chinchow	"	12,000
7th "	(Ho Chien)	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	4,000
8th "	(Chow Lan)	Wukang	"	4,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang)	Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Li Yu-hsuan)	Shihnan	"	4,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu)		(Szechuan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi)		"	6,000
14th "	(Yang Hu-ch'en)	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien)	Miyang	"	3,000
1st " "	(Ch'en Yueh-han)	Suchow	(Anhui)	5,000
2nd " "	(Sun Tien-ying)	P'ingtu	(Shantung)	15,000
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng)	Chengkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
4th " "	(Lo Lin)	Laohokou	(Hupeh)	3,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su)	Chienli	"	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh)	Taoyuan	(Hunan)	2,000
7th " "	(Li Ch'i)	Wuhu	(Anhui)	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo)	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
10th " "	(Kao Kuei-tze)	Mengying	(Shantung)	3,000
11th " "	(Wan Yi-wu)	Shihnan	(Hupeh)	6,000
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu)	Hsiaokan	"	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu)	Chishui	"	5,000
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao)	Ich'ang	"	2,000
			Total . . .	188,500

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The 1st Division under Tsao Wan-shun mutinied on October 6, 1929, at Ich'ang and some troops of this division have been reorganized and incorporated into the 14th Division under Yang Hu-cheng.

The above troops consist principally of former Wuhan forces and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions, or have been reorganized from defunct armies. Many of them are very undependable.

Total First Group of Armies 684,000

Provincial Garrison Forces

1st Ind.Brig.	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan)	Tsinan	(Shantung)	5,000
Nanking Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu)	Tsingtao	"	3,600
2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung)	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
3rd " "	(Li Yun-chieh)	Hsiangt'an	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming)		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui)		"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan)		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo)	" "	"	4,000

Total 31,600

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

Second Group of Armies

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun)	Jungyang	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu)	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying)	Jungyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming)	Yuchow	"	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin)	Kuanghua	(Hupeh)	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou)	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi)	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung)	Kingtzekuan	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-k'ai)	Chengp'ing	"	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi)	Paiho	(Hupeh)	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan)	Szeshui	(Honan)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien)	Lushihhsien	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang)	Kuanghua	(Hupeh)	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung)	Kingtzekuan	(Honan)	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang)	Chinchow	(Kansu)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen)	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua)	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang)	Jungyang	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin)	Loyang	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng)	Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung)	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en)	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen)	Hsingan	(Honan)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin)	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen)	Tungkuan	(Honan)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin)	Kuanyingtang	"	4,000

Total 249,000

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In the previous Situation Report the Second Group of Armies was divided into "Routes", while "Routes" are existent now, no definate information as to divisions assigned them is available, since there has been a general re-assignment of forces throughout the Knominchun, and the information reaching us has been of a conflicting nature.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command -- Shang Chen

32nd Division	(Li P'ei-chi)			
33rd "	(Sun Ch'u)	Taming	(Chihli)	12,000
34th "	(Hsu Yung-chang)			
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou)	Shihchiachuang		12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta)	Tientsin	"	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo)	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying)	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-shou)	Shihchiachuang	"	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an)	Yunch'eng	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao)	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi)	Peking	(Chihli)	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi)	Tientsin	"	9,000
1st Cav. Div.	(T'an Ching-lin)	Tatung-Fengchen		6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying)	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Wang Kuei-te)	Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu)	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
25th Ind. Brig.	(Ho Shao-nan)	Suiyuan	"	6,000
26th " "	(Ho Yuan-pi)	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku)	Chengting	(Chihli)	6,000
4th Art. "	(Tseng Yen-yi)	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang)	Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh)	Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i)	Tientsin	"	2,500

Provincial Garrison Force - Ku Jen-fa

1st Division	(Wang Tse)	Tat'ungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying)	Yuanp'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung)	P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang)	Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih)	Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he)	Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai)	Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou)	Yunch'eng	"	8,000

Total Third Group of Armies 211,000

The 32nd and 34th divisions under Li Pei-chi and Hsu Yung-chang respectively, for political reasons have been declared dissolved by Yen Hsi-shan. Two brigades of the 32nd Division have been reorganized and incorporated into the 35th division under Yang Hsiao-ou and the 42nd division under Feng Hung-chi; two brigades of the 34th division have been incorporated with the 33rd division under Sun Ch'u and the 39th division under Chao Ch'en-shou.

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangsi

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	)	(Kwangsi)	20,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Namheung	"	6,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Wuchow	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Namheung	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Kweihsien	"	4,000
			Total	40,000

The above troops are at present at war with the National Government in the province.

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) "	"	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind.Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Chaotung	"	2,400
Body Guard Corps	(Yen Chia-hsun	) Yunnanfu	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng	) (Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun	) "	5,000
Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang	) "	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces
Two Reserve Regiments
One Gendarmerie Battalion
One Artillery Corps
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force) 10,000

Szechuan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total . . .	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chou	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Independent Div.	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total . . .	54,000

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Szechwan (continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying	)	(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan	)	"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng	)	"	3,000
			Total . . .	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	) Fowchow	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	) "	"	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	) Patung	(Hupeh)	7,000
			Total . . .	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	) Chengtu	(Szechuan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	) "	"	12,000
Border Def. Troops	(Len Ying-tung	) Szechuan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total . . .	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	) Chengtu	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	) Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	) Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	) Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	) Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total . . .	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	) Tungchuan	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	) "	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	) "	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun	) "	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Min-chang	) "	"	6,000
			Total . . .	30,000

Border Defence Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechuan)	10,000

Total Szechuan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 370,500

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(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikuan-Lwanchow Area ..... Yu Hsueh-chung

6th Brigade	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Yungping	)		11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikuan	)	Chihli	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang	) Lwanchow	)		10,000
				Total	31,000

Manchuria

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Yingkow	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Chinchow	"	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu	) Manchouli	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Liaoyuan	(Fengtien)	11,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan	"	11,000
24th "	(Huang Shih Yueh	) Changwu	"	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	) Chinchow	"	10,000
			Total	83,000

First Army - Wang Shu-ch'ang

4th Brigade	(Liu Yi-fei	) Harbin	)		10,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	) Yimienp'o	)		10,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Mishanhsien	)		8,000
1st " "	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Harbin	)	Kirin	6,000
1st Art.Regt	(	) "	)		6,000
6th Engr.Bn.	(	)	)		800
				Total	40,800

Second Army - Hu Yu-k'un

5th Brigade	(Ting Ying-pin	) Manchouli	)		10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho	) Pokotu	)	Hei-	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig	(Chang Shu-seng	) "	)	lung-	6,000
5th Art.Regt	(	)	)	kiang	6,000
1st Engr.Bn.	(	)	)		800
				Total	32,800

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Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

2nd Art. Regt.	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikuan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Battalions stationed in Fengtien	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total	227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Suifen	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) "	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Fuchin	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Manchouli	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Lingkiang	)	7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan	) Hailar	) Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Manchouli	) lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	37,000

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 360,600

Jehol

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Luanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Luanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,955,200

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2. General Remarks. (September 13-October 21, 1929)

The South China Situation. On the 12th of September the Central Government ordered Chang Fa-kuei in command of China's famous Ironsides, the 4th Division, to move south from Ichang to an area along the Lung-Hai Railway. This order was issued after the government was alleged to have discovered an anti-government plot, implicating among others Fang Chen-wu and Chang Fa-kuei. Chang, upon receipt of this order, repudiated the Central Government, denounced Chiang Kai-shek, acclaimed Wang Ching-hui, and leaving for the time being a rear guard in Ichang started overland for the discontented province of Kwangsi, whose governor, Yu Tso-po, declared in his favor. Fang Chen-wu was relieved of his command and constrained to take up residence in Nanking.

On September 20, Nanking issued a mandate dismissing Chang Fa-kuei from office and by the last of the month three divisions, the 3rd, the 8th and the 50th, had reached Canton in obedience to orders from the Central Government. Concurrently with Chang Fa-kuei's declaration of independence, Yu Tso-po, the Chairman of the Kwangsi Provincial Government, Li Ming-shui, Yang T'eng-hui and Wu Shih-ch'i, division commanders under him, denounced the Central Government and that of Canton and declared for Chang Fa-kuei. Canton's counter was rapid and effective. Troops at once seized Wuchow which guards the only practicable route of attack from Kwangsi.

The Kwangtung Army consists of five divisions, the 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd and 63rd, and in addition, the three divisions sent by Nanking. The Cantonese Navy possesses some twenty gun boats and the cruiser Chung Shan. The Kwangsi Army consists of the 15th, 16th and 57th Divisions, and the 1st and 2nd Independent Brigades. In addition Chang Fa-kuei's 4th Division, variously estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000 men, must be considered. The commanders of the 16th and 57th divisions, shortly after Yu Tso-po's defection, declared for Canton, thereby reducing the Kwangsi effectives, exclusive of the 4th Division, to a handful, with no navy in support. Chang Fa-kuei, on reaching Kweilin in Kwangsi on the 6th of October, with a part of his men, saw that the time for attack was not ripe and is now reported to be marching north again to join forces with the Kuominchun. There seems to be a concert of action between the Kuominchun and the combination Kwangsi-C hang Fa-kuei. For the time being Canton is in no danger, and the 3rd and 8th Nationalist Divisions have received orders to return north.

In spite of a mandate issued to Ho Chien, the governor of Hunan, to attack and obstruct Chang in his passage through that province, the 4th Division as far as is known met with no obstacles, and various reports state with assistance.

The Situation in Central China. On Chinese Independence Day, October 10, 27 generals of the Kuominchun issued a telegraphic circular denouncing the Central Government and especially its chief executive, Chiang Kai-shek. On the day following Nanking declared that "For the sake of unity, this rebellion must be suppressed". There has been no crystallization of the military situation since these declarations.

Yen Hsi-shan, as has been his want in recent wars, holds the pivotal position in Shansi. He is generally believed to be in league with Feng Yu-hsiang but will not, it is believed, actually announce his

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partisanship until at least some of the other doubtful entities, Ch'en T'iao-yuan, Han Fu-chu, Liu Chen-hua, Shih Yu-san, Ma Hung-kwei, Tang Sheng-chih and Ho Chien, have indicated their courses of action. A glance at the two sketch maps accompanying this report will show the strategic positions occupied by these doubtful generals. No predictions are warranted until some assurance is received as to which side they will follow.

As of interest in this connection the following brief notes on the various Route Army Commanders, as announced by the Central Government, are made:

1st Route Army: Hsuchang, Honan. Commanding Officer, Fang Ting-ying. Fang Ting-ying, hitherto a division commander, is a loyal Chiang Kai-shek man.

2nd Route Army: Along Peking-Hankow Railway in neighborhood of Wushengkuan. Commanded by Liu Chih. Liu Chih is a loyal follower of Chiang Kai-shek.

(Arms, personnel, training and equipment of the 1st and 2nd Routes are of the highest order.)

3rd Route Army: Hsinhsiang-Honan. Han Fu-ch'u in command. Han Fu-ch'u was up until March of this year a loyal henchman of Feng Yu-hsiang. At present his loyalty to Nanking is doubtful.

4th Route Army: Pao-king, Hunan. Ho Chien in command. Ho Chien formerly was one of the leaders in the Wu-Han clique. After the Kwangsi Party's disaster in the Hankow area he cast in his lot with Chiang Kai-shek. A month ago the Nationalist Government ordered him to stop Chang Fa-kuei's passage through Hunan and his evasion of this order has led the Nanking Government to distrust him. He then is to be considered doubtful.

5th Route Army: Chengchow, Honan. Tang Sheng-chih in command. Tang Sheng-chih was originally in command of the troops, which in the Wu-Han trouble, were under Pai Chung-hsi. In 1927 Pai Ch'ung-hsi, then one of Chang Kai-shek's generals, defeated Tang, who then was a follower of the Hankow Government, and took over his troops. When, this spring, Pai was ousted by Chiang Kai-shek, Tang took his old troops back again. At present Tang's allegiance to the Central Government may be considered very doubtful.

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6th Route Army: This Route has been dissolved and its commander, Fang C hen-wu, arrested.

11th Route Army: Changtehfu-Honan. Liu Chen-hua in command. Liu Chen-hua in 1924 was Tuchun of Shensi and assisted Wu Pei-fu in his campaign against Feng. When the "Christian" general had disposed of Wu he turned on Liu and defeated him. Later in 1925, Liu Chen-hua assisted Feng in his war against Chang Tso-lin. This spring he apparently became dissatisfied with Feng's command and declared for the Central Government. His past indicates his future——doubtful.

13th Route Army: Techow, Shantung. Shih Yu-san. Until this spring a loyal follower of Feng's. Whether he actually betrayed Feng or acted upon Feng's orders is still unknown. His allegiance is uncertain.

Chen T'iao-yuan, who holds a strategically important position in Shantung, in the past nine years has declared for Ch'i Hsieh-yuan, Sun Ch'uan-fang, Chang Tsung-chang, Chang Tso-lin, and latterly Chiang Kai-shek. His allegiance is uncertain and once obtained of doubtful value.

7.

With Yen solidly behind the Kuominchun, and with an even distribution of the fence-riders, defeat most certainly will come to Chiang Kai-shek. The latter is at present still in Nanking apparently endeavoring to patch up differences with the disaffected generals.

Feng Yu-hsiang remains in Shansi. His army is truly a one-man army and is not expected to put forth its usual efforts without his personal leadership. Reports from the Consulate General in Hankow indicate a lack of the old-time organization and cohesion in the Kuominchun, and might have added that the Nationalist Armies present even a worse picture.

To date, although minor hostilities have broken out in the neighborhood of Chengchow on the Lung-Hai Railway and in the Han River Valley near Laohokow, no decisive action may be expected until, as indicated in the paragraphs above, some crystallization has taken place.

The main effort of the Kuominchun is being directed towards Hankow along the Han River Valley and north of this valley towards Nanyang. Nanyang is especially important since it controls, excepting the Wushengkuan, the most important pass through the mountains towards Hankow. The secondary effort is being pushed along the Lung-Hai Railway with the double object of capturing Chengchow and cutting the Kin-Han at Hsuchow.

There are enclosed two sketch maps showing troop dispositions in Central China as of October 17 and of October 25, 1929.

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The Manchurian Situation. From the time of the Russian raid in the Suifenho area on September 7, mentioned in Situation Report No. 7589, until the present writing, with the exception of the capture and re-capture of Lahasusu and minor raids at Manchouli on October 1 and 2, there has been a lull in activities along the Siberian frontier. On October 13, Lahasusu, at the confluence of the Sungari and Amur Rivers, fell to the Soviet forces after a naval engagement in which, according to best available reports, one or two Chinese and one or two Russian gunboats were sunk. The Chinese garrison withdrew some 40 or 50 li from the town.

While various reports would seem to indicate that a very bloody land and naval battle was fought in re-capturing the city, in which the Russian losses were heavy, the truth seems to be that when the town had been cleared of such food supplies as it contained the Russians withdrew and the Chinese garrison marched in without opposition.

Forces on both sides of the frontier at strategic points continue to face each other from more or less elaborate trench systems, but are loath to take the offensive. In most well informed circles the likelihood of any serious hostilities is regarded lightly, and the possibility is growing stronger that as Nanking's attention is now engaged with her own difficulties, Mukden may be able to settle the differences which still exist.

Mention was made in Situation Report No.7477 of the over-size Fengtien Artillery Regiment. There is attached the organization of the typical Fengtien regiment. It should be borne in mind that this organization is the result of disbandment and that the men, materiel and horses comprising the present regiment formerly constituted two regiments. Mukden can point to the fact that her strength in artillery regiments has been cut in half and take comfort in the knowledge that her fighting power remains the same.

It should also be mentioned that Tsou Tso-hua, the commander of the Fengtien artillery, which is maintained as a general artillery reserve, has by this disbandment been able to make a number of promotions in his officer personnel, to consolidate his command, and to increase his authority. He is said to be ambitious.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

No. 7609 1st Ind.

Office of the Military, Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, October 24, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache



TOTAL. . . . 6,000 men
48 guns

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Y-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 28 1929
2657-J-276
284
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

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I. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 26 1929

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st	Division	(Liu Chih	Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
2nd	"	(Ku Chu-t'ung	Hsingcheng	(Honan)	12,000
3rd	"	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
5th	"	(Hsiung Shih-hui	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th	"	(Pao Kang	Kuangshui	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th	"	(Wang Chun	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
8th	"	(Mao Ping-wen	Linju	(")	12,000
9th	"	(Chiang Ting-wen	Hsinyang	(")	12,000
10th	"	(Juan Hsuan-wu	Lushan	(")	12,000
11th	"	(Ch'en Ch'eng	Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
12th	"	(Chin Han-ting	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th	"	(Hsia Tou-yin	Chumatien	(Honan)	12,000
			Total		144,000

Part of the 3rd division under Ch'en Chi-cheng and the 8th division under Mao Ping-wen, which had been sent to Kuangtung for operations against Kuangsi, have returned to North; the 3rd division is stationed at Hankow, and the 8th division is operating against the Kuominchun at Linju in Honan.

Central Government Troops

14th	Division	(Liu Chun-jung	Tengfeng	(Honan)	15,000
16th	"	(Lu Huan-yen	Junghsien	(Kuangsi)	8,000
17th	"	(Sun Kuang-chien	Pengpu	(Anhui)	12,000
18th	"	(Chang Hui-tsan	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu	Hengchow	(Hunan)	10,000
20th	"	(Han Fu-chun	Taokow	(Honan)	25,000
24th	"	(Shih Yu-san	Suchow	(Anhui)	13,000
44th	"	(Fang Ting-ying	Hsuchang	(Honan)	12,000
45th	"	(Fang Tse	Anking	(Anhui)	12,000
46th	"	(Fan Hsi-chi	Weihsien	(Shantung)	12,000
47th	"	(Wang Chin-yu	Linju	(Honan)	28,000
48th	"	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	"	(")	24,000
49th	"	(Jen Ying-chi	Haichow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
50th	"	(Tan Tao-yuan	Shaokuan	(Kuangtung)	12,000
51st	"	(Kung Hao	Jungyang	(Honan)	12,000
52nd	"	(Wu Shang			
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing	Jungyang	(Honan)	15,000
54th	"	(Wei Yi-san	Hsuchang	(")	16,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting	Amoy	(Fukien)	4,000
			Carried Forward		254,000

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		Brought Forward			254,000
58th	Division	(Wen Hung-en	Huichow	(Kuangtung)	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou	Hsikiang	"	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai	Wuchow	"	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kuang-nai	Ch'aochow	"	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-pin	Wuchow	"	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching	"	"	8,000
64th	Mix.Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	T'angshan	(Honan)	12,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(An Chun-tsai	Chengchow	"	6,000
1st	" Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih	Tsining	(Shantung)	8,000
2nd	" "	(Chang Li-sheng	Hsuchang	(Honan)	10,000
1st	Ind.Art.Regt.	(Yang Jung-an	Chengchow	"	2,500
2nd	" " "	(Fan Chu	"	"	2,500
4th	" " "	(Lu Tsung-ching	Tengfeng	"	2,500
				Total	345,500

Designation of the 17th Mixed Division under Ma Hung-kuei has been changed to the 64th Mixed Division, which is stationed now at T'angshan in Honan.

The 52nd Division under Wu Shang mutinied Nov. 6, 1929. Troops of this division have been transferred to the 7th division under Ho Chien and the 8th division under Chou Lan. The said division is declared dissolved.

The 54th division under Wei Li-san is reported to have sufferred great losses in action against the Kuominchun at Tengfeng in Honan. This division has returned to Hsuchang for reorganization.

Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st	Division	(Chang Chen	Liangkuan	(Fukien)	9,500
2nd	"	(Lu Hsing-pang	Fuchow	"	8,000
3rd	"	(Ho Li-san	Tsinan	(Shantung)	8,000
3rd	"	(Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	"	30,000
3rd	"	(Liu Mao-en	Tengfeng	(Honan)	10,000
4th	"	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	"	"	10,000
4th	"	(Liu Kuei-tang	Yucheng	"	6,000
5th	"	(Fan Shih-sheng	Chinchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th	"	(Ho Chien	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	7,000
8th	"	(Chou Lan	Wukang	"	7,000
9th	"	(Yin Cheng-kang	Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th	"	(Li Ju-hsuan	Shihnan	"	4,000
10th	"	(Hsieh Pin	Yuping	(Kueichow)	8,000
12th	"	(Hu Jo-yu		(Szechuan)	6,000
13th	"	(Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
14th	"	(Yang Hu-ch'en	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
18th	"	(Sun Tien-ying	Mamutsi	"	15,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	Miyang	"	3,000
3rd	" "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	Chengkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
4th	" "	(Lo Lin	Hsiangyang	(Hupeh)	3,000
5th	" "	(Wei Chung-su	Chienli	"	2,000
6th	" "	(Men Ping-yueh	Hankow	"	2,000
7th	" "	(Li Ch'i	Wuhu	(Anhui)	2,000
8th	" "	(Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
			Carried Forward		181,500

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			Brought Forward		181,500
10th Ind. Brig.	(Kao Kuei-tze	) Mengying	(Shantung)		3,000
11th " " "	(Wan Yi-wu	) Shihman	(Hupeh)		6,000
12th " " "	(Hsu Shen-yu	) Hsiaokan	"		4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	) Chishui	"		5,000
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao	) Hankow	"		2,000
15th " "	(Tang Sze-tung	) "	"		4,000
16th " "	(Teng Ying	) Wuhsueh	"		3,000
			Total		208,500

The 3rd division under Ho Yi-san is a newly organized unit and is stationed at Tsinan in Shantung.

The 5th division under Teng Ying has been reorganized into the 16th Independent Brigade.

The 10th division under Hsieh Pin has been formed from the old 43rd Army under Li Yen, information of which was just obtained.

The 18th division under Sun Tien-ying is reorganized from the 2nd Independent Brigade and is now stationed at Mamutsi, Honan.

The 15th Ind. Brig. under Tang Sze-tung has been formed from some troops of the 1st division formerly under Tsao Wan-shun.

The above troops consist principally of former Wuhan forces and several former Feng Yu-hsiang divisions, or have been reorganized from defunct armies. Many of them are very undependable.

Total First Group of Armies 698,000

Provincial Garrison Forces

1st Ind. Brig.	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan	) Tsinan	(Shantung)	6,000
2nd " "	(Chang Chi-hsiung	) Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
3rd " "	(Li Yun-chieh	) Hsiangt'an	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming	)	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Ch'en Kuo-hui	)	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan	)	"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	) NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	) " "	"	4,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	3,600
			Total	32,600

The Gendarmerie under Wu Sze-yu which had been sent to Tsingtao, Shantung, is reported to have returned to Nanking, Kiangsu.

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

Second Group of Armies

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Tengfeng	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Tengfeng	(Honan)	12,000
			Carried Forward	36,000

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		Brought Forward		36,000
22nd Division	(Chen Hsing-ming	Yuchow	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	Linju	(Honan)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	Honan-Shansi	Border	12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung	Chenping	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	Kucheng	(Hupeh)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	Laohokow	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	Lushan	(Honan)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	"	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	Nanchang	(Hupeh)	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	Laohokow	"	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	Chinchow	(Kansu)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang	Jungyang	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin	Linju	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen	Mihsien	(Honan)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen	Tungkuan	(Honan)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	Tengfeng	"	4,000
Total Second Group of Armies				249,000

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command -- Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u	Taming	(Chihli)	12,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	Shihchiachuang	"	12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	Tientsin	"	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying	Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-shou	Shihchiachuang	"	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	Yuncheng	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	Kalgan	(Chahar)	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	Peking	(Chihli)	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	Tientsin	"	9,000
1st Cav.Div.	(T'an Ching-lin	Tatung-Fengchen		6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Wang Kuei-te	Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
25th Ind.Brig.	(Ho Shao-nan	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	6,000
4th Cav.Div.	(Li Chia-yu	Paotou	"	4,000
26th Ind.Brig.	(Ho Yuan-pi	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku	Chengting	(Chihli)	6,000
4th Art. "	(Tseng Yen-yi	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang	Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh	Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i	Tientsin	"	2,500
		Carried Forward		147,000

CHINA (Military)

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			Brought Forward		147,000

Provincial Garrison Force - Ku Jen-fa

1st Division	(Wang Tse	)	Tat'ungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	)	Yuanp'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	)	P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	)	Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	)	Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	)	Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	)	Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	)	Yunch'eng	"	8,000

Total Third Group of Armies 211,000

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kuangsi

			Lienshan	(Kuangtung)	
4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	)	Hohsien	(Kuangsi)	20,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	)	Liuchow	"	6,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	)	Laipo	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	)	Mongkong	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	)	Liuchow	"	4,000

Total 40,000

The above troops are at present at war with the Kuangtung forces near Wuchow.

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	)	Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	)	"	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	)	"	"	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	)	Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind.Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	)	Chaotung	"	2,400
Body Guard Corps	(Yen Chia-hsun	)	Yunnanfu	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	)	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	)	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces				"	3,100

Total 26,500

Kweichow

25th Army	(Chow Hsi-cheng	)	(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun	)	"	5,000
Ind. Brig.	(Tsao Yung-hsiang	)	"	3,000

Total 20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Chekiang
Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces
Two Reserve Regiments
One Gendarmerie Battalion
One Artillery Corps
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force) 10,000

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Szechuan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total . . .	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng)	Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Independent Div	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total . . .	54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying	)	(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan	)	"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng	)	"	3,000
			Total . . .	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	) Fowchow	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	) Ichang	(Hupeh)	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	) Patung	"	7,000
			Total . . .	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	) Chengtu	(Szechuan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	) "	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Len Ying-tung	) Szechuan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total . . .	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	) Chengtu	(Szechuan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	) Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	) Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	) Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	) Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total . . .	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	) Tungchuan	(Szechuan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	) "	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	) "	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun	) "	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Min-chang	) "	"	6,000
			Total . . .	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechuan)	10,000

Total Szechuan Forces . . . 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 370,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

Shanhaikuan-Lwanchow Area ..... Yu Hsueh-chung

6th Brigade	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Yungping	)		11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikuan	)	Chihli	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang	) Lwanchow	)		10,000
				Total	31,000

Manchuria

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Fuchin	(Kirin)		11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Yingkow	(Fengtien)		10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Tichow	"		10,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan	"		11,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	) Chinchow	"		10,000
				Total	52,000

The 16th and 19th Brigades under Ying Chen-fu and Sun Te-chuan respectivelly have been ordered to Harbin-Ch'angch'un and Fuchin to reinforce the Kirin troops, and are placed under the First Army of Wang Shu-chang. The 24th Brigade under Huang Shih-yueh has been ordered to Anganghsi to reinforce the Heilungkiang troops, and is placed under the Second Army of Hu Yu-k'un.

First Army - Wang Shu-ch'ang

4th Brigade	(Liu Yi-fei	) Harbin	)		10,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	) Huachuan	)		10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu	) Harbin-Changchun			10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Fuchin	)	Kirin	11,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Mishanhsien	)		8,000
1st " Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Harbin	)		6,000
1st Art.Regt	(	) "	)		6,000
6th Engr.Bn.	(	)			800
				Total	61,800

Second Army - Hu Yu-k'un

5th Brigade	(Ting Ying-pin	) Manchouli	)		10,000
14th "	(Hsun Yung-ho	) Hailar	)	Hei-	10,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	) Anganghsi	)	lung-	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig	(Chang Shu-seng	) Pokotu	)	kiang	6,000
5th Art.Regt	(	) Harbin	)		6,000
1st Engr.Bn.	(	)			800
				Total	42,800

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Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

2nd Art. Regt.	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shahaikuan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	Harbin	(Kirin)	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 battalions stationed in Fengtien	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total	227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Huachuan	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Fuchin	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Manchouli	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Suipin	)	7,000
17th "	(Ho Shuan-shan	) Hailar	) Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Manchouli	) lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ling-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	37,000

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 360,600

Jehol

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Luanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Ju-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsiu Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Luanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 1,970,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. General Remarks. (October 22 - November 18, 1929)

Central China. A general attack was launched by the Kuominchun on October 27, 1929. The First Route Army under Sun Liang-chen attacking in the direction Loyang—Chengchow with the latter city as its objective, failed to push through. The cavalry attached to this Route came within striking distance of the city, since its inhabitants could easily hear the firing, but either lacked the "punch" or the intention of capturing the city. It would seem as though the Kuominchun had moved too slowly. From the date of the fatal declaration by the twenty-seven generals, October 10, seventeen days had elapsed before the general attack order was issued. These seventeen days were employed to good advantage by the Nationalist forces and when the Kuominchun attack was finally launched instead of facing only the troops of Tang Sheng-chih, four divisions, of which two were doubtful, a cavalry brigade, an infantry division and an artillery regiment had been added to Chengchow's defense. Finding the defense of Chengchow stubborn the Kuominchun made an attempt to turn the position and succeeded on or about November 3rd in capturing Mihsien, about 20 miles southwest of Chengchow.

The commencement of this general offensive found the 9th, 2nd, 11th Divisions, the 4th Infantry Brigade and a part of the 1st Division (Nationalist) under Liu Chih in the neighborhood of Laohokow. This contingent, upon being attacked by the Third Kuominchun Route Army, fell back on Siangyang where they had prepared an elaborate defensive system; the Kuominchun entering Laohokow on November 12. With the capture of Mihsien and the establishment of a front line generally north and south through this place, this phase of the Kuominchun general offensive seems to have collapsed. Fighting, according to all available reports, was fierce, and it is worthy of note that most of the Nationalist wounded were suffering from sword cuts. Rifle ammunition on Feng's side seems to be scarce, but there is reported to be a plentiful supply of hand grenades.

On November 4, Ho Chen-chun, who was in command of the Nationalist forces in the Chengchow area, was relieved of his command, and Tang Sheng-chih, who was without doubt being tested, was given his duties.

On the fall of Mihsien the Nationalist forces started a series of attacks for its recapture which culminated in success on November 9. Reports from Nationalist sources indicate that disaffected Kuominchun troops made the final capture possible.

In this connection, it should be added that news from Nationalist sources, even from Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, is highly flavored to say the least. Communiques are no more than propaganda. On the other hand, there is practically no Kuominchun source of information available.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

The fall of Mihsien, for instance, was reported by official Nationalist sources on each of four or five days before it fell, and Tengfeng, which was captured by Chiang Kai-shek on November 17, was reported captured so many times, and on dates varying from November 6 to November 20, that the observer was in a quandary. As this report is being typed it is reliably reported that Siangyang fell on November 17 to the Kuominchun.

At the present time the government front line extends roughly from north to south through the following places: Yenshih (excl); Tengfeng (incl); Juchow; Lushan (excl); Nanyangfu (incl); Sinyeh (excl); Tsangtsai (incl); Siangyang and Nanchang (excl). The divisions along this line may be noted on the accompanying map.

With the very heavy Nationalist concentrations existent in the Chengchow area it would seem as though the most feasible Kuominchun plan would be a turning movement around Siangyang with the objective of cutting Chiang Kai-shek's line of communications and capturing Wuhan, which now is practically devoid of troops.

Recent reports state that having received "transportation expenses", Yang Sen is moving from his position in Szechuan to attack the Kuominchun rear. It will be remembered that in January of this year Yang Sen, in one of Szechuan's periodic wars, was opposed to Liu Hsiang and the Nationalist Government. Yang Sen was defeated and moved from the Yangtze to his present position. It would be natural for the government to order Liu Hsiang to assist in the present struggle, but a glance at the map will show that it would be necessary for him to pass through Yang Sen's area. This in all likelihood would not be permitted, so Nanking is forced to the dubious expedient of employing and paying Yang Sen, a Peiyang Party man, to come to its aid.

More or less off-setting any advantages to be derived from Yang Sen's assistance is the rejuvenation of Gen. Hu Tsung-to. General Hu disappeared from the picture of Chinese affairs after his unsuccessful rebellion against the Central Government in Wuhan last spring. It was thought that he was abroad. However, he now emerges and heading a force variously estimated as from 10,000 to 40,000 composed of remnants of his old units, has set up the slogan "Hupeh for the Hupehans", and is marching upon Ichang.

At present there appears to be a lull in activities along the whole front, but attention should be focussed on the Siangyang and northern Hupeh area. There, if anywhere, will come the Kuominchun's greatest attempt to force a decision.

The fighting has been, on the whole, of a very sanguine character. Chiang's troops for the most part are well equipped and supplied, and the Kuominchun is each and individually fighting for bread.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Manchuria. From the date of the last Situation Report until November 17, comparative quiet reigned on the Manchurian fronts, broken but occassionally by small raids across the frontier by the Soviets, evidently in search of food supplies. All White Russians met by these raiding parties were butchered, but little harm was done the native population.

On the 17th, however, the lull was broken both on the Manchouli and the Suifenho fronts. Confirmation has been received of reports that serious airplane attacks occurred during the above day on the towns of Chalainor, Tsagan, and on the railroad line between Chalainor and Hailar. Thirty kilometers of line between Chalainor and Hailar were destroyed. It is reported, although not confirmed, that Manchouli was captured. All wire communication has been disrupted and such reports as we have received are for the most part incapable of confirmation.

It is reported that 6 Soviet planes bombed the town of Mutanchan, 10 miles west of Muling (Suifenho front), on the 17th. The attack was evidently made for the purpose of destroying a newly erected hangar.

It was erroneously reported in Situation Report No. 7583 of August 29, 1929, due to false official reports, that Mukden was dispatching airplanes to the fronts. It is now known that the airplanes mentioned were only moved up on the 11th inst.

South China. In the last Situation Report mention was made of the fact that Chang Fa-kuei and his "Ironsides", the 4th Division, were moving north evidently with the intention of creating a diversion in the Wuhan area. This movement was halted and on November 4, reports were at hand showing that Chang's forces were distributed generally over southern Hunan and the adjacent borders of the two Kwang provinces. A juncture has been made between Chang Fa-kuei's troops and those of Yu Tso-po and Li Ming-jui. Latest consular reports from Canton state that all of the Kwangsi soldiery is willing to cooperate with Chang against Canton.

Chang Fa-kuei and his allies are attacking in two general directions. On the east a part of Chang's troops are moving along the line Linchow-Yingtak, thence south to Canton. Yingtak, on the Canton-Hankow Railway fell probably on the 18th inst.

In the center the remainder of Chang Fa-kuei's troops are attacking in the direction Hohsien-Wuchow.

On the west, the Kwangsi troops under Yu Tso-po and Li Ming-jui are moving from Nanning and Liuchow along the West River with Wuchow also as their immediate objective.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

The latest consular reports from Canton state that Kwangtung has evacuated Wuchow and is preparing defenses at Shuihing and Samshui, farther south on the West River. Further, that the Cantonese are preparing defenses on the North River in the neighborhood of Yingtak.

From the above it will be noted that Canton's measures are purely defensive and that the evacuation of Wuchow is a sign of weakness. While too early to make any prediction the guess may be hazarded that there may yet be trouble between Yu Tso-po and Li Ming-jui on the one hand, and Chang Fa-kuei on the other, since they cannot be conceived as bed fellows.

It is impossible to divorce the situation in eastern Kwangtung from that around and north of Canton. Reports have been numerous for over a year in stating that practically every village in that section and along the Fukien border contained its nuclei of communism. The Consul at Swatow reports that in the middle of October, upon the despatch of two brigades of the 61st Division to aid in the campaign against Chang Fa-kuei, the communist forces in Fukien crossed the border and captured the town of Hushih in Kwangtung on the 16th. The Cantonese Government was forced to send troops to Swatow from Waichow and Ch'aochowfu, which eventually forced the communists to retire to the border districts.

Thus it is impossible for the Cantonese Government to direct its whole attention to the threat offered by Chang Fa-kuei. It must weaken its forces to intimidate the communists in eastern Kwangtung, and while guarding against Chang must expect a sympathetic outbreak around Swatow at any moment.

Parker G. Tenney
Parker G. Tenney,
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, November 18, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 4
2657-J-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

November 27, 1929

Subject: Report of Trip to Chengchow, Honan Province.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China.

1. In compliance with your verbal instructions I left Peiping the night of (Tues) 12 November 1929 for Chengchow, Honan Province, to make military observations of the civil warfare then in progress between the forces of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang (The Northwest Armies) and those of the Central Government. I arrived at Chengchow about midnight the following day (13 November 1929).

2. Soon after my arrival thereat I estimated the situation, in that vicinity, as being favorable to the Central Government, and wired you to that effect. Mihsien (about 30 miles southeast of Chengchow) had been taken by them a few days before (Nov. 9th); large-scale troop movements into Chengchow had ceased (indicating to me that it was considered that sufficient forces had already been moved into the area); railroad yards were rather free of congestion of idle troop trains; and business presented a normal aspect.

3. No large combat units could be located quartered in Chengchow. The only soldiers to be seen about were the usual guards at various headquarters, street patrols, troops engaged in the service of supply, medical units, communication detachments, and those of a small air service force.

4. The supreme headquarters at Chengchow was that of General T'ang Sheng-chih, Commander of the 5th Route Army. I called, officially, at General T'ang's Headquarters. General T'ang was at the front and other officers too busy to receive me---requesting that I return later. I asked for an appointment with the Chief of Staff and was given one for the following day; when I called, as per my appointment, the Chief of Staff was "indisposed" and his assistant "had not yet come in". I was given an interview with a Mr. Yeh, who I understand handled other than ordinary affairs of the office. Mr. Yeh told me that General T'ang would not have authority to grant me permission, as per my request, to observe air unit and communication centers thereat, or to visit rear units at the front; he stated that such permission would have to come from Marshal Chiang, at Hsuchow. I requested him to take the matter up with Marshal Chiang's Headquarters by telephone or wireless. Mr. Yeh replied that it would not be possible to do so and suggested that I personally go to Hsuchow and see Marshal Chiang. I felt as though they did not care to have me carry on my work or to be bothered with me.

5. The only sources of observation open to me were troops seen about town and those passing through via rail transportation; sources which only warrant general remarks and conclusions, and which naturally could not be applied to units as a whole. Civil and military contacts which I made enabled me, however, to make some personal observations of which I can report on in detail.

6. a. I prepared the following outline as a guide for my work:

I. - STAFF,
II. - COMMUNICATIONS,
III. - SUPPLY,
IV. - TRANSPORTATION,
V. - AIR SERVICE,
VI. - PERSONNEL,
VII. - MATERIEL, and
VIII. - HOSPITAL CARE.

b. Observations made in accordance with the above outline are listed below.

I. - STAFF.

a. In view of the nature of my visits, as recounted above, to General T'ang's Headquarters, it was impossible for me to make any direct observations of staff-functioning.

b. Through a civil source I learned that during the initial days of the war (October 10-20, or thereabouts), that rail transportation of troops and supplies was unusually heavy and supervision of same taken over by the military, completely disregarding railway staff and personnel. With a large headquarters at Chengchow and another at Hsuchow, and no coordination of rail transportation destined for said stations, it was but natural that transportation tangles and congestion would result——which it did, to such an extent that the Lunghai and Kin-Han lines were practically paralyzed. To remedy this condition Marshal Chiang created a Military Transportation Headquarters and a Commissary General, appointing officers to take charge of each and with headquarters at Chengchow. The Military Transportation Headquarters handled all troop movements, via rail, and also rail evacuation of the wounded. The Commissary General handled the rail movements of food, supplies, equipment, and munitions, etc.; a certain amount of transportation being assigned to him for that purpose. However this did not improve the situation for there was no coordination or control between these two offices and the usual demands for right-of-way, for their respective trains, were made on the railway staff. Marshal Chiang called a conference at which the traffic officials of the railways and the representatives of The Military Transportation Headquarters and The Commissary General discussed the operation and despatch of trains. It was agreed that the railway personnel have charge of same; from then on the transportation functioned free of congestion. Marshal Chiang, presumably to enable him, through some staff organ, to keep in touch with rail transportation, or to see if instruction relative to same were being adhered to, required, as of October 21, all railroads to submit to him a daily train report in the following form:

MILITARY TRAINS
Report required by General Chiang.
Date:

No. of the train.	No. of the locomotive	No. of cars in the train	Military Unit	Hour of dept.	Station From	Station To	Remarks

EMPTY TRANSPORTATION

(Same form as above)

g. Through a military contact I secured an introduction to General T'ang's Chief of General Staff. I arrived at his office at about 11:00 A.M. It looked as though they had just arisen for their work. Of course my visit was unexpected and made several days—six—after Leyang had fallen, but I had the impression that more activity should have been apparent around a headquarters of that size than I noticed. I remained there for about one hour and during that time only one orderly came in and only one telephone call arrived. Two large maps were on the walls but no marks or dispositions posted on either of them; in fact they were not readily accessible. One of the maps was contoured and to get a look at same necessitated getting on some officer's bed. I later asked them if they kept a situation map and was told that General T'ang did so and kept it in his office.

The staff of the Fifth Route Army is organized into 8 "departments" as follows:

Commander-in-Chief (TSUNG CHIH HUI). . . T'ANG SHENG-CHIH
The Chief of Staff (TS'AN MOU CHANG) . . Major General YEN.
Secretary to Commander-in-Chief. . . . . Mr. TSENG.

1. The General Staff Department (TS'AN MOU C H'U) - Brig.Gen.YANG in charge
2. The Adjutant General's Department (FU KUAN CH'U) - Brig.Gen.YAO in charge
3. The Communications Department (CHIAO T'UNG CH'U) - Brig.Gen. WU acting for officer in charge.
4. The Munitions Department (CHUN HSIEH CH'U) - Brig.Gen.WANG in charge
5. The Comptroller's (Finance Department (CHING LI CH'U) - Brig.Gen.TENG in charge
6. The Surgeon General's Department (CHUN I CH'U) - Brig.Gen. WU in charge
7. The Judge Advocate's Department (CHUN FA CH'U) - Brig.Gen.CH'EN in charge
8. The Social Welfare Department (CHIAO CHI CH'U) - (Officer in charge unknown.)

The designations of the various departments of this staff organization are self-explanatory, with the exception of The Social Welfare Department—No.8. The work of this department is along the lines of the work done in our service by the Y.M.C.A., and other similar organizations. I could see no evidences of any such work however.

I discussed with General Yang (Chief of General Staff) the functioning of this staff organization and their needs for as many divisions as their staff has. General Yang very frankly stated that he considered the organization too large and that in all their departments they were "over-staffed".

In addition to this staff, General T'ang has several "advisers"; one of whom is an "aviation engineer", a Mr. Li Jen-ping.

On several occasions I observed recruits of the Fifth Route Army being drilled. The instructors appeared to have been well selected and the instruction well organized and applied—instructors explaining, demonstrating, and correcting errors. I felt that this recruit instruction reflected very creditably to whatever staff organization which must have evolved and prescribed same.

From what I could judge of the way troops passing through Chengchow were fed and winter clothing and overcoats issued, to those arriving without same, I would say that the staff activity responsible for their reception and care functioned satisfactorily.

II. - COMMUNICATIONS.

a. I met the officer in charge of the "Fifth Route Army Communications Supply Department and Radio Repair Shop" - a Lt. Col. Shubert M. Chee. Colonel Chee stated that his electrical education had been received in America, at California University. The construction, maintenance, and repair of all radio equipment at Chengchow was in charge of this officer. He informed me that "they" made all their radio-sets, the parts being purchased in America and the cases and containers made as per "their" specifications by The China Electrical Supply Co., Shanghai. Colonel Chee said that sets which he is able to make for $700.00 (L.C.) would cost them $3,000.00 (L.C.) if purchased assembled. Operators are trained at Shanghai and Nanching and are said to be very efficient.

b. The radio-net at Chengchow consisted of two (2) 50-watt, 40 meter wave-length sets, and four (4) 15-watt, 100 meter wave-length sets. One of the 40 meter sets communicates with Peiping and the other with Nanching, Hankow, Shanghai and Canton. The four 100 meter sets are assigned to work, one each, with the divisions, 14th, 51st, 53rd and 54th, of the Fifth Route Army; these divisions having similar sets with them in the field. Radio communication did not extend any lower than the division.

The current for the 50-watt sets was supplied by various types of auto storage-batteries, such as Willard, Exide, etc. The batteries were charged by Delco and Homelite units. Colonel Chee stated that he found the Homelite to be more suitable because of its greater portability. The Homelite generator is made by the Homelite Corporation, Port Chester, N.Y., U.S.A.

The current for the 15-watt sets was furnished by Esco (Electric Supply Co., Stamford, Conn., U.S.A.) generators; a primary current being furnished by two (2) auto-type storage-batteries.

My impression of the wireless communications observed is that it is a big step in advancement of communications in the Chinese Army. I feel that the importance of this means of communications is realized and that Colonel Chee is but one of any number of men who could be employed to supervise this activity. However, I do not feel that, at present, the wireless communications which I observed would function in a prolonged campaign of a war of movement. On a visit to the radio repair shop of the Fifth Route Army I had an opportunity to observe the repair of a Homelite unit. The repair work was being done in a dirty, dusty yard; repairs in question were to the generator commutator. Several times the commutator fell to the ground and it was simply picked up and wiped off on the leg of the workman's breeches. I noticed that the valve of the set being worked on was badly "smoked" with carbon deposit; I inquired if this condition was peculia r to the machine and was informed that though the generator was supposed to be run on gasoline that they had found that a mixture of gasoline and a heavy oil was suitable and much cheaper; to my mind——false economy. It also appears that not much thought had been given to anticipated repairs. Colonel Chee in a conversation spoke of having sent a man to Peiping for some spare parts——not being able to obtain them the man returned to Chengchow and was then sent to Tientsin; parts could not be found there and the man returned to Chengchow again; he was then sent to Shanghai where the parts were secured.

I also inspected the telephone exchange at the headquarters of the Fifth Route Army. The switchboard thereat was an old 60 line type. This central handled the city connections. I inquired about wire communications to the front and was told that they had another switchboard, 50 lines, to the units in the field. They stated that each division headquarters has personnel that runs the wire forward as the division advances. In a stabilized position they run the wire down to the regiment and if equipment is available to the battalion.

The wires leading away from the exchange were very poorly strung and no insulation of friction or contact points provided. The wire was a good grade of insulated field wire but my experience would lead me to predict that a heavy rain or a few days of streng wind would put many of the lines out. From a previous observation of wire communications of the Fengtien Armies, I would say that from a standpoint of installation of lines, that the Fifth Route Army's installation was inferior to that observed in the Fengtien Army.

III - SUPPLY.

a. My inspection of Lung-Hai railway traffic records revealed that an average of one train of provisions arrived in Chengchow every other day. Records of supply of provisions from the North and South via Kin-Han line were not available to me, but no doubt many supplies came in over that railroad.

b. Practically all of the troops which I saw appeared to be suitably supplied with clothing. On several occasions replacements arriving without overcoats were issued same within a few hours after their arrival.

c. Munitions came in at various times and in train load lots; it is believed that the supply of same was also adequate.

d. Coal was also supplied to various units in train load lots; it is believed that supply of same was also adequate.

e. Supply of troops in Chengchow and west along Lung-Hai and south to Hsuchow, was from Nanching base; from Hsuchow to Hankow from Hankow base.

f. Supply to the field was effected by motor transportation, and impressed native carts, wheel-barrows, and carrying-coolies. Loading and unloading of most transportation being done by impressed labor. Impressed help was reported in some cases as being paid (as much as $6.00 per month) as well as fed, and in other cases as being only fed; carts were also reported as being paid for. I talked to several impressed men and they all stated that they were fed but received no pay; and in the case of their carts that though no money was received that their animals were fed.

My impression of the supply of the troops in the Chengchow area is that they were adequately supplied with food, clothing, and munitions, but the primitive modes of native transportation and the abuse of motor transportation (to follow herein) would seriously affect the quantity of supplies reaching troops in the field, as the distance away from the railway bases increased.

IV. - TRANSPORTATION.

a. Native carts are naturally employed in great numbers to transport supplies into the field, as well as to evacuate wounded therefrom. The type of native transportation in the Chengchow section of China is much cruder and not nearly as mobile as that found in the North. This disadvantage is off-set, to some extent, by the use of motor-trucks in much larger numbers than I have previously observed in Chinese armies. The Dodge, 1-1/4 ton Graham Body truck was the predominating make observed.

b. Passenger transportation, for staff officers, was furnished by all makes and sizes of cars of rather old models.

c. I could find no repair shop for motor vehicles in Chengchow and was informed that none existed. A motor-car dealer advised me that the motor transportation of the military received very little attention and that they had no facilities for field repairs; he stated that many of the drivers tamper with the machines so as to make it appear that repairs are needed——the drivers "collecting" for the alleged repairs.

d. It was reported to me that on or about November 10, a shipment of 32 new motor trucks arrived in Chengchow; informant stated that he was not familiar with the makes of motorcars and could not state just what make these trucks were. In view of the fact that the only new trucks which I observed were Dodges, it is believed that this shipment of 32 was also of that make. On November 24, I saw 8 practically new Dodge trucks being sent to Hankow for repairs; all of these trucks were unserviceable either because of bended frames, due of course to overloading and careless driving, or because of differential troubles, due most likely to lack of lubrication care.

If these 8 trucks were part of the shipment of 32 which are supposed to have arrived in Chengchow on November 10 (and I am convinced that they are), why then I consider that this loss of 25% of this transportation unit, from such causes, in a period of only two weeks, as entirely unwarranted, and a strong indication that a large Chinese army in the field, any distance from a railway, could not transport supplies and equipment with sufficient despatch to insure its success or even to maintain its existence.

V. - AIR SERVICE.

a. The air service unit stationed at Chengchow consisted of 21 pilots, a few mechanics, and four (4) all metal, 12-cylinder, Junkers monoplanes, and five (5) Moth biplanes. The Junkers monoplanes each carry four (4) bombs, about three feet long, requiring two men to lift, and six (6) bombs, about one foot long. A light detachable machine gun can be mounted in the rear cock-pit of the J unkers.

b. All pilots observed were beyond any doubt the best type of man I have yet seen in the Chinese military service; their flying suits were very modern and to all appearances imported; parachutes were not used. The pilot of the unit stationed at Chengchow was a Captain Liu; he received his training in America.

c. The air field is on the outskirts of town. Planes are secured to the ground by ropes tied to stakes. Motors and cockpits are covered when planes are idle with a cloth covering made for that purpose. No repair facilities were seen and it is believed that none existed. I visited the field at least once each day and not a single time did I see any cleaning work being done. On two occasions, after all night dust

storms, I saw planes take off without, to my knowledge, having exposed parts of motors oiled or wiped. During all of my stay at Chengchow one small biplane (about the size of a Moth) was out of commission because of needed repairs. This plane was marked on tail, BAYER, FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G., AUGSBURG, DEUTSCHLAND.

d. Shortly after my arrival at Chengchow I heard that it was rumored that one of the Nationalist planes had fallen in the city. I located the place where the plane was said to have crashed; guards posted on the outside of the property denied that any plane had fallen therein; while talking to guards I got a glimpse through the gate and could see a wing leaning against the side of a building; I pointed this out to the guard and explained that I only wanted to see the damage done to the building; I was permitted to enter. The plane was a large enclosed passenger type, named Ch'ang Chiang (The Long River---the Yangtze); motor was marked Societe Motuer des Salmson--Rotary Moter-Type 9-AB. Men employed clearing up the wreckage stated that the accident was due to a failure of the lubricating system. Three men were aboard at the time; a pilot and two observers; one of the observers was killed and the other very seriously injured. The loss of this plane was kept as secret as possible. One of the J unkers monoplanes had its markings painted over and Ch'ang Chiang painted thereon. About a week later a new plane, of the same general size and type, came in to replace the one which had crashed. This new plane was marked on the tail---Potez-33.

e. I was told that in the early days of the war that a Kuominchun plane had come over Chengchow and dropped three bombs; the plane was flying at a much greater heighth than that flown at by the planes at Chengchow; no damage was inflicted by the bombs. Fully twenty minutes after this plane had departed the local planes "tuned up" but not a single one took to the air. The next few days the news agencies announced an air duel over Chengchow and an enemy plane as having been forced down.

f. On one occasion I was able to get close enough to two Junkers taking off; two men went with each plane. Only one map was available and but a hasty inspection of it was made. The pilots stated that they were going over the front and also behind the Kuominchun lines, yet all bombs were removed from both planes; one mounted a light machine gun and the other started to but decided not to and left without it.

g. As far as I am able to judge, the pilots take off and land properly. I at no time saw any flying which indicated to me that the pilots were proficient in aerial combat maneuvering.

I feel that this unit, operating against a modern foe, could not inflict serious casualties on ground troops or materially damage stationary targets; and further, that the apparent lack of mechanical care and attention would seen eliminate it as a combat factor. I also feel that a much smaller air force, of a modern army, would have no difficulty in completely destroying this unit, either by combat in the air or by bombing the planes on the ground.

My impression of the value of air service to the Chinese Army, is at present, that of reconnaissance only, and that this value would naturally be lessened in propertion to the efficiency of the anti-aircraft service of the enemy; as a combat factor I believe this unit, in its present state, would be valueless against a modern opponent.

VI. - PERSONNEL.

a. The greater part of the troops which I observed were men from provinces south of the Yellow River; I feel that I can state that as a type they are smaller than the soldier of the North and as soldiers they impressed me as being much inferior to soldiers of the Fengtien Army type.

b. One of the most striking observations which I made was the very noticeable difference between the commissioned and non-commissioned personnel, as compared to what I have previously observed in the old Northern Armies. Officers, as a rule, were young, intelligent and energetic appearing, and created a most favorable impression. They generally carry themselves and dress as though they have a pride in their profession.

c. The impression I carried away from Chengchow is, that the most noticeable improvement in the Chinese Army that I observed, was the selection of its commissioned personnel in the junior grades.

VII - MATERIEL.

a. The amount of materiel which I was able to observe, other than that reported on elsewhere herein, was not sufficient to warrant my attempting to express any general opinions. The usual assortment of various old and new rifles, pistols, and machine guns, are carried by the Infantry. I had occasion to see the 1st Bty (Field Artillery) 1st Bn 3rd Div being moved by rail. The guns looked like they were 75's but I could not ascertain their caliber, or where they had been made or purchased; they were much the worse for age, and wear, and badly in need of care and cleaning. I also had an opportunity to observe the 4th Bty (Mountain Artillery) 5th Bn 53rd Div. These guns are 7 cm, 30-year Meji model (Japanese); they were well cared for and appeared to be serviceable. The pack equipment, however, showed no signs of much dismounted and transporting drill.

b. A source informed me that on a visit to the front he fired ten (10) rounds of rifle ammunition and only two (2) of the rounds went off. This he states caused the Division Commander (51st Div) who was with him at the time, to offer an apology for the defectiveness of the ammunition; the General, apparently to regain the face which he must have believed himself to have lost, ordered a near-by field gun to fire two (2) rounds; source states that both rounds fired but whether or not the fuses functioned he did not know.

VIII. - HOSPITAL CARE.

a. Three hospitals were established at Chengchow. Two of them confined entirely to buildings, and the third, the largest, consisted of several buildings and three mat-sheds (p'engs). The capacity of the three was 1,000.

b. Wounded were evacuated from the field dressing stations to either C hengchow or Hsuchow; being transported by native carts or the railway.

c. Seriously wounded, when sufficient numbers had accumulated, at Chengchow, were moved by rail to Hsuchow or K'aifeng. Very little surgery was performed at Chengchow. To my knowledge——and I visited the large hospital once each day, and sometimes twice——the only surgery performed, during my stay of two weeks at Chengchow, was an arm amputation. The doctors with this hospital were reported as having been Japanese trained.

d. The wounded lay on beds of wooden frames and kao-liang stalk bottoms; a loose straw mattress and pillow to each bed. Wounded were put to bed with the clothes they had on when they came in from the front. Each patient was given a cotton quilt and fed twice a day. All of this phase of hospital care I considered very satisfactory.

e. Dressings on wounds were not changed as often as I believe they should have been. Most dressings looked as if they had not been changed for many days. There was no "hospital" (aseptic) odor noticeable and I do not think that a sufficient supply of disinfectants or surgical medicines was on hand.

f. Hospital discipline was not enforced. Many patients smoked in bed; which of course was a most serious fire menace. Convalescent patients, able to be up, were seen at different times to be gambling within sight of an order, posted on the side of their hospital, prohibiting same.

g. A Major Abraham B. Chain (Ch'ien), Physical Director, The Officers' Moral Endeavor Association, Nanking, came to Chengchow on or about November 22, and organized a committee of seven people of the town to carry on welfare work among the wounded. This work to consist of writing letters, telling stories, suppress gambling, devise and supervise games for those who could participate, and supply religious needs for those interested. Major Chain is a well-appearing young man and gave the impression that he would put his work across. It is believed that this is a new activity for the Chinese Army and as such very creditable.

f. The largest hospital is on the property of the Southern Baptist Mission. An order from the Central Government is posted on the gates of their grounds to the effect that the property is not to be entered, or any part of it used by the military for any purpose. This order was shown to the officer who was with the first detail to start the hospital; despite same he took over the mission church (putting the seats outside), orphanage, mission hospital, and erected three p'engs on the mission grounds. The mission authorities report that, other than the occupancy of their property, the soldiers have given them no trouble. A few days prior to my return, the mission authorities received a letter from the Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Government stating that it had come to their attention that this property was being occupied by the military, and requested the designations of the units occupying same be given, that office, as well as the date the property was entered.

g. I believe that the reports of the severity of the fighting were greatly exaggerated. In my opinion 4,000 would be the maximum number of wounded who went through or were still in the Chengchow hospitals.

Most of the wounded are very young boys. Hand and foot wounds were the most common observed, and I believe that many such wounds were self-inflicted. While I did not see any unbandaged wounds I feel, however, that no form of warfare produces predominating hand or foot wounds. The majority of serious wounds were said to be caused by grenades. The seriously wounded I saw were mostly officers.

7. It is difficult for me to give an accurate narrative of the military operations in the Chengchow area. No information of the military situation could be obtained from the army personnel and the daily bulletins issued by General T'ang's Headquarters were always very vague in everything except the "crushing" defeats of the Northwest Armies, which they announced daily.

It is believed that purely military operations were resorted to by the Central Government only when political measures failed. An official of the Lung-Hai railroad informed me that last spring when the Northwest Army retired west through Honan and into Shansi, they took with them 29 locomotives and some 600 cars, and controlled the railroad from Loyang to the west; this transportation was more than the Lung-Hai had left to operate all the rest of their road with.

The railway was deprived of receipts from that part of the line but was required to continue the maintenance of the right-of-way and the pay of the employees. Railroad officials undertook to correct this situation and after conferences with Sun Liang-chen, of the Northwest Army, at Loyang, succeeded in having the receipts remitted to the Lung-Hai treasury and arranged for an exchange of transportation through Loyang. My informant stated that all of the detained receipts were returned intact——the Kuominchun having put on a military tax as a source of revenue.

The transportation question was taken up with the Central Government and after several conferences, the Northwest Army agreed to release same provided the Government undertook to feed and clothe them. Nanking agreed to this and a train-load of feed and one of winter clothing was sent to Sun Liang-chen, at Loyang. An official of the Lung-Hai went to Loyang to supervise the return of the detained transportation and he informed me that Sun Liang-chen gave him a list of eight (8) locomotives, by number, and one hundred and twenty (120) cars, also by number, and directed him to sign the list as having received, for the Lung-Hai, all of the transportation supposedly held by the Northwest Army. The official states that he naturally declined, and on September 28, notified Nanking of Sun Liang-chen's action. Nanking is said to have then begun to move troops towards the Chengchow area.

When the Kuominchun proclamation of October 10 was issued, the military advantage was in a state of balance; troops of T'ang Sheng-chih, stationed around Chengchow were expected to decide the balance by "turning over" to the "rebels". General T'ang some time previous, had been suspected of plotting with Feng Yu-hsiang for the overthrow of the present government, and had been summoned, by Marshal Chiang, to Nanking, where he was placed under very close surveillance. Marshal Chiang is said to have sent a General Yang Chow to Chengchow to take over the command of T'ang's troops, and to have told them that if they joined the "rebels" that T'ang would be dealt with as a traitor. The troops are supposed to have agreed not to "go over" but also to have refused to fight unless under their commander——General T'ang. Marshal Chiang released T'ang and is said to have detained his father as a guarantee of loyalty. T'ang upon assuming command of his forces is alleged to have ordered, at first, only two of his divisions, the 14th and 54th, to advance to the west. These two divisions being Northerners and T'ang not having engaged his entire force, is said to have caused Chiang to suspect duplicity, whereupon he placed General Ho Ch'eng-hsun

in command of the two divisions, then in the field, and ordered them to advance (in subsequent fighting a large part of the 54th Division is alleged to have been "captured" at Mihsien), and at the same time ordering T'ang to employ his other two divisions, the 51st and 53rd, without further delay.

The Northwest Army occupied Loyang on or about October 15 or 16, and began a slow but steady advance eastwards, with the Kin-Han railway as an objective. Mihsien and Tengfeng fell to them in due time and on or about October 25, the fighting had advanced to within about 15 miles of Chengchow. It was generally expected that the city would fall to them then. Five trains stood by, ready for T'ang's troops to retire to K'aifeng. The Chamber of Commerce of Chengchow actually did go, in a body, to K'aifeng, fully expecting the turnover to take place.

Marshal Chiang is reported to have wired to Liu Chen-hua to move his troops, the 3rd and 4th Divisions, to Chengchow, and to have sent him fourteen (14) trains for that purpose; General Liu was then at Hsin Hsiang Hsien (Honan), about 45 miles north of Chengchow. Liu, supposedly because of his being a relative of Yen Hsi-shan, is said to have hesitated to obey this order in full, sending only one brigade to Chengchow, from where they moved but a short distance to the west and then halted. He subsequently did send the balance of his troops along; upon arrival of same Chiang, it is said, suspecting Liu's loyalty, immediately moved half of the troops to Hsuchow. The participation of Liu's troops is reported to have presaged some political maneuver, which caused the tide to turn against the K uominchun; a few hours more and they would most likely have had Chengchow and all the possibilities such a victory would have offered.

The Northwest Army began to retire to the west, organizing Loyang, Mihsien and Tengfeng in force. Mihsien was given up on November 9.* The line held by the 5th Route Army, as of my arrival (November 13) in Chengchow, ran generally south from Hsiao I, on the Lung-Hai railroad, to a point a few miles east of Tengfeng; passing several miles west of M ihsien. Troops of General Liu Chen-hua, the 3rd and 4th Divisions, spoken of as the "reserves", occupied a general line half-way between the front and the Kin-Han railroad.

8. From the few number of wounded coming into Chengchow and the general military activity thereat, I judged that the fighting was not of an aggressive nature. I could not understand why, with their recent success and the superiority of numbers in that area, the Nationalists were not making more rapid progress.

Reports began to reach me, about November 16, that Sun Liang-chen had a representative in Chengchow, negotiating to turn over to Chiang. It was said that the Nationalists did not put any faith in his offers and suspected a ruse.

Tengfeng seemed to be the center of attack and finally fell on the morning of November 17. It was rumored, and I was told by a foreign missionary that it appeared in the Chinese papers, that the Kuominchun had used tear gas at Tengfeng. I investigated this rumor very thoroughly; talked to many wounded and carefully observed them for tear gas symptoms; had occasion to interview a foreign missionary and a foreign doctor, who had come through the Tengfeng area shortly after its fall; I could find no evidence of the truth of this report and am

convinced that it was without foundation. Villagers reported to me that the Kuominchun had taken into their armies the local bandits and that Mihsien and Tengfeng had been defended almost entirely by the ex-bandit troops. These troops are reported as having been very poorly equipped. The fighting was said not to have been severe; the Nationalists would work troops around a place and arrange an avenue of escape, whereby the defenders could withdraw during the night; small units were defeated by superior odds——defenders resisting to the last, as little quarter was given, with grenades and "long knives".

After the capture of Tengfeng reports began to reach me of Kuominchun withdrawals to the west. Marshal Chiang visited Chengchow on the 19th of November (two days after the fall of Tengfeng). It was rumored that he was on his way to Shih Chia Chuang to confer with General Yen Hsi-shan, thereat; it was also rumored that he was going to K'aifeng to confer with representative of Sun Liang-chen. He actually did go to K'aifeng and also west on the Lung-Hai, and returned to Hsuchow same day. Marshal Chiang travelled in a very poor looking train and it was said to me that he did so because of his having "learned a lesson from Chang Tso-lin". The railway officials informed me that he moved with great secrecy and very little advance notice was ever given of his train being due to arrive at any place.

The same day that Chiang arrived in Chengchow, I called on the officers of the local air unit. One of the officers stated that he had been over the Kuominchun rear that day and that he had observed heavy troop withdrawals to the west. The next day posters appeared in Chengchow announcing that Sun Liang-chen had turned over to Chiang and had accepted the appointment as Commander of the 6th Route Army. While not believing this announcement it nevertheless was an indication of the nature of the concessions being offered by Chiang. This announcement was published in Chengchow on the 20th of November; two days later, on the 22nd, I was advised through a Kuominchun sympathizer, that the Northwest Army was retiring to Loyang and that they would make a stand at T'iehmen if they could not hold Loyang; my informant also reported that he had heard that the Kuominchun were meeting with success on the South front (Han River Valley). This same day I talked with a native who had just come in from the Mihsien area; he told me that the Nationalists were making very heavy, rapid, withdrawals to Hsincheng, where they were said to be entraining for the south. Railroad yards at Chengchow were noticeably clear of transportation, which lent color to the native's report and was taken as an indication that the rumor of Kuominchun victories in the H an River Valley were correct.

The afternoon of this same day, November 22, I was told by an officer of General T'ang's Headquarters that the 51st Division (5th Route Army) had taken Loyang that morning. In attempting to verify this, I learned the next day, from a Lung-Hai railway official who had just returned from Loyang, that it had really been taken the night of November 19, by the 10th Army (47th and 48th Divisions),which had been despatched from the Hsuchow area and attacked Loyang from the south. The 5th Route Army was attacking from the East and I believe that the attack of the 10th Army was absolutely unknown to the 5th Route Army.

The attack of the 10th Army appeared to be the only phase of the war which was a true military operation; the way this attack seems to have been organized and carried out, strongly savors of supervision by Chiang's foreign military advisers. Loyang is pictured as having

been taken practically by complete surprise. The 10th Army is said to have had heavy fighting at Lin Ju Chen; the next encounter was at Lung Men, about eight (8) miles south of Leyang. In both of these engagements the 47th Division is said to have borne the brunt of the fighting; it was reported that in these encounters the 47th Division suffered 3,000 casualties and that their Commander had stated that they could not attack Leyang without reinforcements. It appears that no news of the fighting at Lin Ju Chen get to Leyang and that the first they learned of the 10th Army's advance was when Lung Men was attacked. This place is said to have offered stubborn resistance; after its fall, the advance was resumed on Leyang. Despite the supposed heavy casualties, the 47th in conjunction with the 48th Division, launched an attack on Leyang. It is hard to believe that with the check that Lung Men must have had on the advance of the 10th Army, that the Kuominchun at Leyang could not have evacuated the town with less haste than they apparently did; yet the account which I secured of Leyang's evacuation indicates that the place was given up in great disorder. It is said that as soon as the Northwest Army learned of the attack at Lung Men they made hurried preparations to leave Leyang. At the time they started to get away they are reported as having only one (1) locomotive with enough steam up to draw a train. They hastily made up a train and just did get under way when the advance elements of the 10th Army got into the city (11:30 p.m. November 19); this train was fired on by troops of the 47th Division. Generals Sun Liang-chen, Liang Kuan-ying and P'eng Ping-sung were reported as having been on this train. The train went west some few miles and detached seven (7) cars of small arms ammunition and set them afire to delay pursuit. A railway official informed me that so hasty was the evacuation that the private train of Sun Liang-chen, which he had been using for some time and living in, had been left behind; my informant further stated that by his actual count there were left in the railway yards, sixty (60) covered cars of ammunition and seventy (70) covered cars of provisions; 12 locomotives, and 400 odd cars; he reported the ground around the station as having been strewn knee deep with military documents and records, equipment, ammunition, rifles, clothing, etc.; he also said that he personally saw a car of silver dollars ($27,000) and that he had been told that three (3) such cars had been left behind, but that before the 10th Army got in and took control, the two other cars had been looted by soldiers, left because of lack of transportation, and civilians; he states that Kuominchun officials when leaving were trying to buy paper money---offering $16.00 silver dollars for $10.00 in notes. It is claimed that 30,000 rifles and 20,000 soldiers, and 7,000 wounded were left in L eyang.

Two explanations of the Leyang surprise were current in Chengchow. One was that Sun Liang-chen in his bargaining with Chiang had not secured the terms he had hoped for and that he thought that he could eventually get more by remaining inactive at Leyang---anticipating that Chiang would not direct any operations against him. Chiang supposedly having assumed that Sun Liang-chen had accepted his terms and not seeing any action on Sun's part, felt that he had been, or was soon going to be, defrauded by Sun; therefore he ordered the attack by the 10th Army on Leyang, conducting it with as much secrecy as he could so as to insure a victory thereat and make Sun more ready to accept Chiang's terms.

The other explanation was that Sung Chih-yuan would not be a party to the defection---but he too, in view of the relations between Sun and Chiang did not anticipate any operations against them, Chiang acting as explained above. Both these commanders were no doubt taken absolutely by surprise by the 10th Army's attack from the south. All

former attacks on Loyang had been from the east, generally along the Lung-Hai railway. A stalemate situation had long existed in that sector, by a well organized position at Hsiao I. The Northwest Army held high ground, rising up from the river (Lo Ho) and on the west side of same. The 51st Division was entrenched in an elaborate trench system on this (the east) side of the river. A foreign military officer who visited the 51st Division area told me that the ground was perfectly organized with a modern trench system; he states that it was no doubt laid out by Chiang's foreign military advisers.

9. I had no means of obtaining reliable information of the action on the south front - the Han River Valley. My general understanding was that the troops Chiang employed there were much better than those he used around Chengchow. These troops, which I saw around Chengchow, with the exception of their officers, were the poorest Chinese soldiers I have ever seen; their loyalty was said to be in proportion to their income. Chiang did keep them well supplied and fed and, I was told, regularly paid. I feel that they did receive regular payment, for on every occasion when I passed the post-office I always saw a large crowd of soldiers thereat, sending money home——this was very noticeable. The post-office could not take care of all of this business at once, so had small tables placed outside where a man for a small fee could have a letter written and the necessary money-order forms made out for him. They would be admitted into the post-office in batches of about sixty (60) and then the doors would be closed until their business had been completed; another batch then entering. The business activity observed in the shops and restaurants was also an indication that the troops were receiving pay. I ascertained through inquiries that the average pay was from $8.00 to $15.00 per month.

10. The situation as of my departure (November 27) was a slow, gradual retirement of the Kuominchun to the west. Troops of the Central Government were being sent to Hankow and over the Lung-Hai to Pukow. Rumors of trouble in Canton were said to be the cause of these troop movements.

CONCLUSIONS

1. It is my opinion that the personnel, except offi cers and non-commissioned officers, of that part of the Central Government troops which I observed, is inferior to that of - say the Fengtien Armies. The commissioned and non-commissioned personnel,however, being superior to the Fengtien type. Judging from the appearance of the junior officers, I feel that the southern military academies are doing more to increase the efficiency of the Chinese Army than any other factor.

2. The employment of wireless communications, motor transportation, and air service, while a pronounced forward step in the art of war for a Chinese Army, is not believed to have been developed to such a stage where they would function satisfactorily in a prolonged war of movement against a modern foe.

3. The insight gained by me, during my observation of this Honan conflict, of the political intrigues of the high commanders of both sides, convinces me more than ever that the settlement of any civil war in this country is never likely to be by decisive military action. While this thought is by no means original, I nevertheless feel that as long as this condition exists that governments of China will rise and fall with as great frequency as they have done since the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty.

Morris B. DePass, Jr.

Morris B. DePass, Jr.,
First Lieutenant, Infantry

G-2 Report

6180
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 18 1930
2657-J-2761
288
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 18 1930

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

14th	Division	(Liu Chun-jung)	Changchow	(Honan)	15,000 x
17th	"	(Sun Kuang-chien)	Chuchow	(Anhwei)	12,000 x
18th	"	(Chang Hui-tsan)	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu)	Shiuchow	(Kwangtung)	10,000
20th	"	(Han Fu-chu)	Chuchow	(Anhwei)	25,000 x
24th	"	(Shih Yu-san)	"	"	13,000 x
44th	"	(Fang Ting-ying)	Sincheng	(Honan)	12,000
45th	"	(Pao Kang)	Hweichow	(Anhwei)	12,000
46th	"	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Weihsien	(Shantung)	14,000
47th	"	(Wang Chin-yu)	Juchow	(Honan)	28,000
48th	"	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Lushan	"	24,000
49th	"	(Jen Ying-chi)	Lungtan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
50th	"	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Loktsung	(Kwangtung)	12,000
51st	"	(Kung Hao)	Minkiang	(Honan)	12,000 x
52nd	"	(Yeh Kai-hsing)	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	10,000
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	15,000 x
54th	"	(Wei Yi-san)	Lushan	"	16,000 x
55th	"	(Juan Chao-chang)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting)	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	4,000
58th	"	(Wen Hung-en)	Waichow	"	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou)	Wushek	"	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai)	Chiknai	"	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	Hoyunhsien	"	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-pin)	Kunyin	"	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching)	Kotung	"	8,000
64th	Mix. Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei)	Kweiteh	(Honan)	12,000 x
65th	Division	(Wan Hsuan-tsai)	Loyang	"	10,000
66th	"	(Liu Mao-en)	Pingluhsien	(Shansi)	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(An Chun-tsai)	Minkiang	(Honan)	6,000 x
1st	" Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih)	Tsaochow	(Shantung)	8,000 x
2nd	" "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	10,000
1st	Ind.Art.Regt	(Yang Yung-an)	Chengchow	"	
2nd	" " "	(Fan Chu)	Yencheng	"	2,500
4th	" " "	(Lu Tsung-ching)	Hsuchow	"	2,500
				Total	379,000

Note: x - Troops which have rebelled against the Government. The 14th, 51st, 53rd, 54th divisions and 1st cav. brig. are under Tang Sheng-chih, leader of pro-Wang Ching-wei party, while the remainder led by Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san are working together against Chiang Kai-shek.

The 55th div. under Juan Chao-chang is newly organized. It is reorganized from the 1st Ind.Brig. under Yueh Sheng-hsuan and the 4th Ind.Brig. under Li Sung-shan, the latter force being a newly organized unit also.

Designations of the 3rd and 4th divisions under Liu Mao-en and Wan Hsuan-tsai respectively have been changed to the 65th and 66th divisions.

The 1st Ind. Art. Regt. under Yang Yung-am has been disarmed by Tang Sheng-chih at Chengchow.

From M/A, China Report No.7631 December 16, 1929.

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Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st	Division	(Chang Chen	) Lienkong	(Fukien)	9,500
2nd	"	(Lu Hsing-pang	) Foochow	"	8,000
3rd	"	(Ho Yi-san	) Tsinan	(Shantung)	8,000
3rd	"	(Liu Chen-nien	) Chefoo	"	35,000
4th	"	(Liu Kuei-tang	) Loyang	(Honan)	6,000
5th	"	(Fan Shih-sheng	) Kingchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th	"	(Ho Chien	) Yochow	(Hunan)	7,000
8th	"	(Chou Lan	) Wukang	"	7,000
9th	"	(Yin Cheng-kang	) Siangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th	"	(Li Yi-hsuan	) Shihnan	"	4,000
10th	"	(Hsieh Pin	) Yuping	(Kweichow)	8,000
12th	"	(Kao Kuei-tze	) Taerhchwang	(Shantung)	6,000
12th	"	(Hu Jo-yu	)	(Szechwan)	6,000
13th	"	(Chang Ju-chi	)	"	6,000
14th	"	(Yang Hu-cheng	) Sichwan	(Honan)	12,000
18th	"	(Sun Tien-ying	) Juchow	"	15,000 x
20th	"	(Li Yung-heng	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	8,000
21st	"	(Li Yun-chieh	) Siangyang	"	8,000
22nd	"	(Lo Lin	) Shashi	"	6,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	) Piyang	(Honan)	3,000
1st	" "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	) Suchow	(Anhwei)	5,000
3rd	" "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	) Chengkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th	" "	(Wei Chung-su	) Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000
6th	" "	(Men Ping-yueh	) Minkiang	(Honan)	3,000 x
7th	" "	(Li Ch'i	) Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000
8th	" "	(Hu Tien-lo	) Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
11th	" "	(Wan Yi-wu	) Itu	"	6,000
12th	" "	(Hsu Shen-yu	) Hankow	"	4,000
13th	" "	(Hsu Chia-yu	) Kishui	"	5,000
14th	" "	(Peng Chi-piao	) Ichang	"	2,000
15th	" "	(Tang Sze-tung	) Hankow	"	4,000
16th	" "	(Teng Ying	) Wuhsueh	"	3,000
				Total	221,500

Note: x - Troops affiliated with Tang Sheng-chih, leader of pro-Wang Ching-wei party, which have rebelled against the Government.

The 12th Division under Kao Kuei-tze is reorganized from the 10th Ind. Brigade.

The 20th Division under Li Yung-heng is a newly organized unit.

The 21st Division under Li Yun-chieh is reorganized from the 3rd Ind. Brigade of Provincial Garrison Forces.

The 22nd Division under Lo Lin is reorganized from the 4th Ind. Brig.

Hu Tsung-to's 11th and 14th Ind. Brigades under Wan Yi-wu and Peng Chi-piao respectively are reported to have mutinied and occupied Ichang and later to have been forced out, no detailed information is available.

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Provincial Garrison Forces

2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung)	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
3rd " "	(Han Te-ch'in)	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	4,000
1st " "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	Lintsing	(Shantung)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze)	Tehchow	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming)		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui)		"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan)		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung)	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo)	" "	"	4,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu)	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	3,600
			Total	34,600

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ind. Brigades under Shih Chung-cheng, Chen Hsiao-sze and Han Te-ch'in respectively are newly organized units.

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	(Liu Chih)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung)	Chuchow	(Anhwei)	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng)	Samshui	(Kwangtung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui)	Pukow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tze)	Teian	(Hupeh)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun)	Tengfeng	(Honan)	12,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen)	Fatshan	(Kwangtung)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen)	Wuyi	(Anhwei)	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu)	Hiangcheng	(Honan)	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng)	Sinyang	"	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting)	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin)	Minkiang	(Honan)	12,000
			Total	144,000

Part of the 3rd division under Ch'en Chi-cheng and the 8th division under Mao Ping-wen have been sent to Kwangtung again for military operations against the Ironsides and Kwangsi forces.

Total Government troops, including Provincial Garrison forces, and the First Group of Armies 779,100

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Second Group of Armies

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	Yulin	"	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	Loyang	(Honan	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	"	"	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	Yunyang	(Hupeh	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	Honan-Shansi	border	12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	Tungkwan	(Shensi	12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung	Lingpao	(Honan	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	Laohokow	(Hupeh	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	Nanchang	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	Shanchow	(Honan	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	"	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	Kwanghwa	(Hupeh	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	Laohokow	"	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	Chinchow	(Kansu	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	Hanchung	(Shensi	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	Loyang	(Honan	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang	Shanchow	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin	Loyang	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	(Kansu	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen	Tungkwan	(Shensi	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	Lanchow	(Kansu	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen	Tungkwan	(Shensi	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	Shanchow	(Honan	4,000
Total Second Group of Armies				249,000

The above troops are at present under command of Feng's generals, Sun Liang-cheng, Sung Che-yuan and Shih Ching-ting. Nominally Feng Yu-hsiang is now in retirement, but in reality he is still in the head of the Second Group of Armies.

Third Group of Armies

(Yen Hsi-shan)

Second in Command - Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u	Sinsiang	(Honan	12,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	Chuwohsien	(Shansi	12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	Tientsin	(Chihli	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying	Peking	(Chihli	9,000
39th "	(Chao Ch'en-shou	Sinsiang	(Honan	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	Yuncheng	(Shansi	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	Kalgan	(Chahar	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	Peking	(Chihli	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	Tientsin	"	9,000
1st Cav.Div.	(T'an Ching-lin	Tatung-Fengchen		6,000
2nd " "	(Wang Ying	Paotou	(Suiyuan	3,000
3rd " "	(Wang Kuei-te	Dolonor	(Chahar	4,000
4th " "	(Li Chia-yu	Paotou	(Suiyuan	4,000
25th Ind.Brig.	(Ho Shao-nan	Suiyuan	"	6,000
26th " "	(Ho Yuan-pi	Tatung	(Shansi	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku	Chengting	(Chihli	6,000
4th Art. "	(Tseng Yen-yi	Taiyuan	(Shansi	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang	Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh	Peking	(Chihli	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i	Tientsin	"	2,500
Carried Forward				147,000

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		Brought Forward		147,000

Provincial Garrison Forces - Ku Jen-fa

1st Division	(Wang Tse	) Tatungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	) Yump'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	) P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	) Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	) Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	) Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	) Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	) Yunch'eng	"	8,000
Total Third Group of Armies				211,000

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangsi

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	) Yingtak	(Kwangtung)	15,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Szewui	"	6,000
16th "	(Lu Huan-yen	) Chiuhing	"	8,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Szewui	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Dosing	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Liuchow	(Kwangsi)	4,000
			Total	43,000

The above troops are at present at war with the Government forces in Kwangtung.

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) "	"	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind.Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Chaotung	"	2,400
Body Guard Corps	(Yen Chia-hsun	) Yunnanfu	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang)	(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Chow Hsi-cheng, Chairman of Kweichow and concurrently commander of the 25th Army, is reported to have died. His vacant posts are to be filled by his subordinate, Ma Kuang-hsiang.

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army	10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces	
Two Reserve Regiments	
One Gendarmerie Battalion	
One Artillery Corps	
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)	10,000

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Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	)	Chuhsien	(Szechwan) 10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	)	"	" 10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	)	"	" 10,000
				Total 30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	)	Chungking	(Szechwan) 10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	)	Lingshui	" 10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	)	Chungking	" 15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	)	Lingshui	" 10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	)	Chungking	" 5,000
Independent Div	(Wang Chao-kuei	)	"	" 4,000
				Total 54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying	)		(Kweichow) 4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan	)		" 3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng	)		" 3,000
				Total 10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	)	Fowchow	(Szechwan) 6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	)	Ichang	(Hupeh) 7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	)	Patung	" 7,000
				Total 20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	)	Chengtu	(Szechwan) 12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	)	"	" 12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	)	"	" 12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Len Ying-tung	)	Szechwan-Hsikang	14,000
				Total 50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	)	Chengtu	(Szechwan) 10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	)	Suining	" 10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	)	Chengtu	" 10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	)	Shunking	" 20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	)	Chengtu	" 10,000
				Total 60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	)	Tungchwan	(Szechwan) 6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	)	"	" 6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	)	"	" 6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun	)	"	" 6,000
5th " "	(Wang Min-chang	)	"	" 6,000
				Total 30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechwan)	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 370,500

CHINA (Military)

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(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Fuchin	(Kirin)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Yingkow	(Fengtien)	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Ichow	"	10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Yungping	(Chihli)	11,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan	(Fengtien)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	) Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang	) Lwanchow	(Chihli)	10,000
			Total	83,000

The 6th, 23rd and 27th Brigades of Li Chen-t'ang, Ma Ting-fu and Liu Nai-ch'ang respectively, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

First Army - Wang Shu-ch'ang

4th Brigade	(Liu Yi-fei	) Harbin	)	10,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	) Hwachwan	)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu	) Harbin-Changchun		10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Fuchin	) Kirin	11,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Mishanhsien	)	8,000
1st " Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Harbin	)	6,000
1st Art.Regt	(	) "	)	6,000
6th Engr.Bn.	(	)	)	800
			Total	61,800

Second Army - Hu Yu-k'un

5th Brigade	(Ting Ying-pin	) Shedinlin	)	10,000
14th "	(Hsun Yung-ho	) Angangki	) Hei-	10,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	) "	) lung-	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig	(Chang Shu-seng	) Mientuho	) kiang	6,000
5th Art.Regt	(	) Harbin	)	6,000
1st Engr.Bn.	(	)	)	800
			Total	42,800

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

2nd Art. Regt.	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	Harbin	(Kirin)	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 battalions stationed in Fengtien	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total	227,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Hwachwan	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Fuchin	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Suipin	)	7,000
17th "	(	)	) Hei-	
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	30,000

The 17th Brigade is reported to have been captured or totally routed by the Russians. The commander, [illegible] Han Kwang-ti, is also said to have been killed in action at Manchouli.

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 353,600

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchwan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,014,700

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Subject: Situation Report.

2. General Remarks. (As of December 16, 1929)

Central China.

The Kuominchun vs. the Central Government. At the close of the last Situation Report, November 18, 1929, the government front line in the Kuominchun-Central Government conflict ran roughly from north to south as follows: Yenshih (excl); Tengfeng (incl); Juchow; Lushan (both excl); Nanyangfu (incl); Sinyeh (excl); Tsangtsai (incl); Siangyang and Nanchang (excl). This line remained intact until the morning of November 21, when the 47th and 48th government Divisions in a night attack from the southeast captured Loyang by surprise. This was the only strategic move of importance made by either side in the campaign and has definitely put the Kuominchun out of the running for the time being.

As will be remembered, the Kuominchun in the Loyang area was opposed by the troops of Tang Sheng-chih. It is significant that apparently Tang's troops knew nothing of the attack from the south and that Loyang had actually fallen before the news leaked out. Tang's troops and those of the Kuominchun had reached a stalemate in this sector. Tang's ground had been very carefully organized, according to the best available reports, by Chiang's German military advisers, and neither the Kuominchun nor Tang Sheng-chih showed any disposition to assume the offensive along the Lung-Hai Railway.

Chiang by his capture of Loya ng upset this equilibrium and forced the Kuominchun to retreat. The retreat from Loyang was precipitate, arms and ammunition as well as silver being abandoned en route, and Shanchow was reported to be in government hands on November 27. For further details concerning this phase see Report No. 7629.

It is not the intention of this report to convey the impression that the Kuominchun was defeated by military means alone. Prior to the capture of Loyang, General Sun Liang-ch'en's deputies had held conversation with Chiang Kai-shek in Chengchow, and it is generally thought that Yen, either by word or act, hastened the debacle. The Kuominchun, as reported earlier, shows a lack of cohesion which is at variance with its past history and makes it a more typical Chinese organization. It may be pulled together by Feng, in the event that he is able to leave Shansi, or by Lu Chung-lin, who is reported to have joined it recently, in which event it would again present an ominous menace.

The Revolt of the "Lesser Generals". On the 2nd of December Shih Yu-san and Han Fu-chu revolted against the growing power of Chiang Kai-shek. Tang Sheng-chih soon joined them, and although the revolt, which broke out at Pukow, was at first regarded as a mutiny of a few troops, with Tang Sheng-chih's defection it began to assume a graver aspect and for awhile was deemed to place the government in the gravest danger.

Just what the relationship of this revolt is to the uprising of the Kuominchun, and exactly who the participants are and particularly, who fomented the uprising, are questions which can not be answered exactly at present. It has been alleged that the uprising is a part of the Kuominchun revolt, but it is extremely unlikely that this is the case since to help the Kuominchun a time prior to rather than after its defeat would certainly have been chosen.

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Subject: Situation Report.

It was announced by Reuter on November 30, that Shih Yu-san's divisions had been ordered to sail from Pukow to Canton. Such a movement would certainly have meant Shih Yu-san's eclipse, and it seems reasonable to assume that his revolt was for self-protection. In like manner Han Fu-chu would have been adversely affected by the absence of Shih's soldiery, since their relationship has always been close, and since his power would have been endangered by Shih's departure he was probably a ready seconder of the latter's proposal. From all available material it would seem as though T'ang Sheng-chih's revolt is not directly connected with that of Shih Yu-san and Han Fu-ch'u. He apparently seized the opportunity, when others were revolting, when loyal government troops had been withdrawn from Honan, and when his action might assist Chang Fa-kwei in the south, to throw his weight against the government.

When considered as an insurrection separate from the Kuominchun uprising, the time selected for the Shih-Han revolt could not have been better chosen. In the latter half of November the Ironsides were reaching their zenith in the Canton area. In the Nanking area were only parts of the 9th, 3rd and 5th loyal divisions. The 8th, the 50th and a part of the 3rd had already left for Canton. All eyes were turned to the south and Chiang himself was on the verge of departure thereto. If Shih Yu-san had so desired he could have captured Nanking. Upon revolting, however, his troops looted Pukow and seizing all available rolling stock left for Chuchow about 30 miles to the north along the Pukow line. Arriving at Chuchow trenches were dug, and overtures were awaited from Nanking.

Nanking was thrown into a state of excitement, and it seemed for a while as though the government must fall. Parts of the 1st, 2nd and 9th Divisions were sent downstream from Hankow and an expedition crossed the Yangtze to attack the rebels. It seems significant that the latter made no attempt to prevent the government troops from crossing the river, and appears as though either the motivating power behind the rebellion became weak, or that Shih and Han wished to gain trading material from the revolt for demands upon the government.

Ma Hung-kwei's position is anomalous. He has received orders from the Central Government to suppress the rebellion——yet fails to obey, and yet seems to take no active part. However, since his division, the 64th Mixed Division, occupies Hsuchow, and so separates Shih's and Han's forces, it would appear that no cooperation between Shih and Han would be possible without Ma's consent. Ch'en Tiao-yuan, the governor of Shantung, also has received orders to attack the insurgents, but except for moving two divisions into the southern part of his province for self-protection, he has done nothing. It may be safely assumed that his is a critical position since both Shih and Han would prefer Shantung to Anhui and Honan.

Tang Sheng-chih, who on December 4th issued a telegram denouncing the Central Government and acclaiming Wang Ching-hui, is apparently out of step with all but his chief. He can find no one to sympathize with his ambition for seizing Hankow, and has lost Yen's support and gained his enmity both by desiring Hankow, and by placing him in an open telegram in the same category as Wang Ch'ing-hui. In spite of the fact that in Tang's telegram he claims the support of some 75 northern generals, even his friend and erstwhile subordinate, Ho Chian, has not

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openly come to his aid. Tang has at present four divisions and one cavalry brigade of his own, and one division and one brigade which apparently went over to him from the government rather than be disarmed. His threat towards Hankow is being met by Liu Chih and Ho Cheng-chun with four loyal government divisions and seven divisions and five brigades whose loyalty is in doubt and which are composed of mediocre troops.

Without the active assistance of either the Kuominchun or of Ho Chien, T'ang's revolt will be short-lived.

More Unrest. Hu Tsung-to, whose regeneration was noted in the last Situation Report, seized the opportunity offered by all this turmoil to attack Ichang, but has been defeated and has retreated into the interior. His forces were reported to number about 20,000 men.

Twice, on December 7 and December 9, the Shanghai-Nanking railway was cut by small bodies of mutineers, and a small mutiny was put down in Shanghai itself. These disturbances were probably of leftist origin.

Recruiting. In the North China area recruiting goes on apace, Liu Chih in Hankow, and Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi, being the most active. Official reports from Shansi state that Yen is re-enlisting such men as were discharged under the Disbandment Agreement (whose number is considered to be negligible by this office), and forming them into a Pao An Tui, or Preservation of the Peace Corps, "in accordance with the terms of the Disbandment Conference".

South China.

The Central Government has come out of the Canton situation decidedly the victor. Latest Chinese official despatches from Canton state that the Ironsides-Kwangsi coalition is in full flight with the Cantonese hotly in pursuit. The Consul-General at Canton somewhat optomistically reports that there are no more than 3,000 Ironsides left under Chang's immediate command. The re-occupation of Wuchow is expected shortly.

In the last Situation Report the evacuation of Wuchow by the Cantonese was reported, and the withdrawal of their lines of defense to the Samshui area. During the latter part of November, during which period Canton's defenses were wholly inadequate and a general Kwangsi-Ironsides attack would have been successful, negotiations were being carried on for a peaceful settlement. This ruse was apparently successful and gave the Central Government the time needed in which to bring reinforcements from Nanking, and with the help of German advisers, to build up a modern system of defense. General Chang Hui-chang, Director of the Central Aviation Bureau, was put in charge of the aerial activities, and Admiral Chen Shao-kuan was made commander of the naval forces. General Ho Ying-ch'in was transferred to Canton from Hankow as director of the Canton Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and assumed control of all the government forces in the area.

During the last week in November, General Li Tsung-jen established his headquarters in Wuchow, and is reported to have used one at least of the four French planes he brought with him to bomb Canton. During this period the government planes also rather ineffectually

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bombed Wuchow. Anti-government forces outnumbered the loyal troops by two to one, but by the 1st of December parts of the 3rd, 8th and 50th Divisions had arrived from Nanking, making the forces of the contenders about equal.

On about the 6th of December the government front line extended southwest from Sunkaiho (excl) to Kotung, to Kunyiu, to Samshui, all inclusive. A glance at the map will indicate the difficulties of attack from that line when Canton's 15 odd gunboats and the numerous waterways are taken into consideration.

On December 8th the invaders apparently seeing the futility of attacking from the line they were holding, in a wide turning movement crossed the North River in force and from a position about 15 miles northeast of Sunkaihu formed for an attack on the undefended side of Canton.

Upon this threat, Ho Ying-ch'in in a manner reminiscent of Galliéne at Paris commandeered the rickshaws and automobiles of Canton and rushed his troops from their position in the west to counter this new threat. They arrived in time, and were able to build defenses which stopped the attack. Soon thereafter the Cantonese took the offensive and by the 14th inst., the invaders were in full retreat to the north and northwest.

While the defeat of the I ronsides and the troops of Kwangsi has relieved Canton from any danger at present, and while these troops are undoubtedly in flight, it is not to be assumed that they have ceased to be a military factor. It is not thought that the pursuit will be pushed home, and it is believed that the retreating troops will re-form in the mountains of Kwangsi from which fastnesses in the future they will again emerge to take their place in these pages.

Manchuria.

The Soviet knowledge of Chinese mental processes is profound. In a series of raids from July 16 to November 16, they so sapped the courage, so undermined the morale, so unstrung the highly stretched nerves of the Manchurian Army, that the final action commencing on November 17, though still in the nature of a riad, was completely successful and clearly demonstrated the wisdom of their course. Although Russian ground troops participated in this attack they were present in small numbers, probably not exceeding a division. Some 30 odd airplanes did the brunt of the work, and flying low over the Chinese troops added the final bomb which broke what was left of the morale of some 40 odd thousand of China's best troops.

The Soviet occupied the towns of Manchuli, Chalainor, Hailar, on the western front, and Mishan on the eastern.

In the capture of Chalainor the Russians captured and/or annihilated the Chinese 17th Brigade, the flower of the Heilungchiang Army.

The Second Cavalry Brigade (Chinese) was cut off in Manchuli, but was able to extricate itself after losing many of its men, and by a forced march to the south finally reached Hailar.

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On November 27th it was reported that the Chinese defense lines had been withdrawn to the Hingan mountains on the west, and to Mutangchiang on the east, and on the 28th that Soviet airplanes raided Buketo, on the crest of the Hingan.

On the 28th the Russian troops commenced to withdraw from Mishan and Chalainor.

Communications have been cut off between Harbin and the West, and the fate of the civilian population west of the Hingan is extremely precarious. Soon after their initial defeat the Chinese army became a horde of burning, murdering, pillaging ruffians, and their retreat will probably leave a red trail through history. The Russian treatment of the civilian population was markedly humane.

In the wake of the Russian occupation, and in all likelihood fostered by it, the Young Mongol movement has sprung up again with the idea of an independent Barga with Hailar as capital. No definite news of this movement is at hand at present.

A lull in operations has now occurred since the Chinese have given in to the Russian demands, and a resumption of activity is not likely unless the negotiations strike a snag. In the last named event more raids will probably take place until Russian "diplomacy" wins its point.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

No. 7631 1st Ind. JM/elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, December 16, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.

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Central Government Troops

14th	Division	(Liu Chun-jung)	Chengchow	(Honan)	15,000
17th	"	(Sun Kuang-chien)	Pengpu	(Anhwei)	12,000
18th	"	(Chang Hui-tsan)	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu)	Linchow	(Kwangtung)	10,000
20th	"	(Han Fu-chu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	25,000
24th	"	(Shih Yu-san)	Wuyi	(Anhwei)	13,000
44th	"	(Yang Sheng-chih)	Jungyang	(Honan)	12,000
45th	"	(Pao Kang)	Hweichow	(Anhwei)	12,000
46th	"	(Fan Hsi-chi)	Weihsien	(Shantung)	14,000
47th	"	(Wang Chin-yu)	Chengchow	(Honan)	28,000
48th	"	(Hsu Yuan-chuan)	Hiangcheng	"	24,000
49th	"	(Jen Ying-chi)	Lungtan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
50th	"	(Tan Tao-yuan)	Taiwan	(Kwangtung)	12,000
51st	"	(Kung Hao)	Yencheng	(Honan)	12,000 x
52nd	"	(Yeh Kai-hsing)	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	13,000
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	15,000 x
54th	"	(Wei Yi-san)	Chengchow	"	16,000
55th	"	(Juan Chao-chang)	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting)	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	4,000
58th	"	(Wen Hung-en)	Waichow	"	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou)	Szewui	"	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai)	Tengyun	(Kwangsi)	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kuang-nai)	Sunchow	"	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-pin)	Hohsien	"	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching)	Kotung	(Kwangtung)	8,000
64th	Mix. Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei)	Kweiteh	(Honan)	12,000
65th	Division	(Wan Hsuan-tsai)	Loyang	"	10,000
66th	"	(Liu Mao-en)	Pingluhsien	(Shansi)	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(An Chun-tsai)	Yencheng	(Honan)	6,000 x
1st	" Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih)	Chengchow	"	8,000
2nd	" "	(Chang Li-sheng)	Chowkiakow	"	10,000
2nd	Ind.Art.Regt	(Fan Chu)	Yencheng	"	2,500
4th	" " "	(Lu Tsung-ching)	Hsuchow	"	2,500
				Total	382,000

Note: x - Troops which have rebelled against the Government. The 51st and 53rd Divisions and 1st Cavalry Brigade are under Tang Sheng-chih, leader of pro-Wang Ching-wei party.

The 3rd Independent Brigade, Provincial Garrison Forces, has been reorganized into the 52nd Division under Yeh Kai-hsing.

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Newly Organised Troops under Central Government

1st Division	(Chang Chen	) Lienkong	(Fukien)	9,500	
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang	) Foochow	"	8,000	
3rd "	(Ho Yi-san	) Tsinan	(Shantung)	8,000	
3rd "	(Liu Chen-nien	) Chefoo	"	35,000	
4th "	(Liu Kuei-tang	) Chengchow	(Honan)	6,000	
5th "	(Fan Shih-sheng	) Kingchow	(Hupeh)	12,000	
7th "	(Ho Chien	) Yochow	(Hunan)	7,000	
8th "	(Chou Lan	) Chuanchow	(Kwangsi)	7,000	
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	) Siangyang	(Hupeh)	4,000	
10th "	(Li Yi-hsuan	) Shihnan	"	4,000	
10th "	(Hsieh Pin	) Yuping	(Kweichow)	8,000	
12th "	(Kao Kuei-tse	) Taerhchwang	(Shantung)	6,000	
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu	)	(Szechwan)	6,000	
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi	)	"	6,000	
14th "	(Yang Hu-cheng	) Wuyang	(Honan)	12,000	
18th "	(Sun Tien-ying	) Hsuchow	"	15,000	x
20th "	(Li Yung-heng	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	8,000	
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	) Siangyang	"	8,000	
22nd "	(Lo Lin	) Shashi	"	6,000	
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	) Piyang	(Honan)	3,000	
1st " "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	) Suchow	(Anhwei)	5,000	
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng)	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000	
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	) Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000	
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh	) Mihsien	(Honan)	3,000	x
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	) Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000	
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	) Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000	
11th " "	(Wan Yi-wu	) Itu	"	6,000	
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu	) Hankow	"	4,000	
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	) Kishui	"	5,000	
14th " "	(Peng Chi-piao	) Ichang	"	2,000	
15th " "	(Tang Sze-tung	) Puchi	"	4,000	
16th " "	(Teng Ying	) Hwangmei	"	3,000	
			Total	221,500	

Note: x - Troops affiliated with Tang Sheng-chih, leader of pro-Wang Ching-wei party, which have rebelled against the Government.

Provincial Garrison Forces

2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung)	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000	
1st " "	(Shih Chung-cheng)	Lintsing	(Shantung)	4,000	
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	) Techow	"	4,000	
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming	)	(Fukien)	2,500	
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui	) Yungchun	"	2,500	
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan	)	"	2,000	
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	) NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000	
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	) " "	"	4,000	
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	3,600	
			Total	30,600	

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

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First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	(Liu Chih	) Chumatien	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	) Canton	(Kwangtung)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Pukow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
6th "	(Fang Tse	) Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	) Jungyang	"	12,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen	) Hohsien	(Kwangsi)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	) Linying	(Honan)	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	) Hiangcheng	"	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	) Siping	"	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	) Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	) Linying	(Honan)	12,000
			Total	144,000

Total Government troops, including Provincial Garrison forces, and the First Group of Armies 778,100

Second Group of Armies

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	) "	"	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	) Yunyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	) Honan-Shansi border		12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	) Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung	) Lingpao	"	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	) Nanchang	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	) Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	) "	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	) Loyang	"	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	) Chinchow	(Kansu)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	) Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	) Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang	) Shanchow	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin	) Loyang	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	) Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung	) Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	) Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen	) Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	) Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen	) Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	) Shanchow	(Honan)	4,000

Total Second Group of Armies 249,000

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Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command - Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u	) Kaifeng	(Honan)	12,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	) Chuwohsien	(Shansi)	12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	) Sinsiang	(Honan)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	) Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying	) Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Yang Yao-fang	) Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	) Yuncheng	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	) Sinsiang	(Honan)	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	) Sinsiang	"	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	) Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	) Peking	"	8,000
1st Cav. "	(Yang Chao-lin	) Tatung-Fengchen	(Shansi)	6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	) Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	) Kalgan	(Chahar)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	) Chengchow	(Honan)	4,000
19th Ind.Brig.	(Kuo Tsung-fan	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
25th " "	(Ho Shan-nan	) Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	6,000
26th " "	(Ho Yuan-pi	) Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku	) Chengting	(Chihli)	6,000
28th " "	(Yuan Tseng-ching	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
Bodyguard "	(Tu Chun-i	) "	"	6,000
4th Art. "	(Tseng Yen-yi	) Taiyuan	"	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang	) Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh	) Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i	) Tientsin	"	2,500
			Total	181,000

The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, 19th and 28th Ind. Brigades and the Bodyguard Brigade are newly organized units, information of which was just obtained.

Provincial Garrison Forces - Ku Jen-fa.

1st Division	(Wang Tse	) Tatungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	) Yung'ping	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	) P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	) Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	) Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	) Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	) Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	) Yunch'eng	"	8,000
			Total	64,000

Total Third Group of Armies 245,000

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangsi

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	) Kweilin	(Kwangsi)	10,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Poseh	"	6,000
16th "	(Lu Huan-yen	) Kweiping	"	8,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Sunchow	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Linchow	"	4,000
			Total	38,000

The above troops have been forced out of Kwangtung by the government forces and have fled to points as indicated above in Kwangsi.

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) "	"	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind.Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Chaotung	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-hsun	) Yunnanfu	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Ma Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang)	(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces
Two Reserve Regiments
One Gendarmerie Battalion
One Artillery Corps
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)

10,000

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Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total . . .	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Ind. Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total . . .	54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying	)	(Kweichow)	6,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan	)	"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng	)	"	3,000
			Total . . .	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	) Fowchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	) Ichang	(Hupeh)	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	) Patung	"	7,000
			Total . . .	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	) Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	) "	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Len Ying-tung	) Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total . . .	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	) Chengtu	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	) Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	) Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	) Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	) Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total . . .	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	) Tungchwan	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	) "	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	) "	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun	) "	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Min-chang	) "	"	6,000
			Total . . .	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechwan)	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 368,500

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(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Fuchin	(Kirin)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Yingkow	(Fengtien)	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Ichow	"	10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Yungping	(Chihli)	11,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan	(Fengtien)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	) Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-ch'ang	) Lwanchow	(Chihli)	10,000
			Total . . .	83,000

The 6th, 23rd and 27th Brigades of Li Chen-t'ang, Ma Ting-fu and Liu Nai-ch'ang respectively, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

First Army - Wang Shu-ch'ang

4th Brigade	(Liu Yi-fei	) Harbin	)		10,000
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	) Hwachwan	)		10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu	) Harbin-Changchun			10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Fuchin	)	Kirin	11,000
1st Cav.Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Mishanhsien	)		8,000
1st " Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Harbin	)		6,000
1st Art.Regt	(	) "	)		6,000
6th Engr.Bn.	(	)	)		800
			Total . . .		61,800

Second Army - Hu Yu-k'un

5th Brigade	(Tung Ying-pin	) Shedinlin	)		10,000
14th "	(Hsun Yung-ho	) Angangki	)	Hei-	10,000
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	) "	)	lung-	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig	(Chang Shu-seng	) Mientuho	)	kiang	6,000
5th Art.Regt	(	) Harbin	)		6,000
1st Engr.Bn.	(	)	)		800
			Total . . .		42,800

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

2nd Art. Regt.	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	(Fengtien)	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	Harbin	(Kirin)	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 battalions stationed in Fengtien	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow (Fengtien)	800
Total	227,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Hwachwan	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Fuchin	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) Hei-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) lung-	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	) kiang	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	30,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchwan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 402,100

* * * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,042,700

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Narrative of Events.

General. The wide-spread disorder as reflected in the past few Situation Reports has for the time being been segregated into the Central China area. The Sino-Russian situation has ceased to bear a military aspect, and so long as negotiations continue to run smoothly no further Soviet aggression may be expected. The general warfare in South China can be said to have ended with the fall of Wuchow on December 19, and with the retreat of the anti-government forces to the north and northwest.

However, each of the struggles of the past year has sapped its quota of the life blood of the government, and while the total number of men in the Chinese Army considered more or less loyal to the government has increased from 266,000 on December 31, 1928, to 778,100 today, the army considered as an implement for the use of Nanking has grown weaker. Various factors contribute to this effect, such as the plethora of war, the inability of the soldier to understand why he has been called on to fight, intrigue of every kind from every source, and the reflection from the common Chinese citizen of the opinion that internecine warfare should cease. To these reasons must be added the one that the soldier must see that the government does not grow stronger with his effort, and if he was ever inspired, the consideration that he is engaged in a series of wars for personal aggrandizement.

The Revolt of the Lesser Generals, narrated in the last Situation Report, has ended as far as Shih Yu-san, Han Fu-chu and Ma Hung-kwei are concerned as predicted. Through the offices of Ma Fu-hsiang an agreement has been reached with Chiang Kai-shek which has brought to a close any active military operations and has resulted in placing Shih Yu-san's troops in the Pengpu area, Han Fu-chu's along the Lung-Hai from C hengchow to Lanfeng, and Ma Hung-kwei's from Lanfeng to Suchow. The position thus occupied is strategically very significant, and the inclination of this triumvirate in the coming war towards Yen or towards the Kuominchun is a matter of utmost importance.

The stage is being set in Honan for another war. Chiang Kai-shek has turned over affairs north of the Yangtze to Yen Hsi-shan, together with all of the troops in the Honan area, including those of Han Fu-chu, Shih Yu-san, Ma Hung-kwei and the government forces north of Hankow. The "Model Governor" has apparently come off the fence and is in all likelihood preparing to suppress the Kuominchun, which has probably allied itself with Tang Sheng-chih. Yen has dubbed his Shansi army "The Army for the Upholding of Righteousness" and has ordered 8 divisions to Chengchow, of which 3 have arrived and 5 are en route. It is reported that he himself will follow shortly.

Lu Chung-lin is now in active command of the Kuominchun. It is considered likely that under his command the unity and cohesion of the force may be regained. While it is generally rumored that the Kuominchun is in movement, there is at present no confirmation. According to the latest information, the Kuominchun holds positions from north to south along the line Loyang, Sunghsien, Shihfosze, Sichwan, Laohokow, Nanchang (all inclusive).

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The troops of Tang Sheng-chih remain along the Peking-Hankow from Hsuchow to Yencheng. Reports of skirmishes on the 20th in the neighborhood of Yencheng indicate that the government troops north of Hankow are exerting pressure northward.

While Yen's advent in Chengchow is heralded merely as an expedition against Tang Sheng-chih, such a hypothesis is not within the bounds of probability since with the eight Shansi divisions in Chengchow there will be a rough 200,000 men against Tang's 30 or 35,000. Too, it is learned from reliable Kuominchun sources that an agreement exists between Tang and the Northwestern Army.

Barga.

While the news from Barga is limited and sketchy, it appears that following the Russian withdrawal the Young Mongol party of Barga proclaimed the independence of that state, and that at present Barga is the site of another revolution. Unconfirmed reports state that the troops under the Young Mongol party are officered by Russians, and an official report from Mukden advises that a communistic form of government under a commission of seven has been set up at Hailar, the capital. In the Barga area reside about 30,000 nomadic Mongols, 50,000 Chinese, and 10,000 foreigners, mostly White Russians. The Young Mongol party of course is made up from the nomadic Mongolian population, but from this element has also emerged a pro-Chinese group, favorable to Chinese dominion. While it is known that Chinese troops are operating against the Young Mongols, no details are at hand at present.

In the event that Bargan independence is sustained and a communistic protectorate established, an important area, both economically and from a military viewpoint, will have been lost to China. It is believed that the Young Mongol movement is being inspired by the Soviet.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

No. 7637 1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China - January 3, 1930 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G-2 Report

6180

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

4-1

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

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WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 27 1930

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Yen Hsi-shan, Vice Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

14th	Division	(Liu Chun-jung	Hsuchow	(Honan)	15,000
15th	"	(Ho Chien	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	7,000
16th	"	(Lo Pan-ying	Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	7,000
17th	"	(Sun Kuang-chien	Linhwaikwan	(Anhwei)	12,000
18th	"	(Chang Hui-tsan	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu	Linchow	(Kwangtung)	10,000
20th	"	(Han Fu-chu	Chengchow	(Honan)	25,000
24th	"	(Shih Yu-san	Pengpu	(Anhwei)	13,000
29th	"	(Tsao Fu-lin	Chungmou	(Honan)	10,000
44th	"	(Yang Sheng-chih	Hsuchow	(")	12,000
45th	"	(Pao Kang	Hweichow	(Anhwei)	12,000
46th	"	(Fan Hsi-chi	Taian	(Shantung)	14,000
47th	"	(Wang Chin-yu	Hsuchow	(Honan)	28,000
48th	"	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	Yencheng	(")	24,000
49th	"	(Jen Ying-chi	Lungtan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
50th	"	(Tan Tao-yuan	Pinglo	(Kwangsi)	12,000
51st	"	(Kung Hao	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	12,000 x
52nd	"	(Yeh Kai-hsing	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	13,000
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	15,000 x
54th	"	(Wei Yi-san	Chengchow	"	16,000
55th	"	(Juan Chao-chang	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	4,000
58th	"	(Wen Hung-en	Waichow	"	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou	Ertang	(Kwangsi)	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai	Makiang	"	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kuang-nai	"	"	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-pin	Tungon	"	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching	Hohsien	"	8,000
64th	Mix. Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
65th	Division	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	Loyang	(Honan)	10,000
66th	"	(Liu Mao-en	Pingluhsien	(Shansi)	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(An Chun-tsai	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	6,000 x
1st	" Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih	Chengchow	"	8,000
2nd	" "	(Chang Li-sheng	Chowkiakow	"	10,000
2nd	Ind.Art.Regt	(Fan Chu	Yencheng	"	2,500
4th	" " "	(Lu Tsung-ching	Hsuchow	"	2,500
				Total	406,000

The 15th and 16th Divisions, appearing above, were organized from the 7th and 8th Divisions, formerly carried under "Newly Organized Troops". Chou Lan, Commander of the former 8th Division was relieved from command and a new commander to the 16th Division, Lo Pan-ying, was appointed.

The 29th Division under Tsao Fu-lin is a newly organized unit.

x Troops which have rebelled against the Government. Tang Sheng-chih has left these forces, which are concentrated at Chowkiakow and are apparently awaiting reorganization.

From M/A, China Report No.7655 January 27, 1930.

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Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st Division	(Chang Chen	Changchow	(Fukien)	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang	Foochow	"	8,000
3rd "	(Ho Yi-san	Tsinan	(Shantung)	8,000
3rd "	(Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	"	35,000
4th "	(Liu Kuei-tang	Mihsien	(Honan)	6,000
5th "	(Fan Shih-sheng	Fancheng	(Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	Siangyang	"	4,000
10th "	(Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	"	4,000
10th "	(Hsieh-Pin	Yuping	(Kweichow)	8,000
12th "	(Kao Kuei-tze	Taerhchwang	(Shantung)	6,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu		(Szechwan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
14th "	(Yang Hu-cheng	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Sun Tien-ying	Chowkiakow	"	15,000 x
20th "	(Li Yung-heng	Laohokow	(Hupeh)	8,000
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	Siangyang	"	8,000
22nd "	(Lo Lin	Shashi	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	Piyang	(Honan)	3,000
1st " "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	Suchow	(Anhwei)	5,000
1st " "	(Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	(Hupeh)	6,000
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	3,000 x
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
12th " "	(Hsu Shen-yu	Hankow	"	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	Kishui	"	5,000
15th " "	(Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000
16th " "	(Teng Ying	Hwangmei	"	3,000
			Total	205,500

x Troops which have rebelled against the Government. Tang Sheng-chih has left these forces, which are concentrated at Chowkiakow and are apparently awaiting reorganization.

The 1st Ind. Brigade under Wu Chun-ping has been organized from the 11th and 14th Ind. Brigade under Wan Yi-wu and Peng Chi-piao respectively. The latter two brigades were formerly under Hu Tsung-to, who attacked Ichang, but has been defeated and has retreated into the interior as reported in Situation Report 7631.

Provincial Garrison Forces

2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
1st " "	(Shih Chung-cheng	Lintsing	(Shantung)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	Tehchow	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	" "	"	4,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	3,600
			Total	30,600

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	(Liu Chih	Chumatien	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	Chuchow	(Anhwei)	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	Pukow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	"	"	12,000
6th "	(Chao Kuan-tao	Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	Hsuchow	"	12,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen	Kungcheng	(Kwangsi)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	Hiangcheng	"	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	Wuchang	(Hupeh)	12,000

Total 144,000

Total Government troops, including Provincial Garrison forces, and the First Group of Armies 786,100

Second Group of Armies

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	"	"	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	Yunyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	Honan-Shansi border		12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung	Lingpao	"	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	Chenping	(Honan)	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	Shanchow	"	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	"	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	Chinchow	(Kansu)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang	Shanchow	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin	Loyang	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	Shanchow	(Honan)	4,000

Total Second Group of Armies 249,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command - Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u	) Meishihkwan	(Honan)	12,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	) Chuwohsien	(Shansi)	12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	) Shihkiachwang	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	) Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying	) Peking	(Chihli)	9,000
39th "	(Yang Yao-fang	) Yingtseh	(Honan)	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	) Yuncheng	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	) Sinsiang	(Honan)	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	) "	"	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	) Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	) Peking	"	8,000
1st Cav. "	(Yang Chao-lin	) Tatung-Fengchen	(Shansi)	6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	) Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	) Kalgan	(Chahar)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	) Chengchow	(Honan)	4,000
19th Ind.Brig.	(Kuo Tsung-fan	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
25th " "	(Ho Shan-nan	) Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	6,000
26th " "	(Ho Yuan-pi	) Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku	) Chengting	(Chihli)	6,000
28th " "	(Yuan Tseng-ching	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
Bodyguard "	(Tu Chun-i	) "	"	6,000
4th Art. "	(Tseng Yen-yi	) "	"	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang	) Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh	) Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i	) Tientsin	"	2,500
			Total	181,000

Provincial Garrison Forces - Ku Jen-fa.

1st Division	(Wang Tse	) Tatungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	) Yunp'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	) P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	) Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	) Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	) Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	) Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	) Yunch'eng	"	8,000
			Total	64,000

Total Third Group of Armies 245,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangsi

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	) Kweilin	(Kwangsi)	10,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Poseh	"	6,000
16th "	(Lu Huan-yen	) Sunchow	"	8,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) "	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Liuchow	"	4,000
			Total	38,000

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Lunganhsien	(Kwangsi)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind.Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Chaotung	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-ling	) Yunnanfu	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Ma Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang	)	(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun	)	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang	)	"	3,000
			Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Forces
Two Reserve Regiments
One Gendarmerie Battalion
One Artillery Corps
Two Flotilla (Provincial Defense Force)

10,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total . . .	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Ind. Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total . . .	54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying	)	(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan	)	"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng	)	"	3,000
			Total . . .	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	) Fowchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	) Ichang	(Hupeh)	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	) Patung	"	7,000
			Total . . .	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	) Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	) "	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Len Ying-tung	) Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total . . .	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	) Chengtu	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	) Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	) Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	) Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	) Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total . . .	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	) Tungchwan	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	) "	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	) "	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chun	) "	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Nin-chang	) "	"	6,000
			Total . . .	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechwan)	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 368,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Yingkow	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Ichow	"	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei)	Hsingcheng	"	10,000
5th "	(Tung Ying-pin)	Shedinlin	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Peitaiho	(Chihli)	11,000 *
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho)	Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Tahushan	"	11,000
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	T'aonan	"	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu)	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
24th "	(Huang Shih Yueh)	Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan)	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-chang)	Lwanchow	(Chihli)	10,000 *
1st Cav.Brig	(Kuo Hsi-peng)	Changli	"	6,000 *
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Mientuho	(Heilungkiang)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chienan	(Chihli)	8,000 *
				174,000

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

As an agreement has been reached between China and Russia, the First and Second Armies which were organized by Fengtien and which have been despatched to Kirin and Heilungkiang for military operations as reported in previous Situation Reports, are declared dissolved, and these forces are returning to their former stations.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan	(Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Chinchow	(Fengtien)	800
		53,600

Total Fengtien Forces 227,600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Hwachwan	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Fuchin	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-feng	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) Hei-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) lung-	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	) kiang	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
			Total	30,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchwan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 402,100

* * * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,050,700

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Narrative of Events--January 1 - 27, 1930.

Honan: With the capture of Hsuchang, T'ang Sheng-chih's base, on January 9, the warfare in Honan was brought to a finish, temporarily at least. T'ang was not attacked from the north since Yen and his troops did not leave the area of the railway junction at Chengchow, though the 48th, 44th and 7th Divisions under Yang Chieh moved southeast from the Loyang area. Liu Chih from the south, with the 1st, 9th, 11th, 13th and 14th Divisions, attacking first at Chumatien on or about January 2, brought the campaign to a successful conclusion on the 9th with the capture of Hsuchang as stated above. The Nationalist Government reported the capture of two armored trains, 10,000 men, and much materiel. Since the campaign closed in a severe cold wave and in the snow, the suffering of T'ang's men, mostly Hunanese, was severe, the Consul-General at Hankow reporting many cases of frozen feet among the captives, of which some 2,000 were despatched to Hankow. It is not believed that T'ang's defeat can be ascribed in more than a perfunctory manner to direct military action. The old Chinese implements of bribery, cajolery and intrigue were certainly put to use. Just what has happened to T'ang and his whereabouts at present are unknown. Reports have had him in both Tientsin and in Taiyuanfu, but it has been substantiated that he has left his troops. While some, probably not more than 5,000 or 6,000, of Tang's men were taken prisoner, T'ang's forces were not broken up. The 51st Division, and the 6th Infantry Brigade retreated practically intact to Chowkiakow, about 80 miles east of Yencheng, where it is rumored they are receiving offers of incorporation into both the Shansi and the National Armies.

Though the press contained fiery denunciations of T'ang credited to Yen, in Chinese circles it is generally believed that Yen did all he could to protect T'ang and despatched Sun T'ien-ying with his over-size 18th Division to T'ang's aid for that purpose. Well informed Chinese add that Liu Chih in pushing home his attack was attacking on orders from Chiang Kai-shek and in opposition to Yen, his immediate superior.

Szechuan. Skirmishes are reported as having taken place in Szechuan in telegraphic advices from Chungking received on January 14. There has been opposition to the rule of Liu Hsiang in Szechuan for some time which is periodically reflected in the uprising of Yang Sen and of the lesser generals. Probably there has been no fighting on a large scale, and it is thought that such differences as may have existed have been patched over, for the time being at least.

From the foregoing it will be seen that news from Szechuan is extremely limited--but it is believed that the followers of the Chinese military situation should bear in mind that Szechuan affairs are in a very unstable condition, and desultory fighting is a common occurrence. A review of the Szechuan situation was given in the Comments for January 15-31, 1929, which in its major issues holds still.

Barga. Such meagre reports as are available indicate the collapse of the Young Mongol movement in Barga, and the occupation of Hailar by the Chinese. Though this seems to be the case, Barga remains a center of unrest and an area easily subject to Soviet influence.



CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Shih Yu-san: As this report is being written Shih Yu-san in obedience to Nanking's orders is moving his troops from along the Tsin-Pu line to Honan in the vicinity of Kweiteh. While this removes him from a position which was very embarrassing to the government, it places him in closer contact with his allies, Han Fu-chu's and Ma Hung-kwei. He has to date not turned over an indeterminate amount of rolling stock thereby crippling service on the Tsin-Pu line.

South China: After the collapse of the Kwangsi offensive on December 14, the Cantonese took up the pursuit and as stated in Situation Report No. 7631, occupied Wuchow on December 19. Feeling that with Wuchow in their hands Canton was safe, the pursuit was not pushed beyond. The Kwangsi troops have taken advantage of this pause and have made enough reorganization in their forces to be able to present another menace to Canton. It was announced officially that for two weeks starting January 21, the West River above Tengyün would be closed to traffic, and the Cantonese Navy is reported to have been ordered to assist the land forces in an attack on the rebels, who have gathered enough strength to again threaten Wuchow. As in the recent war no plans are apparently being made by the Cantonese to reinforce the garrison of Wuchow and it would appear that if the Kwangsi Army is in force another evacuation will be made.

In sympathy with the Kwangsi rebellion a mutiny broke out during the first week in January on the island of Hainan where some 2,600 rebellious troops occupied Kiungchow, the capital and Hoihow, the principal port. The Cantonese Navy, under Admiral Chan Chat, with 5 gunboats and one transport carrying four battalions of Cantonese troops, left Canton for Hainan on January 7, and meeting with little resistance occupied Hoihow on January 22. The rebels have fled to the interior.

Until either the Kwangsi Army receives a decisive defeat, or until a part of the revenues of the port of Canton--revenues enlarged by Kwangsi trade--are put at the disposal of Kwangsians, little peace may be expected between the two Kwang provinces. The former event it unlikely in view of the antipathy of the Chinese to carry war to its logical conclusions, and the latter will only eventuate when Cantonese safety lies in the direction of generosity.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

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MAR 13 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

4-1

2657-D-2760

291

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Kwangsi-Canton Warfare of October, November and December, 1929.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 12 1930

The accompanying report and map of operations describing the Kwangsi-Canton warfare of October, November and December, 1929, is compiled from extracts from reports furnished the British Military Attache by British G.H.Q. in Hongkong, and are based for the most part upon reports rendered by a British Intelligence Officer stationed at Wuchow.

- - - - -

1. Political.

The revolt of Chang Fa-kwei at Ichang and his march through Hunan on Kwangsi had an immediate repercussion on the whole of South China and particularly on Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

The Hunan forces under General Ho Chien did not attempt to interfere with his advance South, and by the middle of October his advanced troops had reached Kweilin in Kwangsi and were threatening Canton.

The effect of this development on the political situation in Canton is far reaching. Martial law and a strict censorship were instituted, but this did not prevent a fall in the value of the notes of the Central Bank of China---a sure barometer of the real situation. The latter complication was met by a determined effort on the part of the Canton Government to maintain its value.

A circumstance which did much to reassure the population was the unexpected return of Chan Ming-shu from Nanking. It was generally believed that he would not return and the fact that the Central Government had prevailed on him to do so must be considered to have been a sound move on their part.

2. Troop Movements.

Canton lost no time in carrying out an adjustment of dispositions of its five divisions to meet any contingency that might arise and troops were rushed by rail, steamer and junk up the West River towards the Western border of Kwangtung. It was quite obvious that an attack by Kwangsi forces was the chief anxiety of the Canton Government.

While these troop movements were going on, reinforcements were also despatched from the N orth under arrangement of the Central Government and these commenced to arrive about the 6th October.

Final dispositions and intentions were as follows:

Wuchow Area.

60th Division - General Choi Ting-kai.
62nd " - General Heung Hon-ping.

These two divisions to advance up West River to Nanning.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Kwangsi-Canton Warfare of October, November and December, 1929.

Takhing and Shiuhing.
59th Division - General Yu Hon-mou.
63rd Division - General Li Yang-king.

These two divisions to move up to Wuchow when the leading divisions advance.

On East River.
61st Division - General Chiang Kwang-nai.

Location doubtful, but this division is probably fully occupied in dealing with Communist bands on the Kwangtung-Fukien border.

3. Northern Reinforcements.

Northern reinforcements, total estimated at 7,000 troops, on disembarkation at Canton were moved up the North River while another division marched into Kwangtung from Kiukang.

Dispositions are:

About Ying Tak: 2nd Nanking Division - General Miao Bing-min.
About Shiuchow: 8th " " - General Chu Shao-liang.
About Nam Yun : 18th " " - General Tan Tao-yan.

4. Armaments.

Arms and equipment of the Cantonese troops are of a very mixed assortment.

Rifles are mostly German manufacture, 1898 and even 1893. There are also some of local manufacture but a very indifferent kind.

Trench Mortars are to be found; sometimes as many as 24 to a battalion.

The units that have arrived from the North are better equipped, their rifles are nearly all 1898 German manufacture and they are a better disciplined looking set of men. They are reported to have brought some Artillery with them.

5. Effect of Presence of Northern Troops.

The dispositions of the Provincial and Northern forces have given rise to much speculation. That they have not met with the approval of the Military Commander, General Chan Chai-tong, is well known. He feels that he has been moved out of Canton to the inhospitable province of Kwangsi to make room for Northern troops in Canton. It is even said that Canton is being got ready for the reception of Chiang Kai-shek and his unpopular friends should circumstances necessitate his flight from Nanking.

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A more likely reason for the location of the Nanking reinforcements along the North River is that in case of a collapse in Kwangtung they will be able to retire North or get away again by sea. It is interesting to note that the Commander of these reinforcements is keeping 8 transports standing by at Canton.

In any case, there is a widespread objection to the presence of these troops in Kwangtung and this feeling may have far reaching results and may end in a change of government at Canton.

General Chan Chai-tong has been in touch with the Kwangsi Commander, General Lui Wooh-yim, ostensibly to concert a combined move against Nannking, but it is possible that both these men are preparing a coup against Canton. It is known that no love is lost between Chan Chai-tong and the Civil Governor of Canton, Chan Ming-shu.

1. By the end of October all Northern reinforcements had left Kwangtung and were returning by sea to Nanking. The plan to send two Cantonese Divisions into North East Kwangsi to attack the Ironsides was abandoned and all forces were withdrawn to the Wuchow area.

2. At the beginning of November banditry suddenly became rife throughout Kwangtung and it was clear that Chan Fat-kwai's agents were active, preparing the ground for a possible advance down the Shiukwan-Canton Railway. General Chan Ming-shue took immediate steps to counter this and elements of the 63rd Division were moved up as far as the railhead at Shiukwan.

3. By the 10th November it was known that the Ironsides were advancing along the Little North River and were reported in vicinity of Yangshan.

It was also known that the situation in Kwangsi was such that Canton could not afford to withdraw many troops from the West River to Northern Kwangtung.

4. On 15th November events again gave cause for anxiety and it was decided that in view of the danger of Chan Fat-kwai's advance cutting the Cantonese communications with the Divisions at Wuchow it would be necessary to withdraw, and take up the line Shiuhing-Yingtak.

5. The situation on the East River may also have played a part in the decision to take up a defensive position close to Canton, since this whole area appears to be overrun by bandits estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 strong and under the leadership of the notorious bandits Chu and Mo.

6. The Cantonese 61st Division commanded by General Chiang Kwang-nai, based on Swatow had been attempting to deal with this menace but had only succeeded in driving the bandits towards the East River and towards the Kwangsi border. Dispositions of 61st Division in November were:

7th Brigade at Swatow and Chaochow.
8th Brigade at Fungshun Area.
9th Brigade at Waichow.

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7. On the 18th November anxiety in Canton increased because of the continued advance into North Kwangtung of Chan Fat-kwai's troops. Although these troops were reported to be showing signs of exhaustion due to the long march and shortage of supplies, no attempt was made to oppose them, and the whole country as far South as Yingtak lay within their grasp.

8. On the 19th November the Cantonese finally abandoned Wuchow before the advancing Kwangsi troops. The Canton Naval Squadron under Admiral Chan Chak, which had been stationed above Wuchow, also withdrew to below the city.

- - - - -

1. By the latter half of November the Cantonese Government was faced with the loss of its allies in Kwangsi, who had turned over to Chang Fat-kwai's Ironsides.

A converging movement by the Kwangsi forces and the Ironsides on Canton via the West River and Sz ewui on the Bamboo River forced the Cantonese Divisions to evacuate Wuchow, and by the 21st November they had commenced a general retirement up the line Samshui-Kuntiu-Kotong, which ran within 30 miles of Canton.

2. Luckily for the defenders of Canton, the Kwangsi leaders and their allies did not follow up their initial success and a lull in the situation ensued. This gave rise to various rumours, among them the story that the Ironsides were carrying out a big flanking movement along the Kiangsi border with a view to turning the Western and Northern defences of Canton from the direction of the East River. Grossly exaggerated reports of the attacker's strength were in circulation. At least 70,000 men were said to be bearing down on the city.

3. The position of Ho Chien in Hunan was doubtful and it was obvious that he had extended at least a benevolent neutrality to Chan Fat-kwei on the latter's way to the South, though both sides claimed him as an ally.

4. Although there were no signs of anti-foreign feeling, the Police Force, the Special Constables and French Troops on the Shameen Concession prepared for all eventualities. Assistance from outside both Naval and Military was also available at short notice.

5. A strange fact was that, although a battle appeared to be imminent, the outcome of which was very likely to result in the capture of Canton, the population remained quiet and firmly believed that the conflict would be settled by "arrangement".

6. By the 30th November, the main body of the Kwangsi Army was definitely located on the Bamboo River, while a detachment some 2,000 strong was in the West River, moving via Shiuhing towards Samshui Railhead.

Chan Fat-kwai's Ironsides, now reported from 10,000 to 20,000 strong had at last commenced their forward move down the Linchow River and were about to cross the North River and seize the Canton-Hankow Railway.

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7. The Cantonese Divisions fell back without offering any serious resistance and took up a position along the North River, supported on their left by gunboats and on their right by elements of the Kwangsi Divisions.

Detailed dispositions as follows:

59th Division (General Yu Hon-mou).
About Yingtak-Pakonghow.

60th Division (General Tsoi Ting-kai).
About Paknaj.

61st Division (General Chiang Kwang-nai).
About Samshui.

62nd Division (General Heung Hon-ping).
About Murao.

13th (Kiangsi) Div. (General Chan Fai-chung).
North of Yingtak.

50th (Kiangsi) Div. (General Tan Tao-yuen).
North of Yingtak.

8. In Canton itself martial law was being strictly enforced, several plots to seize the city having been discovered.

It must be stated that the Government officials were showing a brave front and expressed complete confidence in their ability to deal with the invaders, a belief that was not reflected in the exchange value of the C anton Currency which slumped with every fresh report of further setbacks.

To add to Canton's difficulties, brigand bands made their appearance on the North River where the notorious outlaw Leung Sau-ching hoisted the banner of the Ironsides and further South an ex-battalion Commander, Mok Hung stirred up trouble in the Lung Moon area.

On the East River banditry became so serious that a thousand Whampoa Cadets were sent to Waichow to assist in dealing with this menace.

9. Between 2nd and 4th December reinforcements arrived from the North. They consisted of two Divisions, 3rd and 8th. Air reinforcements in the shape of 6 aeroplanes also arrived. With these reinforcements came General Ho Ting-chien, Chief of Staff, together with General Chen Chi-cheng and Mao Ping-wen, Commanders of the 3rd and 8th Divisions respectively. Admiral Tseng I-teng brought the Northern 2nd Naval Squadron, consisting of 6 gunboats.

On the Staff of the Northern Commanders were three German military advisers. On their advice Canton's defences were drawn still closer in to the very suburbs of the town, where any sector could easily be reached by the existing motor-roads.

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10. On the approach of the Ironsides, who had worked round to the North-East of Canton, the 18th and 50th Divisions fell back into reserve and the Canton Army took up its selected position, close to Canton, extending its right to the eastward towards Tsungfa.

On the 8th December there were indications that a panic at Canton was about to develop. The funds of the Central Bank were transferred to the gunboats Hai Fou and Woo Fung. Families of high officials including that of the Cantonese Commander, General Chan Choi-tong, began to arrive at Hongkong.

The first serious fighting commenced on the 9th December about Fayun (Huahsien) to the Northward of Canton. At one time the attackers were almost at the gate of the Shekchung Arsenal.

On the 12th December, after three days heavy fighting, the issue was decided by reserves which were hurried up by motor bus columns from Canton.

On the 13th December the Kwangsi Army, in its turn attempted to advance near Lupao on the North River. By rushing Cantonese troops up to Samshui by rail and executing a flank attack this attempt was speedily crushed.

By the 15th December the Kwangsi and Ironside forces were in full retreat towards Sewui and towards Yingtak. This left the West River open to Wuchow, where Kwangsi troops were hastily throwing a wooden barrier across the river.

At 0200 hours on the 19th December, almost exactly a month after the Cantonese had been forced to evacuate Wuchow, their gunboats under Admiral Chan Chak arrived there again. They were soon followed by troops of the 60th Division who quietly re-occupied the town.

11. The fighting has been exceptionally fierce and the casualties have been heavy. The following is an estimate:

Cantonese:	3,000	killed	and	wounded.
Ironsides:	2,000	"	"	"
Kwangsi :	2,000	"	"	"

Among the killed are several officers of high rank. General Wang Shao-hung is reported to have died of wounds.

In addition the Cantonese made several thousand prisoners.

12. The failure of this latest attempt by the Reorganization Party to establish itself at Canton must be put down to indecision and divided counsels. It was known that the Kwangsi leaders were anxious to keep Chan Fat-kwai from gaining control of Canton while at the same time Ho Chien was anxious to see the Ironsides Army in Canton and out of his own province of Hunan.

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The Ironsides depended for their supply of ammunition on Kwangsi who were believed to have obtained a considerable quantity from French sources, but Kwangsi would not part with it.

The Cantonese forces were well equipped and had the great advantage of naval and air superiority. A remarkable feature of these operations has been the good staff work shown by the Canton higher command, the use made of rapid transportation, and the employment of troops, to good effect, in night operations, in all of which can be seen the influence of the German advisers. The doubtful factor in all Chinese military operations, i.e., the loyalty of the generals, was conspicuous by its absence and this augurs well for the future safety of the city.

The morale of the Cantonese must have greatly improved as a result of this latest struggle in which they have defeated the once invincible Ironsides and crushed yet another attempt of the Kwangsi Clique to dominate the South.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

P. G. T.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

SHANSI
YEN HSI-SHAN
HONAN
ANTUNG
HSINGSU
TROOP DISPOSITIONS AS
OF FEB. 25TH 1938.
DISPUTED TERRITORY

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 1 6180 1930
2657-J-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

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2. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - January 28--February 25, 1930.

North Central China. It will be remembered that Shih Yu-san during the last days of January withdrew his troops to the area around Kweiteh, in Honan, and that it was reported then that in his retreat he failed to release an indeterminate amount of Tsin-Pu rolling stock.

Chiang Kai-shek, announcing that his purpose was the protection of the railway line, followed Shih Yu-san's retreat with the 3rd and 1st Divisions, and has since practically denuded the Wuhan area of first class troops. Nanking by this move threatened not only Shih Yu-san and Han Fu-chu, but pointed a spear-head at Yen Hsi-shan. Yen on February 10th telegraphically suggested that Chiang Kai-shek and he resign their posts and that Chiang refrain from his ambition for the pacification of China by force of arms. This telegram has led to many others, and while to date Yen seems to be concentrating his attention on this verbal exchange and the possibilities of a peaceful settlement, Nanking is moving troops and supplies and concentrating in the strategic Hsuchow area.

As will be noted on the accompanying map, Chiang Kai-shek has effected a heavy concentration under Liu Chih in the H suchow area with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions west from Hsuchow along the Lung-Hai Railway. The Nanking Divisions in this area and along the railroad to Pukow are all considered as Chiang Kai-shek's personal troops whose loyalty is not doubted and all moreover are the divisions which have received the maximum in German training and in modern equipment. They are picked troops. During the recent trouble with Shih Yu-san a part of the 5th Division, then in Shanghai, mutinied, but the division commander can not be doubted. A part of this division still remains in that city, but the greater part of it is now at Pukow en route to Hsuchow. This division is said to contain communistic elements, and it is rumored might stir up trouble in Chiang's rear areas.

It will be noted that Ma Hung-kwei's troops are at Anking, in Anhwei. His father, Ma Fu-hsieng, has accepted the chairmanship of Anhwei and with his son seems to be playing his own game. Hitherto, Ma Hung-kwei, Shih Yu-san and Han Fu-chu were considered to be of one mind, and Ma Hung-kwei's intentions at present are uncertain.

Moving to the Hupeh-Honan area with Ho Ying-ch'in in command of the Wuhan military headquarters, a very different picture is presented. Nanking has practically abandoned this district, since only the loyalty of the 9th and 10th Divisions, reaching from Hankow to Chumatien can not be questioned. From north to south along the Kin-Han Railway, the 14th Division under Liu Chun-jung was formerly a Pai Chiung-hsi and later a Tang Sheng-chih (唐生智) division. With the 54th Division also a Tang Sheng-chih division, and the 33rd and 6th Shansi Divisions, it has been placed by Yen Hsi-shan under the command of Han Fu-chu. These two divisions may for the time being be considered as loyal to Yen and Han Fu-ch'u.

The 47th, under Wang Chin-yu, an old Sun Chuan-fang division and the 48th under Hsu Yuan-ch'uan, an old Chang Tsung-chang division, bore the brunt of hardship in the attack on Loyang and practically won the decision for Chiang Kai-shek. Their loyalty is extremely doubtful

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since they have felt that they were not recompensed for their endeavors in the Kuominchun campaign, since they are northern troops, and since Wang Chin-yu refused the chairmanship of Anhwei offered by Chiang, and recently remained fast after receiving Chiang's order to report with his troops at Nanking.

The 44th is a unit organized from Tang Sheng-chih's remnants.

East of Yencheng at Chowkiakow, it will be noted, are 3 units, the 51st and 53rd Divisions and the 6th Independent Brigade, formerly under Tang Sheng-chih's command. It is not known in what condition or numbers these troops are, or whether their designation has been changed. Arrivals from that area, however, maintain that they are still an organization. Their loyalty and value is doubtful.

The 9th and 10th, north of and in Hankow, have been mentioned. The 13th across the river at Wuchang under Hsia Tou-yin can not be considered loyal since he, Hsia, was promised the chairmanship of Hupeh province for his assistance against Tang, and then was given nothing.

This tabulation accounts for all of the important Nanking forces. In the eastern zone, Chiang is strong; in the Hupeh-Honan area very weak. He has apparently, regardless of Hankow, shortened his lines and moved his troops for an attack along the Lung-Hai and/or the Tsin-Pu railways. His position is strong and but for a rather long line of communications, fairly secure. He has not followed the usual Chinese custom of dividing his force, but has massed them for his main effort. His troop dispositions may be said to reflect good German strategy.

Turning to the anti-government forces, little is known of the movements of the Kuominchun. It has been reported that Shih Yu-san's trains, consisting, it is now known, of 9 locomotives and 200 cars, have been moving elements east from Tungkwan and that the advance elements of Sun Liang-ch'en's command reached Chengchow on the 19th inst. It is known that the Kuominchun is in force as far east at Loyang. Reports, lacking authentic confirmation, have also been received of a Kuominchun movement down the Han River Valley. Yen is without doubt in dire need of Kuominchun assistance and while it may come high he is obliged to request it. Hu Tsung-to is again in action and may be expected to pick up such crumbs as drop in his direction.

From east to west along the Lung-Hai, are first Shih Yu-san's 2 divisions which can be expected to give a good account of themselves against the government forces, and then Han Fu-chu's troops, of which 3 divisions are his own and 4 others, two composed of Shansi troops—— the 33rd and 6th——and the 14th and 54th Divisions previously mentioned. South of the railroad in and around Pochow is Sun T'ien-ying's bandit 18th which is stationed in its home district, and through a thorough knowledge of the country may be expected to make itself valuable.

Further westward are Liu Chen-hua's former divisions, the 66th in Shansi and the 65th near Loyang. The 66th can now be considered as practically a Shansi division and the 65th to have Shansi inclinations. Both of these divisions have repudiated Liu Chen-hua.

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In Shantung, Liu Chen-nien's attitude is anti-government and he is especially hostile to Ch'en T'iao-yuan, governor of the province, who at present is friendly to Chiang. Liu may be expected to seize on any opportunity to discomfit Ch'en, who has split his 46th Division, a brigade of which is containing him and the balance watching Han Fu-chu along the Honan-Shantung border at Tsaochow.

In all there are six Shansi divisions from Shihchiachuang to Chengchow, and one division and two brigades from Tientsin to the Shantung border.

On the 19th, Kao Kwei-tze's 12th Division was driven from the rich mining area along the Lincheng-Taierchwang branch of the Tsin-Pu Railway northeast to Ichow by Ch'en T'iao-yuan's 55th Division. The 12th Division is regarded as pro-Liu Chen-nien and was formerly under Fang Ch'en-wu. At about the same time, Jen Ying-ch'i was persuaded to move his 44th Division, a doubtful unit, to Chenyang in Anhwei. By these two maneuvers uncertain troops were removed from important positions along Chiang's line of action.

It will be noted that the forces opposing the government are in force west along the Lung-Hai and from Chengchow north to Shihchiachuang, and that with Ch'en T'iao-yuan's co-operation very few troops would be available in opposition were Chiang to deliver a holding attack along the Lung-Hai and exert his main effort northwards. This would in all likelihood be the Chinese plan——but with his German advisers it may be expected that he will first endeavor to deliver a signal defeat to his adversaries along the Lung-Hai railroad. It is also worthy of remark that Yen apparently is not willing to sacrifice Shansi troops unless urgently needed, and while his troops may not be needed to obtain a numerical superiority, their presence might do a great deal of good in holding together the heterogeneous soldiery opposing the government.

It may be remarked parenthetically, that in spite of the troop movements shown negotiations are still in progress and that war is by no means inevitable. Chang Hsueh-liang, whose favor has been courted by all parties and who gives every indication of remaining neutral, could by throwing his weight on one side or the other, rapidly bring the talk of war to an end. It would seem that Chiang Kai-shek had gone too far to withdraw without the loss of a prestige very dear to him, but it is always possible that the versatile Yen may be able to extricate himself from yet another difficulty without actually coming to blows.

South China. From the meager and conflicting reports which are available concerning the state of affairs in the two Kwang provinces, it would appear that very little has been accomplished by either side since January 27, the date of the last Situation Report.

An attempt has apparently been made to synchronize the northern and southern revolts and has been successful to the extent that Chiang Kai-shek dare not send reinforcements to Canton until he has cleared the complications in the North. This period promises to be of sufficient duration to enable the Ironside-Kwangsi combine to carry their plans to completion without fear of northern interference. Though no predictions

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are possible as to the future, at present the western combine presents a united front brought together as they have been by a series of misfortunes, while the three Cantonese Chen's——Ch'en Chi-t'ang, the chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Government, Ch'en Ming-shu, his most powerful army commander, and Ch'en Tak, the Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Navy——are divided by personal interests. At present pourparlers are going on between both Ch'en Tak, Ch'en Ming-shu and the Kwangsi-Ironside faction. Ch'en Ming-shu is anxious to regain the governorship of Kwangtung and Ch'en Tak anxious to increase his own power. Ch'en Ming-shu, while anxious to re-establish control, can not be certain that Chang Fa-kwei's ambition does not run along parallel lines, and while he is nibbling at Kwangsi bait, he might at any time draw back with the decision that his interests lie after all with the existing regime.

On or about February 19, the 8th Nanking Division, the only one of the three sent south by Chiang Kai-shek which remains in that area, and the 59th and 63rd Divisions, were forced to abandon Pingle, and have retreated to the Wuchow area where the 60th is strongly established. The 62nd Division, to meet Chang Fa-kwei's threat, was recently moved to southwest Kwangtung, and crossing the border lost heavily to the Ironsides. They have since withdrawn to southwest Kwangtung.

Chang Fa-kwei, in addition to a concentration at Sünchow, is occupying a line from Kochow to Tinpak on the sea, his northeastern flank being protected by a high chain of mountains. The assault by the 62nd has not moved him from this position. From Tinpak he is able to get supplies, and also it is rumored, help from Hainan which is now under Ch'en Tak's control.

Exact dispositions of the Kwangsi forces are unknown. The whole of Kwangsi excepting the Wuchow area is in their possession as well as that part of Kwangtung immediately north of Waitsap.

One of Ho Chien's commanders, Tang Sheng-ming, T'ang Sheng-chih's younger brother, has with his division, designation unknown, lately joined the Kwangsi faction. This would seem to indicate active assistance from Hunan, although the younger T'ang, seeing his brother's distress, may be acting in self-preservation only.

Briefly, faced by confusion and intrigue in the Cantonese camp and the practical impossibility of that faction receiving any reinforcements from Nanking, the Kwangsi-Ironsides clique finds its chances of securing Canton greater than ever before.

3. Miscellaneous.

Chiang Kai-shek is rapidly organizing two new divisions, the 1st and 2nd, which are to be composed of cadets from the Military School at Nanking. The organization of these two divisions is not yet complete.

Reports are being circulated that Chiang's troops will use gas in the event of hostilities. It is likely that such reports are spread for their effect upon moral.

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

No. 7666 1st Ind. JM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, February 25, 1930 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. Reviewed and concurred in. I consider this an exceptionally clear description of a military situation which is as confusing as only Chinese situations can be.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Yen Hsi-shan, Vice Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

14th	Division	(Liu Chun-jung	Chengchow	(Honan)	15,000
15th	"	(Ho Chien	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	7,000
16th	"	(Lo Pan-ying	Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	7,000
17th	"	(Sun Kuang-chien	Mamutsi	(Honan)	12,000 *
18th	"	(Chang Hui-tsan	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu	Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	10,000
20th	"	(Han Fu-chu	Lanfen	(Honan)	25,000 *
24th	"	(Shih Yu-san	Mamutsi	"	13,000 *
29th	"	(Tsao Fu-lin	Chengchow	"	10,000
45th	"	(Pao Kang	Hweichow	(Anhwei)	12,000
46th	"	(Fan Hsi-chi	Tsaochow	(Shantung)	14,000
49th	"	(Jen Ying-chi	Chengyang	(Anhwei)	12,000
50th	"	(Tan Tao-yuan	Konghow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
51st	"	(Kung Hao	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	7,000 x
52nd	"	(Yeh Kai-hsing	Pukow	(Kiangsu)	13,000
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	10,000 x
54th	"	(Wei Yi-san	Chengchow	"	16,000
55th	"	(Juan Chao-chang	Lincheng	(Shantung)	12,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	(Fukien)	4,000
58th	"	(Wen Hung-en	Waichow	(Kwangtung)	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai	Wuchow	"	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kuang-nai	Waiheung	(Kwangtung)	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-pin	Waitsap	(Kwangsi)	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching	Tengyun	"	8,000
64th	Mix. Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	Anking	(Anhwei)	12,000
65th	Division	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	Loyang	(Honan)	10,000
66th	"	(Liu Mao-en	Pingluhsien	(Shansi)	10,000
1st	Cav. Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih	Kweiteh	(Honan)	8,000 *
11th	" Brig.	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	Hsiuwu	"	6,000
2nd	Ind.Art.Regt	(Fan Chu	Hsuchow	(Kiangsu)	2,500
4th	" " "	(Lu Tsung-ching	"	"	2,500
				Total	322,000

* Troops which have rebelled against the Government and which are led by Shih Yu-san and Han Fu-chu. It is learned that they are under command of Yen Hsi-shan.

x The defeated 51st and 53rd divisions formerly under Tang Sheng-chih are said to be reorganized, but no definite information has yet been obtained.

The 11th Cavalry Brigade under Wan Hsuan-tsai is a newly organized unit.

From M/A, China Report No. 7666 February 25, 1930.

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Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st	Division	(Chang Chen	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	9,500
2nd	"	(Lu Hsing-pang	Yenping	(Fukien)	8,000
3rd	"	(Ho Yi-san			
3rd	"	(Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	(Shantung)	35,000
4th	"	(Liu Kwei-tang	Suicheng	(Honan)	6,000
10th	"	(Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th	"	(Hsieh Pin	Yuping	(Kweichow)	8,000
12th	"	(Kao Kuei-tze	Ichow	(Shantung)	6,000
12th	"	(Hu Jo-yu		(Szechwan)	6,000
13th	"	(Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
18th	"	(Sun Tien-ying	Luyi	(Honan)	30,000 *
22nd	"	(Lo Lin	Puchi	(Hupeh)	6,000
3rd	Ind.Brig.	(Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th	" "	(Wei Chung-su	Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000
6th	" "	(Men Ping-yueh	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	3,000 x
7th	" "	(Li Ch'i	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000
8th	" "	(Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
15th	" "	(Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	(Hupeh)	4,000
16th	" "	(Teng Ying	Hwangmei	"	3,000
				Total	145,500

The 3rd division under Ho Yi-san, which chiefly consisted of bandits, is said to have been disbanded by Chen Tiao-yuan, Chairman of Shantung.

* Sun Tien-ying, Commander of the 18th Division, has joined with Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san in the anti-government movement.

x The defeated 6th Ind. Brigade formerly under Tang Sheng-chih is said to be reorganized, but no definite information has yet been obtained.

Provincial Garrison Forces

2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
1st " "	(Shih Chung-cheng	Lintsing	(Shantung)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	Tehchow	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	" "	"	4,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	3,600
			Total	30,600

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

8th Division	(Mao Ping-wen	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
			Total	24,000

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Troops Along Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

1st Division	(Liu Chih	) Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	) Hsuchow	"	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	) "	"	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Pukow	"	12,000
6th "	(Chao Kuan-tao	) "	"	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	) Hsuchow	"	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	) Pengpu	(Anhwei)	12,000
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	) Pukow	(Kiangsu)	8,000
26th "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	) Hsuchow	"	10,000
44th "	(Yang Sheng-chih	) "	"	12,000
12th Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Shen-yu	) Suchow	(Anhwei)	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	) "	"	5,000
1st Cav. "	(An Chun-tsai	) "	"	6,000
2nd " Div.	(Chang Li-sheng	) "	"	10,000
			Total	139,000

The 26th Division under Chen Yueh-han is the old 1st Ind. Brigade.

Hupeh-Honan Area

5th Division	(Fan Shih-sheng	) Siangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	) Siaokan	"	4,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	) Hankow	"	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	) Chumatien	(Honan)	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	) Wuchang	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th "	(Yang Hu-cheng	) Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
20th "	(Li Yung-heng	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	8,000
44th "	(Hsiao Chih-chu	) Yencheng	(Honan)	10,000
47th "	(Wang Chin-yu	) Hsuchow	"	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	) Yencheng	"	24,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	) Chumatien	"	3,000
1st Ind. "	(Wu Chun-ping	) Ichang	(Hupeh)	6,000
			Total	143,000

Designation of the 14th Division under Yang Hu-cheng has been changed to the 17th Division.

The 44th Division under Hsiao Chih-chu is reorganized from the remnants of Tang Sheng-chih's troops.

Total Government troops, including Provincial Garrison forces, and the First Group of Armies 804,100

Second Group of Armies (Northwestern Frontier Defense Force)

Feng Yu-hsiang
Actually in Command - Lu Chung-lin

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	) Kunchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	) Laohokow	"	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	) Honan-Shansi border		12,000
		Carried Forward		72,000

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		Brought Forward		72,000
23rd Division	(Wei Feng-lou	Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung	Lingpao	"	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	Siangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	Chushan	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	Kingtzekwan	(Honan)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	"	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	Loyang	"	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	Chinckow	(Kansu)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang	Shanchow	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin	Loyang	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Ju-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	Shanchow	(Honan)	4,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	(Li Cheng-tung	Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
Total Second Group of Armies				254,000

The Pistol & Sword Brigade under Li Cheng-tung is an old unit, information of which just obtained.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command - Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	Chuwohsien	(Shansi)	12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	Shihkiachwang	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	Nankow	(")	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying	Peking	(")	9,000
39th "	(Yang Yao-fang	Shunteh	(")	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	Yuncheng	(Shansi)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	Sinsiang	(Honan)	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	"	(")	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	Tientsin	(Chihli)	9,000
Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	Peking	(")	8,000
1st Cav. "	(Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengchen	(Shansi)	6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	Kalgan	(Chahar)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	Chengchow	(Honan)	4,000
19th Ind.Brig.	(Kuo Tsung-fan	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
25th " "	(Ho Shan-nan	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	6,000
26th " "	(Ho Yuan-pi	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th " "	(An Hsi-ku	Tungkwang	(Chihli)	6,000
28th " "	(Yuan Tseng-ching	Machang	(")	6,000
Bodyguard "	(Tu Chun-i	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
4th Art. "	(Tseng Yen-yi	"	"	2,500
5th " "	(Liu Kuang	Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th " "	(Chow Chun-chieh	Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th " "	(Peng Ch'i	Tientsin	"	2,500
			Total	181,000

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Provincial Garrison Forces - Ku Jen-fa.

1st Division	(Wang Tse	) Tatungfu	(Shansi)	8,000
2nd "	(Liang Kuo-ying	) Yunp'ing	"	8,000
3rd "	(Fang Ta-sung	) P'ingting	"	8,000
4th "	(Wu Chi-pang	) Taiyuanfu	"	8,000
5th "	(Sheng Liang-chih	) Chiehhsiu	"	8,000
6th "	(Hu Chung-he	) Ch'angyeh	"	8,000
7th "	(Li K'ai	) Linfeng	"	8,000
8th "	(Liu Ying-hou	) Yunch'eng	"	8,000
			Total	64,000

Total Third Group of Armies 245,000

Miscellaneous Units

(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangsi

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	) Tengyun	(Kwangsi)	15,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) "	"	10,000
16th "	(Pai Chun-hsi	) "	"	12,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) "	"	10,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Liuchow	"	4,000
" "	(Tang Sheng-ming	) Chaoping	"	5,000
			Total	60,000

It is reported that the Kwangsi troops and Chang Fa-kwei's Ironsides have been greatly strengthened after their defeat in Kwangtung last December. They have obtained several victories over the Kwangtung invaders in Kwangsi and are now operating at Tengyun, an important city very close to Wuchow.

Lu Huan-yen has been forced from command of the 16th division by Pai Chun-hsi who has taken up command of the said division.

The Ind.Brig. under Tang Sheng-ming is a newly organized unit.

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Lunganhsien	(Kwangsi)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Yunnanfu	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-ling	) "	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Ma Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang)	(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Jung-hsiang)	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

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Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces. Two Reserve Regiments)
One Gendarmerie Bn. One Art. Corps. Two Flotilla.) . . . 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total . .	.30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	Chungking	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	Chungking	"	5,000
Ind.Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	"	"	4,000
			Total . .	.54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tzu-ying		(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan		"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng		"	3,000
			Total . .	.10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	Fowchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	Ichang	(Hupeh)	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	Patung	"	7,000
			Total . .	.20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total . .	.50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total . .	.60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	Tungchwan	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chung	"	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Nin-chang	"	"	6,000
			Total . .	.30,000

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Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechwan)	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 390,500

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	)	Yingkow	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	)	Ichow	"	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei	)	Hsingcheng	"	10,000
5th "	(Tung Ying-pin	)	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang	)	Peitaiho	"	11,000 *
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	)	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho	)	Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
16th "	(Ying Chen-fu	)	Mukden	(Fengtien)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	)	Leting	(Chihli)	11,000 *
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	)	T'aonan	(Fengtien)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	)	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	)	Pamiencheng	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	)	Chinchow	"	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-chang	)	Lwanchow	(Chihli)	10,000 *
1st Cav.Brig	(Kuo Hsi-peng	)	Changli	"	6,000 *
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng	)	Mientuho	(Heilungkiang)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	)	Chienan	(Chihli)	8,000 *
					174,000

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Peicheng	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Battalions stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying (Fengtien)	800
	53,600

Total Fengtien Forces 227,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Kirin	)	8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Fuchin	)	15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th Cav.Brig	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-fang	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) Hei-	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Chung-chia	) "	) lung-	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	) kiang	4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
17th Brigade	(Wang Er-chan	) Tsitsihar	)	7,000
			Total	37,000

The 17th Brigade under Wang Er-chan is newly organized in place of the old 17th brigade which was reported to have been captured or totally routed by the Russians in Situation Report 7631.

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st Cav.Brig	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchwan	)	4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th " "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500
			Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Force - 409,100

* * * *

* TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,102,700

G-2 Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 25 5180

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Yen Hsi-shan, Vice Commander-in-Chief.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 25 1930

Central Government Troops

14th	Division	(Liu Chun-jung	Sincheng	(Honan)	15,000
15th	"	(Ho Chien	Yuehchow	(Hunan)	7,000
16th	"	(Lo Pan-ying	Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	7,000
17th	"	(Sun Kuang-chien	Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000 *
18th	"	(Chang Hui-tsan	Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu	Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	10,000
20th	"	(Han Fu-chu	Kweiteh	(Honan)	25,000
24th	"	(Shih Yu-san	Chengchow	"	13,000 *
29th	"	(Tsao Fu-lin	Kweiteh	"	10,000
45th	"	(Pao Kang	Hweichow	(Anhwei)	12,000
49th	"	(Jen Ying-chi	Tsaochow	(Shantung)	14,000 *
50th	"	(Tan Tao-yuan	Konghow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
51st	"	(Kung Hao	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	7,000 x
53rd	"	(Liu Hsing	"	"	10,000 x
54th	"	(Hao Meng-lin	Hsuchow	"	16,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	(Fukien)	4,000
58th	"	(Wen Hung-en	Waichow	(Kwangtung)	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou	Tengyun	(Kwangsi)	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai	"	"	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kuang-nai	"	"	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-pin	Fungchun	(Kwangtung)	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching	Tengyun	(Kwangsi)	8,000
65th	"	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	Chengchow	(Honan)	10,000 *
66th	"	(Liu Mao-en	Pingluhsien	(Shansi)	10,000 *
1st	Cav. Div.	(Hsi Yeh-chih	Kweiteh	(Honan)	8,000
11th	" Brig.	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	Hsiwu	"	6,000 *
				Total	268,000

* Troops which have joined the 2nd and 3rd Groups of Armies in the anti-government movement.

The 20th and 29th Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division, all of which under Han Fu-chu's command, are said to have joined the Central Government.

x The defeated 51st and 53rd Divisions formerly under Tang Sheng-chih are said to be reorganized, but no definite information has yet been obtained.

Newly Organized Troops under Central Government

1st	Division	(Chang Chen	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	9,500
1st	"	(Yen Yueh-chih	Chengchow	(Honan)	8,000 *
2nd	"	(Lu Hsing-pang	Yenping	(Fukien)	8,000
3rd	"	(Shih Cheng-ching	Chengchow	(Honan)	8,000 *
3rd	"	(Liu Chen-nien	Changi	(Shantung)	35,000 *
			Carried Forward		68,500

From M/A, China Report No. 7685 March 24, 1930.

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Newly Organized Troops under Central Government (Continued).

	Brought Forward			68,500
4th Division	(Liu Kwei-tang	Sincheng	(Honan)	6,000
5th "	(Chang Hsi-shan	Chengchow	"	8,000 *
10th "	(Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Hsieh Pin	Yuping	(Kweichow)	8,000
12th "	(Kao Kuei-tze	Chucheng	(Shantung)	6,000 *
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu		(Szechwan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
18th "	(Sun Tien-ying	Kweiteh	(Honan)	30,000 *
22nd "	(Lo Lin	Puchi	(Hupeh)	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Li Wan-ho	Chengchow	(Honan)	4,000 *
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh	Chowkiakow	(Honan)	3,000 x
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000
8th " "	(Chen Han-chang	Changsha	(Hunan)	4,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
15th " "	(Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000
16th " "	(Teng Ying	Juichow	(Kiangsi)	3,000
		Total		177,500

* Troops which have joined the 2nd and 3rd Groups of Armies in the anti-government movement.

The 1st, 3rd and 5th Divisions under Yen Yueh-chih, Shih Cheng-ching and Chang Hsi-shan respectively and the 1st Ind. Brig. under Li Wan-ho are newly organized units, and are under the command of Wan Hsuan-tsai. The 8th Ind. Brig. under Chen Han-chang is also a newly organized unit and is placed under command of Ho Chien, Chairman of Hunan.

x The defeated 6th Ind. Brig. formerly under Tang Sheng-chih is said to be reorganized, but no definite information has yet been obtained.

Provincial Garrison Forces

1st Division	(Chen Ming-shu	Canton	(Kwangtung)	8,000
2nd Ind.Brig.	(Chang Chi-hsiung	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
1st " "	(Shih Chung-cheng	Changtsing	(Shantung)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	Tsinan	"	4,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming		(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan		"	2,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	NAVAL CONSTB.	"	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	" "	"	4,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	3,600
		Total		38,600

The 1st Division under Chen Ming-shu is a newly organized unit and is reported in Canton, Kwangtung.

The above units are not included in the Central Government troops because they are used primarily as forces for bandit suppression.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

First Group of Armies
(Chiang Kai-shek)
Second in Command - Ho Ying-chin

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

8th Division	(Mao Ping-wen	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	12,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
			Total	24,000

Troops along Tientsin-Pukow Railway

1st Division	(Liu Chih	Lincheng	(Shantung)	12,000
1st "	(Feng Yi-pei	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
2nd "	(Chang Chih-chung	Nanking	"	10,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	Yenchow	(Shantung)	12,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	Pengpu	"	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	Linhwaikwan	(Anhwei)	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	Pukow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	Taian	(Shantung)	8,000
26th "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
44th "	(Yang Sheng-chih	"	"	12,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	Tehchow	(Shantung)	14,000
52nd "	(Yeh Kai-hsing	Lincheng	"	13,000
55th "	(Juan Chao-chang	Tsinan	"	12,000
64th Mix.Div.	(Ma Hung-kwei	Yenchow	"	12,000
12th Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Shen-yu	Suchow	(Anhwei)	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	"	"	5,000
1st Cav. "	(An Chun-tsai	"	"	6,000
2nd " Div.	(Chang Li-sheng	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
2nd Ind.Art.Regt	(Fan Chu	"	"	2,500
4th " " "	(Lu Tsung-ching	"	"	2,500
			Total	203,000

The 1st and 2nd Divisions under Feng Yi-pei and Chang Chih-chung respectively are newly organized units, mention of which was made in the last Situation Report, and are composed of cadets from the Military School at Nanking.

Hupeh-Honan Area

5th Division	(Fan Shih-sheng	Shayang	(Hupeh)	12,000
6th "	(Chao Kuang-tao	Mingkiang	(Honan)	12,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	Siaokan	(Hupeh)	4,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	Chumatien	"	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-yin	Wuchang	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th "	(Yang Hu-cheng	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
20th "	(Li Yung-heng	Siangyang	(Hupeh)	8,000
44th "	(Hsiao Chih-chu	"	"	10,000
47th "	(Wang Chin-yu	Sincheng	(Honan)	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	Fancheng	(Hupeh)	24,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	Chumatien	(Honan)	3,000
1st " "	(Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	(Hupeh)	6,000
			Total	155,000

Total Government troops, including Provincial Garrison Forces, and the First Group of Armies 866,100

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Second Group of Armies (Northwestern Frontier Defense Force)
(Feng Yu-hsiang)
Second in Command - Lu Chung-lin

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
18th "	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Yulin	(Shensi)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	) "	"	12,000
22nd "	(Ma Hung-pin	) Yunyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	) Honan-Shansi border		12,000
23rd "	(Wei Feng-lou	) Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
25th "	(Chang Tze-chung	) Lingpao	"	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	) Fanghsien	(Hupeh)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	) Chushan	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	) Kingtzekwan	(Honan)	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	) Loyang	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	) Jungyang	"	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	) Chinchow	(Kansu)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	) Hanchung	(Shensi)	12,000
Training "	(Wang Kuan-hua	) Loyang	(Honan)	12,000
2nd Cav. "	(Cheng Ta-chang	) Chengchow	"	8,000
8th " Brig.	(Chao Hsi-pin	) "	"	4,000
9th " "	(Su Yu-sheng	) Chungwei	(Kansu)	4,000
1st Mix. "	(Men Chih-chung	) Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Ju-en	) Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	(Chao Kung-wen	) Chengchow	(Honan)	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	) Lanchow	(Kansu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pai Chien-shen	) Tungkuan	(Shensi)	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	) Shanchow	(Honan)	4,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	(Li Cheng-tung	) Tungkwan	(Shensi)	5,000
Total Second Group of Armies				254,000

Feng Yu-hsiang is reported to have returned to Shensi from Shansi and has again assumed command of the 2nd Group of Armies.

Third Group of Armies
(Yen Hsi-shan)
Second in Command - Shang Chen

33rd Division	(Sun Ch'u	) Shunteh	(Chihli)	12,000
35th "	(Yang Hsiao-ou	) Changteh	(Honan)	12,000
36th "	(Li Sheng-ta	) Tsangchow	(Chihli)	9,000
37th "	(Wang Ching-kuo	) Peking	"	9,000
38th "	(Li Fu-ying	) "	"	9,000
39th "	(Yang Yao-fang	) Changteh	(Honan)	12,000
40th "	(Kuan Fu-an	) Taming	(Chihli)	9,000
41st "	(Chang Hui-chao	) Shihkiachwang	"	9,000
42nd "	(Feng Hung-chi	) Shunteh	"	12,000
43rd "	(Fu Tso-yi	) Tsangchow	"	9,000
Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	) Peking	"	8,000
1st Cav. "	(Yang Chao-lin	) Tatung-Fengchen	(Shansi)	6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	) Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	) Kalgan	(Chahar)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	) Changteh	(Honan)	4,000
			Carried Forward	135,000

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			Brought Forward		135,000
19th Ind.	Brig.	(Kuo Tsung-fan	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
25th "	"	(Ho Shao-nan	Suiyuan	(Suiyuan)	6,000
26th "	"	(Ho Yuan-pi	Tatung	(Shansi)	6,000
27th "	"	(An Hsi-ku	Tungkwang	(Chihli)	6,000
28th "	"	(Yuan Tseng-ching	Machang	"	6,000
Bodyguard	"	(Tu Chun-i	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
4th Art.	"	(Tseng Yen-yi	"	"	2,500
5th "	"	(Liu Kuang	Kiangchow	"	2,500
6th "	"	(Chow Chun-chieh	Peking	(Chihli)	2,500
7th "	"	(Peng Ch'i	Tientsin	"	2,500
			Total		181,000

The Provincial Garrison Forces under Ku Jen-fa, carried in previous Situation Reports, are said to have been reorganized and amalgamated with the newly organized Pao An Tui, or Peace Maintenance Forces. They are under training at present.

Pao An Tui or Peace Maintenance Forces

1st Corps under Feng Yu-hsi				
1st Brigade	(Li Ting-hsiu	Peking	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd "	(Wang Fu	"	"	6,000
3rd "	(Liu Chao-tang	Paoting	"	6,000
2nd Corps under Yang Ch'eng-yuan				
4th Brigade	(Liu Kuang-tou		(Shansi)	6,000
5th "	(Li Chia-ling		"	6,000
6th "	(Liang Chien-tang		"	6,000
3rd Corps under Chow Shih-lian				
7th Brigade	(Liu Feng-chi		(Chahar)	6,000
8th "	(Tu K'ung		"	6,000
9th "	(Ma Liang		"	6,000
4th Corps under Ch'in Shao-kuan				
10th Brigade	(Liu Cho-ch'ing		(Suiyuan)	6,000
11th "	(Fan Keng-lan		"	6,000
12th "	(Huang Shih-tung		"	6,000
			Total	72,000

Total Third Group of Armies 253,000

Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Kwangsi

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kuei	Sunchow	(Kwangsi)	15,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	"	"	10,000
16th "	(Pai Chun-hsi	"	"	12,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	"	"	10,000
1st Ind. Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000
" "	(Tang Sheng-ming	Wuhsuan	"	5,000
		Total		60,000

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Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army

98th Division	(Lu Han	Lunganhsien	(Kwangsi)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	"	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	(Yunnan	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang		(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun		"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang		"	3,000
			Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Chekiang

Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces. Two Reserve Regiments
One Gendarmerie Battalion. One Art. Corps. Two Flotilla. . . 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
				30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	Chungking	"	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Pang-chow	Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	Chungking	"	5,000
Ind.Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	"	"	4,000
				54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tsu-ying		(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan		"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng		"	3,000
				10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	Fowchow	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	Ichang	(Hupeh)	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	Patung	"	7,000
				20,000

CHINA (Military)

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24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	) Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	) "	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Lan Ying-tung	) Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
				50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	) Chengtu	"	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	) Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	) Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	) Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	) Chengtu	"	10,000
				60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	) Tungchwan	"	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	) "	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	) "	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Nai-chung	) "	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Nin-chang	) "	"	6,000
				30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	"	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 390,500

(b) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Ichow	(Fengtien)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei	) Hsingcheng	"	10,000
5th "	(Tung Ying-pin	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Peitaiho	"	11,000 *
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	) Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho	) Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
16th "	(Miao Chen-lin	) Mukden	(Fengtien)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Leting	(Chihli)	11,000 *
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan	(Fengtien)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	) Pamiencheng	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	) Chinchow	"	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-chang	) Lwanchow	(Chihli)	10,000 *
1st Cav.Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Changli	"	6,000 *
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng	) Mientuho	(Heilungkiang)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Chienan	(Chihli)	8,000 *
				174,000

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

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Field Artillary - Tsou Tso-hua

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Peicheng	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Batt'ns stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)		4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying (Fengtien)		800
		53,600
Total Fengtien Forces		227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	( )	Fuchin		8,000
8th "	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling		7,000
9th "	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang		8,000
10th "	(Chang Tso-chow	) Kirin		8,000
13th "	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	Kirin	7,000
15th "	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Huachwan		15,000
19th "	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen		7,000
21st "	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang		10,000
26th "	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen		8,000
16th Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "		10,000
18th " "	(Huang Ch'in	) "		8,000
			Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	(Shih Mei-fang	) Pokotu		7,000
2nd "	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow		7,000
17th "	(Wang Er-chan	) Tsitsihar	Hei-	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	lung-	4,000
2nd " "	(Su Ping-wen	) "	kiang	4,000
3rd " "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho		4,000
12th " "	(Ma Chan-shan	) Hulan		4,000
			Total	37,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol		6,000
22nd "	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping		6,000
38th "	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang		7,000
51st "	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning		7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	Jehol	4,500
2nd " "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchwan		4,500
3rd " "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng		4,500
17th " "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol		4,500
19th " "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping		4,500
			Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 409,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,172,700

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

2. Narrative of Events - February 26--March 24, 1930.

Central China. Basically the military situation remains as it was when the last Situation Report was submitted. There have been troop movements which were predicted, and the obscure position held by certain divisions has obtained definition. In general, however, there remains the same obscurity which clouded the situation a month ago.

Comparing the map submitted with the last report with the present one, it will be observed that the position of the Nationalist forces has practically remained unchanged. The troops carried as doubtful have defined their present allegiance at least. Han Fu-chu, through fear of the Kuominchun he betrayed a year ago, has cast in his lot with Chiang Kai-shek, while Shih Yu-san, who in his revolt at Pukow and subsequent seizure of Tsin-P u rolling stock definitely alienated Nationalist support, is now on the side of rebellion, but his chameleon-like coat may turn again. The 54th, 14th, 4th and 47th divisions in Honan, the first two of which are old Tang Sheng-chih divisions and the other two composed of Northern troops, have cast in their lot with Feng and Yen, as has the 49th. The 48th and the 44th divisions have, contrary to expectations, lined up with the government. Ma Hung-kwei is again in Nationalist uniform, and so, far the time being at least, the alignment is definite.

It will be noted that along the Tsin-Pu line Yen Hsi-shan's forces have been greatly augmented. The 36th and 43rd Divisions and the 27th and 28th Brigades are practically on the Shantung border, while the six divisions in the neighborhood of Taming are ready to strike Shantung-wards also. In case of an assault the movement from the north and northwest will be carried out by Yen, while the attack eastwards along the Lunghai will be in Feng's hands.

Feng arrived in Tungkwan on about March 8. He is rumored to have already effected considerable unification among the Kuominchun and with supplies and funds supplied by Yen, that organization may be regarded in about the same light that it was in the past. Feng has advanced eastward to Chengchow in strength. It is believed that the presence of the 22nd, 26th, 27th and 28th Divisions in the Han River Valley constitutes a feint and that Feng does not intend to divide his effort in that direction. What strength these divisions are in is unknown---it may be that they are skeletonized. Feng in our opinion will, in the event of hostilities, meet the Nationalist force with a concentration along the Lunghai and will not adopt the unmilitary expedient of an attack along both the Han River Valley and the Lunghai. The strength he has along the Han River, however, effectually checks Ho Chien's aspirations in the Wuhan area.

Sun Tien-ying's over-size bandit 18th Division from the 20th to the 23rd prevented a union between Han Fu-chu and the government forces near Suchow, but as this report is being prepared is reported to be withdrawing north into Shantung.

While it may seem that Chiang Kai-shek is making a mistake in delaying action in that he is giving the Kuominchun time to concentrate, there are very likely advantages in delay which are not quite so obvious. In the first place, neither side cares for the onus of striking the first

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blow, and again Chiang Kai-shek during this delay probably is making overtures to the lesser leaders which if successful will make his task easier. Moreover Chiang wishes to be certain of his rear areas and can not attack while any uncertainty exists.

Shots were exchanged during the last part of February between Shih Yu-san's forces and the Nationalists along the Lunghai---and from the 22nd to the 23rd, as reported above, Sun Tien-ying offered some resistance to Han Fu-chu's movement eastward. Outside of these two events, in themselves of no consequence, there have been no open hostilities. On March 18, Yen's supporters seized all the Kuomintang and government offices in the area under his control---even arresting the guards posted over Sun Yat-sen's former resting place, Pi Yun Szu, but released his prisoners in a week's time. On either hand is seen the regard paid the old Chinese proverb - "leave yourself some ground to stand on".

The inevitability of war is felt universally among all northern Chinese. There has been developing in the North, slowly it is true but none the less surely, a conviction that the South should not be permitted to rule the North. The slogan "The North for the Northerners" has as yet not emerged, but the feeling is here. While a year ago the change of this city's name from the "Northern Capital" to "Northern Peace" and the transfer of the seat of the government was observed with comparative equanimity, today there is a deep and widespread feeling that Chiang Kai-shek and his southern adherents must vacate North China. Consequently, even though Nanking declares her abhorrence of initiating trouble, war is likely to be foisted upon her if she delays. It may be said that this is the first time since 1911 when in North China there was the popular urge to fight.

On paper the outcome is not difficult to decide. The well-trained, well-equipped, well-led soldiers of the government, sure of their leader and under <u>one</u> leader, backed by the only fluid money left in China and supported by the wealthiest provinces, are certain to win. But on the tympanum of Chinese military-politics, too many other issues impinge to make a paper deduction safe. Chiang in strengthening his position has weakened it. His friends are fewer than a year ago, his enemies more plentiful. While a paradox, the longer he remains in the saddle the more the saddle turns. A year ago, though he had few friends north of the Yangtze, he had few enemies. Today his enemies are on every hand. In the thousands of years recounted in Chinese history, the South has never ruled the North, and the Chinese are not yet to be measured by other than ancient standards.

<u>Mukden's Position.</u> Unless some unforeseen incident urges, or some juicy plum presents itself, Chang Hsueh-liang will remain on the fence during the present trouble in intra-mural China. His urge is threefold. In the first place, many millions were expended from the Fengtien coffers in the late Russian trouble and he must retrench; in the second, Japan is distinctly hostile to any Manchurian exploitation in China proper; and lastly, Manchuria is becoming more and more an entity herself and feels with each year a growing independence of China proper.

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Notwithstanding this, however, there is a gradual sequestration of rolling stock going on outside the wall---and Fengtien has now eight divisions prepared for eventualities in the Shanhaikuan-Lanchow area. There is also known to be a unanimous desire on the part of Fengtien army officers to return to the broader and more pleasant life of the Peking fleshpots.

Szechuan Declares Against Chiang. On March 23, Liu Wen-hui telegraphically declared for Yen and Feng. Wu Pei-fu, who has been under Yang Sen's protection, is again rumored to be emerging in an effort to resuscitate the defunct Chihli Party. While a united Szechuan threat down the Yangtze might have serious consequences for the government, there is as yet no utopia of unity within Szechuanese boundaries. It is generally believed in Chinese circles that Liu Wen-hui's repudiation of the government is an answer to a threat by Yang Sen and Liu Sun-hou who have Feng Yu-hsiang's support, the attempt being to climb into the same boat and to take away any motive there may be for attack.

Wan Hsuan-tsai. It may have been noted that a new name, Wan Hsuan-tsai, is printed upon the current situation map. In a rapidly moving situation new names appear and disappear with great frequency, but it is thought best to remark that Wan Hsuan-tsai six months ago was one of Liu Chen-hua's brigadiers, that he has succeeded in alienating Liu's troops, and now finds himself at the head of Liu's old 65th Division and 11th Brigade, and the 1st, 3rd and 5th Divisions as well as the 1st Brigade, which he has recruited himself. He has aligned himself with Feng and Yen.

for Parker G. Tenney,
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache.

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Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

G-2 Report

Y-1

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

A number of Government troops and the First Group of Armies have been reorganized as four armies by Chiang Kai-shek.

First Army - Hsu Fu-chu.

20th Division	(Sun Tung-hsuan	) Tsinan	(Shantung)	20,000
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	) Yenchow	"	8,000
29th "	(Tsao Fu-lin	) Tsinan	"	10,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	) Tsining	"	14,000
55th "	(Juan Chao-chang	) "	"	12,000
64th Mix. "	(Ma Hung-kwei	) Taian	"	22,000
		Total		86,000

There are one Independent Brigade and one Cavalry Brigade subordinate to the 64th Mixed Division under Ma Hung-kwei, designation and name of commanders are not known.

Second Army - Liu Chih

1st Division	(Liu Chih	) Suchow	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	) Yenchow	(Shantung)	15,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	) Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	) Pengpu	(Anhwei)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	) Kwoyang	"	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	) Pengpu	"	12,000
44th "	(Yang Sheng-chih	) Showchow	"	12,000
45th "	(Li Chieh-san	) Pengpu	"	12,000
52nd "	(Yeh Kai-hsing	) Yingchow	"	13,000
2nd Cav. "	(Chang Li-sheng	) Kwoyang	"	10,000
1st " Brig.	(An Chun-tsai	) Suchow	"	6,000
12th Ind. "	(Hsu Shen-yu	) "	"	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	) "	"	5,000
2nd " Art.Regt.	(Fan Chu	) Suchow	(Kiangsu)	2,500
4th " " "	(Lu Tsung-ching	) "	"	2,500
		Total		142,000

Third Army - Ho Cheng-chun.

5th Division	(Fan Shih-sheng	) Siangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
6th "	(Chao Kuan-tao	) Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	) Wushengkuan	"	12,000
10th "	(Juan Hsuan-wu	) Chumatien	"	12,000
		Carried Forward		48,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7705 April 21, 1930.

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		Brought Forward		48,000
13th Division	(Hsia Tou-yin	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th "	(Yang Hu-cheng	) Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
20th "	(Li Yun-heng	) Paokang	(Hupeh)	8,000
22nd "	(Lo Lin	) Puchi	"	6,000
44th "	(Hsiao Chih-chu	) Fancheng	"	10,000
47th "	(Shangkuan Yun-hsiang	) Sinyang	(Honan)	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	) Siangyang	(Hupeh)	24,000
54th "	(Hao Meng-lin	) Chumatien	(Honan)	16,000
			Total	164,000

Supplemantary Army - Chen Tiao-yuan.

26th Division	(Ch'en Yueh-han	) Ichow	(Shantung)	10,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Shih Chung-cheng	) Tsinan	"	4,000
1st " "	(Sung Jung-ting	) "	"	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	) Lokow	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Hung-en	) Tsinan	"	5,000
			Total	28,000

The 1st and 2nd Independent Brigades under Sung Jung-ting and Liang Hung-en respectively are newly organized units.

Central Government Troops

The following units are not included in the above four armies because they are used chiefly for maintenance of peace and order or as forces for bandit suppression.

1st Division	(Feng Yi-pei	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	10,000
1st "	(Chen Ming-shu	) Canton	(Kwangtung)	8,000
1st "	(Chang Chen	) Chaochow	"	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang	) Yenping	(Fukien)	8,000
2nd "	(Chang Chih-chung	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	10,000
3rd "	(Chien Ta-chun	) Hankow	(Hupeh)	10,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen	) Pingnam	(Kwangsi)	12,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	) Siaokan	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Li Yi-hsuan	) Shihnan	"	4,000
10th "	(Hsieh Pin	) Hungkiang	(Human)	8,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu	)	(Szechwan)	6,000
12th "	(Chin Han-ting	) Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
12th "	(Yuan Ying	) Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi	)	(Szechwan)	6,000
15th "	(Ho Chien	) Lungchow	(Human)	7,000
16th "	(Lo Pan-ying	) Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	7,000
18th "	(Chang Hwei-tsan	) Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th "	(Liu Chien-hsu	) Chwanchow	(Kwangsi)	10,000
24th "	(Chen Han-chang	) Lungchow	(Human)	4,000
			Carried Forward	159,500

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		Brought Forward		159,500
50th Division	(Tan Tao-yuan	Kweiping	(Kwangsi)	12,000
51st "	(Kung Hao			
53rd "	(Liu Hsing			
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	(Fukien)	11,000
58th "	(Wen Hung-en	Waichow	(Kwangtung)	8,000
59th "	(Yu Han-mou	Tengyun	(Kwangsi)	8,000
60th "	(Tsai Ting-kai	Mongkong	"	8,000
61st "	(Chiang Kuang-ngai	Jungyun	"	8,000
62nd "	(Hsiang Han-ping	Wuchow	"	8,000
63rd "	(Li Yang-ching	Tengyun	"	8,000
1st Ind. Brig.	(Chiao Wen-tien	Piyang	(Honan)	3,000
1st " "	(Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	(Hupeh)	6,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming	Chwanchow	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Chang Chi-hsiung	Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	(Fukien)	2,500
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th " "	(Wei Chung-su	Kienli	(Hupeh)	2,000
6th " "	(Men Ping-yueh			
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	Wuhu	(Anhwei)	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
15th " "	(Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000
16th " "	(Teng Ying	Juichow	(Kiangsi)	3,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	NAVAL CONSTB.	(Fukien)	4,000
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	" "	"	4,000
Bodyguard"	(	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	5,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	"	"	3,600
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan		(Fukien)	2,000
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces				
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.		Chekiang		10,000
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.				
		Total		295,100

The 3rd Division under Chien Ta-chun is newly organized and is composed of cadets from the Military School at Nanking.

The 12th Division under Yuan Ying is a newly organized unit and is used for bandit suppression in southern Honan.

The 24th Division under Chen Han-chang is reorganized from the 8th Independent Brigade.

The 51st and 53rd Divisions and the 6th Independent Brigade under Kung Hao, Liu Hsing and Men Ping-yueh respectively are said to have been incorporated in the forces under Liu Chun-jung, Commander of the 20th Army Corps, who has joined in the anti-government movement.

The Bodyguard Brigade is reorganized from a bodyguard regiment under Chiang Kai-shek.

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 715,100

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

The anti-Government forces have, in general, undergone a complete reorganisation. They include the former 2nd and 3rd Groups of Armies, Kwangsi troops, and the commands under Shih Yu-san.

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Division	(Chang Fa-kwei	) Pinglo	(Kwangsi)	15,000
15th "	(Li Ming-jui	) Sunchow	"	10,000
16th "	(Pai Chung-hsi	) "	"	12,000
57th "	(Yang Teng-hui	) "	"	10,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Liuchow	"	4,000
" "	(Tang Sheng-ming	) Pinglo	"	5,000

Total 60,000

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	(Ma Hung-pin	) Chunchow	(Hupeh)	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	) Neihsiang	(Honan)	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000

Total 36,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-cheng, Field Commander.

21st Division	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Chengchow	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	) "	"	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	) "	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	) Hsuchow	"	12,000
2nd Cav."	(Cheng Ta-chang	) Chengchow	"	8,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	(Li Cheng-tung)	"	"	5,000

Total 61,000

Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Lushan	(Honan)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	) Jungyang	"	12,000
3rd Mix.Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen	) Chengchow	"	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	) Loyang	"	4,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsi-pin	) Chengchow	"	4,000

Total 37,000

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Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	) Tungkwan	(Shensi)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	) Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
23rd Division	(Wei Feng-lou	) "	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	) Loyang	"	12,000
			Total	48,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th Division	(Chang Tze-chung	) Kingtzekwan	(Honan)	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	) Chenping	"	12,000
Training"	(Wang Kuan-hua	) Lushih	"	12,000
5th Mix.Brig.	(Pai Chien-shen	) "	"	5,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Chang Te-sheng	) Chengchow	"	8,000
			Total	49,000

The 1st Cavalry Division formerly under Hsi Yeh-chih has rejoined the Second Group of Armies under a new commander, Chang Te-sheng.

Army Reserve - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
1st Mix.Brig.	(Men Chih-chung	) Ninghsia	(Kansu)	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	) Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	) "	"	5,000
9th Cav. "	(Su Yu-sheng	) Chungwei	"	4,000
			Total	31,000

Total Second Group of Armies - 262,000

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

The Third Group of Armies has been augmented by reorganizing its Independent Brigades and Infantry Division Brigades to divisions, and the old divisions have been made Army Corps. Four Artillery Brigades (4th, 5th, 6th & 7th) are distributed among the various Army Corps. Information as to this reorganization is not as yet very complete, the appointment of several division commanders having not been reported.

First Route Army - Sun Ch'u, Field Commander.

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u.

1st Division	(Meng Hsien-chi	) Shunteh	(Chihli)	5,000
2nd "	(Tao Cheng-wu	) "	"	5,000
3rd "	(Ma Yen-show	) Taming	"	5,000
			Total	15,000

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First Route Army (Continued)

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang.

16th Division	(Wen Yu-ju	)	Changteh	(Honan)	5,000
17th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
18th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao.

22nd Division	(Chow Cheng-chien	)	Taming	(Chihli)	5,000
23rd "	(Yu Hai-ho	)	"	"	5,000
24th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta.

10th Division	(Ch'en Chang-chieh	)	Yucheng	(Shantung)	5,000
11th "	(Tuan Shu-hua	)	"	"	5,000
12th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi.

28th Division	(Yeh Ch'i-chieh	)	Yucheng	(Shantung)	5,000
29th "	(Pai Ju-ch'ing	)	"	"	5,000
30th "	(Ch'en Ping-ch'ien	)	"	"	5,000
28th Gend.Brig	(Yuan Tseng-ching	)	Tientsin	(Chihli)	6,000
				Total	21,000

Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou.

4th Division	(Chang Wan-shun	)	Sinsiang	(Honan)	5,000
5th "	(Chow Sze-ch'eng	)	Taming	"	5,000
6th "	(	)	Sinsiang	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an.

19th Division	(Lu Ying-lin	)	Weihui	(Honan)	5,000
20th "	(Liu Tien-kwei	)	Hwanghokow	"	5,000
21st "	(Kuo Tsung-fen	)	"	"	6,000
				Total	16,000

9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu

25th Division	(Kao Hung-wen	)	Taming	(Chihli)	5,000
26th "	(Huang Kuang-hua	)	"	"	5,000
27th "	(Chu Hsi-ch'un	)	Peking	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

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Miscellaneous Troops directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo.

7th Division	(Ho Shao-nan	) Peking	(Chihli)	6,000
8th "	(T'ien Shu-mei	) "	"	5,000
9th "	(Wang T'ing-ying	) Langfang	"	5,000
			Total	16,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

13th Division	(An Hsi-ku	) Tungchow	(Chihli)	6,000
14th "	(To Chen	) Peking	"	6,000
15th "	(Chia Hsueh-ming	) "	"	5,000
			Total	17,000

Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	) Peking	(Chihli)	8,000
Bodyguard Brig	(Tu Chun-yi	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Yang Chao-lin	) Tatung-Fengchen	"	6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	) Paotou	"	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	) Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	) Kalgan	(Chahar)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	) Changteh	(Honan)	4,000
			Total	39,000

Pao An Tui or Peace Maintenance Forces.

1st Corps - Feng Yu-hsi.

1st Brigade	(Li Ting-hsiu	) Peking	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd "	(Wang Fu	) "	"	6,000
3rd "	(Liu Chao-tang	) Paoting	"	6,000

2nd Corps - Yang Ch'ang-yuan.

4th Brigade	(Liu Kuang-tou	)	(Shansi)	6,000
5th "	(Li Chia-ling	)	"	6,000
6th "	(Liang Chien-tang	)	"	6,000

3rd Corps - Chow Shih-lien.

7th Brigade	(Liu Feng-chi	)	(Chahar)	6,000
8th "	(Tu K'ung	)	"	6,000
9th "	(Ma Liang	)	"	6,000

4th Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan.

10th Brigade	(Liu Cho-ch'ing	)	(Suiyuan)	6,000
11th "	(Fan Keng-lan	)	"	6,000
12th "	(Huang Shih-tung	)	"	6,000
			Total	72,000

Total Third Group of Armies - 271,000

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Fourth Group of Armies
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps	- Sun Kuang-chien	15,000
2nd Army Corps	- Mi Wen-ho	15,000
3rd Army Corps	- Su Ming-ch'i	15,000
4th Army Corps	- Sheng K'e	15,000
	Total	60,000

The Fourth Group of Armies has been formed from the 17th and 24th divisions formerly under Sun Kuang-chien and Shih Yu-san respectively; and it is reported that the strength of this force has been greatly increased. The 1st and 2nd Army Corps are stationed between Tsaochow and Chuyeh in western Shantung, while the 3rd and 4th Army Corps in regions of Taokow in eastern Honan. Information as to the organization of each of these army corps has not as yet been obtained.

Miscellaneous Troops In Anti-Government Movement

The following troops, formerly belonging to the Central Government, have joined in the anti-Government movement and are now under the direct command of Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

6th Route Army - Wan Hsuan-tsai, Field Commander.

1st Division	(Wan Yueh-tsung	) Kihsien	(Honan)	12,000
3rd "	(Shih Cheng-ch'ing	) Lanfeng	"	8,000
5th "	(Chang Hsi-shan	) Kweiteh	"	8,000
65th "	(Wan Hsuan-tsai	) Liuho	"	10,000
18th Ind.Brig.	(Li Wan-ho	) Kaifeng	"	5,000
		Total		43,000

Designation of the 18th Independent Brigade under Li Wan-ho is changed from the 1st Independent Brigade.

11th Army Corps - Liu Mao-en.

66th Division	(Liu Mao-en	) Sinsiang	(Honan)	10,000
11th Cav.Brig.	(	) Hsiuwu	"	6,000
		Total		16,000

The 11th Cavalry Brigade formerly under Wan Hsuan-tsai has been transferred to the 11th Army Corps, name of new commander unknown.

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12th Army Corps - Jen Ying-chi. 14,000

This army corps has been formed from the 49th Division formerly under the Government, and is at present stationed in Hsuchow, Honan.

14th Army Corps - Sun Tien-ying. 30,000

It is reported that this Army Corps is composed of 4 divisions, but further information is unobtainable.

15th Army Corps - Liu Kwei-tang. 15,000

Detailed information as to the organization of this Army Corps is not yet known. It is formed from the 4th division formerly belonging to the Government.

20th Army Corps - Liu Chun-jung.

1st Division	(Pao Ping-ch'ing)	Sincheng	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ying Chung-ming)	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Shen T'i-ch'eng)	"	"	12,000
			Total	36,000

The 51st and 53rd Divisions and the 6th Independent Brigade have been incorporated in this Army Corps as stated in Page 3, this Situation Report.

23rd Army Corps - Kao Kuei-tze. 6,000

This Army Corps has been defeated by the Government troops and is being beseiged in Chuch'eng, Shantung. It is formed of troops from the 12th Division formerly under command of the Government.

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju.

24th Division	(Hsu Li-chung)	Luyi	(Honan)	6,000
1st "	(Kuo Fang-hsi)	"	"	6,000
2nd "	(Chin K'wei-ping)	Pochow	(Anhwei)	6,000
3rd "	(Ma Hsi-jen)	"	"	6,000
			Total	24,000

This Army Corps, chiefly consisting of bandits, has been formed of scattered troops in Anhwei and Honan.

3rd Division - Liu Chen-nien. 35,000

It is reported that this Division under Liu Chen-nien has also rebelled against the Government, but no report as to its movement has yet been made. It is still stationed in the Chefoo area, Shantung.

Total Miscellaneous Troops In Anti-Government Movement - 219,000

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Lunganhsien	(Kwangsi)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Yunnanfu	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-ling	) "	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kwaichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang.

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang)	(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
				30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang.

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	"	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Troops	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Ind.Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
				54,000

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Szechwan (Continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tsu-ying	)	(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan	)	"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng	)	"	3,000
				10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao	) Huangchow	(Hupeh)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu	) "	"	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting	) "	"	7,000
				20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui	) Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun	) "	"	12,000
Border Def.Troops	(Lan Ying-tung	) Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
				50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin	) Chengtu	"	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu	) Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung	) Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow	) Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi	) Chengtu	"	10,000
				60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung	) Tungchwan	"	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng	) "	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung	) "	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Hai-chung	) "	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Nin-chang	) "	"	6,000
				30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	"	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 320,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Fengtien

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow	) Mukden	(Fengtien)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo	) Ichow	(Fengtien)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei	) Hsingcheng	"	10,000
5th "	(Tung Ying-pin	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang	) Peitaiho	"	11,000 *
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu	) Chinchow	(Fengtien)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho	) Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
16th "	(Miao Chen-lin	) Mukden	(Fengtien)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan	) Leting	(Chihli)	11,000 *
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei	) T'aonan	(Fengtien)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu	) Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	10,000 *
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh	) Pamiencheng	(Fengtien)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan	) Chinchow	"	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-chang	) Lwanchow	(Chihli)	10,000 *
1st Cav.Brig.	(Kuo Hsi-peng	) Changli	"	6,000 *
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng	) Mientuho	(Heilungkiang)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng	) Chienan	(Chihli)	8,000 *
				174,000

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua.

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Fengtien)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Chihli)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Peicheng	(Fengtien)	6,000
6th " "	Mukden	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000
			48,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Batt'ns stationed at Mukden, Changwu & Kaiyuan (Fengtien)	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying (Fengtien)	800
	5,600

Total Fengtien Forces 227,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th	Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th	"	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th	"	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th	"	(Chang Tso-chow	) Kirin	)	8,000
13th	"	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Huachwan	)	15,000
19th	"	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st	"	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th	"	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th	" "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000

Total 96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st	Brigade	(Shih Mei-fang	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd	"	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow	)	7,000
17th	"	(Wang Er-chan	) Tsitsihar	) Hei-	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) lung-	4,000
2nd	" "	(Su Ping-wen	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd	" "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th	" "	(Ma Chen-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000

Total 37,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd	"	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th	"	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st	"	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd	" "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd	" "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th	" "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th	" "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500

Total 48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 409,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,316,700

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2. Narrative of Events.

General. In a manner that is inexplicable to the western military observer the period of inactivity on the part of China's opposing armies continues. Yen has assumed the title of Generalissimo, and Feng and Li Tsung-jen the titles of deputy commanders-in-chief. Yen has slightly enlarged and reorganized the Shansi Armies, so that former brigades are divisions and former divisions army corps. Feng has divided his army into a number of "Route Armies". Chiang Kai-shek, on the one hand, and his opponents on the other, continue to court Chang Hsueh-liang's favor. Political issues bear greater importance, but the military situation has changed but slightly. Probably more denunciatory telegrams have been dispatched than rifles discharged.

Eastern Front. The most notable factor about the military situation in the eastern arena for the past month has been the amount of territory and the numbers of men which have fallen to the anti-government forces with scarcely a blow being struck. A month ago the Northern government line extended to Techow, and territory as far west as Shantung's western boundary was all under government control. Today there is every indication that Chiang Kai-shek will give up Shantung and he has already evacuated practically all of the province north of the Yellow River, and as the accompanying map indicates, a goodly portion west of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. In addition to this gain in territory, there has also been an increase in the total of anti-government forces, many of the lesser generals having gone over to the opposition.

In Shantung, Han Fu-chu has been placed in command of military operations and Chen Tiao-yuan as Reserve Commander has been relegated to a subordinate position. This change has not taken place without mutual hostility. By it, practically one half of Chen Tiao-yuan's forces, the 55th and the 46 Divisions, have been placed under Han.

A surprise attack on Pengpu was reported on April 18, by the bandit forces of Sun Tien-ying. It was at first believed that the attack was in the nature of a diversion and that it might signal activity at other points, but as soon as the attack developed government resistance it halted, and was followed by no activity in any other area.

Western Front. While the front lines remain practically unchanged on this front, there has been a re-distribution of government troops and an enlargement of rebel forces. The government by the change has sought to place the most loyal troops in and near Hankow, and has moved the doubtful units to places of less importance. The forces of the Kuominchun have been building up slowly——but more strength is daily being placed in the area. Very little resistance could be given to a strong thrust by the present line running through Chumatien, and the main resistance would be reached along the Honan-Hupeh border in the area of Wushengkuan. On the west an attack from the Siangyang-Nanyang district would, because of the terrain, be more effective than a thrust down the Han River Valley itself.

Indications are not lacking that the Kuominchun will make its main effort in the direction of Hankow. Feng has not moved off the railroad and with the establishment of his headquarters at Chengchow on April 19th is in a position from which to threaten both east and south. It is

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of course common knowledge that the government forces have strongly fortified their position along the Tientsin-Pukow railroad, and it may well be Feng's idea to check them there with a part of his own army, aided by Sun Tien-ying, Wan Hsuan-tsai, Shih Yu-san and Yen, while he gobbles up Wuhan. This possibility has been made light of in former reports, since it was believed that Feng realized that no real victory could be won until Chiang's army was faced and defeated. It begins to appear, however, that Feng does not dare to risk an engagement on ground of Chiang's choosing and that he may try this other expedient.

South and Southwest China. From British sources it is reported that the alignment between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which has been indicated as probable in past situation reports, has been effected. This alliance is thought to be anti-government, and it is rumored that an advance towards Hankow by these new allies, plus Ho Chien, may be expected.

On April 10, it was reported that troops from the province of Kweichow had invaded Hunan and had reached Hunkiang on the Yuan River. While the reports so far state that this attack was instigated by Chiang Kai-shek to divert and embarrass Ho Chien, there remains much doubt as to the real motive.

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache.

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 20 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-9-276

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

First Army - Han Fu-chu.

20th Division	(Sun Tung-hsuan	Tsinan	(Shantung)	20,000
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	Yenchow	"	8,000
22nd "	(Ku Liang-min	Kaotang	"	10,000
29th "	(Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	"	10,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	Tsining	"	14,000
55th "	(Juan Chao-chang	Chinhsiang	"	12,000
64th Mix. "	(Ma Hung-kwei	Taian	"	24,000
Bodyguard Brig	(Lei Tai-ping	Tsinan	"	6,000
		Total		104,000

The 22nd Division under Ku Liang-min is a newly organized unit.

There are one Independent Brigade and one Cavalry Brigade subordinate to the 64th Mixed Division under Ma Hung-kwei, designation and name of commanders are not known.

The Bodyguard Brigade under Lei Tai-ping is a newly organized unit attached to the First Army under Han Fu-chu.

Second Army - Liu Chih.

1st Division	(Hsu Ting-yao	Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	"	"	15,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Li Yun-lung	Chihho	(Anhwei)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	Pengpu	"	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	Kwoyang	"	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	Pengpu	"	12,000
45th "	(Wei Li-huang	"	"	12,000
52nd "	(Yeh Kai-hsing	Yingchow	"	13,000
2nd Cav. "	(Chang Li-sheng	Kwoyang	"	10,000
1st " Brig.	(An Chun-tsai	Suchow	"	6,000
12th Ind. "	(Hsu Shen-yu	"	"	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	"	"	5,000
1st " Art.Regt	(Yao Yung-an	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	2,500
2nd " " "	(Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500
3rd " " "	(Li Chung-kwei	"	"	2,500
		Total		144,500

The 3rd Division under Li Yun-lung is reorganized from the old 44th Division formerly belonging to Yang Sheng-chih.

From M/A, China Report No. 7731 May 19, 1930.

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Third Army - Ho Cheng-chun.

6th	Division	(Chao Kuan-tao	Yencheng	(Honan)	12,000
9th	"	(Chiang Ting-wen	"	"	12,000
10th	"	(Yang Sheng-chih	Chumatien	"	12,000
13th	"	(Hsia Tou-yin	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th	"	(Yang Hu-cheng	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd	"	(Lo Lin	Puchi	(Hupeh)	6,000
44th	"	(Hsiao Chih-chu	Yencheng	(Honan)	10,000
47th	"	(Shangkuan Yun-hsiang)	Shangshui	"	28,000
48th	"	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	Yencheng	"	24,000
51st	"	(Fan Shih-sheng	Siangyang	(Hupeh)	12,000
53rd	"	(Li Yun-heng	"	"	8,000
54th	"	(Hao Meng-lin	Shangshui	(Honan)	16,000
				Total	164,000

Designation of the 5th Division under Fan Shih-sheng is changed to the 51st Division, also the 20th Division under Li Yun-heng to the 53rd Division.

Supplementary Army - Chen Tiao-yuan.

26th	Division	(Ch'en Yueh-han	Yenchow	(Shantung)	10,000
57th	"	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Changtsing	"	10,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	(Shih Chung-cheng	"	"	4,000
2nd	" "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	Lokow	"	4,000
2nd	" "	(Liang Hung-en	Tsinan	"	5,000
				Total	33,000

The 57th Division under Yueh Sheng-hsuan has been formed from the 1st Independent Brigade formerly under Sung Jung-ting.

Central Government Troops

17th Army - Liu Chen-nien 35,000

1st	Division	(Feng Yi-pei	Pengpu	(Anhwei)	10,000
1st	"	(Chen Ming-shu	Canton	(Kwangtung)	8,000
1st	"	(Chang Chen	Chaochow	"	9,500
2nd	"	(Lu Hsing-pang	Yenping	(Fukien)	8,000
2nd	"	(Chang Chih-chung	Pengpu	(Anhwei)	10,000
3rd	"	(Chien Ta-chun	Hankow	(Hupeh)	10,000
8th	"	(Mao Ping-wen	Pingnam	(Kwangsi)	12,000
9th	"	(Yin Cheng-kang	Siaokan	(Hupeh)	4,000
9th	"	(Chang Ju-kwang	Changchow	(Fukien)	8,000
10th	"	(Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th	"	(Hsieh Pin	Yuping	(Kweichow)	10,000
				Carried Forward	93,500

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	Brought Forward			93,500
12th Division	(Chin Han-ting	) Kanchow	(Kiangsi)	12,000
12th "	(Yuan Ying	) Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
12th "	(Hu Jo-yu	)	(Szechwan)	6,000
13th "	(Chang Ju-chi	)	"	6,000
13th "	(Teng Ying	) Changshu	(Kiangsi)	8,000
15th "	(Ho Chien	) Yuehchow	(Hunan)	7,000
16th "	(Lo Pan-ying	) Hungkiang	"	7,000
18th "	(Chang Hwei-tsan	) Kienchang	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th "	(Liu Chien-hsu	) Hengchow	(Hunan)	10,000
24th "	(Chen Han-chang	)		
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan	) Kweiping	(Kwangsi)	12,000
56th "	(Liu Ho-ting	) Foochow	(Fukien)	11,000
58th "	(Wen Hung-en	) Waichow	(Kwangtung)	8,000
59th "	(Yu Han-mou	) Linshan	"	8,000
60th "	(Tsai Ting-kai	) Paklow	(Kwangsi)	8,000
61st "	(Chiang Kuang-nai	) Jungyun	"	8,000
62nd "	(Hsiang Han-ping	) Linshan	(Kwangtung)	8,000
63rd "	(Li Yang-ching	) Jungyun	(Kwangsi)	8,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Wu Chun-ping	) Ichang	(Hupeh)	6,000
1st " "	(Kuo Feng-ming	) Chwanchow	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd " "	(Chang Chi-hsiung	) Lichow	(Hunan)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Kuo-hui	) Yungchun	(Fukien)	2,500
3rd " "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	) Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th " "	(Pan Shan-chai	) Hwohsien	(Anhwei)	2,000
7th " "	(Li Ch'i	) Wuhu	"	2,000
8th " "	(Hu Tien-lo	) Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
15th " "	(Tang Sze-tung	) Puchi	"	4,000
1st Brigade	(Lin Chung	) Funing	(Fukien)	4,000 NAVAL CONSTB.
2nd "	(Lin Shou-kuo	) Mamoi	"	4,000 " "
Bodyguard"	(Yu Chi-shih	) Nanking	(Kiangsu)	5,000
Gendarmerie	(Wu Sze-yu	) "	"	3,600
Training Regt.	(Hsia Shu-hsuan	)	(Fukien)	2,000
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces		)		
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn		)	Chekiang	10,000
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.		)		
			Total	338,100

The 17th Army under Liu Chen-nien is reliably reported to have joined the Central Government Army. Designation of his former 3rd Division has since been changed as stated.

The 9th Division under Chang Ju-kwang has been newly organized by Chang Chen, Commander of the 1st Division.

The 13th Division under Teng Ying has been reorganized from the 16th Independent Brigade.

The 24th Division under Chen Han-chang is reported to have been defeated by the 10th Division under Hsieh Pin at Hungkiang, Hunan, and some of the said division have joined the latter force.

The 1st Independent Brigade under Chiao Wen-tien has joined Fan Chung-hsiu, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Group of Armies, and is now the 2nd Division, (See ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES).

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 783,600

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	(Chang Fa-kwei	) Liuchow	(Kwangsi)	20,000
7th " "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Sunchow	"	15,000
8th " "	(Chow Lan	) Pinglo	"	15,000
15th " "	(Huang Shao-hsiung	) Sunchow	"	15,000
15th Division	(Li Ming-jui	) Sunchow	"	10,000
16th "	(Pai Chung-hsi	) "	"	12,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Liuchow	"	4,000
		Total		95,000

The 4th Army Corps has been formed from the 4th Division or the "Ironsides"; the 7th Army Corps from the 57th Division; the 8th Army Corps from the Independent Brigade under Tang Sheng-ming; and the 15th Army Corps is a new unit.

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	(Ma Hung-pin	) Jungyang	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	) Neihsiang	"	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	) Yehsien	"	12,000
		Total		36,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-cheng, Field Commander.

21st Division	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Yehsien	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	) Chengchow	"	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	) "	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	) Hsuchow	"	12,000
2nd Cav."	(Cheng Ta-chang	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	8,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	(Li Cheng-tung)	Chengchow	(Honan)	5,000
		Total		61,000

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Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Yehsien	(Honan)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	) Chengchow	"	12,000
3rd Mix.Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen	) "	"	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	) "	"	4,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsi-pin	) "	"	4,000
			Total	37,000

Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	) Tungkwan	(Shensi)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	) Shanchow	(Honan)	12,000
23rd Division	(Wei Feng-lou	) "	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	) Loyang	"	12,000
			Total	48,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th Division	(Chang Tze-chung	) Kingtzekwan	(Honan)	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	) Chenping	"	12,000
Training"	(Wang Kuan-hua	) Lushih	"	12,000
5th Mix.Brig.	(Pai Chien-shen	) "	"	5,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Chang Te-sheng	) Kaocheng	"	8,000
			Total	49,000

Army Reserve - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

16th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
1st Mix.Brig.	(Men Chih-chung	) Ninghsia	(Kansu)	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	) Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	) "	"	5,000
9th Cav. "	(Su Yu-sheng	) Chungwei	"	4,000
			Total	31,000

Total Second Group of Armies - 262,000

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

First Route Army - Sun Ch'u, Field Commander.

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u.

1st Division	(Meng Hsien-chi	) Chengchow	(Honan)	5,000
2nd "	(Tao Cheng-wu	) "	"	5,000
3rd "	(Ma Yen-show	) "	"	5,000
			Total	15,000

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First Route Army (Continued)

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang.

16th Division	(Wen Yu-ju	)	Shihkiachwang	(Hopei)	5,000
17th "	(	)	Yuanshih	"	5,000
18th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao

22nd Division	(Chow Cheng-chien	)	Taming	(Hopei)	5,000
23rd "	(Yu Hai-ho	)	Lintsing	(Shantung)	5,000
24th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta.

10th Division	(Ch'en Chang-chieh	)	Yucheng	(Shantung)	5,000
11th "	(Tuan Shu-hua	)	"	"	5,000
12th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi.

28th Division	(Yeh Ch'i-chieh	)	Yucheng	(Shantung)	5,000
29th "	(Pai Ju-ch'ing	)	"	"	5,000
30th "	(Ch'en Ping-ch'ien	)	"	"	5,000
28th Gend.Brig	(Yuan Tseng-ching	)	Tientsin	(Hopei)	6,000
				Total	21,000

Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou.

4th Division	(Chow Sze-ch'eng	)	Lanfeng	(Honan)	5,000
5th "	(Chang Wen-shun	)	"	"	5,000
6th "	(	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an.

19th Division	(Lu Ying-lin	)	Kaifeng	(Honan)	5,000
20th "	(Liu Tien-kwei	)	Chengchow	"	5,000
21st "	(Kuo Tsung-fen	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	16,000

9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu

25th Division	(Kao Hung-wen	)	Chengting	(Hopei)	5,000
26th "	(Huang Kuang-hua	)	Kwanhsien	"	5,000
27th "	(Chu Hsi-ch'un	)	Peiping	"	5,000
				Total	15,000

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Miscellaneous Troops Directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo.

7th Division	(Ho Shao-han	Langfang	(Hopei)	6,000
8th "	(T'ien Shu-mei	Nankow	"	5,000
9th "	(Wang T'ing-ying	Paoting	"	5,000
		Total		16,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying.

13th Division	(An Hsi-ku	Tungchow	(Hopei)	6,000
14th "	(To Chen	Peiping	"	6,000
15th "	(Chia Hsueh-ming	"	"	5,000
		Total		17,000

Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	Peiping	(Hopei)	8,000
Bodyguard Brig	(Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengchen"		6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	Kweiteh	(Honan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	Pochow	(Anhwei)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	4,000
		Total		39,000

Pao An Tui or Peace Maintenance Forces.

1st Corps - Feng Yu-hsi.

1st Brigade	(Li Ting-hsiu	Tangshan	(Hopei)	6,000
2nd "	(Wang Fu	Peiping	"	6,000
3rd "	(Liu Chao-tang	Paoting	"	6,000

2nd Corps - Yang Ch'ang-yuan.

4th Brigade	(Liu Kuang-tou		(Shansi)	6,000
5th "	(Li Chia-ling		"	6,000
6th "	(Liang Chien-tang		"	6,000

3rd Corps - Chow Shih-lien.

7th Brigade	(Liu Feng-chi		(Chahar)	6,000
8th "	(Tu K'ung		"	6,000
9th "	(Ma Liang		"	6,000

4th Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan.

10th Brigade	(Liu Cho-ch'ing		(Suiyuan)	6,000
11th "	(Fan Kang-lan		"	6,000
12th "	(Huang Shih-tung		"	6,000
		Total		72,000

Total Third Group of Armies - 271,000

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Fourth Group of Armies
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps	- Sun Kuang-chien	Tingtao	(Shantung)	15,000
2nd Army Corps	- Mi Wen-ho	Tsaochow	"	15,000
3rd Army Corps	- Su Ming-ch'i	Chuyeh	"	15,000
4th Army Corps	- Sheng K'e	Tungming	(Hopei)	15,000
			Total	60,000

Eighth Group of Armies
(Fan Chung-hsiu)

1st Division	(Sun Chen-hua)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	6,000
2nd "	(Chiao Wen-tien)	Linying	"	6,000
3rd "	(Wang Hsueh-chu)	Shangtsai	"	6,000
4th "	(Sun Chang-jung)	Huaiyang	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiang Tao-chen)	Hsuchow	"	4,000
Bodyguard Brig	(Kuan Huai-tung)	"	"	4,000
			Total	32,000

The above forces, chiefly consisting of bandits, are newly organized units, except the 2nd Division under Chiao Wen-tien which joined this Group of Armies as stated in Page 3, this Situation Report. They are under the direct command of Fan Chung-hsiu, Commander-in-Chief.

12th Army Corps - Jen Ying-chi.

1st Division	(Chang Ching-shan)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	8,000
2nd "	(An Yung-fu)	"	"	8,000
			Total	16,000

15th Army Corps	- Liu Kwei-tang.	Fukow	(Honan)	15,000
25th Army Corps	- Wang Cheng	Yuchow	"	14,000

The 12th and 15th Army Corps, carried under "Miscellaneous Troops In Anti-Government Movement" in last Situation Report, have been incorporated in this Group of Armies, together with the 25th Army Corps which is newly formed.

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 77,000

CHINA (Military)

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Miscellaneous Troops In Anti-Government Movement

The following troops, formerly belonging to the Central Government, have joined in the anti-Government movement and are now under the direct command of Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st Division	(Sun Tien-ying	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	8,000
2nd "	(Chin Han-tung	) "	"	8,000
3rd "	(Liu Yueh-ting	) Mamutsi	(Honan)	8,000
4th "	(Chang Tien-ching	) Luyi	"	8,000
5th "	(Chin Huei-pin	) Kweiteh	"	8,000
6th "	(Sheng Feng-kang	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	8,000
			Total	48,000

This Route Army has been formed from the 14th Army Corps.

6th Route Army - Wan Hsuan-tsai, Field Commander.

1st Division	(Yen Yueh-chih	) Kihsien	(Honan)	12,000
5th "	(Chang Hsi-shan	) Kweiteh	"	8,000
38th "	(Shih Cheng-ch'ing	) "	"	8,000
65th "	(Wan Tien-tsung	) Liuho	"	10,000
2nd Ind.Brig.	(Li Wan-ho	) Kaifeng	"	5,000
			Total	43,000

Designation of the 3rd Division under Shih Cheng-ching has been changed to the 38th Division, also the 18th Independent Brigade under Li Wan-ho to the 2nd Independent Brigade.

11th Army Corps - Liu Mao-en.

66th Division	(Liu Mao-en	) Chenliu	(Honan)	10,000
11th Cav.Brig.	(	) Kihsien	"	6,000
			Total	16,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Chun-jung.

1st Division	(Pao Ping-ch'ing	) Kweiteh	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ying Chung-ming	) "	"	12,000
3rd "	(Shen T'i-ch'eng	) "	"	12,000
			Total	36,000

23rd Army Corps - Kao Kuei-tze.

This Army Corps which had defended Chucheng, Shantung, for some times is now reported to have been disarmed and disbanded by the Government, many of the troops joining Ma Hung-kwei, Commander of the 64th Mixed Division.

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju.

24th Division	(Hsu Li-Chung	) Luyi	(Honan)	6,000
1st "	(Kuo Fang-hsi	) "	"	6,000
2nd "	(Chin K'wei-ping	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	6,000
3rd "	(Ma Hsi-jen	) "	"	6,000
			Total	24,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops In Anti-Government Movement - 167,000

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Lunganhsien	(Kwangsi)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Yunnanfu	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-ling	) "	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

It is reported, but not confirmed, that three divisions of Yunnanese have combined with the Kwangtung Army in operations against Kwangsi and that the said divisions are advancing towards Poseh in western Kwangsi.

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang.

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang)		(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		"	3,000
			Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Fang-chow	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Trps	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Ind.Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

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Szechwan (Continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tsu-ying)		(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan)		"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-sheng)		"	3,000
			Total	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao)	Huangchow	(Hupeh)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu)	"	"	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting)	"	"	7,000
			Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i)	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun)	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Trps	(Lan Ying-tung)	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu)	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung)	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow)	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi)	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung)	Tungchwan	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng)	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung)	"	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Hai-chung)	"	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Nin-chang)	"	"	6,000
			Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechwan)	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 320,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow)	Shenyang	(Liaoning)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	10,000 *
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Ichow	(Liaoning)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei)	Hsingcheng	"	10,000
5th "	(Tung Ying-pin)	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	10,000 *
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Peitaiho	"	11,000 *
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	(Liaoning)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho)	Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
16th "	(Miao Chen-lin)	Hsinmin	(Liaoning)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Leting	(Hopei)	11,000 *
20th "	(Fu Chan-k'uei)	T'aonan	(Liaoning)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu)	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	10,000 *
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Pamiencheng	(Liaoning)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan)	Chinchow	"	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-chang)	Lwanchow	(Hopei)	10,000 *
1st Cav.Brig	(Kuo Hsi-peng)	Tungliao	(Liaoning)	6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Mientuho	(Heilungkiang)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chienan	(Hopei)	8,000 *
			Total	174,000

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua.

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Liaoning)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Peicheng	(Liaoning)	6,000
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000
		Total	48,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

6 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan.	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying (Liaoning).	800
Total	5,600

Total Liaoning Forces 227,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang.

7th	Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th	"	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th	"	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th	"	(Chang Tso-chow	) Kirin	)	8,000
13th	"	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Huachwan	)	15,000
19th	"	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st	"	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th	"	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th	" "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000
				Total	96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin.

1st	Brigade	(Shih Mei-fang	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd	"	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow	)	7,000
17th	"	(Wang Er-chan	) Tsitsihar	) Hei-	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) lung-	4,000
2nd	" "	(Su Ping-wen	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd	" "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th	" "	(Ma Chen-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000
				Total	37,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd	"	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th	"	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st	"	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd	" "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd	" "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th	" "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th	" "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500
				Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 409,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,445,200

CHINA (Military)

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2. Central China Area.

The present conflict witnesses a change in Chiang Kai-shek's military policy. Heretofore he was remarkable for rapidity of movement and his successes may be attributed to the fact that he struck before the enemy was ready. Coupled with this rapidity of manoeuvre was also his policy of buying over any generals who were for sale. The two methods dove-tailed and made a hard combination for his opponents to go up against.

Now this has all changed. He is no longer spending millions on doubtful generals, and he is playing a waiting game. This may be due to the fact that money is not so plentiful as it was a year or two years ago and that he has adopted the Fabian policy. Or again, it may be a sign of weakness.

It would seem, however, that the former was the case, since in the past in buying troops he gained nothing of lasting value but only jumped a temporary obstacle. These troops when bought sometimes went back to his opponents and he dissipated his real strength in having to assign trusted units the duty of watching them. Then the Fabian policy would seem to be the logical one under present conditions. The expense on the Northern side for the war is squarely upon Yen's soldiers and by refusing to buy over doubtful troops he has added them to Yen's responsibility. When it is remembered that Yen has been in control of the Tientsin-Peiping area for but a little over two years it will be seen that his war chest has a bottom. His representative here states that he is able to earmark about $4,000,000 a month for war purposes; that $2,000,000 goes to the Shansi contingent and the balance to their allies. If this is true, $2,000,000 per month is given some 506,000 men as follows: 262,000 comprising the 2nd Army Group; 60,000 under Shih Yu-san and 184,000 miscellaneous troops. While it is not known how much these "allies" are able to wring from the countryside, it is seen that the $2,000,000 per month is insufficient even though our figures of men on the one side and dollars on the other were out 25%. As Yen's representative said, Feng's men who for the past few years have had nothing, are content with very little; but this can not be said of the miscellaneous collection who are mercenaries or bandits pure and simple.

Again the Fabian policy may be successful in that contention is almost certain to spring up in the Northern camp. A group of men with more divergent ambitions and aims would be hard to collect under one flag, and Chiang is certainly playing for a split.

Since the last Situation Report was submitted there have been very few troop movements and but for desultory fighting along the whole front no conclusive action has been fought. General attack orders have been reported as being issued from both sides, and as reflected in my radio No. 227, it appeared as though general hostilities were going to commence on or about May 10th. However, except for a steady and gradual advance all along the line by government troops which have not as yet come in contact with either Shansi or Kuominchun troops in any numbers, but only with the miscellaneous collection under their control, there has been little movement. It will be noted on the accompanying map that during the past month the salient south of and along the Lunghai has been

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flattened considerably. The tip of this salient a month ago touched and crossed the Hwai River northwest of Luchow, but now has been moved back about 75 miles to the northwest. Liu Chen-nien has declared for the Government which places the Shantung peninsula in Chiang's hands. There has been a gradual withdrawal in Shantung towards the western border. A gradual advance has taken place up the Peking-Hankow Railway.

In these advances Chiang is of course getting farther from his most effective lines of communication, but he is drawing together his eastern and his western armies. The military narrow gauge railroad from Suchow to Hwaitien reported in radio No. 227 has aided in this union.

3. Modern Weapons.

While Chiang started the war with twelve American Corsair planes, from authentic sources it is learned that he has but nine left. One landed in Feng's territory; one was shot down (it is not known by what means); and one crashed. These planes are probably too fast for Chinese pilots at present. Twelve Douglas planes have been ordered. The arsenal in Nanking is manufacturing 130 lb. aerial bombs, which will soon make their appearance. So far Nanking's bombing, which has been directed largely at Chengchow, has been very ineffective for the reason that the planes flew at 5,000 or 6,000 ft. altitudes and dropped their bombs indiscriminately.

The twelve Whippet tanks which Chiang recently bought in Great Britain are at the front, but no accounts of their use have reached this office. The British Military Attache states that they are the last word in speed tanks and have been used in England at speeds in excess of thirty miles per hour in maneuvers. He adds, however, that they are useless in sand since no method of keeping sand out of the frictional elements of the track have as yet been devised. Large parts of the war area are very sandy.

4. South China.

While skirmishes still continue in Kwangsi, there is a general lull in activities pending the outcome of the Northern war.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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CHINA (Military)

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

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First Army - Han Fu-chu.

20th Division	(Sun Tung-hsuan	Tsiho	(Shantung)	20,000
21st "	(Li Yun-chieh	Yenchow	"	8,000
22nd "	(Ku Liang-min	Lokow	"	10,000
29th "	(Tsao Fu-lin	Changkiu	"	10,000
46th "	(Fan Hsi-chi	Tsining	"	14,000
55th "	(Juan Chao-chang	"	"	12,000
Bodyguard Brig	(Lei Tai-ping	Tsinan	"	6,000
			Total	80,000

The above troops are on the defensive southwest of Tsinan and along the Kiao-Tsi railway line against the Shansi forces. Liu Chen-nien, Commander of the 17th Army, is reported to have sent a detachment of his troops to Weihsien by order of the Government to assist Han Fu-chu in the defensive, though his allegiance is doubtful.

Second Army - Liu Chih.

1st Division	(Hsu Ting-yao	Kweiteh	(Honan)	12,000
2nd "	(Ku Chu-tung	"	"	15,000
2nd "	(Chang Chih-chung	Tangshan	(Kiangsu)	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Chi-cheng	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Li Yun-lung	Chihho	(Anhwei)	12,000
5th "	(Hsiung Shih-hui	Mamutsi	(Honan)	12,000
7th "	(Wang Chun	Kwoyang	(Anhwei)	12,000
11th "	(Ch'en Ch'eng	Pengpu	"	12,000
45th "	(Wei Li-huang	"	"	12,000
52nd "	(Yeh Kai-hsing	Yingchow	"	13,000
64th Mix.Div.	(Ma Hung-kuei	Taian	(Shantung)	19,000
66th Division	(Liu Mao-en	Kweiteh	(Honan)	10,000
2nd Cav. Div.	(Chang Li-sheng	Kwoyang	(Anhwei)	10,000
1st " Brig.	(An Chun-tsai	Suchow	"	6,000
" "	(Ma T'eng-chiao	Feicheng	(Shantung)	5,000
12th Ind. "	(Hsu Shen-yu	Kweiteh	(Honan)	4,000
13th " "	(Hsu Chia-yu	"	"	5,000
1st " Art.Regt	(Yao Yung-an	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	2,500
2nd " " "	(Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500
3rd " " "	(Li Chung-kwei	"	"	2,500
			Total	188,500

The 66th Division under Liu Mao-en, formerly the 11th Army Corps, has joined the Government forces, (see Page 9 this Situation Report).

The Cavalry Brigade under Ma T'eng-chiao, designation unknown, is an old unit attached to the 64th Mixed Division of Ma Hung-kuei, mention of which has been made in previous Situation Reports.

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Third Army - Ho Cheng-chun.

1st Division	(Feng Yi-pei	)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	10,000
3rd "	(Chien Ta-chun	)	Sienning	"	10,000
6th "	(Chao Kuan-tao	)	Chumatien	(Honan)	12,000
8th "	(Mao Ping-wen	)	Hankow	(Hupeh)	12,000
9th "	(Chiang Ting-wen	)	Chumatien	(Honan)	12,000
10th "	(Yang Sheng-chih	)	"	"	12,000
13th "	(Hsia Tou-ying	)	Sienning	(Hupeh)	12,000
17th "	(Yang Hu-cheng	)	Nanyang	(Honan)	12,000
22nd "	(Lo Lin	)	Puchi	(Hupeh)	6,000
44th "	(Hsiao Chih-chu	)	Chumatien	(Honan)	10,000
47th "	(Shangkuan Yun-hsiang	)	"	(")	28,000
48th "	(Hsu Yuan-chuan	)	"	(")	24,000
50th "	(Tan Tao-yuan	)	Sienning	(Hupeh)	12,000
51st "	(Fan Shih-sheng	)	Siangyang	(")	12,000
53rd "	(Li Yun-heng	)	Sienning	(")	8,000
54th "	(Hao Meng-lin	)	Chumatien	(Honan)	16,000
				Total	208,000

The 8th and 50th Divisions under Mao Ping-wen and Tan Tao-yuan respectively have recently arrived from Kwangtung.

Supplementary Army - Chen Tiao-yuan.

57th Division	(Yueh Sheng-hsuan	)	Suchow	(Kiangsu)	10,000
65th "	(Ch'en Yueh-han	)	"	"	10,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Shih Chung-cheng	)	Taian	(Shantung)	4,000
2nd " "	(Chen Hsiao-sze	)	"	"	4,000
2nd " "	(Liang Hung-en	)	"	"	5,000
				Total	33,000

Designation of the 26th Division under Ch'en Yueh-han has been changed to the 65th Division.

Central Government Troops

17th Army - Liu Chen-nien Chefoo & Weihsien (Shantung) . . . 35,000

1st Division	(Chen Ming-shu	)	Canton	(Kwangtung)	8,000
1st "	(Chang Chen	)	Chaochow	"	9,500
2nd "	(Lu Hsing-pang	)	Foochow	(Fukien)	8,000
9th "	(Yin Cheng-kang	)	Siaokan	(Hupeh)	4,000
9th "	(Chang Ju-kwang	)	Changchow	(Fukien)	8,000
10th "	(Li Yi-hsuan	)	Shihnan	(Hupeh)	4,000
10th "	(Hsien Pin	)	Yuping	(Kweichow)	10,000
				Carried Forward	51,500

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		Brought Forward			51,500
12th	Division	(Chin Han-ting	Kian	(Kiangsi)	12,000
12th	"	(Yuan Ying	Sinyang	(Honan)	12,000
12th	"	(Hu Jo-yu		(Szechwan)	6,000
13th	"	(Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	(Teng Ying	Changshu	(Kiangsi)	8,000
15th	"	(Ho Chien	Hanshow	(Hunan)	7,000
16th	"	(Lo Pan-ying	Yiyang	")	7,000
18th	"	(Chang Hwei-tsan	Tungku	(Kiangsi)	12,000
19th	"	(Liu Chien-hsu	Changteh	(Hunan)	10,000
56th	"	(Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	(Fukien)	11,000
58th	"	(Wen Hung-en	Waichow	(Kwangtung)	8,000
59th	"	(Yu Han-mou	Wuchow	(Kwangsi)	8,000
60th	"	(Tsai Ting-kai	Hengchow	(Hunan)	8,000
61st	"	(Chiang Kwang-nai	"	(")	8,000
62nd	"	(Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	(Kwangtung)	8,000
63rd	"	(Li Yang-ching	Yunghing	(Hunan)	8,000
	Ind. Brig.	(Chang Jui-kuei		(Kwangtung)	6,000
	" "	(Huang Jen-huan		"	6,000
1st	" "	(Wu Chung-ping	Ichang	(Hupeh)	6,000
1st	" "	(Kuo Feng-ming	Chwanchow	(Fukien)	2,500
2nd	" "	(Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	(Hunan)	4,000
2nd	" "	(Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	(Fukien)	2,500
3rd	" "	(Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	(Kiangsu)	5,000
5th	" "	(Pan Shan-chai	Hwohsien	(Anhwei)	2,000
7th	" "	(Li Ch'i	Wuhu	"	2,000
8th	" "	(Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	(Hupeh)	2,000
15th	" "	(Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000
1st	Brigade	(Lin Chung	Fuming	(Fukien)	4,000 Naval Const.
2nd	"	(Lin Shou-kuo	Mamoi	"	4,000 " "
Bodyguard	"	(Yu Chi-shih	Nanking	(Kiangsu)	5,000
Gendarmerie		(Wu Sze-yu	"	"	3,600
Training Regt.		(Hsia Shu-hsuan		(Fukien)	2,000
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)				Chekiang	10,000
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.)					
				Total	261,100

The 2nd Division under Lu Hsing-pang is at present at war with Liu Ho-ting and his 56th Division at Foochow.

Liu Chen-nien, Commander of the 17th Army, is reported to have sent a detachment of his troops to Weihsien from Chefoo to cope with the military situation along the Kiao-Tsi railway line. It is reported that he will assist Han Fu-chu against the invading Shansi forces which have taken Tsingcheng which is located north of the said railway. As noted above, his allegiance is doubtful.

Independent Brigades under Chang Jui-kuei and Huang Jen-huan, designation unknown, have been newly organized by Chen Chi-tang, who is reported to have left Canton on the 15th instant with these troops and 4 other regiments for Hunan to follow up the "Ironsides" and the Kwangsi forces, together with the 60th, 61st and 63rd Divisions which have already entered Hunan as shown above.

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 805,600

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	(Chang Fa-kwei	) Siangtan	(Hunan)	20,000
7th " "	(Yang Teng-hui	) Pingkiang	"	15,000
8th " "	(Chow Lan	) Siangtan	"	15,000
15th " "	(Huang Shao-hsiung	) Hengshan	"	15,000
15th Division	(Li Ming-jui	) Pingkiang	"	10,000
16th "	(Pai Chung-hsi	) Tungcheng	(Hupeh)	12,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Hsu Chi-ming	) Kweilin	(Kwangsi)	4,000
2nd " "	(Meng Chih	) Liuchow	"	4,000
			Total	95,000

The above First Group of Armies continues to march northward on Wu-Han. The advance guards are reported to have reached Tungcheng in southern Hupeh.

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	)Ma Hung-pin	) Jungyang	(Honan)	12,000
26th "	(Tien Chin-kai	) Neihsiang	"	12,000
27th "	(Chang Wei-hsi	) Linying	"	12,000
			Total	36,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-cheng, Field Commander.

9th Division	(Feng Chih-an	) Lanfeng	(Honan)	12,000
21st "	(Liang Kuan-ying	) Ninglin	"	12,000
22nd "	(Chen Hsing-ming	) "	"	12,000
29th "	(Cheng Hsi-hsien	) Kweiteh	"	12,000
30th "	(Chi Hung-chang	) "	"	12,000
2nd Cav."	(Cheng Ta-chang	) Siayi	"	8,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	(Li Cheng-tung	) Kweiteh	"	5,000
			Total	73,000

The 9th Division under Feng Chih-an is a newly organized unit.

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Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th Division	(P'ang Ping-hsun	) Luyi	(Honan)	12,000
23rd "	(Ma Chi	) Chengchow	"	12,000
3rd Mix.Brig.	(Chao Kung-wen	) "	"	5,000
6th " "	(Liu Yu-lin	) "	"	4,000
8th Cav. "	(Chao Hsi-pin	) "	"	4,000
			Total	37,000

Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st New Div.	(Kuo Chih-kang	) Yüchow	(Honan)	12,000
2nd " "	(Tung Yu-chen	) "	"	12,000
23rd Division	(Wei Feng-lou	) Shanchow	"	12,000
28th "	(Sung Che-yuan	) Loyang	"	12,000
			Total	48,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th Division	(Chang Tze-chung	) Yehsien	(Honan)	12,000
31st "	(Sun Lien-chung	) Laohokow	(Hupeh)	12,000
Training"	(Wang Kuan-hua	) Lushih	(Honan)	12,000
5th Mix.Brig.	(Pai Chien-shen	) "	"	5,000
1 st Cav. Div.	(Chang Te-sheng	) Kaocheng	"	8,000
			Total	49,000

Army Reserve - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

18th Division	(Ching Yueh-hsiu	) Sian	(Shensi)	12,000
1st Mix.Brig.	(Men Chih-chung	) Ninghsia	(Kansu)	5,000
2nd " "	(Chen Jui-en	) Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	(Ma Lin	) "	"	5,000
9th Cav. "	(Su Yu-sheng	) Chungwei	"	4,000
			Total	31,000

Total Second Group of Armies - 274,000

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

First Route Army - Sun Ch'u, Field Commander.

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u.

1st Division	(Meng Hsien-chi	) Liuho	(Honan)	5,000
2nd "	(Tao Cheng-wu	) "	"	5,000
3rd "	(Ma Yen-show	) "	"	5,000
			Carried Forward	15,000

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First Route Army (Continued)			Brought Forward	15,000
6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang.				
16th Division	(Wen Yu-ju	) Shihkiachuang	(Hopei)	5,000
17th "	(	) Yuanshih	"	5,000
18th "	(	) "	"	5,000
				15,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao.				
22nd Division	(Chow Cheng-chien	) Tunga	(Shantung)	5,000
23rd "	(Yu Hai-ho	) "	"	5,000
24th "	(	) "	"	5,000
			Total First Route Army	45,000
Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.				
3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo.				
7th Division	(Ho Shao-nan	) Chowtsun	(Shantung)	6,000
8th "	(T'ien Shu-mei	) "	"	5,000
9th "	(Wang T'ing-ying	) "	"	5,000
				16,000
4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta.				
10th Division	(Ch'en Chang-chieh	) Tsingcheng	(Shantung)	5,000
11th "	(Tuan Shu-hua	) "	"	5,000
12th "	(	) "	"	5,000
				15,000
5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying.				
13th Division	(An Hsi-ku	) Yencheng	(Shantung)	6,000
14th "	(To Chen	) Yucheng	"	6,000
15th "	(Chia Hsueh-ming	) Tsiho	"	5,000
				17,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi.				
28th Division	(Yeh Ch'i-chieh	) Santzetien	(Shantung)	5,000
29th "	(Pai Ju-ch'ing	) "	"	5,000
30th "	(Ch'en Ping-ch'ien	) "	"	5,000
28th Gend.Brig	(Yuan Tseng-ching	) Tientsin	(Hopei)	6,000
			Total Second Route Army	69,000

The Second Route Army is now on the offensive southwest of Tsinan and north along the Kiao-Tsi railway line against Han Fu-chu, Commander of the First Army of the Government.

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Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou.

4th Division	(Chow Sze-ch'eng	) Lanfeng	(Honan)	5,000
5th "	(Chang Wen-shun	) "	"	5,000
6th "	(	) "	"	5,000
				15,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an.

19th Division	(Lu Ying-lin	) Kaifeng	(Honan)	5,000
20th "	(Liu Tien-kwei	) Chengchow	"	5,000
21st "	(Kuo Tsung-fen	) "	"	6,000
				16,000

9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu.

25th Division	(Kao Hung-wen	) Pingyuan	(Shantung)	5,000
26th "	(Huang Kuang-hua	) "	"	5,000
27th "	(Chu Hsi-ch'un	) "	"	5,000

Total Third Route Army 46,000

Miscellaneous Troops Directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

Training Div.	(Li Ching-jung	) Peiping	(Hopei)	8,000
Bodyguard Brig	(Tu Chun-yi	) Taiyuan	(Shansi)	6,000
1st Cav. Div.	(Yang Chao-lin	) Tatung-Fengchen	"	6,000
2nd " "	(Kuo Feng-shan	) Kweiteh	(Honan)	3,000
3rd " "	(Chang Cheng-teh	) Dolonor	(Chahar)	4,000
4th " "	(Wang Ying	) Paotou	(Suiyuan)	4,000
5th " "	(Yuan Ping-fan	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	4,000
6th " "	(Sun Chang-sheng	) "	"	4,000
			Total	39,000

Pao An Tui or Peace Maintenance Forces.

1st Corps - Feng Yu-hsi.

1st Brigade	(Li Ting-hsiu	) Tangshan	(Hopei)	6,000
2nd "	(Wang Fu	) Peiping	"	6,000
3rd "	(Liu Chao-tang	) Paoting	"	6,000

2nd Corps - Yang Ch'ang-yuan.

4th Brigade	(Liu Kuang-tou	)	(Shansi)	6,000
5th "	(Li Chia-ling	)	"	6,000
6th "	(Liang Chien-tang	)	"	6,000

3rd Corps - Chow Shih-lien.

7th Brigade	(Liu Feng-chi	)	(Chahar)	6,000
8th "	(Tu K'ung	)	"	6,000
9th "	(Ma Liang	)	"	6,000

4th Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan.

10th Brigade	(Liu Cho-ch'ing	)	(Suiyuan)	6,000
11th "	(Fan Kang-lan	)	"	6,000
12th "	(Huang Shih-tung	)	"	6,000
			Total	72,000

Total Third Group of Armies - 271,000

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Fourth Group of Armies.
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps	- Sun Kuang-chien	Tingtao	(Shantung)	15,000
2nd Army Corps	- Mi Wen-ho	Tsaochow	"	15,000
3rd Army Corps	- Su Ming-ch'i	"	"	15,000
4th Army Corps	- Sheng K'e	Tunga	"	15,000
			Total	60,000

Eighth Group of Armies.
(Teng Pao-shan)

1st Division	(Sun Chen-hua)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	6,000
2nd "	(Chiao Wen-tien)	Linying	"	6,000
3rd "	(Wang Hsueh-chu)	Shangtsai	"	6,000
4th "	(Sun Chang-jung)	Huaiyang	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	(Chiang Tao-chen)	Hsuchow	"	4,000
Bodyguard "	(Kuan Huai-tung)	"	"	4,000
			Total	32,000

Teng Pao-shan has been jointly appointed by Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang as commander-in-chief of the Eighth Group of Armies in succession to Fan Chung-hsiu, who died on the 4th instant of a wound in Hsuchow, in central Honan. It will be recalled that Teng Pao-shan, the new commander-in-chief, was formerly commander of the third Kuominchun and is regarded as one of Feng's most capable commanders.

12th Army Corps - Jen Ying-chi.

1st Division	(Chang Ching-shan)	Hsuchow	(Honan)	8,000
2nd "	(An Yung-fu)	"	"	8,000
			Total	16,000

15th Army Corps	- Liu Kwei-tang.	Hsihua	(Honan)	15,000
25th Army Corps	- Wang Cheng.	Yuchow	(Honan)	14,000

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 77,000

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Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st Division	(Sun Tien-ying	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	8,000	
2nd "	(Chin Han-tung	) "	"	8,000	
3rd "	(Liu Yueh-ting	) Luyi	(Honan)	8,000	
4th "	(Chang Tien-ching	) "	"	8,000	
5th "	(Chin Kuei-pin	) Kweiteh	"	8,000	
6th "	(Sheng Feng-kang	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	8,000	
			Total		48,000

6th Route Army *- Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

1st Division	(Yen Yueh-chih	) Kihsien	(Honan)	12,000	
5th "	(Chang Hsi-shan	) Kweiteh	"	8,000	
38th "	(Shih Cheng-ch'ing	) "	"	8,000	
35th "	(Wang Tien-tsung	) Liuho	"	10,000	
2nd Ind.Brig.	(Li Wan-ho	) Kaifeng	"	5,000	
			Total		43,000

Designation of the 65th Division under Wan Tien-tsung has been changed to the 35th Division.

11th Army Corps - Liu Mao-en.

66th Division	(Liu Mao-en	)	
11th Cav.Brig.	(	)	

* Wan Hsuan-tsai, Field Commander of the 6th Route Army as carried in previous Situation Reports, was seized while inspecting the front line near Kweiteh and has been turned over to Chiang Kai-shek by Liu Mao-en, Commander of the above Army Corps. Liu, closely related to Liu Chen-hua, resented the latters elimination by Wan Hsuan-tsai in March, and took his revenge in this manner. The rise of Wan Hsuan-tsai was mentioned in the last paragraph of Situation Report 7685. In regard to the 11th Army Corps, a large number of its men have surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek while the remnant has since been disarmed by the Shansi army. The vacant post of field commander of the 6th Route Army is now filled by Shih Cheng-ch'ing, concurrently commander of the 38th Division, as shown above.

20th Army Corps - Liu Chun-jung.

1st Division	(Pao Ping-ch'ing	) Kweiteh	(Honan)	12,000	
2nd "	(Ying Chung-ming	) "	"	12,000	
3rd "	(Shen T'i-ch'eng	) "	"	12,000	
			Total		36,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju.

24th Division	(Hsu Li-chung	) Luyi	(Honan)	6,000	
1st "	(Kuo Fang-hsi	) "	"	6,000	
2nd "	(Chin Kw'ei-ping	) Pochow	(Anhwei)	6,000	
3rd "	(Ma Hsi-jen	) "	"	6,000	
			Total		24,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 151,000

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	(Lu Han	) Poseh	(Kwangsi)	5,200
99th "	(Chu Hsiao-tung	) "	"	5,200
100th "	(Chang Feng-ch'un	) Yunnanfu	(Yunnan)	4,000
101st "	(Chang Ch'ung	) Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	(T'ang Chi-ling	) Yunnanfu	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	(Yen Chia-ling	) "	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	(An Te-hua	) "	"	1,000
Railway Police	(Chang Wei-fan	) Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang.

25th Army	(Mao Kuang-hsiang)		(Kweichow)	12,000
Training Div.	(Liu Cheng-chun)		"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	(Tsao Yung-hsiang)		"	3,000
			Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	(Ho Chin-ao	) Chuhsien	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wu Hsing-kuang	) "	"	10,000
3rd "	(Yang Han-chung	) "	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	(Tang Shih-tsun	) Chungking	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Wang Tsan-hsu	) Lingshui	"	10,000
3rd "	(Wang Feng-chow	) Chungking	"	15,000
Border Def.Trps	(Fan Shao-tseng	) Lingshui	"	10,000
Training Div.	(Chang Tsai	) Chungking	"	5,000
Ind.Division	(Wang Chao-kuei	) "	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

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Szechwan (Continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	(Fan Tsu-ying)		(Kweichow)	4,000
2nd "	(Ma Kung-shan)		"	3,000
3rd "	(Chang Ting-cheng)		"	3,000
			Total	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	(Liao Hai-t'ao)	Huangchow	(Hupeh)	6,000
2nd "	(Liu Kung-tu)	"	"	7,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Lan-ting)	"	"	7,000
			Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	(Liu Wen-hui)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	12,000
2nd "	(Hsiang Chuan-i)	"	"	12,000
3rd "	(Hsia Show-hsun)	"	"	12,000
Border Def. Trps	(Lan Ying-tung)	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	(Huang Yin)	Chengtu	(Szechwan)	10,000
2nd "	(Li Chia-yu)	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	(Ch'en Shu-nung)	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	(Lo Tse-chow)	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	(Ma Te-chi)	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	(Wang Sze-chung)	Tungchwan	(Szechwan)	6,000
2nd " "	(Tung Heng)	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	(Tsen Hsien-tung)	"	"	6,000
4th " "	(Lo Hai-chung)	"	"	6,000
5th " "	(Wang Nin-chang)	"	"	6,000
			Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	(Szechwan)	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 320,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	(Wang Yi-chow)	Shenyang	(Liaoning)	11,000
2nd "	(Ting Hsi-ch'un)	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	10,000 *
3rd "	(Ho Chu-kuo)	Ichow	(Liaoning)	10,000
4th "	(Liu Yi-fei)	Hsingcheng	"	10,000
5th "	(Tung Ying-pin)	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	10,000 *
6th "	(Li Chen-t'ang)	Peitaiho	"	11,000 *
12th "	(Chang Ting-shu)	Chinchow	(Liaoning)	10,000
14th "	(Hsu Yung-ho)	Angangki	(Heilungkiang)	10,000
16th "	(Miao Chen-lin)	Hsinmin	(Liaoning)	10,000
19th "	(Sun Te-chuan)	Leting	(Hopei)	11,000 *
20th "	(Fu Chan-kuei)	T'aonan	(Liaoning)	11,000
23rd "	(Ma Ting-fu)	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	10,000 *
24th "	(Huang Shih-yueh)	Pamiencheng	(Liaoning)	10,000
25th "	(Yao Tung-fan)	Chinchow	"	10,000
27th "	(Liu Nai-chang)	Lwanchow	(Hopei)	10,000 *
1st Cav.Brig	(Kuo Hsi-peng)	Tungliao	(Liaoning)	6,000
3rd " "	(Chang Shu-seng)	Mientuho	(Heilungkiang)	6,000
1st " Div.	(Cheng Tse-sheng)	Chienan	(Hopei)	8,000 *
		Total		174,000

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua.

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	6,000
2nd " "	Chinchow	(Liaoning)	6,000
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	(Hopei)	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	(Jehol)	6,000
5th " "	Peicheng	(Liaoning)	6,000
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peicheng	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000
	Total		48,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling.

6 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan.	4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying (Liaoning).	800
Total	5,600

Total Liaoning Forces 227,600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang.

7th	Brigade	(	) Fuchin	)	8,000
8th	"	(Li Kuei-lin	) Muling	)	7,000
9th	"	(Li Chen-to	) Lingkiang	)	8,000
10th	"	(Chang Tso-chow	) Kirin	)	8,000
13th	"	(Chi Hui	) Hulin	) Kirin	7,000
15th	"	(Chang Tso-hsiang	) Huachwan	)	15,000
19th	"	(Ting Ch'ao	) Suifen	)	7,000
21st	"	(Chang Yao-cheng	) Lingkiang	)	10,000
26th	"	(Ting Hsien-chin	) Suifen	)	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	(Li Cheng-shan	) "	)	10,000
18th	" "	(Huang Ch'in	) "	)	8,000

Total 96,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin.

1st	Brigade	(Shih Mei-fang	) Pokotu	)	7,000
2nd	"	(Wang Nan-p'ing	) Payenchow	)	7,000
17th	"	(Wang Er-chan	) Tsitsihar	) Hei-	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Chang Wei-chan	) Pokotu	) lung-	4,000
2nd	" "	(Su Ping-wen	) "	) kiang	4,000
3rd	" "	(Pa Ying-o	) Heiho	)	4,000
12th	" "	(Ma Chen-shan	) Hulan	)	4,000

Total 37,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin.

7th	Brigade	(Chang Sheng-yun	) Jehol	)	6,000
22nd	"	(Fu Ch'un	) Lwanping	)	6,000
38th	"	(Tung Fu-ting	) Chaoyang	)	7,000
51st	"	(Liu Hsiang-chin	) Fengning	)	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	(Liu Shang-sheng	) Linhsi	) Jehol	4,500
2nd	" "	(Chia Kuo-cheng	) Pingchuan	)	4,500
3rd	" "	(Chao Kuo-tseng	) Chefeng	)	4,500
17th	" "	(Tsen Hsin-wu	) Jehol	)	4,500
19th	" "	(Shih Wen-hua	) Lwanping	)	4,500

Total 48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 409,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,463,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Narrative of Events.

Central China. Since the last Situation Report was submitted the military-political situation has undergone marked changes. At that time the governmental forces were making steady advances along both the Lunghai and the Peiping-Hankow railroads. No serious opposition was being made by the miscellaneous troops under Wan Hsuan-tsai and Sun Tien-ying. The South had apparently reached an agreement which would not affect the Northern situation.

Northern opinion is that in this advance Chiang went against the wishes of his German advisers, who desired that he should occupy his strongly prepared position at Suchow and south along the Tsin-Pu railway and let the rebels expend their energy in useless attack. Be this as it may, Chiang's steady advance, which was not in the nature of an attack, reached and captured Lanfeng on May 22, and on the Peiping-Hankow at that time he was threatening Hsuchang. Along the Lunghai, his advance had not been consolidated and Feng, seeing his over-extended center, counter attacked with his best troops on May 23. Broadly speaking, Feng made a wide turning movement from Chengchow to Hsuchow on the Ping-Han, thereby creating the impression that he was moving in force against the army from Hankow, and then swung north-east and attacked Chiang's southern flank near Lanfeng and for some distance east. At the same time, Shih Yu-san attacked Chiang's northern flank from the region of Tsaohsien in south-western Shantung, and Sun Ch'u with his Shansi troops strengthened by the 29th and 1st Kuominchun Divisions, counter attacked along the Lunghai. Chiang's divisions, of which the 2nd Model Division, and the 2nd, 12th and 113th Brigades, formed the advance elements, beat a hasty retreat, in which the losses were estimated as from 4,000 to 50,000 in killed and wounded. There was an accompanying withdrawal along the Peiping-Hankow railroad and the line at that time ran from Tsining (Shantung) through Kweiteh (Honan) to Yungcheng (Honan).

On May 28, a part of Fu Tso-yi's 10th Division crossed the Yellow River at a point about half way between Tsinan and the sea with the intention of creating a diversion and finally capturing the Shantung capital. As a diversion this movement failed, since as was reported earlier, Chiang is apparently willing to give up Shantung if necessary, and on this occasion did not send any troops to reinforce Han Fu-chu or Ch'en Tiao-yuan. The situation in Shantung has changed but slightly. There has been a gradual building up of Shansi forces across the river, and Shih Yu-san's contingent has occupied Tunga. Skirmishes have been fought east of Tsinan at Tsingcheng and west at Pingying. Liu Chen-nien has moved a part of his command to Weihsien where he presents an enigma to the observer. If he fights at all, which is doubtful, he occupies a position which makes a Shansi advance unfeasible if he be a government man, and makes a government withdrawal necessary if he is a Yen man. He is thought, however, to be so much interested in his holdings around Chefoo that only the certainty of not picking the wrong side will bring him off the fence.

As these items are being recorded the Japanese Military Attache states that on June 16, the Northerners have decided to attack Tsinanfu. This is due to the fact that Han Fu-chu has not, as expected, come over to the North. Under existing circumstances Tsinan will probably fall shortly.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Due to anti-government successes in the south, which will be discussed later, Chiang has shortened his lines so that, exclusive of Shantung, his front runs as follows: Tangshan-Imentsi-Kioshan (on the Peiping-Hankow), all inclusive.

In the South. Canton, it is reported, brought hostilities to a close in Kwangsi by a payment to the rebellious forces of $3,000,000. If this is so it is probably the poorest outlay the government has ever made of so large a sum, for on about May 15, Chang Fa-kwei and his "Ironsides" together with the 15th and 16th Kwangsi Divisions and the 7th, 8th and 15th Army Corps, totaling 95,000, started overland for Changsha, which they entered on June 5, and later captured Yochow on June 10. Ho Chien, suspected of rebellious leanings, has offered little or no resistance to their movements.

The government dispatched the 8th and 50th Divisions and the 8th Army Corps by sea and the Yangtse from Canton to Hankow, and Chen Chi-tang with the 60th, 61st and 63rd Cantonese Divisions are following in the invaders rear, having reached Hengchow, Hunan. So in place of a stalemate in Kwangsi, this payment has projected a very embarrassing factor into the Northern situation. Ho Ching-yin has been forced to withdraw the 6th, 44th, 48th and 54th Divisions from the Ping-Han to meet the threat, and with Chang's Red tendency it is not possible to estimate the help he may be given from the communistic armies of Kiangsi. From a strictly military standpoint, and with the dangerous supposition that all government troops are loyal, Chang Fa-kwei and his Kwangsi allies occupy a very precarious position. Ho Chien with the 15th, 16th and 19th Divisions, is positioned near Changteh, the Cantonese have occupied Hengchow in his rear as stated, and Hsia Tou-yin bars his way to the north at Sienning. The troops under Hsia Tou-yin and Ho Chien were formerly in the old 4th Army, under Kwangsi leadership, and their present allegiance is doubtful. There are other than military factors in the situation, however, and Chang Fa-kwei would not have advanced into such a dangerous position without some safeguards.

General. The capture of 12 airplanes by Kuominchun cavalry, reported in No. 7739, has been confirmed by the Japanese Military Attache, who states that two Whippet tanks have also fallen to the North.

While the alleged Northern goal is simply Chiang's elimination from Chinese politics, the government must, to be successful, quell the rebellion. Obviously the Northern goal is more readily attainable and there will be aid from Chiang's enemies in the government camp. These may be expected to encourage the Chairman of the National Government to retire, since by so doing they would not be injured themselves.

The future with a triumphant North would seem dark indeed. The division of spoils would cause other outbreaks, and China's armies would continue to swell. It must be reported, however, that the future begins to look dark for the government.

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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No. 7746 1st Ind. NEM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China - June 16, 1930 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Tsinanfu, China June 23, 1930.

Encl 3
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 1930
2657-J-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITS, COMMANDERS AND LOCATIONS

討逆軍第三路指揮 Han-fu-ch'u (韓復榘)

Chiefs of staff :Chao-kuang-pei (趙廣培)
Chang-yueh (張鉞)

LOCATION

濟南 } — 20th Division --Sun-t'ung-hsuan (孫同萱)
長清 } 15,000 men, fairly well equipped. This is Han's best division.

藥口 — 22nd Division --Ku-liang-min (谷良民)
Chief of staff--T'ao-yun-chieh (陶雲階)
8,000 poorly equipped men. Not reliable.
藥口 1 brigade
長清 1 "
濟南 1 "

周村 — 29th Division --Ts'ao-fu-lin (曹福林)
7,500 men. Poorly equipped. Unreliable.

任城山口 } — 85th Brigade--Li-han- chang (李漢章)
濟南 } 1 brigade

濟南 } 2nd Squadron National Aviation
C.O.---Chang-t'ing-meng (張廷孟)
Vice-Comdr.--Shih-pang-fan (石邦藩)
2 Junkers all-metal monoplanes
2 DH Moths

Ma-hung-k'uei at Fei-ch'ang-Tai-an
Mao-pin-wen ordered to proceed to Tai-an

Kenneth Wild
Washington D.C. U.S.A.


Shen K'ê hsüeh-chuan-chang-hui-yü li-fu-ying feng-peng-chu chan-liü
said to be:
胡官屯
趙官鎮
牛角店
東阿
Tungchsia
平陰
Pin yin hsien
Artillery active A.M. 23rd
濟河
Pingyuan
Chieh shan
Lo Kou
1 brig 20th Div
Tsinanfu
1 brig 29th Div
this point is likely to be Han's last stand
29th Div at 周村
Han fu ch'u - 1 brigade Hqrs 22nd Div.
Han fu ch'u - 1 brigade (reserve) 2 Div.
Han fu ch'u - 1 brigade 22nd Div
85th brig. of 29th Div. here on 20th
" " "
local papers say by plain clothesmen, red spears
RR bridge blown up by raid not repaired
徐家山口
1 brig 20th
囤山
張夏站
萬德站
長清
A.M. June 23
P.M. June 22
3 DIVISIONS June 22
5 DIVISIONS June 23
肥城
Tai an
Ma hung k'uei
1 DIVISION 1 brigade independent cavalry
Total 27,000
mao-pin-wen (毛炳文) model division ordered to join forces with Ma
Shansi
- Han fu ch'u
- Ma hung k'uei
June 22, 1930
June 23
report of 22nd about Ma-hung-k'uei's troops reaching scene of action at Kuei-te-chen inaccurate - he got inaction just west of Fei-cheng.
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MILITARY DIV.
AUG
WAR DEPARTMENT
M.I. 2 file 2765
1930

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 1
2657-9-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

June 30, 1930.

Subject: Report on observation of hostilities in Tsinanfu, Shantung Province, China.

To: The Military Attache.

Noted L. A. V.

1. In compliance with the Military Attache's code radio received at 4:00 P.M. June 20, 1930 while on board the U.S.S. Jason (aircraft carrier, Asiatic Fleet) then ten miles off Tsingtao and proceeding to that port, I made arrangements for immediate departure to Tsinan.

2. On landing I called again on Mr. Dorsey, the American Consul at Tsingtao and acquainted myself with the events which had taken place during my three days at sea. Left by train at 9:30 P.M. and arrived at Tsinan about 7:00 A.M. following day (June 21).

3. As soon as the Consulate at Tsinan opened I called and accepted Mr. Stanton's invitation to stay with him. He made immediate arrangements for me to interview General Han-fu-ch'u, the commander of the Nationalist army then occupying Tsinan.

4. General Han was very cordial and seemed glad to talk with foreigners.

He is forty-three years old, rather tall for a Chinese, seems active and intelligent. Rather above average in every respect. He has a reputation for taciturnity and maintains a calm aspect in the face of unfavorable events. The result of this interview bears out the basis for his reputation.

Han was quite willing to talk on the philosophy of war and the part which fate plays in the lives of human beings. I commented on his high rank for his age, to which he drew a contrast between the upset conditions in China and the peace in America. He recognized that in the time of revolution youth is often called to higher posts than in peace time. He said he didn't feel exalted by his rank and that he, like any sensible person, wanted only the reasonable comforts of life; a place to live, clothes and food; that when he was a boy he certianly had no idea of being a high military officer. He said that the constant war in China was

was very foolish and only served to drag the country down and down; that he disliked the idea of fighting his own people and envied the United States which was free from war.

How much of this conversation was hypocrisy I cannot estimate but it gives rather a detailed description of what one Chinese warlord says when conversing with foreigners at an official interview.

As regards the military situation Han said that unless the Shansi troops were greatly reinforced he fait that he could hold the south bank of the Yellow River, the Shansi troops being too weak at present to attcak simultaneously on both the right and left flanks. In addition Ma-hung-k'uei had begun to arrive in Tai-an and would work westward to shield Han's left. Han stated that Shansi had three divisions across the river near Tung-ah. The Shansi casualities were, up to date on this front, between 2000 and 3000 killed and 200-300 prisoners. As the latter figures do not seem excessive I assumed the whole estimate to be reasonably correct.

In reply to my questionabout Chang-hsueh-liang's attitude Han said that Chang was still "K'an p'ien i" or looking to see which way the wind was blowing and he felt that Manchuria would not come into the fight at all.

Han stated that Liu-chen-nien (Chefoo) was supporting the National Government and expressed no fear of him.

I was granted permission to visit any front I desired and also the airdrome. A staff officer would be sent the following morning to accompany me.

5. In connection with the above statements I had heard gossip to the effect thst the Manchurian Admiral Shen who is very loyal tonChang-hsueh-liang, had informed Liu-chen-nien that unless he maintained his allegaince in accordance with that of Chang-hsueh-liang he would move his fleet of five fairly good vessels from Tsingtao to Chefoo and bombarddit.

It seems quite possible also that the common belief in Tsingtao that the Japanese have informed both sides that they will permit no fighting within twenty miles of Tsingtao is correct.

6. My activities for the next few days are better presented by attaching hereto the diary which was written at the time. They are placed in this report in chronological order, at the end of which appears paragraph 7 of this report.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Tsinanfu, China
June 22, 1930.

Daily report.

JUNE 22. Sunday. Brig. Gen. Chao-kuang-pei, one of Han fu-ch'u's chiefs of staff arrived at the Consulate this morning at 8;30 and we proceeded to the airdrome by motor car.

The airdrome itslef is quite large and smooth. There is one large brick hangar. I was fortunate in arriving just at the termination of a reconnaissance flight which consisted of two DH Moths and one Junkers, all-metal monoplane. All three pilots made extraordinarily bad landings. There was one additonal Junkers under going repairs on the line.

I listened in on the pilots' reports and went over their war map, which was marked with red and blue pencil giving the friendly and enemy dispositions. A sketch attched gives the locations as well as I can remember them. The map used by the aviation is a large scale Chinese military map, I have not seen one like it before and there is nothing available here, nor I believe in our office in Peking, which is as large saale. Unfortunately I was unable to obtain a copy but will try again.

The pilots, all of whom were sent up by Chiang-kai-shek stated that the enemy anti-aircraft guns are unable to shoot higher than 2000meters and were very inaccurate. The airplanes fly at about 2000 meters but say they have no fear of the anti-aircraft artillery.

Considerable activity is reported by the aviation as developing at Kuei-te-chen (歸德鎮) in which sector the Shansi troops now have been reinforced to more than the 9 regiments reported yesterday * including some cavalry. All of this force crossed on pontoon bridges made of junks attached to cables strung across the river.

Han-fu-ch'u has the 20th Div. in part, and all of the brigade of the 22nd Div. at Ch'ang Ch'ing or vicinity with which he is holding back the Shansi forces. Ma-hung-K'uei has been able to move up some of his cavalry from Fei-ch'eng and is now attacking the enemy southwest of Kuei-te-chen.

* These people all claim that a Shansi division consists of only 3 regiments and seem to refer to their forces as "so many regiments" rather than by divisions.

White
June 22 Comtd.

Ma-hung-k'uei, I was told had not reached the scene of the fighting at 6:00 this morning, at the time of the first airplane reconnaissane,but at 8:30, time of the second reconnaissance, he was beginning to get intonaction.

The Han troops seem very calm, almost indifferent, as evidenced,among other things to be reported later, by the fact that upon the completion of their mission all of the aviators climbed into a motor truck and preceded my car into Tsinan, half an hour away. They went in to report to Han,and I was told would not return until 5:00 tonight.

The commander of the local aviation unit learned to fly in Russia, but speaks very little Russian, another learned flying at Cranwell with the British and speaks equally little English. The other pilots studied either in Japan or China.

The "arsenal" located adjacent to the airdrome, Gen. Chao told me, is still controlled by Ch'en-t'iao-yuan's men and on that account it was impossible for him to take me thru. From outward appeqrances there was no activity as there was no smoke from any of the chimneys in the compound.

Due to the "severe fighting" I was told that I could not go to Ch'ang-ch'ing today but must wait for more settled conditions. I did, however, go to Lo-k'ou which is some six miles over a very rough road from Tsinan and is the southern bridge head of the Tsin-p'u RR. This is strategically the most important point on the entire front but is very quiet for the moment. For some days now no attempt has been made to cross at this point, the reasons for which I have hazarded guesses later on in this report. An attack at this point is apparently not feared by these people and approaching it presented a most unwarlike appearance. All along the road from Tsinan coolies were jamming the road with their wheelbarrows, people were working in the fields and one would not have supposed that a bare two miles away trenches on both sides of the river extended as far as the eye could see.

The village of Lo-k'ou seemed quite normal, extremely hot in the blazing sun and the only unusual scene was an occasional civilian or soldier with a "Red Swastika"-armband.

We checked in at Division Headquarters, Major Gen. Ku-liang-min in command (see attached sheet for names etc.). Here Chao and I were invited to stay for lunch whidh I was quite willing to do, foreseeing a good chance to chat with Gen. Ku and some of his staff. Except that all of the food had garlic in it the lunch was quite a success. Very little of what I got out of the conversation is of great importance to us but it may fit in with information from other sources so I will write it down.

Gen. Ku said that he had only six field guns, these being located about a mile south of Lo-k'ou but within striking range

White
June 22 Contd.

of the north bank of the river. He was particularly strong in trench mortars, a fact with which I later checked. He felt that the Shansi forces in this sector were mostly bandits and that Fu-tso-i was now a secondary commander and therefore there was no great fear of a vigorous attack unless troops were shifted to this front. He said that Yen-hsi-shan had recently been to Ping-yuan for a conference with the commanders on this front.

When I brought up the question of Chang-hsueh-liang, Chao gave Ku a knowing look and said in an undertone that a telegram had come yesterday which was very "k'e ch'i" i.e. friendly, and that things were looking better. I gathered that the wire was either from Chang-hsueh-liang himself or from Han's representative in Mukden. Chao said it was the first wire in some weeks, hence I presume that formerly frequent communication was maintained. Another evidence of Chang's attitude was cited in the appointment of one of his men as mayor of Tsingtao.

On the 18th a serious attempt was made to cross at the bridge but since that time all action has been on the flanks.

After lunch I accompanied the vice-commander of the div. the chief of staff, a young colonel and about a dozen bodyguards to the trenches. My snappy new cards, which are a couple of sizes larger than my old ones, seem to get service. Stanton was much surprised that Han sent Chao with me as he is one of the big guns in Han's staff. A Major General, two brigadiers , a colonel and a platoon of guards is fairly good for even an American 1st Lieutenant. Naturally there is nothing farther from being printed on my cards than my rank !

The dike along the river makes an excellent location for trenches and it has been well taken advantage of. The soft earth makes digging easy and quite elaborate single line connected trenches extend all along the water front; some mile and a half of which I traversed. Dugouts are provided with effective observation posts and loopholes for firing. The trenches were very lightly manned, I saw not more than 200 men, awake and asleep. In the village there are many billets and I was told that at night the full force turns out for duty .

Our passage over one or two spots which were exposed to the enemy soon brought results and a few pots shots were taken at us from across the river. I have no doubt that after seeing our party the enemy have a rumour out that a genral offensive is about to start. None of the bullets seemed to hit anywhere near us, though I heard some of them sing over my head, I having ducked in the meantime. "Our" troops did not return the fire, in fact, I heard only two shots fired from our side of the river while the Shansi people fired a total of 20-30 shots.

White
June 22 Contd

There is very little evidence of shelling in the village. A few roofs caved in and one or two battered walls, all from Shansi trench mortar shells. There are hundreds of junks tied up on the Lo-k'ou side and many of these have been burnt. The Han troops refuse to let them move for fear they will fall into the enemy's hands.

I saw three sizes of trench mortars, all of them larger than our Stokes. The largest caliber must have been 7.5 inches, the barrel being half an inch thick. Length over all about 5½ feet. The rifles I saw were in very poor shape. Many of the men, especially sentries, carry an air-cooled automatic rifle. This gun I had never seen before coming to Tsiaaa. Han told me they were made at Taku amongnother places. The gun is very short, perhaps 26inches over all; the barrel is encased in an air-cooling cylinder which is pierced with holes about ¼ inch in diameter. At the base of the barrel a projection for receiving the mouth of the clip juts out about an inch on the left side. It is bolt action and is loaded by inserting a clip and drawing the bolt back which then slides forward by spring action. The stock and hand grip is made of one piece of thick heavy wood. Total weight about 11 pounds. Caliber about 25. The clip is 18 inches long, 1½ in. wide and ½ inch thick. It holds 30 cartridges. Each soldier carries a leather clip pouch both front and back, in all ~~10~~ clips. 8

I saw two Browning water-cooled machine guns. These were trained thru a sandbag blockade at the south end of the bridge. The bridge, as far as Incould see (the bridge is curved) was covered with wire entanglements which are swept by the guns. The machine guns seemed to be in excellent shape.

I asked particularly and in several quarters as to how long it would take to repair the bridge. Answers ranged from four weeks to ten months. The steel girders have not been damaged, bolts only being removed. Planks and some of the track have been torn up, hence I feel that the estimate of four weeks is nearer the truth.

On arrival at the bridge I was most amused to find one of the lookouts sitting on a stool, peering throughba loophole and holding an oil paper umbrella over his head. There were more troops at this point than at any other. The RR block house is used as a "pill box" and quarters for the troops occupying the sandbag defences. Underneath the bridge on the flats extending to the water the trench line runs to the west side of the RR then curves with the river on eastward, as far as Ch'ing-ch'eng, so I was told. The latter is obviously untrue.

To the west trenches are supposed to extend more or less intermittently as far as Ch'ang-ch'ing, which seems fairly reasonable.

At night several armoured trains come up nearly to the bridge head to provide artillery cover in case of an attack.

From my observations it would seem an easy matter to take the bridge provided the attacking force had artillery. The Shansi people must know that this side is short of field guns and it is probable that their trench mortars are as numerous as those of this side.

Without artillery I believe it would be a difficult matter to get across as the girders of the bridge provide perfect protection for the machine gun nest. These two guns can hold any force attempting to cross as long as they are in action.

My speculations on the reasons for Shansi not taking the bridge lead me to several possible conclusions:

1. Shansi hasn't sufficient artillery or other troops (This seems improbable as we have information from Tientsin that there are 40,000 Shansi troops on this front.)

2. They fear wrecking the bridge by artillery (which would be inevitable in putting the machine guns out of action) thus cutting off their best line of communication as long as there is a possibility of getting to Tsinan by a flank attack.

3. They are awaiting developments on other fronts, hoping to squeeze Han out of Tsinan by side and rear pressure.

4. Both sides have in mind the Tsinan Incident of two years ago and hesitate to become embroiled in a situation that might precipitate a similar affair, this with a particular eye on the Japanese.

A telegram in reply to mine of 2:30 PM 21st has arrived. By "confirm this" I meant more especially to confirm the fact that our codes were coordinated . However this reply indicates that my message was intelligible and I am glad to have the additonal assurance that I am to go wherever I think advisable. While on the subject I would like to call attention to the fact that this code provides no way of transcribing Chinese names into code, if in the future I have occasion to mention names of persons or places which might be censored by the Chinese I will use the Consulate code.

It is now 10:30 PM and artillery firing is heard quite distinctly from the direction of Ch'ang-ch'ing. I hope that tomorrow will bring forth some definite turn of events, though things seem to be decidedly at a standstill. Maphung-k'uei's timely arrival seems to have forestalled the present attack at Kuei-te-chen.

Thomas D. White
1st Lieut. Air Corps, USA

7.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Tsinanfu China
June 23, 1930.

White
Daily report June 23, 1930.

Called this morning on the Japanese Consul and went over the situation with him. He had no startling informa tion except to confirm and add locations of troops on the war map, sketch of which is attached herewith.

On my return from the Japanese Consulate I called on the C.O of the aviation troops whose headquarters happened to be on the road over which I was traveling. I was received very courteously and immediately the C.O. said with rather a long face "Wo men t'ui la ". This was his first greeting as though he had been expecting me to call for information. He then gave me his map to look at and explained that the Han troops had fallen back since last night from Kuei-te-chen to Chang-ching. The troop lines were already drawn showing the amount of ground lost. He said that Ma-hung-k'uei was not moving as he should be and that the Shansi forces had been strongfly reinforced. I said that the loss of Kuei-te-chen meant little and that there would have to be several days elapse before any definite decision would be reached. He said decidedly not , that the game seemd to be up right now.

I then hastened back to the Consulate with my information brimming with the scoop which I thought I might have. I wsnted Stanton's opinion. He sent his interprter to try to confirm the news. This man returned frommthe headquarters of the local martial law troops and stated that he could get no confirmation of any serious reverse for Han. He said he did notice however that on his last visit to these Hqrs. there were three rugs on the floor and today there was only one. Whether this indicated that the personnel was packing up or not he was unable to say but at least thought it significant enough to mention. Stanton thencalled the Japanese Consul and requested that he get his feelers out. The Japanese Consul said that the British Consul had an appointment with Han-fu-ch'u for this AM. Upon checking in with the British Consul on his return the information I had received from the aviation seemed confirmed. Han said that the Shansi forces were pressing him hard at Ch(ang-ch'ing and that in accordance with his promise to the Consular Body, if Ch'ng-ch'ing fell he would withdraw from Tsinan to the east. He said that Ma would retire to the south. Just why Han would go east we do not know yet.

The Consular Body is meeting now and Consul Stanton has advised American residents who so desire to leave Tsinan at once.

Preparation ofreports on troop commanders and locations is now rather useless but I am sending herewith what I have completed.The locations are undoubtedly constantly changing and may be entirely out of date any moment.

It would appear that Tsinan may shortly be cut off from the world. I am remaining here as long as the Consul does.

7
8

White
Daily report, June 23 Contd.

Stanton has just returned from the Consular meeting, at which Han stated that he is definitely leaving and one part of his troops have already withdrawn from Ch'ang-ch'ing. Han states that he is going east and it is obvious that something has gone askew with Ma-hung-k'uei.

I have waited until Stanton's telegram was ready before sending mine. They both go out now in a few minutes. This I am also sending as I fear that mails may soon be cut off. How to get out of here is the question but that can be decided when the time comes. It is fearfully hot and a prolonged deadlock with all the railroads cut is not a pleasing out look, but that can be decided when the time comes.

Han has agreed to leave the local police with their rifles and the Consuls are seeing the leading merchants tomorrow in order to arrange for as peaceful a turn over as possible.

Han says it may be two or three days yet before he evacuates Tsinan completely.

Some of this information may be of interest to the Legation as Stanton won't be able to get a letter off tonight. He is working on his code and I was able to get mine finished while he was attending the meeting which has just dispersed.

Stanton, the Consul is a decidedly efficient young man, and very helpful.

Thomas D. White
1st Lieut. A . C.

2 inclosures -
1 Map
1 List of troops

American Consulate
Tsinanfu, China
June 24, 1930.

White
Daily report . June 24, 1930.

Proceeded to Chiao-chi RR Station at 9:00 am and remained until 12:30 observing the loading of Han-fu-ch'u's troop trains. The tracks were entirely stopped by cars and locomotives, later information revealing that eighteen trains left Tsinan. The regular passenger train due to depart at 12:00 noon actually left at 12:30.

Han's personal train consisting of two thrid class cars, one second class, one first class and four box cars was spotted before 9:00 A.M. The third class cars were chalked marked for various staff units such as "ADCs, Gen. Staff, Supply Officers etc." The Second class car seemed to have been reserved for the families of various high ranking offiwers, while the single first class car was undoubtedly for Han himself.

During the three and a half hours that I wandered about on the platform three goods trains with a scattering of soldiers departed. Very few troops seemed to be departing by train. Equipment such as tables, chairs, clothing, flour, umbrellas, tarpaulins, tents, and ammunition comprised the main cargo of all of these trains. I saw no field guns or trench mortars on any of the trains. One long train pulled out but the cars were entirely covered by canvas. About 10:00 A.M. a unit consisting of about 600 men arrived, they being armed with the short air-cooled automatic rifles which I have reported previously and pistols, as well as the usual scattering of broad bladed knifes. Their collar insignia consisted of the Chinese character t'e (special) and the English letter "B". I assumed that it stood for Special Brigade and later corroborated my feeling that this was the so-called Pistol Brigade which is apparently Han's body guard. This unit was commanded by a brigadier, whose name I was unable to get. I did not wish to make myself conspicuous by asking too many questions so limited myself only to those which I could not infer the answers to by close observation. This unit fell out and remained in a sort of bivouac from its arrival until after 8:00 P.M. the time of my last visit to the RR Station. As martial law was being strictly enforced I decided after my trip at 8:00 not to attempt another one.

The brigadier in command of artillery(apparently, his collar insignia showed 1-A) a very young and fine appearing young officer departed with his staff, a large one, on the regular passenger train. His staff and body guard were the only belligerent troops I saw, These people marched with their commander with their pistols drawn, apparently for the purpose of making face.

I took advantage of my short acquaintanceship with General Chao-kuang-pei by writing him a note on one of my cards and handing it to a Colonel I saw sitting in the car marked Gen. Staff. In this manner I got into conversation with the officer, who was an aide, was invited into the car where I sat and talked until I was able to find out the destination of the staff car. This was to be Ts'ao-yuan-chuang, which information together with later news that the front lines would be at Lung-shan was wired in the consular code last night. Confirmation copy herewith.

News from arriving travelers shows that the main reserve of Han is at Ch'ing-show, it being a supply center while his headquarters is undoubtedly at Ts'ao-yuan.

The rest of the information picked up yesterday consists chiefly of minor details regarding the troops.

I was impressed with the good feeling and comradeship existing among Han's soldiers. I watched with considerable interest a young wounded soldier who was lying on a pile of dirty cotton

blankets. His buddies bought him apricots and cigarettes out of their own meagre supply of coppers. The troops seemed to be quite fair in their dealings with the petty merchants who were peddling food and tea on the platform. I saw more soldiers and officers holding hands after the Chinese fashion of showing particular mutual regard than ever before. There were no evidences of bad humor and apparently no disputes, except minor ones with some of the rickshaw coolies who were streaming into the area with all descriptions of baggage. I was asked only once during the morning and my subsequent trips what my business on the platform was. The entire evacuation was accomplished with surprising calmness and orderliness. This fact evinced considerable comment from the local police and RR employees with whom I talked. They compared this departure with Chang-tsung-ch'ang's madhouse a couple of years ago.

This fact of tranquil retreat coupled with the so-far quiet occupation of Tsinan by the Shansi forces indicates some sort of compromise in my opinion.

There seemed to be more umbrellas in this army than there were rifles.

Not over half a dozen slightly wounded men appeared among the troops departing.

The 22nd Division, having no representatives among the departing troops, except one man of whom I enquired after Gen. Ku, indicates and was so stated by this soldier, that this division formed the rear guard for Han, holding Lo-kow until Tsinan was completely evacuated.

nI saw in all eight women board the train.

A field radio set was installed with aerials extending the length of two cars. The dynamo was started at 10:00 and then shut off. No messages were sent while I was at the station.

Officers and men wear a cloth badge over the left breast pocket of their uniform. General officers badges are piped in red, field officers in yellow, junior officers in blue. Enlisted men are plain white but non-coms have vertical red stripes on the right hand side indicating the three grades by the number of stripes. On the badge is written the "Kuo-min-ko-ming-t'ao-ni-ti-san lu chun," the soldier's unit, his office, as "ABC, Gen. Staff, Ordnance etc." then his full name.

Officers of the various ranks in this army have duties corresponding to those of officers in our army about as follows:

Brig.Gen--- Major, Lt. Col and Col.
Col. *** Major and captain.
Lt. Col. --- Major and Captain
Major ------ 1st Lieut.
Captain ---- 2nd Lt.
1st Lt.----- sergeant
Lt. ------ corporal

Han is reportednby RR men as having departed at 3:00 A.M. 26th.

The local chamber of commerce in conjunction with the police have organized a "pao-an-tui"and "wei-ch'ih tui". These men are good looking and well armed. Many of them are mounted.

There was some artillery firing at 4:00 P.M. Since then quiet.

June 25.

All quiet during the night. Shansi airplane reconnoitered from 8,000 feet at 9:00 a.m.

Shansi 26th Division began entering city about 12:00 noon.

Representative of Fu-tsu-yi met consuls at 3:00 PM. Gen. Feng-peng-tsu will be in command here. 26th Division was not supposed to have come in, as Feng's troops have been designated by Yen-hsi-shan to take over this city. Still quiet at 5:00 PM.

END.

11,

7. The events of the following days were reported verbally on my return from notes.

On the 26th I received a telegram from the Military Attache directing me to return when the situation was quiet.

The Shansi troops were a very tired and poorly aniformed group. Many of the men wore straw hats with their uniforms and their arms did not appear to be equal to Han's. While I realise that I saw Han's defending troops in a more favorable light I nefertheless felt strengthened in my opinion that Tsinan was evacuated by negotiation rather than by a serious clash of arms.

General Fu-tso-yi called in person on the various consuls on the 27th. He is a large heavy man with a great sense of humor. He said that Yen-hsi-shan was particularly anxious to please the foreigners in his occupation of Tsinan, and that every soldier carried on his person a written set of instructions as to how he was to treat foreigners. It seemed unnecessary to inquire how the illiterate soldiers were to read their instructions. However I did find the Shansi soldiers amiable and there was no sign of ill-feeling with the local populace. The Shansi troops all wear arm bands inscribed "Chu-chang kung-tao" --"Maintain fair dealings". During my stay of one week I did not see a single instance of streets arguments or brawls. I recalled however that, while these troops seemed friendly to foreigners etc., just two years ago an observer from this office in Tai-an reported that the southern troops were very friendly and told the Consul in Tsinan not to be apprehensive of their taking over the city. Within two days occurred the Tsinan Incident.

The following units occupied Tsinan between June 25th and June 28th, either remaining in the city or taking up positions nearby:

20th Division --Kao-hung-wen
10th Army ---Fu-tso-i
4th Army --- Li-sheng-tai
8th Army ----Chang-hui-chao
5th Amy --- Li-fu-ying
9th Army --- Feng-peng-chu

I paid a call on Feng-peng-chu's Chief of Staff on the 27th. He stated that as soon as the Shansi troops had rested they would pursue Han-fu-ch'u eastward and Ma to the south. He said Ma-hung-k'uei had already evaduated Tai-an.

What happened in the case of Ma-hung-k'uei is certainlynnot clear. Some of Han-fu-ch'u's senior officers said that Ma failed to arrive in time, some of the junior officers spoke of Ma with contempt, indicating bad feeling or resentment. Feng-peng-chu's Chief of Staff said that Ma had his hands full at Fei-ch'eng and was unable to support Han.

Han being definitely out of the picture, Tsinan quiet and what looked like the lasttrain to Tsingtao before the Shansi eastward move I decided to leave on the 28th. Although it was stated that the Tsin-p'u R.R. from the north bank of the river would be open from the 1st of July I felt that a further adavnce on the partoof the Shansi troops might well prevent passenger travel for sometime.

The Shansi troops extended allng the RR line to only two stations east of Tsinan. The first of Han 's troops carefully inspected the passengers just west of Ming-shui. They extended eastward as far as Kao-mi/ Large concentrations were at Chou-ts'un, Chang-tien,Wei-hsien and Fang-tzu. Most of the troops were still living on their trains. Each station during the day found whole trains of soldiers each sitting under an umbrella.

Some missionaries got on the train at Chou-ts'un and Chang tien.One of them a British doctor said that he had never seen Chinese soldiers with so much money to spend as the Han men had. Troops, he said, always make their way to a foreign hospital, if there is one nearby, mostly in order to obtain treatment for venereal disease. The regular fee for such treatment is $5.00 which Han's men producedwwithout a murmur. This doctor said he was afraid to say that 100% of the Chinese troops had veneraal disease in some stage but that he was sure the figures were near it.

Several of Han's junior staff officers got on the train at Wei-hsien to Tsingtao. Two were in uniform. They said that Han was negotiating for transports to go to Haichow; and failing that he would go overland. They insisted and reports from Chefoo confirm them, that Liu-chen-nien withdrew his troops and turned over Wei-hsien to Han with excellent good feeling.

After 19½ hours on the train I reached Tsingtao and sailed the same day for Peking.

There is apparently no anti-foreign feeling except against the Japanese. The streets everywhere are marked up with signs calling upon the populace to bear in mind 5/3 or May 3, 1928, the date of the Tsinan Incident. On the bombarded walls of Tsinan a large banner reads "Swear to avenge this".

In Tsingtao and along the Chiao-chi R.R. line there are other signs, indications of a really insidious situation. "Pai-wan-wei-hai" "White pills are dangerous". The white pills referred to are

the various compounds of opium and marphine distributed by Japanese petty merchants, apparently throughout China, but especially along this RR where the Japanese population is thick.

The Japanese Consul General in Tsinan is said to have admitted that most of his consular trial cases are for narcotic trading. He says, in passing it off, that it is very difficult for the small Japanese merchant because times are very bad and the petty merchant only sells narcotics in order to tide himself over.

It is said that morphine can be bought at any Japanese store in China.

According to the missionary doctor who boarded the train at Chou-ts'un the Chinese military merely make capital out of this traffic. A guardnis placed over the store for "protection" purposes, but the Japanese merchant has to pay a"squeeze" to the guardnetc. for being allowed to sell his dope to the soldiers. The sentries are frequently changed thus permitting a wide distribution of the "squeeze".

Thomas D. White
1st Lieutenant, Air Corps,
D.O.L.

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 1 1930
2657-9-226
WAR DEPARTMENT

July 1, 1930

No. 7761

Subject: Report on observation of hostilities in Tsinanfu, Shantung Province, China, by Lieutenant Thomas D. White.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 31 1930

Noted I. A. V.

This is an excellent report covering the period June 21-30, 1930, regarding the situation at Tsinanfu, during the evacuation by Han Fu-chu and occupation by the Shansi troops.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Enc. as above

G-2 Report

6180
OFFICE OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 27 1930
2657-I-276
303
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 25 1930

First Army - Han Fu-chu.

20th Division	Sun Tung-hsuan	Lintze	Shantung	20,000
22nd "	Ku Liang-min	Showkwang	"	10,000
29th "	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsingchow	"	10,000
Bodyguard Brig.	Lei Tai-ping	Weihsien	"	6,000
			Total	46,000

The above forces evacuated Tsinan on June 25, and are making a fresh stand between Lintze and Weihsien along the Kiao-Tsi railway line at present against the Shansi troops.

Tsin-Pu Area in Southwestern Shantung - Ho Yueh-tsu, Field Commander.

13th Division	Hsia Tou-yin	Yenchow	Shantung	12,000
20th "	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Lincheng	"	10,000
21st "	Li Yun-chieh	Yenchow	"	8,000
46th "	Fan Hsi-chi	Tsining	"	14,000
55th "	Juan Chao-chang	"	"	12,000
57th "	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Kinsiang	"	10,000
64th Mix. Div.	Ma Hung-kuei	Yenchow	"	14,000
65th Division	Chen Yueh-han	"	"	10,000
1st Ind.Brig.	Shih Chung-cheng	"	"	4,000
2nd " "	Chen Hsiao-sze	"	"	4,000
2nd " "	Liang Hung-en	Tsining	"	5,000
" "	Li Han-yuan	"	"	5,000
Cav. "	Ma Teng-chiao	Yenchow	"	5,000
			Total	113,000

Chiang Kai-shek has appointed Ho Yueh-tsu as field commander along the Tientsin-Pukow railway line in southwestern Shantung. Troops operating in this area are to be placed under his command.

The 20th Division under Hsu Ke-hsiang is a newly organized unit.

The Independent Brigade under Li Han-yuan, designation unknown, is an old unit attached to the 64th Mixed Division of Ma Hung-kuei.

Second Army - Liu Chih.

1st Division	Hsu Ting-yao	Taikang	Honan	12,000
1st "	Feng Yi-pei	Yehkikang	"	10,000
2nd "	Kü Chu-tung	Liuho	"	15,000
2nd "	Chang Chih-chung	Yungcheng	"	10,000
			Carried Forward	47,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Second Army (Continued)			Brought Forward		47,000
3rd	Division	Ch'en Chi-cheng	Yehkikang	Honan	12,000
3rd	"	Li Yun-lung	Kweyang	Anhwei	12,000
5th	"	Hsiung Shih-hui	Suichow	Honan	12,000
7th	"	Wang Chun	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
8th	"	Mao Ping-wen	Suichow	Honan	12,000
11th	"	Ch'en Ch'eng	Yehkikang	"	12,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pengpu	Anhwei	12,000
52nd	"	Yeh Kai-hsing	Yingchow	"	13,000
66th	"	Liu Mao-en	Kweiteh	Honan	10,000
2nd	Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Kweyang	Anhwei	10,000
1st	" Brig.	An Chun-tsai	Liuho	Honan	6,000
12th	Ind. "	Hsu Shen-yu	Kweiteh	"	4,000
13th	" "	Hsu Chia-yu	"	"	5,000
1st	" Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Yehkikang	"	2,500
2nd	" " "	Li Yu-ching	Liuho	"	2,500
3rd	" " "	Li Chung-kwei	"	"	2,500
				Total	186,500

Third Army - Ho Cheng-chun.

3rd	Division	Chien Ta-chun	Changsha	Hunan	10,000
6th	"	Chao Kuan-tao	Yencheng	Honan	12,000
9th	"	Chiang Ting-wen	"	"	12,000
10th	"	Yang Sheng-chih	"	"	12,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	"	12,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-cheng	Nanyang	"	12,000
22nd	"	Lo Lin	Puchi	Hupeh	6,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Chumatien	Honan	10,000
47th	"	Shangkuan Yun-hsiang	Chowkiakow	"	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Yencheng	"	24,000
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Hankow	Hupeh	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Siangyang	"	12,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Sienning	"	8,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-lin	Chumatien	Honan	16,000
				Total	186,000

Central Government Troops

17th	Army - Liu Chen-nien		Chefoo	Shantung	35,000
1st	Division	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
1st	"	Chang Chen	Foochow	Fukien	9,500
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Yenping	"	8,000
9th	"	Yin Cheng-kang	Siaokan	Hupeh	4,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kwang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
				Carried Forward	37,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Central Government Troops (Continued)

			Brought Forward			37,500
10th	Division	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	4,000	
10th	"	Hsien Pin	Yupihg	Kweichow	10,000	
12th	"	Chin Han-ting	Kian	Kiangsi	12,000	
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000	
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000	
13th	"	Teng Ying	Kian	Kiangsi	8,000	
15th	"	Ho Chien	Anjen	Hunan	7,000	
16th	"	Lo Pan-ying	Yuhsien	"	7,000	
16th	"	Yang Ting-chung	Wuchow	Kwangsi	8,000	
18th	"	Chang Hwei-tsan	Kiukiang	Kiangsi	12,000	
19th	"	Liu Chien-hsu	Yuhsien	Hunan	10,000	
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien	11,000	
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Waichow	Kwangtung	8,000	
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Wuchow	Kwangsi	8,000	
60th	"	Tsai Ting-kai	Hengchow	Hunan	8,000	
61st	"	Chiang Kwang-nai	"	"	8,000	
62nd	"	Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000	
63rd	"	Li Yang-ching	Yunghing	Hunan	8,000	
	Ind. Brig.	Chang Jui-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung	6,000	
	" "	Huang Jen-huan	"	"	6,000	
1st	" "	Wu Chung-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000	
1st	" "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chwanchow	Fukien	2,500	
2nd	" "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000	
2nd	" "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	Fukien	2,500	
3rd	" "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000	
5th	" "	Pan Shan-chai	Hwohsien	Anhwei	2,000	
7th	" "	Li Ch'i	Anking	"	2,000	
8th	" "	Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000	
15th	" "	Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000	
1st	Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000	NAVAL CONSTB.
2nd	"	Lin Shou-kuo	Mamoi	"	4,000	" "
Bodyguard Brig.		Yu Chi-shih	Kweiteh	Honan	5,000	
Gendarmerie		Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
Training Regt.		Hsia Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,000	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces						
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.				Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.						
				Total	257,100	

The 2nd Division under Lu Hsing-pang is still at war with Liu Ho-ting and his 56th Division between Foochow and Yenping. The 1st Division under Chang Chen is reported to have joined the latter force against Lu.

The 16th Division under Yang Ting-chung is a newly organized unit.

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 823,600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies.
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th	Army Corps	Chang Fa-kwei	Kweilin	Kwangsi	20,000
7th	" "	Yang Teng-hui	Sinfeng	Kiangsi	15,000
8th	" "	Chow Lan	Kanchow	"	15,000
15th	" "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Kweilin	Kwangsi	15,000
15th	Division	Li Ming-jui	Nanan	Kiangsi	10,000
16th	"	Pai Chung-hsi	Chwanchow	Kwangsi	12,000
1st	Ind. Brig.	Hsu Chi-ming	Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000
				Total	95,000

It is reported, but not confirmed, that the "Ironsides" under Chang Fa-kwei and a part of the Kwangsi forces have gone into Kwangsi again from Hunan, and the vanguards are also reported to be close to Wuchow. The Kwangtung government is sending reinforcements into Kwangsi and many boats are being commandeered for rushing troops to Wuchow. Another body of the Kwangsi forces is invading Kwangtung by way of southwestern Kiangsi.

Second Group of Armies.
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	Ma Hung-pin	Chengchow	Honan	12,000
26th "	Tien Chin-kai	Yencheng	"	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi	"	"	12,000
8th Cav. Brig.	Chao Hsi-pin	Chengchow	"	4,000
			Total	40,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-cheng, Field Commander.

9th Division	Feng Chih-an	Kihsien	Honan	12,000
21st "	Liang Kuan-ying	Lanfeng	"	12,000
22nd "	Chen Hsing-ming	Chenliu	"	12,000
29th "	Cheng Hsi-hsien	Kihsien	"	12,000
30th "	Chi Hung-chang	Fukow	"	12,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Cheng Ta-chang	Kihsien	"	8,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	"	"	5,000
			Total	73,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th Division	P'ang Ping-hsun	Fukow	Honan	12,000
23rd "	Ma Chi	Chengchow	"	12,000
3rd Mix.Brig.	Chao Kung-wen	"	"	5,000
6th " "	Liu Yu-lin	Kaifeng	"	4,000
			Total	33,000

Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st New Div.	Kuo Chih-kang	Yüchow	Honan	12,000
2nd " "	Tung Yu-chen	"	"	12,000
23rd Division	Wei Feng-lou	Shanchow	"	12,000
28th "	Sung Che-yuan	Kihsien	"	12,000
			Total	48,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th Division	Chang Tze-chung	Tungsü	Honan	12,000
31st "	Sun Lien-chung	"	Hupeh	12,000
Training"	Wang Kuan-hua	Lushih	Honan	12,000
5th Mix.Brig.	Pai Chien-shan	"	"	5,000
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Te-sheng	Tungsü	"	8,000
			Total	49,000

Army Reserves - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

18th Division	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Sian	Shensi	12,000
1st Mix.Brig.	Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd " "	Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	Ma Lin	"	"	5,000
9th Cav. "	Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	"	4,000
			Total	31,000

Total Second Group of Armies - 274,000

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

First Route Army - Sun Ch'u, Field Commander.

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u.

1st Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Kaocheng	Honan	5,000
2nd "	Tao Cheng-wu	"	"	5,000
3rd "	Ma Yen-show	"	"	5,000
			Carried Forward	15,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

First Route Army (Continued)

			Brought Forward		15,000

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang

16th	Division	Wen Yu-ju	Yuanshih	Hopei	5,000
17th	"		"	"	5,000
18th	"		"	"	5,000
				Total	30,000

Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta.

10th	Division	Chen Chang-chieh	Kufow	Shantung	5,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	5,000
12th	"		"	"	5,000

10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi.

28th	Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh	Yenchow	"	5,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ch'ing	"	"	5,000
30th	"	Ch'en Ping-ch'ien	"	"	5,000
28th	Gend.Brig.	Yuan Tsneg-ching	Tientsin	Hopei	6,000
				Total	36,000

Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou.

4th	Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng	Lanfeng	Honan	5,000
5th	"	Chang Wen-shun	"	"	5,000
6th	"		"	"	5,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an.

19th	Division	Lu Ying-lin	Kaifeng	"	5,000
20th	"	Liu Tien-kuei	Chengchow	"	5,000
21st	"	Kuo Tsung-fen	"	"	6,000
				Total	31,000

Fourth Route Army - Chang Ying-wu, Field Commander.

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying.

13th	Division	An Hsi-ku	Changtien	Shantung	6,000
14th	"	To Chen	"	"	6,000
15th	"	Chia Hsueh-ming	"	"	5,000
				Carried Forward	17,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Fourth Route Army (Continued)

			Brought Forward		17,000

9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu.

25th	Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Chowtsun	Shantung	5,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen	Tsinan	"	5,000
27th	"	Chu Hsi-ch'un	Chowtsun	"	5,000
			Total		32,000

Fifth Route Army - Chang Huei-chao, Field Commander.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

7th	Division	Ho Shao-nan	Lintze	Shantung	6,000
8th	"	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	5,000
9th	"	Wang Ting-ying	"	"	5,000

8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao,

22nd	Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tunga	"	5,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	5,000
24th	"		"	"	5,000
			Total		31,000

Sixth Route Army - Feng Yu-hsi, Field Commander.

15th Army Corps - Feng Yu-hsi.

1st	Brigade	Li Ting-hsiu	Tawenkow	Shantung	6,000
2nd	"	Wang Fu	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Liu Chao-tang	"	"	6,000

18th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan.

10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Taian	"	6,000
11th	"	Fan Kang-lan	"	"	6,000
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	6,000
			Total		36,000

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps of Pao An Tui or Peace Maintenance Forces as carried in previous Situation Reports have been recently reorganized as the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th Army Corps respectively. The 15th and 18th Army Corps, mentioned above, have been incorporated into the newly formed 6th Route Army operating along the Tientsin-Pukow railway line in northern Shantung, while the 16th and 17th Army Corps are placed between Taiyuan and Shihkiachwang for maintenance of order and peace in those regions.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Cavalry Forces in Honan - Chao Cheng-show, Field Commander.

2nd	Division	Kuo Feng-shan	Kaocheng	Honan	3,000
5th	"	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	4,000
6th	"	Sun Chang-sheng	Lanfeng	"	4,000
				Total	11,000

Miscellaneous Troops Directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan.

4th	Brigade	Liu Kuang-tou	Taiyuan	Shansi	6,000
5th	"	Li Chia-ling	"	"	6,000
6th	"	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	6,000
					18,000

17th Army Corps - Chow Shih-lien.

7th	Brigade	Liu Feng-chi	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	6,000
8th	"	Tu K'ung	"	"	6,000
9th	"	Ma Liang	"	"	6,000
					18,000

Training Div.	Li Ching-jung	Peiping	Hopei	8,000
Bodyguard Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	Shansi	6,000
1st Cav. Div.	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengchen	"	6,000
3rd " "	Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	Chahar	4,000
4th " "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
				28,000

Total 64,000

The 16th and 17th Army Corps have been reorganized from the 2nd and 3rd Corps of Pao An Tui or Peace Maintenance Forces, mention of which has been made in a preceeding page of this Report.

It is noted that all available troops of the Third Group of Armies have been sent to the front with exception of the above which are use for maintenance of order and peace in those regions at present.

Total Third Group of Armies - 271,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

7

Fourth Group of Armies.
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps	- Sun Kuang-chien	Tsaochow	Shantung	15,000
2nd Army Corps	- Mi Wen-ho	Tsaohsien	"	15,000
3rd Army Corps	- Su Ming-ch'i	Kaocheng	Honan	15,000
4th Army Corps	- Sheng K'e	Tunga	Shantung	15,000
				60,000

Total Fourth Group of Armies - 60,000

Eighth Group of Armies.
(Teng Pao-shan)

1st Division	Sun Chen-hua	Hsüchang	Honan	6,000
2nd "	Chiao Wen-tien	Linying	"	6,000
3rd "	Wang Hsueh-chu	Hsüchang	"	6,000
4th "	Sun Chang-jung	Linying	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	Chiang Tso-chen	Hsüchang	"	4,000
Bodyguard "	Kuan Huai-tung	"	"	4,000
			Total	32,000

12th Army Corps - Jen Ying-chi.

1st Division	Chang Ching-shan	Hsüchang	Honan	8,000
2nd "	An Yung-fu	"	"	8,000
			Total	16,000

15th Army Corps - Liu Kwei-tang — Sihua — Honan 15,000

25th Army Corps - Wang Cheng — Yüchow — Honan 14,000

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 77,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying	Pochow	Anhwei	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-tung	"	"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Yueh-ting	Luyi	Honan	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ching	"	"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Kuei-pin	Pochow	Anhwei	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang	"	"	8,000
				Total	48,000

It is reported that the above troops have been surrounded by the National Government Army in Pochow and Luyi. Reports also state that this route army has sustained great losses, but the actual number of casualties has not yet been obtained.

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

36th Army Corps - Sung Tien-tsai.

35th	Division	Li Kuang-lung	Hsüchang	Honan	6,000
36th	"	Han Wen-ying	"	"	6,000
38th	"	Sung Chao-kuei	"	"	6,000

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing.

43rd	Division	Li Wan-ju	Linying	Honan	6,000
44th	"	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	6,000
45th	"	Chao Mien-ying	"	"	6,000
Ind.	Division	Chao Ch'ing-hai	Linying	Honan	7,000
				Total	43,000

The 6th Route Army has been reorganized as two army corps of 3 divisions each, and one independent division.

20th Army Corps - Liu Chun-jung.

1st	Division	Pao Ping-ch'ing	Kihsien	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	Ying Chung-ming	"	"	12,000
3rd	"	Shen T'i-ch'eng	"	"	12,000
				Total	36,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju.

24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	Taikang	Honan	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin K'wei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000
				Total	24,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 151,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	"	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Tunghai	"	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	"	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang.

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Tsao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	Tang Shih-tsun	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kuei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Szechwan (Continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Pan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	3,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
			Total	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	Liao Hai-t'ao	Huangchow	Hupeh	6,000
2nd "	Liu Kung-tu	"	"	7,000
3rd "	Ch'en Lan-ting	"	"	7,000
			Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hsun	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route	Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungchwan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	Tang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tsen Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-chung	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Min-chang	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

	Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 320,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Some changes have been made in the name of commanders and stations of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces, which are believed to be accurate up to date.

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000	
2nd "	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tahushan	"	10,000	
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Ichow	"	10,000	
4th "	Liu Yi-fei	Chinchow	"	10,000	
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Chungtsienso	"	10,000	
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Changli	Hopei	11,000	*
12th "	Chang Ting-shu	Chinchow	Liaoning	10,000	
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000	
19th "	Sun Chao-yin	Panshan	"	11,000	
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	Taonan	"	11,000	
22nd "	Huang Chin-chung	Unknown		10,000	
23rd "	Liu Nai-chang	Yungping	Hopei	10,000	*
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changtu	Liaoning	10,000	
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Kaokiao	"	10,000	
27th "	Ma Ting-fu	Shanhaikwan	Hopeu	10,000	*
1st Cav. Brig.	Kuo Hsi-peng	Tungliao	Liaoning	6,000	
3rd " "	Chang Shu-seng	Shenyang	"	6,000	
1st " Div.	Cheng Tse-sheng	"	"	8,000	
			Total	174,000	

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua.

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000	
2nd " "	Chinchow	Liaoning	6,000	
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000	
4th " "	Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000	
5th " "	Peichen	Liaoning	6,000	
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000	
7th Heavy A.R.	Peichen	"	6,000	
8th " " "	"	"	6,000	
		Total	48,000	

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling.

6 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu and Kaiyuan.		4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.		800
	Total	5,600

Total Liaoning Forces 227,600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang.

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengtze	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Kwei-lin	Kwanchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Chao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ninguta	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ching	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000

Total 81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin.

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wan Nan-ping	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chen	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000

Total 57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin.

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-ting	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchwan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500

Total 48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 414,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,486,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Narrative of Events.

The Lung-hai Sector. Chiang Kai-shek with about 100,000 troops, on June 20th launched an offensive northwest from the general line Suichow-Chowkiakow. This attack was in its initial stage, successful. It carried Nanking on June 26-27 to within ten miles of Kaifeng. However, on the 27th Sun Liang-chen counter-attacked and in the fighting which ensued drove the government troops back to the line Yehkikang-Sihwa which was reached on or about July 4th. There has been little or no action in this sector since that date due to the intense heat which has affected the fighting qualities of all the participants, although Nanking troops have suffered more therefrom than the Kuominchun veterans. This sector, the Lung-hai, has been turned over completely by the allies to Feng and it is not thought that Chiang can make much headway against his seasoned troops.

The Shantung Front. The fall of Tsinanfu, covered in detail in Report No. 7761, has not meant the defeat of Han Fu-chu. Falling back along the Tsinan-Tsingtao line he has reached the Tsingchow-Weihsien area, where in spite of Shansi propoganda, it is believed his troops are intact. His course from the present is open to conjecture. He at first was reported as planning to embark at Tsingtao for Haichow, but the Manchurian authorities have refused him permission to use that port. He too, was believed to be planning to move south from his present position to effect a juncture with the Nanking forces in South Shantung, but he remains along the railroad. Since Shih Yu-san has been made Governor of Shantung, it is likely that Han will await Shih's assumption of power before moving from his present position. Han, it will be remembered was formerly Shih's superior officer and is still his friend.

The Peking-Hankow Line. Chiang Kai-shek has been able to get only little help from his forces in this sector. This is due in part to the inherent difficulty of co-operation between Chinese armies and in part to the fear of a flank attack from Kuominchun forces stationed in the neighborhood of Laohokow. Skirmishes only have been reported from this area.

South China. On or about June 20th, Chang Fa-kuei and his Kwangsi allies commenced a withdrawal from Changsha and Yochow. The reasons for this retreat are not known, though it is believed he was short of ammunition and perhaps accepted advances from Nanking. Chang's withdrawal lightened this sector for the government and enabled reserves to be given Chiang Kai-shek along the Tsin-pu. At present Chang threatens Canton from the neighborhood of Kanchow in Kiangsi and Kweilin in Kwangsi.

General. While neither North nor South have won any important victories, with the exception perhaps of the North in Tsinanfu and the South in the withdrawal of Chang Fa-kuei, the prolongation of the war is seriously embarrassing the government. Yen and his allies have more revenues than they had before the war, the South distinctly fewer. The crack German trained divisions have shown that they were Chinese after all, and have been depleted in their use as shock troops.

G-2 Report 6180

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Suffering from the heat and the concomitants of war can be borne better by Feng's veterans than Chiang's levies.

Morale is better in the North each day, while the South is now losing confidence. It would seem that an attempt to settle the different issues by compromise must soon be made.

For troop dispositions see Situation Map attached.

Parker G Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

Distributions:

4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 Tokyo
1 Manila
1 Legation
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 6180 2657-J-276 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report.

CHINA (MILITARY)

Subject: Situation Report, July 15-27 Inclusive.

2657-J-276/303
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. 3 1930

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

a. See Report No. 7770 from this office, July 14, 1930.
b. It is planned to submit this information monthly as the number of units of which this office now keeps a record, is so large and the number of copies of this report being such as to necessitate it being typed twice, that five days are required to prepare it.

2. Narrative of Events.

The Lung-hai Sector. The anti-Chiang forces are said to have launched a general offensive on this front on the morning of July 12. Reports are very conflicting as to the success of this drive; in general it is believed that the most that the Kuo Min Chun can claim, is to have advanced nearly to Liu Ho on the Lung-hai. Believing that the ultimate military decision, if any, of the present conflict will be decided on this front, it is felt that without decisive Kuo Min Chun gains, that time adds to Nanking's advantage, as their facilities and sources of supply are believed to be better than those of the "Allies." In the case of recruits and replacements, which will probably be Feng's most important factor, available information also gives this advantage to Chiang.

The Shantung Front. This sector has seen little fighting during this period. Marshal Yen Hsi-shan is said to have gone to Shantung (Yencheng, north of Tsinan) to confer with his commanders on the Kiaotsi and Tsinpu lines; however, it is very likely that his visit here is more for the purpose of negotiating directly with Han Fu-chu. Efforts to reach an understanding with Han came to naught and some minor fighting resulted. Shansi has made a large concentration of troops on this front, where they plan to make a determined effort to eliminate Han. Nanking is pushing troops up the Tsinpu line and reinforcing the Yenchow front--they are also said to be sending one division (53rd) via sea to Tsingtao to reinforce Han. Heavy rains have made it difficult for both sides to distribute munitions and supplies and while they both announce plans for major offensives it is probable that a stale-mate will continue here pending some decisive action on the Lung-hai.

The Peking-Hankow Line. No serious fighting has yet taken place here. Nanking while weak on this front is probably secure from Kuo Min Chun threats, as any movement of troops down this line would necessitate Feng's weakening his Lung-hai force and it is inconceivable that he would do this.

South China. It is believed that all of Chang Fa-kuei's and most of the Kwangsi forces have retreated to Kwangsi where it is reported that they hold Kweilin and Liuchow. Three Kwangtung divisions (the 2nd "New Division", 59th and 63rd) and one independent brigade threaten them, but actual contact and engagements between these two forces have not yet taken place.

The "Red" Activities. Reports from Hunan and Kiangsi provinces indicate an alarming development in Red bandit activities in that region. The "Third Army" (said to be a well-armed "Communist Army") led by the Red bandit Mao Tse-tung, is reported to have captured Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, on or about July 27, and to be advancing on Kuikiang.

From M/A Report No. 7787. July 28, 1930

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In Hunan, the "5th Army", under Peng Te-huai (7000 strong) and the "8th Army", under Huang Kung-lieh (5000 strong) also "Communist Armies" are said to have combined. This force marched on Changsha, the Hunan capital on July 25, defeated a Government force sent to intercept them, the Government force retiring to a line about twenty-five miles from Changsha, which they hoped to hold pending the arrival of reinforcements. This line was again defeated and the advance on Changhsa resumed. On the night of July 27, the garrison of Changsha mutinied and left the city which was soon taken over. General disorders, arson and murder ensued. Government buildings and yamens were burnt and wrecking of foreign property begun. The Government troops under General Ho Chien are reported as retreating towards Siangtan (south of Changsha) and Yiyang. (northwest of Changsha) Another body of Communist troops, under Ho Lung is said to have taken Yochow. (north of Changsha)

General. This period has seen no decisive results for either side on any front; both have been hindered by heavy rains and excessive heat. Indications are that the Hsuchow (Kiangsu)--Tsinan area is becoming more critical, with both sides making heavy troop movements thereto, but it is believed that serious fighting, if any, will develop very slowly in the mutual hopes of settlement by compromise. This belief is strengthened by the continued efforts of each party to win Mukden to their cause.

The Red disorders in Kiangsi and Hunan are no doubt most embarrassing to the Central Government and the advance north by these Communist armies may result in the evacuation of the Wuhan area. Such an eventuality while a blow to Nanking prestige, will release troops for action against the Kuo Min Chun on the other fronts. The Reds in control of the Wuhan area are more apt to weaken Feng's fighting power than to strengthen it, as they "live off the country" to a greater extent than does the Kuo Min Chun.

M E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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G-2 Report

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OCT 10 1930

CHINA (Military)

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

First Army - Han Fu-chu

20th	Division	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Lokow	Shantung	10,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tsinan	"	20,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-min	Weihsien	"	10,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	"	10,000
53rd	"	Li Yung-heng	Changtsing	"	8,000
Bodyguard	Brig.	Lei Tai-ping	Tsinan	"	6,000
				Total	64,000

The above forces have regained possession of their former positions from the Shansi army, which has retired to the north bank of the Yellow river.

Tsin-Pu Area in Southwestern Shantung - Ho Yueh-tsu, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Ma Ch'uan-liang	Taian	Shantung	8,000
21st	"	Li Yun-chieh	Changtsing	"	8,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Tsining	"	14,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	"	"	12,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Kinsiang	"	10,000
64th	"	Ma Teng-chiao	Taian	"	14,000
65th	"	Chen Yueh-han	"	"	10,000
1st	Ind. Brig.	Shih Chung-cheng	Yenchow	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Chen Hsiao-sze	"	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Liang Hung-en	Tsining	"	5,000
1st	Cav. "	Ma Ming-shan	Taian	"	5,000
				Total	94,000

The Independent and Cavalry Brigades under Li Han-yuan and Ma Teng-chiao respectively, which were attached to the 64th Mixed Division as previously reported, have been reorganized by expanding the Independent Brigade to the 1st Division with appointment of Ma Ch'uan-liang as commander, and by promoting Ma Teng-chiao, former commander of the Cavalry Brigade, to the post of the new 64th Division, while the said cavalry brigade is known now as the 1st Cavalry Brigade under a new commander, Ma Ming-shan. The old 64th Mixed Division now no longer exists.

Second Army - Liu Chih

1st	Division	Hsu Ting-yao	Ningling	Honan	12,000
1st	"	Feng Yi-pei	Kweiteh	"	10,000
2nd	"	Ku Chu-tung	"	"	15,000
2nd	"	Chang Chih-chung	Tsaohsien	Shantung	10,000
				Carried Forward	47,000

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Second Army (continued)

		Brought Forward		47,000
3rd Division	Ch'en Chi-cheng	Liuho	Honan	12,000
3rd "	Li Yung-lung	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
4th "	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Kweiteh	Honan	10,000
5th "	Hsiung Shih-hui	"	"	12,000
7th "	Wang Chun	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
8th "	Mao Ping-wen	Liuho	Honan	12,000
10th "	Yang Sheng-chih	Mamutsi	"	12,000
12th "	Chin Han-ting	Tangshan	Kiangsu	12,000
45th "	Wei Li-huang	Kwoyang	Anhwei	12,000
52nd "	Yeh Kai-hsin	Tangshan	Kiangsu	13,000
60th "	Tsai Ting-kai	Hsüchow	"	8,000
61st "	Chiang Kwang-nai	"	"	8,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Kwoyang	Anhwei	10,000
1st " Brig.	An Chun-tsai	Liuho	Honan	6,000
12th Ind. "	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	"	4,000
13th " "	Hsu Chia-yu	"	"	5,000
1st " Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Liuho	"	2,500
2nd " " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500
3rd " " "	Li Chung-kwei	"	"	2,500
			Total	214,500

The 1st, 10th, 52nd, 60th and 61st Divisions under Feng Yi-pei, Yang Sheng-chih, Yeh Kai-hsin, Tsai Ting-kai and Chiang Kuang-nai respectively had been engaged against the Shansi army on the Tientsin-Pukow line in Shantung, and have now been returned to their former stations after defeating the latter army which retired to the north bank of the Yellow river.

Third Army - Ho Cheng-chun

3rd Division	Chien Ta-chun	Hankow	Hupeh	10,000
6th "	Chao Kuan-tao	Yencheng	Honan	12,000
9th "	Chiang Ting-wen	"	"	12,000
11th "	Ch'en Ch'eng	Suiping	"	12,000
12th "	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	"	12,000
13th "	Hsia Tou-yin	Yencheng	"	12,000
17th "	Yang Hu-cheng	Nanyang	"	12,000
22nd "	Lo Lin	Changsha	Hunan	6,000
44th "	Hsiao Chih-chu	Chowkiakow	Honan	10,000
47th "	Shang Kuan Yun-hsiang	Yencheng	"	28,000
48th "	Hsu Yuan-chuan	"	"	24,000
50th "	Tan Tao-yuan	Hankow	Hupeh	12,000
51st "	Fan Shih-sheng	Siangyang	"	12,000
54th "	Hao Meng-ling	Shangshui	Honan	16,000
66th "	Liu Mao-en	Siping	"	10,000
			Total	200,000

The 11th and 13th Divisions under Ch'en Ch'eng and Hsia Tou-yin respectively had been engaged against the Shansi army on the Tientsin-Pukow line in Shantung. They have been transfered to this line in Honan, together with the 3rd Division under Chien Ta-chun which has arrived at Hankow.

It is reported that Liu Chih, Commander of the 2nd Army on the Lung-Hai line, is now in command of the forces on this line in Honan.

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Central Government Troops

17th Army - Liu Chen-nien		Chefoo	Shantung	. . . .	35,000
1st Division	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung		8,000
1st "	Chang Chen	Foochow	Fukien		9,500
2nd "	Lu Hsing-pang	Shukow	"		8,000
2nd "	Yang Ting-chung	Wuchow	Kwangsi		8,000
5th "	Kung Ping-fan	Siushui	"		8,000
9th "	Chang Yu-kuang	Changchow	Fukien		8,000
9th "	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung		8,000
10th "	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh		4,000
10th "	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"		10,000
12th "	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan		6,000
13th "	Chang Ju-chi		"		6,000
13th "	Teng Ying	Nanchang	Kiangsi		8,000
15th "	Ho Chien	Changsha	Hunan		7,000
16th "	Lo Pan-ying	"	"		7,000
18th "	Chang Huei-tsan	Nanchang	Kiangsi		12,000
19th "	Liu Chien-hsu	Changsha	Hunan		10,000
25th "	Tai Min-chuan	Hankow	Hupeh		8,000
56th "	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien		11,000
58th "	Wen Hung-en	Waichow	Kwangtung		8,000
59th "	Yu Han-mou	Pinglo	Kwangsi		8,000
62nd "	Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	Kwangtung		8,000
63rd "	Li Yang-ching	Pingnam	Kwangsi		8,000
Ind. Brig.	Chang Jui-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung		6,000
" "	Huang Jen-huan	Pingnam	Kwangsi		6,000
1st " "	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh		6,000
1st " "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chwanchow	Fukien		2,500
2nd " "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"		2,500
2nd " "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan		4,000
3rd " "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu		5,000
5th " "	Pan Shan-chai	Hwoshan	Anhwei		2,000
7th " "	Li Chi	Anking	"		2,000
8th " "	Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	Hupeh		2,000
14th " "	P'eng Chi-piao	Hankow	"		6,000
15th " "	Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"		4,000
1st Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien		4,000 (NAVAL
2nd "	Lin Shou-kuo	Mamoi	"		4,000 CONSTB.)
Bodyguard Brig.	Yu Chi-shih	Kweiteh	Honan		5,000
Gendarmerie	Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu		3,600
Training Regt.	Hsia Shu-hsuan		Fukien		2,000
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)			Chekiang		10,000
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.)					
			Total	. . .	255,100

The 14th Independent Brigade under P'eng Chi-piao is a newly organized unit.

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 862,600

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	Chang Fa-kuei	Liuchow	Kwangsi	20,000
7th " "	Yang Teng-hui	"	"	15,000
8th " "	Chow Lan	Kanchow	Kiangsi	15,000
15th " "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	Kwangsi	15,000
15th Division	Li Ming-jui	Poseh	"	10,000
16th "	Pai Chung-hsi	Kweilin	"	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Hsu Chi-ming	Nanning	"	4,000
2nd " "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000

Total 95,000

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	Ma Hung-pin	Chengchow	Honan	12,000
23rd "	Wei Feng-lou	Kaocheng	"	12,000
26th "	Tien Chin-kai	"	"	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi	"	"	12,000
8th Cav. Brig.	Chao Hsi-pin	"	"	4,000

Total 52,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-cheng, Field Commander.

9th Division	Feng Chih-an	Suichow	Honan	12,000
11th "	Chi Hung-chang	Liuho	"	12,000
21st "	Liang Kuan-ying	"	"	12,000
22nd "	Chen Hsing-ming	Checheng	"	12,000
29th "	Cheng Hsi-hsien	Suichow	"	12,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Cheng Ta-chang	Checheng	"	8,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	Suichow	"	5,000

Total 73,000

Designation of the 30th Division under Chi Hung-chang has been changed to the 11th Division.

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Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th Division	P'ang Ping-hsun	Fukow	Honan	12,000
23rd "	Ma Chi	Chengchow	"	12,000
3rd Mix. Brig.	Chao Kung-wen	Fukow	"	5,000
6th " "	Liu Yu-lin	Kaifeng	"	4,000
			Total	33,000

Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st Division	Kuo Chih-kang	Lanfeng	Honan	12,000
2nd "	Tung Yu-chen	Kihsien	"	12,000
28th "	Sung Che-yuan	"	"	12,000
			Total	36,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th Division	Chang Tze-chung	Taikang	Honan	12,000
31st "	Sun Lien-chung	"	"	12,000
Training "	Wang Kuan-hua	"	"	12,000
5th Mix. Brig.	Pai Chien-sheng	"	"	5,000
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Teh-shun	"	"	8,000
			Total	49,000

Army Reserves - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

18th Division	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Tungkwan	Shensi	12,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd " "	Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	Ma Lin	"	"	5,000
4th Cav. Div.	Su Yu-sheng	Tungkwan	Shensi	6,000
			Total	33,000

The 4th Cavalry Division under Su Yu-sheng has been expanded from the 9th Cavalry Brigade.

29th Division	Juan Hsuan-wu	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
30th "	Pao Kang	Changteh	"	8,000
37th "	Wang Kuan-chun	Tungchang	Shantung	8,000
			Total	24,000

The above three divisions are newly organized units.

Total Second Group of Armies - 300,000

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Third Group of Armies.
(Hsu Yung-chang)

First Route Army - Sun Chu, Field Commander.

1st Army Corps - Sun Chu.

1st	Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Lipachi	Honan	5,000
2nd	"	Tao Chen-wu	"	"	5,000
3rd	"	Ma Yen-show	"	"	5,000

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang.

16th	Division	Wen Yu-ju	Yuanshih	Hopei	5,000
17th	"		"	"	5,000
18th	"		"	"	5,000

Total 30,000

Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta.

10th	Division	Cheng Chang-chieh	Yencheng	Shantung	5,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	5,000
12th	"	Huo Yuan-pi	"	"	5,000

10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi.

28th	Division	Yeh Chi-chieh	Yencheng	"	5,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ching	"	"	5,000
30th	"	Chen Ping-chien	"	"	5,000
28th	Brigade	Yuan Tseng-ching	Tientsin	Hopei	6,000

Total 36,000

Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou.

4th	Division	Chow Sze-cheng	Liuho	Honan	5,000
5th	"	Chang Wen-shun	"	"	5,000
6th	"		"	"	5,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an.

19th	Division	Lu Ying-lin	Lanfeng	"	5,000
20th	"	Liu Tien-kuei	"	"	5,000
21st	"	Kuo Tsung-fen	"	"	6,000

Total 31,000

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Fourth Route Army - Chang Ying-wu, Field Commander.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo.

7th Division	Ho Shao-nan	Yucheng	Shantung	6,000
8th "	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	5,000
9th "	Wang Ting-ying	"	"	5,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying.

13th Division	An Hsi-ku	Tsiho	"	6,000
14th "	To Chen	"	"	6,000
15th "	Chai Hsueh-ming	"	"	5,000

9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu.

25th Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Yucheng	"	5,000
26th "	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	5,000
27th "	Kuo Wei-fan	"	"	5,000
			Total	48,000

Fifth Route Army - Chang Huei-chao, Field Commander.

8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao.

22nd Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tungchang	Shantung	5,000
23rd "	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	5,000
24th "		"	"	5,000
			Total	15,000

Sixth Route Army - Feng Yu-hsi, Field Commander.

15th Army Corps - Feng Yu-hsi.

1st Brigade	Li Ting-hsiu	Yencheng	Shantung	6,000
2nd "	Wang Fu	"	"	6,000
3rd "	Liu Chao-tang	"	"	6,000

18th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan.

10th Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Yucheng	"	6,000
11th "	Fan Kang-lan	"	"	6,000
12th "	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	6,000
			Total	36,000

Cavalry Forces in Honan - Chao Cheng-show, Field Commander.

2nd Division	Kuo Feng-shan	Lipachi	Honan	3,000
5th "	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	4,000
6th "	Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	4,000
			Total	11,000

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Miscellaneous Troops Directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

16th Army Corps - Yang Cheng-yuan.

4th Brigade	Liu Feng-chi	Peiping	Hopei	6,000
5th "	Li Chia-lin	Tehchow	Shantung	6,000
6th "	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	6,000
				18,000

17th Army Corps - Chow Shih-lien.

7th Brigade	Liu Kuan-tou	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	6,000
8th "	Tu K'ung	"	"	6,000
9th "	Ma Liang	"	"	6,000
				18,000

25th Army Corps -	Liu Nai-ch'i	Huimin	Shantung	12,000

This Army Corps is newly organized.

Training Div.	Li Ching-jung	Peiping	Hopei	8,000
Bodyguard Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	"	"	6,000
1st Cav. Div.	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengchen	Shansi	6,000
3rd " "	Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	Chahar	4,000
4th " "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
				28,000

Total 76,000

The Shansi forces which have been engaged in war with the Government army both on the Kiao-Tsi and Tsin-Pu lines in Shantung (see last Situation Report) have been defeated by the latter army and have retired to the north bank of the Yellow river. It is said that the losses of the said forces, in killed, wounded, and missing, were severe, but the actual number of casualties has not yet been obtained.

Total Third Group of Armies - 283,000

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Fourth Group of Armies
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps -	Sun Kuang-chien	Tsaohsien	Shantung	15,000	
2nd " "	Mi Wen-ho	"	"	15,000	
3rd " "	Shu Ming-ch'i	Kaocheng	"	15,000	
4th " "	Shang K'e	Tunga	"	15,000	
			Total		60,000
1st Ind. Div.	Wang Hsing-te	Tungkwang	Hopei	8,000	
2nd " "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Kaocheng	Honan	8,000	
Bodyguard "	Li Feng-ch'un	Tsaochow	Shantung	8,000	
Art. Brigade	Lin Chia-hsun	Tsaohsien	"	4,000	
Pistol and Sword Brigade	Wang Yi-ching	"	"	4,000	
			Total		32,000

The above forces are directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Shih Yu-san. They are old units but this office has just recently learned of their existence as such.

Total Fourth Group of Armies - 92,000

Eighth Group of Armies
(Teng Pao-shan)

1st Division	Sun Chen-hua	Linying	Honan	6,000	
2nd "	Chiao Wen-tien	Shangshui	"	6,000	
3rd "	Wang Hsueh-chu	"	"	6,000	
4th "	Sun Chang-jung	Chowkiakow	"	6,000	
1st Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tse-chan	Hsuchang	"	4,000	
Bodyguard "	Kuan Huai-tung	"	"	4,000	
			Total		32,000
12th Army Corps - Jen Ying-chi					
1st Division	Chang Ching-shan	Chowkiakow	Honan	8,000	
2nd "	An Yung-fu	"	"	8,000	
			Total		16,000
15th Army Corps - Liu Kuei-tang		"		15,000	
1st Cav. Brig.	Wang Jui-shan	"		4,000	
			Total		19,000
25th Army Corps - Wang Cheng		Yuchow	Honan		14,000

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 81,000

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Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying	Chocheng	Honan	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-ting	"	"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Kueh-ting	"	"	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ching	Taikang	"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Kuei-pin	"	"	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang	"	"	8,000
				Total	48,000

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

36th Army Corps - Sung Tien-tsai

35th	Division	Li Kuang-lung	Hsuchang	Honan	6,000
36th	"	Han Wen-ying	"	"	6,000
38th	"	Sung Chao-kuei	"	"	6,000

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

43rd	Division	Li Wen-ju	Linying	"	6,000
44th	"	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	6,000
45th	"	Chao Mien-ying	"	"	6,000
Ind.	Division	Chao Ch'ing-hai	"	"	7,000
				Total	43,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Chun-jung

1st	Division	Pao Ping-ch'ing	Tsaohsien	Shantung	12,000
2nd	"	Ying Chung-ming	"	"	12,000
3rd	"	Shen T'i-ch'eng	"	"	12,000
				Total	36,000

24th Army Corps - Kuoh Hsiang-ju

24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	Taikang	Honan	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin Kwei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000
				Total	24,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 151,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	"	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Lungchow	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Tsao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	Tang Shih-tsung	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kuei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Szechwan (Continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
			Total	11,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	Liao Hai-t'ao	HWangchow	Hupeh	6,000
2nd "	Liu Kung-tu	"	"	7,000
3rd "	Chen Lan-ting	"	"	7,000
			Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Chen Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungchwan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd " "	Tang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	Tseng Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th " "	Lo Nai-chang	"	"	6,000
5th " "	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
			Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 320,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000	
2nd "	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tahushan	"	10,000	
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Ichow	"	10,000	
4th "	Liu Yi-fei	Chinchow	"	10,000	
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Chungtsienso	"	10,000	
6th "	Li Chen-tang	Changli	Hopei	11,000	*
12th "	Chang Ting-shu	Chinchow	Liaoning	10,000	
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Simainfu	"	10,000	
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Panshan	"	11,000	
20th "	Huang Hsien-shang	Taonan	"	11,000	
22nd "	Hung Chih-chung	Unknown		10,000	
23rd "	Yu Hsueh-chung	Kungping	Hopei	10,000	*
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changtu	Liaoning	10,000	
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Kaokiao	"	10,000	
27th "	Liu Nai-chang	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000	*
1st Cav. Brig.	Kuo Hsi-peng	Tungliao	Liaoning	6,000	
3rd " "	Chang Shu-shen	Shenyang	"	6,000	
1st " Div.	Cheng Tse-sheng	Liushuwying	Hopei	8,000	*
			Total	174,000	

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua.

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000	
2nd " "	Chinchow	Liaoning	6,000	
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000	
4th " "	Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000	
5th " "	Feichen	Liaoning	6,000	
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000	
7th Heavy A. R.	Feichen	"	6,000	
8th " " "	"	"	6,000	
		Total	48,000	

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling.

6 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu and Kaiyuan.		4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.		800
	Total	5,600

Total Liaoning Forces 227,600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang.

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengtze	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Kwei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Chao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ninguta	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ching	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav. Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
				Total	81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin.

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-ping	Fayenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav. Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
				Total	57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin.

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Luanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-ting	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav. Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchwan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Luanping	"	4,500
				Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 414,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,599,200

(It must be considered that the total number of men shown is estimated as such. Many of the units listed herein have been engaged in warfare for the past several months and have naturally suffered casualties thereby; the number of which it is practically impossible to ascertain. Then too, on the other hand, recruiting is constantly being carried on and replacement of casualties effected and new units probably organized which this office does not learn of. So in general it is believed that the total number listed is approximately as near correct as can be ascertained under the existing conditions.)

CHINA (Military)

Subject : Situation Report

2. a. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - August 26 to September 8, 1930, inclusive.

From a military point of view nothing of any importance has been accomplished by either side during this period. The severe defeat received by the Shansi army in their loss of Tsinan appears to have definitely eliminated them as a positive factor for some time to come. Reports indicate that the army, which it took Yen so many years to build up, lost heavily in materiel and supplies, and the expenditures necessary to revive it will naturally be directly felt by the Kuominchun and be very apt to have an important bearing on Feng's operations in the immediate future. It is believed that Nanking will be content with a stalemate at the Yellow River, inasmuch as it releases men for action on other fronts and avoids the danger which might arise were the line of communications to be extended too far as a result of offensive operations north of the river.

The Lunghai area is still affected by flooded terrain, which in combination with other factors has resulted in relative quiet in this sector.

Marshal Chiang has announced plans for a combined drive on Kaifeng and Chengchow. Movements of Nanking troops into the Kinhan area indicate that that theatre will soon witness large scale operations.

The Kwangtung-Kwangsi situation remains unsettled; no developments of sufficient importance occurred to affect the general situation of the major conflict in the north.

The Communist menace to Changsha flamed up again and the situation there appears to have been given more attention by the Central Government. The despatch of troops to the Kinhan area will likely ease the Changsha situation, but at the time that this report is being submitted the city is again threatened by Red forces; however, the measures being taken by Ho Chien are believed adequate for its defense.

b. <u>The Shantung Front</u>.

The Nanking plan for the recapture of Tsinan probably did not intend that the offensive be carried beyond the Yellow River, for no pursuit was undertaken north thereof -- which it is believed would not have been too difficult an undertaking.

As soon as the Shansi troops were thrown back across the river, Chiang began to arrange his forces for what, it appears, will be a decisive engagement with the Kuominchun. Government troops have been withdrawn from the Tsinan area and moved to positions along the Lunghai and Kinhan lines. Liu Chih, who directed the operations against Tsinan, is said to have been given charge of the Kinhan forces. It is said that he will conduct the announced offensive against Chengchow and Kaifeng; Han Fu-chu being left in command of the forces around Tsinan.

It is believed that both sides will devote much labor to constructing strong defensive positions along their respective banks of the Yellow River, and that as a result of this they will mutually be content with maintaining a passive defense.

c. The Honan Front

(1) Operations along the Lunghai

No serious fighting has taken place in this sector during this period. The terrain is still affected by the past rains and has been a serious obstacle to any operations, but the heavy losses of the Shansi army at Tsinan is believed to have been largely responsible for the lack of Kuominchun offensive action, as it is most reasonable to suppose that Feng realizes that his supply will be directly affected according to Yen's losses, and it would naturally have been most disastrous to have become engaged in a large scale offensive, knowing or expecting that there would be a diminution of supply.

The major portion of the troops returned from the Tsinan area were concentrated at Hsuchow and distributed along the line to the west thereof. Indications all point to a determined offensive against the Kuominchun which will very probably produce important results.

(2) Operations on the Kinhan Line

Quiet has prevailed on this front during this period. Nanking has announced a combined drive on Chengchow and Kaifeng. Troops and supplies in large numbers are being sent up the Kinhan to Yencheng and vicinity. Chiang is said to have moved ten divisions to that area and to have placed Liu Chih in charge of the operations therein. This offensive, if it materializes, will be a severe test of both the Kuominchun and Nanking arms, for with the Shantung stalemate the situation narrows down to practically a Chiang-Feng issue.

Decisive developments on this front seem imminent.

d. South China

The Kwangsi-Kwangtung situation is still unsettled. Kwangtung forces in conjunction with troops from Yunnan seem to be holding the Kwangsi troops and Chang Fa-kuei's "Ironsides" to operations in Kwangsi province, thus relieving the Central Government of the anxiety which might be occasioned were these forces free to invade Hunan. It is said that Kwangtung troops operating against Liuchow were forced to abandon the offensive, due to the presence of Kwangsi troops which suddenly appeared in the vicinity of Wuchow, thereby minimizing recent successes which the Government troops are credited with having gained.

Reports are scarce from this district, and it is not possible to learn the extent of the fighting; however, it is believed that the Kwangsi "rebels" do not present any immediate danger to the Central Government's position in its war against the Northern "Allies".

e. Communist Activities

The Communist menace in Hunan continues to be of major importance. With the recapture of Changsha there seems to have been an easing of the situation, for with a display of apparent force against them the Red troops broke up into small units and sought refuge in the mountains where pursuit was most difficult. General Ho Chien undertook to secure the Changsha area with three divisions (15th, 16th, and 19th) but discord is said to have developed among the respective leaders, and it appeared that this force would not probably be equal to the task of holding the city against a determined attack.

On or about August 28th it was reported that the Communists were again marching on Changsha. Ho Chien in the initial engagement with

SEPT. 8, 1930

these troops apparently gave way, but as the Reds closed in on the city the defense is said to have stiffened, and it now appears that he will be able to withstand the present attack.

Changsha, of course, is not the only city endangered by Red activities. Numerous smaller places are sacked and looted by them at will. On September 4th the treaty port of Shasi on the Yangtze, above Changsha, was seriously threatened by a Communist force. Government troops are reported as having successfully repulsed them.

The following is an unconfirmed list of alleged Red armies now operating in mid-China:

1st	Red	Army	Hsu Chi-sheng
2nd	"	"	Ho Lung
3rd	"	"	Hwang Kung-lieh
4th	"	"	Chu Teh
5th	"	"	P'eng Teh-huai
6th	"	"	Hwang Teh-yung
7th	"	"	Chao Yin-yun
8th	"	"	Ho Keng-shao
9th	"	"	Ts'ui Chi-chi
10th	"	"	Chow Hsien-ying
11th	"	"	Chu Tung-chih
12th	"	"	Lin Piao
13th	"	"	Hu Kwang-mien
14th	"	"	Li Ch'ao
15th	"	"	Ch'en Shu-p'ing

No information is available as to the size of any of the above units and it is most doubtful if any of them exists as an army other than in name only. However, it is interesting to note the increased number of such units.

Both North and South are keeping a watchful eye on the attempted spread of Communism, but, despite the efforts of the authorities, evidence secured in raids indicates that the movement is gaining ground. On or about August 23rd the Nanking police raided the Central University thereat and arrested some 72 students and seized a quantity of reactionary literature. Some of these students were released on bail after an examination, but the supposed leaders have been held and will probably receive the death penalty, for Nanking is apparently determined to deal very sternly with the disciples of Moscow, having executed twenty of them on August 18th, some of whom are reported as having ridden to the execution grounds "singing the favorite song of the Third Internationale". Such stern measures as these will probably do much to suppress the movement, but it is believed that eventually the armed forces of Communism will have to be faced as a military issue by some government in China.

MBD/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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4-1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 10
2657-J-276
314
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peiping, China
September 10, 1930

Subject : Observations in Mukden

To : Military Attache

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 9 1930

1. According to your instruction I left this city for Mukden on August 30, 1930. My mission was :

(a) To discover if any Manchurian troops were being, or were to be moved inside of the Great Wall.

(b) If answer to (a) was "Yes", to find out the purpose of the move.

(c) If answer to (a) was "Yes", to find out with which side, the government or allies, they would be in sympathy.

(d) To find out when the railway between Shanhaikuan and Mukden would be open.

(e) To ascertain if Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang would object to government troops occupying the region along the Tsin-Pu north of the Yellow River.

(f) To find out Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's attitude towards Yu Hsueh-chung.

2. During my stay in Mukden I found out that

(a) No Manchurian troops were being moved inside the Wall, nor was any movement contemplated in the near future.

(d) The railway is now open and trains run slowly over the damaged sections. Since three temporary bridges are being used and the track traverses mud flats north of Chin Hsien which are still inundated, it will be ten days or two weeks before normal traffic can be resumed.

(e) Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang would not object to the occupation of territory north of the Yellow River by government troops.

(f) Chang Hsueh-liang trusts and places confidence in Yu Hsueh-chung.

3. Some nine and one-half years ago I visited Mukden with First Sergeant Wilson of the 15th Infantry, to demonstrate the Browning Automatic rifle and the infantry pack to Marshal Chang Tso-lin. At that time I came into close contact with the Young General, then a mere boy, and his aide, Captain Li. Both Chang Hsueh-liang and Li, who is now a General and the Director of the Trench Mortar Arsenal, remembered that trip, and because of the acquaintanceship which has grown out of it, talked to me very frankly.

General Li told me that his arsenal was now on a one-fourth production basis, due to the poor exchange and no immediate need for shells. This arsenal was founded by the famous General Sutton, and General Li took it over upon Sutton's discharge for graft. The trench

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Sept 10-30

mortar manufactured has an extreme range of 5100 meters with a 48 pound projectile. This projectile has been used successfully as an airplane bomb.

General Li has orders for truck parts drawn up and within the next few days intends to wire them to the United States. He has employed an American automotive engineer named Myers, and a Mr. W. A. Mitchell, also an American, is Chief Engineer of the plant. This truck will be ostensibly for commercial work, although it may be easily converted for military purposes. One hundred and sixty-five of these trucks will be manufactured the first year.

General Li gave it as his opinion that the Young Marshal was strong enough to remain in power in Manchuria as long as he wanted to do so. He said that Chang Tso-hsiang, the Governor of Kirin, could take over control if he so desired, but he was content to remain in Kirin taking "squeeze" from the Chinese-Eastern while the Young Marshal labored in Mukden under hardships imposed by the control of Manchuria and the many vexing Japanese and Russian questions. Chang Tso-hsiang is in loco parentis to the Young Marshal and no hard feelings exist between the two. Wan Fu-lin is the Marshal's appointee and will obey his orders. The army is subservient to Chang's wishes, and the only discontented element is the old civil official group which has not found employment under his regime.

General Li said that the Young Marshal was much cleverer than his father, and, too, had his father's strength. His morphine habit is his worst defect, and he is striving to overcome that. From personal observation I should say that the morphine would conquer in the long run.

4. General Chang Hsueh-liang was extremely outspoken in his interview with me, which he placed upon a personal rather than an official basis. He was downright in his denunciation of Yen and Feng, who, he said, were pernicious destructionists with no constructive ideas. He was frank in his admiration for Chiang Kai-shek and blunt in his statement that he was solidly in back of the government in the present struggle. His help could not be given by sending troops, he said, but he felt that in not coming to Feng's or Yen's aid he was assisting the government. He mentioned that he was selling munitions to Nanking. According to the Marshal, Feng is "an actor" and Yen "too slippery". He stated that he had no intention of dispatching troops within the Great Wall.

The Marshal feels that while Nanking makes mistakes, it still is the recognized government of China and should be given a chance to show its worth. He does not favor a Northern Government, and allowed himself to be quoted to that effect as an official of the Nanking Government.

His idea of a government in China is that of a group of loosely bound provinces, more or less autonomous in domestic affairs but under the Central Government in matters of foreign policy and national defense. This, of course, is the condition existing in Manchuria today, and the Marshal thinks that as it is good enough for him it should be good enough for Yen and Feng.

My opinion of Chang Hsueh-liang, based on reports from others, was changed by my visit to Mukden. In place of the spineless dupe and cat's paw I had been led to expect, I found a man who, but for his addiction to morphine, has all the ear marks of a first class Chinese ruler. His methods will always be essentially oriental, and he will not, as Chiang Kai-shek so often does, frequently employ direct Western action. Until drugs become his master, he will reign in Manchuria. He is a hard worker, and little by little is cutting down the "squeeze" in the Three Eastern Provinces. He feels very little responsibility for China as a

whole, since his affection and interests lie almost wholly in his native district.

When questioned as to Japanese activities, the Marshal said that the old blatant and imperialistic Japanese attitude in Manchuria had changed to an insidious, but no less dangerous campaign of economic aggression, which was difficult to meet in the open. The Japanese, he said, were trying to get an economic stranglehold on the country.

5. Mr. W. H. Donald, formerly Economic Adviser to the Peking Government, is now adviser on economic and allied subjects to Chang Hsueh-liang. His position is unique, and he without a doubt exercises more power over the Marshal than any other foreigner, and probably at present more than any but two or three Chinese. In general Mr. Donald verified all of the above information. In addition to this, Mr. Donald showed me a copy of a report which he was about to make to the Marshal on an interview that he held on August 30th at Peitaiho Beach, with Sir Miles Lampson.

He was directed by the Marshal to obtain answers to the following questions :

(1) Is Great Britain serious in her alleged intention of returning Wei-hai-wei?

(2) If Great Britain knew that Nanking would construct a naval base there, would she still return it?

(3) Would Great Britain have any objection if the North East Squadron (Manchurian) constructed a naval base there?

Sir Miles' answer to question (1) was: Yes, Wei-hai-wei will be returned on October 1, 1930; to (2): No, that is a matter of Chinese administration; to (3): No, although British naval experts have reported that proper fortification there is not feasible.

In connection with the fact that Manchuria has its own appointee as mayor of Tsingtao, this desire for Wei-hai-wei points an indicative finger. It would seem that perhaps the government has acquiesced to Manchurian domination in Shantung, or at least that Chang Hsueh-liang intends to grasp it.

Mr. Donald, who recently visited Hu-lu-tao, said that the Chinese were obstructing work on that port in every manner conceivable. He stated that the Belgian construction firm was not paying "squeeze" and for that reason the Chinese were doing everything in their power to slow up the work.

6. From the physical standpoint I was greatly impressed with Mukden's growth. Parts of Mukden which were swamp land when I was there before have now been built up with magnificent marble, brick, and concrete palaces of from two to four stories, standing along well-paved highways. The quest for modernity is apparent everywhere. A fine new moving picture theater has recently been finished, automobiles are plentiful, motor trucks will soon be manufactured, and plans for an airplane factory are being discussed.

Incongruous as it is with this modern side, Chang Hsueh-liang's court is truly medieval. He has his favorites, his sycophants, his court jester, his concubines. From his audience room, where he sits in state, backed by his father's stuffed tigers, he climbs into an elaborate automobile to go to the golf club, of which he is the patron saint. Airplanes fly over tiled roofs under which concubines strive jealously for power.

Official cares and worries are often sunk in the oblivion of morphine. A miscellany of good and bad, of the ancient and modern, which is China today.

PGT/edb

No. 7816

Distribution:

4 MID
1 File

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, September 10, 1930. To A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. Forwarded. Because of conflicting reports concerning the political situation in which Chang Hsueh-liang was the leading figure, Captain Tenney, who is a personal friend of the Young Marshal, was sent to Mukden with a mission to find out the true condition by a personal interview. The above report gives a clear exposition of the existing situation as of this date.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. DIV.
SEP 26
2657-D-276
6180
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report.

CHINA (MILITARY)

Situation Report, August 13-25, 1930, Inclusive.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 25 1930
2657-D-276 306

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces.

See Situation Report, No. 7792 of August 11, 1930 from this office.

2. a. Narrative of Events.

The recapture of Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province, by the forces of the Central Government, is the most important event of this period. Unbiased reports depreciate the fighting qualities of troops employed on both sides-i.e. the Shansi soldiers on that of the North and the Cantonese soldiers on that of the South, but the operation, as conducted by the Central Government forces, was carried out in accordance with sound tactical principles and appears to have been a real military achievement. Holding his position along the Lunghai (greatly assisted by excessive rains and floods) Chiang assembled eleven divisions at Yenchow; dispatching a column to the east and one to the west, with one on the Tsinpu he advanced on Tsinan by three routes, while a division and a squadron of cavalry were directed around to the west and rear of the city--at the same time, Han Fu-chu advanced west along the Kiaotsi. The Tsinan area was badly flooded and it is believed that the defenders of Tsinan relied too greatly on that condition as a factor of their defense--either that, or that their communications were badly neglected, for reports indicate that the evacuation of the city was most disorderly and approached a debacle. Large numbers of prisoners are claimed to have been captured as well as a great quantity of materiel and supplies. It is said that Shih Yu-san was kept in ignorance of the fall of the city for several days and that as a result of which his relations with Yen Hsi-shan have become strained. It does not look as though the Nanking offensive will be carried beyond Tsinan. At the present writing eight divisions of the Southern troops are being disposed along the south bank of the Yellow River and the balance (believed to be three divisions) are being withdrawn down the Tsinpu.

Heavy rains have flooded the fighting areas along the Lunghai and have prevented any major operations on that front. Feng's threat to the south has been diverted against Kweiteh. Under favorable conditions it would be most costly for either side to attempt a vigorous offensive in this zone as they both occupy highly organized defensive positions. It seems reasonable to expect that Chiang's next move will be an offensive up the Kinhan line which would likely result in Feng's withdrawal to the Chengchow area and Shih Yu-san and other miscellaneous units to the north bank of the Yellow River.

The Kinhan line has remained quiet.

Considerable stir was created by the "near mutiny" in early August of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces stationed inside the Great Wall. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, despite his attempt to make light of the "incident", was suddenly thrown into the limelight and called upon to display an unusual amount of tact. It is very probable that most of his forces inside the Wall were on the point of announcing their support of Nanking; it is charged that Southern agents violated the hospitality of Marshal Chang and bought these troops, but it is hard to believe that Chiang Kai-shek would have desired such a course of action, as even had it been successful it would have forced Mukden to act against these troops

and as such would have meant a virtual participation of Fengtien against the South. The exact truth of this affair will probably remain a secret but it is not believed that it will change the Young Marshal's policy of neutrality.

News from South China is scarce and hard to confirm, but it is believed that the situation there is of no immediate concern to Nanking.

The Communists in the Changsha-Nanchang area appear to have been properly dealt with and indications are that order will be maintained there for the time being.

b. The Shantung Front.

(1) Operations on the Kiaotsi Line. The operations in this sector were subordinated to the main effort on the Tsinpu; Han Fu-chu and Li Yun-heng not having much difficulty in clearing their area of Shansi troops as soon as the offensive against Tsinan from the south met with success. With the capture of Tsinan the Kiaotsi railway was opened and with the repair of bridges the traffic on August 20 was again restored.

(2) Operations on the Tsinpu Line. The offensive launched on August 2, by the Southern forces was conducted by General Liu Chih, Field Commander on the Tsinpu. Three columns were directed against Tsinan from the south; the Right Wing, consisting of two divisions (Chiang Kwang-ting and Tsai Ting-kai), advanced from Hsintai; the Central Route, consisting of four divisions (Chen Cheng, Hsia Tou-yin, Ma Hung-kuei, and Hu Tsung-nan), advanced from Yenchow along the railroad; the Left Wing, consisting of three divisions (Feng Yi-pei, Hu Peh-han, and Yang Sheng-chi), advanced from the area of Wenshang-Ningyang. A division under Hsu Ke-hsiang and a squadron of the 64th Cavalry Division were dispatched to advance via Yuncheng, Tungahsien, Pingyin, and Changtseng, and to harass the rear of the enemy; Han Fu-chu, in command of the First Army Corps, was to attack on the Kiaotsi. With the fall of Taian before this offensive the Shansi forces apparently realized that their occupancy of Tsinan was precarious for Yen ordered every available man to the Tsinpu front. A military conference was held at Tsinan on August 13, to which Feng sent General Chang Jui-yin, Commander of the Fifth Kuominchun division. On this same date (August 13) Marshals Yen and Feng are reported as having wired to the Allied commanders at Tsinan saying that all the Allied soldiers should fight to the best of their ability and that anyone who retreated should be treated as a deserter and shot. Efforts to brace the Tsinan defense failed to slow up the Southern offensive; the Left Wing captured successively Tungahsien, Pingyin, and Feicheng. On the night of August 13, the Cantonese Division (61st) under General Chiang Kwang-ting, from a point (Chungkingchen) about eight miles southeast of Tsinan, started to drive the Shansi forces back on the capital; the general line continued to advance and at 11.00 a. m. on Friday, August 15, the city was retaken by the South.

Reliable reports have not yet been received as to the nature of the fighting around the city, but from available information one is led to believe that the fall of the city came as a surprise to its defenders, as large numbers of prisoners are said to have been taken as well as 30,000 rifles, 230 field guns, and large quantities of supplies. The withdrawal is reported as having been very disorderly and to have had no semblance of a military operation. It is possible that too much reliance was placed

on the condition of the terrain, as produced by the rains, as an obstacle to Nanking's offensive but what is more likely is that a very poor communications system existed and that their defense was poorly coordinated.

Indications are that the Southern offensive will not be pushed beyond Tsinan. Eight divisions are now taking position along the south bank of the Yellow River and the balance of the troops employed in this drive are being withdrawn down the Tsinpu. Yen in an effort to ensure that Nanking does not advance any farther north is reported as having ordered the 16th Shansi Pao An Tui (Peace Maintenance Corps) from Taiyuanfu to the Tsinpu front. If this report is true it would appear that Shansi has little, if any, man power left and can hardly, under the existing conditions, be expected to operate on the offensive for some time.

The Allies are reported as moving Shih Yu-san over to bolster the Shansi position north of Tsinan, Feng sending three Kuominchun divisions to hold the area vacated by Shih. The report of these movements has not been verified but it will be interesting to watch the movements of Shih, for it is said that he was kept in ignorance for several days of the fall of Tsinan and that because of that he has become decidedly "cool" towards Yen.

The capture of Tsinan naturally restores considerable prestige to Nanking arms and discredits the fighting power of Shansi soldiery. It is believed that operations in Shantung are now stalemate and will continue so until a decision is reached on another front.

c. <u>The Honan Front</u>.

(1) <u>Operations on the Lunghai Line</u>. Incessant rains during the period of this report have flooded the fighting areas along the Lunghai and as a consequence of this no serious fighting developed on this front. At the time of submitting the last Situation Report (July 27-August 12) it appeared as though Feng's main objective was the Tsinpu at some point between Suchow and Pengpu. Whether due to the success of the Southern offensive against Tsinan, or to the condition of the terrain (flooded), or to tactical decisions, the main effort of Feng's attack seems to have been directed to the north with Kweiteh and Tangshan as objectives. The major portion of this fighting was done by General Sun Lien-chung with about 20,000 troops. The attack appears to have been directed principally against Kweiteh, while Kuominchun cavalry, under General Cheng Ta-chang are said to have been sent to within the Kiangsu borders beyond Tangshan with the mission of interrupting the railway in that vicinity. Nanking held the Kweiteh-Tangshan area with the 3rd, 7th, 50th and 54th divisions. Feng's offensive made little headway against the Southern positions and finally came to a standstill. In view of the changed situation on the other fronts it is likely that the Allies on the Lunghai will remain on the defensive for the time being.

(2) <u>Operations on the Kinhan Line</u>. There has been no change in the situation on this front; both sides occupy defensive positions and have refrained from offensive tactics.

d. <u>South China</u>. Information here is too meager to enable one to report intelligently on the activities of Chang Fa-kuei's "Ironsides" and the Kwangsi troops during this period. It has been reported that these forces are assembling at Nanning, capital of Kwangsi, and preparing to invade southern Kwangtung, and that Cantonese troops under General Li Ching-yang have been sent to Mengkiang and Pingnan to check their advance. Yunnanese

troops are said to have invaded Kwangsi and to be advancing on Nanning. To date it has not been possible to verify these reports and learn the true conditions in Kwangsi but it is generally believed that the Central Government is not seriously embarrassed by the situation there.

e. Communist Activities. The measures taken by Generals Ho Chien and Lu Ti-ping in dealing with the Communists in their areas appear to have forced the Red armies to have broken up into small units and to have sought refuge in the mountain fastnesses of Kiangsi where it is very difficult for Government troops to pursue them. Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung, and Peng Teh-huai are reported as being in the neighborhood of Tungku (west Kiangsi). Low water in the river at Changsha may soon necessitate the withdrawal of the gunboats sent there to assist Ho Chien in controlling the situation; the withdrawal of the vessels would seriously affect the defense of the city. While order exists for the present the menace to Changsha and Nanchang is by no means erradicated and there is still every possibility of serious disorders at either or both of those cities. Drastic measures are being taken in dealing with Communists and suspects; there being many executions (over 100 in the first twenty days of August at Hankow alone).

Nanking seems to be trying to keep in touch with the movement, as some time during early or middle August the Nanking police conducted a series of raids in the city and secured evidence showing that the Communists were plotting disturbances in the capital; the leaders are said to include students, persons in the army, and employees of the Government Telegraph and Telephone offices. It is very probably that most of the individuals taken in these raids will pay for their activities (or alleged such) with their lives.

Chinese Communists, like regular soldiers (Chinese), though foreign trained and supervised are very probably going to give way before a display of superior force or sufficient financial inducements. At the present stage it is believed that their organization is such that a proper application of force would dissipate their efforts. Both the South and the North seem opposed to the movement and it remains to be seen whether or not the amount of force applied will be sufficient to change the complexion from Red to Pink to normal; if not, then the weed will grow and China's convulsions become more acute--to the menace of her international relations.

MDP/EF

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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1930
312
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peiping, China
September 4, 1930

No. 7813

Subject : Observations of Military Activities in the Tehchow-Yucheng (Shantung) Area, September 1-3, 1930 (inclusive).

To : The Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 9 1930

1. In compliance with your verbal instructions, I left Peiping, China, the night of Sunday, August 31, 1930, for P'ingyuan (Shantung Province), with the specific mission of ascertaining the condition of the military units of the Northern faction thereabouts and discovering whether or not the Southern army had established itself at any point in that area north of the Yellow River, and with the general mission of making ordinary military observations.

2. I arrived at Tehchow at about 6:00 p.m. the evening of Monday, September first, and was met at the station by a runner who escorted me to the headquarters of the Department of Communications of the "Left Wing"; here I met the Chief of said Department, Colonel Li Ch'ing-ch'i, who informed me that their Peiping "foreign office" had requested them to arrange for me to get to P'ingyuan and meet General Chang Yin-wu, Commander (in the absence of Marshal Yen Hsi-shan) of the Left Wing of the Allied Forces operating along the Tsinpu line. Colonel Li got in touch with P'ingyuan and advised me that a special train would soon come up from there and take me back and that General Chang would grant me an interview thereat sometime that same night. In due course the train arrived and at about 10:30 p.m. I reached P'ingyuan. The city being off the railroad, they arranged for me to occupy a room at the station. Every attention was shown me, and at about 11:00 p.m. the General arrived.

3. General Chang Yin-wu is a young man, around thirty-two years of age, about five feet four inches tall, and would weigh near one hundred fifty pounds. He gives the immediate impression of being a Chinese gentleman of the scholarly but modern type. He approaches Marshal Yen in conversational attitude, and Marshal Feng in physical and outward appearance, though of course much smaller; in fact, I feel that he is best described by saying that he appears to have the composite characteristics of Yen and Feng, with those of the Shansi leader predominating.

4. In my conversation with Colonel Li at Tehchow, I felt that my coming had been the subject of much speculation on their part as to "what I was after", and Colonel Li did not hesitate to ask me just what my business was. I had anticipated this to the extent that I had decided to introduce myself as having been sent there for the purpose of meeting General Chang so as to enable me to write more intelligently the "history" of the present conflict, which it was my duty to prepare -- explaining that this "history" tried to show the designation and size of the various units, their leaders, where engaged, and the daily progress of the war. This explanation seemed satisfactory to Colonel Li, so when I met General Chang I elaborated on same and showed him how we kept our situation-map (I had an unmarked copy with me which I explained was only a copy of the map sold by the Chinese Postal Service) and told him that there was nothing secret about my visit, and that should I bring up or touch on anything which he felt was of a secret nature for him not to hesitate to so advise me, in order that I could go on to something else. I also told him to rest assured that nothing which I might see or hear would be given any publicity -- that my report was made to the Military Attache and Minister of our Legation, and that it was forbidden to discuss it outside of our circle. I further said that the "history" was studied by our War College and used as material for

war games. I stressed the recent visit to Marshals Yen and Feng which I made with you (Colonel Margetts) and the reception they accorded us. I feel that this explanation did much to remove the air of formality of my visit, and that the General talked much more freely than he would otherwise have done.

5. General Chang assured me that no southern troops were north of the Yellow River. I feel sure that this is true in so far as it applies to the area east of the Grand Canal (that to the west not being under General Chang's control), for I talked to several officers and enlisted men, as well as to railway personnel, and they all confirmed the General's statement. General Chang claimed to be holding the line as indicated on the attached map; he also is my source for indicating the rest of the line which is out of his sector. I do not believe his line extends as far east as he claims, for none of the men I subsequently talked to knew anything of troops farther east than Huimin (about 30 miles east of the railroad).

6. The General was particular in telling me that Tsinan had been evacuated in accordance with pre-arranged tactical plans, and that they had not suffered any undue losses of materiel or personnel in giving it up. He subsequently, in reply to a direct question, stated that the present number of men under his command was 80,000. When it is considered that the normal strength of his command should be around 150,000, it is most apparent that the previous reports as to their losses are quite true. The General later, in giving me the individual strength of his various units, gave me their total as being 250,000 -- obviously incompatible with his figure of 80,000; he later said that Kao Keui-tzu still held Changle with about 10,000 men and that three regiments of Feng Yu-hsi's troops were still at Taian (which is most doubtful). In view of his general attitude in discussing his strength and his contradictory statements and figures relative to same, I am convinced that their Tsinan losses were much greater than they care to admit. Observations of the rail transportation failed to reveal a single Kiaotsi railway locomotive and very few Kiaotsi cars, so I am equally convinced that their loss of supplies was also very large. Conversations with enlisted men indicated that their artillery-gun losses were very heavy. I also learned that all of the wounded which they had had in a field hospital in Tehchow were evacuated to Machang, Tientsin, and Paotingfu when Tsinan fell. In talking to people at Tehchow it appears that there was great confusion there when Tsinan was taken, so I am led to the conclusion that the "allies" suffered a severe defeat thereat, and feel certain that the Southern troops could have gone much farther north than they did, had they so desired.

7. I asked General Chang if any Shih Yu-san or Feng Yu-hsiang divisions had been sent into his area to assist in its defense, and he informed me to the contrary. In other conversations with officers and enlisted men I verified the General's statement as being true.

8. General Chang seemed most reluctant to authorize me to visit his front lines, pleading the danger and flooded condition of the country. I sensed embarrassment, so suggested that he permit me to go as far south on the railroad as he deemed wise. This suggestion apparently was most welcome, and he said that he would have a special train take me down the line the following morning. We carried on a general conversation until after midnight, and when I felt that I had learned all that I possibly could, I thanked the General for having been so generous with his time and apologized for having kept him up so late.

9. The next morning I was waited upon by Major Ma, a General Staff officer of General Chang. He advised me that he was to escort me on my trip down the railroad, and told me to bring my baggage along. We went south as far as Yucheng, and here I had an opportunity to observe a

communications unit. The impression gained was most unfavorable; no drill or work was being performed, and the appearance of the men was very poor. In all my observations of Chinese troops I have never seen any worse. Major Ma informed me that the trains did not go any farther south, so we started back. This surprised me, for having been told to bring my baggage I had expected to stay at some place closer to the front than P'ingyuan; imagine my surprise then when we did not even stop at P'ingyuan on our trip back, the train going on to Tehchow. Naturally I felt that General Chang was not anxious to be responsible for me any longer than he felt he had to.

10. Very little supplies were seen being moved into the P'ingyuan area. In later conversation with people at Tehchow I learned that the troops in the area consume about all of the local food supplies and that as a result of this the populace suffers accordingly. This led me to feel that the inadequacy of the supply of the troops was an indication of the financial stringency of the Shansi coffers, rather than of the transportation difficulties due to flooded terrain. At present the supply of the Left Wing forces is all down the Tsinpu to Tehchow where they have an army base. From here the supplies are moved south via the Grand Canal and via the railroad to the railhead at Yucheng, where animal-drawn and motor transportation take over. In this connection I observed a marked scarcity of motor transportation, and most of what I did see was in a deplorable condition.

11. I had no opportunity to make any direct observations of any communications systems. I was told that each Route Army headquarters had telephonic and wireless communications, all of which centered on Tehchow.

12. Upon my return to Tehchow I called upon Colonel Li and spent several hours talking to him. He gave me to understand that great confusion had existed there when Tsinan fell. At this place (Tehchow) I had an opportunity to observe about one regiment of recruits being drilled. The drill appeared well organized and carried out. All the men were being given "big sword" instruction; none of them had any rifles. These men were said to be Shih Yu-san recruits, and it was expected that they would be forwarded to his area upon completion of their recruit instruction.

13. I also saw at this place what were alleged to be four armored trains, two belonging to Yen Hsi-shan and two to Shih Yu-san. I do not believe that if all four were put together they would have made one complete train, as each train consisted of but one artillery car and a few loop-holed armored cars.

14. Before I left there, a train of infantry replacements arrived for General Chang Yin-wu. The men were supposed to have been trained soldiers sent down from Peiping and Paotingfu. They had very few arms and what few they did have were most unpresentable and of ancient and varied models. The great majority of the "men" were nothing but youths, and as a whole looked anything but soldiers. These "men" and those observed at Yucheng gave me the impression that the troops in this area are of a most inferior type, and that the "allies" will be very content to remain on the defensive here until the present conflict is settled elsewhere.

15. The following is the staff organization of the Left Wing :

Commander . . . Marshal Yen Hsi-shan (General Chang Yin-wu present acting-in-command)

1. The General Staff . . . . . (General Liu Shih-neng, Chief of Staff)
   - (Administration - Plans and Training
   - (Intelligence
   - (Communications (includes means of supply)
   - (Supply

2. Adjutant General Department . . (General Wang Tze-chiang in charge)
   - (Documentary Section
   - (Transportation Section
   - (Social Relations Section
   - (Miscellaneous Section

3. Judge Advocate Department

4. Medical Department

16. I left Tehchow for Peiping at 9:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September second, as I felt that there was nothing more that could be gained by my remaining away any longer. I returned hereto at 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, September 4, 1930.

17. As a result of my observations and conversations on this mission I have arrived at the following conclusions :

a. The "allies" lost heavily when Tsinan was recaptured by the South.

b. The Southern army has not established itself north of the Yellow River, in so far as the area east of the Grand Canal is concerned.

c. Some reason other than the troops along the Tsinpu prevented the Central Government forces from having moved on up the line and taking Tientsin and Peiping.

d. No offensive action is likely to be taken by either side in this area unless a decided change occurs on one of the other fronts.

Morris B. De Pass, Jr.

Morris B. De Pass, Jr.
Captain, Infantry, D. O. L.

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No. 7813 1st. Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China,
September 10, 1930. To : A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. Forwarded. This report is a clear exposition of conditions obtaining on the Tsinpu front as of September second. Previous to this date conflicting reports continued to arrive in Peiping to the effect that government troops had crossed the Yellow River and were moving on Tehchow and Tientsin, that Feng had sent divisions of the Kuominchun to the Tsinpu, that General Shih-Yu-San had been moved to the Tsinpu, that Yen was preparing to resume the offensive with a view to the recapture of Tsinanpu. All these reports proved to be propaganda without basis of fact. This report satisfactorily clears up the situation on this front for the time being.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

G-2 Report

6180

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SEP 15 1930
2657-J-276
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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 12 1930

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

First Army - Han Fu-chu.

20th Division	Sun Tung-hsuan	Kaomi	Shantung	20,000
22nd "	Ku Liang-min	Tsoshan	"	10,000
29th "	Tsao Fu-lin	"	"	10,000
53rd "	Li Yung-heng	Kaomi	"	8,000
Bodyguard Brig.	Lei Tai-ping	"	"	6,000
			Total	54,000

The above forces are said to have been defeated by the Shansi army or to have been withdrawn to Tsoshan and Kaomi, with exception of the 53rd Division which has recently arrived as reinforcements from Hupeh. It is also reported that the 64th Mixed Division under Ma Hung-kuei will be sent to reinforce this line.

Tsin-Pu Area in Southwestern Shantung - Ho Yueh-tsu, Field Commander.

13th Division	Hsia Tou-yin	Taian	Shantung	12,000
20th "	Hsu Ke-hsiang	"	"	10,000
21st "	Li Yun-chieh	"	"	8,000
46th "	Fan Hsi-chi	Tsining	"	14,000
55th "	Juan Chao-chang	"	"	12,000
57th "	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Kinsiang	"	10,000
64th Mix. Div.	Ma Hung-kuei	Laiwu	"	14,000
65th Division	Chen Yueh-han	Tawenkow	"	10,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Shih Chung-cheng	Yenchow	"	4,000
2nd " "	Chen Hsiao-sze	"	"	4,000
2nd " "	Liang Hung-en	Tsining	"	5,000
" "	Li Han-yuan	"	"	5,000
Cav. "	Ma Teng-chiao	Yenchow	"	5,000
			Total	113,000

Second Army - Liu Chih

1st Division	Hsu Ting-yao	Ningling	Honan	12,000
1st "	Feng Yi-pei	Liuho	"	10,000
2nd "	Ku Chu-tung	"	"	15,000
2nd "	Chang Chih-chung	Yungcheng	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Chi-cheng	Liuho	"	12,000
3rd "	Li Yung-lung	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
3rd "	Chien Ta-chun	Ningling	Honan	10,000
4th "	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Kweiteh	"	10,000
			Carried Forward	91,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7792 August 11, 1930.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Second Army (Continued)

		Brought Forward			91,000
5th	Division	Hsiung Shih-hui	Kweiteh	Honan	12,000
7th	"	Wang Chun	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
8th	"	Mao Ping-wen	Liuho	Honan	12,000
10th	"	Yang Sheng-chih	Taiho	Anhwei	12,000
11th	"	Ch'en Ch'eng	Kweiteh	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Chin Han-ting	Tangshan	"	12,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Kwoyang	Anhwei	12,000
52nd	"	Yeh Kai-hsing	Yingchow	"	13,000
66th	"	Liu Mao-en	Tangshan	Honan	10,000
2nd	Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Kwoyang	Anhwei	10,000
1st	" Brig.	An Chun-tsai	Liuho	Honan	6,000
12th	Ind. "	Hsu Sheng-yu	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	4,000
13th	" "	Hsu Chia-yu	"	"	5,000
1st	" Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Liuho	Honan	2,500
2nd	" " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500
3rd	" " "	Li Chung-kwei	"	"	2,500
				Total	230,500

The 4th Division under Ch'in Ch'ing-lin is a newly organized unit.

Third Army - Ho Cheng-chun

6th	Division	Chao Kuan-tao	Yencheng	Honan	12,000
9th	"	Chiang Ting-wen	"	"	12,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	"	12,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-chen	Nanyang	"	12,000
22nd	"	Lo Lin	Puchi	Hupeh	6,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Chowkiakow	Honan	10,000
47th	"	Shangkaun Yun-hsiang	"	"	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chwan	Yencheng	"	24,000
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	"	"	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Siangyang	Hupeh	12,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-ling	Shangshui	Honan	16,000
				Total	156,000

Central Government Troops

17th	Army - Liu Chen-nien		Chefoo	Shantung	 35,000
1st	Division	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
1st	"	Chang Chen	Foochow	Fukien	9,500
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shukow	"	8,000
2nd	"	Yang Ting-chung	Wuchow	Kwangsi	8,000
5th	"	Kung Pin-fan	Siushui	Kiangsi	8,000
9th	"	Chang Yu-kwang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
9th	"	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000
			Carried Forward		57,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Central Government Troops (Continued) Brought Forward 57,500

10th	Division	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihman	Hupeh	4,000	
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Yuping	Kweichow	10,000	
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000	
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000	
13th	"	Teng Ying	Nanchang	Kiangsi	8,000	
15th	"	Ho Chien	Changsha	Hunan	7,000	
16th	"	Lo Pan-ying	"	"	7,000	
16th	"	Yang Ting-chung	Wuchow	Kwangsi	8,000	
18th	"	Chang Hwei-tsan	Nanchang	Kiangsi	12,000	
19th	"	Liu Chien-hsu	Yiyang	Hunan	10,000	
25th	"	Tai Ming-ch'uan	Hankow	Hupeh	8,000	
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien	11,000	
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Waichow	Kwangtung	8,000	
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Siujen	Kwangsi	8,000	
60th	"	Tsai Ting-kan	Pukow	Kiangsu	8,000	
61st	"	Chiang Kwang-nai	"	"	8,000	
62nd	"	Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000	
63rd	"	Li Yang-ching	Yangso	Kwangsi	8,000	
	Ind. Brig.	Chang Jui-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung	6,000	
	" "	Huang Jen-huan	Pinglo	Kwangsi	6,000	
1st	" "	Wu Chung-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000	
1st	" "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chwanchow	Fukien	2,500	
2nd	" "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500	
2nd	" "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000	
3rd	" "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000	
5th	" "	Pan Shan-chai	Hwoshan	Anhwei	2,000	
7th	" "	Li Ch'i	Anking	"	2,000	
8th	" "	Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000	
15th	" "	Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000	
1st	Brigade	Lin Chung	Fuming	Fukien	4,000	NAVAL CONSTB.
2nd	"	Lin Shou-kuo	Mamoi	"	4,000	" "
Bodyguard Brig.		Yu Chi-shih	Kweiteh	Honan	5,000	
Gendarmerie		Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
Training Regt.		Hsia Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,000	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces)						
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)				Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.)						
				Total	273,100	

The 2nd, 5th and 8th Divisions under Yang Ting-chung, Kung Pin-fan and Tai Chi respectively are newly organized units.

The 25th Division under Tai Ming-ch'uan has been reorganized from the 9th Division formerly under Ying Cheng-kang.

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 861,600

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	Chang Fa-kuei	Kweilin	Kwangsi	20,000
7th " "	Yang Teng-hui	"	"	15,000
8th " "	Chow Lan	Kanchow	Kiangsi	15,000
15th " "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	Kwangsi	15,000
15th Division	Li Ming-jui	Nanan	Kiangsi	10,000
16th "	Pai Chung-hsi	Liuchow	Kwangsi	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Hsu Chi-ming	Kweilin	"	4,000
2nd " "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000
			Total	95,000

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	Ma Hung-pin	Chengchow	Honan	12,000
26th "	Tien Chin-kai	Yencheng	"	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi	"	"	12,000
8th Cav. Brig.	Chao Hsi-pin	"	"	4,000
			Total	40,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-cheng, Field Commander.

9th Division	Feng Chih-an	Suichow	Honan	12,000
21st "	Liang Kuan-ying	Liuho	"	12,000
22nd "	Chen Hsing-ming	Checheng	"	12,000
29th "	Cheng Hsi-hsien	Suichow	"	12,000
30th "	Chi Hung-chang	Liuho	"	12,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Cheng Ta-chang	Checheng	"	8,000
Pistoal & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	Suichow	"	5,000
			Total	73,000

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Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th Division	P'ang Ping-hsun	Fukow	Honan	12,000
23rd "	Ma Chi	Chengchow	"	12,000
3rd Mix. Brig.	Chao Kung-wen	Fukow	"	5,000
6th " "	Liu Yu-lin	Kaifeng	"	4,000
			Total	33,000

Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st New Div.	Kuo Chih-kang	Lanfeng	Honan	12,000
2nd " "	Tung Yu-chen	Kihsien	"	12,000
23rd Division	Wei Feng-lou	Kaifeng	"	12,000
28th "	Sung Che-yuan	Kihsien	"	12,000
			Total	48,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th Division	Chang Tse-chung	Luyi	Honan	12,000
31st "	Sun Lien-chung	"	"	12,000
Training "	Wang Kuan-hua	"	"	12,000
5th Mix. Brig.	Pai Chien-shan	"	"	5,000
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Teh-shan	"	"	8,000
			Total	49,000

Army Reserves - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

18th Division	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Sian	Shensi	12,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Men Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd " "	Chen Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th " "	Ma Lin	"	"	5,000
9th Cav. "	Su Yu-sheng	Chungwei	"	4,000
			Total	31,000

Total Second Group of Armies - 274,000

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

First Route Army - Sun Chu, Field Commander.

1st Army Corps - Sun Chu.

1st Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Lipachi	Honan	5,000
2nd "	Tao Chen-wu	"	"	5,000
3rd "	Ma Yen-show	"	"	5,000
			Carried Forward	15,000

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First Route Army (Continued)

			Brought Forward		15,000

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang

16th	Division	Wen Yu-ju	Yuanshih	Hopei	5,000
17th	"		"	"	5,000
18th	"		"	"	5,000
				Total	30,000

Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta

10th	Division	Cheng Chang-chieh	Taian	Shantung	5,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	5,000
12th	"		"	"	5,000

10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi

28th	Division	Yeh Chi-chieh	Taian	"	5,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ching	"	"	5,000
30th	"	Chen Ping-chien	"	"	5,000
28th	Brigade	Yuan Tseng-ching	Tientsin	Hopei	6,000
				Total	36,000

Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou

4th	Division	Chow Sze-cheng	Liuho	Honan	5,000
5th	"	Chang Wan-shun	"	"	5,000
6th	"		"	"	5,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an

19th	Division	Lu Ying-lin	Lanfeng	"	5,000
20th	"	Liu Tien-kwei	"	"	5,000
21st	"	Kuo Tsung-fen	"	"	6,000
				Total	31,000

Fourth Route Army - Chang Ying-wu, Field Commander.

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

13th	Division	An Hsi-ku	Taian	Shantung	6,000
14th	"	To Chen	"	"	6,000
15th	"	Chai Hsueh-ming	"	"	5,000
				Carried Forward	17,000

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Fourth Route Army (Continued)

		Brought Forward			17,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu					
25th	Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Weihsien	Shantung	5,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	5,000
27th	"	Kuo Wei-fan	"	"	5,000
				Total	32,000

Fifth Route Army - Chang Huei-chao, Field Commander.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo					
7th	Division	Ho Shao-nan	Fangtze	Shantung	6,000
8th	"	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	5,000
9th	"	Wang Ting-ying	"	"	5,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao					
22nd	Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tunga	"	5,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	5,000
24th	"		"	"	5,000
				Total	31,000

Sixth Route Army - Feng Yu-hsi, Field Commander.

15th Army Corps - Feng Yu-hsi					
1st	Brigade	Li Ting-hsiu	Feicheng	Shantung	6,000
2nd	"	Wang Fu	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Liu Chao-tang	"	"	6,000
18th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan					
10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Taian	"	6,000
11th	"	Fan Kang-lan	"	"	6,000
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	6,000
				Total	36,000

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Cavalry Forces in Honan - Chao Cheng-show, Field Commander.

2nd	Division	Kuo Feng-shan	Lipachi	Honan	3,000
5th	"	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	4,000
6th	"	Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	4,000
				Total	11,000

Miscellaneous Troops Directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

16th Army Corps - Yang Cheng-yuan

4th	Brigade	Liu Kuang-tou	Taiyuan	Shansi	6,000
5th	"	Li Chia-lin	"	"	6,000
6th	"	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	6,000
					18,000

17th Army Corps - Chow Shih-liem

7th	Brigade	Liu Feng-chi	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	6,000
8th	"	Tu K'ung	"	"	6,000
9th	"	Ma Liang	"	"	6,000
					18,000

Training	Div.	Li Ching-jung	Peiping	Hopei	8,000
Bodyguard	Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	Shansi	6,000
1st	Cav. Div.	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengcheng	"	6,000
3rd	" "	Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	Chahar	4,000
4th	" "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
					28,000

Total 64,000

Total Third Group of Armies - 271,000

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Fourth Group of Armies.
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps	- Sun Kuang-chien	Tsaochow	Shantung	15,000
2nd Army Corps	- Mi Wen-ho	Tsaohsien	"	15,000
3rd Army Corps	- Shu Ming-ch'i	Kaocheng	"	15,000
4th Army Corps	- Sheng K'e	Tunga	"	15,000
				60,000

Total Fourth Group of Armies - 60,000

Eighth Group of Armies.
(Teng Pao-shan)

1st Division	Sun Chen-hua	Linying	Honan	6,000
2nd "	Chiao Wen-tien	Shangshui	"	6,000
3rd "	Wang Hsueh-chu	"	"	6,000
4th "	Sun Chang-jung	Chowkiakow	"	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.	Chiang Tse-chen	Hsuchang	"	4,000
Bodyguard "	Kuan Huai-tung	"	"	4,000
			Total	32,000

12th Army Corps - Jen Ying-chi

1st Division	Chang Ching-shan	Chowkiakow	Honan	8,000
2nd "	An Yung-fu	"	"	8,000
			Total	16,000

15th Army Corps	- Liu Kuei-tang	Chowkiakow	Honan	15,000
25th Army Corps	- Wang Cheng	Yuchow	Honan	14,000

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 77,000

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Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying	Checheng	Honan	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-ting	"	"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Yueh-ting	"	"	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ching	Taikang	"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Kuei-pin	"	"	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang	"	"	8,000
				Total	48,000

The above troops which have been surrounded for sometime by the National Government Army in Pochow, Anhwei, are reported to have been relieved by the Kuo Min Chun, and are now operating at points as given above.

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

36th Army Corps - Sung Tien-tsai

35th	Division	Li Kuang-lung	Hsuchang	Honan	6,000
36th	"	Han Wen-ying	"	"	6,000
38th	"	Sung Chao-kuei	"	"	6,000

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

43rd	Division	Li Wen-ju	Linying	"	6,000
44th	"	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	6,000
45th	"	Chao Mien-ying	"	"	6,000
Ind.	Division	Chao Ch'ing-hai	Linying	"	7,000
				Total	43,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Chun-jung

1st	Division	Pao Ping-ch'ing	Kihsien	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	Ying Chung-ming	"	"	12,000
3rd	"	Shen T'i-ch'eng	"	"	12,000
				Total	36,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju

24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	Taikang	Honan	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin K'wei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000
				Total	24,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 151,000

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	"	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Lungchow	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang.

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Tsao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	Tang Shih-tsun	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kuei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

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Szechwan (Continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
			Total	10,000

23rd Army under Kuo Ju-tung

1st Division	Liao Hai-t'ao	Hwangchow	Hupeh	6,000
2nd "	Liu Kung-tu	"	"	7,000
3rd "	Chen Lan-ting	"	"	7,000
			Total	20,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Trps	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Tang Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Chen Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under Tien Sung-yao

1st Route	Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungchwan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	Tang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tseng Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-chung	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

	Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 264,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 320,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000	
2nd "	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tahushan	"	10,000	
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Ichow	"	10,000	
4th "	Liu Yi-fei	Chinchow	"	10,000	
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Chungtsienso	"	10,000	
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Changli	Hopei	11,000	*
12th "	Chang Ting-shu	Chinchow	Liaoning	10,000	
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000	
19th "	Sun Chao-yin	Panshan	"	11,000	
20th "	Huang Hsien-shang	Taonan	"	11,000	
22nd "	Huang Chin-chung	Unknown		10,000	
23rd "	Liu Nai-chang	Yungping	Hopei	10,000	*
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changtu	Liaoning	10,000	
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Kaokiao	"	10,000	
27th "	Ma Ting-fu	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000	
1st Cav. Brig.	Kuo Hsi-peng	Tungliao	Liaoning	6,000	
3rd " "	Chang Shu-seng	Shenyang	"	6,000	
1st " Div.	Cheng Tse-sheng	"	"	8,000	
			Total	174,000	

* Troops, stationed inside the Great Wall, are under command of Yu Hsueh-chung.

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua.

1st Art. Regt.	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000	
2nd " "	Chinchow	Liaoning	6,000	
3rd " "	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000	
4th " "	Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000	
5th " "	Peichen	Liaoning	6,000	
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000	
7th Heavy A.R.	Peichen	"	6,000	
8th " " "	"	"	6,000	
		Total	48,000	

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling.

6 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu and Kaiyuan.		4,800
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.		800
	Total	5,600

Total Liaoning Forces 227,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang.

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengtze	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Kwei-lin	Kwanchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Chao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ninguta	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ching	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000

Total 81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin.

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-ping	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000

Total 57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin.

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-ting	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchwan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500

Total 48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 414,100

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TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,524,200

CHINA (MILITARY)

Situation Report
(July 27-August 12, 1930, inclusive)

2.a, Narrative of Events.

The capture and sack of Changsha by Communist Armies is the outstanding event during this period. From July 27 to August 6, the city was in the hands of organized forces of Communists who burned and laid waste property of the Provincial Government and of well-to-do Chinese as well as that of foreign enterprises. For a time the menance threatened Hankow and despite the despatch of Government troops to the Wuhan area it is probable that Hankow would have met a like fate but for the presence thereat of foreign force.

Prolonged rains and excessive heat in the last few days of July and the first few days of August confined the conflict in Shantung and Honan to minor engagements. Events in Shantung brought about the announced resignation and retirement of General Han Fu-chu, but he was apparently persuaded by his leading officers and by promises from Nanking from carrying out his intentions. To effset the Shansi advantage in Shantung, Nanking pushed up on the Tsinpu; this offensive enabled Han Fu-chu, who had been reinforced with Government troops, sent in through Tsingtao, to advance west. With a large Government concentration so far north of Hsuchow, the Allies along the Lunghai also launched an offensive and appear to be trying to hold the Government forces at Kweiteh and Tangshan while Feng pushes south, avoiding the strong defenses of Hsuchow, to establish himself on the Tsinpu at some point between Suchow and Pengpu.

The situation on the Kinhan has been quiet.

Mukden continues neutral.

b. The Shantung Front.

(1) Operations on the Kiaotsi Line. Shansi having dislodged Han Fu-chu from Tsinan has had to divide her forces and operate along the Kiaotsi as well as the Tsinpu. This has necessitated the employment of every available man and Yen has had to draw heavily on his troops from the rear; he has sent into Shantung recently about 6,000 (and probably more) Pao-an-tui;(garrison troops recruited to maintain order while regular troops are engaged at the front) this demonstrates the extremity to which Shansi has been put in providing reinforcements. While rains slowed up the military operations on the Kiaotsi during late July, the Shansi faction made repeated efforts to reach an understanding with Han Fu-chu, but they found him unyielding. Strong efforts were also made to secure the assistance of General Liu Chen-nien. General Liu has played both parties to his probable advantage; were he to give positive support to either side it is very likely that his action would decide the Shantung issue. Following the unsuccessful efforts to reach an understanding with Han, hostilities were renewed. Additional Shansi troops were moved in and the offensive taken; the left of their line was gradually pushed forward in the vicinity of Shewkuang (some 15 miles north of Tsingchow). It is reported that due to the defection of a brigade of troops entrusted with the defense of Showkuang and said to be part of the command of General Ku Liang-ming (Commander of Han's 22nd Division) that the line held by Han at Tzuho collapsed and the advance of the Shansi left beyond Showkuang and towards the railway was thus unopposed and necessitated the abandon-

ment of the Tzuho line on the night of July 27, and the withdrawal of Han's forces from Tsingchow to Weihsien on the 28th. The retreat is said to have been orderly and rapid, due to good discipline which was maintained and to ample rolling stock. As a result of this defection, as well as the surrender of other small units, General Han has probably lost six to seven thousand men; however his own Division, the 20th, which is the backbone of his army probably remains intact. On the 28th General Han issued a circular wire of resignation. On the 30th his principal officers, with the exception of General Ku Liang-ming, issued a circular wire urging him to reconsider his decision and to remain in command of his troops. Nanking lost no time in sending General Ma Hung-kuei to try to persuade him to remain in office and most likely assured him of money, supplies and reinforcements. The 53rd Division was at once ordered to Shantung, via Tsingtao, to reinforce Han and subsequently the 59th and 28th divisions are also said to have been sent direct from Canton to Tsingtao as well as three other divisions from Pukow; these troops to operate against the Shansi forces on the Kiaotsi. These reinforcements began to arrive at Tsingtao in large numbers on the night of July 30. To relieve the pressure on Han, Marshal Chiang began a drive up the Tsinpu on the 2nd of July. Han and General Li Yun-heng (Commander of the 53rd Division) assumed the offensive and drove the Shansi forces beyond the old line of the Tzuho river to the west bank of the Yangho river, (a stream not shown on available maps but understood to be west of Tsingchow). This drive along the Kiaotsi in conjunction with that on the Tsinpu may result in the recapture of Tsinan and the re-establishment of Nanking prestige in Shantung.

It is reported that Mr. Hu Ju-yu who was appointed by Nanking as mayor of Tsingtao more than a month ago, has decided to assume office. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is a "sworn brother" of Mr. Hu. For some time after his appointment Mr. Hu would not indicate whether or not he would accept the office, but his recent actions indicate that he will assume office shortly. It is reported that he has been advised by his "sworn brother" as well as Marshal Yen to accept the post; his acceptance will very likely increase Nanking's influence in Shantung.

The heavy drain of troops from Yen's rear is resulting in brigandage to such an extent as has not existed for some time in the Tientsin-Peking area. While there does not appear to be any organized bands in the area, still the number of robberies and kidnappings steadily increase and is of growing concern.

(2) Operations of the Tsinpu Line. The Nanking activities displayed on this line lead one to believe that the long announced offensive is at last getting under way. During late July heavy troop movements were made to this area and by August 1, approximately 120,000 troops had been concentrated at Yenchow, where they took the offensive on August 2. This offensive was directed against Taian but it is believed that Tsinan is the main objective. Shansi gave way before the drive and by August 9 had retreated to Chiehshiu (10 miles north of Taian) at the same time giving way to the attack of Han Fu-chu on the Kiaotsi. Chiang is said to have brought to Hsuchow one aviation squadron under the personal command of Colonel Chang Hui-chang (Field Commander of the National Air Forces and Head of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of War). Systematic air raids are reported as being conducted over Chengchow and Kaifeng, and while possibly not inflicting any great damage, yet the reconnaissance which they are able to make on such trips is naturally of decided advantage to Chiang; an advantage of the utmost importance should he meet with unexpected reverses north of Yenchow.

c. The Honan Front.

(1) Operations on the Lunghai. The heat of late July was not conducive to active operations by either side. With the Nanking offensive north of Yenchow, the Allies on August 4 launched their third general offensive with Kweiteh and Tangshan as objectives. They claim the capture of Kweiteh on August 8, but it is not believed that they have taken it; however they are making a strong push and appear to be working troops around to the south and rear of the town in the hopes of cutting off the troops stationed thereat. At the same time that Kweiteh and Tangshan are being attacked, Marshal Feng is said to be directing seven of his divisions south of the Lunghai with the object of avoiding the defenses of Hsuchow and of advancing southeast towards the Tsinpu so as to sieze it between Suchow and Pengpu. Information at present is not available to verify the report of this attack by Feng to the south--if true, it is a real menance to Chiang's rear--but then on the other hand, with the aerial reconnoissance advantage which Chiang enjoys, he might at the proper moment be able to retake Kaifeng and thus deprive the Kuominchun of an important base and administer a decisive defeat to Feng. Reliable information concerning this action along the Lunghai is lacking but it is believed that the present situation will prove to be one of the most interesting phases of the conflict and very apt to lead to important results.

(2) Operations on the Kinhan. No serious fighting has taken place on this front during the period covered by this report.

d. South China. The "Ironsides" and Kwangsi forces in northern and central Kwangsi are still being engaged by Government troops at Kweilin and Liuchow. The attack is being directed by General Chen Chi-tang, Commander of the 8th Route Army. One division of Kwangtung troops and Hunan expeditionary force are said to have surrounded Kweilin and to have effected its capture on or about August 1; the defenders retreating towards Liuchow. Very little information is at hand regarding the true situation in this area, but it is believed to be favorable to the Government forces.

e. Communist Activities. The rapidly growing force of Communism evidenced its cohesion and established itself as an organization which will have to be dealt with by whatever government is in power in China by its capture and loot of Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province. The city was attacked by Red troops under Chu Teh (who embraced communism while a student in Berlin), Mao Tse-tung (who studied for a brief period in the Peking National University), and Ho Lung; they numbered about 20,000 but had only about 8,000 rifles. Four regiments of government troops, under General Ho Chien, defended the city from July 22nd to July 26th. Ho Chien ordered the 19th Division from Hengchow and also took five regiments from the anti-Kwangsi expedition for reinforcements, but before reinforcements arrived, about 400 Communists in hiding in the city, which they had entered disguised as refugees, emerged from their hiding places and set fire to the buildings of the Provincial Government and the Bureau of Public Safety. When the Government troops outside of the city learned that the Communists had effected an entrance into it they assumed the defensive and awaited the arrival of the 19th Division before launching a counter-attack. The main force of the Communists entered the city and proceeded to sack it in a systematic manner; houses of the well-to-do people were all looted and their belongings carried out into the streets and distributed to the rabble, after which the houses were generally burned; the occupants if captured were murdered or held as hostages. Gaols were opened and prisoners released. The brother of General Ho Chien and several officials were brutally beheaded. Government and foreign property seem to have been signalled out for destruction. The reported intention of the Communists to attack Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi province, and also to

attack Wuhan, may have influenced Nanking to employing sufficient troops to effect the recapture of Changsha, as well as of preserving the peace and safety of Nanchang, Kiukiang, Wuhan and Hankow; at any rate, two gunboats and government planes were quickly sent to assist in the recovery of Changsha; the 22nd Division was ordered thereto and General Lo Lin, who was engaged in bandit suppression in northern Hupeh, was also ordered to send one brigade to co-operate with Ho Chien. Efforts to retake the city were resisted but by August 3, most of the Communists had left it and only small groups, manning machine-gun nests, remained behind; the main body moved eastwards, via Liuyang, and appear to have made for Kiangsi rather than to have been making for Hankow as was at first feared. On August 5, Ho Chien recaptured Changsha.

Six regiments of Nanking troops are said to have reached Hankow on the 5th and that the situation there then became normal. Order in the Wuhan area was ensured by stationing ten battalions of the Gendarmerie force at various important points, while two gunboats stood by in the harbor. The 14th Independent Brigade under General Pang Chi-piao, was moved to Hankow from southwest Hupeh and two additional brigades were also ordered thereto; these units were to be stationed at Wuchang, Nanhu, Hankow, and Chiakow. A total of three divisions were stationed in the Wuhan area for its protection. Gunboats patrolled along the Siang River in the vicinity of Yochow and an armored train was despatched along the Hunan section of the Canton-Hankow railway. A reward of $50,000 has been offered for the head of Chu Teh, the Communist Leader, and $100,000 for him alive.

The communists under Chu Teh were reported as marching on Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi. This threat was met by General Lu Ti-ping Chief of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, by massing the entire 18th Division and the newly organized 13th Division, numbering about 10,000 men at Nanchang. General Lu is said to have taken all possible precautions to repell the Red forces in his area, who were reported as planning to raid Nanchang, Hsuchiafu, and Kiukiang. To date none of these places appear to have been attacked.

Unconfirmed information available at present gives the following Red units supposedly under Chu Teh:

(1)	2nd Red Army	Ho Lung)	Captured Changsha.
	5th Red Army	Peng Te-huai)	
(2)	4th Red Army	Mao Tse-tung)	
	3rd Red Army	Tsai Chung-hsi)	Were said to have been
	16th Red Army	? ? ?)	charged with the capture of Nanchang.
(3)	1st Red Army	Hsu Chi-sheng)	Were said to have been
	6th Red Army	K'uang Chi-hsun)	charged with the cap-
	8th Red Army	Huang Kung-lieh)	ture of Wuhan.

Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to secure the true story of the capture of Changsha by the Communists and its recapture by Government forces, but it is believed that sufficient truth is contained in the foregoing to warrant the statement that the Red menance is now more of an ORGANIZATION than a MOVEMENT and that as long as civil wars exist that the organization will become more concrete. Formerly many outrages have been committed by soldiery and labelled "Communism"; now however with

approximately 45,000 men in central China with about 30,000 rifles, field guns and wireless and led by men of higher education, it seems clear that in this organization there is a genuine effort towards communism.

The Red Army of China appears definitely to exist and bids fair to play a prominent role on the military stage of China and will very likely affect her world relations.

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, August 14, 1930. To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. Reviewed and concurred in:

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19

Report No. 7792
Aug. 11, 1930

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject : Situation Report

September 9 to 22, 1930, inclusive

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

As this report is submitted Shansi troops are withdrawing into their native province, Fengtien is moving into the vacated areas with newly organized forces (brigades assembled into armies), and, according to reports, the Kuominchun are preparing to disengage themselves from Honan for retirement towards Shensi; hence it is not possible at this time to indicate the changes which have occurred in the distribution of forces as listed in Report No. 7815, this office, since date same was submitted, September 10, 1930.

2. a. Narrative of Events

The Nanking preparation for offensive operations against Kaifeng and Chengchow, as indicated in the last Situation Report, culminated in severe fighting on both the Lunghai and Kinhan fronts during the period of September 12 - 16. "Allied" propaganda has never been more insidious than during this time and no definite reliable information is at hand as to the outcome of this action, but it is believed that the Kuominchun had to give way before the Southern armies, and that the Central Government's success was the deciding factor in the subsequent Mukden intervention.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, though ardently "wooed" by both Nanking and the Allies, managed to preserve his policy of neutrality until September 18, when he issued a circular telegram advocating cessation of hostilities and followed the wire with the despatch of troops inside the Great Wall. This decision of the Young Marshal resulted from a formal conference of all the Manchurian leaders, which was held in Mukden on Wednesday, September 17. The formal conference came after informal exchanges of opinions between Chang Hsueh-liang and his military and political advisers in conferences which they had been having since September 10, relative to what positive attitude, if any, the Three Eastern Provinces should take in the present conflict.

Mukden, at the present writing, has as yet made no public announcement as to their reasons for moving into the Tientsin-Peiping area, but it is the opinion of this office that Yen, realizing his own defeat and the probable ultimate defeat of Feng also, decided to salvage as much of the wreckage of his military machine as he could by retiring into the haven of his province, Shansi, and that as a result of Yen's decision to retire, Mukden was forced to decide to move into the area vacated by the Shansi army. This of course is pure speculation and the real reasons for Fengtien's action is for the future to reveal.

It is momentarily expected that the Young Marshal will publish some sort of peace proposals which will enable all to "save face" by acquiescence. In the meantime, however, reports indicate that Nanking is not letting up on the offensive against the Kuominchun.

It is reported that General Shih Yu-san and General Han Fu-chu have announced that they will cooperate with the Mukden forces and that Generals Ma Hung-kuei and Liu Chen-nien have declined to do so. The nature

of this cooperation, and just what it will amount to is of course at present unknown and can hardly be commented upon until Mukden has announced itself.

Operations in Kwangsi and in Kwangtung are as obscure as ever, but believed to continue localized thereat and of no immediate menace to the Central Government's campaign in the north.

Szechwan generals are said to have joined against Nanking but as long as General Liu Hsiang, commanding Chungking, remains loyal to Nanking (and there is every indication that he will) it is not likely that any threat from that province will materialize.

Increased communists' activities in Hunan and Kiangsi have presented a military problem which approached major proportions, but the despatch of government troops, gunboats and airplanes to assist the provincial authorities appears to have maintained a situation favorable to Nanking.

Red forces in the Changsha area are said to have been administered a severe defeat, and it is said that their leader, Chu Teh, has died of wounds. Drastic action has been employed in dealing with captured communists and suspects and it is believed that this has arrested the movement for the present, at least.

b. <u>The Shantung Front</u>

No offensive operations have taken place on this front during this period.

On September 13 it was reported that Generals Ma Hung-kuei, Chen Tiao-yuan, Liu Chen-nien, and Han Fu-chu had agreed to a peace pact, and that they were going to make Shantung a "neutral zone".

On September 14 a regiment of Shansi troops passed through Tientsin from Tehchow to Shihchiachuang and on the following day another regiment made the same change of station. Unconfirmed reports at that time also reported that Shansi forces were moving across country towards Shihchiachuang.

On September 18 it was reported that Shih Yu-san had asked the Central Government to reaccept him into the fold but that his request had been denied.

On September 19 Yen Hsi-shan published a circular telegram, dated September 14, in which he accused the South of having employed poisonous gas, stating that because of same he felt that he had to retreat in order to save the people from further horrors of war.

On September 21 Fengtien troops commenced to move into the Tientsin-Peiping area and it is said that they are taking over control of Hopei Province. The force which Mukden has sent within the Wall is organized into two armies. The first army, under General Yu Hsueh-chung, consists of the 5th, 26th and 27th Brigades, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Artillery Regiment; this force, it is said, will garrison Tientsin and the Tsinpu as far south as Tehchow. The second army, under General Wang Shu-ch'ang, consists of the 2nd, 4th and 25th Brigades, and the 2nd Artillery Regiment; this force, it is said, will garrison Peiping and the Pingsui and Kinhan lines as far as Kalgan and Paotingfu respectively.

All of the foregoing factors strongly indicate that the Shantung Front has ceased to exist as a war zone, and that if peace between Nanking and the Kuominchun does not eventuate from the action taken by Mukden, Nanking will probably have additional units which can be moved from this front to Honan for service against Feng.

c. The Honan Front

During the period of this report the operations along the Lunghai and Kinhan lines have become so coordinated as to warrant the former Lunghai and Kinhan Fronts being considered as one -- the Honan Front.

Troop concentrations, indicated in the last Situation Report, resulted in twelve divisions of Central Government troops being distributed along the Honan Front, along and to the south of the Lunghai, with fifteen divisions to the east and west of the Kinhan. The Kuominchun and "allies" opposed this force with nineteen divisions. The Chengchow-Kaifeng terrain being so highly organized, it appears that Chiang's plan of action is to push west of the Kinhan and seize the Lunghai at some point west of Chengchow, in conjunction with general attacks on Hsuchang and Kaifeng. Serious fighting is said to have developed on September 7 and continued through the 16th, the results of which have as yet not been learned, but it is believed that the Kuominchun were forced to retire to a second line of defense as indicated on the attached map. A foreign news agency reports that the Kuominchun are making preparations to retire towards Shensi. It is not believed, however, that the South will be able to inflict a serious defeat, if any, on Feng in his present position, and if Yen will continue the service of supply it is felt that Feng can maintain himself against the present odds.

d. South China

Reports are conflicting as to the outcome of the Kwangsi-Kwangtung war. The main action just now seems to center around Nanning. Kwangtung forces are reported as having started a general offensive against Nanning, Kueilin and Liuchow. The Central Government is said to have promised $500,000 as monthly expenses to Yunnan for the operation of their troops, in conjunction with Kwangtung, against the Kwangsi "rebels". It seems certain that the Kwangsi forces in Nanning are under heavy siege. Most foreigners have evacuated the city, and reports are that the food and water supply is none too plentiful; however, the place is said to be strongly defended and capable of holding out (as of September 13) for two months.

The "Ironsides" and some Kwangsi forces are reported (September 18) as having entered south Hunan but nothing definite is known of their size or location, even if the report be true. Whatever success such a force might have in operating in Hunan is most doubtful for it is believed that the "anti-communists" forces already sent to the Wuhan and Changsha areas would be sufficient, with slight reinforcements, to take care of any such menace.

Two Szechwan forces of 30,000 and 60,000 each are said (September 18) to have been mobilized and to be ready to start down river against the Central Government. It is not believed that these troops could force their passage through Chungking, for that port is held for Nanking by General Liu Hsiang, whose loyalty seems certain.

In general it may be said that the Government's position in the major conflict in Honan does not appear to be seriously embarrassed by the present situation in South China.

e. The Communist Activities

The Fourth and Fifth Communist Armies under Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai, respectively, operating in north-east Hunan, appear to have occasioned considerable concern to the Central Government during the period of this report. Judging from the number of government units sent General Ho Chien and his provincial forces, and the energetic measures which appear to have been taken by General Ho Ying-ching (Chief-of-Staff

of Chiang Kai-shek), who was placed in charge of the "Communist-Bandit Suppression" in Hupeh, Hunan and Kiangsi, one is led to believe that a serious threat to Hankow must have existed for a while.

Changsha, ever since its recapture from the Reds (August 5) has never been entirely free from the Communist menace. Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai assembled their forces in the vicinity of Chuchow (south of Changsha) and Liuyang, and presented a serious threat to Changsha; this, in conjunction with the presence of other bands in the neighborhood of Shasi, on the Yangtze, as well as those in northwest Kiangsi, appears to have caused Nanking no little concern. General Ho Ying-ching, who had some time before been appointed to take charge of the operations against the forces of disorder in the three provinces of Hupeh, Hunan and Kiangsi, called a conference on August 27 at Hankow to formulate appropriate measures for the suppression of communist-bandits in those provinces. It was decided at this meeting to garrison Changsha with the 15th, 19th, and 20th Divisions and the 106th Battalion, and to garrison the area between Liuyang and Changsha with Hunan Provincial units.

Two divisions were ordered down from the northern front to assist in the anti-communist operations; the 3d Training Division was given charge of the Hankow-Yochow section of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the 50th Division sent to augment the garrison in the Nanchang-Kuiking region. Two brigades of the 18th Division in Kiangsi were moved to the Tungku-Wantsai area to cooperate with the Hunan forces in subjugating the outlaws. The 10th and 5th, newly organized Hupeh Divisions, and the 3d Independent Brigade, were stationed in the region between Yochow and Changsha. The Central Government despatched one gunboat and one airplane to Changsha for duty thereat.

The foregoing dispositions were completed as of about September 1, and an attack was launched on September 2 against the positions of Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai. The success of this offensive against the Red positions is doubtful for the 5th Division was withdrawn from Yochow and returned to Changsha, and four government gunboats and five additional planes were sent to Changsha to assist in holding the city. While this action was going on, the treaty port of Shasi, on the Yangtze, was threatened on September 7 by other communist bands. Two government gunboats were sent there to assist the local defenders. The threat seems to have been warded off and the city held for Nanking. On September 8 another gunboat is said to have been sent to Changsha and on the 10th it was announced that the 33d and 13th Government Divisions would be employed in the effort to exterminate the Hunan communists.

On September 11 Ho Ying-ching claims to have administered a severe defeat to the bandit troops and to have broken them up into small bands; however, it is believed that Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai still hold their positions around Chuchow and Luiyang - Liling, respectively. At any rate, the forces being employed against the communist troops appear sufficient to cope with them and it is quite likely that Ho Ying-ching will soon be able to subdue them, if he has not done so already.

The apparent determined effort of the Central Government to suppress the armed forces of communism was probably influenced by the plots discovered within the walls of the capital itself, as noted in the previous Situation Report. Consular reports are to the effect that it appears reasonable to surmise that the plot discovered contained a more serious threat than the government authorities cared to have become known. The press stated that twenty of those arrested were convicted and executed; however, a Consular report from Nanking advises that over a hundred were executed, and that the executions were not public.

In Wuchang and Hankow public executions have taken place nearly every day and it is probable that more than one innocent life has been snuffed out with the stroke of the beheading knife, but unless such stern measures are continued the communist movement can hardly be eradicated.

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

WAR DEPARTMENT

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff.

First Army - Han Fu-chu

20th Division	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Tsinan	Shantung	10,000
20th "	Sun T'ung-hsuan	Tehchow	"	20,000
22nd "	Ku Liang-min	Huimin	"	10,000
29th "	Ts'ao Fu-lin	Yucheng	"	10,000
Bodyguard Brig.	Lei T'ai-p'ing	Tsinan	"	6,000
			Total	56,000

Tsin-Pu Area in Southwestern Shantung - Ho Yueh-tsu, Field Commander.

1st Division	Ma Ch'uan-liang	Tungchang	Shantung	8,000
21st "	Li Yun-chieh	Changtsing	"	8,000
64th "	Ma T'eng-ch'iao	Tunga	"	14,000
65th "	Ch'en Yueh-han	Taian	"	10,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Shih Chung-ch'eng	Yenchow	"	4,000
2nd " "	Ch'en Hsiao-sze	Tsining	"	4,000
2nd " "	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	"	5,000
1st Cav. "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	"	5,000
			Total	58,000

Second Army - Liu Chih

1st Division	Feng Yi-p'ei	Lanfeng	Honan	10,000
2nd "	Ku Chu-tung	Kihsien	"	15,000
2nd "	Chang Chih-chung	Kaocheng	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Chi-ch'eng	Liuho	"	12,000
3rd "	Li Yung-lung	Kihsien	"	12,000
4th "	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
5th "	Hsiung Shih-hui	Taikang	Honan	12,000
7th "	Wang Chun	Chenliu	"	12,000
8th "	Mao Ping-wen	Tungsu	"	12,000
10th "	Yang Sheng-chih	"	"	12,000
12th "	Chin Han-ting	"	"	12,000
45th "	Wei Li-huang	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
46th "	Fan Hsi-chi	Lanfeng	Honan	14,000
55th "	Juan Chao-ch'ang	"	"	12,000
52nd "	Yeh K'ai-hsin	Kihsien	"	13,000
53rd "	Li Yung-heng	Lanfeng	"	8,000
		Carried Forward		186,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Second Army (continued)

		Brought Forward			186,000
73rd	Division	Chao Ch'i-to	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
2nd	Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Taikang	Honan	10,000
1st	" Brig.	An Chun-ts'ai	Lanfeng	"	6,000
12th	Ind. "	Hsu Sheng-yü	"	"	4,000
13th	" "	Hsu Chia-yu	Liuho	"	5,000
1st	" Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	"	"	2,500
2nd	" " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500
3rd	" " "	Li Chung-wei	Taikang	"	2,500
				Total	226,500

The 4th and 73rd Divisions under Chang Yi-fen and Chao Chi-to, respectively, are newly organized units.

Third Army - Ho Ch'eng-chun

1st	Division	Hsu Ting-yao	Yencheng	Honan	12,000
3rd	"	Ch'ien Ta-chun	Chumatien	"	10,000
4th	"	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Yishih	"	10,000
6th	"	Chao Kuan-t'ao	Yencheng	"	12,000
9th	"	Chiang Ting-wen	"	"	12,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	Hupeh	10,000
11th	"	Ch'en Ch'eng	Yencheng	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	"	12,000
13th	"	Hsia Tou-yin	Yencheng	"	12,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-ch'eng	Lushan	"	12,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-ch'u	Yencheng	"	10,000
47th	"	Shang Kuan Yun-hsiang	"	"	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-ch'uan	Hsuchang	"	24,000
50th	"	T'an Tao-yuan	Yehhsien	"	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Lushan	"	12,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-ling	"	"	16,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Hankow	Hupeh	10,000
60th	"	Tsai Ting-kai	Paofeng	Honan	8,000
61st	"	Chiang Kuang-nai	Chiahsien	"	8,000
66th	"	Liu Mao-en	Paofeng	"	10,000
				Total	252,000

Central Government Troops

17th	Army - Liu	Chen-nien	Chefoo	Shantung	35,000
1st	Division	Ch'en Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
1st	"	Chang Chen	Yenping	Fukien	9,500
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shukow	"	8,000
			Carried Forward		25,500

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Central Government Troops (continued)

			Brought Forward		25,500	
2nd	Division	Yang Ting-chung	Yungyi	Kwangsi	8,000	
5th	"	Kung Ping-fan	Siushui	"	8,000	
9th	"	Chang Ju-k'uang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000	
9th	"	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000	
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	4,000	
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000	
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000	
13th	"	Teng Ying	Nanch'ang	Kiangsi	8,000	
15th	"	Ho Chien	Changsha	Hunan	7,000	
16th	"	Lo P'an-ying	Liuyang	"	7,000	
18th	"	Chang Hui-tsan	Nanchang	Kiangsi	12,000	
19th	"	Liu Chien-hsu	Yochow	Hunan	10,000	
22nd	"	Lo Lin	Pingsiang	Kiangsi	6,000	
25th	"	Tai Min-ch'uan	Hankow	Hupeh	8,000	
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Huangchow	"	20,000	
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien	11,000	
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Waichow	Kwangtung	8,000	
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Nanning	Kwangsi	8,000	
62nd	"	Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000	
63rd	"	Li Yang-ching	Tengyun	Kwangsi	8,000	
	Ind. Brig.	Chang Ju-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung	6,000	
	" "	Huang Jen-huan	Pingnam	Kwangsi	6,000	
1st	" "	Wu Chun-p'ing	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000	
1st	" "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chwanchow	Fukien	2,500	
2nd	" "	Ch'en Kuo-hui	Yungch'un	"	2,500	
2nd	" "	Chang Ch'i-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000	
3rd	" "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000	
5th	" "	P'an Shan-chai	Hwoshan	Anhwei	2,000	
7th	" "	Li Ch'i	Anking	"	2,000	
8th	" "	Hu T'ien-lo	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000	
14th	" "	P'eng Ch'i-piao	Tienmen	"	6,000	
15th	" "	T'ang Sze-tung	P'uch'i	"	4,000	
1st Brigade		Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000	(NAVAL
2nd	"	Lin Shou-kuo	Mamoi	"	4,000	CONSTB.)
Bodyguard Brig.		Yu Chi-shih	Kweiteh	Honan	5,000	
Gendarmerie		Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
Training Regt.		Hsia Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,000	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces)						
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)				Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla)						
				Total	271,100	

The 26th Division under Kuo Ju-tung has been reorganized from the 23rd Army which was carried under Szechwan forces in previous Situation Reports. This division is now under the direct control of the Central Government.

Total Government Troops and the First Group of Armies 898,600

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Ch'ung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Liuchow	Kwangsi	20,000
7th " "	Yang T'eng-hui	Kweilin	"	15,000
8th " "	Chow Lan	Chuanchow	"	15,000
15th " "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
15th Division	Li Ming-jui	Poseh	"	10,000
16th "	Pai Ch'ung-hsi	Liuchow	"	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Nanning	"	4,000
2nd " "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000

Total 95,000

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

First Route Army - Chang Wei-hsi, Field Commander.

22nd Division	Ma Hung-pin	Yushih	Honan	12,000
23rd "	Wei Feng-lou	"	"	12,000
26th "	T'ien Chin-k'ai	"	"	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi	Tungsu	"	12,000
8th Cav. Brig.	Chao Hsi-pin	"	"	4,000

Total 52,000

Second Route Army - Sun Liang-ch'eng, Field Commander.

9th Division	Feng Chih-an	Mihsien	Honan	12,000
11th "	Chi Hung-chang	"	"	12,000
21st "	Liang Kuan-ying	Sincheng	"	12,000
22nd "	Ch'en Hsing-ming	"	"	12,000
29th "	Ch'eng Hsi-hsien	Yuchow	"	12,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Cheng Ta-chang	"	"	8,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	"	"	5,000

Total 73,000

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Third Route Army - P'ang Ping-hsun, Field Commander.

14th	Division	P'ang Ping-hsun	Fukow	Honan	12,000
23rd	"	Ma Ch'i	Chengchow	"	12,000
3rd	Mix. Brig.	Chao Kung-wen	Fukow	"	5,000
6th	" "	Liu Yu-lin	Kaifeng	"	4,000
				Total	33,000

Fourth Route Army - Sung Che-yuan, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Kuo Chih-kang	Lushan	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	T'ung Yu-chen	"	"	12,000
28th	"	Sung Che-yuan	"	"	12,000
				Total	36,000

Fifth Route Army - Sun Lien-chung, Field Commander.

25th	Division	Chang Tze-chung	Mihsien	Honan	12,000
31st	"	Sun Lien-chung	Yuchow	"	12,000
Training	"	Wang Kuan-hua	"	"	12,000
5th	Mix. Brig.	Pai Chien-sheng	Chengchow	"	5,000
1st	Cav. Div.	Chang Teh-shun	"	"	8,000
				Total	49,000

Army Reserves - Liu Yu-fen, Commander.

18th	Division	Ching Yueh-hsiu	T'ungkwan	Shensi	12,000
1st	Mix. Brig.	Man Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd	" "	Ch'en Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th	" "	Ma Lin	"	"	5,000
4th	Cav. Div.	Su Yu-sheng	Lingpao	Honan	6,000
				Total	33,000

29th	Division	Juan Hsuan-wu	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
30th	"	Pao Kang	Changteh	"	8,000
37th	"	Wang Kuan-chün	"	"	8,000
				Total	24,000

Total Second Group of Armies - 300,000

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Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

First Route Army - Sun Ch'u, Field Commander

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u.

1st	Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Kaifeng	Honan	5,000
2nd	"	T'ao Chen-wu	"	"	5,000
3rd	"	Ma Yen-chow	"	"	5,000

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang

16th	Division	Wen Yu-ju	Kaifeng	Honan	5,000
17th	"		"	"	5,000
18th	"		"	"	5,000
				Total . . .	30,000

Second Route Army - Fu Tso-yi, Field Commander.

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta.

10th	Division	Ch'en Ch'ang-chieh	Taming	Hopei	5,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	5,000
12th	"	Huo Yuan-pi	"	"	5,000

10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi.

28th	Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh	Taming	Hopei	5,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ch'ing	"	"	5,000
30th	"	Ch'en Ping-chien	"	"	5,000
28th	Brigade	Yuan Tseng-ch'ing	Shihkiachuang	"	6,000
				Total . . .	36,000

Third Route Army - Yang Hsiao-ou, Field Commander.

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou.

4th	Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng	Kaifeng	Honan	5,000
5th	"	Chang Wen-shun	"	"	5,000
6th	"		"	"	5,000

7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an

19th	Division	Lu Ying-lin	Kaifeng	Honan	5,000
20th	"	Liu Tien-ku'ei	"	"	5,000
21st	"	Kuo Tsung-fen	"	"	6,000
				Total . . .	31,000

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Fourth Route Army - Chang Ying-wu, Field Commander.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

7th	Division	Ho Shao-nan	Shihkiachuang	Hopei	6,000
8th	"	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	5,000
9th	"	Wang T'ing-ying	"	"	5,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

13th	Division	An Hsi-ku	Shihkiachuang	"	6,000
14th	"	To Chen	"	"	6,000
15th	"	Chai Hsueh-ming	"	"	5,000

9th Army Corps - Feng P'eng-ch'u

25th	Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Shuntehfu	"	5,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	5,000
27th	"	Kuo Wei-fan	Hsuanhua	"	5,000

Total . . . 48,000

Fifth Route Army - Chang Huei-chao, Field Commander.

8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao

22nd	Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Changteh	Honan	5,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	5,000
24th	"		"	"	5,000

Total . . . 15,000

Sixth Route Army - Feng Yu-hsi, Field Commander.

15th Army Corps - Feng Yu-hsi

1st	Brigade	Li T'ing-hsiu	Hantan	Hopei	6,000
2nd	"	Wang Fu	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Liu Chao-t'ang	"	"	6,000

18th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan

10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Kalgan	"	6,000
11th	"	Fan Kang-lan	"	"	6,000
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	6,000

Total . . . 36,000

Cavalry Forces in Honan - Chao Ch'eng-show, Field Commander.

2nd	Division	Kuo Feng-shan	Kaifeng	Honan	3,000
5th	"	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	4,000
6th	"	Sun Ch'ang-sheng	"	"	4,000

Total . . . 11,000

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Miscellaneous Troops Directly under Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief.

16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan.					
4th Brigade		Liu Fang-ch'i	Kangchuang	Hopei	6,000
5th	"	Li Chia-lin	Kalgan	"	6,000
6th	"	Liang Chien-t'ang	"	"	6,000
					18,000
17th Army Corps - Chow Shih-lien.					
7th Brigade		Liu Kuan-tou	Shihkiachuang	Hopei	6,000
8th	"	Tu K'ung	"	"	6,000
9th	"	Ma Liang	"	"	6,000
					18,000
25th Army Corps -		Liu Nai-ch'i	Kwangpingfu	Hopei	12,000
Training Div.		Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	Shansi	8,000
Bodyguard Brig.		Tu Ch'un-yi	Shihkiachuang	Hopei	6,000
1st Cav. Div.		Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengchen	Shansi	6,000
3rd	" "	Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	Chahar	4,000
4th	" "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
					28,000
Total					76,000

Total Third Group of Armies - 283,000

The Shansi forces which have retired to the north bank of the Yellow river in northern Shantung as stated in the last Situation Report have now been withdrawn to the southern regions of Paoting in Hopei province, and some of these forces are also said to have returned to Shansi. It is practically impossible to ascertain where they are stationed at the present and the units listed herein are approximately as near correct as can be estimated under the existing conditions.

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Fourth Group of Armies
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps -	Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	15,000	
2nd " "	Mi Wen-ho	Weihuei	"	15,000	
3rd " "	Shu Ming-ch'i	Taokow	"	15,000	
4th " "	Sheng K'e	Sinsiang	"	15,000	
			Total		60,000
1st Ind. Div.	Wang Hsing-te	Chihsien	Honan	8,000	
2nd " "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Yangwu	"	8,000	
Bodyguard "	Li Feng-ch'un	Taokow	"	8,000	
Art. Brigade	Lin Chia-hsun	Weihuei	"	4,000	
Pistol & Sword Brigade	Wang Yi-ching	Sinsiang	"	4,000	
			Total		32,000

The above forces are directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Shih Yu-san.

Total Fourth Group of Armies - 92,000

Eighth Group of Armies
(Teng Pao-shan)

1st Division	Sun Chen-hua	Hsuchang	Honan	6,000	
2nd "	Chiao Wen-tien	"	"	6,000	
3rd "	Wang Hsueh-chu	Fukow	"	6,000	
4th "	Sung Ch'ang-jung	"	"	6,000	
1st Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tze-chan	Hsuchang	"	4,000	
Bodyguard "	Kuan Huai-tung	"	"	4,000	
			Total		32,000
12th Army Corps -	Jen Ying-ch'i				
1st Division	Chang Ching-shan	Yenling	Honan	8,000	
2nd "	An Yung-fu	"	"	8,000	
			Total		16,000
15th Army Corps -	Liu Kuei-t'ang	Weich'uan	Honan	15,000	
1st Cav. Brig.	Wang Jui-shan	"	"	4,000	
			Total		19,000
25th Army Corps -	Wang Cheng	Fukow	Honan		14,000

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 81,000

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Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying	Kihsien	Honan	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-ting	"	"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Yueh-t'ing	"	"	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ch'ing	Ch'enliu	"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Ku'ei-pin	"	"	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang	"	"	8,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju

24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	Tungsti	Honan	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin Kuei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000

Total 72,000

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

36th Army Corps - Sung T'ien-ts'ai

35th	Division	Li Kuang-lung	Paofeng	Honan	6,000
36th	"	Han Wen-ying	"	"	6,000
38th	"	Sung Chao-kw'ei	"	"	6,000

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

43rd	Division	Li Wen-ju	Chiahsien	Honan	6,000
44th	"	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	6,000
45th	"	Chao Mien-ying	"	"	6,000
Ind.	Division	Chao Ch'ing-hai	"	"	7,000

Total 43,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Ch'un-jung

1st	Division	Pao Ping-ch'ing	Chiahsien	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	Ying Chung-ming	"	"	12,000
3rd	"	Shen T'i-ch'eng	"	"	12,000

Total 36,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 151,000

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Li Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	Nanning	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Nanning	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defence Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ich'ang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kw'ei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

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Szechwan (continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
			Total	11,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def. Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route	Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	T'ang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tseng Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 244,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 300,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikuan	Hopei	10,000
12th "	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Lwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd "	Huang Chih-chung			10,000
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changtu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd Cav. Brig.	Chang Shu-shen	Shenyang	"	6,000
			Total	89,000

Liaoning forces which were moved into the Peiping and Tientsin areas consist of the First and Second Armies under Yu Hsueh-chung and Wang Shu-chang, respectively. The First Army garrisons Peiping, Pinghan and Pingsui railway lines; and the Second Army garrisons Tientsin and Tsinpu railway line, and part of the Peiping-Tientsin railway line as far as Langfang (inclusive).

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

5th Brigade	Tung Ying-pin	Peiping	Hopei	10,000
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Paoting	"	11,000
23rd "	Yu Hsueh-chung	Peiping	"	10,000
27th "	Liu Nai-ch'ang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th Cav. Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Tingchow	"	8,000
1st Art. Regt.		Peiping	"	6,000
1st Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	55,800

The 6th Cavalry Brigade under Pai Feng-hsiang has been reorganized from the 1st Cavalry Division, formerly under the late Cheng Tse-sheng.

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

2nd Brigade	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Mach'ang	Hopei	10,000
4th "	Liu Yi-fei	Langfang	"	10,000
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Tsangchow	"	6,000
2nd Art. Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	42,800

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Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd Art. Regt.	Shanhaikuan	Hopei	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th " "	Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peichen	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000
		Total	36,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.	800
Total	4,000

Total Liaoning Forces 227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th "	Li Kwei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th "	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th "	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th "	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th "	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st "	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th "	Hsing Chan-ch'ing	Harbin	"	8,000
16th Cav. Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th " "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
			Total	81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd "	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th "	Hsu Jung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th "	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th "	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd " "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd " "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th " "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
			Total	57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd "	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th "	Tung Fu-t'ing	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st "	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd " "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd " "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th " "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th " "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500
			Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 414,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,615,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject : Situation Report

September 23 - October 6, 1930, inclusive

2. a. Narrative of Events

The taking over of Hopei Province by the 1st and 2nd Fengtien Armies and the tactical disposition of their troops in the province will soon have been completed. The 1st and 2nd Armies are commanded by Generals Yu Hsueh-chung and Wang Shu-ch'ang, respectively. The 1st Army garrisons Peiping, the Kinhan and Pingsui lines, and is composed of the 5th, 6th, 23rd and 27th Infantry Brigades, the 6th Cavalry Brigade, the 1st Artillery Regiment, and the 1st Engineer Battalion -- a total strength of approximately 55,800 men. At present this force has taken over the Kinhan Line as far south as Paotingfu and it is reported that they are moving on down towards Shihchiachwang. On the Pingsui Line they have taken over as far as Nankow and it is rumored that they are going to take over the entire line to Suiyuan. On the Peking-Tientsin Line they extend from Langfang (exclusive) to Peiping.

The 2nd Army garrisons Tientsin and the Tsinpu Line, and is composed of the 2nd, 4th and 25th Infantry Brigades, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 2nd Artillery Regiment, and the 2nd Engineer Battalion -- a total strength of approximately 42,800 men. At present this force has taken over the Tsinpu Line as far as Tsangchow, and it is believed that they will move on down to the Shantung border. They occupy the Peking-Tientsin Line from Shanhaikuan to Langfang (inclusive).

Shansi units have all been withdrawn from Shantung and the Tientsin-Peking area and moved down the Kinhan to positions north of the Yellow River. The Shansi withdrawal from Hopei, in the face of the Fengtien "invasion", has been without incident; in the cases of Tientsin and Peiping former officials and troops remained on duty until the new ones had arrived and taken over.

At the time of the Mukden intervention it appeared as though the Shansi Army was withdrawing into its native province, but as the concentration at Shihchiachwang became heavier, instead of moving on up in Shansi, Yen's forces moved on down the Kinhan to points north of the river. He avowed his purpose of supporting Feng and of fighting to the end, but it is said that he has taken up a position to prevent Feng from retiring into Shansi, should he be driven from the Chengchow area. There is no evidence of any Shansi units participating in the present fighting and the lapse of time must be awaited before the real purpose of the disposition of Shansi troops becomes known.

The Fengtien "dove" has as yet not disclosed its mission, but it is expected to do so in the very near future -- as soon as the 1st and 2nd Armies are entirely disposed of within the Wall, at which time the "dove" will probably be seen in its true form as an eagle and likely to act as such, but it is also for time to reveal whether the eagle will alight on the "allied" banners or on those of the Central Government.

The Nanking offensive along the Lunghai has continued successfully; they claim, but it is unconfirmed, that Lanfeng and Kaifeng have been recaptured; however, it is believed that Lanfeng has fallen to them and that Kaifeng will soon be taken also.

It is frequently reported and rumored that Feng is making preparations to abandon the Chengchow area. This is colored by evidence of a strong successful counter-attack by the Kuominchun west of and along the Kinhan, for were Feng to give up Chengchow and retire along the Lunghai it would be necessary for him to hold the area south of same until he had cleared Chengchow. This counter-offensive is said to have been very sanguinary and even the government reports admit losing ground. Most observers here find it impossible to secure reliable information relative to the fighting until some few days have transpired, and in the present instance it is most difficult to secure accurate news as to the Honan operations.

The Kwangsi situation is still unsettled but it is believed to have developed somewhat favorably to the government troops. Nothing has come of the reported Szechwan mobilization, and it is not thought that any immediate threat from that province exists.

The Red forces in the Changsha area, while not dispersed, appear to have been immobilized and their further depredations prevented. Reports from Fukien Province indicate a very disturbed condition there due to communist-bandits but one not likely to have any immediate effect on Nanking's war in Honan.

b. <u>The Shantung Front</u>

As noted in the last Situation Report, this front has ceased to exist as a war zone. Han Fu-chu has moved part of his troops into Tehchow and Ma Hung-kuei is said to be moving on that city also. It is not believed that any government forces will move further north than the Shantung border. Banditry exists in all the interior districts off the railroads and other main lines of communication. Troops at present in this province could well be used in bandit suppression, but until Mukden announces itself it is not likely that Nanking will authorize any such operations.

c. <u>The Honan Front</u>

The operations on this front have been impossible to follow with any degree of confident accuracy. The Nanking bulletins have been so obviously false as to make one dubious of any and all of their claims. In general it appears that Feng, on or about September 16th, launched a determined counter-attack west of and along the Kinhan. On the east of the railway he is said to have closed in on Kaifeng, giving up Lanfeng on or about September 25, and to have evacuated Kaifeng on October 3rd. If it subsequently is confirmed that Kaifeng has been given up it would seem to indicate that the reports of Feng's preparations for withdrawal into Shensi are true and that his counter-offensive west of the Kinhan is being made to cover his retreat west on the Lunghai. Nanking still seems to be striving to intercept the Lunghai at some point west of Chengchow. Chiang, after having experienced Feng's strong counter-attack in this region, is reported to have employed two additional divisions (the 61st and 66th Cantonese) in his effort to seize the line. From personal knowledge of the terrain and observation of its organization it is believed that the Kuominchun could maintain its present position indefinitely -- if supplied. Therefore, any possible "defeat" of Feng just now would probably be due to political intrigue rather than to military operations.

d. <u>South China</u>

Very little information has come to hand relative to the Kwangsi fighting. The siege of Nanning continues to be of chief interest. The city, having held out for two months, is in a deplorable condition. The combined Cantonese and Yunnanese forces are said to be making preparations

for a determined effort to capture the city before the national holiday, October 10. The Kwangsi defenders, on the other hand, are reported as preparing to keep up the resistance. Food and water get scarcer and the people are suffering terrible hardships as a result of same.

A foreign news agency claims (on September 28) that it had been reliably reported that the Kwangsi leaders were making peace proposals. It was said that General Li Ting-yang, former acting-chairman of the Kwangsi Provincial Government, had been mediating between the Kwangsi and Kwangtung forces. He is alleged to have proposed among other things that Generals Li Tsung-jen, Chang Fa-kuei, Pai Chung-hsi, and Huang Chao-hsiung should retire and that Kwangsi troops should be supported by the Central Government. Lacking confirmation for these reports one is naturally handicapped in commenting on them, but it is generally felt that the situation in Kwangsi continues localized and most probably favors the government forces.

e. Communist Activities

The anti-communist campaign as set forth in the last Situation Report has settled down to a passive operation. The government has made almost daily reports of victories but the Red menace has not been removed. The communist forces are still holding the strategic points at Liuyang, Chuchow and Liling. The government attacks on these positions appear to have been confined to aerial activities. At present the "front" is quiet. The outstanding development has been several important changes made by the government in the Hunanese armies. This includes the promotion of several important commanders and the transfer of Generals Wei Su-chung and Lo Fan-yung to the Staff Department of the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters at Nanking. Dissension, previously noted in Situation Reports, among the Hunanese commanders, is generally known and the changes ordered by Nanking are probably designed to effect more cooperation between the units. The continued presence of the array of government forces in the Changsha area appears to preserve order in that vicinity but unless determined offensive measures are employed the Red menace is merely being temporized. Though the military measures are passive, the measures taken by the civil authorities are by no means so. The grip on the communists or reactionaries in the larger centers is not relaxed; to be taken into custody as a Red suspect is most certain to result in death. The executioners in large cities are not concerned with unemployment. Forty-four men, all of them, with one exception, in their early twenties, were executed in one day (September 26) alone, at Wuchang. Most of them had been convicted of communism.

A recent report received here of a bandit outrage in Kansu several weeks ago indicates the fate that awaits many a soul in China if the civil wars continue on as large a scale as at present. An army (size unknown) attacked the town of Lihsien (about four miles southwest of Tsinchow), South Kansu. The townspeople put up a desperate resistance for about a month, when the place finally fell to the besiegers, who then wreaked a terrible vengeance on the unfortunate citizenry for having offered resistance. It is reported that everyone was killed except the young girls who were all carried off to a hapless fate. The report states that no less than 8,000 people were massacred. While it is true that the details of this will probably never be confirmed and that the number is very likely less than 8,000, and the bandits in question are from an area of most primitive and lawless people, still the fact remains that what a bandit army does in Kansu will very likely be no different from what a bandit army would do in any of the provinces of China, coastal not excepted, and the fate which befell this city of Lihsien is just as apt to befall any other city which has to rely upon its civil populace for its defence.

The general conditions in Fukien Province are far from peaceful. Our consul at Foochow reports that "the influence of the Provincial Govern-

ment apparently extends only to Foochow and its immediate environments and the larger centers along the coast, such as Santuao, Futsing, Hinghwa, and Sienyu. A "rebel" general, Lu Hsing-pang, has definite control over the area between Yu Chi, Yenping and Kutien and down river to the neighborhood of Foochow. Communists control the northwest about Chung An and Kienninghsien and as far as Sha Kow. Banditry is rampant throughout the district. The only forces protecting the larger centers are local militia or bandit groups bought over by the merchants for protection. The only thing saving the larger centers is that the communists are not organized or centrally controlled and the bandits still move in sporadic bands. Should they organize or unite into stronger groups, the larger centers could not possibly hold out against them." Evidence of the disorder in this province is shown by the reported, and generally believed true, murder of two female missionaries, British subjects. These ladies had been held for ransom for some time, and as same was not forthcoming the bandits cut off a finger of one of the ladies and threatened further mutilation if the money was not paid. It was reported recently that they were insisting that they would kill the prisoners unless the ransom was paid, and it now appears that they have put their threat into execution.

Changsha -- sacked; Lihsien -- 8,000 inhabitants massacred; Fukien -- two foreign women murdered; CHINA -- a land where the authorities who might insure a semblance of national law and order are too busy with personal quarrels and civil wars and their own personal aggrandizement to pay much, if any, attention to the civil mass. This is the China that insists on world recognition and this is the China of today. What it will be tomorrow, Time will have to tell -- but to the writer it is feared that Time's story for the next several years will be a dark chapter in one of the darkest volumes of the history of the Flowery Kingdom.

MBE/edb

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Military Attache

Report No. 7841

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Later Information:

Since the above report was compiled it has been learned that Chengchow fell on October 4th to the government forces, and that the bulk of the Kuominchun under Lu Chung-liu, Sun Liang-cheng, and Sun Lien-chung have crossed to the north bank of the river at that place. From the above information it would seem that the Kuominchun was destined to garrison southwest Shansi and perhaps parts of Honan north of the Yellow River, rather than to retreat through the Tungkwan again.

G-2 Report

6180

4-1

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

As wars both in Honan and Shantung have ceased, at least for the time being, a number of the Central Government units and Chiang Kai-shek's own divisions, known as the old First Group of Armies, have been ordered from the theater of operations to provinces that are under the sphere of influence of the Nationalist Government for the purpose of maintaining peace and order and for the suppression of bandits and communists. The First, Second and Third Armies which were organized by Chiang Kai-shek as shown in previous Situation Reports are believed to have been abolished as such, for various divisions which compossed these Armies are being transferred as herein before stated.

Central Government Troops

1st	Division	Chang Chen	Yenping	Fukien	9,500
1st	"	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Yenping	Fukien	8,000
2nd	"	Yang Ting-chung	Jungyi	Kwangsi	8,000
3rd	"	Li Yun-lung	Ichang	Hupeh	12,000
4th	"	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
6th	"	Li Yun-heng	Lanfeng	Honan	8,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kuang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
9th	"	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	4,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"	10,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	Teng Ying	Nanchang	Kiangsi	8,000
15th	"	Wang Tung-yuan	Changsha	Hunan	7,000
16th	"	Peng Wei-jen	Liuyang	"	7,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-cheng	Loyang	Honan	12,000
18th	"	Chang Hui-tsan	Changshu	Kiangsi	12,000
19th	"	Li Chueh	Yochow	Hunan	10,000
20th	"	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Nanking	Kiangsu	10,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tehchow	Shantung	20,000
21st	"	Li Yun-chieh	Changtsing	"	8,000
22nd	"	Lo Lin	Pingsiang	Kiangsi	6,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-ming	Huimin	Shantung	10,000
25th	"	Tai Ming-chuan	Hankow	Hupeh	8,000
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Huangchow	"	20,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Yucheng	Shantung	10,000
			Carried Forward		263,500

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Central Government Troops (continued)			Brought Forward		263,500
44th	Division	Hsiao Chih-chu	Siangyang	Hupeh	10,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Kaifeng	Honan	14,000
47th	"	Shang Kuan Yun-hsiang	Hsuchang	"	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Ichang	Hupeh	24,000
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Hankow	"	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Loyang	Honan	12,000
52nd	"	Yeh Kai-hsing	Kunghsien	"	13,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Nanking	Kiangsu	8,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-lin	Chengchow	Honan	16,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	Kaifeng	"	12,000
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien	11,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Anking	Anhwei	10,000
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Haichow	Kwangtung	8,000
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Nanning	Kwangsi	8,000
60th	"	Tsai Ting-kai	Wuchang	Hupeh	8,000
61st	"	Chiang Kuang-nai	"	"	8,000
62nd	"	Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000
63rd	"	Li Yang-ching	Sunchow	Kwangsi	8,000
64th	"	Ma Teng-chiao	Hsiatsin	Shantung	14,000
65th	"	Chen Yueh-han	Haichow	Kiangsu	10,000
66th	"	Liu Mao-en	Loyang	Honan	10,000
72nd	"	Ma Chuan-liang	Tsining	Shantung	8,000
73rd	"	Chao Chi-to	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
2nd	Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Pengpu	Anhwei	10,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000
1st	" "	Shih Chung-cheng	Yenchow	Shantung	4,000
1st	" "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chuanchow	Fukien	2,500
2nd	" "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500
2nd	" "	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	Shantung	5,000
2nd	" "	Chen Hsiao-sze	Tsining	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000
3rd	" "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000
5th	" "	Pan Shan-chai	Hwoshan	Anhwei	2,000
7th	" "	Li Ch'i	Anking	"	2,000
8th	" "	Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000
12th	" "	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000
13th	" "	Hsu Chia-yu	Lanfeng	"	5,000
14th	" "	Peng Chi-piao	Tienmen	Hupeh	6,000
15th	" "	Tang Sze-tung	Puchi	"	4,000
	" "	Huang Jen-huan	Nanning	Kwangsi	6,000
	" "	Chang Jui-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung	6,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	An Chun-tsai	Kaifeng	Honan	6,000
	" "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	Shantung	5,000
Pistol	Brigade	Lei Tai-ping	Kaomi	"	6,000
Bodyguard	"	Yu Chi-shih	Nanking	Kiangsu	5,000
1st	Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000 (NAVAL
2nd	"	Lin Shou-kuo	Yungchun	"	4,000 CONSTB.)
Gendarmerie		Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600
1st	Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Chengchow	Honan	2,500
2nd	" "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500
3rd	" "	Li Chung-wei	Kaifeng	"	2,500
Training	"	Hsia Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,000
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)				Chekiang	10,000
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla)					
17th Army -		Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	Shantung	35,000
				Total	 711,600

CHINA (Military)

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The 6th Division under Li Yun-heng is a newly organized unit and is attached to the 53rd Division.

Designation of the 1st Division under Ma Chuan-liang has been changed to the 72nd Division.

The Pistol Brigade under Lei Tai-ping is also named as bodyguard Brigade attached to Han Fu-chu's command.

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st	Division	Hsu Ting-yao	Chengchow	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	Ku Chu-tung	Lanfeng	"	15,000
3rd	"	Ch'en Chi-ch'eng	Kaifeng	"	12,000
5th	"	Hsiung Shih-hui	Lanfeng	"	12,000
6th	"	Chao Kuan-tao	Kunghsien	"	12,000
7th	"	Wang Chun	Kaifeng	"	12,000
8th	"	Mao Ping-wen	Pukow	Kiangsu	12,000
9th	"	Chiang Ting-wen	Sincheng	Honan	12,000
10th	"	Yang Sheng-chih	Chengchow	"	12,000
11th	"	Ch'en Ch'eng	Hankow	Hupeh	12,000
12th	"	Chin Han-ting	Kaifeng	Honan	12,000
13th	"	Hsia Tou-yin	Wusueh	Hupeh	12,000
					147,000

The following units have been organized personally by Chiang Kai-shek and chiefly composed of cadets from the Military School at Nanking.

1st	Division	Feng Yi-pei	Kaifeng	Honan	10,000
2nd	"	Chang Chih-chung	"	"	10,000
3rd	"	Ch'ien Ta-chun	Hsuchang	"	10,000
4th	"	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Yushih	"	10,000
5th	"	Kung Pin-fan	Kaoan	Kiangsi	8,000
				Total	195,000

Total Central Government Troops and Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions - 906,600

Many of the above units which have been engaged in warfare for the past several months have suffered considerable casualties. According to a statement made by Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist had lost 30,000 killed and 60,000 wounded. It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of casualties sustained by a particular unit and, on the other hand, recruiting is being carried on and replacement of casualties effected which this office does not learn of.

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Liuchow	Kwangsi	20,000
7th " "	Yang T'eng-hui	Kweilin	"	15,000
8th " "	Chow Lan	Chuanchow	"	15,000
15th " "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
15th Division	Li Ming-jui	Poseh	"	10,000
15th "	Pai Chung-hsi	Liuchow	"	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Nanning	"	4,000
2nd " "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000

Total First Group of Armies 95,000

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

A large number of the Kuominchun forces has retired to the north bank of the Yellow River in northern Honan, while another body of the said forces still occupies some points south of the Yellow River in the western regions of the province. The "Route Armies" are believed to have been abolished.

1st Division	Kuo Chih-kang	Loyang	Honan	12,000
2nd "	T'ung Yu-chen	Shanchow	"	12,000
9th "	Feng Chih-an	Sinsiang	"	12,000
11th "	Chi Hung-ch'ang *			12,000
14th "	P'ang Ping-hsun	Chihsien	Honan	12,000
18th "	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Tungkwan	Shensi	12,000
21st "	Liang Kuan-ying *			12,000
22nd "	Ma Hung-pin	Wuchih	Honan	12,000
22nd "	Ch'eng Hsing-ming	Yuanwu	"	12,000
23rd "	Ma Chi	Tsiaotso	"	12,000
23rd "	Wei Feng-lou	Tsinghwachen	"	12,000
25th "	Chang Tze-chung	Hwaiking	"	12,000
		Carried Forward		144,000

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Second Group of Armies (continued)		Brought Forward		144,000
26th Division	Tien Chin-kai	Hwaiking	Honan	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi *			12,000
28th "	Sung Che-yuan	Loyang	Honan	12,000
29th "	Juan Hsuan-wu	Sinsiang	"	8,000
30th "	Pao Kang	Siuwu	"	8,000
29th "	Ch'eng Hsi-hsien	Sinsiang	"	12,000
31st "	Sun Lien-chung	Tsiaotso	"	12,000
37th "	Wang Kuan-chun	Tsinghwachen	"	8,000
Training Div.	Wang Kuan-hua	Siuwu	"	12,000
1st Cav. "	Chang Te-shun	Sinsiang	"	8,000
2nd " "	Cheng Ta-chang	Yangwu	"	8,000
4th " "	Su Yu-sheng	Lingpao	"	6,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Meng Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd " "	Ch'en Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	Chao Kung-wen	Sinsiang	Honan	5,000
4th " "	Ma Lin	Lanchow	Kansu	5,000
5th " "	Pai Chien-sheng	Hwaiking	Honan	5,000
6th " "	Liu Yu-lin	Yangwu	"	4,000
8th Cav. "	Chao Hsi-pin	Huchiahsien	"	4,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	Sinsiang	"	5,000
		Total Second Group of Armies		300,000

* It is reported, but not confirmed, that the 11th, 21st and 27th Divisions under Chi Hung-ch'ang, Liang Kuan-ying and Chang Wei-hsi, respectively, have surrendered to Nanking or have been disarmed by the latter Army.

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

The Shansi forces which have been withdrawn from northern Shantung to the southern regions of Paoting as stated in the last Report, and those which have recently retired to the north bank of the Yellow River from the Honan front, are now en route to Shansi by the Cheng-Tai railway. It is not yet known where they will be stationed in the province, but a large number of these forces will no doubt be massed at Niangtzekwan, an important pass located between the border of Hopei and Shansi provinces. The "Route Armies" are believed to have been abolished.

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u

1st Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Shansi	5,000
2nd "	T'ao Chen-wu	"	5,000
3rd "	Ma Yen-show	"	5,000
	Carried Forward		15,000

CHINA (Military)

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Third Group of Armies (continued)				Brought Forward	15,000
2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou					
4th Division		Chow Sze-ch'eng		Shansi	5,000
5th	"	Chang Wan-shun		"	5,000
6th	"			"	5,000
3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo					
7th Division		Ho Shao-nan		"	6,000
8th	"	T'ien Shu-mei		"	5,000
9th	"	Wang T'ing-ying		"	5,000
4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta					
10th Division		Ch'en Ch'ang-chieh		"	5,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua		"	5,000
12th	"	Huo Yuan-pi		"	5,000
5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying					
13th Division		An Hsi-ku	Hwailu	Hopei	6,000
14th	"	To Chen	"	"	6,000
15th	"	Chai Hsueh-ming	"	"	5,000
6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang					
16th Division		Wang Yu-ju		Shansi	5,000
17th	"			"	5,000
18th	"			"	5,000
7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an					
19th Division		Lu Ying-lin		"	5,000
20th	"	Liu Tien-ku'ei		"	5,000
21st	"	Kuo Tsung-fen		"	6,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao					
22nd Division		Chow Cheng-chien		"	5,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho		"	5,000
24th	"			"	5,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu					
25th Division		Huang Kuang-hua		"	5,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen		"	5,000
27th	"	Kuo Wei-fan	Kalgan	Chahar	5,000
				Carried Forward	139,000

CHINA (Military)

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Third Group of Armies (continued)			Brought Forward	139,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi				
28th Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh		Shansi	5,000
29th "	Pai Ju-ch'ing		"	5,000
30th "	Chen Ping-chieh		"	5,000
28th Brigade	Yuan Tseng-ch'ing		"	6,000
15th Army Corps - Feng Yu-hsi				
1st Brigade	Li T'ing-hsiu		"	6,000
2nd "	Wang Fu		"	6,000
3rd "	Liu Chao-tang		"	6,000
16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan				
4th Brigade	Liu Feng-chi	Tatung	"	6,000
5th "	Li Chia-lin	Kalgan	Chahar	6,000
6th "	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	6,000
17th Army Corps - Chow Shih-lien				
7th Brigade	Liu Kuan-tou		Shansi	6,000
8th "	Tu K'ung		"	6,000
9th "	Ma Liang		"	6,000
18th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan				
10th Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Kalgan	Chahar	6,000
11th "	Fan Kang-lan	Tatung	Shansi	6,000
12th "	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	6,000
25th Army Corps - Liu Nai-ch'i			"	12,000
Training Division	Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	"	8,000
Bodyguard Brigade	Tu Ch'un-yi	"	"	6,000
1st Cav. Division	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung-Fengchen	"	6,000
2nd " "	Kuo Feng-shan		"	3,000
3rd " "	Chang Cheng-teh	Dolonor	Chahar	4,000
4th " "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
5th " "	Yuan Ping-fan		Shansi	4,000
6th " "	Sun Chang-sheng		"	4,000
			Total Third Group of Armies	283,000

During the last war Shansi sent all available troops to the front as stated in Situation Report 7770, and suffered greater casualties than other forces in the anti-Government movement - especially in the province of Shantung, mention of which has been made in Report 7815. It is generally believed that they lost at least one third of the total number of men given above, including small bodies of men who were disarmed by Shih Yu-san while retreating northward from the Honan front.

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Fourth Group of Armies.
(Shih Yu-san)

This Group of Armies is reported to have affiliated with Liaoning and the arm bands to have been changed to the form of the Northeastern Defense Forces'.

1st Army Corps -		Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	15,000
2nd	" "	Mi Wen-ho	Weihwei	"	15,000
3rd	" "	Su Ming-ch'i	Shaho	Hopei	15,000
4th	" "	Sheng Ke	Tzechow	"	15,000
5th	" "	Yuan Te-hsing	Hantan	"	15,000
				Total	75,000
1st Ind. Div.		Li Feng-ch'un	Changteh	Honan	8,000
2nd	" "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Tzechow	Hopei	8,000
3rd	" "	Wang Hsing-te	Shaho	"	8,000
Cav.	"	Su Ching-ch'ing	"	"	5,000
Art. Brig.		Lin Chia-hsun	Changteh	Honan	4,000
Trench Mortar Brig.		Wang Mao-ch'ing	"	"	4,000
Pistol & Sword	"	Pi Wen-shan	Hantan	Hopei	4,000
				Total	41,000

The 5th Army Corps, Cavalry Division and Trench Mortar Brigade under Yuan Te-hsing, Su Ching-ch'ing and Wang Mao-ch'ing, respectively, are newly organized units.

Total Fourth Group of Armies - 116,000

Eighth Group of Armies
(Teng Pao-shan)

This Group of Armies was engaged in operations in the vicinity of Hsuchow on the Pinghan line in Honan. No definite information has yet been received as to their whereabouts at present since the fall of Chengchow into the hands of the Nationalists.

1st Division	Sun Chen-hua	6,000	
2nd "	Chiao Wen-tien	6,000	
3rd "	Wang Hsueh-chu	6,000	
4th "	Sung Ch'ang-jung	6,000	
1st Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tze-chan	4,000	
Bodyguard "	Kuan Huai-tung	4,000	
		Total	32,000
12th Army Corps -	Jen Ying-ch'i		
1st Division	Chang Ching-shan	8,000	
2nd "	An Jung-fu	8,000	
		Total	16,000
15th Army Corps -	Liu Kuei-t'ang	15,000	
1st Cav. Brig.	Wang Jui-shan	4,000	
		Total	19,000
25th Army Corps -	Wang Cheng		14,000

Total Eighth Group of Armies - 81,000

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Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying	Hwaiking	Honan	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-ting	"	"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Yueh-t'ing	"	"	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ch'ing	Menghsien	"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Ku'ei-pin	"	"	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang	"	"	8,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju

24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	Wenhsien	"	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin Kuei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000

Total . . . 72,000

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

36th Army Corps - Sung T'ien-ts'ai

35th	Division	Li Kuang-lung	Yiyang	Honan	6,000
36th	"	Han Wen-ying	"	"	6,000
38th	"	Sung Chao-kw'ei	"	"	6,000

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

43rd	Division	Kao Yun-lung	Sinan	"	6,000
44th	"	Chang Lan-shan	"	"	6,000
45th	"	Yang Hsuan-ya	"	"	6,000
Ind.	Division	Chao Ch'ing-hai	"	"	7,000

Total . . . 43,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Ch'un-jung

1st	Division	Pao Ping-ch'ing	Yentsing	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	Ying Chung-ming	"	"	12,000
3rd	"	Shen T'i-ch'eng	"	"	12,000

Total . . . 36,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 151,000

CHINA (Military)

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Luh Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	Nanning	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Nanning	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind. Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ich'ang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def. Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-ke'ei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

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Szechwan (continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
			Total	11,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def. Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan		Szechwan	6,000
2nd " "	T'ang Heng	"		"	6,000
3rd " "	Tsang Hsien-tung	"		"	6,000
4th " "	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"		"	6,000
5th " "	Wang Ming-chang	"		"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

	Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan forces 244,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 300,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
- Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st	Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd	"	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000
12th	"	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th	"	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th	"	Sun Chao-ying	Iwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th	"	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd	"	Huang Shih-chung			10,000
24th	"	Huang Shih-yueh	Changtu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd	Cav.Brig.	Chang Shu-shen	Yungping	Hopei	6,000
				Total	89,000

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

5th	Brigade	Tung Ying-pin	Peiping	Hopei	10,000
6th	"	Li Chan-t'ang	Chengting	"	11,000
23rd	"	Yu Hsueh-chung	Peiping	"	10,000
27th	"	Liu Nai-ch'ang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th	Cav.Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Shihkiachwang	"	8,000
1st	Art.Regt.		Peiping	"	6,000
1st	Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
				Total	55,800

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

2nd	Brigade	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tungkwang	Hopei	10,000
4th	"	Liu Yi-fei	Langfang	"	10,000
25th	"	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Taming	"	6,000
2nd	Art.Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd	Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
				Total	42,800

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd	Art.	Regt.	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000
4th	"	"	Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th	"	"	Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th	"	"	Shenyang	"	6,000
7th	Heavy	A.R.	Peichen	"	6,000
8th	"	" "	"	"	6,000
				Total	36,000

Carried Forward 223,600

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Liaoning (continued) Brought Forward 223,600

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan		3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.		800
		4,000
Total Liaoning Forces		 227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Kwei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ch'ing	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
			Total	. . . .	81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
			Total	. . . .	57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-t'ing	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500
			Total	. . . .	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 414,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,647,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject : Situation Report

October 7 - 20, 1930, inclusive

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2. a. Narrative of Events

The capture of Loyang by Nanking on October 11 brought the campaign against the northern anti-government forces to an apparent successful conclusion, but the stage of real prominence, during the period of this report, continued to be occupied by Mukden, with the action fading from military to political activities, sufficient time not yet having elapsed for the focus to become properly adjusted and reveal the true political outlines; from "zones", "fronts", and "theaters of operations" we now pass to factional "spheres of influence". The attached map endeavors to give a graphic picture of the "situation at present". With the cessation of hostilities in Honan many units are being shifted around, which makes it extremely difficult at this early date to demarcate accurately the exact areas or "spheres" under the control of the various factions, but it is believed that a map of this nature, submitted every fourth week, will be of interest in following the political events which the next eight or ten months will witness -- assuming that major military operations are finished for the time being.

The civil and military control of Hopei Province has by now been entirely taken over by Mukden. It is reported that the military control of the province, by the First and Second Fengtien Armies, as stated in previous Situation Report, will be augmented by two new Fengtien Armies, the Third and Fourth (and even a Fifth), which Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is said to have decided to organize and move inside the Wall. Information at hand is to the effect that no mobilization orders for these new armies have to date been published, but that Mukden has issued a "warning order" in the case of the Third Army, stating that it will be composed of the 16th, 20th and 24th Infantry Brigades and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and if mobilized that it will be commanded by General Hu Yu-kun, this army to be sent either to Peiping or Shihchiachwang to serve as available reinforcements for the First Army. The report states that when necessary, Jehol forces under Tang Yu-lin will be organized as the Fourth Army and take over the Shansi territories in Suiyuan and Charhar, and that the Kirin and Heilungkiang troops will be organized as a Fifth Army. It has not been possible to verify these reports, but a Chinese source, known to be well informed and found to be generally reliable, states that the report relative to the Third Army "warning order" is correct but gives no information concerning the Fourth and Fifth Armies, other than the foregoing reported rumors.

Active operations on the Honan front were brought to a close with the capture of Loyang on October 11. Shansi units along the Kinhan have been withdrawn into their native province, holding the Niangtzekuan Pass, and have been closely followed up by the troops of Shih Yu-san, who appear none too friendly towards them; those on the Pingsui are said to be preparing to give up that line to Mukden and move within the Yenmenkuan Pass. The Kuominchun north of the Yellow River are at present in the vicinity of Sinsiang and Tsiaotso (west of Sinsiang on the branch railway) and are said to have been assigned ten "hsien" (districts) in south Shansi, by Yen, for station. Those who were forced west of Loyang are said to be retiring towards Shensi via Tungkuan Pass. Government forces have not undertaken the pursuit of any of the former "rebels" beyond the Yellow River or west of Loyang. Their victory will no doubt greatly enhance Nanking's prestige but the victory from a military point of view is a hollow one, as Feng's

"defeat", though probably greatly influenced by Yen's false promises of reinforcements and supplies, is also more probably due to profitable concessions as to pay, supplies and winter necessities secured from the government, for the Kuominchun, in exchange for their withdrawal -- "defeat, so-called. The Kuominchun on previous occasions have been in far worse straits than they are just now, and their present "defeat" strongly savors of a definite understanding with Nanking.

Kwangsi operations have apparently terminated.

Communist activities were very pronounced, but the despatch of troops -- now available in large numbers -- to the areas of disorder will undoubtedly succeed in restoring control to the government and various provincial authorities.

b. <u>The Honan Front</u>

With the fall of Kaifeng on October 3rd the Kuominchun began to evacuate their positions along the Lunghai and Kinhan railways, due to circumstances imposed by the failure of Yen to support, as promised, Feng's counter-attack of September 16th, west of and along the Kinhan, and also to the defection of General Chi Hung-chang. The evacuation was effected without confusion; by October 5th Feng is said to have moved his headquarters to Sinsiang, leaving General Lu Chung-lin at Chengchow to cover the withdrawal of the Northwest Armies to the north bank of the Yellow River. At that time Shih Yu-san's troops occupied the area that it appeared the Kuominchun would have to enter, but as Feng's men moved into it the Shih troops retired north on the Kinhan and eventually gave up all of their positions in the vicinity of Sinsiang and Tsiaotso to the Kuominchun.

The advance of the government troops on Chengchow was made without serious fighting. On October 3rd Hsuchang, on the Kinhan, was taken and the following day Sincheng and Yuchow (southwest of Sincheng) also fell to the government. This same day, October 4th, Chungmow, on the Lunghai, was taken and contact was established between the two Nanking forces operating along the Lunghai and Kinhan lines. Chengchow was eventually taken at 9:00 p.m. on October 6th, and Loyang on the 11th. In their evacuation of Honan the Kuominchun are said to have retained practically all of their materiel and supplies.

With the return of Honan Province to the Central Government's control, Generalissimo Chiang announced the conclusion of the anti-rebel campaign, and directed the various units to return to their original defence areas.

Speculation is rife as to the future of the Kuominchun. Yen is reported to have assigned ten "hsien" (districts) in southern Shansi to them for station. Other reports are that they will be "reorganized" by Nanking -- the nature of this "reorganization" not being clear, but believed to have been previously arranged between Chiang and Feng and in the nature of concessions as to pay and supplies from the government in exchange for the Kuominchun's retirement from Honan.

Relations between Yen and Feng are probably none too good. The offer of the ten Shansi "hsien" to Feng as billets is a very weak gesture, for it is believed that the Kuominchun will suit their own pleasure in occupying such portions of Shansi Province as they see fit. Shih Yu-san and Feng appear to have some understanding which in itself is felt to be inimical to cordial Shansi relations. Shih and Feng are said to have disarmed some Shansi troops near Sinsiang and one or two minor clashes have occurred between Shih and Yen troops, which have been explained as "misunderstandings".

The Young Marshal has suggested that Feng and Yen retire, and Feng is said to have expressed his willingness to do so, but if he should it is

not felt that it will be permanently. The writer firmly believes that future civil wars in China will see the "Christian General" again in the field at the head of "The People's Army".

c. South China

The Kwangsi-Kwangtung affair appears to have clarified with the government's victory in Honan. Nanking is reported, as of October 16, to have ordered the campaign against Kwangsi to be abandoned and the differences to be settled by means other than force. Yunnanese troops who participated in the siege of Nanning are stated as returning to their province and Kwangtung troops are reported as turning back to their homes. Should the Kwangsi forces insist on prolonging the war (and it is not believed that they will) Nanking will very probably despatch troops against them and with little difficulty settle the situation.

d. Communist Activities

The continued array of government and provincial forces in the vicinity of Changsha is believed to have discouraged a fusion of the communist forces in that area, but apparently it resulted in the menace moving into Kiangsi with threats against its capital, Nanchang.

Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-hui withdrew their forces, the Fourth and Fifth Communist Armies, respectively, into southern Kiangsi, and took positions around Kian and Kishui. Arrangements were made for the employment of Hupeh and Hunan units to assist the Kiangsi forces in their efforts to disperse the outlaws. Little appears to have been accomplished or done until the capture of Chengchow, Honan, on October 6th, following which three government divisions were released for service in the bandit-suppression campaign in the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan and Kiangsi. The 13th Division was moved down to Hankow for garrison duties in the Wu-Han area, the 20th Division, on the Lunghai, was directed to return to Pukow for subsequent transfer to the Hunan-Kiangsi border, and the 50th Division ordered to assemble at Chungmow (east of Chengchow) for subsequent service in Kiangsi. Other units are being concentrated in the Wu-Han area and it should not be long before active operations are undertaken against the Red armies and normal control restored to the provincial authorities. President Chiang predicts that the bandit-communist menace will be cleared up within six months after he has completed plans and appointed commanders to various districts for carrying out the work.

While the main effort just now is being made against Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-hui, it does not mean that they are the only forces of disorder operating at present, for many small villages in the Yangtze Valley and various provinces of the country are looted and numerous peasants murdered every day by bands who carry the Red flag and who profess to believe the Red doctrine.

The bandit-communist movement bids fair to be China's big problem for some time to come. Of course the immediate forces of disorder can be dispersed and an era of peace made possible, but eventually the military personnel will have to undertake disbandment, with the resultant release of many potential bandits to roam the countryside, for whom leaders will not be lacking -- a situation naturally non-conducive to internal peace and national tranquillity, and one which will furnish an interesting study to students of China's footprints on the sands of time.

MBD/edb

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

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1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

1st	Division	Chang Chen	Yenping	Fukien	9,500
1st	"	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shukow	Fukien	8,000
2nd	"	Yang Ting-chung	Jungyi	Kwangsi	8,000
3rd	"	Li Yun-lung	Anlu	Hupeh	12,000
4th	"	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
6th	"	Li Yun-heng	Lanfeng	Honan	8,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kuang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
9th	"	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	4,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"	10,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	Teng Ying	Fuchow	Kiangsi	8,000
14th	"	Li Hsiao-ting	Hankow	Hupeh	8,000
15th	"	Wang Tung-yuan	Changsha	Hunan	7,000
16th	"	Peng Wei-jen	Liuyang	"	7,000
16th	"	Ke Yun-lung	Loyang	Honan	10,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-cheng	Sian	Shensi	12,000
18th	"	Chang Hui-tsan	Changshu	Kiangsi	12,000
19th	"	Li Chueh	Pingsiang	"	10,000
20th	"	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Jaochow	"	10,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tehchow	Shantung	20,000
21st	"	Li Yun-chieh	Changtsing	"	8,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-ming	Huimin	"	10,000
25th	"	Tai Ming-chuan	Kushih	Honan	8,000
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Sientaochen	Hupeh	20,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	Shantung	10,000
31st	"	T'ao Kuang	Yochow	Hunan	10,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Mienchih	Honan	10,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pochow	Anhwei	12,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Yingchow	"	14,000
47th	"	Wang Chin-yu	Chengchow	Honan	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Kingchow	Hupeh	24,000
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Kiukiang	Kiangsi	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Hwayuan	Hupeh	12,000
52nd	"	Yeh Kai-hsing	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	13,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Nanking	"	8,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-lin	Chengchow	Honan	16,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	Pengpu	Anhwei	12,000
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien	11,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Anking	Anhwei	10,000
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Haichow	Kwangtung	8,000
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Penchow	Kwangsi	8,000
			Carried Forward		483,500

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Central Government Troops (continued)			Brought Forward		483,500
60th Division	Tsai Ting-kai	Sinti	Hupeh	8,000	
61st "	Chiang Kuang-nai	Yochow	Hunan	8,000	
62nd "	Hsiang Han-ping	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000	
63rd "	Li Yang-ching	Laipo	Kwangsi	8,000	
64th "	Ma Teng-chiao	Tsining	Shantung	14,000	
65th "	Chen Yueh-han	Haichow	Kiangsu	10,000	
66th "	Liu Mao-en	Loyang	Honan	10,000	
72nd "	Ma Chuan-liang	Tsining	Shantung	8,000	
73rd "	Chao Chi-to	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000	
76th "	Liu Mao-lin	Paofeng	Honan	10,000	
77th "	Lo Lin	Tungshan	Hupeh	6,000	
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Chiao-lin	Kweiteh	Honan	6,000	
2nd " "	Chang Li-sheng	Pengpu	Anhwei	10,000	
1st Ind.Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000	
1st " "	Shih Chung-cheng	Yenchow	Shantung	4,000	
1st " "	Chang Jui-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung	6,000	
1st " "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chuanchow	Fukien	2,500	
2nd " "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500	
2nd " "	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	Shantung	5,000	
2nd " "	Chen Hsiao-sze	Tsining	"	4,000	
2nd " "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000	
3rd " "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000	
5th " "	Pan Shan-chai	Yingshan	Anhwei	2,000	
7th " "	Li Ch'i	Liuyang	Hunan	2,000	
8th " "	Hu Tien-lo	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000	
12th " "	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000	
13th " "	Hsu Chia-yu	Lanfeng	"	5,000	
14th " "	Peng Chi-piao	Tienmen	Hupeh	6,000	
15th " "	Tang Sze-tung	Kaifeng	Honan	4,000	
18th " "	Chow Chih-chung	Chienou	Fukien	4,000	
Training "	Huang Jen-huan	Penchow	Kwangsi	6,000	
Pistol "	Lei Tai-ping	Kaomi	Shantung	6,000	
1st Cav. "	An Chun-tsai	Kaifeng	Honan	6,000	
" "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	Shantung	5,000	
1st Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000	(NAVAL
2nd "	Lin Shou-kuo	Yungchun	"	4,000	CONSTB.)
Gendarmerie	Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
1st Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Chengchow	Honan	2,500	
2nd " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500	
3rd " "	Li Chung-wei	Kaifeng	"	2,500	
Training "	Hsiao Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,000	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn. One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla			Chekiang	10,000	
17th Army -	Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	Shantung	35,000	
			Total	. . . .	754,600

The 14th, 16th, 31st and 76th Divisions under Li Hsiao-ting, Ke Yun-lung, T'ao Kuang and Liu Mao-lin, respectively, are newly organized units.

Designation of the 22nd Division under Lo Lin has been changed to the 77th Division.

The 1st Cavalry Division and the 18th Independent Brigade under Chang Chiao-lin and Chow Chih-chung are also newly organized units.

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Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	Hsu Ting-yao	Chengchow	Honan	12,000	
1st "	Feng Yi-pei	Nanking	Kiangsu	10,000	*
2nd "	Ku Chu-tung	Loyang	Honan	15,000	
2nd "	Chang Chih-chung	Haochai	Kiangsu	10,000	*
3rd "	Ch'en Chi-ch'eng	Kaifeng	Honan	12,000	
3rd "	Ch'ien Ta-chun	Ningpo	Chekiang	10,000	*
4th "	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Yüshih	Honan	10,000	*
5th "	Hsiung Shih-hui	Shanghai	Kiangsu	12,000	
5th "	Kung Pin-fan	Kaoan	Kiangsi	8,000	*
6th "	Chao Kuan-tao	Kunghsien	Honan	12,000	
7th "	Wang Chun	Kaifeng	"	12,000	
8th "	Mao Ping-wen	Nanchang	Kiangsi	12,000	
9th "	Chiang Ting-wen	Sincheng	Honan	12,000	
10th "	Yang Sheng-chih	Chengchow	"	12,000	
11th "	Ch'en Ch'eng	Hankow	Hupeh	12,000	
12th "	Chin Han-ting	Kaifeng	Honan	12,000	
13th "	Hsia Tou-yin	Hwangchow	Hupeh	12,000	
Bodyguard Brig.	Yu Chi-shih	Nanking	Kiangsu	5,000	
			Total	200,000	

* Cadets from the Military School at Nanking as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's old divisions.

11th Division	Chi Hung-chang	Shangcheng	Honan	12,000	
21st "	Liang Kuan-ying	Hwaiying	Kiangsu	12,000	
23rd "	Wei Feng-lou	Chenchow	Honan	12,000	
			Total	36,000	

The above Kuominchun units are reported to have surrendered to the Government, according to information obtained from the latter source.

Total Central Government Troops and Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions - 990,600

Although the Nationalist had lost some 30,000 killed and 60,000 wounded in wars as stated in the last Situation Report, it is generally believed that replacement of casualties has been recently effected by a large number of the anti-government troops captured or surrendered and by recruiting which is still going on.

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(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Yen Hsi-shan
Deputy Commanders - Feng Yu-hsiang
- Li Tsung-jen

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Liuchow	Kwangsi	20,000
7th " "	Yang T'eng-hui	Kweilin	"	15,000
8th " "	Chow Lan	Chuanchow	"	15,000
15th " "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
15th Division	Li Ming-jui	Poseh	"	10,000
16th "	Pai Chung-hsi	Liuchow	"	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Nanning	"	4,000
2nd " "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000
Total First Group of Armies				95,000

Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

1st Division	Kuo Chih-kang	Puchow	Shansi	12,000
2nd "	T'ung Yu-chen	Chiehchow	"	12,000
9th "	Feng Chih-an	Sinsiang	Honan	12,000
14th "	P'ang Ping-hsun	Yuncheng	Shansi	12,000
18th "	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Sienyang	Shensi	12,000
22nd "	Ma Hung-pin	Tsehchow	Shansi	12,000
22nd "	Ch'eng Hsing-ming	Kaoping	"	12,000
23rd "	Ma Chi	Tsiaotso	Honan	12,000
25th "	Chang Tze-chung	Sinsiang	"	12,000
26th "	Tien Chin-kai	Hwaiking	"	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi	Yangcheng	Shansi	12,000
28th "	Sung Che-yuan	Sienyang	Shensi	12,000
29th "	Juan Hsuan-wu	Tsehchow	Shansi	8,000
29th "	Ch'eng Hsi-hsien	Lucheng	"	12,000
30th "	Pao Kang	Siuwu	Honan	8,000
31st "	Sun Lien-chung	Sinsiang	"	12,000
37th "	Wang Kuan-chun	Tsehchow	Shansi	8,000
Training Div.	Wang Kuan-hua	Yuncheng	"	12,000
1st Cav. "	Chang Te-shun	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
2nd " "	Cheng Ta-chang	Taokow	"	8,000
4th " "	Su Yu-sheng	Luanfu	Shansi	6,000
Carried Forward				226,000

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Second Group of Armies (continued)		**Brought Forward**		226,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Meng Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd " "	Ch'en Jui-an	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	Chao Kung-wen	Sinsiang	Honan	5,000
4th " "	Ma Lin	Lanchow	Kansu	5,000
5th " "	Pai Chien-sheng	Hwaiking	Honan	5,000
6th " "	Liu Yu-lin	Yangwu	"	4,000
8th Cav. "	Chao Hsi-pin	Huchiahsien	"	4,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	Tsehchow	Shansi	5,000
		Total Second Group of Armies		264,000

With exception of several divisions of troops which have surrendered to the Government as stated in Page 3 of this Report, the remaining units of the Kuominchun are said to have suffered but little losses in the last war in Honan; therefore, the total strength given above is believed to be approximately correct.

Third Group of Armies
(Hsu Yung-chang)

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u

1st Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Tsehchow	Shansi	3,000
2nd "	T'ao Chen-wu	"	"	3,000
3rd "	Ma Yen-show	"	"	3,000

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou

4th Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng	Luanfu	"	3,000
5th "	Chang Wan-shun	"	"	3,000
6th "		"	"	3,000

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

7th Division	Ho Shao-nan	Yang Chuan	"	3,000
8th "	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	3,000
9th "	Wang T'ing-ying	"	"	3,000

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta

10th Division	Ch'en Ch'ang-chieh	Tsingsin	Hopei	3,000
11th "	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	3,000
12th "	Huo Yuan-pi	"	"	3,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

13th Division	An Hsi-ku	Tungchuan Pass	"	3,000
14th "	To Chen	" "	"	3,000
15th "	Chai Hsueh-ming	" "	"	3,000
		Carried Forward		45,000

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Third Group of Armies (continued)			Brought Forward		45,000
6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang					
16th	Division	Wang Yu-ju	Tsehchow	Shansi	3,000
17th	"		"	"	3,000
18th	"		"	"	3,000
7th Army Corps - Kuan Fu-an					
19th	Division	Lu Ying-lin	Yuncheng	"	3,000
20th	"	Liu Tien-ku'ei	"	"	3,000
21st	"	Kuo Tsung-fen	"	"	3,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao					
22nd	Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tatung	"	3,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	3,000
24th	"		"	"	3,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu					
25th	Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Hwailu	Hopei	3,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	3,000
27th	"	Kuo Wei-fan	Tatung	Shansi	3,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi					
28th	Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh	Liaochow	Shansi	3,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ch'ing	"	"	3,000
30th	"	Chen Ping-chien	"	"	3,000
28th	Brigade	Yuan Tseng-ch'ing	Taiyuan	"	6,000
15th Army Corps - Feng Yu-hsi					
1st	Brigade	Li T'ing-hsiu			
2nd	"	Wang Fu			
3rd	"	Liu Chao-tang			

This Army Corps no longer exists, having been annihilated in Shantung, captured or disarmed by the Government army, and has been replaced by the 18th Army Corps under Ch'in Shao-kuan, the designation of which has been changed to the 15th Army Corps.

15th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan					
10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Taiku	Shansi	2,500
11th	"	Fan Kang-lan	"	"	2,500
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	2,500

This Army Corps was the old 18th Army Corps as stated above.

Carried Forward 103,500

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Third Group of Armies (continued)			Brought Forward		103,500
16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan					
4th Brigade		Liu Feng-chi	Yutze	Shansi	2,500
5th	"	Li Chia-lin	"	"	2,500
6th	"	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	2,500
17th Army Corps - Chow Shih-lien					
7th Brigade		Liu Kuan-tou	Taiyuan	"	2,500
8th	"	Tu K'ung	"	"	2,500
9th	"	Ma Liang	"	"	2,500
25th Army Corps - Liu Nai-ch'i					

This Army Corps is reported to have been dissolved; the men being reorganized into other units to replace casualties.

Training Division	Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	Shansi	8,000
Bodyguard Brigade	Tu Ch'un-yi	"	"	6,000
1st Cav. Division	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung	"	6,000
2nd " "	Kuo Feng-shan	Luanfu	"	2,000
3rd " "	Chang Cheng-teh	Tatung	"	4,000
4th " "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
5th " "	Yuan Ping-fan	Showyang	Shansi	2,500
6th " "	Sun Chang-sheng	Taiyuan	"	2,500

Total Third Group of Armies . . . 153,500

Comparing the number of men in each unit listed in the last Situation Report with the present one, it will be observed that the total strength of the above Group of Armies has been greatly reduced by severe losses sustained in the past military operations both in Honan and Shantung, mention of which has been made in previous Reports. According to a statement recently made by an influential personage of the Shansi clique, there still remains some 167,000 men at present in the province after their withdrawal from the theaters of operations. Therefore, the total strength estimated is believed to be approximately correct.

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Fourth Group of Armies
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Army Corps -	Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	15,000	
2nd " "	Mi Wen-ho	Weihwei	"	15,000	
3rd " "	Su Ming-ch'i	Shaho	Hopei	15,000	
4th " "	Sheng Ke	Tzechow	"	15,000	
5th " "	Yuan Te-hsing	Hantan	"	15,000	
			Total		75,000

1st Ind. Div.	Li Feng-ch'un	Changteh	Honan	8,000
2nd " "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Tzechow	Hopei	8,000
3rd " "	Wang Hsing-te	Shaho	"	8,000
Cav. "	Su Ching-ch'ing	"	"	5,000
Art. Brig.	Lin Chia-hsun	Changteh	Honan	4,000
Trench Mortar Brig.	Wang Mao-ching	"	"	4,000
Pistol & Sword "	Pi Wen-shan	Hantan	Hopei	4,000
Brigade	Liu Wan-ch'un	Changteh	Honan	4,000
"	Sheng T'i-ch'eng	"	"	4,000
		Total		49,000

The Brigades, designations unknown, under Liu Wan-ch'un and Sheng T'i-ch'eng have been transfered from the 20th Army Corps which now no longer exists (see Page 9 of this Report).

Total Fourth Group of Armies - 124,000

Eighth Group of Armies
(Teng Pao-shan)

With exception of the 15th Army Corps under Liu Kwei-t'ang which has successfully crossed the Yellow River into Shansi and which will be carried under "Miscellaneous Troops" in the following page, other units which composed this Eighth Group of Armies as listed in the last Situation Report are said to have disintegrated as such in Honan, or to have been disarmed or reorganized into the Government forces (see Page 3 of this Report).

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Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander

1st Division	Sun Tien-ying	Changteh	Honan	8,000
2nd "	Chin Han-ting	"	"	8,000
3rd "	Liu Yueh-t'ing	"	"	8,000
4th "	Chang Tien-ch'ing	"	"	8,000
5th "	Chin Ku'ei-pin	"	"	8,000
6th "	Sheng Feng-kang	"	"	8,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju

24th Division	Hsu Li-chung	Wenhsien	"	6,000
1st "	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd "	Chin Kuei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd "	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000
			Total	72,000

15th Army Corps -	Liu Kwei-t'ang	Yicheng	Shansi	12,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Wang Jui-shan	"	"	2,000
			Total	14,000

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

Many of the units which composed this 6th Route Army as listed in the last Situation Report suffered considerable casualties during the past several months in Honan, a large number of which has also been disarmed or reorganized into the Government forces. The remnants which crossed the Yellow River are reported to have been reorganized as follows:-

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

35th Division	Li Kuang-lung	Tsinghwachen	Honan	8,000
38th "	Sung Chao-kwei	"	"	8,000
Special Brig.	Yang T'ing-ya	"	"	4,000
			Total	20,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Ch'un-jung

This Army Corps is reported to have revolted or mutinied on the 23rd ult. at Weihwei, and the commander, Liu Ch'un-jung, is said to have been killed by his subordinates. Information regarding the revolt or mutiny is very confused, but as far as it has been learned, two brigades under Liu Wan-ch'un and Sheng T'i-ch'eng surrendered to the Fourth Group of Armies and the remaining units deserted or have been disarmed by the said Fourth Group of Armies.

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 106,000

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Miscellaneous Units.
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	Nanning	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Nanning	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ich'ang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kw'ei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

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Szechwan (continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
			Total	11,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def. Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Lo Tse-chow	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route	Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	T'ang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tsang Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 244,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 300,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
- Wan Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000
12th "	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Lwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd "	Huang Chih-chung			10,000
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changtu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig.	Chang Shu-shan	Yungping	Hopei	6,000
			Total	89,000

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

4th Brigade	Liu Yi-fei	Nankow	Hopei	10,000
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Kalgan	Chahar	10,000
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Shihkiachuang	Hopei	11,000
23rd "	Yu Hsueh-chung	Peiping	"	10,000
27th "	Liu Nai-ch'ang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th Cav.Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Shunteh	"	8,000
1st Art.Regt.		Peiping	"	6,000
1st Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	65,800

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

2nd Brigade	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tungkwang	Hopei	10,000
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Taming	"	6,000
2nd Art.Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	32,800

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd Art.Regt.		Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000
4th " "		Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th " "		Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th " "		Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.		Peichen	"	6,000
8th " " "		"	"	6,000
			Total	36,000

Carried Forward 223,600

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Liaoning (continued)

		Brought Forward			223,600
Engineers - Po Khei-ling					
4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan					3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.					800
				Total	4,000
				Total Liaoning Forces	227,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Kwei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ch'ing	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
				Total	81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
				Total	57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-t'ing	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500
				Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 414,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA , not including irregulars - 2,447,700

CHINA (Military)

Subject : Situation Report

October 21 to November 3, inclusive.

2. a. Narrative of Events

The event of prime importance during the period of this report was the increased bandit-communist activity in the provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi and the concentration of government troops in the Wuhan area, as a preliminary measure, for their suppression.

Mukden further consolidated its position in Hopei and extended her control to Charhar and Suiyuan, Shansi troops turning over peacefully to the Fengtien authorities and retiring within their own boundaries.

In Honan, Nanking has made no effort to operate north of the Yellow River -- though claiming that the "Northeastern forces (acting under instructions from the Central Government) are pursuing the rebels by two separate routes, one from Nankow and the other from Shihkiachwang". The Kuominchun have withdrawn the major portion of their forces into north Honan (beyond the Yellow River) and south Shansi, a small portion retiring into Shensi and moving north therein as government troops "pressed" them back, occupying Tungkwan on or about October 25, and Sianfu on or about the 27th.

Unconfirmed news-reports emanating from the Central Government are to the effect that the so-called "grey" troops in Honan, south of the Yellow River, have been reorganized into the government armies and that leading Kuominchun military commanders have issued a joint telegram declaring that they will await the decision of the Central Government regarding the settlement of military affairs. In the case of the "grey" troops it is believed that they have probably been absorbed by government units, but as regards the Kuominchun (other than the troops of General Chi Hung-chang, whose defection has been previously reported) it is not believed that any such absorption in the case of the "grey" troops has been effected, and moreover that such will not be done, for as time transpires it begins to appear more certain that Feng's withdrawal from Honan was in accordance with prearranged terms with Nanking; hence in the ultimate disposition of the Kuominchun they will probably maintain their integrity. In this connection it is interesting to note that emissaries of Yen Hsi-shan have arrived in Mukden with an autographed letter to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang concerning the present situation but no such representatives appear to have been sent to Nanking; on the other hand, Kuominchun agents, presumably with the knowledge and consent of Feng Yu-hsiang, journey only to the capital where they are received and entertained by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek -- a strong indication of a pronounced rift between Yen and Feng and believed significant of the true relations existing at present between Fengtien and Nanking.

A government bombing-plane raided Taiyuanfu on October 28 but inflicted no material damage.

The situation in the Kwang provinces has as yet not been settled. The present advantage, if any, appears to rest with the "Ironsides" and Kwangsi troops.

Communist-bandit operations have been most evident in Kiangsi where the city of Kianfu was looted and a number of the inhabitants murdered, and ten foreign missionaries taken and held for ransom, on or about October 14, by the forces of the Communist leaders, Chu, Mao and P'eng. Troops are being concentrated in the Wuhan area for a campaign against the forces of disorder in the affected areas and it is said that the baptism of General Chiang Kai-shek as a Christian (October 23) will probably have a far-reaching effect in the government's efforts to put down the Red movement.

b. Mukden Expansion

Mukden, during the period of this report, completed her civil and military organization of Hopei Province and is believed to be extending (as she naturally should) her authority and control, by physical occupation, to include the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan.

Fengtien troops as of October 21 had taken over along the Kinhan as far south as Shihkiachwang and by the 28th occupancy of Shuntehfu had been effected. On October 21 the Shansi forces on the Pingsui line commenced withdrawing to Tatungfu and from there to within the fastness of Yenmenkwan pass. On October 22 General Tung Ying-pin (C.O. 5th Brig., 1st Manchurian Army) arrived in Kalgan and took over the administration thereof as well as that of Charhar; with the retirement of the Shansi army to its native province it is generally believed that the Mukden control has also been extended to include Suiyuan -- this is colored by the movement of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Fengtien Army to Nankow on October 28. The 2nd Army troops having been previously assigned to the Tientsin area, this transfer therefrom may possibly result in the organization and despatch within the Wall of additional Fengtien armies as reported in the last Situation Report.

Mukden air experts have arrived at Peiping and are said to be selecting a suitable location for an airdrome large enough to accommodate their entire air force, claimed to consist of 36 planes, which it is reported are to be flown here for station.

General Shih Yu-san, whose troops occupy the Kinhan south of where Mukden leaves off, is now courting Fengtien favor and has made a trip to interview Chang Hsueh-liang. Nanking is said to have published an order placing General Shih's troops under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. Shih has developed his force to a state where it can now command attention, but the present position in which he finds himself is such that he has to tie on to someone who can maintain his supply; Nanking has probably spurned his overtures so he apparently is appealing to Mukden. His mission is being watched with interest for if he is taken into the Fengtien fold it will probably be with the idea of strengthening Mukden's position north of the Yellow River and will either hasten or delay the settlement of the issue which it is believed will eventuate between the Central Government and the Manchurian authorities.

c. The Kuominchun

Marshal Feng has as yet not evidenced his future course of action. His exact whereabouts in Shansi are uncertain. It appears, however, that he has established his temporary personal headquarters at Tsechow. The direct command of the troops now in the field rests with General Lu Chung-lin who is reported to have an agent in Nanking negotiating with the government. General Sun Lien-chung, who commands four divisions under Lu Chung-lin is also reported as having agents in the capital arranging terms for the turnover of his troops. The reports of these Kuominchun approaches to the government all emanate therefrom, which in itself is

considered as an indication of former agreements between Feng and Chiang; hence any "reorganization" of the People's Army will probably not be to their disadvantage.

d. South China

The Central Government has apparently paid no attention to the Kwangsi-Kwangtung affair, other than its reported orders (as of October 16) to cease hostilities and settle the differences by peaceful means. Unconfirmed reports continue to filter through which indicate that sporadic fighting is still being conducted. The Yunnan forces (which have never been any too creditable), who were operating in conjunction with the Kwangtung troops in the siege against Nanning, are reported as having suffered a severe defeat on or about October 17 as a result of a counter-attack of the Kwangsi and "Ironsides" armies, losing very heavily in personnel and materiel. Very little information is available concerning the situation in this region, but this office believes that military operations thereabouts are localized and that Nanking will take no immediate steps to effect its settlement.

In Fukien where for the past nine or ten months the authority of the Central Government has hardly existed, due to the revolt of General Lu Hsing-pang, the situation appears to have developed in favor of Nanking, for with the despatch of two government brigades to assist loyal troops operating against the rebels, Lu is said to have issued a circular wire declaring that he will order his troops to support the government and that he himself awaits punishment. Five officials of the Provincial Government whom he carried off from Foochow in his coup of last January have been released; the civil governor who was also captured at that time died in captivity some few months ago.

6. Communist Activities

Communist-bandit activities have been most pronounced in Kiangsi where the forces of Chu, Mao and P'eng looted the city of Kianfu on October 14. Five foreign male missionaries and five foreign and five Chinese nuns were taken and held for ransom by the brigands. This is the largest capture of foreigners since the famous Lincheng outrage in 1923, and very likely planned to discredit the National Government, for the leaders, Chu, Mao and P'eng are believed to be well enough informed as to the policy of foreign governments, as well as that of China, to know that no such ransom, if any, as they demand ($10,000,000.00) will ever be considered. One of the captives (Bishop Mignani) was released to communicate the outlaws' demands and he is said to have stated that on his journey to Kiukiang he encountered several Red bands who interrogated him, as a result of which he feels that it is clear that the different Red armies in Kiangsi and Hunan are working in cooperation. It is reported that with the capture of Kianfu about 1,000 inhabitants lost their lives, but with the arrival of the Red leaders, Chu, Mao and P'eng, order was restored and a "properly organized Red government set up". The Red leaders are said to have expressed enmity towards British and Americans, claiming that they are supporting Chiang Kai-shek.

Despite the initiating of an announced communist-bandit suppression campaign by the heavy concentration of troops in the Wuhan area, the provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi have experienced very active depredations. Bandit bands have attacked and captured towns near the Tungting Lake in Hunan, and now threaten the area of the Poyang Lake in Kiangsi.

Nanking has ordered the concentration of nearly 100,000 soldiers at Hankow to await orders to move out for bandit suppression. The 60th

and 61st Cantonese Divisions, who established such excellent records during the fighting which resulted in the recent fall of Tsinan, are part of the forces ordered to assemble at Hankow; these troops are to be stationed in the Wuchang-Changsha Railway area. A division will be stationed in west Hupeh at Ichang and Shasi, while one will be in the Han River area and one stationed in Hsiang-yang and Fancheng. In eastern Hupeh the campaign will be carried out by the employment of two divisions.

A news-report from Nanchang announces the advance of the expeditionary forces against the Reds in southwest Kiangsi. The forces will move in three columns, with the 18th and 20th Divisions as the first, the 50th Division and the 14th Independent Brigade as the second, and the 5th (newly organized) and 77th Divisions as the third columns, respectively. The routes of these columns have not been learned.

Despite the size and organization of the various Red units, which should make contact with them possible, their suppression will be no easy task, and the military defeat of any one of them will probably never be accomplished. Any disposition that the government may make of such forces will most likely be the result of a compromise or concession in the nature of absorption and as such will naturally pave the way for future disorder on a larger scale.

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Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

G-2 Report

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

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(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief
- Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

1st	Division	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shukow	Fukien	8,000
3rd	"	Li Yun-lung	Anlu	Hupeh	12,000
4th	"	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
6th	"	Li Yun-heng	Lanfeng	Honan	8,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kuang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
9th	"	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	4,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"	10,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	Teng Ying	Fuchow	Kiangsi	8,000
14th	"	Li Hsiao-ting			
15th	"	Wang Tung-yuan	Changsha	Hunan	7,000
15th	"	Wang Han-ming	Chumatien	Honan	8,000
16th	"	Peng Wei-jen	Liuyang	Hunan	7,000
16th	"	Ke Yun-lung	Loyang	Honan	10,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-cheng	Sian	Shensi	12,000
18th	"	Chang Hui-tsan	Changshu	Kiangsi	12,000
19th	"	Li Chueh	Pingsiang	"	10,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tehchow	Shantung	20,000
21st	"	Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	"	35,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-ming	Huimin	"	10,000
23rd	"	Li Yun-chieh	Changtsing	"	8,000
24th	"	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Jaochow	Kiangsi	12,000
25th	"	Tai Ming-chuan	Kushih	Honan	12,000
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Sientaochen	Hupeh	20,000
27th	"	Sun Chin-t'ai	Shuyang	Kiangsu	8,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	Shantung	10,000
31st	"	T'ao Kuang	Siangyin	Hunan	10,000
32nd	"	Chen Kuang-chung	Liuyang	"	7,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Mienchih	Honan	10,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pengpu	Anhwei	12,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Yingchow	"	14,000
47th	"	Wang Chin-yu	Sinsiang	Honan	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Kingchow	Hupeh	24,000
49th	"	Chang Chen	Yenping	Fukien	9,500
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Kiukiang	Kiangsi	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Hwayuan	Hupeh	12,000
52nd	"	Han Te-ch'in	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	13,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
54th	"	Hao Mao-lin	"	"	16,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	Kingtehchen	Kiangsi	12,000
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Foochow	Fukien	11,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Anking	Anhwei	10,000
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Haichow	Kwangtung	8,000
58th	"	Ma Ching-yuan	Sian	Shensi	10,000
			Carried Forward		533,500

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Central Government Troops (continued)			Brought Forward		533,500
59th Division	Yu Han-mou	Penchow	Kwangsi	8,000	
60th "	Tsai Ting-kai	Pingsiang	Kiangsi	8,000	
61st "	Chiang Kuang-nai	"	"	8,000	
62nd "	Hsiang Han-ping	Linping	Kwangtung	8,000	
63rd "	Li Yang-ching	Laipo	Kwangsi	8,000	
64th "	Ma Teng-chiao	Tsining	Shantung	14,000	
65th "	Juan Hsun	Haichow	Kiangsu	10,000	
66th "	Hsu Peng-yun	Shanchow	Honan	10,000	
67th "	Wu Ting-lin	Miensiang	"	8,000	
69th "	Chao Kuan-yin	Yiyang	"	8,000	
70th "	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	8,000	
71st "	Feng Ch'in-tsai	Sanyuan	Shensi	10,000	
72nd "	Ma Chuan-liang	Tsining	Shantung	8,000	
73rd "	Chan Shu-t'ang	Kiaochow	"	8,000	
74th "	Ch'iao Li-chih	"	"	8,000	
75th "	Wang Ling-yuan	Kwanyintang	Honan	8,000	
76th "	Li Mao-lin	Paofeng	"	10,000	
77th "	Lo Lin	Tungshan	Hupeh	6,000	
2nd Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Suchow	Anhwei	10,000	
3rd " "	Chang Chan-kwei	Kweiteh	Honan	6,000	
1st Ind.Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000	
1st " "	Shih Chung-cheng	Pengpu	Anhwei	4,000	
1st " "	Chang Jui-kuei	Lokchong	Kwangtung	6,000	
1st " "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chuanchow	Fukien	2,500	
2nd " "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500	
2nd " "	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	Shantung	5,000	
2nd " "	Chen Hsiao-sze	Mengcheng	Anhwei	4,000	
2nd " "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000	
3rd " "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000	
5th " "	Pan Shan-chai	Yingshan	Anhwei	2,000	
7th " "	Li Ch'i				
8th " "	Li Mu-ming	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000	
12th " "	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000	
13th " "	Hsu Chia-yu	Lanfeng	"	5,000	
14th " "	Peng Chi-piao	Nanchang	Kiangsi	6,000	
15th " "	Tang Sze-tung	Kaifeng	Honan	4,000	
18th " "	Chow Chih-chung	Chienou	Fukien	4,000	
Training "	Huang Jen-huan	Penchow	Kwangsi	6,000	
Pistol "	Lei Tai-ping	Kaomi	Shantung	6,000	
1st Cav. "	An Chun-tsai	Kaifeng	Honan	6,000	
" "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	Shantung	5,000	
1st Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000	(NAVAL
2nd "	Lin Shou-kuo	Yungchun	"	4,000	CONSTB.)
Gendarmerie	Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
1st Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Chengchow	Honan	2,500	
2nd " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500	
3rd " "	Li Chung-wei	Kaifeng	"	2,500	
Training "	Hsiao Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,000	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Forces)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)			Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla)					
			Total	825,600	

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Subject: Situation Report

The 14th Division under Li Hsiao-ting, which no longer exists, has been reorganized into the 25th Division under Tai Ming-chi.

The 15th, 27th, 58th, 67th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 74th and 75th Divisions under Wang Han-ming, Sun Chin-t'ai, Ma Ching-yuan, Wu Ting-lin, Chao Kuan-yin, Fan Lung-chang, Feng Ch'in-tsai, Ch'iao Li-chih and Wang Ling-yuan, respectively, are newly organized units; it is believed that they have been formed largely from old Kuominchun troops and Miscellaneous forces captured or surrendered.

The 21st Division under Liu Chen-nien is the old 17th Army; designation having been changed after the war.

Designations of the 23rd and 24th Divisions under Li Yun-chieh and Hsu Ke-hsiang, respectively, have been changed from the 21st and 20th Divisions.

The 32nd Division under Chen Kuang-chung has been reorganized from the 7th Independent Brigade of Li Ch'i.

Designation of the 3rd Cavalry Division under Chang Chan-kwei has been changed from the 1st Cavalry Division.

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Kaifeng	Honan	12,000	
1st "	Feng Yi-pei	Nanking	Kiangsu	10,000	*
2nd "	Ku Chu-tung	Tungkwan	Shensi	15,000	
3rd "	Ch'en Chi-ch'eng	Hwaying	"	12,000	
4th "	Chang Chih-chung	Haochai	Kiangsu	10,000	*
4th "	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Yushih	Honan	10,000	*
5th "	Hsiung Shih-hui	Shanghai	Kiangsu	12,000	
5th "	Kung Pin-fan	Kian	Kiangsi	8,000	*
6th "	Chao Kuan-tao	Chengchow	Honan	12,000	
7th "	Wang Chun	Kaifeng	"	12,000	
8th "	Mao Ping-wen	Nanchang	Kiangsi	12,000	
9th "	Chiang Ting-wen	Loyang	Honan	12,000	
10th "	Yang Sheng-chih	"	"	12,000	
11th "	Ch'en Ch'eng	Yochow	Hunan	12,000	
12th "	Chin Han-ting	Siaoyi	Honan	12,000	
13th "	Hsia Tou-yin	Hwangchow	Hupeh	12,000	
14th "	Ch'ien Ta-chun	Ningpo	Chekiang	10,000	*
Bodyguard Div.	Yu Chi-shih	Nanking	Kiangsu	10,000	
			Total	205,000	

* Cadets from the Military School at Nanking as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's old divisions.

Designations of the 4th and 14th Divisions under Chang Chih-chung and Ch'ien Ta-chun have been changed from the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, respectively.

The Bodyguard Division under Yu Chi-shih has been expanded from Bodyguard Brigade.

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23rd	Division	Wei Feng-lou	Chenchow	Honan	12,000
30th	"	Chi Hung-chang	Kwangchow	"	12,000
31st	"	Chang Yin-hsiang	Loshan	"	12,000
31st	"	Sun Lien-chung	Tsaochow	Shantung	12,000
32nd	"	Liang Kuan-ying	Tsingkiangpu	Kiangsu	12,000
1st	Cav.Div.	Liu Feng-ch'i	Tsaochow	Shantung	4,000
				Total	64,000

The above units are old Kuominchun divisions which surrendered to the Government.

Designations of the 30th and 32nd Divisions under Chi Hung-chang and Liang Kuan-ying, respectively, have been changed from the 11th and 21st Divisions by the Government.

The 31st Division under Chang Yin-hsiang has been organized from Kuominchun remnants and is placed under Chi Hung-chang, Commander of the 30th Division.

The 31st Division under Sun Lien-chung is said to have surrendered to the Government and is now under reorganization.

The 1st Cavalry Division under Liu Feng-ch'i has been organized from remnants of the old 2nd Cavalry Division formerly under Cheng Ta-chang (see Page 5, this Report).

Total Central Government Troops, Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions and former Kuominchun forces who surrendered. 1,094,600

(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES

The posts of Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commanders as stated in previous Reports are said to have been abolished.

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th	Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Liuchow	Kwangsi	20,000
7th	" "	Yang T'eng-hui	Kweilin	"	15,000
8th	" "	Chow Lan	Chuanchow	"	15,000
15th	" "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
15th	Division	Li Ming-jui	Poseh	"	10,000
16th	"	Pai Chung-hsi	Liuchow	"	12,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Nanning	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000
				Total First Group of Armies	95,000

CHINA (Military)

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Second Group of Armies
(Lu Chung-lin)

1st Division	Kuo Chih-kang	Puchow	Shansi	12,000
2nd "	T'ung Yu-chen	Chiehchow	"	12,000
9th "	Feng Chih-an	Sinsiang	Honan	12,000
14th "	P'ang Ping-hsun	Yuncheng	Shansi	12,000
18th "	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Sienyang	Shensi	12,000
22nd "	Ma Hung-pin	Lanchow	Kansu	12,000
22nd "	Ch'eng Hsing-ming	Kaoping	Shansi	12,000
23rd "	Ma Chi	Tsiaotso	Honan	12,000
25th "	Chang Tze-chung	Sinsiang	"	12,000
26th "	Tien Chin-kai	Hwaiking	"	12,000
27th "	Chang Wei-hsi	Yangcheng	Shansi	12,000
28th "	Sung Che-yuan	Yuncheng	"	12,000
29th "	Juan Hsuan-wu	Tsehchow	"	8,000
29th "	Ch'eng Hsi-hsien	Lucheng	"	12,000
30th "	Pao Kang	Siuwu	Honan	8,000
31st "	Sun Lien-chung			
37th "	Wang Kuan-chun	Tsechow	Shansi	8,000
Training Div.	Wang Kuan-hua	Yuncheng	"	12,000
1st Cav. "	Chang Te-shun	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
2nd " "	Cheng Ta-chang			
4th " "	Su Yu-sheng	Luanfu	Shansi	6,000
1st Mix.Brig.	Meng Chih-chung	Ninghsia	Kansu	5,000
2nd " "	Ch'en Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
3rd " "	Chao Kung-wen	Sinsiang	Honan	5,000
5th " "	Pai Chien-sheng	Hwaiking	"	5,000
4th " "	Ma Lin	Lanchow	Kansu	5,000
6th " "	Liu Yu-lin	Yangwu	Honan	4,000
8th Cav. "	Chao Hsi-pin	Huchiahsien	"	4,000
Pistol & Sword Brig.	Li Cheng-tung	Tsehchow	Shansi	5,000
		Total Second Group of Armies		244,000

In addition to three divisions which have surrendered to the Government and which have been reported in Page 3 of Situation Report No. 7858, the 31st Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division under Sun Lien-chung and Cheng Ta-chang, respectively, are also said to have gone over. It is said that some other units had also sided with the Government, but this office has not been able to secure definite information thereof.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces
(Hsu Yung-chang)

The name of the Third Group of Armies, stated in the previous Reports, has now been changed under a new title of Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces as above.

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u

1st	Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Tatung	Shansi	3,000
2nd	"	T'ao Chen-wu	"	"	3,000
3rd	"	Ma Yen-show	"	"	3,000

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou

4th	Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng	Changtze	"	3,000
5th	"	Chang Wen-shun	"	"	3,000
6th	"		"	"	3,000

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

7th	Division	Ho Shao-nan	Showyang	"	3,000
8th	"	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	3,000
9th	"	Wang T'ing-ying	"	"	3,000

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta

10th	Division	Ch'en Ch'ang-chieh	Tungyang Pass		Hopei	3,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	"	3,000
12th	"	Huo Yuan-pi	"	"	"	3,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

13th	Division	An Hsi-ku	Taiyuan	Shansi	3,000
14th	"	To Chen	Wutai	"	3,000
15th	"	Chai Hsueh-ming	Kwohsien	"	3,000

6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang

16th	Division	Wang Yu-ju	Kaoping	"	3,000
17th	"		"	"	3,000
18th	"		"	"	3,000

Carried Forward 54,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces (cont'd)			Brought Forward		54,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Huei-chao					
22nd	Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tatung	Shansi	3,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	3,000
24th	"		"	"	3,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu					
25th	Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Yuhsien	Shansi	3,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	3,000
27th	"	Kuo Wei-fan	Tatung	"	3,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi					
28th	Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh	Liaochow	Shansi	3,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ch'ing	"	"	3,000
30th	"	Chen Ping-chien	"	"	3,000
15th Army Corps - Ch'in Shao-kuan					
10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Yutze	Shansi	2,500
11th	"	Fan Kang-lan	"	"	2,500
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	2,500
16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan					
4th	Brigade	Liu Feng-chi	Chuwu	Shansi	2,500
5th	"	Li Chia-lin	"	"	2,500
6th	"	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	2,500
Training	Division	Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	Shansi	8,000
1st Cav.	"	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung	"	6,000
2nd	" "	Kuo Feng-shan	"	"	2,000
3rd	" "	Chang Cheng-teh			
4th	" "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
5th	" "	Yuan Ping-fan	Tatung	Shansi	2,500
6th	" "	Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	2,500
Bodyguard	Brigade	Tu Ch'un-yi	Taiyuan	"	6,000
28th	"	Yuan Tseng-ching	Tatung	"	6,000
					79,000

Total Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces - 133,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

The 7th and 17th Army Corps under Kuan Fu-an and Chow Shih-lien, respectively, as listed in the previous Reports, have been disbanded or a number of the men has been transfered to other units to replace casualties.

The 3rd Cavalry Division under Chang Cheng-teh has joined the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces (see Page 12, this Report).

The Thirteenth Route Army
(Shih Yu-san)

The Fourth Group of Armies has affiliated with Liaoning as stated in Report No. 7849, and the name of which has since been changed by the Government as the Thirteenth Route Army as above. Subsequently, this Route Army has been greatly reorganized as follows, and a number of the men in its old units are said to have been disbanded.

1st Division	Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	10,000
2nd "	Mi Wen-ho	Weihwei	"	10,000
3rd "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Tzechow	Hopei	10,000
4th "	Wang Hsing-te	Shaho	"	10,000
5th "	Sung T'ieh-lin	Hantan	"	10,000
6th "	Sheng Ke	Tzechow	"	10,000
6 Ind.Regts. of Pistol, Training, Artillery, Light Trench Mortar, Heavy Trench Mortar & Engineers		Changteh	"	12,000
			Total	72,000

Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st Division	Sun Tien-ying	Shansi	8,000
2nd "	Chin Han-ting	"	8,000
3rd "	Liu Yueh-t'ing	"	8,000
4th "	Chang Tien-ch'ing	"	8,000
5th "	Chin Kw'ei-pin	"	8,000
6th "	Sheng Feng-kang	"	8,000
		Carried Forward	48,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

5th Route Army (continued)				Brought Forward	48,000
24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju					
24th Division	Hsu Li-chung			Shansi	6,000
1st "	Kuo Fang-hsi			"	6,000
2nd "	Chin Kuei-ping			"	6,000
3rd "	Ma Hsi-jen			"	6,000
				Total	72,000

Naturally this Route Army which has been engaged in warfare for the past several months both in Anhwei and Honan has suffered considerable casualties thereby, and after its retirement to the north bank of the Yellow River this office has received no information as to the existence of these units which composed this Route Army or to the losses sustained by them. It is recently reported that a large number of them have entered into the southern regions of Shansi but their stations have not been definitely given.

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

35th Division	Li Kuang-lung	Tsinghwachen	Honan	8,000
38th "	Sung Chao-kwei	"	"	8,000
Special Brig.	Yang T'ing-ya	"	"	4,000
			Total	20,000

15th Army Corps - Liu Kwei-t'ang		Yicheng	Shansi	12,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Wang Jui-shan	"	"	2,000
			Total	14,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 106,000

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	Nanning	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Nanning	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yan Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind. Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Total	30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def. Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kw'ei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying	Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan	"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng	"	3,000
		Total	11,000

CHINA (Military)

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Szechwan (continued)

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Li Ch'i-hsiang	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
			Total	60,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps		Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	T'ang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tsang Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 245,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 301,500

(No information relative to these troops has been received for some time and it is natural that the information given above is not exact. Efforts are being made to secure reliable data as to these forces.)

CHINA (Military)

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
- Wang Fu-lin
- Chang Tso-hsiang

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000
12th "	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Iwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd "	Huang Chih-chung			10,000
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changwu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig.	Chang Shu-shen	Yungping	Hopei	6,000
			Total	89,000

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

4th Brigade	Liu Yi-fei	Kalgan	Chahar	10,000
5th "	Tung Ting-pin	Hsuanhwa	"	10,000
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	11,000
23rd "	Yu Hsueh-chung	Peiping	"	10,000
27th "	Liu Nai-ch'ang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th Cav.Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Shunteh	"	8,000
2nd " Div.	Chang Cheng-te	Kalgan	Chahar	4,000
1st Art.Regt.		Peiping	Hopei	6,000
1st Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	69,800

The 2nd Cavalry Division under Chang Cheng-te was the old 3rd Cavalry Division of Shansi forces, which joined with Liaoning as stated in Page 8, this Report.

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

2nd Brigade	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tungkwang	Hopei	10,000
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Taming	"	6,000
2nd Art.Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	32,800

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd Art.Regt.		Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000
4th " "		Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th " "		Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th " "		Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.		Peichen	"	6,000
8th " " "		"	"	6,000
			Total	36,000

Carried Forward 227,600

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Subject: Situation Report

Liaoning (continued)

Brought Forward 227,600

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan		3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.		800
	Total	4,000
Total Liaoning Forces		231,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th "	Li Wei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th "	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th "	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th "	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th "	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st "	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th "	Hsing Chan-ch'ing	Harbin	"	8,000
16th Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th " "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
		Total		81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd "	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th "	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th "	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th "	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd " "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd " "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th " "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
		Total		57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd "	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th "	Tung Fu-t'ing	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st "	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd " "	Chiakuo-cheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd " "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th " "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th " "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500
		Total		48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 418,100

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TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,464,200

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report
November 4 to December 1, 1930, inclusive

2. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

a. General

During the period covered by this report the communist-bandit activities in South China have evidenced no signs of abatement. The government has completed its preliminary arrangements for the suppression campaign in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, which they announce will be concluded within three months. This campaign has now started active operations in Kiangsi and the government is claiming initial successes.

In North China there have been several bandit incidents which, while isolated in themselves, yet point to a possibly growing disregard of organized authority.

Personal observations (See Report No. 7880, Nov. 25, 1930, this office) have confirmed the reports of the reorganization of "gray" and certain Kuominchun troops into the government armies. The forces of Chi Hung-chang, the first of Feng's subordinates to turn over to Nanking, have now been moved into southern Honan where they have been sent for bandit suppression duty. Liang Kuan-ying's troops, also former Kuominchun, have been sent to Tsingkiangfu, Kiangsu, for pacification duty, where, it is said, they will be under the direct control of Chang Chih-chiang, who, though himself a former Kuominchun official, is thoroughly trusted by Nanking. Sun Lien-chung has also been taken into the government fold and his troops are being moved to southwest Shantung for station. The Kuominchun remaining in Shansi have as yet not been taken care of; Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is reported as having been charged with the rehabilitation of this province and it is expected that as soon as he returns from his present visit to Nanking some disposition will be made of these troops, which number about 50,000. Foreigners resident in China who have observed these troops have informed this office that they are Feng's best soldiers. It is our opinion that this force, however, will acquiesce to such proposals as Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang may make, since it is most apparent that resistance would be futile, for Chiang has moved Nanking troops to positions along the south bank of the Yellow River, and now holds the line from Loyang to Sianfu, inclusive, with eight (8) divisions, and Mukden's pledged support of the government is naturally non-conducive to further rebellion.

Nothing is known as to Feng's present whereabouts, but persistent reports are to the effect that he is en route to Moscow by motor. The Kuominchun appears to have been decimated and its leader shorn of his power, but the lapse of time must be awaited before it can be stated that this is, or is not, an accomplished fact, for it is felt that the circumstances of their Honan defeat were such as to make (with the possible exception of Chi Hung-chang) their surrender to Nanking acceptable to Feng and that same surrender in no way alienated their devotion to him. In fairness to Nanking, however, it must be stated that the Kuominchun now no longer exists as a coherent force.

Taiyuanfu has been subjected to further air raids which, while accomplishing little material damage, have no doubt served to create a public feeling antagonistic to Yen's continued domicile in the province. Marshal Yen is reported to have issued a circular wire on November 4th announcing his retirement and his desire to return to his family home at

Wutaishan, Shansi. The Central Government insists that he go abroad for a few years. Twenty-six Shansi and Kuominchun commanders, headed by General Shang Chen, are said to have sent a wire to Nanking pledging their support of the Central Government and advising that Yen would retire and go abroad as soon as he has settled private affairs; since no mention is made of Feng in this wire it would appear that he and Yen have nothing now in common.

Three Manchurian planes have arrived here by rail and are stationed at Nanyuan. The pilots are Russians.

Chang Hsueh-liang is reported to have given Shih Yu-san $200,000 and 2,000 rifles and to have agreed to furnish his troops with a monthly allowance of $600,000. Since his return from Mukden, Shih is said to have made known a desire to retire into private life.

Reports from the Kwang Provinces indicate that the situation in Kwangsi now favors the "anti-rebel" forces, but is still unsettled.

b. South China

Little information concerning the Kwangsi warfare is available. In early November it was reported that the government was despatching troops to the south to operate against the rebels. Subsequent to this report, the press announced that the families of Li Tsung-jen and other Kwangsi leaders had left Nanning. About this same time it was also reported that Li and Pai Chung-hsi had sent delegates to Wuchow announcing their willingness to retire and turn their troops over to the government for reorganization. The reports rather color the government's official announcement of the capture of Nanning on November 19 and the withdrawal of the Kwangsi and "Ironside" forces toward the Yunnan border.

While there is no confirmation of the foregoing reports, it is believed at least that the siege of Nanning has been raised and that the Kwangsi situation, even though unsettled, still remains localized.

c. The Communist Situation

There has been no decrease in the communist-bandit activities in the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Fukien, but rather a marked increase. Towns, too numerous to mention, have been captured with the resultant disregard of life and destruction of property. The problem with which the government has to deal can be better understood by reading Report No. 7882, Nov. 26, 1930, this office.

Information available hereat as to the Communist Armies is as follows: (Source: British Military Attache, Peiping)

1st Army

Commander Hsu Chi-chen, Whampoa cadet, Political Officer Tsao Ta-ching, student. 5,300 operating on borders of Honan, Hupeh and Anhui, Peking-Hankow Railway and Yangtze.

2nd Army

Commander Ho Lung, peasant; Acting Political Officer Ch'en Hsieh-p'ing; 5,800 mainly recruited from unemployed peasants in west Hunan, divided into 1st and 2nd Route Armies operating in west Hunan, west Hupeh, middle reaches of Yangtze, and Li-chow, (Honan); is in close cooperation with 6th Army.

3rd Army

Commander Tsai Shen-hsi, Whampoa cadet; Political Officer Tseng Ju-hsiang, student; 5,400, divided into two main columns each with two regiments, operating in southwest Kiangsi and extending to southeast Hupeh and north Kwangtung.

4th Army

Commander Chu Teh, old style militarist trained in Germany; Political Officer Mao Tze-tung; 8,800, divided into four columns, operating in southeast Kiangsi, west Fukien, north and west river areas of Kwangtung and Hunan. This force has the longest history in regard to its establishment and administration by the Communists; has lately operated in cooperation with the 3rd and 5th Armies in southwest Kiangsi; has raised a force of over 10,000 armed peasants.

5th Army

Commander P'eng Teh-huai, old style militarist; Political Officer Hsi Tai-yuan, student; 6,865, divided into five columns, operating in east Hunan, south Hupeh, west Kiangsi; expected to join with the 4th Army against Canton-Hankow Railway and Wuhan cities.

6th Army

Commander Kuang Chi-hsun, military graduate; Political Officer Chou I-ch'un, Whampoa cadet; 5,890, divided into three columns, operating in west Hupeh extending to Hanyang; one band has been despatched to act with the 2nd Army under the command of Ho Lung.

7th Army

Commander Chang Yun-i, graduate of Paoting Military College; Political Officer Teng Hsi-hsien, student; 7,890, divided into four columns, formerly operating in Kwangsi with Lungchow as center, now working in the Liu-chow district in Kwangsi and in Hunan and Kwangtung Provinces.

8th Army

Commander Huang Kung-liao, student; Political Officer Teng Kan-yuan, student; 4,870, divided into three columns, operating in southeast Hupeh in vicinity of Puchi, Tayeh and Kiukiang (Kiangsi Province).

9th Army

Commander Ts'ui Chi-chi; under organization and will operate in Hupeh.

10th Army

Commander Chow Hsien-ying; has been formed and will operate in West Hupeh.

11th Army

Commander Chu Tung-chih; 5,000 strong, formerly part of the Red Army under Ho Lung and Yuan Yeh-ting, and operates along the East River in Kwangtung.

12th Army

Acting Commander Teng Tse-hui, student; 8,860, divided into six columns, operating in the west of Fukien in the Han and East River districts; cooperates with 11th Army.

13th Army

Commander Hu Kwang-mien; in course of formation; sphere of operations Hunan.

14th Army

Acting Commander Ho K'un, student; acting Political Officer Tung Wei-min, Whampoa Cadet; 1,800, operating in Kwangtung.

In addition to the above it is alleged that there are other armies in the process of organization in Hopei, Honan, Hunan, Kwangsi, as well as Hainan and even in Manchuria.

The government formerly announced that the expenses of the campaign would have to be borne by the provinces concerned, but the complete lack of control of the respective provincial authorities outside of their immediate capitals makes it absolutely impossible for the collection of taxes necessary to finance the campaign to be made. Nanking has apparently admitted this as a fact, for in their announcing that they expect to conclude the operations in three months they also state that the government will provide the expenses. Troops, funds, and supplies have been rushed to Hunan and Kiangsi. Chiang Kai-shek has stated that he will personally take the field, and direct the operations. It appears that the government will make its main effort in Kiangsi (Kiukiang being the initial headquarters of the Generalissimo), where contact with the Red Armies has already been established. The attached map indicates the troop disposition and units involved. Latest reports are that the anti-Red forces are pushing the attack to the southeast and that the 5th and 8th, and 4th and 12th Red Armies are giving way and would appear to be retiring towards Fukien. If such is the case and it is part of the plan of campaign, it indicates a sound plan of action, and may furnish an interesting tactical study, as, if successful it will effect a separation of these forces from those in Hunan, and, in driving them closer to the coast (Fukien) it makes it possible for the government to despatch with greater facility additional troops against them -- by sea.

The capturing of Kian (Kiangsi) is announced and a report of the execution of 3,000 people thereat while the Reds were in control of the city is reminiscent of T'ai P'ing Rebellion days.

The government has announced that it will not compromise with any of the communist units and that not a man of them are to be enlisted into the government service. If such a policy is adhered to it will be of great credit to the Nanking government, but will probably result in a long, passive campaign, and necessitate the maintenance of a large army for station in the areas involved for some time -- during which the "thought" will have to be fought relentlessly to prevent its permeating into the government ranks.

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Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Note: Since this report was compiled information has been received which makes the capture of Nanning doubtful.

G-2 Report

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 17 1931
2657-D-276
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Conversation with Mr. Wm. H. Donald

December 10 and 11, 1930.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 16 1931

Mr. William H. Donald, an Australian by birth, has been in China for thirty years, during which period he has been adviser to practically every government since the establishment of the republic. He wrote the original proclamation for Dr. Sun Yat-sen. For the past two years he has been the intimate adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and without doubt enjoys the Young Marshal's confidence more closely than any other person.

Mr. Donald arrived in Peiping from Nanking for a few days of rest, leaving the Young Marshal's party at Tientsin. In interviews on the morning of December 10 and the evening of December 11, Mr. Donald summarized the activities of the Young Marshal during the period beginning with the Russian trouble in 1929 and continuing to the present time.

At the time of the trouble with the Soviet Government in the fall of 1929, which was the result of the action taken by Mukden authorities in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the Young Marshal was under the influence of the Political Council and obliged to comply with their decisions. Donald stated that the reason for this was that the Young Marshal was a confirmed drug addict and was mentally and physically incapable of conducting state affairs. Following the humiliating terms of the settlement with Russia which the Young Marshal was required to sign, he was persuaded to take the cure for the drug habit. This he did, and from that time showed rapid improvement both mentally and physically, soon thereafter assuming control of state affairs in Manchuria and becoming the dominating figure in the north east, a position which he has continued to occupy up to the present time.

In the early part of 1930 when Yen and Feng had agreed to join forces in rebellion against the Nanking Government for the purpose of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek and it looked as though civil war would break out again in China, the Young Marshal was besieged in Mukden by delegates from both sides who endeavored to win his support to their respective causes. Donald stated that at this time Chang refused to discuss interference or participation in the political or military affairs inside the wall, and rarely would receive delegates from the various factions in China. In order to free himself from the persistent efforts of the increasing number of delegates in Mukden he attempted to leave secretly for Hulutao, but upon his arrival at the latter place he found that a special car filled with Nanking delegates had arrived with him. During his stay of over a month at Hulutao these delegates won him over to an orgy of gambling and drinking which continued throughout the night. He was finally persuaded from this dissipation by his intimate friends, and left for Peitaiho where he arrived on August 10.

While at Hulutao the Young Marshal confided to Donald that the Nanking delegates had approached him with an offer from Chiang Kai-shek of one hundred million dollars for interference on the side of Nanking. When asked what reply he had made to them he said that if Chiang Kai-shek would give him one hundred million dollars in cash, the provinces of Hopei and Shantung, half the appointments in the Cabinet, and remove the Kuomintang from government affairs, he would consider the matter of intervention, and laughingly added that he did not believe Chiang Kai-shek would accept his proposition.

While his train was passing through Shanhaikuan en route to Peitaiho, General Yu Hsueh-chung, who commanded his troops inside the Wall, came on board and reported to the Young Marshal that his subor-

dinates had been approached by Nanking delegates and offered money considerations if they would attack the Shansi troops from the rear in the direction of Tientsin. Donald stated that the Young Marshal told General Yu he would not oppose him, but that General Yu had replied that he intended to remain loyal to the Young Marshal, and requested the latter to send for General Yu's subordinates and settle the matter at Peitaiho. The news reports covering this incident were very much exaggerated.

Donald said that after the defeat of Yen, followed by the occupation of Tsinanfu on August 15 by government troops, the Young Marshal sent for him and announced that the time had come when he would probably have to intervene in order to prevent the Kuomintang forces from moving north of the Yellow River. He feared that if they did come north and occupy Hopei, this would be followed by the establishment of the Tang Pu (branch party organization) and that communistic activities would very soon be felt throughout Manchuria, where the communists would be shaking hands with the Russians across the border. When asked in favor of which side he intended to intervene, he replied that he was opposed to the establishment of two governments in China, that Yen had ceased to be of further importance, that Feng was impossible, that he had little regard for the doctrines enunciated by Wang Ching-hui, that if he interfered on the side of the Northern Coalition it would mean the establishment of two governments or possibly the fall of the government at Nanking, that, although he did not look favorably upon a one-party government, the existing government at Nanking had been recognized by foreign governments and was preferable to a new government organized and dominated by Yen, Feng and Wang Ching-hui, and that his intervention, therefore, would ostensibly be in favor of Nanking. Donald stated that this was the decision arrived at by the Young Marshal immediately after the fall of Tsinan, although he continued to announce to the world a policy of neutrality until definite action was taken on September 18, more than a month later.

Donald further stated that the Young Marshal did not give serious consideration to the futile attempts of Wang Ching-hui to organize a new national government in Peiping until his name was included in the list of members and given out for publication in that connection. This action infuriated the Young Marshal, who immediately sent a telegram to Yen and Wang Ching-hui demanding an explanation for their action in using his name without authority and directing that it be removed from their list at once. Donald stated that this action on the part of Wang Ching-hui precipitated the intervention of the Young Marshal, who on the 17th of September met with the Political Council and submitted his plans for interference on the side of Nanking. There was serious opposition, Donald said, on the part of the old guard to the move inside the Wall, as they recalled the disaster that had followed a similar move on the part of the Young Marshal's father. However, Chang insisted, threatening to resign if his proposal were not approved, and finally won them over. The result was the issuance of the Peace Circular on September 18.

Donald stated that the Young Marshal was firm in his intention that the occupation of Hopei should be peaceful and for the maintenance of peace. He felt that if there were any indications that he would have to fight he would withdraw his troops from inside the Wall. The taking over of the Tientsin and Peiping area was accomplished without disorder. During the time in which Chiang Kai-shek and Feng were engaged in the struggle for a final decision, the Young Marshal devoted himself to securing his position in his newly acquired territory. He was now the dominating figure in the north east.

After the Nanking Government had announced the meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session, to be held in Nanking on November 12, there was an exchange of correspondence between Chiang Kai-shek and the Young Marshal with a view to getting together, but plans decided upon failed to

mature, and finally the Young Marshal announced that he intended to go to Nanking in person. This decision was seriously opposed by members of the Political Council but the opposition was turned down and the Young Marshal surprised the world by arriving in Nanking on November 12. Donald's description of the reception of the Young Marshal at Nanking was very interesting. He stated that all reports from Japanese sources tending to indicate that there was anything but the warmest reception extended are false, that during the entire three weeks at Nanking the most delightful relations existed between the Young Marshal and his followers and Chiang Kai-shek and members of the government. He stated that the Young Marshal attended practically all of the sessions of the different committees and that he was very liberal in making concessions of all kinds to the central government.

Donald stated that the Young Marshal was definitely charged with the rehabilitation of the territory north of the Yellow River including Shansi, that during the conference at Nanking the question of disbandment was discussed at length and both Chiang and the Young Marshal were of the same accord, agreeing that the old policy should be abandoned as it was felt the attempt of the government to put into effect the provisions thereof was one of the principal causes of the last civil war. It was agreed between them that the reorganization of the military into an army for national defense would best meet present requirements of the government and that later the strength of the army should be reduced at varying intervals by lopping off certain units that would not adversely affect economic conditions. The Young Marshal believes it will require ten years to accomplish desired results; Chiang thinks it can be done in five.

Donald believes that peace will continue for some considerable time. He bases this belief on the following premises: Two men now completely dominate in China. One has no political or military ambition. He loves peace and hates the suffering caused by military activity, and would give up his job tomorrow if he could. This is Chang Hsueh-liang. The other has unlimited ambition. To reach his object he would employ both military and political means. This is Chiang Kai-shek. The Young Marshal has made pledges of loyalty and cooperation to the government, and as the ambitions of these two leaders do not conflict Donald believes the future peace of China can be viewed with optimism.

Donald added that he is curious to see what the reaction will be when the Young Marshal returns to Mukden and lays before the Political Council the pledges he has made to Nanking. It will be a test, in Donald's opinion, as to who will control Manchuria. If the old guard do not accept the obligations made by the Young Marshal to Nanking they may attempt to ease him out, and one of the means will be to have him establish his headquarters at Peiping and keep him there, in which case Manchuria will remain aloof from Nanking. He says the old guard in this attempt will have the support of Japanese influence, for there is much concern on the part of the Japanese regarding the concessions made and the apparent close cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Young Marshal.

In conclusion, I got the impression from Donald that the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and the Young Marshal have become very close, and that so long as these two dominating figures work together there is little danger that the peace of China will be disturbed by civil war.

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N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

G-2 Report

4-1

WAR DEPARTMENT
JAN 17 1931
2657-J-276
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Review of Events

July to End of 1930

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 16 1931

At last it appears that war-ridden China is to enjoy a period free from civil war. The Dragon, surfeited with blood, famine and the miseries resulting from long months of internecine warfare, has reached the point of exhaustion where rest and recuperation are essential. With the overthrow of the rebellion headed by Yen and Feng,and the cooperation of the Young Marshal with the Central Government, the future peace of China can be viewed with optimism.

However, the communist-bandit activity in the south central provinces remains a real menace to the peace of the nation and must receive the immediate and serious attention of the government.

Now that peace in general has come to China, and the Fourth Plenary Session has convened, adopted many proposals for government reform, and adjourned, the time appears appropriate to summarize or rather review the important events of the past months which have led up to the present situation.

During the month of July the government was facing a critical situation. Yen with his Shansi troops was south of the Yellow River, moving east along the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad in pursuit of Han Fu-chu, and south along the Tsin-Pu with Hsuchowfu as objective; Feng was occupying strong positions on the Lunghai front east of Lanfeng and also constituting a serious threat against Hsuchowfu in cooperation with Yen's movement. The situation in Hunan was still undertain as the movements of Chang Fa-kwei and his Kwangsi Allies was not definitely known.

During this period the Young Marshal sat in Mukden observing, declining appeals of both sides to lend his support and announcing to all the world a policy of neutrality.

With the confirmation that Chang Fa-kwei and the Kwangsi forces were retreating toward Kweilin in north Kwangsi, due to the threat to their rear by forces from Kwangtung under General Chen Chi-tang, the situation in Hunan became easier and Chiang moved a number of his divisions from this area to the Tsin-Pu front.

In the early part of August, while holding Feng west of Kweiteh, aided by heavy rains which flooded the flat country, Chiang began an energetic attack against the Shansi army in the direction of Tsinanfu. At this same time reinforcements had reached Han Fu-chu via Tsingtao at the moment when he was about to quit. Han, reinforced, turned on the Shansi troops; the attack up the Tsin-Pu and westward along the Tsinan-Tsingtao met with little resistance, and by August 15 the Shansi armies south of the river were in full flight, leaving many prisoners and huge quantities of supplies, rail and motor transportation in the hands of government troops entering Tsinanfu.

This decisive victory of the government marked the beginning of the end of the Northern rebellion.

Coincident with the occupation of Tsinan by government troops on August 15, a report spread over North China that the Young Marshal, who was vacationing at Peitaiho, had been assassinated and the Fengtien troops inside the Wall near Shanhaikuan had mutinied in favor of the Central Government. The report of the assassination proved false, but mutiny

was attempted by subordinate officers and quickly put down.

Following this, frantic efforts continued to be employed by both sides to enlist the support of the Young Marshal; however, the time had not come, and Fengtien adhered to its announced policy of neutrality.

During this period, Wang Ching-hui was in Peiping struggling with the organization of a new National Government. Before the defeat of Yen's armies south of the Yellow River, his attitude, as also that of Feng, toward the new government was one of indifference. Immediately following the Tsinan debacle, in order to maintain "face" and regain some evidence of power, Yen accepted the Chairmanship of the new government and took the oath of office in Peiping on September 10. Yen had been eliminated as a further serious factor in the military situation. The final decision rested with Chiang and Feng.

Following his decisive victory over Yen at Tsinan, Chiang did not pursue north of the Yellow River but contented himself with securing the Yellow River line with a minimum strength, and began moving all available divisions in the direction of the Wuhan area for a final drive against Feng in the Chengchow region.

During the first half of September, while Chiang was completing his plans for a final drive against Feng, the situation in the North was approaching the most critical period of the war, events of which were to hasten the end of hostilities. During this period delegates from all the important war lords were assembled in Mukden endeavoring to enlist the sympathy and support of the Young Marshal on behalf of their respective chiefs. Reports and rumors of action to be taken by the Young Marshal flew thick and fast, but the Young Marshal continued to declare his neutrality. However, on September 18 he exploded a bombshell which cleared the political and military atmosphere by issuing a peace circular in favor of the central government and announcing that he would send troops to take over the Tientsin and Peiping area. This decision on the part of the Mukden Conference sounded the death knell of the northern rebellion and brought about the dissolution of the new National Government. Following the announcement of the Young Marshal, Shansi troops began withdrawing westward toward the Shansi border, followed closely by Fengtien troops, and by early October the latter had practically completed the taking over of Hopei Province. This entire movement was effected without reported disorder of any kind.

When Chiang's mobilization in the Wuhan area and north along the Kinhan Railroad was completed, he began his offensive in late September and by concentrating on the Chengchow area from the east and south launched intensive attacks against Feng of which at times the result was in doubt, favoring one side and then the other, until some of Feng's commanders turned over to the government and Yen failed to send promised reinforcements to Chengchow. The final decision came with the withdrawal of Feng and his remaining forces to the north of the Yellow River on October 6, 1930, thus ending civil war in China for this year. The government troops continued to clean up west of Chengchow and occupied Tungkwan and Sianfu without opposition. Feng and Yen withdrew their defeated armies into Shansi to await final action by the government.

The defeat of Yen, then of Feng, resulting in the disintegration of the Kuominchun and the declaration of loyalty to the Central Government at Nanking by the Young Marshal, has brought great prestige and power to Nanking and in particular to Chiang Kai-shek.

With the cessation of hostilities, military operations were immediately followed by political activities. Chiang Kai-shek returned in triumph to Nanking on October 10, National Independence Day.

Soon after his return to Nanking it was announced that the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee would convene on November 12, 1930, when certain reforms would be proposed for the reorganization of the National Government, and a serious discussion of party matters would be held.

Chiang remained in Nanking long enough to give instructions for Communist-Bandit suppression and disposal of Kuominchun units that had turned over to the government, then left for Ningpo to worship at the tomb of his ancestors, stopping in Shanghai long enough to be baptized a Christian.

Hupeh and all provinces south of the Yangtze River were feeling the effects of Communist-Bandit activity. The center of the Red atrocities was located in the area bounded by the provinces of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Hunan. That part of the population that did not join the Reds had suffered frightfully, the government being helpless to offer assistance, all available troops being required to meet the Northern Rebellion which threatened to overthrow the government. With the cessation of hostilities the government has been moving troops into the affected areas with the avowed intention of suppressing Red and Bandit activities within six months.

During this period, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Chang Fa-kwei were in virtual control of Kwangsi Province. Although attacked from the west by troops from Yunnan and the east by troops from Kwangtung, they have been able to maintain themselves and have held Nanning and the country north to include Liuchow and Kweilin. Although the situation is somewhat obscure, reliable information indicates that negotiations are proceeding for a turn-over to the government.

The Kuominchun or People's Army, which for years has been considered the best trained army in China, and which has always evidenced its loyalty to Feng in spite of the heroic discipline he imposed upon both officers and men, is no more. Reports from all sources confirm the strength of Feng's remnant Kuominchun army at 50,000 and report it to be located in south west Shansi. Many small units have been incorporated into the government forces. The principal units have been disposed of as follows:

Sun Lien-chang with 80,000 is now in south west Shantung with headquarters at Tsining.

Liang Kwang-ying with 30,000 is now in north Kiangsu charged with bandit suppression.

Chi Hung-chang with 25,000 is in Hupeh operating against communist-bandits.

All the above are under command of government officials.

Feng has disappeared. Whether he is in Shansi or en route to Moscow is not known. Has he passed out of the picture, or will he be heard from again?

The period from October 6 to November 12 was more a period of recuperation than of action, a sort of convalescing period during which all factions were preparing for the next act, which was the raising of the curtain on the opening of the Fourth Plenary Session, November 12.

As the date for opening the Conference approached, leading military commanders and politicians began to assemble at Nanking. There was much speculation as to action the Young Marshal might take. He did the unexpected and went to Nanking, where he arrived on November 12 and remained

until December 4. His going to Nanking added great prestige to the government and dispelled the idea that may have been cherished on the part of any opposition that the Young Marshal would not cooperate with Nanking. He was cordially received and widely entertained by all members of the government while in Nanking. His attitude was one of cooperation and his pledges of support to the government in the maintenance of peace went further than there was cause to expect. It remains to be seen whether or not the old guard at Mukden will ratify these pledges.

The Fourth Plenary Session convened on November 12 and adjourned on the 18th after adopting many proposals intended to reform and reorganize the government administration. The reported opposition of members of the old guard, headed by Hu Han-ming, to certain reforms proposed by Chiang did not materialize. Chiang was the strong man of the hour, completely dominating the Session. He spared no words in his criticism of the failure of the party and the government to accomplish anything of material benefit to the people, and threatened to apply military discipline to officials in the conduct of government affairs.

With the departure of the Young Marshal from Nanking, December 4, Chiang left en route for Hankow to give personal attention to the organization of his troops for suppression of Communist-Bandit activities. At this writing he is up the Yangtze River, holding conferences and giving orders to his commanders in an endeavor to clean up and bring peace to those provinces sufferihg from communist and bandit aggression.

The Young Marshal arrived in Tientsin on December 6 and is still there. Donald, his immediate adviser, stated that when the Young Marshal gets away from Mukden they have difficulty getting him back. On this occasion he left on November 8 and is still absent.

In conclusion, the situation obtaining at the end of 1930 can be summed up briefly as follows:

1. Civil war in China is ended.

2. Communist-bandit activities still continue throughout most of China and will require a long time to bring under control.

3. There is no organized military opposition to the government.

4. In the North East Provinces, although outward appearances indicate cooperation with and submission to Nanking, there is an undercurrent of opposition, supported and encouraged by both Japan and Russia, to too close relations between Mukden and Nanking. Japan is much concerned regarding reports of pledges made to Nanking by the Young Marshal. It remains to be seen just how far he has surrendered foreign and local affairs to Nanking's control, and what the reaction will be.

The conference at Moscow is still dragging out with no satisfactory results obtained to date.

The situation in Hopei is peaceful. Fengtien troops have not entered Shansi nor Suiyuan, although both provinces have submitted to the government and rehabilitation is to be supervised by Mukden.

5. Shantung is being administered for the government by Han Fu-chu. This province appears to be the receiving ground for gray generals. Han Fu-chu (Chairman) occupies Tsinanfu with the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad. Liu Chen-nien, whose status is still uncertain, occupies the north east sector. Ma Hung-kuei is on the Tsin-pu fromTaian southward, and Sun Lien-cheng, former Kuominchun leader, with 80,000 men occupies south west Shantung with headquarters at Tsining.

6. A committee headed by Ma Fuhsiang has been designated to proceed to Kansu to effect reorganization of the provincial government.

7. Szechuan, the province of mystery, remains obscure. The province is divided and controlled by various war lords: Liu Hsiang, with headquarters at Chungking, controls down the river to the Hupeh border and has declared for the government; Chengtu, the capital, is controlled by General Liu Wen-hui. Standard Oil agents report conditions in their area very bad, due to bandits and frequent mutiny of troops. There has been no action reported to be taken by the government in settling affairs in this province to date.

8. Nanking, feeling the effects of increased prestige resulting from the successful termination of the war, is preparing to make it uncomfortable for those foreign powers who enjoy extra-territoriality and other special privileges in China.

9. Chiang Kai-shek, as Chairman of the Executive Yuan, assumes the duties of President and Premier of China, and becomes a virtual Dictator.

10. Peace in China appears to be assured for so long as Chiang Kai-shek dominates at Nanking and Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden. If anything should happen to eliminate either of these men from power, then the stage must be set for the next act.

NEM/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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G-2 Report

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JAN 30 1931

2657-D-276

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 29 1931

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief.
- Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

1st	Division	Chang Fan	Hingan	Shensi	10,000
1st	"	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
2nd	"	Yang Ting-chung	Jungyi	Kwangsi	8,000
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shunchang	Fukien	8,000
3rd	"	Li Yun-lung	Anlu	Hupeh	12,000
4th	"	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
6th	"	Chow Ch'i-to	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kuang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
9th	"	Tai Chi	Chaochow	Kwangtung	8,000
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	4,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"	10,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	Lu Hsiao-ch'en	Fuchow	Kiangsi	8,000
15th	"	Wang Tung-yuan	Pingkiang	Hunan	10,000
15th	"	Wan Han-ming	Chumatien	Honan	8,000
16th	"	Peng Wei-jen	Liuyang	Hunan	10,000
16th	"	Ke Yun-lung	Loyang	Honan	10,000
17th	"	Yang Hu-cheng	Sian	Shensi	12,000
18th	"	Chang Hui-tsan	Changshu	Kiangsi	12,000
19th	"	Li Chueh	Kungan	Hupeh	12,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tehchow	Shantung	20,000
21st	"	Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	"	35,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-ming	Huimin	"	10,000
23rd	"	Li Yun-chieh	Wuchang	Hupeh	8,000
24th	"	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Jaochow	Kiangsi	12,000
25th	"	Tai Ming-chuan	Lienhwa	"	12,000
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Changsha	Hunan	20,000
26th	"	Chen Yueh-han	Haichow	Kiangsu	10,000
27th	"	Sun Chin-t'ai	Shuyang	"	8,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	Shantung	10,000
31st	"	T'ao Kuang	Siangyin	Hunan	8,000
32nd	"	Chen Kuang-chung	Liuyang	"	7,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Hwangan	Hupeh	10,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pengpu	Anhwei	12,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Yingchow	"	14,000
47th	"	Wang Chin-yu	Lienhwa	Kiangsi	28,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Kingchow	Hupeh	24,000
49th	"	Chang Chen	Tingchow	Fukien	9,500
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Kiukiang	Kiangsi	12,000
51st	"	Fan Shih-sheng	Hwayuan	Hupeh	12,000
52nd	"	Han Te-ch'in	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	13,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-lin	Wuning	Kiangsi	16,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	Kingtehchen	"	12,000
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Yenping	Fukien	11,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Anking	Anhwei	10,000
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Haichow	Kwangtung	8,000
			Carried Forward		557,500

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Central Government Troops (continued)		Brought Forward			557,500
58th Division	Ma Ching-yuan	Sian	Shensi	10,000	
59th "	Yu Han-mou	Penchow	Kwangsi	8,000	
60th "	Tsai Ting-kai	Yungsin	Kiangsi	8,000	
61st "	Chiang Kuang-nai	Pingsiang	"	8,000	
62nd "	Hsiang Han-ping	Linping	Kwangtung	8,000	
63rd "	Li Yang-ching	Laipo	Kwangsi	8,000	
64th "	Ma Teng-chiao	Tsining	Shantung	14,000	
65th "	Juan Hsun	Tsiaotso	Honan	10,000	
66th "	Hsu Peng-yun	Sinsiang	"	10,000	
67th "	Wu Ting-lin	Miensiang	"	8,000	
68th "	Chang Fang	Shanchow	"	10,000	
69th "	Chao Kuan-yin	Yiyang	"	8,000	
70th "	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	8,000	
71st "	Feng Ch'in-tsai	Sanyuan	Shensi	10,000	
72nd "	Ma Chuan-liang	Tsining	Shantung	8,000	
73rd "	Chan Shu-t'ang	Weihsien	"	8,000	
74th "	Ch'iao Li-chai	Kiaochow	"	8,000	
75th "	Sung Tien-tsai	Kwanyintang	Honan	8,000	
76th "	Li Mao-lin	Paofeng	"	10,000	
77th "	Lo Lin	Tungshan	Hupeh	9,000	
Special "	Li Lin-hsiao	Kishan	Shensi	10,000	
2nd Cav. Div.	Chang Li-sheng	Suchow	Anhwei	10,000	
3rd " "	Chang Chan-kwei	Hwaian	Kiangsu	6,000	
1st Ind. Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000	
1st " "	Shih Chung-cheng	Pengpu	Anhwei	4,000	
1st " "	Chang Jui-kuei	Shiuchow	Kwangtung	6,000	
1st " "	Kuo Feng-ming	Chuanchow	Fukien	2,500	
2nd " "	Chen Kuo-hui	Yungchun	"	2,500	
2nd " "	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	Shantung	5,000	
2nd " "	Chen Hsiao-sze	Mengcheng	Anhwei	4,000	
2nd " "	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000	
3rd " "	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000	
5th " "	Pan Shan-chai	Yingshan	Anhwei	2,000	
7th " "	Tai Hui-yuan	Chuchow	Hunan	6,000	
8th " "	Li Mu-ming	Anlu	Hupeh	2,000	
9th " "	T'ung K'un	Changsha	Hunan	6,000	
12th " "	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000	
13th " "	Hsu Chia-yu	Lanfeng	"	5,000	
14th " "	Peng Chi-piao	Nanchang	Kiangsi	6,000	
15th " "	Tang Sze-tung	Kaifeng	Honan	4,000	
18th " "	Chow Chih-chung	Chienou	Fukien	4,000	
Training "	Huang Jen-huan	Penchow	Kwangsi	6,000	
1st Cav. "	An Chun-tsai	Kaifeng	Honan	6,000	
" "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	Shantung	5,000	
1st Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000	(NAVAL
2nd "	Lin Ping-chow	Yungchun	"	4,000	CONSTB.)
Gendarmerie	Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
1st Art. Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Chengchow	Honan	2,500	
2nd " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500	
3rd " "	Li Chung-wei	Kaifeng	"	2,500	
Training "	Hsiao Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,500	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Force)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)			Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla)					
			Total	. . . .	889,100

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The 1st, 68th and Special Divisions under Chang Fan, Chang Pang and Li Lin-hsiao, respectively, are newly organized units from the Kuominchun remnants.

The 7th and 9th Independent Brigades under Tai Hui-yuan and T'ung K'un are also newly organized units.

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st	Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Kaifeng	Honan	12,000
1st	"	Feng Yi-pei	Nanking	Kiangsu	10,000 *
2nd	"	Ku Chu-tung	Tungkwan	Shensi	15,000
3rd	"	Ch'en Chi-ch'eng	Hwaying	"	12,000
4th	"	Chang Chih-chung	Haochai	Kiangsu	10,000 *
4th	"	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin	Yüshih	Honan	10,000 *
5th	"	Hsiung Shih-hui	Shanghai	Kiangsu	12,000
5th	"	Kung Pin-fan	Kian	Kiangsi	8,000 *
6th	"	Chao Kuan-tao	Chengchow	Honan	12,000
7th	"	Wang Chun	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	12,000
8th	"	Mao Ping-wen	Feni	Kiangsi	12,000
9th	"	Chiang Ting-wen	Loyang	Honan	12,000
10th	"	Yang Sheng-chih	Lingpao	"	12,000
11th	"	Ch'en Ch'eng	Nanchowting	Hunan	12,000
12th	"	Chin Han-ting	Haichow	Kiangsu	12,000
13th	"	Hsia Tou-yin	Hwangchow	Hupeh	12,000
14th	"	Ch'ien Ta-chun	Ningpo	Chekiang	10,000 *
Bodyguard	Div.	Yu Chi-shih	Nanking	Kiangsu	10,000
				Total	205,000

* Cadets from the Military School at Nanking as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's old divisions.

12th	Division	Kao Shu-hsun	Tsining	Shantung	12,000
13th	"	Tung Chen-fan	Tsaochow	"	12,000
14th	"	Chi Cheng-tung	"	"	12,000
15th	"	Li Sung-ch'a	"	"	12,000
23rd	"	Wei Feng-lou	Chenchow	Honan	12,000
30th	"	Chi Hung-chang	Kwangchow	"	12,000
31st	"	Chang Yin-hsiang	Loshan	"	12,000
32nd	"	Liang Kuan-ying	Hwaian	Kiangsu	12,000
1st	Cav.Div.	Liu Feng-ch'i	Tsaochow	Shantung	4,000
2nd	" "	Chu Ch'ang-te	Tingchow	"	5,000
3rd	" "	Chang Hua-t'ang	"	"	5,000
Special	Brig.	Kao Chih-ho	Tsining	"	6,000
				Total	116,000

The above units are old Kuominchun divisions which surrendered to the Government.

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The units of the Second Group of Armies which were stationed in Honan as listed in Page 5 of last Situation Report 7890 have been reorganized by Sun Lien-chung, Commander of the former 31st Kuominchun Division, as the above 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Divisions, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions and the Special Brigade. (See Kuominchun Forces below)

Total Central Government Troops, Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions and former Kuominchun forces who surrendered 1,210,100

(b) ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th	Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Pingnam	Kwangsi	20,000
7th	" "	Yang T'eng-hui	Poseh	"	15,000
8th	" "	Chow Lan	Liuchow	"	15,000
15th	" "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
15th	Division	Li Ming-jui	Poseh	"	10,000
16th	"	Pai Chung-hsi	"	"	12,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Nanning	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Meng Chih	Liuchow	"	4,000
		Total First Group of Armies			95,000

Kuominchun Forces

The name of the Second Group of Armies, stated in the previous Reports, has now been abolished. With exception of those units which have been reorganized by Sun Lien-chung as before stated, the remaining forces at present stationed in Shansi are said to have been reorganized as follows:-

1st	Division	Pao Kang	Chuwu	Shansi 6,000
2nd	"	Tung Ru-chen	Kiangchow	" 6,000
3rd	"	Chang Jen-chieh	Icheng	" 6,000
4th	"	Chang Sui-yin	Chuwu	" 6,000
5th	"	T'ang Chuan-sheng	Kiangchow	" 6,000
6th	"	Chang Tzu-chung	"	" 6,000
		P'ang Ping-hsun	Yuncheng	" 20,000
		Sung Che-yuan	"	" 24,000
			Carried Forward	80,000

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Kuominchun Forces (continued) Brought Forward 80,000

The following are former Kuominchun units, the designation of which has not yet been learned:-

22nd	Division	Ma Hung-pin	Lanchow	Kansu	12,000
1st	Mix. Brig.	Meng Chih-chung	Ninghsia	"	5,000
2nd	" "	Ch'en Jui-en	Lanchow	"	5,000
4th	" "	Ma Lin	"	"	5,000
				Total	27,000

Total Kuominchun Forces - 107,000

Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces.
(Hsu Yung-chang)

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u

1st	Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Tatung	Shansi	3,000
2nd	"	T'ao Chen-wu	"	"	3,000
3rd	"	Ma Yen-show	"	"	3,000

2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou

4th	Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng	Changtze	"	3,000
5th	"	Chang Wen-shun	"	"	3,000
6th	"		"	"	3,000

3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

7th	Division	Ho Shao-nan	Saratsi	Suiyuan	3,000
8th	"	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	3,000
9th	"	Wang T'ing-ying	"	"	3,000

4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta

10th	Division	Ch'en Chang-chieh	Tatung	Shansi	3,000
11th	"	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	3,000
12th	"	Huo Yuan-pi	"	"	3,000

5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

13th	Division	An Hsi-ku	Taiyuan	"	3,000
14th	"	To Chen	Wutai	"	3,000
15th	"	Chai Hsueh-ming	Kwohsien	"	3,000

Carried Forward 45,000

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Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces (cont'd) Brought Forward					45,000
6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang					
16th	Division	Wang Yu-ju	Kaoping	Shansi	3,000
17th	"		"	"	3,000
18th	"		"	"	3,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Hui-chao					
22nd	Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tatung	"	3,000
23rd	"	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	3,000
24th	"		"	"	3,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu					
25th	Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Yuhsien	"	3,000
26th	"	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	3,000
27th	"	Kuo Wei-fan	Niangtzekwan	"	3,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi					
28th	Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh	Fengchen	Suiyuan	3,000
29th	"	Pai Ju-ch'ing	"	"	3,000
30th	"	Chen Ping-chien	"	"	3,000
15th Army Corps - Ch'ien Shao-kuan					
10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Yutze	Shansi	2,500
11th	"	Fan Kang-lin	"	"	2,500
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	2,500
16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan					
4th	Brigade	Liu Fang-chi	Chuwu	"	2,500
5th	"	Li Chia-lin	"	"	2,500
6th	"	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	2,500
Training	Division	Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	"	8,000
1st Cav.	"	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung	"	6,000
2nd	"	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	2,000
4th	"	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
5th	"	Kuo Feng-shan	Tatung	Shansi	2,500
6th	"	Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	2,500
Bodyguard	Brigade	Tu Ch'un-yi	Taiyuan	"	6,000
28th	"	Yuan Tseng-ching	Tatung	"	6,000
					88,000

Total Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces - 133,000

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The Thirteenth Route Army
(Shih Yu-san)

1st	Division	Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	10,000
2nd	"	Mi Wen-ho	Weihwei	"	10,000
3rd	"	Liang Fang-ch'i	Tzechow	Hopei	10,000
4th	"	Wang Hsing-te	Shaho	"	10,000
5th	"	Sung T'ieh-lin	Hantan	"	10,000
6th	"	Sheng Ke	Tzechow	"	10,000
6 Ind.Regts. of Pistol, Training, Artillery, Light Trench Mortar, Heavy Trench Mortar & Engineers)			Changteh	"	12,000
				Total	72,000

Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.

1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying	Shansi	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-ting	"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Yueh-t'ing	"	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ch'ing	"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Kw'ei-pin	"	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang	"	8,000

24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju

24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	"	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin Kuei-ping	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	6,000
			Total	72,000

6th Route Army - Shih Cheng-ch'ing, Field Commander.

37th Army Corps - Shih Cheng-ch'ing

35th	Division	Li Kuang-lung	Tsinghwachen	Honan	8,000
38th	"	Sung Chao-kwei	"	"	8,000
Special Brig.		Yang T'ing-ya	"	"	4,000
				Total	20,000

15th Army Corps -	Liu Kwei-t'ang	Yicheng	Shansi	12,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Wang Jui-shan	"	"	2,000
			Total	14,000

Total Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement - 106,000

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	Nanning	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Nanning	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	26,500

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
				30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Feng-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kw'ei	"	"	4,000
				54,000

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Szechwan (continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

1st Division	Fan Tsu-ying		Kweichow	4,000
2nd "	Ma Kung-shan		"	4,000
3rd "	Chang Ting-cheng		"	3,000
				11,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def. Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
				50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
4th "	Li Ch'i-hsiang	Shunking	"	20,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	Chengtu	"	10,000
				60,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route	Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	T'ang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tsang Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
					30,000

Border Defense Troops

Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 245,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 301,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Chang Tso-hsiang
- Wan Fu-lin

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000
12th "	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th "	Miao Chen-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Lwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd "	Huang Chih-chung			10,000
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changwu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig.	Chang Shu-shen	Yungping	Hopei	6,000
			Total	89,000

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

4th Brigade	Liu Yi-fei	Kalgan	Chahar	10,000
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Hsuanhwa	"	10,000
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	11,000
23rd "	Yu Hsueh-chung	Peiping	"	10,000
27th "	Liu Nai-chang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th Cav.Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Shunteh	"	8,000
2nd " Div.	Chang Cheng-te	Kalgan	Chahar	4,000
1st Art.Regt.		Peiping	Hopei	6,000
1st Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	69,800

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

2nd Brigade	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tungkwang	Hopei	10,000
25th "	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st Cav.Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Taming	"	6,000
2nd Art.Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	32,800

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd Art.Regt.	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000
4th " "	Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th " "	Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th " "	Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.	Peichen	"	6,000
8th " " "	"	"	6,000
		Total	36,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.	800
Total	4,000

Total Liaoning Forces 231,600

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Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Wei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ch'ing	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
			Total		 81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
			Total		 57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-t'ing	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500
			Total		 48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 418,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,442,700

It is noted that the total number of men in the Chinese Army, not to mention irregulars, local gendarmes and the so-called garrison troops, has increased from 2,042,700 on December 31, 1929, to 2,442,700 today.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

December 2—28, 1930, inclusive.

2. a. Narrative of Events.

Major military operations during the period covered by this report were confined to the communist-bandit suppression campaign in the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi.

The Kwangsi situation remains unsettled but continues localized.

In the North the problem is now one of rehabilitation; the only events of purely military interest, during this period, being the transfer of Sun Lien-chung's former Kuominchun troops, from northern Honan to southwest Shantung (with his new headquarters at Tsining), and the assignment of ten districts along the Hopei, Honan and Shansi borders to Shih Yu-san's forces. 150,000 Shansi and former Kuominchun troops remain in Shansi and Suiyuan awaiting reorganization.

b. The Communist-Bandit Suppression Campaign.

The suppression campaign under way in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi has been impossible to follow with any degree of continuity, due, partly to the lack of maps of the areas involved but more so to the lack of reliable information available. Nanking announces 300,000 troops engaged in the movement, with the main effort being made in Kiangsi; Generalissimo Chiang journeyed thereto and on December 9th held a conference of important leaders at the provincial capital, Nanchang, to discuss the situation. Subsequent Nanking reports state that the outlaws in the three provinces are now being surrounded and that their complete eradication will soon be effected.

In Kiangsi it appears as though the major operation is to the south and at the present writing, in the vicinity of Kian. Official despatches claim the capture, on December 19th, of Tungku (a few miles southeast of Kian), which has been the impregnable stronghold of Chu Teh, the notorious Red leader who was educated in Europe.

The attached map indicates the units believed to be engaged in the provinces concerned. No information is at hand as to the plan of action for the combined forces. From what little is known of the campaign, so far, it would seem to resolve itself into a passive affair, with the larger cities and towns garrisoned by government or provincial troops in the hope that a respect for organized authority would be gradually restored and extended to the smaller localities.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

MBdeP/elh

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief
- Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief

Central Government Troops

1st	Division	Chang Fan	Hingan	Shensi	10,000
1st	"	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shunchang	Fukien	8,000
4th	"	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
6th	"	Li Chi-hsiang	Wanhsien	Szechwan	8,000
6th	"	Chow Ch'i-to	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kuang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	6,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"	10,000
11th	"	Chang Ying	Nanchowting	Hunan	10,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	Lu Hsiao-ch'en	Nanfeng	Kiangsi	8,000
15th	"	Wang Tung-yuan	Pingkiang	Hunan	10,000
15th	"	Wang Han-ming	Chumatien	Honan	8,000
16th	"	Yang Ting-chung	Kweihsien	Kwangsi	8,000
16th	"	Peng Wei-jen	Taohsien	Hunan	10,000
16th	"	Ke Yun-lung	Loyang	Honan	10,000
17th	"	Sun Yu-ju	Fengsiang	Shensi	12,000
18th	"	Hsiao Wen-te	Changshu	Kiangsi	12,000
19th	"	Li Chueh	Lichow	Hunan	12,000
20th	"	Wan Tien-tsun	Tungsu	Honan	12,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tehchow	Shantung	20,000
21st	"	Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	"	35,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-ming	Huimin	"	10,000
23rd	"	Li Yun-chieh	Kweiteh	Honan	8,000
24th	"	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Shihcheng	Kiangsi	12,000
25th	"	Tai Ming-chuan	Lienhwa	"	12,000
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Kishui	Hupeh	20,000
26th	"	Chen Yueh-han	Ichow	Shantung	10,000
27th	"	Sun Chin-t'ai			
28th	"	Kung Pin-fan	Taiho	Kiangsi	10,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	Shantung	10,000
31st	"	T'ao Kuang	Tungcheng	Hupeh	8,000
32nd	"	Chen Kuang-chung	Liuyang	Hunan	7,000
34th	"	Yueh Wei-chun	Siaokan	Hupeh	14,000
43rd	"	Kwo Hua-tsung	Anfu	Kiangsi	14,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Hwangpei	Hupeh	10,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pengpu	Anhwei	12,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Yingchow	"	14,000
47th	"	Wang Chin-yu	Anfu	Kiangsi	14,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Kungan	Hupeh	24,000
49th	"	Chang Chen	Lungyen	Fukien	9,500
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Fuchow	Kiangsi	12,000
				Carried Forward	495,500

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Central Government Troops (cont'd)			Brought Forward		495,500
51st	Division	Fan Shih-sheng	Siangyang	Hupeh	12,000
52nd	"	Han Te-ch'in	Kian	Kiangsi	13,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-lin	Lienhwa	Kiangsi	16,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	Kingtehchen	"	12,000
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Kienning	Fukien	11,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Anking	Anhwei	10,000
58th	"	Wen Hung-en	Haichow	Kwangtung	8,000
58th	"	Ma Ching-yuan	Sanyuan	Shensi	10,000
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Sunchow	Kwangsi	8,000
60th	"	Tsai Ting-kai	Yutu	Kiangsi	8,000
61st	"	Tai Chi	Hingkwo	"	12,000
62nd	"	Hsiang Han-ping	Chenping	Kwangtung	8,000
63rd	"	Li Yang-ching	Kweilin	Kwangsi	8,000
64th	"	Ma Teng-chiao	Tsining	Shantung	14,000
65th	"	Juan Hsun	Tsiaotso	Honan	10,000
66th	"	Hsu Peng-yun	Sinsiang	"	10,000
67th	"	Wu Ting-lin	Miensiang	"	8,000
68th	"	Chang Fang	Loyang	"	10,000
69th	"	Chao Kuan-yin	Yiyang	"	8,000
70th	"	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	8,000
71st	"	Feng Ch'in-tsai	Pucheng	Shensi	10,000
72nd	"	Ma Chuan-liang	Tsining	Shantung	8,000
73rd	"	Chan Shu-t'ang			
74th	"	Ch'iao Li-chai			
75th	"	Sung Tien-tsai	Kwanyintang	Honan	8,000
76th	"	Li Mao-lin	Paofeng	"	10,000
77th	"	Lo Lin	Taiho	Kiangsi	9,000
Special	"	Li Lin-hsiao	Kishan	Shensi	10,000
Metro.Gar.	Div.	Feng Yi-pei	Nanking	Kiangsu	20,000
2nd Cav.	"	Chang Li-sheng	Suchow	Anhwei	10,000
3rd "	"	Chang Chan-kwei	Hwaian	Kiangsu	6,000
1st Ind.	Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000
1st "	"	Shih Chung-cheng	Pengpu	Anhwei	4,000
1st "	"	Chang Jui-kwei	Canton	Kwangtung	6,000
1st "	"	Kuo Feng-ming	Chuanchow	Fukien	2,500
2nd "	"	Chen Kuo-hui	"	"	2,500
2nd "	"	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	Shantung	5,000
2nd "	"	Chen Hsiao-sze	Mengcheng	Anhwei	4,000
2nd "	"	Chang Chi-hsiung	Changteh	Hunan	4,000
2nd "	"	Liu Pei-hsu	Sungtze	Hupeh	5,000
3rd "	"	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000
4th "	"	Wang Ti-wen	Itu	Hupeh	5,000
5th "	"	Pan Shan-chai	Liuan	Anhwei	4,000
7th "	"	Tai Hui-yuan	Shihmen	Hunan	6,000
8th "	"	Li Mu-ming	Anlu	Hupeh	3,000
9th "	"	T'ung K'un	Pingkiang	Hunan	6,000
12th "	"	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000
13th "	"	Hsu Chia-yu	Lanfeng	"	5,000
15th "	"	Tang Sze-tung	Sinyang	"	4,000
16th "	"	Wang Yun-shan	Sincheng	"	5,000
			Carried Forward		884,500

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Central Government Troops (cont'd)		Brought Forward		884,500	
18th Ind.Brig.	Chow Chih-chung	Chienou	Fukien	4,000	
Training "	Huang Jen-huan	Sunchow	Kwangsi	6,000	
Pistol "	Lei Tai-ping	Kaomi	Shantung	6,000	
1st Cav. "	An Chun-tsai	Kaifeng	Honan	6,000	
" "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	Shantung	5,000	
1st Brigade	Lin Chung	Funing	Fukien	4,000	(NAVAL
2nd "	Lin Ping-chow	Yungchun	"	4,000	CONSTB.)
Gendarmerie	Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
1st Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Chengchow	Honan	2,500	
2nd " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500	
3rd " "	Li Chung-wei	Kaifeng	"	2,500	
Training "	Hsiao Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,500	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Force)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)			Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla)					
			Total	943,100	

The 6th Division under Li Chi-hsiang has been reorganized from the 4th Division of the 28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou in Szechwan, and is now under direct control of the National Government.

The 9th Division under Tai Chi has been reorganized into the 61st Division.

The 11th Division under Chang Ying has been reorganized from remnants of the 22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui in Szechwan and has since been transferred to Hunan for suppression of bandits.

Designation of the Division under Yang Ting-chung has been changed from the 2nd Division to the 16th.

The 20th Division under Wan Tien-tsun is newly reorganized from the 37th Army Corps of the 6th Route Army formerly under Shih Cheng-ching, as listed in Page 7 of last Situation Report 7912.

The 27th Division under Sun Chin-tai is reported to have been disarmed and disbanded on account of negligence of orders.

Designation of the Division under Kung Pin-fan is changed from the 5th Division to the 28th. This division was listed under "Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions" on Page 3 of last Situation Report.

The 34th Division under Yueh Wei-chun is newly organized chiefly from the 3rd Division under Li Yun-lung. The commander of the latter division is now second-in-command of this new division.

The 43rd Division under Kuo Hua-tsung is newly organized from part of the over-sized 47th Division under Wang Chin-yu.

The 73rd and 74th Divisions and the 14th Independent Brigade under Chan Shu-tang, Chiao Li-chai and Peng Chi-piao, respectively, are reported to have been disbanded or reorganized into other units.

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The Metropolitan Garrison Division under Feng Yi-pei has been recently reorganized from the 1st Division under Feng Yi-pei and the Bodyguard Division under Yu Chi-shih, which were listed in Page 3 of last Situation Report. This division has four brigades and is to be used chiefly for the protection of the capital city of Nanking.

The 2nd, 4th and 16th Independent Brigades under Liu Pei-hsu, Wang Ti-wen and Wang Yun-shan, respectively, are newly organized units.

Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Kweiteh	Honan	12,000
2nd "	Ku Chu-tung	Loyang	"	15,000
3rd "	Chen Chi-cheng	Hwaying	Shensi	12,000
4th "	Hsu Ting-yao	Nanchang	Kiangsi	10,000 *
4th "	Ch'in Ch'ing-lin			
5th "	Hu Tsu-yu	Ihwang	"	12,000
6th "	Chao Kuan-tao	Hsuchang	Honan	12,000
7th "	Wang Chun	Kiukiang	Kiangsi	12,000
8th "	Mao Ping-wen	Nanfeng	"	12,000
9th "	Chiang Ting-wen	Loyang	Honan	12,000
10th "	Yang Sheng-chih	Shanchow	"	12,000
11th "	Lo Cho-ying	Nanchowting	Hunan	12,000
12th "	Chin Han-ting	Haichow	Kiangsu	12,000
13th "	Hsia Tou-yin	Hwangchow	Hupeh	12,000
14th "	Chen Cheng	Hankow	"	10,000 *
			Total	167,000

* Cadets from the Military School at Nanking as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's old divisions.

The 4th Division under Ch'in Ch'ing-lin is reported to have been disarmed and disbanded on the 13th at Ninglin in Honan.

1st Division	Lei Chung-tien	Lanchow	Kansu	8,000
7th "	Ma Hung-pin	"	"	12,000
12th "	Kao Shu-hsun	Tsining	Shantung	12,000
13th "	Tung Chen-fan	Tsaochow	"	12,000
14th "	Chi Chang-tung	"	"	12,000
15th "	Li Sung-ch'a	"	"	12,000
23rd "	Wei Feng-lou			
30th "	Chi Hung-chang	Kwangchow	Honan	12,000
31st "	Chang Yin-hsiang	Hwangan	Hupeh	12,000
32nd "	Liang Kuan-ying	Hwaian	Kiangsu	12,000
1st Cav.Div.	Liu Feng-chi	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000
2nd " "	Chu Ch'ang-te	Tingchow	Shantung	5,000
3rd " "	Chang Hua-t'ang	Shuyang	Kiangsu	5,000
Special Brig.	Kao Chih-ho	Tsining	Shantung	6,000
			Total	124,000

The above units are old Kuominchun divisions which surrendered to the Government.

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The 1st and 7th Divisions under Lei Chung-tien and Ma Hung-pin, respectively, are reorganized from former Kuominchun units stationed in Kansu, as listed in Page 5 of last Situation Report 7912.

The 23rd Division under Wei Feng-lou is said to have been amalgamated into the 30th and 31st Divisions under Chi Hung-chang and Chang Yin-hsiang, respectively.

Total Central Government Troops, Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions and former Kuominchun forces who surrendered 1,234,100

(b) FORMER ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th	Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Nanning	Kwangsi	20,000
7th	" "	Yang T'eng-hui	Poseh	"	15,000
8th	" "	Chow Lan	Liuchow	"	15,000
15th	" "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
15th	Division	Li Ming-jui			
16th	"	Pai Chung-hsi	Poseh	"	12,000
1st	Ind.Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Liuchow	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Meng Chih	"	"	4,000
				Total	85,000

Hostilities have suspended in Kwangsi. Huang Shao-hsiung, representative of the Kwangsi military commanders, is reported to have reached Nanking on the 25th instant from Kwangsi, hoping to come to an agreement with the Government. The Government is also said to favor a peaceful settlement.

The 15th Division under Li Ming-jui is reported to have joined the Communist-troops and to have occupied Linchow in northern Kwangtung, and is at present operating on the border of Kiangsi.

Kuominchun Forces

1st	Division	Pao Kang	Chuwu	Shansi	6,000
2nd	"	Tung Yu-chen	Kiangchow	"	6,000
3rd	"	Chang Jen-chieh	Icheng	"	6,000
4th	"	Chang Sui-yin	Chuwu	"	6,000
5th	"	T'ang Chuan-sheng	Kiangchow	"	6,000
6th	"	Chang Tzu-chung	"	"	6,000
		P'ang Ping-hsun	Yuncheng	"	20,000
		Sung Che-yuan	Tsechow	"	24,000
				Total	80,000

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Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u				
1st Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Yutze	Shansi	3,000
2nd "	T'ao Chen-wu	"	"	3,000
3rd "	Ma Yen-chow	"	"	3,000
2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou				
4th Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng	Taiyuan	"	3,000
5th "	Chang Wen-shun	"	"	3,000
6th "		"	"	3,000
3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo				
7th Division	Ho Shao-nan	Saratsi	Suiyuan	3,000
8th "	T'ien Shu-mei	"	"	3,000
9th "	Wang T'ing-ying	"	"	3,000
4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta				
10th Division	Ch'en Chang-chieh	Tatung	Shansi	3,000
11th "	Tuan Shu-hua	"	"	3,000
12th "	Huo Yuan-pi	"	"	3,000
5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying				
13th Division	An Hsi-ku	Taiyuan	"	3,000
14th "	To Chen	Wutai	"	3,000
15th "	Chai Hsueh-ming	Kwohsien	"	3,000
6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang				
16th Division	Wang Yu-ju	Taiku	"	3,000
17th "		"	"	3,000
18th "		"	"	3,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Hai-chao				
22nd Division	Chow Cheng-chien	Tatung	"	3,000
23rd "	Yu Hai-ho	"	"	3,000
24th "		"	"	3,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu				
25th Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Yuhsien	"	3,000
26th "	Kao Hung-wen	"	"	3,000
27th "	Kuo Wei-fan	Niangtzekwan	"	3,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi				
28th Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh	Fengchen	Suiyuan	3,000
29th "	Pai Ju-ch'ing	"	"	3,000
30th "	Chen Ping-chien	"	"	3,000
		Carried Forward		 81,000

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Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces (cont'd)			Brought Forward		81,000
15th Army Corps - Chien Shao-kuan					
10th	Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing	Yutze	Shansi	2,500
11th	"	Fan Kang-lin	"	"	2,500
12th	"	Huang Shih-tung	"	"	2,500
16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan					
4th	Brigade	Liu Fang-chi	Chuwu	"	2,500
5th	"	Li Chia-lin	"	"	2,500
6th	"	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	2,500
Training	Division	Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	"	8,000
1st Cav.	"	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung	"	6,000
2nd "	"	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	2,000
4th "	"	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
5th "	"	Kuo Feng-shan	Tatung	Shansi	2,500
6th "	"	Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	2,500
Bodyguard	Brigade	Tu Ch'un-yi	Taiyuan	"	6,000
28th	"	Yuan Tseng-ching	Tatung	"	6,000
				Total	133,000

Former Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

5th Route Army - Sun Tien-ying, Field Commander.					
1st	Division	Sun Tien-ying		Shansi	8,000
2nd	"	Chin Han-ting		"	8,000
3rd	"	Liu Yueh-ting		"	8,000
4th	"	Chang Tien-ch'ing		"	8,000
5th	"	Chin Kw'ei-pin		"	8,000
6th	"	Sheng Feng-kang		"	8,000
24th Army Corps - Yueh Hsiang-ju					
24th	Division	Hsu Li-chung	Yangcheng	"	6,000
1st	"	Kuo Fang-hsi	"	"	6,000
2nd	"	Chin Kuei-ping	"	"	6,000
3rd	"	Ma Hsi-jen	"	"	6,000
				Total	72,000

The units of the Kuominchun Forces, Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces and the 5th Route Army under Sun Tien-ying, will be reorganized in view of a circular telegram jointly issued by Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang on the 16th instant, which announced the appointment of commanders to the command of the following Armies and

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Divisions of the National infantry forces. The cavalry divisions of the Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces will also be reorganized as two cavalry brigades - designation and name of commanders are not yet known. After completion of this reorganization, these troops be placed under control of Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, Navy and Aeronautical Forces.

3rd Army - Sung Che-yuan

1st Division	P'ang Ping-hsun	(Kuominchun)	
2nd "	Sung Tien-ying	("	or 5th Route Army)

4th Army - Shang Chen

3rd Division	Yang Hsiao-ou	(Shansi)
4th "	Feng Peng-chu	"

5th Army - Hsu Yung-chang

5th Division	Sun Chu	"
6th "	Yang Ch'eng-yuan	"

6th Army - Yang Ai-yuan

7th Division	Wang Ching-kuo	"
8th "	Yang Yueh-fang	"

7th Army - Fu Tso-yi

9th Division	Li Sheng-ta	"
10th "	Fu Tso-yi	"

Independent Div. Kao Kuei-tze (Miscellaneous Troops)

The Thirteenth Route Army
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Division	Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	10,000
2nd "	Mi Wen-ho	Weihwei	"	10,000
3rd "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Tzechow	Hopei	10,000
4th "	Wang Hsing-te	Shaho	"	10,000
5th "	Sung T'ieh-lin	Hantan	"	10,000
6th "	Sheng Ke	Tzechow	"	10,000
6 Ind.Regts. of Pistol, Training, Artillery, Light Trench Mortar, Heavy Trench Mortar & Engineers)		Changteh	Honan	12,000
		Total		72,000

Total Former Anti-Government Forces - 442,000

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's Control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander of 38th Army.

98th Division	Lu Han	Poseh	Kwangsi	5,200
99th "	Chu Hsiao-tung	Nanning	"	5,200
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	4,000
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Nanning	Kwangsi	4,000
7th Ind. Div.	T'ang Chi-ling	Yunnanfu	Yunnan	2,400
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-ling	"	"	1,200
Ind.Reserve Force	An Te-hua	"	"	1,000
Railway Police	Chang Wei-fan	Amichow	"	400
6 Corps of Border Defense Forces			"	3,100
			Total	 26,500

It is reported that the 98th, 99th and 101st Divisions, which were engaged in military operations against Kwangsi, have been withdrawn from the province, but no report relative to arrival in Yunnan has yet been received.

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	 20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
				30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Fang-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kw'ei	"	"	4,000
				54,000

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Szechwan (continued)

22nd Army under Lai Hsing-hui

This Army is reported to have disintegrated; the remnants have been reorganized as the 11th Division under Chang Ying as it was stated in a preceeding page of this Report.

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def. Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
				50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	"	"	10,000
				40,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd " "	T'ang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd " "	Tsang Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th " "	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"	"	6,000
5th " "	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
				30,000

Border Defense Troops

	Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 214,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 270,500

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Chang Tso-hsiang
- Wan Fu-lin

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000
12th "	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th "	Miao Chan-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Iwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd "	Huang Chih-chung			10,000
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changwu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig.	Chang Shu-shen	Yungping	Hopei	6,000
			Total	89,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd Art.Regt		Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000
4th " "		Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th " "		Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th " "		Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.		Peichen	"	6,000
8th " " "		"	"	6,000
			Total	36,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.	800
Total	4,000

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

4th Brigade	Liu Yi-fei	Kalgan	Chahar	10,000
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Hsuahwa	"	10,000
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	11,000
23rd "	Yu Hsueh-chung	Peiping	"	10,000
27th "	Liu Nai-chang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th Cav.Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Shunteh	"	8,000
2nd " Div.	Chang Cheng-te	Kalgan	Chahar	4,000
1st Art.Regt.		Peiping	Hopei	6,000
1st Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	69,800

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Liaoning (continued)

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

1st	Brigade	Liu Kwei-t'ang	Puyang	Hopei	10,000
2nd	"	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tungkwang	"	10,000
25th	"	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Taming	"	6,000
2nd	Art.Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd	Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
				Total	42,800

The 1st Brigade under Liu Kwei-t'ang is reorganized from the 15th Army Corps which was listed, under "Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement", in Page 7 of last Situation Report 7912. This unit is also named Hopei Provincial Brigade.

Total Liaoning Forces 241,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Wei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ch'ing	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
				Total	 81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
				Total	 57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Lwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-ting	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Lwanping	"	4,500
				Total	 48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 428,100

* * * *

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,374,700

CHINA (Military)

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General.

While peace is said to pervade China, 200,000 men are engaged with the communist-bandit insurgents along the Yangtze, and signs of unrest are apparent in Shansi, Shantung and Szechuan. The ancient rivalry between Kwangtung and Kwanghsi has temporarily been patched up, but no permanent friendship can be envisaged.

The situation in Shantung is pregnant with possibilities. In that province are concentrated most of the "grey" troops whose disbandment is greatly desired by the National Government and who as stoutly resist attempts at dissolution.

The present peace bears more resemblance to an armistice, and a cloud of uncertainty hangs over the country. The past war settled nothing finally. Old grievances, old jealousies, old quarrels remain—economic and political differences existent before the war still exist. The hatchet has been buried, but neither deeply nor for all time.

Communist-Bandit Suppression.

During the period December 6-26 that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in person directed the communist-bandit suppression activities, progress was made by the government troops. Upon Chiang's return to Nanking a great deal of spirit left the troops and since that time there has been but little accomplished.

Bandits who have an intimate knowledge of the country retreat before the government troops, assume the garb of laborers when necessary and unless forced to do so, or having odds tremendously in their favor, do not come out in the open. There is very little cooperation between troops operating in Kiangsi and Hunan, so that when the situation becomes too hot in one of these provinces the communist-bandits move to the other.

Pressure on the Kiangsi "Reds" has caused many to cross the Yangtze into Anhui, where things are going badly for the government troops. Press dispatches report that 30% of Anhui is in the hands of the bandits.

This guerilla warfare is not to the Chinese soldiers' liking. The "Reds" have been driven into the more inaccessible parts of the country. In Kiangsi, for instance, they are largely concentrated in the mountainous area north of Ningtu, where the 6th, 9th and 19th Armies under General Chiang Kuang-nai marching south from east, central and west Kiangsi, respectively, are converging upon them. It is too much to expect these communist-bandits, who often are well-led and are fighting for their lives, to await calmly the slow and well known consummation of government machinations. When the government concentration has been completed, the Reds will no longer be in that area. The town of Tung-ku, for instance, which is some 130 li southeast of Kian, was recently captured by the government forces. Tung-ku was prized highly by the communists. There they had founded their "college" and there they had brought the spoils from Kian—among which might be noted Kian's electric light plant. Tung-ku was to be the communist center. But in capturing Tung-ku, the government did not capture or injure a communist or a bandit. The guerillas simply moved away before troops whom they were not prepared to fight.

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Disorders along the Yangtze may be put down in one place, but they are fluid and appear in another. Government troops with great effort push in one point on the rubber ball only to find a bulge on the other side.

The government has announced the following:

(1) The 6th, 9th and 19th Government Divisions are surrounding the Hingkwo-Ningtu region in Kiangsi. The 5th Aviation group in support is bombing bandit strongholds there.
(2) Showshui-Tungku and Wuning (Kiangsi) are cleared of bandits.
(3) Mienyang-Ouchih and Taikwan (South Hupeh) have been captured by the 48th Division.
(4) The Sixth Communist Army in the Hwangpei-Wangchiatien area in east Hupeh has been completely routed by the 44th Division.
(5) The Communist stronghold in the Hunghu lake region in south Hupeh has been destroyed and cleared of bandits. Huangsungkow, east Hupeh, and Siatien, north Hupeh, have been cleared of bandits.
(6) The time limit for bandit eradication has been advanced to June 30.

On the other hand the Chinese press has reported recently that -

(1) The 18th Government Division has been wiped out (this is fairly well authenticated).
(2) The 2nd Red Army is attacking (January 26) Shihmen in north Hunan.
(3) The Kwangsi bandit division (formerly the 15th) is marching from north Kwangtung into Kiangsi.
(4) The city of Hwajung in Hunan is in the hands of bandits and the Hunanese government troops are not able to dislodge them.
(5) An Amazon named Ho-ling, sister of the bandit leader Holung, has captured Tsingshih in north Hunan. The 11th Government Division has fought several battles with her to no purpose.
(6) The 27th Government Division has been disarmed due to too much fraternization with the bandits.
(7) The 50th Government Division has been defeated by the 4th Red Army.
(8) The 4th Government Division stationed at Ningling, east Honan, has been disbanded due to disobedience of orders.
(9) 30,000 communist-bandits entered Lot'ienhsien in east Hupeh and completely sacked the city.

Since/the above summary there does not appear, and of course it is impossible to obtain, any communist-bandit reports or propaganda, and since at this juncture when a loan of one billion ounces of silver to China is being considered, Nanking is not emphasizing communist-bandit successes, it would appear that things are not going any too well for the government. If Chiang Kai-shek actually takes the field himself, conditions will improve. There is little cooperation except under his direction.

In closing this discussion, attention is invited to the following order, which Chiang Kai-shek promulgated before leaving Nanking to take charge of his bandit-suppression troops last month. This order indicates some of the weaknesses of the nationalist troops.

(1) Bandit-suppression forces shall not enlist new recruits in the locality in which they are now stationed.
(2) They shall not raise funds among the local people.

CHINA (Military)

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(3) They shall engage solely in bandit suppression and shall not interfere with local administration.
(4) They shall not disarm the local militia.
(5) They shall not incorporate bandits into their organization.
(6) They shall institute rigid vigilance against the secret sale of arms and ammunition by individual soldiers in their organization to bandits.
(7) During the period of the bandit-suppression campaign military organs shall not recommend persons for civil or financial administrative posts or for Party offices.

Shansi.

With Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's departure by Ford plane from Tientsin on January 18, the conference called to settle Shansi affairs came to an end, and the "buck" was passed to Shang Chen. The details of the reorganization of troops in Shansi are to be found in preceding paragraphs of this report, and the conference is dealt with in Report No. 7932.

Shang Chen goes back to Taiyuanfu to meet a complicated and dangerous situation. Shansi bank notes are about one-third their normal value. The wealth of the province was hypothecated by Yen Hsi-shan in his effort to win the war. Such discordant elements as the Kuominchun, the troops of Kao Kwei-tze and Sun Tien-ying, various undisciplined Shansi generals, and the peripatetic Feng Yu-hsiang, go to make up a cocktail which even the smiling Shang Chen cannot swallow with equanimity.

Shang Chen's mandate is given by Chang Hsueh-liang and by the National Government, but there were not enough funds available to put it into execution without creating dissatisfaction among the merchant-generals of Shansi. Fu Tso-yi, Li Fu-ying and Hsu Yung-chang resent the power given to Shang Chen---not a native of Shansi. The subordinate generals decline to reduce their forces. Sun Tien-ying and Kao Kwei-tze await their share of the spoils. And wandering from village to village, according to reports, resting but a short period in each place, unshaven, unshorn and unbathed, goes the champion of the people, Feng. Bigger in defeat than in victory his shadow falls athwart the halcyon dream of many an official. He is Shang Chen's blood brother and this close friendship may be put to the test ere affairs in Shansi return to normal again.

Shansi's debacle is local and trouble is not expected to spread to neighboring provinces.

Kwangsi.

For the past month conciliatory efforts have been noticed in Kwangsi on the part of her eastern neighbor. On January 25, General Huang Shao-hsiung, leader of the once famous Kwangsi Party and prior to April, 1928, governor of Kwangsi, arrived in Nanking to bargain with the National Government for a cessation of hostilities. General Huang represents Chang Fa-kuei, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, and whereas the last three are among China's most able military leaders, Huang is one of China's most astute politicians.

As a result of negotiations, Nanking announced on January 27 that (1) the three Kwangsi generals, Chang, Pai and Li, were to be sent abroad by the National Government as military inspectors; that (2) the Kwangsi troops would be reorganized under loyal leaders; (3) that 10,000

CHINA (Military)

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rifles belonging to defeated government troops are now in the hands of bandits in that province, and (4) that when reorganized the Kwangsi troops would take part in bandit suppression. It is further indicated that Huang Shao-hsiung may be appointed Chairman of the Kwangsi Provincial Government.

While this conference has apparently ended the hostilities between the two Kwang provinces, it should still be borne in mind that the main difference between them is not political but economic. Canton, due to her geographic position, controls the imports and exports into and from Kwangsi, and so long as Kwangsi does not get a fair share of the profits, dissatisfaction is bound to exist.

Shantung.

Difficulties of a perplexing nature confront the Nanking Government in the miscellaneous troops in Shantung. In the confines of this province are the 46,000 troops of Han Fu-chu, the 48,000 Kuominchun soldiers under Sun Lien-chung, the 35,000 troops under Liu Chen-nien, and Ma Hung-kwei's 27,000 soldiers. Orders have been issued to Sun Lien-chung to entrain for bandit-suppression work in Kiangsi, and it has been reported although not confirmed that Han Fu-chu has received similar commands.

Nanking, either with or without Mukden's aid, is evidently trying to get rid of this doubtful concentration. Once it is broken up with the part in Kiangsi separated from the other fraction by a thousand miles and many loyal divisions it can be easily handled in any way that the government sees fit. However, Sun has not commenced to move. Meetings in Chinanfu of these grey leaders indicate a disposition on the part of some of them at least to disobey orders. It will be remembered that Chiang's attempt to split Shih Yu-san's command in February of last year precipitated last year's war, and the present situation in Shantung contains the same dynamite. Chang Hsueh-liang's weight will probably be felt, and it is generally accepted that Mukden desires control of Shantung.

Chiang Kai-shek's plan of fighting the communist-bandits in Kiangsi with the Kuominchun may be looked upon as oriental strategy. It is not believed that the Commander-in-Chief believes he will receive much help from Feng's old followers, and it is thought that he recognizes the dangers involved in using them there. He is evidently using Kiangsi as an excuse to break up the grey concentration in Shantung, believing that in so doing he is choosing the lesser of the two evils.

Szechuan.

The ancient rivalry among the generals of Szechuan for the profits of the river trade up and down the Yangtze is again causing trouble, although in general conditions are becoming more favorable to Nanking's favorite, Liu Hsiang. The two Lius have for some time controlled the richest areas, and while Yang Sen is not satisfied with his position in and around Ch'uhsien he is constrained, through his impotency, from making immediate trouble.

The two relatives, Liu Hsiang and Liu Wen-hui, played a safe game during the past war. Liu Hsiang supported the government and Liu Wen-hui, Yen Hsi-shan. No matter where the tide of war was carried, the

CHINA (Military)

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two Lius were bound to win. Other Szechuan generals were not so fortunate and the commanders of the 28th and 29th Armies, Teng Hsi-hau and T'ien Sung-yao, supported the losing side. At present, fearing punishment, they are withdrawing from Szechuan and are reported as being entering southern Shensi and Kansu.

Armored Train Corps.

Reorganization of the Armored Train Corps under General Chiang Tso-ou into four artillery corps has been completed. Each corps consists of three armored trains, which are to be employed for the garrisoning of the various government railways.

The 1st Corps, which is assigned to maintain peace and order on the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, will be under the control of General Han Fu-chu, Commander of the 3rd Route Army. The 2nd Corps, which is to guard the Lung-Hai Railway, will be under the command of General Liu Chih, Commander of the 2nd Route Army. The 3rd Corps will be under the control of General Wang Chun, Garrison Commander of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, while the 4th Corps will guard the Peiping-Hankow Railway and be under the control of General Ho Cheng-chun, Acting Director of the Hankow Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief.

PGT

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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2657-D-276 1931
328

Peiping, February 25 1931

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Report on Trip into Shantung.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 27 1931

1. In compliance with your instructions, I left Peiping on February 16th for Tsining, Shantung. My mission was first to ascertain whether the troops stationed there would comply with Nanking's orders to move south for bandit suppression, and second, to report on military conditions in general among the so-called "grey" armies in Shantung.

2. On February 17, I arrived in Yenchowfu, the junction point of the Tientsin-Pukow railway, and the short line leading to Tsining. As there was no train to the west that evening, I entered the city and went to the Catholic Mission for lodging. Here I spent the evening talking with Bishop Hemminghouse and several of the members of the priesthood relative to political and military conditions. Within the last month, the Catholic mission plant at Tsining suffered severe losses by fire, believed to be of incendiary origin. Consequently the attitude of some members of the group with whom I talked was not entirely free from bias. The order of priests conducting the work in this mission is German, and has been in Shantung some fifty-six years. The bishop himself has been there forty-four years and none with whom I talked had had less than twenty years' service in this province. Consequently, these gentlemen all had first-hand knowledge. It cannot be said, however, that they had been able to retain the position of the impartial observer——prejudices were apparent, and pessimism as to China's future was quite evident. One Father in particular was most emphatic in his prediction that another spring revolt was brewing, and that the rupture between Nanking and the various malcontents might take place at any minute. These men, however, reported the local troops (a brigade of Ma Hung-k'uei's army) a well disciplined body of soldiery, and that there was no evidence of military oppression in Yenchowfu.

The next day, February 18, I departed about noon for Tsining, arriving at about two-thirty in the afternoon. I immediately got in touch with the missionaries in both the Presbyterian and Baptist missions. These people told me that although they had known for several weeks of the instructions, they had heard very little definite information relative to the move of General Sun's army to the south. It was generally believed, however, that he was going soon. They had heard of a reported mutiny of two battalions of Sun's troops, apparently brought about by the attempt to send them to the south. These troops were said to have left their train at Sun Shih Tien, a small station half way between Tsining and Yenchow, with the announced intention of marching overland to Shansi to report in to Feng Yu-hsiang.

Early the next morning, February 19, I set out with Mr. Connelly, of the Baptist mission, to visit a village to the southwest, where a detachment of Sun's troops were garrisoned, and to drive generally over the surrounding country; this in view of rumors that the troops stationed in the outlying garrisons were being called in for concentration in Tsining prior to entraining for the move south.

On arrival at the village, we found a regiment at drill on the parade ground. I approached the battalion commander, presented my card and engaged him in conversation. He told me that his division, the 27th Infantry, was scheduled to move to the south for bandit and communist suppression in Kiangsi, their departure to take place on the twenty-fourth.

Relative to the mutiny of the troops previously mentioned herein, he knew little. They were not from his post, and he had not learned what units were involved. He did not know whether they had returned. No explanation of the mutiny was attempted, but on the contrary, he evidenced no dissatisfaction or bitterness over the orders directing their transfer south. They had been ordered south, and were going as soon as they could get ready - nothing more or less. He permitted me to take photographs of his troops at drill and talked freely in replying to such questions as I asked him.

We then returned to the city of Tsining, where I divided the time between the barracks and the railroad station. In the latter area, I found that since my arrival the day previous, a tent camp capable of sheltering a regiment of troops had been erected, and that three trains of about twenty-five freight cars each had arrived and were being loaded. The station master informed me that the trains had been sent to transport General Sun's troops to Pukow. He could give no definite information as to time of departure but believed some trains would leave the next day.

The morning of February 20, I first went to the railroad yard, where I took some photographs of Sun's armored train, of the tent camp mentioned above (which had not yet been occupied), and of troops which were being entrained. The roads to the station were filled with small groups of soldiers transporting supplies to the train. Contrary to the usual practice, the soldiers themselves were doing the work. Some local carts and rickshas were being used but there was no evidence of the local coolie labor being impressed into the service of the military. Three ton-and-a-half GMC trucks were being used for movement of supplies to the depot.

After witnessing this loading, I returned to the city and called at General Sun's headquarters. First I met his chief of staff, with whom I talked for ten minutes, after which I was escorted to General Sun's office and had a short conversation with him. He told me that his entire command , consisting of the 25th and 27th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Division, was going into Kiangsi to be engaged in the suppression of the communist bands. (In his conversation he never once referred to them as "bandits".) His Army Corps, the 26th, had a strength of roughly 45,000 men, of which 9,000 were cavalry, the remainder infantry. His first units were to leave that afternoon and he expected all to be under way within twelve days. Subsequent to this communist suppression work, he did not know where his troops would be stationed as he had received no instructions further than those under which the present move was being conducted. Very likely he would not return to Shantung. He had learned that Han Fu-ch'u would send troops to take over the garrisoning of Tsining and vicinity. The delay in his departure had been occasioned by the necessity to obtain a large supply of flour. His troops were Northerners---wheat eaters, and would not be able to subsist on the rice diet of Kiangsi. Since the receipt of his orders, he had steadily been accumulating flour, and now had enough to take care of his troops for two or three months.

After lunch I went again to the railroad station. En route I met the car of General Sun returning from the depot, where I subsequently learned he had gone to inspect the loading of his first units. At about two-thirty the first train left, another was moved up to the station from the yards, and the loading of this second train began immediately. Up to the time my train departed for the return to Yenchow, this second train was still loading.

When I arrived in Yenchow, I learned that the train preceding mine had moved right on through without incident and was en route south. Without doubt the move which had been so long delayed, and concerning which so much speculation had arisen, was actually under way.

On the morning of February 21, at 2:40, I boarded the train for Taian, where the 35th Army Corps under Ma Hung-k'uei was stationed. I arrived at 6:00 a.m., and although it was still an hour before sunrise, the troops were at drill, marching through the streets of that part of the city outside and west of the city walls. At about nine o'clock I proceeded to Ma Hung-k'uei's headquarters to call and found the infantry division drawn up on the adjacent grounds. There were some twenty-three thousand troops in formation, including the cooks and kitchen coolies, who wore a distinctive uniform but were formed up with their respective battalions. The occasion was a competitive drill in marching at double time, which was conducted by battalions. Although all the troops had not yet moved up to their places, nevertheless General Ma was on the reviewing stand with the brigade commanders, who with him were to act as the judges. His entire staff was formed up on the ground at the left of the reviewing stand. About ten o'clock the competition commenced. Each battalion in turn moved forward to a position opposite the reviewing stand and reported, and went immediately through its drill. It was a simple maneuver of marching at the double three times around a staked-out path, the total distance being between a mile and a mile and a half. Troops were in full field equipment. The battalion commander, his staff, headquarters and orderlies, cooks and kitchen coolies - all made the march. There was no counting of time, but the cadence was good. Dress in squads was very fair, the rifles were carried at a uniform slope, and altogether it was a very creditable performance. I saw no case of a pack coming loose nor of men dropping any equipment. I watched this competition until about twelve, all the time in the company of the Adjutant General, who had come forward and introduced himself to me. When I left the field for lunch I was informed that I could meet the General at about two or three o'clock, immediately after the competition had ended. Consequently, I returned at two but found the drill still in progress. By three the last battalion had finished, within five minutes the awards had been announced and the presentation of the trophies started. These prizes were such articles as face towels, handkerchiefs, etc., and were distributed alike to the officers and men of the winning battalions. About three, the troops were dismissed and were marched off to their respective barrack areas, the formation breaking up in the presence of General Ma, who remained on the reviewing stand to watch his troops march off. To my knowledge, he was standing at this reviewing stand from nine o'clock steadily until after three o'clock. My train was due to leave in a short time, so I left cards with his Adjutant General and departed for the station to return to Peiping.

3. As a result of my observations, and from the opinions of others with whom I came in contact, I feel that there is little probability of a recurrence of the annual spring revolt against Nanking. The four grey leaders, Han Fu-chu, Ma Hung-k'uei, Shih Yu-san and Sun Lien-chung, do not feel strong enough to attack Chiang Kai-shek. Their troops are as good as any I have seen in China, but insufficient in number. Mukden is not to be counted upon as an ally or even as a benevolent neutral, consequently these grey generals are forced "to be good" until something happens which considerably alters the present situation. A serious threat from Kwangtung and Kwangsi might be enough to give hope to these greys, but the situation would need to be much graver than that faced by Nanking at present. Sun's move from close proximity to the others suggests an attempt on the part of Nanking to break up the group of potential revolters in the north. However, located in Kiangsi, Sun would be in an excellent position to cooperate with the troops of the Kwang provinces to the south. This move weakens the North but may so strengthen the South as to encourage them in taking the initiative, especially if assured of prompt assistance from the Shantung greys. Also, Feng is still in Shansi and there is enough disaffection,

arising from the reorganization of the Shansi troops, to warrant their inclusion in the list of potential revolters. However, Mukden and Nanking still would have the decided advantage, and hence the belief that the coming spring and summer will see no large revolt. Nevertheless the fact that Sun has obeyed and gone does not necessarily indicate either loyalty to or fear of Nanking. Maybe Sun is just letting Nanking pay for his ticket to a ring-side seat from which he could quickly climb into the ring itself.

4. The troops observed were without doubt the best disciplined I have seen in China——but not the best equipped. Probably half of Sun's and Ma's men do not have rifles but instead are equipped with the big knife and pistols. For the first time I saw no evidence of hand grenades. The rifles on hand were of Chinese manufacture and were clean, mostly from the Hanyang arsenal. Each regiment had a machine gun company and a trench mortar company, the equipment being transported on pack-saddles.

5. The discipline, as mentioned above, was excellent. These are all old Kuominchun troops and are thoroughly imbued with the Kuominchun doctrines. I did not see an instance of either officer or man smoking, and although Sun's chief of staff brought out a tin of cigarettes and offered me one he did not join me in smoking. There were no cases observed of the soldiery being rude or overbearing towards the civilians, a very common practise among a high percentage of the soldiery of China. The uniforms were clean, belts were worn, coats buttoned, hats on properly, and the men appeared alert and self-respecting. Such drills as I saw were conducted with energy and the men paid attention to the instructors to an unusual degree. The presence of two foreigners did not make the slightest change in their attitude, although the villagers on hand demonstrated the usual overpowering curiosity. These troops turn out at five o'clock every day and as soon as dressed form up and go for a fast march, mostly at the double time, for about five miles——without equipment. From this they return to a cup of tea and some rice cakes or wheat biscuits. After a short rest, drill under arms commences and continues until about eleven, when the first real meal is taken. The afternoons are taken up by schools, the officers acting as teachers. The soldiers must learn to read. Copies of simplified drill regulations and handbooks on minor tactics are the texts. Examinations are conducted at regular intervals, and according to reports, are most thorough in their scope. The troops are quite punctual about saluting and salute with snap. Off the drill field, there seems to be much more contact between officers and men than in our army.

6. To summarize: Sun Lien-chung is complying with his orders to go to Kiangsi,and there is no apparent threat of a move against Nanking from the grey generals of Shantung and southern Hopei in the near future.

C. J. Kanaga

C. J. Kanaga
First Lieutenant, F.A.

7949 1st Ind. NEM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, February 26, 1931, To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

Nelson E. Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

G-2 Report

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MILITARY DIV. 6180

MAR 30 2657-9-276 1931

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 27 1931

1. Composition and Distribution of Forces

(a) NATIONALIST FORCES - Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief
- Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

Central Government Troops

1st	Division	Chang Fan	Hingan	Shensi	10,000
1st	"	Chen Ming-shu	Canton	Kwangtung	8,000
2nd	"	Lu Hsing-pang	Shunchang	Fukien	8,000
4th	"	Chang Yi-fen	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	8,000
5th	"	Wan Tien-tsun	Yushih	Honan	12,000
6th	"	Li Chi-hsiang	Wanhsien	Szechwan	8,000
6th	"	Chow Ch'i-to	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
9th	"	Chang Ju-kuang	Changchow	Fukien	8,000
10th	"	Li Yi-hsuan	Shihnan	Hupeh	6,000
10th	"	Hsieh Pin	Hankow	"	10,000
11th	"	Chang Ying	Hwajung	Hunan	10,000
12th	"	Yuan Ying	Sinyang	Honan	12,000
12th	"	Hu Jo-yu		Szechwan	6,000
13th	"	Chang Ju-chi		"	6,000
13th	"	Lu Hsiao-ch'en	Loan	Kiangsi	8,000
15th	"	Wang Tung-yuan	Pingkiang	Hunan	10,000
15th	"	Wang Han-ming	Chumatien	Honan	8,000
16th	"	Yang Ting-chung	Watlam	Kwangsi	8,000
16th	"	Peng Wei-jen	Taohsien	Hunan	10,000
17th	"	Sun Yu-ju	Hanchung	Shensi	12,000
18th	"	Lu Ti-ping	Yuanchow	Kiangsi	12,000
19th	"	Li Chueh	Pingkiang	Hunan	12,000
20th	"	Sun Tung-hsuan	Tehchow	Shantung	20,000
21st	"	Liu Chen-nien	Chefoo	"	35,000
22nd	"	Ku Liang-ming	Tsaochow	"	10,000
23rd	"	Li Yun-chieh	Kweiteh	Honan	8,000
24th	"	Hsu Ke-hsiang	Shihcheng	Kiangsi	12,000
25th	"	Tai Ming-chuan	Kushih	"	12,000
26th	"	Kuo Ju-tung	Hingkwo	Hupeh	20,000
26th	"	Chen Yueh-han	Ichow	Shantung	10,000
28th	"	Kung Pin-fan	Taiho	Kiangsi	10,000
29th	"	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	Shantung	10,000
31st	"	T'ao Kuang	Changsha	Hunan	8,000
32nd	"	Chen Kuang-chung	Liuyang	"	7,000
33rd	"	Ke Yun-lung	Hwangan	Hupeh	10,000
34th	"	Chen Chu-chen	Hofeng	"	8,000
34th	"	Yueh Wei-chun	Siaokan	"	14,000
43rd	"	Kwo Hua-tsung	Yichang	Kiangsi	14,000
44th	"	Hsiao Chih-chu	Changteh	Hunan	10,000
45th	"	Wei Li-huang	Pengpu	Anhwei	12,000
46th	"	Fan Hsi-chi	Yingchow	"	14,000
47th	"	Wang Chin-yu	Anfu	Kiangsi	14,000
48th	"	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Shasi	Hupeh	17,000
49th	"	Chang Chen	Shihchung	Fukien	9,500
50th	"	Tan Tao-yuan	Tungku	Kiangsi	12,000
			Carried Forward		496,500

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Central Government Troops (cont'd)			Brought Forward		496,500
51st	Division	Fan Shih-sheng	Siangyang	Hupeh	12,000
52nd	"	Han Te-ch'in	Changshu	Kiangsi	13,000
53rd	"	Li Yun-heng	Sinsiang	Honan	8,000
54th	"	Hao Meng-lin	Tungku	Kiangsi	16,000
55th	"	Juan Chao-chang	Kingtehchen	"	12,000
56th	"	Liu Ho-ting	Nanfeng	"	11,000
57th	"	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Anking	Anhwei	10,000
58th	"	Wen Hung-en			
58th	"	Ma Ching-yuan	Sanyuan	Shensi	10,000
59th	"	Yu Han-mou	Wuchow	Kwangsi	8,000
60th	"	Tsai Ting-kai	Kanchow	Kiangsi	8,000
61st	"	Tai Chi	"	"	12,000
62nd	"	Hsiang Han-ping	Swatow	Kwangtung	8,000
63rd	"	Li Yang-ching	Shiuchow	"	8,000
64th	"	Ma Teng-chiao	Tsining	Shantung	14,000
65th	"	Liu Cheng-hua	Sinsiang	Honan	12,000
66th	"	Liu Mao-en	"	"	12,000
68th	"	Chang Fang	Loyang	"	10,000
69th	"	Chao Kuan-yin	Yiyang	"	8,000
70th	"	Fan Lung-chang	"	"	8,000
71st	"	Feng Ch'in-tsai	Pucheng	Shensi	10,000
72nd	"	Ma Chuan-liang	Tsining	Shantung	8,000
74th	"	Ch'iao Li-chai	Tsingchow	"	8,000
75th	"	Sung Tien-tsai	Lushan	Honan	8,000
76th	"	Li Mao-lin	Paofeng	"	10,000
77th	"	Lo Lin	Kian	Kiangsi	9,000
Special	"	Li Lin-hsiao			
Metro.Gar.	Div.	Feng Yi-pei	Nanking	Kiangsu	20,000
2nd Cav.	"	Chang Li-sheng	Suchow	Anhwei	10,000
3rd "	"	Chang Chan-kwei	Hwaian	Kiangsu	6,000
1st Ind.Brig.		Jung Chin-fang	Mienyang	Hupeh	7,000
1st "	"	Li Po-hua	Shanchow	Honan	7,000
1st "	"	Wang Chih-yuan	Hanchung	Shensi	5,000
1st "	"	Wu Chun-ping	Ichang	Hupeh	6,000
1st "	"	Shih Chung-cheng	Pengpu	Anhwei	4,000
1st "	"	Chang Jui-kwei	Swatow	Kwangtung	6,000
1st "	"	Kuo Feng-ming	Hweian	Fukien	2,500
2nd "	"	Chen Kuo-hui	Chuanchow	"	2,500
2nd "	"	Liang Hung-en	Tsaochow	Shantung	5,000
2nd "	"	Chen Hsiao-sze	Mengcheng	Anhwei	4,000
2nd "	"	Chang Chi-hsiang	Changteh	Hunan	4,000
2nd "	"	Liu Pei-hsu	Sungtze	Hupeh	5,000
3rd "	"	Yuan Chia-sheng	Chinkiang	Kiangsu	5,000
4th "	"	Wang Ti-wen	Itu	Hupeh	5,000
5th "	"	Pan Shan-chai	Liuan	Anhwei	4,000
7th "	"	Tai Hui-yuan	Shihmen	Hunan	6,000
8th "	"	Li Mu-ming	Anlu	Hupeh	3,000
9th "	"	T'ung K'un	Siangying	Hunan	6,000
12th "	"	Hsu Sheng-yu	Kweiteh	Honan	6,000
13th "	"	Hsu Chia-yu	Lanfeng	"	5,000
15th "	"	Tang Sze-tung	Sinyang	"	4,000
			Carried Forward		887,500

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Central Government Troops (cont'd)		Brought Forward		887,500	
16th Ind.Brig.	Wang Yun-shan	Sincheng	Honan	5,000	
18th " "	Chow Chih-chung	Chienou	Fukien	4,000	
Training "	Huang Jen-huan	Wuchow	Kwangsi	6,000	
Pistol "	Lei Tai-ping	Kaomi	Shantung	6,000	
1st Cav. "	An Chun-tsai	Kaifeng	Honan	6,000	
" "	Ma Ming-shan	Kaotang	Shantung	5,000	
1st Brigade	Chin Chen-chung	Futing	Fukien	4,000	(NAVAL
2nd "	Lin Ping-chow	Kutien	"	4,000	CONSTB.)
Gendarmerie	Wu Sze-yu	Nanking	Kiangsu	3,600	
1st Art.Regt.	Yao Yung-an	Chengchow	Honan	2,500	
2nd " "	Li Yu-ching	"	"	2,500	
3rd " "	Li Chung-wei	Kaifeng	"	2,500	
Training "	Hsiao Shu-hsuan		Fukien	2,500	
Six Regiment Provincial Defense Force)					
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.)			Chekiang	10,000	
One Artillery Corps. Two Flotilla.)					
			Total	951,100	

Designations of the Divisions under Wan Tien-tsun and Ke Yun-lung have been changed from the 20th and 16th Divisions to the 5th and 33rd, respectively.

The 34th Division and the 1st Independent Brigade under Chen Chu-chen and Wang Chih-yuan, respectively, are newly organized units, the latter is also named Shensi Provincial Brigade.

The 58th Division under Wen Hung-en no longer exists. It is said to have been reorganized into other units.

The 65th and 66th Divisions under Liu Cheng-hua and Liu Mao-en, respectively, have been reorganized from the 65th, 66th and 67th divisions which were listed in Page 2 of last Situation Report.

The 74th Division under Ch'iao Li-chai is reported to be still in existence, not having been disbanded or reorganized as was stated in the last Report.

The Special Division under Li Lin-hsiao is reported to have disintegrated, the commander is also said to have been killed by his subordinates at Kishan in Shensi.

The 1st Independent Brigade under Jung Chin-fang is newly organized from part of the over-sized 48th Division under Hsu Yuan-chuan.

The 1st Independent Brigade under Li Po-hua has been reorganized from the 10th Division which was listed under "Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions" on Page 4 of last Report.

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Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions

1st	Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Kweiteh	Honan	12,000
2nd	"	Yang Sheng-chih	Loyang	"	15,000
3rd	"	Chen Chi-cheng	Hwaying	Shensi	12,000
4th	"	Hsu Ting-yao	Yushan	Kiangsi	10,000 *
5th	"	Hu Tsu-yu	Ihwang	"	12,000
6th	"	Chao Kuan-tao	Yencheng	Honan	12,000
7th	"	Wang Chun	Hsuchow	Kiangsu	12,000
8th	"	Mao Ping-wen	Sincheng	Kiangsi	12,000
9th	"	Chiang Ting-wen	Loyang	Honan	12,000
11th	"	Lo Cho-ying	Nanchowting	Hunan	12,000
12th	"	Chin Han-ting	Haichow	Kiangsu	12,000
13th	"	Hsia Tou-yin	Macheng	Hupeh	12,000
14th	"	Chen Cheng	Hankow	"	10,000 *
				Total	 155,000

* Cadets from the Military School at Nanking as distinguished from Chiang Kai-shek's old divisions.

1st	Division	Lei Chung-tien	Lanchow	Kansu	8,000
7th	"	Ma Hung-pin	"	"	12,000
25th	"	Sun Lien-chung	Tsining	Shantung	18,000
27th	"	Shih Chi-shu	"	"	18,000
30th	"	Chi Hung-chang	Shangcheng	Honan	12,000
31st	"	Chang Yin-hsiang	Macheng	Hupeh	12,000
32nd	"	Liang Kuan-ying	Hwaian	Kiangsu	12,000
1st	Cav.Div.	Ma Lin	Lanchow	Kansu	5,000
1st	" "	Liu Feng-chi	Kweiteh	Honan	4,000
2nd	" "	Chu Ch'ang-te	Tingtao	Shantung	5,000
3rd	" "	Chang Hua-t'ang	Shuyang	Kiangsu	5,000
				Total	 111,000

The above units are old Kuominchun divisions which surrendered to the Government.

The 25th and 27th Divisions under Sun Lien-chung and Shih Chi-shu, respectively, have been reorganized from the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Divisions and the Special Brigade, which were listed in Page 4 of last Report. These units are being moved into Kiangsi at present in compliance with orders of the Government to suppress communist-bandits in that province.

The 1st Cavalry Division under Ma Lin has been reorganized from remnants of the Kuominchun in Kansu.

Total Central Government Troops, Old Chiang Kai-shek Divisions and former Kuominchun forces who surrendered 1,217,100

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(b) FORMER ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES

First Group of Armies
(Pai Chung-hsi)

4th Army Corps	Chang Fa-ku'ei	Nanning	Kwangsi	20,000
7th " "	Yang T'eng-hui	Poseh	"	15,000
8th " "	Chow Lan	Liuchow	"	15,000
15th " "	Huang Shao-hsiung	Nanning	"	15,000
16th Division	Pai Chung-hsi	Poseh	"	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Hsu Ch'i-ming	Liuchow	"	4,000
2nd " "	Meng Chih	"	"	4,000
			Total	 85,000

A peace agreement is reported to have been reached between Huang Shao-hsiung, representative of Kwangsi military commanders, and the Government at Nanking. The former is appointed Tupan (director) of Rehabilitation Affairs and has left the capital en route to Kwangsi. It is reported that the units listed above will be reorganized as three divisions, which will be used for suppression of bandits in that province.

Kuominchun Forces

1st Division	Pao Kang	Chuwu	Shansi	6,000
2nd "	Tung Yu-chen	Kiangchow	"	6,000
3rd "	Chang Jen-chieh	Icheng	"	6,000
4th "	Chang Sui-yin	Chuwu	"	6,000
5th "	T'ang Chuan-sheng	Kiangchow	"	6,000
6th "	Chang Tzu-chung	"	"	6,000
	P'ang Ping-hsun	Yuncheng	"	20,000
	Sung Che-yuan	Tsechow	"	24,000
			Total	 80,000

Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces

1st Army Corps - Sun Ch'u

1st Division	Meng Hsien-chi	Yutze	Shansi	3,000
2nd "	T'ao Chen-wu	"	"	3,000
3rd "	Ma Yen-chow	"	"	3,000
			Carried Forward	9,000

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Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces (cont'd)			Brought Forward		9,000
2nd Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou					
4th Division	Chow Sze-ch'eng		Luan	Shansi	3,000
5th "	Chang Wen-shun		"	"	3,000
6th "			"	"	3,000
3rd Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo					
7th Division	Ho Shao-nan		Saratsi	Suiyuan	3,000
8th "	T'ien Shu-mei		"	"	3,000
9th "	Wang T'ing-ying		"	"	3,000
4th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta					
10th Division	Ch'en Chang-chieh		Tatung	Shansi	3,000
11th "	Tuan Shu-hua		"	"	3,000
12th "	Huo Yuan-pi		"	"	3,000
5th Army Corps - Li Fu-ying					
13th Division	An Hsi-ku		Taiyuan	"	3,000
14th "	To Chen		Wutai	"	3,000
15th "	Chai Hsueh-ming		Kwohsien	"	3,000
6th Army Corps - Yang Yueh-fang					
16th Division	Wang Yu-ju		Taiku	"	3,000
17th "			"	"	3,000
18th "			"	"	3,000
8th Army Corps - Chang Hui-chao					
22nd Division	Chow Cheng-chien		Tatung	"	3,000
23rd "	Yu Hai-ho		"	"	3,000
24th "			"	"	3,000
9th Army Corps - Feng Peng-chu					
25th Division	Huang Kuang-hua		Yuhsien	"	3,000
26th "	Kao Hung-wen		"	"	3,000
27th "	Kuo Wei-fan		Niangtzekwan	"	3,000
10th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi					
28th Division	Yeh Ch'i-chieh		Fengchen	Suiyuan	3,000
29th "	Pai Ju-ch'ing		"	"	3,000
30th "	Chen Ping-chien		"	"	3,000
15th Army Corps - Chien Shao-kuan					
10th Brigade	Liu Cho-ch'ing		Yutze	Shansi	2,500
11th "	Fan Kang-lin		"	"	2,500
12th "	Huang Shih-tung		"	"	2,500
			Carried Forward		88,500

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Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces (cont'd) Brought Forward 88,500

16th Army Corps - Yang Ch'eng-yuan

4th Brigade	Liu Fang-chi	Pingyang	Shansi	2,500
5th "	Li Chia-lin	"	"	2,500
6th "	Liang Chien-tang	"	"	2,500
Training Division	Li Ching-jung	Taiyuan	"	8,000
1st Cavalry "	Yang Chao-lin	Tatung	"	6,000
2nd " "	Yuan Ping-fan	"	"	2,000
4th " "	Wang Ying	Paotou	Suiyuan	4,000
5th " "	Kuo Feng-shan	Tatung	Shansi	2,500
6th " "	Sun Chang-sheng	"	"	2,500
Bodyguard Brigade	Tu Ch'un-yi	Taiyuan	"	6,000
28th "	Yuan Tseng-ching	Tatung	"	6,000
			Total	 133,000

The above units are under disbandment and reorganization at present in compliance with the disbandment plan drawn up at Tientsin, after completion of which, the names of Kuominchun Forces and Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces will be abrogated. Commanders of five armies and ten divisions, as they were stated in Page 8 of last Report, have jointly issued a circular telegram, which announced their assumption of office on February 6. In addition to these units there will be also organized one railway protection army and an emergency force from the Shansi-Suiyuan Precautionary Forces. The cavalry divisions will be reorganized as three cavalry brigades, instead of two as formerly reported, which will be placed under Chao Ch'eng-shou and be used for suppression of bandits.

Former Miscellaneous Troops in Anti-Government Movement

2nd Division	Sun Tien-ying	Tsechow	Shansi	26,000

The units which were listed under this heading in the last Report are said to have undergone some disbandment and to have been reorganized into one division as the above. This new division is still under the command of Sun Tien-ying, who assumed office on February 6, together with Kuominchun and Shansi generals, as was before stated.

The Thirteenth Route Army
(Shih Yu-san)

1st Division	Sun Kuang-chien	Changteh	Honan	10,000
2nd "	Mi Wen-ho	Weihwei	"	10,000
3rd "	Liang Fang-ch'i	Tzechow	Hopei	10,000
4th "	Wang Hsing-te	Shaho	"	10,000
5th "	Sung T'ieh-lin	Hantan	"	10,000
6th "	Sheng Ke	Tzechow	"	10,000
6 Independent Regiments		Changteh	Honan	12,000
			Total	 72,000

Total Former Anti-Government Forces - 396,000

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Miscellaneous Units
(Nominally under National Government's control)

Yunnan - Lung Yun, Commander-in-Chief.

98th Division	Lu Han	Kwangnan	Yunnan	6,420
99th "	Chu Hsu	Chiupei	"	4,420
100th "	Chang Feng-ch'un	Yunnanfu	"	4,420
101st "	Chang Ch'ung	Kwangnan	"	2,320
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-shun	Yunnanfu	"	2,000
Mixed Regiment	Ch'en Yi	"	"	800
First "	An Te-hua	Chaotung	"	2,000
Peace Maintenance Battalion	Shih Hua	Talifu	"	456
			Total	22,836

Information concerning the formation and station of the above various units has been very recently received from our Consulate in Yunnan and is believed correct.

Kweichow - Mao Kuang-hsiang

25th Army	Mao Kuang-hsiang	Kweichow	12,000
Training Div.	Liu Cheng-chun	"	5,000
Ind. Brigade	Ts'ao Yung-hsiang	"	3,000
		Total	20,000

Sinkiang

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army 10,000

Szechwan

20th Army under Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Chuhsien	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	"	10,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	"	"	10,000
			Carried Forward	30,000

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Szechwan (continued)

		Brought Forward		30,000

21st Army under Liu Hsiang

1st Division	T'ang Shih-tsung	Ichang	Hupeh	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hsu	Patung	"	10,000
3rd "	Wang Fang-chow	Chungking	Szechwan	15,000
Border Def.Trps.	Fan Shao-tseng	Kweichow	Hupeh	10,000
Training Div.	Chang Tsai	Chungking	Szechwan	5,000
Ind. Division	Wang Chao-kw'ei	"	"	4,000
			Total	54,000

24th Army under Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Szechwan	12,000
2nd "	Hsiang Chuan-i	"	"	12,000
3rd "	Hsia Show-hai	"	"	12,000
Border Def.Trps.	Lan Ying-tung	Szechwan-Hsikang		14,000
			Total	50,000

28th Army under Teng Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Chengtu	Szechwan	10,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Suining	"	10,000
3rd "	Ch'en Shu-nung	Chengtu	"	10,000
5th "	Ma Te-chi	"	"	10,000
			Total	40,000

29th Army under T'ien Sung-yao

1st Route	Corps	Wang Sze-chung	Tungch'uan	Szechwan	6,000
2nd "	"	T'ang Heng	"	"	6,000
3rd "	"	Tsang Hsien-tung	"	"	6,000
4th "	"	Lo Nai-ch'ang	"	"	6,000
5th "	"	Wang Ming-chang	"	"	6,000
				Total	30,000

Border Defense Troops

	Liu Tsung-hou	Suiting	Szechwan	10,000

Total Szechwan Forces 214,000

Total Miscellaneous Units - 266,836

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(c) NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES -

Commander-in-Chief - Chang Hsueh-liang
Deputy Commanders - Chang Tso-hsiang
- Wan Fu-lin

Liaoning

1st Brigade	Wang Yi-che	Shenyang	Liaoning	11,000
3rd "	Ho Chu-kuo	Shanhaikwan	Hopei	10,000
12th "	Chang T'ing-shu	Kowpangtze	Liaoning	10,000
16th "	Miao Chan-lin	Sinminfu	"	10,000
19th "	Sun Chao-ying	Lwanchow	Hopei	11,000
20th "	Huang Hsien-sheng	T'aonan	Liaoning	11,000
22nd "	Huang Chih-chung			10,000
24th "	Huang Shih-yueh	Changwu	Liaoning	10,000
3rd Cav.Brig.	Chang Shu-shen	Yungping	Hopei	6,000
			Total	89,000

Field Artillery - Tsou Tso-hua

3rd Art.Regt.		Shanhaikwan	Hopei	6,000
4th " "		Chaoyang	Jehol	6,000
5th " "		Peichen	Liaoning	6,000
6th " "		Shenyang	"	6,000
7th Heavy A.R.		Peichen	"	6,000
8th " " "		"	"	6,000
			Total	36,000

Engineers - Po Kuei-ling

4 Batt'ns stationed at Shenyang, Changwu & Kaiyuan	3,200
1 Communications Detachment - Peitaying, Liaoning.	800
Total	4,000

First Army - Yu Hsueh-chung

4th Brigade	Liu Yi-fei	Kalgan	Chahar	10,000
5th "	Tung Ying-pin	Hsuanhwa	"	10,000
6th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Shihkiachwang	Hopei	11,000
23rd "	Ch'en Kuang-chun	Peiping	"	10,000
27th "	Liu Nai-chang	Paoting	"	10,000
6th Cav.Brig.	Pai Feng-hsiang	Neikiu	"	8,000
2nd " Div.	Chang Cheng-te	Kalgan	Chahar	4,000
1st Art.Regt.		Peiping	Hopei	6,000
1st Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
			Total	69,800

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Liaoning (continued)

Second Army - Wang Shu-chang

1st	Brigade	Liu Kwei-t'ang	Puyang	Hopei	10,000
2nd	"	Ting Hsi-ch'un	Tungkwang	"	10,000
25th	"	Yao Tung-fan	Tientsin	"	10,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Sun Hsu-chang	Taming	"	6,000
2nd	Art.Regt.		Tientsin	"	6,000
2nd	Engr. Bn.		"	"	800
				Total	42,800

Total Liaoning Forces 241,600

Kirin - Chang Tso-hsiang

7th	Brigade	Su Te-ch'en	Shwangchengfu	Kirin	8,000
8th	"	Li Wei-lin	Kwangchengtze	"	7,000
9th	"	Li Tu	Yenki	"	8,000
10th	"	Chang Tso-chow	Kirin	"	8,000
13th	"	Ki Hsing	Yenki	"	7,000
18th	"	Ting Ch'ao	Harbin	"	7,000
21st	"	Chao Chih-hsiang	Ningut'a	"	10,000
26th	"	Hsing Chan-ching	Harbin	"	8,000
16th	Cav.Brig.	Li Cheng-shan	Suifen	"	10,000
18th	" "	Huang Ch'in	"	"	8,000
				Total	81,000

Heilungkiang - Wan Fu-lin

1st	Brigade	Shih Mei-feng	Pokotu	Heilungkiang	7,000
2nd	"	Wang Nan-p'ing	Payenchow	"	7,000
14th	"	Hsu Yung-ho	Angangki	"	10,000
15th	"	Su Ping-wen	Hailar	"	10,000
17th	"	Yu Chao-lin	Tsitsihar	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Chang Wei-chan	Pokotu	"	4,000
2nd	" "	Wang Er-chan	"	"	4,000
3rd	" "	Pa Ying-o	Heiho	"	4,000
12th	" "	Ma Chen-shan	Hulan	"	4,000
				Total	57,000

Jehol - Tang Yu-lin

7th	Brigade	Chang Sheng-yun	Jehol	Jehol	6,000
22nd	"	Fu Ch'un	Iwanping	"	6,000
38th	"	Tung Fu-ting	Chaoyang	"	7,000
51st	"	Liu Hsiang-chin	Fengning	"	7,000
1st	Cav.Brig.	Liu Shang-sheng	Pingchuan	"	4,500
2nd	" "	Chia Kuo-cheng	Linhsi	"	4,500
3rd	" "	Chao Kuo-tseng	Chefeng	"	4,500
17th	" "	Tsen Hsin-wu	Jehol	"	4,500
19th	" "	Shih Wen-hua	Iwanping	"	4,500
				Total	48,500

Total Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces - 428,100

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TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, not including irregulars - 2,308,036

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

2. Narrative of Events (January 29 - February 25, 1931).

Used as China is to an annual spring war, and in spite of many rumors, it would seem as though the spring of the year 1931 would stand out in peaceful contrast. The conciliation reported in Kwangsi in the last Situation Report has apparently been effected although General Hwang Shao-hsiung has not yet returned to his native province and consequently has not faced Chang Fa-kwei, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi. These last gentlemen may of course repudiate General Hwang's negotiations.

The troops of Sun Lien-chung started moving towards Kiangsi on February 20, and on the same day Sun accepted the post of Rehabilitation Commissioner for Kiangsi Province. His obedience in this case is a victory for the government and an indication of governmental strength. Sun did not want to move——he feared separation from his Kuominchun comrades, Han Fu-chu and Ma Hung-kwei, and Kiangsi's climate does not appeal to his northern soldiers. Over a month and a half went by from the time he received the order to move and his actual movement. Upon consultation with other Shantung commanders it was undoubtedly decided that the combined Kuominchun strength was insufficient to warrant a break with Nanking - and Sun accepted his fate. The danger to the government of 45,000 Kuominchun troops in contact with the Red-bandit groups and in the government back areas, would seem to counter-balance the advantage of breaking up the Kuominchun group in Shantung.

In Shansi the search for funds still goes on and the arsenal works day and night. The once "Model Province" is now in a state of turmoil.

The conditions in Szechuan are still obscure and no developments worthy of note have been reported since the last report. It is rumored that the Szechuanese column which is invading south Shensi is led by Wu Pei-fu, but no confirmation can be obtained. Wu Pei-fu is a name with which to scare naughty children and bad militarists. A name only, with its halo of past power——a name which finds no place in the halls of fame of modern China.

Bandit suppression in southeast Hupeh and in central Kiangsi has made no apparent impression on the numbers or depredations of the communist-bandit elements. Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, who is in charge of the entire program, has not been successful in instilling any ardor into the movement. What Sun Lien-chung's troops will effect remains to be seen.

3. Miscellaneous.

Chang Hsueh-liang has announced that he will shortly establish his headquarters here in Peiping.

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On January 28, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed the Hupeh-Hunan and Kiangsi Provincial Government that the Pao-chia system would be employed in the future, for the eradication of banditry and communism. By this system the community is held responsible for the action of its individuals. It is a system which is not new in China, and in practice has been in effect for many hundreds of years. Its re-introduction should prove beneficial.

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Nanking announced on February 18th that reorganization and expansion of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of War will be effected on March 15th, in view of the importance of the air force for the country's defence. The Department, which will in future be independent of the Ministry of War, will be under the direct jurisdiction of the National Government Council in time of peace and under the Commander-in-Chief of the Military, Naval and Air Forces in time of war.

It is understood that the Department will in future be known as the National Aviation Administration, consisting of three departments and nine sections instead of the original six sections. The entire National Air Force is to be reorganized so as to centralize control in the hands of the Administration.

PGT

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Legation
1 Tientsin
1 Manila
1 Tokyo
1 File

Peiping, March 31, 1931

Subject: Trip to Mukden and Harbin.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China.

On March 23, 1931, I left Peiping on a trip to Mukden and Harbin for the purpose of seeing Manchuria, making useful contacts, and to get first-hand information of the general situation in that part of China. I returned at midnight, March 30, 1931.

Through the good offices of Mr. Meyers, the American Consul General at Mukden, I was invited to dinner by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang the night after my arrival. There I met several interesting Chinese, all of the younger generation, fluent in English. Among them were General Chu, who had recently completed a course at the Quartermaster School in Philadelphia, and Colonel Lee. Mr. Donald, adviser to the Marshal, was also there and I had lunch with him the following day. During my brief stay I also interviewed Mr. Cochrane, the Manager of the Mukden branch of the National City Bank, Mr. Erhardt, U. S. Trade Commissioner, Consul General Meyers, Major Watari, with the Foreign Office of the South Manchuria Railway, and several business men. For ease in reading I will separate my impressions under appropriate headings.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

During the dinner at the Marshal's and for a few hours afterward, I had a good opportunity to observe Chang Hsueh-liang. Except for a sallowness which may be natural, he showed no signs of taking narcotics. All the people I questioned in Mukden on this point doubted that he used them to any great extent. He was simple and cordial in his manner. He speaks a little English, but whenever a remark was passed which might puzzle him, Colonel Lee or one of the other Chinese would instantly translate it. In reply to my question he said that he expected to come to Peiping soon. There was no opportunity for any sort of a personal interview during the evening. One of the most striking impressions of my stay in Mukden was the praise bestowed on the Marshal by the various foreigners with whom I discussed him. While they may have differed on some points, they were unanimous in saying that he was truly sincere and patriotic and that he would do all in his power to uplift and unify China. I have never before heard a Chinese so extolled.

Chang's Relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

The general impression is that the tie between Chang and Chiang is very strong and would not be lightly broken. Chang admires Chiang's strong policy. Mr. Donald said that the two were in perfect accord and that unless Chiang did something strongly subversive to the interests of the nation, Chang would back him to the limit. He also said that Chang was going to attend the forthcoming People's Conference in Nanking. This certainly would be indicative of a fairly strong tie and would also enhance Chiang's prestige.

Vice-Commander's Headquarters in Peiping.

The consensus of opinion appears to be that Chang will not take up permanent residence in Peiping. His major interests are all in Manchuria and his presence in Mukden is necessary to guard them. He will probably stop over in Peiping on the way to Nanking and come here from time to time. Chang is very secretive about setting a date for his movements. He has not forgotten the bombing of his father. He will probably use his Ford plane to come as far as Peiping anyway.

Chang Tso-hsiang.

The relations between the Marshal and Chang Tso-hsiang seem to be quite strong and friendly. Chang Tso-hsiang is primarily responsible for the Marshal taking over the reins after the death of Chang Tso-lin and would on that account alone feel inclined to uphold him. He apparently has approved all of Chang Hsueh-liang's actions in Nanking and Tientsin. An additional indication of this approval was Chang Tso-hsiang's presence in Mukden last week at the ceremonies inaugurating the Provincial Kuomintang Committee.

Kuomintang.

Only provincial Kuomintang committees will be organized for the present. Mr. Donald said that one of the points stressed by Chang Hsueh-liang in his discussions with Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking was that the Kuomintang would have no hand in government affairs. It is generally believed in Mukden that only an emasculated version of the Kuomintang would be permitted in Fengtien controlled territory.

Shih Yu-san.

There was no verification of the report that Shih Yu-san was being detained in Mukden under duress. On the contrary, all people in Mukden were of the opinion that a satisfactory agreement had been reached and that Shih Yu-san would leave in a few days to supervise the reorganization of his troops. About one thousand of his men are being sent up to Kirin to be absorbed there. North of Shanhaikuan I passed some of them on the way up. There was a report in a Dairen paper to the effect that some of Shih's troops had commandeered Kailan Mining Company rolling stock, but I could get no verification.

Railroads.

Several foreigners in Mukden expressed the belief that Japan is exerting great pressure to proceed with the construction of the railroad from Tunhua to Lautouerho, to connect with her North Korean line. Mr. Donald, however, says that this question is closed and that in no case will the Fengtien Government permit the line to be built. It may be possible that the Japanese stress on this point will be used as a bargaining point in other negotiations, a method of diplomacy not uncommon in Japanese history.

The Peking-Mukden line and one small branch line are the only Chinese railroads in Manchuria that are showing a profit. But that profit is insufficient by ten million dollars to cover the deficits of the other Chinese railroads. This

despite the fact that very little money is being spent for maintenance. The Peking-Mukden road-bed is getting into deplorable shape. Many ties are in need of replacing and the ballast in many places should be renewed. I met Mr. H. Kalin, a director of the Skoda works in Prague, on the train and he told me that practically every bridge on the line was in bad shape, some even dangerous. I noticed they were all crossed very slowly.

Skoda has recently sold some locomotives to the Fengtien authorities on a part credit basis. Payments so far have been regular. Bids for about one hundred cars additional rolling-stock are about to be opened. It is believed that Skoda will get this contract also on account of their willingness to extend credit.

A dispute between the Kailan Mining Administration and the Peking-Mukden line over a million and a half taels claimed by the railroad for demurrage has reached the point where the railroad is no longer furnishing locomotives to haul Kailan coal. Coal stocks at Chinwangtao are practically exhausted and storage facilities at the mines, including rolling-stock, are being rapidly filled to capacity. Many of the six thousand stevedore coolies at Chinwangtao have been diverted to road building and other clean-up work. It is possible that coal production will soon be stopped on account of lack of storage space. Ships have to coal at Dairen to the great profit of the Japanese. I was unable to get any details as to the reasons for the dispute.

All the important bridges on the South Manchuria Railway are protected by permanent concrete blockhouses at each end. No garrison was visible. Road-bed, rolling-stock and service were excellent on this line. The crossing of the Sungari at Taolaichao, on the Chinese Eastern, is protected by a rather massive concrete blockhouse. The road-bed and rolling-stock on this line were also very good.

Harbin.

Harbin, with about one hundred thousand Russian residents, is practically a Russian city. Store and street signs are all in Russian and that language predominates. While there I talked to Mr. Thomas, our Consul; the Postal Commissioner, Mr. Ross; the Manager of the local branch of the National City Bank, and many of the business people there. The present economic conditions are very bad, the prime factor of course being the present state of the Soya bean market. One strange concomitant of the recent fracas is the fact that the breaking out of hostilities between Russia and China served to close the border tightly and stop a tremendous flow of smuggled goods into Siberia, all of which goods were first imported to Harbin. The border is still fairly tight. As a result the merchants are left with large stocks of imports and all the bank go-downs are filled with merchandise which cannot be moved. Soviet dumping is another factor which is giving local merchants a lot of grief. Linens, manufactured articles, and many kinds of foodstuffs can be bought at the Soviet controlled stores cheaper than other merchants can bring them in. Russian kerosene and oil are also making their

appearance at prices which importing firms cannot meet. The Chinese Eastern Railway is apparently also in financial difficulties,owing large bills to a number of merchants in Harbin. All these factors have their effect on local economics.

The Russian management of the Chinese Eastern is discharging all of the Russian employees who stayed with the road during the break with China, replacing these with purer Reds from Russia. Many of these discharged men are entitled to some sort of pension for long service, which the railroad is in no position to pay at this time.

The impression among foreigners in Harbin seems to be that Russia will gain all of her points at the forthcoming conference in Moscow, including that of maintaining railway guards along the line. The Chinese fear a repetition of the debacle of 1929, and are willing to make any concession to avoid it. It is possible, however, that Nanking will be much braver about an invasion so far north of the Yangtse.

The influence of the Soviet Consulate among the Chinese officials in Harbin is daily waxing greater. In two recent cases in which Soviet subjects were accused of murder of White Russians, the Consulate was able to get them off without punishment. The White Russians living in Harbin will undoubtedly feel the effects of the rising Soviet influence.

Haussler Case.

While in Mukden I heard of an interesting case which I will repeat here. Mr. J. Haussler, a secretary in the German Consulate at Mukden, was driving his car containing his family and friends outside the city. He apparently scared a horse pulling a Chinese cart. The horse ran away, upset the cart and fatally injured an old Chinese lady who was riding in it. There were no witnesses except the cart driver and the occupants of the automobile. Some soldiers came up immediately afterwards and were quite nasty. They would not permit the car to move, not even to take the injured lady to the hospital. Haussler managed to get word back to Mukden and was finally permitted to go. In the meantime the soldiers tried to wreck the car. The upshot was that Haussler was tried in a Chinese court under Chinese legal procedure, and on evidence which he claims was manufactured and which he was not permitted to rebut, and was fined $600.00. His lawyers' fees were $900.00. This closed the criminal case. A civil suit is now being brought for $17,000.00, part of the money to be used as follows. A monument to be erected at the scene of the accident with an inscription saying that in 1900 a German diplomat was killed in Peking and the Chinese had to erect a monument; now a German "diplomat" killed a Chinese and he had to erect a monument. A similar monument to be erected at the grave.

William Mayer
Captain, Field Artillery

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

MAY 2 1931
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peiping, March 31, 1931.

Subject: Report on Trip to South of Yangtse.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 29 1931

On March 7, I left Peiping by rail for Hankow, planning to go from there to Ch'angsha in Hunan, and to Nan-ch'ang in Kiangsi. My purpose in making this trip was twofold; first, to visit the communist area and learn what I could of present conditions, and second, to see something of China south of the Yangtse. I had visited the Yangtse Valley on several previous occasions and had done a fair amount of traveling in northern China, but until now the opportunity had never presented itself to go south of the river. On this trip I was limited by time, in that I must return to Peiping in time to prepare for a further and longer trip to the west——into Shensi and Kansu.

At the time of purchasing the ticket for Hankow it was unknown whether or not the train would be able to proceed on through to that point. Several days previous the service had been interrupted due to the activities of a group variously reported as bandits, communists and mutinous soldiers. Troops had been sent up from Hankow and south from Chengchow to re-open the railroad, but at the time of the departure of the train the telegraph lines through the district involved were still not repaired, hence no accurate information was obtain-able. Rumors as to the extent and nature of the damages suffered varied between the tearing up of a mile of track, and the destruction of thirty miles of track and several bridges.

At Chengchow, in Honan, there was still no further news. Telegraphic communication to the south made it possible for the train to proceed as far as Chumatien, some thirty-three hours south of Peiping and nearly three-fourths of the distance to Hankow. On arrival there news was still non-existent, the telegraph lines to the south were out, and rumor located the disturbances at various points between Sintien and Kwangshui. After a very short delay the train began its return trip to the North. More than half of the passengers left the train at Chumatien, intending to remain there until service to the south opened up, although the railway people could make no predictions as to the amount of time necessary to restore communications. I, however, decided to return to Chengchow and to cross on the Lunghai to Hsuchowfu, Kiangsu, where I could get a train to Pukow. The train arrived at Chengchow about ten o'clock the morning of the 9th.

In the depot I found a battalion of infantry drawn up on the platform, and the band, whose presence invariably means the passing through or arrival of a visitor of rank. On inquiry I learned that these troops were bodyguard troops of Liu Ch'ih, the provincial governor of Honan, whose arrival from Kaifeng was due very shortly. All the passengers from the train on which I arrived were immediately bustled out of the station by the railroad police. I made an attempt to find the

station-master in order to get my ticket indorsed, due to the change of route necessitated. He, however, was one of the reception committee and could not be bothered with routine affairs at such a time. I was not permitted to remain in the station but was told to return later to fix up my ticket. After inquiry as to the time of departure of the train to the east, I left and proceeded to a Chinese hotel. I found the streets heavily guarded with soldiers along the route to the magistrate's yamen, and the usual crowd of the curious out to see the Governor. His train arrived shortly and his car, heavily guarded by soldiers standing on the running boards, whisked by on its way to headquarters.

On arrival at the hotel, I was informed that Liu Ch'ih's visit was for the purpose of inspecting a body of troops who were to be sent into southern Honan on communist and bandit suppression work. Liu Ch'ih was reported as being very active and very determined in his efforts to restore order in Honan, and to be especially severe in his dealings with the communists. The possession of communist literature was sufficient evidence for a prison sentence of considerable duration, while a more active and positive indication of communist leanings was very likely to result in an execution. According to the same informants, a large percentage of the young school teachers in Honan were communists---men of some education who, due to their inability to secure official positions commensurate with their education and ambitions, were becoming anti-government and from that point it was just a step to communism. Although these were not the bandit type they were nevertheless considered dangerous on account of their influence, and were dealt with most severely.

Chengchow, to outward appearances, seems prosperous. During the revolts and rebellions it has always been a strategical point and has seen much fighting. At the junction of the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai railroads, its location is such as to make it a collecting and distributing center. Now that work is actually progressing in the building of the line to the west, its importance will increase. Eventually it is planned to extend the Lunghai through Sianfu, in Shensi, on to Lanchow, the capital of Kansu. Then the products of the northwestern provinces will flow out along this route and the sale of these will pay for the imports which will go back. At present, China is much concerned over the isolation of these provinces, especially in view of the threatened Soviet economic penetration from the other side, and will do all possible to push such railroad construction.

Several missionaries who were called on informed me that business was very flourishing this year, that last year's crops were good and that this year's heavy snows had given promise of even a larger yield of wheat. Last year the daily air raids and bombing, although they had not caused much loss of life or property, had seriously affected the morale, and business had practically come to a standstill. Now that peace was here, capital was coming out of hiding and although banditry was still a menace, nevertheless generally there was confidence in Liu Ch'ih's ability to control the situation.

The next morning at seven o'clock my train left for Hsuchowfu, where I was to change for Pukow. This train was one of the best I have traveled on in China. The rolling stock was in better shape than has been the case on any except a few special trains which appear usually only when a large tourist party reserves such accommodations. The country traversed, northeastern Honan, still bore traces of the recent fighting, trenches extending from the tracks as far as the eye could reach both to the north and south. Some artillery emplacements were in evidence, but apparently artillery had not played its proportionate share in the campaigning there.

The stop at Hsuchowfu was of too short a duration to permit a trip into the city. The railway people here also reported general prosperity and a revival of business during these piping times of peace. There were no reports of banditry or communism in this area. In the railroad yards were two trains of cavalry——the remaining units of Sun Lien-chung's troops——en route to Kiangsi for bandit suppression work. These troops were side-tracked, waiting for the express train to go through - an unusual concession on the part of the military to the ordinary traveler. Far too often such trains take the right of way and irrespective of respective speeds of the trains concerned, move on without consideration of the inconvenience caused to others.

On arrival at Pukow other units of cavalry of the same organization were seen. These troops were awaiting the arrival of river transport to carry them to Kiukiang, where they would entrain for Nanch'ang. Except for this, no further military activity was noticed.

I crossed the ferry to Hsiakuan, the port of Nanking, and from there proceeded to our Consulate. After a short call, I went to the Aviation Bureau Headquarters to call on Chang Hui-ch'ang, the Air Chief. He notified me of the air assistance being planned for Sun Lien-chung in Kiangsi. A good landing field had been built at Nanch'ang and fifteen planes, mostly Voight Corsairs, newly purchased from America, were to be sent. The main mission was to be reconnaissance, but bomb racks had been installed and all these planes would be able to do bombing if necessary. Machine guns were also standard equipment and these he planned to use in ground attack work, when marching columns of communists or bandits were located. Chang Hui-chang is an American trained flyer, one of the best pilots in China, a man of most pleasant personality but in my estimation not a man of particular resource or force of character. He is, however, well informed on matters aeronautical, particularly along military lines. His assistant, General Hwang, he told me, was now in America studying our military and commercial air activities.

Eventually the conversation drifted to politics. Chang is a Kwangtung man, one of the very few who have reached and held high position in the present government. He has steadfastly urged the creation of an Air Ministry to control and develop aeronautics in China. Now this bureau works under the Ministry of War. He seems rather pessimistic as to the early realization of his hopes, especially so since Hu Han-min, the head of the Legislative Yuan, was forced to resign. With his

removal from the government, the position of Kwangtung is still further weakened and very little influence can now be brought to bear in regard to the matter of a separate Air Ministry.

In the evening, I talked with some young Chinese business men at the International Club. Again politics was the subject, and Hu Han-min's resignation the principal item of interest. It was predicted that the Party——the Kuomintang—— would suffer severe financial set-back as a result of this move. Thousands of overseas Chinese, nearly all from Kwangtung, have been contributing very heavily to the Party treasury. It was feared that this support would now be withdrawn, since they would strongly resent Chiang Kai-shek's removal of Hu Han-min from office.

Early the next morning I sailed for Kiukiang, en route to Nanch'ang. This rail trip to Nanch'ang took fourteen hours, although it is normally a four hour trip by express train and a six hour trip by the slower one. Just prior to the departure from the Kiukiang station, six cars of ammunition for Nanch'ang were added to our train. This made too great a load for our small engine. For the first forty miles we puffed along slowly, but at the first appreciable grade it was found impossible to proceed. Twice the train was backed up and an attempt made to get up sufficient speed on the level track to negotiate the pull on the grade, but each time the engine failed. Finally the passenger train was uncoupled and dropped off and the engine proceeded on with the six cars of ammunition. Our train was left for some five hours, after which time an engine appeared and took us on to Nanch'ang. We arrived at about three in the morning, found martial law in effect preventing us from passing through the streets to our hotels, and were forced to put up at the little inns nearest to the ferry docks.

In the morning I set out to call on Ho Ying-ching, the Minister of War, who is now in active charge of bandit suppression activities in Kiangsi. This province is undoubtedly the stronghold of communism in China. Chu, Mao, P'eng and Hwang, the big men of the movement, are all now in the southern part of this province; hence Nanking is making her strongest efforts here and has concentrated nearly two hundred thousand troops. The communist military strength is considerably less but the nature of Nanking's problem is particularly difficult in that the communists and bandit groups disperse on the approach of troops and go back to work on their farms, or retreat into the mountain fastnesses where they are very hard to find.

General Ho was not in his office but had left town with Sun Lien-chung for an inspection of some of Sun's troops. They were not expected back until after three or four days and had not returned up to the time of my departure. I next called on Miss Ida Kahn, a mission doctor. She is a Chinese woman of about fifty-five who was adopted when two years of age by an American missionary. She was educated in America at Ann Arbor and later took post-graduate work at Northwestern University in Chicago. She runs a large hospital and training school for nurses, and at present with practically no support from mission funds. She claims that she must soon close unless mission funds are supplied because the wealthy class of Chinese who formed her clientele have all left Kiangsi for Shanghai to escape the communists. Now she has only poor patients who are unable to pay.

Miss Kahn is keen and tremendously in earnest regarding the necessity for extermination of communism. She has written considerably on this subject, several long articles recently having appeared in the China Weekly Review. These articles are in the main an appeal for aid from America. She points out the wide-spread suffering, tells of the tremendous loss of life and property, and claims that it is a greater catastrophe than flood, famine, tidal wave, fire or earthquake disasters. In the past America has always responded most generously——why doesn't she now come to the aid of the sufferers from communism and banditry? Here there is a serious threat that a quarter of the world's population will go Red, and in America apparently no one realizes the danger. How can America expect to develop or even hold on to its markets here should China become sovietized?

Our conversation lasted some three hours. She told me of her work among the sufferers and of the tremendous losses. She says in the last year $40,000,000.00 (Mex.) has been taken from the people by the communists and bandits, and that this is only a small part of the actual losses, not including the theft and looting and burning which have in nearly every case followed upon the capture of a town or village by either of these groups.

In reply to questions, Miss Kahn gave me the following information. Chu Teh is a German educated returned student and an enthusiastic convert to communism. Mao Tse-tung, who is Japanese educated, is the other of the two leaders who is really a communist. P'eng Teh-huai and Huang Kung-lueh are bandit chiefs who have lately been converted to communism or at least manifestly so. These four leaders have an army as well equipped as the troops sent against them, and including cavalry, artillery and machine gunners. It is even reported that they carry field radio sets and thus maintain contact with and receive instructions from their headquarters, somewhere in the vicinity of Tangku, in southern Kiangsi. A large share of the equipment was obtained from soldiers, whom they persuaded to join them or to sell them their rifles and cartridges. In addition, it is generally believed that they have been very successful in smuggling large amounts of arms into Kiangsi. Japanese river boats are said to have been the chief offenders in this respect.

However, it is not so much materiel as morale that has caused their success. The troops are paid regularly and well from the moneys captured. As most of the rank and file were formerly soldiers who were paid only when necessary, or poor farmers who were constantly suffering from the confiscation of their crops by the military, the regular pay of this army is most welcome and has brought about a high morale. Of course they are also taught the communist doctrines and to a certain degree have come to believe in them.

Among a people of whom three-fourths are tenant-farmers, working on shares or paying rents, a re-division of land makes an appeal, especially when it costs nothing. And this division of land has been enforced. Whenever possible, the deeds to lands and property have been collected and burned, the boundary markers have been removed and the land parcelled out at the rate of half an acre per individual. A family of six received three acres. In addition, rice is sold them at a half or less of the market price.

Miss Kahn is very skeptical of the ability of the present government to cope with the situation. The individual soldier can benefit himself by deserting, selling his arms, and joining the communist bands, and the officers are deathly afraid of the communists. The report is everywhere current that although the individual soldier captured by the communists is never harmed, the officers are invariably tortured and eventually killed. Some of the stories as to the methods employed were fiendishly ingenious. For these reasons, it is difficult to expect much from the troops. If two years ago, or even last year, action had been taken the spread of communism might have been arrested; but instead, during late years the local garrisons have each year been sent North to take a part in putting down a rebellion——this actually encouraging the communist leaders and opening to them unlimited opportunities. Now that they are strong and well organized, the problem is infinitely more difficult. Miss Kahn is thoroughly in earnest and although uninformed in many details, information on which I had hoped to obtain, she feels grave concern over the future.

Nanch'ang seems to be a more progressive, more modern city than most of the places of equal size north of the Yangtse. Between the bandit suppression troops and the people who have flocked in for the sake of safety from the communist-bandit groups, the city is much over-crowded. At the time I was there it was raining steadily and already the water of the Kan River was much higher than normal. Floods were feared, and epidemics also due to the congestion.

During the last few years this city has never been captured. It is entrenched on three sides and protected by the Kan River, a broad stream, on the fourth. The trench system is quite elaborate and is reinforced by a live-wire defense system in which the current is turned on every night. Liu Ti-ping, the defense commissioner, is not considered a particularly well qualified man and his transfer to another post is expected now that Sun Lien-chung has arrived.

From Nanch'ang I proceeded to Hankow, via Kiukiang, and took the first train for Ch'angsha, where I arrived the morning of the 19th. Here again it was raining and as the cars had all been "rented" by the military I was not able to see as much of the city or as many people as I had hoped to. I did however call on the Standard Oil representative, on Mr. Helde, the Y.M.C.A. secretary, and on several missionaries, and in addition, talked to a number of Chinese business men and shopkeepers. The story of the looting and burning of Ch'angsha last year as told me by these people was much different from such accounts as I had read.

The occupation of the city, according to my informants, was almost a complete surprise. The communist army, estimated at from two to four thousand, encountered practically no resistance in the last forty miles of its approach, and arrived within a few hours of the news announcing its coming. It immediately began to burn the government buildings and I was told that probably three-fourths of the people did not know the communists had arrived until they saw the flames mounting to heaven. P'eng Teh-huai was the leader of this group. They were formed into patrols of fifty or a hundred men each and went systematically through the city

for nine days, searching buildings, demanding and securing money from the shopkeepers, bankers and such wealthy citizens as had not escaped. During the search, the parties themselves would take such articles of value as they could conveniently remove, and then would post a notice at the gate announcing that this building was due for burning or other form of destruction and inviting the poor to loot it prior to that time——all of this of course under the claim of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, a re-distribution of wealth, etc. For the first two or three days the rougher element of the locality took full advantage of these opportunities, but during the last few days there was practically none of this type of looting. These local looters sensed too keenly the resentment of the populace and realized that looters would be punished as soon as the communists withdrew and the local authorities again took over control. Furthermore, these communist patrol groups were too busy to support and back the coolies should the inhabitants of the buildings marked for looting offer resistance. The Yale in China buildings and the Y.M.C.A. were both placarded for such looting but in both cases the servants were organized into a defense corps and were successful in holding off the local looters, who apparently were unable to get any physical backing from the communists. In many cases, according to report, appeals were successfully made to the communists against burning which had been decided upon. For instance, one mission building thus singled out was closely surrounded by numerous frame and straw houses of the Chinese. The occupants of these places pointed out to the communists that the burning of the one would greatly endanger the others, all of which belonged to the poor whom the communists claimed to be helping. The communists agreed not to burn the mission building on condition that these neighboring residents should themselves tear off its roof, pull down the walls and wreck the structure. This was accordingly done.

Some of the public utilities were saved from destruction, among them being the post office, the telegraph and telephone companies and the power plant. They wanted to use the telephones during their occupancy and so saved the power plant to permit its use. It is now learned that P'eng Teh-huai was severely criticized by Chu and Mao for not destroying the power plant, because it now furnishes the current to the live-wire fence surrounding the city, similar to that employed at Nanch'ang and mentioned above.

Although called out by proclamation and urged to take matters in their own hands, the people of Ch'angsha on the whole did not respond to the pleas of the communists. At first some of the rougher and less responsible people did indulge in the looting but, as just stated, even these people soon ceased such activities under fear of future recognition and punishment. The whole undercurrent was a feeling of strong resentment which became so noticeable that the communist group left suddenly after nine days of occupation. Their departure was not caused by fear of the local military, all of whom had left town very early and who made no attempt to counter-attack. Ho Chien, the Governor, has been severely criticized in most quarters for his failure to act, but the local people are not so bitter towards him. They realize that he had been left with a very small garrison of inferior troops, that all troops of any value whatsoever to Nanking had been sent away to participate in the

campaign being waged against the North. An attempt to resist would have meant street fighting and their probable defeat, in which case Ch'angsha would have suffered still more. Furthermore, in the cases of other captures of smaller cities during the previous year, it had become the practice to attack, loot quickly and as suddenly leave. The people of Ch'angsha expected the occupation to be of short duration, consequently they rather approved Ho Chien's refusal to antagonize the invaders. An interesting sidelight showing the trend of feeling during these nine days was the practice adopted by the communists of withdrawing all patrols from the city at nightfall and returning to their bivouacs to sleep. They were well armed and felt secure during the daytime, but when night fell they left the city and drew together, even establishing sentries at their camp as if in anticipation of retaliatory measures from the local people.

I attempted to get some of the posters or other publications of propaganda but was informed by the people that everything of that kind had been destroyed immediately after the departure of the communists, this for fear that the possessor of such would be accused of having been in the employ of or in sympathy with the communists. After Ho Chien returned, prompt and energetic measures were taken to punish the local offenders and in this Ho Chien had the support of public opinion to a degree which left no doubt as to the failure of the communist propaganda to take hold in Ch'angsha. Work was also started on the reconstruction of many of the buildings destroyed, the defense plans were improved and to such an extent that the second attack, some six weeks later, was defeated.

As to the firing by the foreign gunboats, Mr. Helde reports as follows. Nearly all of it was merely in the nature of a demonstration. One or two shells were fired into the city, but in nearly every case the gunboats fired point-blank at the embankments, more for the sake of the noise and to emphasize the fact of their presence than in the hope of inflicting damage on the communists. In some cases, machine gun fire was opened on groups of looters who were so imprudent as to work along the water-front within range of the gunboats. Mr. Helde said that since his return to Ch'angsha (he had left for a short time after the first attack and occupation) he had not once heard a Chinese express any resentment towards the action of the foreign gunboats; in fact, many had openly voiced their approval, and the opinion was often expressed that the early withdrawal of the communists from Ch'angsha was due largely to the demonstrated determination of the foreign gunners to act.

Mr. Helde, undoubtedly the best informed of all with whom I talked, says in his opinion communism in Hunan and Kiangsi is misnamed. The outbreaks are just another recurrence of the emotional heavings to which the Chinese people have been subject for centuries. It is the periodic uprising against oppressive government and the communist leaders have taken advantage of it. At heart, Mr. Helde does not believe the Chinese will ever become real converts to the principles communism advocates. Nevertheless, whether it is communism or revolt, something must be done if an orderly government is to

result. The suffering of the people and the destruction of property is appalling, especially in the smaller cities and villages. Business, except in the cities protected by large bodies of troops, is at a standstill.

The Standard Oil man, Mr. Mead, told me something of their difficulties. Small agents everywhere were suffering the confiscation of their stocks. In several cases, receipts for goods thus taken had been given, signed by the local soviet government. These governments claimed that when better able they would pay for these stocks of goods but that at present payment was impracticable. Hence these receipts are valueless except as the basis for compensation claims to Nanking. It was even suggested that the communists hope they will be used as such——another annoyance to Nanking.

From Ch'angsha I returned to Hankow by boat down the Siang River and through the Tungting Lake to the Yangtse. On the evening of my arrival I inquired and learned that the railroad to Peiping was expected to be cleared of bandits and reopened very soon. The following morning I learned that a train was soon to start and immediately made preparations to take it. The train left Hankow shortly before noon and maintained the scheduled speed until arriving in the vicinity of Kwangshui near the Hupeh-Honan border. This had been the scene of the mutiny and bandit outbreaks, so because of uncertainty as to the condition of tracks and bridges, the train proceeded more cautiously. Just after passing through Kwangshui fires were seen on the neighboring hillcrests. Uncertainty and fear as to what these fires might mean urged discretion, and all lights in the train were extinguished until we had passed through the area of the fires. The train attendants and some passengers insisted these fires indicated the presence of bandits, but such may not have been the case. At least, our train successfully passed through the zone without being fired on and the lights were turned on again.

The other occupant of my compartment was a Colonel Ch'en Hsi-ch'in, who graduated in 1922 from Sandhurst, the British Infantry and Cavalry School. He told me that on the 18th, the day I had left Hankow for Ch'angsha, the authorities in Hankow had been greatly disturbed over the approach of bandits down the line to as near as forty miles from the city. This news, he informed me, was completely suppressed and the most energetic measures taken to dispatch troops immediately to the north where they had driven off this group, which had withdrawn into eastern Honan. Colonel Ch'en also supplied me with the data pertaining to the mutiny at Kwangshui, on the Peking-Hankow railway. The newly formed 12th Division, commanded by Yuan Ying, a relative of the former president of China, Yuan Shih-kai, had been ordered south to take part in the bandit suppression work in Hunan. About the time of departure, rumors had become prevalent that the division was really being taken to Hankow to be disarmed. This had caused the mutiny——the troops had then made approaches to the local bandit leader and these two groups, the soldiers and the bandits, had started the disturbances, cut the railroad, broken the telegraphic lines, damaged bridges, and even made the threat on Hankow. Colonel Ch'en did not know whether any units of the division had remained faithful or neutral or had returned to the fold.

I reached Peiping at noon on the 24th of March, after a trip otherwise without incident.

C. J. Kanaga

C. J. Kanaga
First Lieutenant, F.A.

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No. 7978 1st Ind. NEM

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, March 31, 1931 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

Nelson E. Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 2 1931
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

2657-J-276

Peiping, 24 March, 1931

Subject: The Shansi Situation.

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 29 1931

1. In compliance with your verbal instructions to proceed to Taiyuanfu, Shansi, and study the situation in that province, I left Peiping at 9:20 p.m. on the evening of Thursday, March 19,1931. Present service on the Kinhan line, as you know, is very unsatisfactory. The only accommodations on my train were poor third-class coaches which could not have been more overcrowded. No space could be found other than a place on the floor where I either sat or stood for the next thirteen hours. After a slow and most uncomfortable journey the train finally arrived at Shihchiachuang the following forenoon.

2. Very few soldiers were seen on guard at the various stations between Peiping and Shihchiachuang. Such as were on duty did not measure up to the usual Fengtien standard. Troops of the First Army, Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces, are stationed along this section of the line. When our train arrived at Paotingfu it was held there for over an hour. During this time a detachment of soldiers went through each car and thoroughly searched every passenger and most of the baggage. Upon inquiry I was informed that the search was being made for cocaine and other narcotics.

3. The only serviceable passenger coach on the train was one "belonging" to Shih Yu-san. I was told that its occupant was one of Shih's officials returning to Changte after having transacted some business at their Peiping office. The guards accompanying the car could or would not tell me the official's name.

4. Part of my train was an open freight car being used by a group of nine Russians and one Pole. These men wore various types of ill-fitting Chinese and foreign uniforms. One had on an old-style uniform formerly worn by the enlisted men of our Army. The only one of them who appeared worth while was the Pole. He spoke perfect English and told me that they had been engaged in Tientsin as instructors for General Liu Ch'ih and were then on their way to Chengchow to report to him. Lack of employment was given as the reason for having undertaken this work. The Pole said that the lowest rank which they expected to receive was that of Captain. I must say that with the exception of the Pole they did not impress me very much. One would be more inclined to believe that they had been enlisted rather than commissioned. In either case though it seemed that were these men to serve Liu Ch'ih it was of more than passing interest, so I tried, without success, to learn from the railway staff their destination. At that time I decided to visit Chengchow upon my return from Taiyuan and attempt to verify their story. On after-thought, however, it occurred to me that they might not have been telling the truth and that you could ask the Japanese Military Attache to ascertain, through their consul at Chengchow, whether or not they were. So I refrained from going there.

5. Arriving in Shihchiachuang when I did, it was necessary to remain there until the following morning before a train left for Shansi. I was most hospitably received by Mr. Boulton of the B.A.T., and spent the night at their quarters as his guest. That afternoon I went to the Kinhan station and called upon the station-master. During our conversation he informed me that Shih Yu-san was still holding 375 cars and 15 locomotives. He also stated that part of Shih's troops had been disbanded. I subsequently discussed this with three separate Fengtien officers whom I met around the Shihchiachuang station. They agreed that Shih had not yet released all of the rolling stock which had been seized, though none had any idea as to how much was still being retained. Each said that some of Shih's troops had been disbanded but they could do no more than to hazard a guess as to the number. Their estimates of his present strength were from 40,000 to 60,000, fairly well equipped. I talked to several merchants about town relative to business in Shansi and will touch on their conversations later herein.

6. Before setting forth my impression of conditions in Shansi, I feel that it would not be amiss to review the events leading up to the Tientsin Conference (December-January, 1930-1931), its decisions, later amendments, and subsequent developments in the former Model Province, for it is believed that any study of the Shansi of to-day must be based on such a preface.

It will be recalled that following the suppression of the 1929-1930 anti-government rebellion in the North, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive and Supervisory Committees was convened at Nanking in November, 1930. Chang Hsueh-liang, whose intervention hastened the collapse of the revolt, surprised all by journeying to the Capital, attending the Session as an observer, and pledging his whole-hearted support to the Central Government.

The defeated Shansi armies had withdrawn to their native domain. They were accompanied by some former allies, certain Kuominchun and "grey" forces, who sought asylum within the province. Yen Hsi-shan, the Shansi leader, and Feng Yu-hsiang, the Kuominchun commander, retired. Civil affairs were left in the hands of Shang Chen, Chairman of the Provincial Government, and military affairs were turned over to General Hsu Yung-ch'ang, a high-commander of the Shansi armies. The Model Province thus again came under "control" of the Central Government. The provincial administration had to be re-adjusted and numerous troops disposed of——a task difficult enough under ordinary circumstances but rendered more so by the financial stringency of the province. An enforced circulation of badly inflated paper currency of a provincial bank had absorbed practically all the silver in circulation and had left just so much paper instead. Shansi in peace bid fair to cost Nanking as much as in war.

The Central Government at that time had more than its share of worries to contend with south of the Yellow River. It was but natural that Mukden should have been called upon to assist in the North. After the Young Marshal left

Nanking it was given out that he, as Deputy Commander of the National Land, Naval and Air Forces, would be responsible for the rehabilitation of the North. The settlement of the problem of Shansi demanded immediate attention.

Returning home the Young Marshal stopped off at Tientsin and assembled for a conference at that port the various important officials of Shansi, as well as the leading generals of the other forces occupying the province. Shansi was represented by Shang Chen and Generals Hsu Yung-ch'ang, Yang Ai-yuan and Fu Tso-yi; Generals Sung Che-yuan, P'ang Ping-hsun, and Sun Liang-ch'eng represented the Kuominchun; and General Sun Tien-ying the "greys". The deliberations lasted until January 18, 1931, and are now known to all as "The Tientsin Conference".

The greatest problem of the Conference was that of finances. It was first decided that some 70,000 of the 200,000 soldiers, supposedly in Shansi, would have to be disbanded. Military leaders concerned announced that at least $6,000,000 was necessary for back pay and discharge bonuses of troops to be released. It is obvious that such a large sum was nothing more or less than a bargaining price. Marshal Chang's return offer, if any, was not made known but it was stated that he was communicating with Nanking about the terms. As an impasse appeared to have been reached, Marshal Chang invited Mr. T.V. Soong, Minister of Finance of the Central Government, to come north and confer with him. This Soong did and as a result of their conferences the Marshal announced that Nanking could only allot $800,000 for disbandment and that the balance would have to be raised in Shansi and Suiyuan. It is amusing to note that the generals then agreed that the disbandment could be accomplished with that sum provided it was increased by an additional $1,000,000. A typical Chinese situation but such high bargaining rather unexpected from recently defeated parties.

The Conference had worries other than agreeing on disbandment funds. The abolition of "likin" on the first of the year was said to have caused Shansi to face a $4,000,000 deficit this year in its administration expenses. Its paper currency also required stabilization. While the Conference appeared to have arrived at a partial solution of the disbandment difficulty, it did not approach any solution of the other two problems.

Negotiations with the Tientsin bankers were started for a disbandment loan of $2,000,000 to cover the balance of the funds (other than Nanking's $800,000) said necessary to carry out the agreed reductions. After a month of much discussion, Marshal Chang is said to have dispersed Nanking's $800,000 allotment. Shang Chen was given $450,000 for Shansi, $170,000 went to the Kuominchun, and Sun Tien-ying and Kao Kwei-tzu received the balance.

On January 16, Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek and Vice-Commander Chang Hsueh-liang jointly issued a circular telegram announcing the appointment of former Shansi and Kuominchun commanders to the command of five armies of two divisions each, and an artillery force for Shansi. Nothing was said about the "grey" troops of Sun Tien-ying and Kao Kwei-tzu. All appeared satisfied and the Conference was adjourned. On January 18, Chang returned to Mukden and the

Shansi and Kuominchun generals started back to their billets. About this same time, Nanking re-appointed Shang Chen as chairman of the provincial government and chief of the civil department of the province as well; in addition, he was also placed in charge of all Shansi military affairs.

The ability of Shang Chen is well known. With the entire control of the province in his hands it looked as though Shansi affairs would soon be settling down. However, as soon as the results of the Tientsin Conference were formally published, a number of Shansi generals wired Generalissimo Chiang and Marshal Chang expressing their dissatisfaction with the arrangements, and strongly blaming Shang Chen for not having transmitted their views. What they wanted was ten divisions of infantry rather than the eight which the Conference decided there should be. No objection was heard from the Kuominchun and apparently they were going ahead with reorganization and disbandment. Shang Chen, upon his return to Taiyuan, held a military conference for the discussion of troop reduction (Shansi) and made a detailed report on the Tientsin proceedings. Some of the Shansi generals held conferences of their own and it was most evident that Shang Chen was not acceptable to them. Great opposition to him must have developed, for he soon wired to the Young Marshal offering to resign his position as an army commander. Hsu Yung-ch'ang and Yang Ai-yuan also declared that they would like to give up their posts. Chang Hsueh-liang lost no time in advising the dissatisfied parties that they should adhere to the plan drawn up in Tientsin. He did compromise, however, and agree that Shansi could have an additional division of infantry as railway guards for the Cheng-Tai line and also an additional division of "Emergency Affair" troops. This seemed acceptable to all concerned, so on February 6, the various commanders issued a joint circular telegram announcing their assumption of office and saying that the disbandment plan drawn up at Tientsin was being carried out.

This telegram of February 6th was evidently issued simply to have it appear on record that the commanders concerned were abiding by Mukden's instructions, for after sending out the wire not one of them made any effort to organize his new command. Although funds had been allotted ($450,000 of Nanking's $800,000) there were as yet no signs of actual disbandment. The reorganization of any one unit, depending as it does upon the cooperation of other commanders, could not be effected except through the mutual efforts of all concerned. Therefore the delay in undertaking their duties can only be explained by a lack of harmony and sincerity of purpose amongst these leaders. As time went on it was patent enough that no cooperation existed among them. Discord was further evidenced by a report on February 27th that Yang Ai-yuan was again on the point of resigning.

These generals all insisted that money was urgently needed for the troops before any changes could be effected. Mukden had promised to contribute to the pay of their soldiers after reorganization, but the failure to make any efforts to carry out the Tientsin plan, the lack of evidence that the $450,000 allotment had been used as intended, the general attitude of resistance towards Shang Chen, the lack of cooperation and the disinclination to help themselves, must

finally have become too much for the Young Marshal's patience, for on March first he notified them that "for the present" they would have to raise their own military funds. He followed this by despatching additional inspectors to Shansi ostensibly to report on disbandment and reorganization progress but more probably to ascertain which of them will have to be eliminated first.

On March 4, matters assumed a grave aspect when it was reported that a Shansi division in the south of the province had mutinied a few days previous. Official reports made light of this and stated that it would be easily settled by the men themselves as it was simply a dispute which had resulted from a misunderstanding. Reports concerning the mutiny differed widely. Some said that the place where it took place suffered great losses. Others were of the opinion that the mutineers were but few and that some of the Shansi generals had exaggerated it, pretending that it was due to lack of pay, and thus hoping to induce Nanking or Mukden to provide funds for them. In any event, however, the fact remained that troops had committed violence and it was to be feared that others might follow their example. In addition to this, Red Spears were also reported active in the southern part of the province.

At the time I received your instructions to visit Shansi, representatives from there were then in Mukden vainly trying to secure military funds.

7. The foregoing resume gives some idea of the manifold problems Shansi appeared to be burdened with. I listed them as follows and used the list as an outline for my observations:

(a) Disbandment and reorganization of military forces.
(b) Unstable provincial currency.
(c) Lack of cooperation between important commanders towards the provincial chairman.
(d) Loss of revenue to the province through the abolition of likin.

8. On my train from Peiping to Shihchiachuang I was surprised to hear any number of men state that they were merchants from Tientsin on their way to Taiyuanfu and other Shansi cities to transact business. I followed this up in Shihchiachuang and called at several of the better appearing firms and inquired about business up in Shansi. They all said that "it could be done" and some stated that it was "not wrong" - meaning not bad. This indication of business activity where I had expected to find none naturally surprised me. I was further surprised to learn from a Cheng-Tai railway official that their line was not suffering from a lack of passenger or freight receipts.

9. On the trip up through the province the terrain traversed does, at this time of the year, give one a feeling of desolation. The stream which the railroad generally follows is dry, the rains have not yet come and the "cultivated" strips along the hillsides appear as so much barren waste land. Fengtien troops are stationed along the line almost as far as Niangtzekuan. Very few of their soldiers were seen at any of the stations and those who were out were only armed with the

flogging-stick. The same is true after entering Shansi except that at the larger stations an armed guard is on duty. My ride to Taiyuan was uneventful. Upon arrival there I found that the main hotel was completely occupied and I had to seek accommodations within the walled city at one of the Chinese establishments. The first two I tried were also filled up and I finally found a room at the next one I tried.

10. It was about five o'clock in the afternoon when I got settled down and finished with the police registration red-tape and "hu-chao" examinations. It was learned upon inquiry that the only Chinese officials whom I cared to see who were in the city were Generals Shang Chen, Hsu Yung-chang, Sun Ch'u and Yung Ai-yuan. I thought it best to start with General Shang as I felt sure he would receive me and talk as freely as he has done on previous occasions. I waited until late evening before requesting an appointment as I feared that if I got in touch with him too early he might set the time for that evening or night. I much preferred to see him the following day. This would give me time to look around and in event I learned anything worth while I would have an opportunity to discuss it with him should I so desire.

In the meantime I called on Mr. Wright of the Shansi University. Mr. Wright has spent several years in Taiyuan and at one time was (and I am inclined to believe still is) an adviser connected with the arsenal there. He is also one of General Shang Chen's English teachers. He assured me that the arsenal was still working but only on a light schedule——this because of scarcity of materials. Both Nanking and Mukden refuse to let any arsenal supplies move in. At present there is a shipment being held up in Tientsin by Chang Hsueh-liang. The work of the arsenal just now is mostly limited to the production of small arms ammunition. There are enough supplies on hand to continue operation for about six weeks more. No great amount however can be turned out. Mr. Wright was not familiar with the disbandment question nor did he know anything about the new tax system. It was his opinion, however, that Shansi would get very little, if any, financial assistance from outside and would have to work out her own salvation. Mr. Wright felt that the major problem in the province was that concerning the Bank of Shansi. If the paper currency could be stabilized there would be no reorganization pains. The bank had been able to regain some confidence during the past two months. This was accomplished by a 1% monthly redemption of its notes at par. Each month two numbers have been drawn and all notes having these two numbers as terminal figures are redeemed at par——regardless of the existing rate. Redeemed notes are then "chopped" and withdrawn from circulation. In this connection, Mr. Wright had been fortunate enough to hold about $300 in notes which he was able to redeem so he assures me that something really concrete is being done to stabilize the currency. This scheme is supposed to continue until all the notes have been taken up.

11. After taking leave of Mr. Wright I arranged for a talk the next morning with a Mr. Wang, also of the Shansi University.

12. My next call was on Mr. Young of the Salt Gabelle. I found that he had just moved to Taiyuan and was not yet familiar with any of the conditions in the province.

13. I then started in on the Chinese business houses. Business had all the outward appearances of being good. Every shop and store was displaying clean and fresh wares. Customers were going in and out. The general air along the streets was that of any ordinary Chinese city. I first selected the Singer Sewing Machine agency as I felt that they could speak for the province as a whole. I found the manager, a Mr. Li, a most intelligent and well informed man. Mr. Li said that his business was normal. He stated that business as a whole was good, this being due to the excellent crops of last year and the prospect of good ones this year. It was his belief that the soldiers did not burden the province too heavily. To begin with, as long as they were not faced with having to fight and were fed they did not have to be paid regularly. They were not used to it anyway. If the generals really wanted to disband they could do so with little trouble as more than half of the soldiers were unarmed, and it is cheaper to disband an unarmed soldier than an armed one. They were not disbanding or reorganizing because the generals wanted to be paid to do so. Mr. Li assured me that likin was not being collected in the province. The biggest thing affecting his business was the fall of silver, which made his prices higher than the people have been accustomed to pay for his articles. Mr. Li felt that Shang Chen was the best man they could have given the Chairmanship of Shansi to. It was his opinion that the Chairman was being opposed by certain elements in the province. The Shansi Bank currency was the chief problem to be solved. The currency was forced on the people and all business had to be transacted with it. The drawings of the past two months had steadied the rate a little but the bank could not continue this indefinitely. The silver reserve was not sufficient and the present taxes do not contribute enough to enable the province to operate without drawing on the funds of the bank. Mr. Li felt that the People's Conference will be called in May and says that many Chinese expect Chiang Kai-shek to be elected provisional president. Mr. Li says that he believes that Honan is going Red but that there is no evidence of it in Shansi.

14. I next picked out a large notions store. By this time it had grown dark and when the lights came on one could not help noticing that practically every shop was using electricity. Even the smallest one-room affair had at least one and sometimes two bulbs burning. Electricity costs money and these people were using it so they must be doing well. The manager of this notions store spoke a little English and seemed to enjoy being able to use it. He felt that the provincial bank currency was a heavy burden. His business was not as good as it had been and last year he had suffered a loss. He would like to move away to Tientsin but had too much invested there so would have to try it for another year. The generals were not going to disband or reorganize until they had been paid. Shansi was used to having a lot of soldiers but the Kuominchun and "greys" would have to be moved away.

15. I then had a talk with the Chinese manager of the Shansi hotel. He did not feel free to express himself. A Mr. Fu Tan-kwei and his secretaries are occupying most of the hotel. Mr. Fu is Mukden's agent in Shansi inspecting the troops in the province. I was anxious to talk to Mr. Fu but he was away on a trip and was not expected back for five days. The hotel manager said that the Kuominchun seemed to receive most of Mukden's attention. Before leaving the hotel I 'phoned to General Shang Chen and he was kind enough to give me an appointment for early the next morning.

16. I returned to my hotel and there made up a list of questions to ask General Shang. The following morning I called at his home as arranged for the previous night. General Shang is a picture of perfect health and shows no trace of cares or worry. The last time I saw him, about nine months ago, his English was very weak. He now speaks remarkably well——has a good vocabulary and enunciates very distinctly. I presented my list of questions to him and he said he would be willing to try to answer them. I give them below with his answers:

What is the present strength of the Shansi forces?
Including the Suiyuan troops, about 120,000.

What is the strength of the Kuominchun?
Between 50,000-60,000.

What is the strength of the "greys"?
Sun Tien-ying and Kao Kwei-tzu together have about 25,000.

How many of the Shansi troops are equipped with arms?
About half of them.

How many of the Kuominchun are armed?
About three-eights.

How many Shansi troops have been disbanded?
About 20,000.

How many Kuominchun?
I do not know.

How many Shansi troops will have to be disbanded?
About three-fifths.

How many of the Kuominchun?
About two-thirds.

What will it cost to disband Shansi?
$2,000,000. Each man must receive his back pay and a discharge bonus of $10.00.

How much will it cost to disband the Kuominchun?
About $300,000.

What will the new Shansi organization be?
I will command the 4th Army, General Hsu Yung-chang the 5th Army, General Yang Ai-yuan the 6th Army, and General Fu Tso-yi the 7th Army. General Fu will also have the 10th Division. Each army will be made up of two divisions and there will be

four brigades in each division. The strength of the division will be a little less than 12,000. Then there will be ten regiments of artillery and three brigades of cavalry. We will also have two divisions of railway guards, an emergency affairs division and possibly some few battalions of a special detective corps.

Has this new organization been accomplished yet?
No. We have not yet been able to get enough funds and we have not yet decided how the old units will be grouped.

If any disbandment has been carried out (Shansi) where did the funds come from?
Marshal Chang gave me $450,000. I passed it around and some several thousand troops were paid off.

What troops, if any, were disbanded?
Some of those in the northern part of Shansi.

Was any money given to the Kuominchun to disband?
I do not know. I did not give them any.

What will it cost to keep the reorganized Shansi armies?
$2,000,000 a month.

What will it cost to keep the Kuominchun?
They will have one army of two divisions and in addition will have two more divisions. P'ang Ping-hsun and Sun Tien-ying will command the two extra divisions. It will cost $1,000,000 a month to keep them.

What will be done with disbanded soldiers?
They will be sent to their homes. Those who live out of the province will be transported by rail free of charge.

Who will support the Shansi armies after reorganization?
Nanking and Mukden promised to but they both say now that they cannot so Shansi will have to do so.

Who will support the Kuominchun?
I do not know who will pay or equip them. Mukden will feed them. Chang has promised to give them $14,000 per division each month for food. He has already done so for this month.

What will be done with the disbanded Shansi officers?
They will be divided into three groups according to merit. Group one will be disbanded. Group two will go to the Headquarters of the Deputy Commander in Mukden. These will be the officers of high rank, like colonels and up. They will be used for duty in connection with the arsenal, military hospitals, veterinary hospitals, military schools, and given temporary positions as advisers. Group three will come to the Headquarters of the Shansi Provincial Government and will be used to develop communications, on reconstruction work, and in commercial aviation.

What will be done with the Kuominchun disbanded officers?
They will be disposed of by Mukden.

What will the new Kuominchun organization be?
They will have one army of two divisions. Sung Che-yuan will command the army and Chang Tze-chung and Feng Chih-an will have the divisions. They will also have two other divisions commanded by P'ang Ping-hsun and Sun Tien-ying.

What will be done with Sun Liang-ch'eng?
He is already in Mukden and his soldiers have been turned over to Sung Che-yuan.

What will be done with Sun Tien-ying?
He now commands a division under Sung Che-yuan.

What will be done with Kao Kwei-tze?
His troops have been reorganized into the 21st Division which he commands.

How much work is the arsenal doing?
None. Marshal Chang ordered it closed. The workmen will be paid off and sent to their homes free. They have not yet left here as we are waiting for funds from Mukden to pay them. The products of the arsenal have been kept here but there is not much. Mostly small arms ammunition.

What is the present strength of Pao An Tui?
We do not have it any more. One division of it is being reorganized into an Emergency Affairs Corps. It is now being formed at Tatung.

Does the special detective corps still exist?
General Li is now in Mukden discussing this with Marshal Chang. We plan on reorganizing twelve battalions of Shansi-Suiyuan military-police into a special detective corps of two or three battalions.

Have the Cheng-Tai railway guards been organized yet?
Yes. But they have not taken over their duties.

Will Sun Ch'u command them?
Yes.

What will their strength be?
Two divisions, one of Sun Ch'u's and one of Kao Kwei-tzu's, who is under Sun Ch'u.

Have any Provincial Guards been organized?
No.

Has an anti-bandit corps been organized?
No.

Do you have an emergency commander for Taiyuan?
No.

For North Shansi? No.

For South Shansi?
No. We will have only the Emergency Affairs Corps. It will be commanded by General Jung Hung-lo and will be kept in Taiyuan.

Is the military commission which you and Generals Hsu Yung-ch'ang, Yang Ai-yuan, Fu Tso-yi, and Sun Ch'u compose functioning?
No. Marshal Chang disapproved of it but we meet and act as such when necessary.

Will Sun Ch'u get Kao Kwei-tzu's troops?
Yes, he already has.

Will they be incorporated into the railway guards?
They already have been.

Are your military schools functioning?
No, but we require some officers to attend a school here and receive an ordinary lower school education.

What is the strength of your Air Service now?
We had six planes. Two of them had been captured from Nanking. One of these two was Feng's. General Sung Che-yuan recently sent it to Mukden. We have four or five instructors and three or four student pilots.

What was the revolt at Luanfu?
One regiment of the 3rd Division mutinied and looted their village. They escaped. Only two or three hundred of them had arms.

Was this General Yang Hsiao-ao's division?
Yes.

What was the trouble at Mencheng?
This happened before Luanfu. A company started to loot there but were quickly suppressed.

Are the Red Spears giving you any trouble?
No.

Have any loans been made to you by the Tientsin bankers?
No. But we are trying to arrange one of $2,000,000 for disbandment.

Who gave the securities?
The Hopei and Shansi Finance Commissions.

What securities were given?
The taxes of the two provinces.

How will repayment be made and by whom?
Shansi must repay the loan in two years otherwise Hopei will have to do so.

What is the condition of the Shansi Bank?
That is my greatest difficulty. We are trying to stabilize the currency by redeeming 1% of the notes each month. There is $60,000,000 in notes in circulation in excess of the silver on hand. We will have to have a loan to maintain the bank.

Have all the likin stations been closed?
Yes. We used to get $6,000,000 a month and now we get only $1,000,000.

Are the substitute taxes being collected satisfactorily?
No. The regulations of the Business Tax have not yet been published and all we get now is $1,000,000 each month.

When will the Business Tax be collected?
I do not know.

Is the Consolidated Tax being collected?
Yes, on tobacco, but not on cement.

Is the Special Consumption Tax being collected?
Yes. It is about the same as the old likin rates.

How is Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's health?
Very good.

Is he still at Fenyang?
Yes.

Will he remain in China?
He will have to leave the country.

If he goes abroad where will he go to?
First to Japan and then to America. He will not go to Russia.

Will the People's Conference be called?
Yes, I think so.

Do you expect Chiang Kai-shek to be elected provisional president?
I have heard that he would.

What will be done with Shih Yu-san?
He will have to be disbanded.

Is he a prisoner in Mukden?
I do not know but I have heard it said that he is. I believe he is trying to arrange with Marshal Chang about the disposition of his troops.

How is Liu Ch'ih, over in Honan?
A good man and loyal to Nanking.

What do you think of the Shantung generals?
Han Fu-chu and Ma Hung-kwei can work together and will probably support Nanking. Liu Chen-nien can not work with Han and Ma. He will have to be eliminated.

17. The above questions consumed nearly two hours and I felt that I had taken enough of General Shang's time. We had been interrupted several times and he had been given a lengthy telegram which he seemed greatly interested in. He gave me to understand that I should consider our talk confidential. I thanked the General for having been so generous with his time and departed.

18. I went to Sun Ch'u's home but he sent out word that he was then entertaining many guests and asked that I tell him where I was staying. I then went to Yung Ai-yuan's home but he sent out word that he had not yet gotten up. As it was nearly time for my appointment with Mr. Wang of the Shansi University I thenwent to see him.

19. I feel that my talk with Mr. Wang gave me a true picture of the Shansi situation. According to him the so-called troubles of the province could be very easily settled were all the leaders to support Shang Chen. The real trouble is internal politics. Sun Ch'u and Fu Tso-yi, as leaders of a south Shansi element, are constantly working to oust Shang Chen and get one of their own men in. Mr. Wang says that the talk of disbandment and reorganization of Shansi forces is nothing more or less than an effort on the part of the leading generals to enrich themselves. To begin with, there are not enough soldiers in the province to fill up all the units of the reorganized armies, and yet they cry for money for disbandment when there would be no men to disband. If the new scheme were made effective it would only mean fewer but larger armies. Nanking and Mukden were willing to help at first but as soon as they saw the attitude of the Shansi generals after the Tientsin Conference, they decided to let them get along as best they could. Without outside help some of the soldiers will have to be disbanded but they can work that out for themselves. Mr. Wang also stated that he feels that the Red movement is spreading throughout Honan.

20. The reception which I had received at Sun Ch'u's and Yang Ai-yuan's led me to believe that I had nothing to gain by calling at Hsu Yung-ch'ang's. It was just about time for the noon train so I hurried to the station and left for Shihchiachuang.

21. I remained in Shihchiachuang one day and returned to Peiping on March 24.

22. Based on the impressions which I have received on this trip, I have arrived at the following conclusions:

(a) Shang Chen with the backing of Nanking and Mukden will be able to restore the province to normalcy.

(b) There is no need of funds to disband Shansi forces if the new reorganization is effected. (Shang Chen says they now have 120,000 men. He also says that under the new plan they will have 10 divisions of about 12,000 men each. That makes 120,000. Then he speaks of 10 regiments of artillery, 3 brigades of cavalry, an Emergency Affairs Corps, and a few battalions of special detectives.)

(c) Under the present tax system Shansi can not support the new armies. Nanking of course won't. Mukden is not likely to. So I believe it is but a question of time before there will be another Tientsin Conference and the Shansi armies abolished and some real disbandment carried out.

(d) I can see no hope of the Shansi Bank redeeming its note issue. No Hopei bankers are going to make a loan sufficiently large to rehabilitate this Bank. The Bank will probably soon die a natural death and government institutions, such as the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, will become the collectors of Shansi earnings.

(e) I do not feel that the troops in Shansi constitute any particular menace to the peace of North China. Chinese troops generally live off the country wherever they are. Prospects are bright for a good crop this summer, so for the next seven months it seems reasonable to expect that the troops will be satisfied as they are. Before that time the Kuominchun will probably have been moved into Hopei or over into Shantung. Shansi if necessary can then spread out. Of course she does not need 120,000 troops and when they find that they have to support them it is very likely that number will be reduced.

(f) The only possible danger I can see is that of civil war in the province itself. This, however, is very remote. The influence of Fu Tso-yi and Sun Ch'u is an important factor in Shansi affairs. Shang Chen and Hsu Yung-ch'ang are outsiders. Fu will not rest until he has a better position than the one he now holds. Yet with Nanking divisions along the Yellow River across from Shansi's southern border, and Fengtien on the east, the odds are surely in Shang Chen's favor and civil war is not likely to arise.

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Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, March 24, 1931 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Forwarded.

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